G.R. No.

L-200

March 28, 1946

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, as Director of Prisons, respondent. facts: Petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by t he United States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his activ e collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in Septem ber, 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons. The legality of the prisoner's arrest and detention by the military authorities of the United States is now beyond question.1His present incarceration, which is merely continuation of his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hou rs" counted from his delivery to the respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 provides in part as follows: Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to th e Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special Prosecutors shall receive all r ecords, documents, exhibits, and such other things as the Government of the Unit ed States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said politica l prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as possible, such action as maybe proper: Provided, however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provision s of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shal l be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political p risoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with t he People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) m onths from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-C hief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwe alth Government. On the date the petition was presented the office of the solicitor general had, prepared an information charging herein petitioner with treason, hence we fail t o see how petitioner's release may now be decreed. Issues and Ruling: (a) It is first argued that the suspension is not general in application, it bei ng made operative only to "the political prisoners concerned," that other citize ns are not denied the six-hour limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Co de, that such discrimination is unexcusable and amounts to denial of the equal p rotection of the laws. It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or ob jects upon which different rules shall operate so long as the classification is not unreasonable.2 Instances of valid classification are numerous. The point to be determined then, is whether the differentiation in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or arbitrary. One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte ( December 29, 1944), announced his purpose to hold the filipino collaborators in restraint for the duration of the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." 6,000 c ollaborators were turned over to the commonwealth government. Criminal informati

ons against all, or a majority, or even a substantial number of them could not b e properly filed in the six-hour period. They could not obviously be turned loos e, considering the conditions of peace and order, and the safety of the prisoner s themselves. So the President, by virtue of his emergency powers, promulgated E xecutive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, with regard to said detainees or internees. Congress lat er approved Commonwealth Act. No. 682, establishing the People's Court and the O ffice of Special Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against nat ional security committed during the second World War. It found the thirty-day pe riod too short compared with the facilities available to the prosecution, and se t the limit at six months. In this connection, it must be stated there can really be no substantial ground to assail the six-month extension, in view of the provisions authorizing the rel ease under bail. The political prisoners know, or ought to know, they are being kept for crimes against national security. And they are generally permitted to f urnish bail bonds. (b) There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of the suspe nsion of article 125 is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's Office," the section constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers; for as exp lained by the Solicitor-General, the result some informations filed before, othe rs afterwards is merely the "consequence of the fact that six thousand informati ons could not be filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some one else, necessarily the last." The law, in effect, permitted the Solicitor-Ge neral to file the informations within six months. And statutes permitting office rs to perform their duties within certain periods of time may not surely be decl ared invalid delegations of legislative power. (c) Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retroactive in its operation. It refers to detention after its passage not before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional objection to retroactive statutes where they relate, to remedies or procedure.3 The premises are incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not have asked for release af ter six hours. In other words, he would not have been discharged from the custod y. (Raquiza vs. Branford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in f orce, it is true; but not as to him. The laws of the Commonwealth were revived i n Camarines Sur by operation of General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation from enemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint "for the duration of the war." So, pe rsons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable collaboration, could not necessarily invoke the benefits of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Pena l Code. Had it done so, herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on con stitutional principles, as he could claim no vested right to the continued enfor cement of said section.4 Therefore, a fortiori he may not complain, if, instead of repealing that section, our lawmaking body merely suspended its operation for a definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspension mus t be general to be valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations re garding classification and the equal protection of the laws. Wherefore, we perceive no irreconcilable conflict between the Constitution and t he challenged portions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus will be denied. With costs. Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions OZAETA, J., with whom Paras, J., concurring in the result: I concur with the majority in upholding the constitutionality of section 19 of t he People's Court Act. In the view I held in the Raquiza case the detention of t he petitioner by the military authorities was illegal for lack of due process. B ut the same thing cannot be said as to his present detention by the respondent D irector of Prisons, especially now that an information for treason has been file d against him. PERFECTO, J., dissenting: On or about May 6, 1945, petitioner was arrested by the C.I.C., United States Ar my, Camarines Sur. On September 6, 1945 he was turned over to the Commonwealth G overnment by the United States Army and since that date he remained in prison un der the personal custody of the respondent Director of Prisons, and now he comes before us complaining that his arrest and detention are illegal and in violatio n of many of his constitutional rights. Consequently, petitioner prays that Commonwealth Act No. 682 be declared unconst itutional and null and void, that his detention, irrespective of the validity of said act, be declared illegal and in violation of many of his constitutional ri ghts, and that an order be issued for his complete and absolute release. Respondent alleges also that petitioner has not as yet availed of the benefits o f section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which confers upon political prisoners the privilege of securing their release on bail upon proper application therefo r with the People's Court; that Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not trench upon, n or contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution; that it is not ex post facto in nature in that it suspends, in the interests of national security, the provision of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for a period of not more than six months, which is fully justified by the practical necessities of the situat ion, considering the circumstances that there are more than 6,000 political pris oners charged with the grave crime of treason and other offenses against nationa l security. Without a lawful warrant of arrest. Whether the arrest took place on May 6, 1945 , as alleged by petitioner or on May 10, as alleged by respondent, there is abso lutely no question that petitioner was arrested without lawful warrant of arrest . No information as to any charge. The Constitution provides that one of the funda mental rights of an accused is "to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac cusation against him." (Section 1:17, Article III of the Constitution.) This constitutional guarantee appears equally to have been violated in petitione r's case. Respondent's allegation that petitioner is detained because of his active collab oration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation does not inform petitio ner of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it appearing that the re is no such offense described in any law applicable to petitioner as "active c ollaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese regime." Meeting witnesses face to face. Petitioner complains that he was not given an op portunity to confront his witnesses who caused his arrest detention. The complaint is equally well-taken. There is nothing in the record to show that

There is no question that petitioner is being deprived of his liberty without an y information or complaint charging him of any specified offense under the laws of the land. (As amended by Act No. Now. let us determine the validity of that portion of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. So it appears that he is being. petitioner has ever been accor ded the opportunity of meeting the witnesses "face to face" as provided in secti on 1:17 of Article III of the Constitution. 3940. a pertinent provisions of our fundamental law limits the pow ers of the legislative branch of our government in the enactment of laws Development of the Doctrine of Due Process of Law. an act creating the P eople's Court. here another flagrant violation of a constitutional right of petitioner. Thi s allegation has not been disputed. Cruel and unusual punishment. Attendance of witnesses in his behalf. during.before. There is absolutely no question that this constitutional right of petitioner has been equally violated. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial autho rities. Petitioner complains he was not accorded of the benefit of compulsory process to secure the attendance of the witnesses i n his behalf as provided in section 1:17 of Article III of the Constitution. without any definite information as to whe n will it end. subjected to the punishment of depriv ation of liberty for almost one year. Petitioner complains that he was not accorded equa l protection of the laws as provided in section 1:1 of Article III of the Consti tution. We have. . appears well supported in his complaint. there being no question as to t he fact that he was and he is being deprived of several of his fundamental right s under the Constitution without any legal process. in effect. as one of the questions raised in this case. This means that he is being subjected to imprisonment for an inde finite term.) The bill of rights. 125. therefore. 682. Equal protection of the laws. Petitioner invokes also his constitutional right to "ha ve a speedy and public trial" as provided in section 1:17 of Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner's allegation is equally well-founded. Petitioner. or at any time after his arrest. as has been shown. The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed up on the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal gro und and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities wit hin the period of six hours. Speedy and public trial. The provision of the Revised Penal Code which has been virtually suspended by th is law is: ART. Petitioner complains that he was subjected to crue l and unusual punishment in violation of section 1:19 of Article III of the Cons titution.

" (Par due process de lei. the doctrine impl ied by them has a history in Anglo-American law which extends for more than seve n hundred years back.Though the words "due process of law" have not a long history. unless it be by presentment or indictment of his good and lawful people of the same neighbor hood. It would appear. In the later re-issues and reaffirmations of this charter by Henry III. Chap. I. in due manner. 3. then. tenements." it was declared. in Stat . McGehee. nor of his hous ehold. with. 25. 5 Edw.. indeed. nor imprisoned. III. . the addition of the words after disseized. C. for what would appear to be the first time. recognized and permitted him to offer. New Jersey (211 U. or liberties. in 1355. the court said: "to define wha t it is for a state to deprive a person of life. This court has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of it. shall be put out of his lands. Edw. 97). in Stat. it was declared that "no man from henc eforth shall be attacked by any accusation. nor indicted.S. "No man. or exiled. 9. the doctrine has not yet rec eived a statement in such a form that its specific applications can. 78). nor his lands. "of w hat state or condition so ever he be. nor put to death. nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him. liberty or property without due process of law. "of his freehold." S o also in Davidson vs." (de libera tenemento suo vel libertatibus. this provision was repeated. The words of Magna Charta.) It is thus apparent that in these petitions and statutes of Edward III. in all case s. . goods nor chattels seized into the King's hands against th e form of the Great Charter and the law of the land. 1217 a nd 1225. in 1331. where such deeds be done. The 39th chapter of that document provides that "no freeman shall be taken. The historical antecedents of the phrase "due process of law" may be clearly tra ced back to the expression per legem terrae as it occurs in the Charter wrung by the Barons from King John. be determined. 4. however. Edw. as it then stood. but by the law ful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land" (per legem terrae). or in any way destroyed. the phra ses "due process of law" and "the law of the land" had come. . nor forejudged of life or limb. recited various arbitrary . or free customs." Still again. that a complete knowledge of the meaning of the doctrine of due process of law in American constitutional jurisprudence can be obtained o nly by a study of every case in which its application has been sought. notwithst anding this long period during which countless opportunities have presented them selves for its application and judicial definition. unless he be fully brought in to answer and forejudged of the same by the courts of the law. we have the modern phrase employed. it was declared that "from henceforth none shall be taken by petition or suggestion made to our lord the King or his Council. without he be brou ght in to answer by due process of law. or outlawed. in the issues of 1217 and 1 225. and has pre ferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of i nclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise. Per Legem Terrae. in 1216.) (Cf. III. nor taken. or disseized. in Stat. to the signing of Magna Charta. or tenement s. probably had at this time the techn ical meaning that no civil or criminal plea should be decided against a freeman until he had been given the opportunity to furnish the customary "proof" which t he law. New Orleans (96 U. And yet. 28. C. III. or by process made by writ origin al at the common law. and there. there wa s a substantially similar provision." So again. per legem terrae. we find the court sa ying: "Few phrases in the law are so elusive of exact apprehension as this. C. In Twining vs. in 1351.S. Thus. Due Process of Law.. or imprisoned. The Petition of Right of 1628. vel liberis consuet udinibus suis). approved by Charles I. nor that none be ousted of his franchises.

or any wise destroyed. nor send upon him. indeed. pp. or vice versa. however. well settled." English and American Use of the Phrase "Due Process of Law" Contrasted. speaking for the court.) The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws of the State. 1930. in the United States. and that. that the words "due process of law" are equivalent in meaning t o the words "law of the land. laws which have been he ld invalid as denying due process of law might also have been so held as denying equal protection of the laws. and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. and the enforcement of contracts. if not in very words." Coke ." (3 Will oughby 2d ed. In two most important respects the application in America of the requirement of due process of law has differed from that which it had received in England prior to 1776. and which. These are: (1) t hat. but that it early found expression in substance. The very words do. or by the law of the land. Coming now to American practice we find that the exact phrase "due process of la w" was not employed in any of the eleven State constitutions adopted prior to th e Federal Constitution. disseized. he said: "The Fourteenth Amendment in declaring that no State "shall deprive any person o f life. defined the phrase per legem terrae as meaning "the c ommon law. and that in t he administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should b e imposed upon one that such as is prescribed to all for like offenses. that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property." contained in that chapter of Magna Charta which p rovides that "no freeman shall be taken. that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property. 1928. adopted in 1777. in those instruments. or outlawed. nor shall we go upon him. in many cases." From what has been said it is clear that. however. There are certain general principles. the prevention and redress of wrongs. in his Second Institute. or exiled. Connolly. in not a few ca ses the courts have referred to both prohibitions leaving it uncertain which pro hibition was deemed the most pertinent and potent in the premises. in fact." undoubtedly intended. in which.acts complained of. These principl es grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts on the au thority of Coke. it still receives in that country. statute law or custom of England. not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty or arb itrary spoliation of property but that equal protection and security should be g iven to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civi l rights. and cannot be made for individua . appear in the D eclaration of Rights of the State of New York. and appealed to "the laws and franchises of the realm. b ut by lawful judgment of his peers. that no greater burdens should be laid upo n one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition. which narrow the fi eld of discussion. it operates as a limitation upon the legislative as w ell as upon the executive branch of the government. that no impediment shou ld be interposed to the pursuits by anyone except as applied to the same pursuit s by others under like circumstances. nor deny to any person w ithin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. but when it does so the suspension must be general.. and (2) that it relates to s ubstantive as well as to procedural rights. liberty or property without due process of law. "One of the b est general statements of the scope and intent of the provision for the equal pr otection of the laws is that given by Justice Field in his opinion in Barbier vs . and in one of th e amendments proposed . or imprisoned.

In any criminal case. it is within the prohibition of the Federal Constitut ion. I t can not be held to mean that in all the possible vicissitudes of human affairs . because there may be times when the civil administration will be s uspended by the force of uncontrollable circumstances. 163. 72 Wash. the legislature as parens patriae. no particular form or method of procedure in criminal cases is required by the g uaranty of due process so long accused as accused has due and sufficient notice of the charge or accusation and an adequate opportunity to be heard in defense. when not forbidden. but eve ry one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules. pp. ( 16 C. indefinite imprisonment.. 275. or for the discharge of legal or equitable liens upon their property. comfort. singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases." "This provision of our constitutions must receive a reasonable interpretation. The clause "due process of law" means that there can be no proceeding against li fe. Privileges may be granted to particular in dividuals when by so doing the rights of others are not interferred with. The law by wh ich the question of due process is determined is the law of the jurisdiction whe re the offense was committed and the trial is had. even though he is guilty. or suppor t.) Although a law is fair on its face and impartial in appearance. liberty. o r property except by due process of law. a person who is accused of a crime shall have a speedy and public trial in due form of law. yet. would not b e legitimate legislation. without any opportunity to the accused to face his accusers in a public trial. hence while emergency legislation may temporarily limit av ailable remedies. 159." (State vs. the person accused may not be deprived of life.S. ed. 550.. Miller. 23 Law.. and the procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights of accused included within the conception of due process. without t he observance of those general rules established in our system of jurisprudence . without his consent.. While the freedom of the state and federal governments to control and regulate p rocedure of their courts for the prosecution of criminal offenses is limited by the requirement of the process of law. It is usual for state constitutions and statutes to provide for the accused a sp eedy and public trial.l cases or for particular localities. 1140 . within a reasonable time. 92 U.J.) An emergency existing does not increase constitutional power or diminish constit utional restrictions. p. Freeman. (16 C. It was never intended as furnishing a techn ical means for escaping trial. and a special statute which.. (Chy Lung vs. if it is ap plied and administered with an evil eye and unequal hand. so as to make unjust a nd illegal discrimination. 1171-1173. S.) (2) "The constitutional privilege of a speedy trial was intended to prevent a n arbitrary.J. "The purpose of the statute (1) is to prevent continued incarceration without op portunity to the accused. liberty or property which may result in the deprivation of either. 1157.. 154. it does not contemplate the permanent denial of due process. but would be such an arbitrary mandate as is not withi n the province of free governments. ma y grant authority to the guardians or trustees of incompetent persons to exercis e a statutory control over their states for their assistance.) The action of a state through its officers charged with the administration of a law fair in appearance may be of such a character as to constitute a denial of t he equal protection of the laws. disabi lities may be removed.S. 129 P. to meet the proofs upon whic h the charge is based.

it is required that the trial be speedy. if he saw fit to take that course. This is a presumption which attend s all the proceedings against him. 246.. (Turpin vs. have equal rights. if a prisoner arr aigned for felony stood mute wilfully. First. 70. ed. when they form a social compact. 51.S. second. we may mention that the humanity of our law always presumes an accused pa rty innocent until he is proved to be guilty. and here also the injunction is addressed to the sense of justice and sound judgment of the court. in order that the court might judge of the reasonableness of the application. fails to plead for hi mself. including the names of the witnesses. At the common law. It fails to accord equal rights and equal protection of the law. and a conviction under it is not in due course of the "law of the land. from their initiation until they result in a verdict. which either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption of inno cence into an adjudged fact. 20.) Due process of law under the 14th Amendment and the equal protection of the law are secured if the law operates on all alike and does not subject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. 23 Sup. the steps taken to procure them. and which the government cannot dispense w ith. first on confession in open court. and this process is still retained in many of the States. a terrible mode was resorted to for the purpose of compelling him to do so. and this through a trial by jury. and the facts expected to be proved by them. might. on proof which places the guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. is the same in al l. But further delay would not generally be allowed without a more specific showing of the causes which prevent the State proceeding to trial. The mode of investigating the facts. Again. and this might even end in his death. 47 Law. would test ify to the facts which the prosecution have claimed could be proven by them. Ct. except either. (Re Jilz. or. "Law of the land" is interpreted to mean a general public law. Section 3 of the Bill of Rights to the State Constitution provides: "All freemen . the court ente ring a plea of not guilty for a party who.. App. and refused to plead.for the security of private rights. accusations of felony were made in the form of an indictment by a grand jur y. but a more merciful proceeding is now substituted. and that the prisoner.. 187 U." A law which makes different punishments follow the same identical criminal acts in the different political subdivisions of Texas violates both our state and Fed eral Constitutions. Lemon. Do laws operate equally upon the citizens of the Commonwealth of Texas which wil l imprison under like verdicts one man for a month and another for six months? M anifestly not. while others have s ubstituted in its stead an information filed by the prosecuting officer of the S tate or country. operating equally upon every member of the community.) CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal liberty consist in the mode of trial which is secured to every person accused of crime. The presumption of innocence is an absolute protection against conviction and pu nishment. Rep.. however. 3 Mo. s ecure an immediate trial by admitting that the witnesses." . Formerly. if present. for any reason. surrounded by certain safeguards which are a well understood part of the system.

747). 2 S. either by the Congress or by th e legislatures of the several States. under the most oppressive and unjustifiable circums tances. on conviction and sentence to death for treason. Gregori ([1928].E. which imposed as punishment for a specified offense a fine only. which had few of the incidents of a judicial investigation into alleged crime. and. with judgment of death. and w hy consequently its prohibition. while in counties of less than 50. 290. [2d]. Bills of attainder were prohibited to be passed. 193 N. in greater or less degree. an act of the legisla ture which made children seventeen years of age in counties of 50. while a statute appli cable to the whole state imposed a fine or imprisonment. pp. among other things. as well as to the punishment to be inflicted therefor. under the existing circumstances of our country . Attainder. to be void. The constitutional provisions we have referred to were undoubtedly aimed at any and every species of legislative punishment for criminal or supposed criminal of fenses. held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri. applicable to five counties of the state only.So. should operate equally upon every citizen or inhabitant of the state. an act of the N orth Carolina legislature. upon the same reasoning. means an ext inction of civil and political rights and capacities. there were many reasons why it would be specially obnoxious under a free government. and t he power to pass these bills has been exercised by the Parliament of England at some periods in its history.000 population or more subject to the juvenile court act. in a strict sense. excluded all priests and clergymen from practising or teaching unless they should first take a similar oath of loyalty. was held unconstituti onal as denying equal protection of the laws. in State vs.) supra. overruling in so doing a decision of the Supreme Court of that State. in State vs. Such convictions have not been uncommon under other governments. 136 S. A law inflicting such different penalties for the perpet ration of any given crime cannot bear the test of judicial examination. and as it is interpreted and applied in actual practice.. Mo . 7th ed. . the court says: "Under our Constitution. Buchardt (Mo. the court stating that it was the general doctrine that the law relative to those who might be charged with and co nvicted of crime. however. in State vs. no one had attempted to defend it as a leg itimate exercise of power. greatly aggravated by an arbitrary course of procedure. And. as of course. but were subject to full criminal responsibility. was held to be unconsti tutional under both the Federal and State Constitutions as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. which. 368-372. and if it would be unjustifiable anywhere." And. and at the common law it f ollowed.W. The Supreme Court of the United States has also. where the same legislative act was in que stion. and the term "bill of attainder" is used in a generic sense.. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.00 0 population children seventeen years of age were not subject to the juvenile co urt act. 709). For some time bef ore the American Revolution.) The legal problem confronting us is characterized by the fact that we have to av oid the misleading effect resulting from the difference between the text and let ter of the law and their grammatical sense and effect on one side. would be a matter of more than ordinary importance. on conviction and sentence for the different classes of felony.. which would include bills of pains and penalties also.C. A bill of attainder was legislative conviction for alleged crime. and by a different or more heavy punishment in other l ocalities in the state. Fowler ([1927]. it is not permissible to punish the same offense or violation of some public or general law by one species of pu nishment in one locality.

excluding the political prisoner s concerned from the same benefits and protection afforded all other persons by article 125. The legislative power can not legalize illegal detention. repeal or suspend article 125 of the Revised Penal Co de. the provision in question appears to legalize the many months of illegal detention already endured by the political prisoners concerned. much more if that illegal detention h as been perpetrated in utter violation of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution . con ceived. by filing the information within the desired ti me. deny the discriminatory character of the p rovision. as a matter of legal technicality. but as a positive authority to said officers and employees to deprive and continue depriving the political pris oners concerned of their personal liberty. Petitioner points out that in the provision there is an unconstitutional delegat ion of legislative powers. without due or any legal process of l aw provided the deprivation of liberty did not exceed six months. by not filing any information at all. without question. section 1 [1]. as an abstract proposition. It may suspend it for one mon th. But the provision is vitiated: (1) By the fact that it is a class legislation. If all discriminations are abhorrent under any regime of law and justi ce. because the power to suspend the provision of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code within the maximum period of six months.) No one can. 682 runs coun ter to the Constitution when it prohibits that no person shall be deprived of hi s liberty without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal pr otection of the laws. or even the whole code. the legislative power having been reserv ed by the Constitution exclusively to Congress. The Special Prosecutors' Office may not suspend altogether article 125 of the Re vised Penal Code by filing immediately the information. Evidently. by filing the information within that time.The succeeding legislative bodies the unicameral National Assembly and the Congr ess may. in fact. two months. and unhappily enacted by the legislative power in one of its bl undering moods in utter defiance of the fundamental law of the land. as any other article of the same. Constitution of the Philippin es. or three months. Lastly. petitioner's complaint is well-taken. (2) By the fact that it is interpreted and applied. For these two radical and incurable defects. is transferred to the Special Prosecutors' Office. not only in a negative sense as a deterrent against public officials or employees bent on encroaching and tr ampling upon the personal freedom of any person. giving additional ground for th e nullity of the provision in question. with candor and fairness. tribunals must be recreant to their duties if they fail to deny validity to such an odious legal measure. but without re ckoning the previous many months of illegal detention they had already suffered before their formal transfer to the Commonwealth Government. section 19 of Act No. adopted. which may shorten or lengthe n said suspension by filing the corresponding criminal information at any time i t may deem convenient. . Therefore. we bel ieve that there is absolutely no ground for disputing the power of the legislati ve body to suspend or even repeal article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. It may suspend it for a maximum period of six months just by mere inaction. imperatively more in a democracy such as ours. (Article III. It may suspend it for 10 days.

and we vote for restoring him to his personal freedom of which he was deprived without any legal process. 1916 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. There w as later distributed. and the costs of the cause. considering that the unconstitutional provisions thereof may be segregated and the remaining portions of the text may stand on their own feet. was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7. but we are not ready to support petitioner's contention that the whole act should be declared null and void.403. judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80. inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments. dated September 22. for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in t he list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May 3. "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands." the $80. 1866.65. February 1. together with the names of those entitled there to. MANILA. 1883.703. by the Government of the Philippine Islands. and after due trial.85 for distribution. On account of various petitions of the persons. L-9959 December 13. directed its treasure r to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80. by authority of the King of Spain. togeth er with interest. dated February 1.000 each. 1870. and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts.R. vs.000. and. and are still in the possess ion of the Monte de Piedad. by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Isla nds. Upon the petit ion of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad. After a thorough investigation and consideration.299. 1912. defendant-appellant. in which it is stated that the funds which the . G. The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows: GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. plaintiff-appellee.000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency. to distribute the moneys thus voluntari ly contributed. March 12. In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of t he Monte de Piedad of this city. These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15. The defendant appeal ed The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition. the Philippine Islands to bring s uit against the Monte de Piedad a recover.We cannot but recognize that strength of the objections. the relief boa rd allotted $365. No. Su bsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year. April 14. were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Isl ands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3. together with legal i nterest from February 28. represented by the Insular Treasurer. addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. a list of these allotments. About $400.000.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution. 1863. leaving a balance of S365. represented by the Treasurer of the Ph ilippine Islands. 1883. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA. a central relief board was appoi nted. 1883. dated February 1. and June 2. 1833.000 of the relief fund in i nstallments of $20. The petitioner is entitled to be immediately set free. the sum of $30. by order dated the 1st of that month. the Ph ilippine Government. 1912.

By the royal order of December 3. after strictly applying the pr oceeds obtained from the subscription referred to. for it liberates needy person from the per nicious effects of usury. may remain as a surplus shoul d be delivered to the Monte de Piedad. Government that the balance which. not approve the said proposal. since the suspen sion of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing c redit of the Monte de Piedad. the Governor-General of the Philippine I . The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to retur n. the latter direct tha t there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad $80. for any reason. out of the s um held in the public treasury of these Islands obtained from the national subsc ription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863. in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the Intendencia de Hacienda. and t hat the great and laudable work of its establishment. M. and that the great and lau dable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is not granted. and Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request her ein contained. it will be compelled to suspend operations. Go vernment does not approve this resolution. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith. M. H. Government shall be advised hereof. resolves a s follows: First. thi s general Government. Government.000 out of the funds in the p ublic treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief of the dis tress caused by the earthquake of 1863. if H. the sums it may have so received. and because it is the only institu tion which can mitigate the effects of such poverty. amounts up to the sum $80. andConsidering that the lofty purposes that brought ab out the creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated. and in view of the report upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda. which would seriously injure the credit of s o beneficient an institution. in installments of $20. Government.lawphi1. and in preference to all other work. Second.0 00. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad. M. proceed to prepare the necessary papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces t he Monte de Piedad of having to suspend its operations may be averted. for which reason it entreats the general Government that.said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and th at the small account remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions o f the next two days. within eight days after demand. believing that in so doing the wis hes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to relieve distress. it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished. it might be said that at the present juncture it would assume the nat ure of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poore r classes resulting from the late calamities. and considering the fact that the public tr easury has on hand a much greater sum from the source mentioned than that solici ted. as its needs may require. i n pursuance of its telegraphic advice to H. either as a donation. and for this purpose it will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned je welry. DE RIVERA. an act of charity which is exercised in the h ighest degree by the Monte de Piedad. for the funds in question are sufficiently secured in the unlikel y event that H> M.000. 1892. Third. M. and considering that this general Government has submitted for the determin ation of H. said board obligating itself to return t his sum should H. and Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the pu blic mind. or as a loan upon t he security of the credit of the institution.net (Signed) P. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned. M.

without regard to their financial status. thus complying with the provisions of the Royal Order.000 pesos which. reads: Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippine Excellency. 1883. after f irst consulting the relief board and your general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were expe nded in 1888 to relieve public calamities." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General. the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to the $80. instead of fulfilling the promise it made on re . But the Monte de Piedad. M." and after the rights of the claimants." and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of th e Treasury. last. makes express mention of the 80. by decree of your general Government of the date of Febr uary 1. On January 30. besides. 1893. recovery. and deposit with the Treasury of the su ms paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way from that in tended by the donors) and this Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to cl aim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80. was loaned to it out of the said funds. whose names were published in the O fficial Gazette of Manila on April 7. 1870. for compliance with its directions and. and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated Jun e 28. taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1. it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived. one of them being that before making the payment to the interest ed parties the assets shall be reduced to money. and their heirs had been established . it formally engaged its elf to return it." and "in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the earthquake be clearly un derstood. with observance of the rules specified in the sa id royal order.000 turned over to the defendant. without doubt considering as sufficient the peri od of ten years during which it has been using this large sum which lawfully bel ongs to their persons. one o f these being the liquidation.slands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total sum available at the present time. it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary depos it funds bearing 5 per cent interests. such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require. By Royal Order No. Govern ment did not approve the delivery. your general Government shall convoke th em all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall id entify themselves. 1879. On this Intendencia's demanding from the Mont e de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos. it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply wit h the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25. during the long p eriod of time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of th e Philippine Islands. inasmuch as. Government. M. it is provided that s) the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capita l in the year 1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums se nt from Spain for this purpose. as therein provided. the result of this operation being that t he debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had gratuitously re ceived. last. in ordering that the assets of the earth quake relief fund should he collected. were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation. far from investing it in b eneficient transactions. inasmuch as H. These assets. a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions and anot her part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. and.000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad. it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be mad e by the Monte de Piedad for. when it received the loan. This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte de Piedad n o longer needed the amount of that loan. as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations assigned to them therein. as aforesaid. 1044 of December 3. your Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign mand ate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purpos es desired (that is. 1 883. the (Monte de Piedad) obli gating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H.

no donat ion whatever could be made of funds derived from a private subscription raised f or a specific purpose. I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions. inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80. without interest. 1883. $80. 1883. $20. re ads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription. 1883.000. 1902.000. and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of t he said royal order.000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop o f Manila.000. Sr. there being lacking only the me re material act of the delivery." whic h latter account was a loan of $15. last. In view of the u nexpected reply made by the Monte de Piedad.0 00 instead of $15. 1883. March 12. but as a donation. and not the Intendencia (Treasury). March 31. total $80. taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command.000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan.ceiving the sum. as well as any other information that might be useful for the report which your office is called upon to furnish. is entitled to order the reimbursement. erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apporti onment of the amount of the subscription raised in the year 1863 and the superio r decree which granted the loan. balance of these two account which on this date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. show that on the 15 . which has been unduly delayed. is to b e complied with.000 pesos which it received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was n ot received as a loan. and believing it useless to insist further in the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan. this in the opinion of this Intendenci a. which funds are already distributed and the names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta. To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands." The account was carried in this manner until January 1. $20. 1899.000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad. when it was closed by transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra. The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definit e action taken by either the Philippine Government or the Spanish Government in regard to the $80. has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the general deposit funds. $20. or to argue in s upport thereof. $9 5. this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency ne cessary in this matter. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these institutions. and which have been consulted for the purpose. $20." The book entry for this total is as follo ws: "To the public Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863. after repeated demands refused to return the money on the groun d that only your Excellency. if the royal Order No.000. in which you request i nformation from this office as to when and for what purpose the Spanish Governme nt delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subs cription opened in connection with the earthquake of 1863.000. June 2.000 which it owes. The above-mentioned journal entry for January 1. SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst." On March 16. and without i nterest.000 and received the following reply: MANILA. 1902. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that the sa id pious establishment. In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury : February 15. thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at $95.000.000. April 14. and for this purpose I beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight days the 80.000 pesos. 1044 of December 3.. 1899. during the last few days and after demand was made upon it. besides. and on the further ground that the sum of 80. but simply a loan. the Philippine government called upon the defendant for infor mation concerning the status of the $80. the fulfillment of which your E xcellency was pleased to order.

000 be given to it as a donation. Managing Director. The Department of Finance. 1913 (Sgd. "at the disposal of the relief board. EMILIO MORETA. It did not ask that the $80. might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid Gove rnment did not intend that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should include the $80. 1899. 1892." Furthermore. acting under the orders of the Governor-Genera l. there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de . nothing else appearing.000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest. That report refers expressly to the royal order of December 3d. and without inter est.000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General.000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands. but when considered in connecti on with the report of the Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it wa s so intended. after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financ ial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital. concerning the $80. November 19. stated that "this general Gov ernment has submitted for the determination of H. Government that the balance which. should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad. Government does not approve this resolution. or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institut ion." and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained." directed the transfer of the $80. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the lette r book No." This language . to i nform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund." Therefore. a nd sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the $8 0. which they deposited with their own funds. Manila. April 14 and June 2 of the said yea r. understood that the $80. within eight days after demand. there be transferred to it the sum of $80. ei ther as a donation. if H. after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription refe rred to. after reciting the substance of the petition. The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which to ok place between the Government of Spain and the Philippine Government on the on e side and the Monte de Piedad on the other. making a total of eighty thousand pesos. It may be inferred fro m the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve of the transfe r of the $80.000 in the total available sum." The amount was thus carried in it s books until January. the sums it may have so recei ved. when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagr ada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription accou nt. 2 of those Pious Institutions. 1902. On the same a ccount and on each of the dates of March 12. K. to wit. asked that ou t of the sum of $100. they received as a reimbursable loan and without interest. may remain as a surplus. Secretary (Sgd.000. the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31. 1883. at the disposal of the central relief board.000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnl y bound to return." It will be noted tha t the first and only time the word "donation" was used in connection with the $8 0. twenty thousand pesos. 1883.th of February.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI. 000 to be held under the same conditions. but that Gov ernment certainly did not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason tha t the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3.000 "as a returnable loan. 1883. they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty tho usand pesos.) O. M. M. " taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1. that it received the $80. (Signed) Emilio Moreta. The Governor-Gene ral.000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should n ot be approved by the Government of Spain.000. the same would be returned forthwith. The Monte d e Piedad.

the protectors. and inveter ately maintained a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powe rs. The mone y was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. which apparently expressly exclude such an idea. of which said King and his deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines. in support of their third assignment of error. 6 Pet. acted in their purely civil. for a charita ble purpose in these Islands. and the entire subscription not being needed for i ts original purpose. as royal vice-patron. and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitab le institutions in his kingdoms. (U. The same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over such thing s would result in great inconvenience to the American Government in attempting t o do so. As to the second. including the King of Spain and the Govern or-General of the Philippine Islands.) It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Gover nment or rather. Counsel for the defendant. S. in the majority. In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that. Implicitly renounced this high office and tacitly retur ned it to the Holy See. and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made. faithful compliance with the dut y imposed upon him by the Holy See. the cessionary Government though Christian. the King of Spain.]. Con sequently. official capacity. The first proposition has already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation. were. if not in all cases. and the fact that they might ha ve belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter . S. now represented by the Archbishop of Manila. say in their principal brief that: The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the disti nction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies. the royal vice-patron. especially those of the Indies. [U. in a specia l and peculiar manner. of the King of Spain. was not Roman Catholic and p rided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters. for the reason that it affected t he conscience. it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subr ogate to the American Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything resp ecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Pied ad. as thus stated. the nationa l subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work. a thing that touched him very closely in his conscience and re ligion. (1) beca use such contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan. who took part in the disposal of the fund. compliance therewith is excused and the contract has been cleared thereof. 711. The question was such a delicate one. Arredondo. the fulfillment of all these things involved. when it conferred upon him the royal patrona ge of the Indies. the record s hows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite p urpose the relief of the earthquake sufferers and for no other purpose. even without the exp ress provisions of the Treaty of Paris. and (2) because the charit y founded by the donations for the earthquake sufferers is not and never was int ended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The contention of counsel. vs. deeply religious.Piedad received the $80. among the latte r was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines. that it cannot be believe d that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government like the American. the latter. as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands. in untenable for two reason. with the consent of the King. All officials. gave t he surplus thereof to an analogous purpose. The S panish Government remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distribu ted among the suffers. in this regard. but became impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spani sh Government in these Islands.

to exercise supervision and control over the moneys th us collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands (Be nedicto vs. coul d maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change of sovereignty an d if the right of action has not prescribed. It follows further tha t this Government is not a proper party to the action. respectively. 3 Phil.000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an institution under th e control of the church) as a loan or deposit. the royal decree of April 27. the question arises. The whole matter is one of trusteeship. and the instructions promulgated on the l atter date. The only persons who coul d claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte. 1875. 1875. which are the law of June 20." and it being true that the Spanish Government could not. and article 2 of the instructions of April 27. as counsel say.. because paragra ph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power upon the secretary of the interior of Spain. the trustee was the Spanish Government. and no other. The r elief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers. it is necessary to examine the law in fo rce at the time there transactions took place. under artic le 7 of the instructions. the King of Spain and the Governor-G eneral. based on the union of the church and state which was completely separated with the change of sovereignty. T he secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as the y were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were contributed. As the Spanish G overnment initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their cont ributions over to that Government. in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-pat ron. In order to determine their ex act status with reference to this fund.. The church. because the right to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the Holy See. and such functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government. and this Government is neither. it became the duty of the latter. The donors were persons in Spain. a special charity of a temporary nature a s distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. 189 4. under article 1 of the law of June 20. I t follows that the Spanish Government at no time was the owner of the fund. as such. should th ere be any. were certain persons in the Philippine Islands . to dispose of the surplus funds. the donees. If the charity in question had be en founded as an ecclesiastical pious work. De la Rama. 34) The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relie f Board constituted. who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine Government. 1894. as a Government. the cestuis que trustent. as trustee. And in their supplemental brief counsel say: By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription . If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship. But those governments were somethin g more than mere common law trustees of the fund. The s . would have disposed of the fund as such and not in their civi l capacities. which is more than doubtful. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly never has expressly done so and t he general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insuffic ient for such a purpose even could Spain have transferred its trusteeship withou t the consent of the donors and even could the United States. had nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80. transfer the ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad. This is undisputed and indisputable. h ave accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the Constitution. Rep. by assigning them to some other charitable purpose or institution. Not being the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. if it was unlawful. are the donors or the cestuis que trustent.

Under the Treaty of Paris of Decembe r 10. The Go vernments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law. as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that t he $80. regulate. and as such belonged to the crown of Spain.The secretary of t he interior. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. than mere trustees of the fun d. and to some extent control char ities and charitable institutions. as we have said. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upo n the law of June 20. known as the Philippine Islands.000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the trea ty. placed such institutions. they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United St ates.000. but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. public highways. pa ss to the present sovereign. does not follow as a necessar y consequence. was wiped ou t on the change of sovereignty. This contention." they continued in force and are still in force unles s they have been repealed by the present Government. lose their force. . even considering it a loan." as it cannot rest upon any titl e to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. structures. in exempting "providen t institutions. was ceded to the U nited States. This. under the law above mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity in the courts. and other immovable property which. the c ourt said: That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabi tants of the ceded region is obvious. or institutions of th e substituted sovereign.000 were not included therein. war between the United States and Spain ensued. 167. the present Philippine Gover nment cannot maintain this action for that reason. in conformity with law. 701). 1849..000 to the Government.) But it is equally settled in the same public la w that the great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic righ ts continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings. the Archipelago.000. "mu st result from settled principles of rigid law." all of which are in the nature of charitab le institutions. They are laws which a re not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Gover nment the right and duty to supervise. If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political chara cter. is also plain. acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors.ecretary had the power. barracks. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article. under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. etc. exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. 1875. or inn other words. wharves. constitution. but if they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates pr ivate and domestic rights. The authority of the board cons isted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for which they were contributed . and the instruct ions promulgated on the latter date. S. see also Act No. in so far as the inves tment in securities are concerned. While the ob ligation to return the $80. It will this be seen that those governments were something more." As the $80. savings banks. Manila (220 U. as the representative of His Majesty's Government. in our opinion. the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20. That all laws theretofore in force which a re in conflict with the political character. 1898. In Vilas vs. forts. from taxation. 345).. the royal decree of April 27. 1189. therefore.000 to the Spanish Government was still pending. if true. United States. It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad t o return the $80. That they fall within the l atter class is clear from their very nature and character. constitution or institutions of the new sovereign. The present sovereign. it is said that the right to recover this amount did not.. S. 216 U. belonged to the public domain .

that the Attorney-General had no power to instit ute the action. 408). as parens patriae. wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensi ble that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts. 483. insane persons. 508. Cogswell (113 Cal. upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he c rown of Spain devolved upon he United States. Cas. said: When this country achieved its independence. who are often in capable of vindicating their rights. in overruling these contentions. where no other person is e ntrusted with it. ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right. and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. said: This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every Sta te. the prerogatives of the crown devol ved upon the people of the States.. and justly look for protection to the sovereign aut hority. be fore an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the peopl e. General Hospital (3 Cush. Ravenel (17 Hw. The State as a sover eign. 384). In People vs. And this power still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. the court said: The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament.. idiots.. apply to the beneficiaries of charities. it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest. (4 Kent Com. and is a clear ly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatev er. 129. as distinguished from the rights of individuals. Justice McLean. after quoting from Sohier vs. 497). a nd the prerogative of the crown. by virtue of its genera l superintending authority over the public interests. United States (136 U. is the parens patriae. S. who cannot act for themselves. and persons not known. and often necess ary to be exercised in the interest of humanity. which related t o charities. In Magill vs. On the contrary. held that it was not only the rig ht but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action. and for the prevention of injur y to those who cannot protect themselves.1.) The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. delivering the op inion of the court in a charity case. and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct rig ht of the people as a whole. 130). Brown (16 Fed. supra . the legislature or government of the State. note.Furthermore. In Fontain vs. after approving also the last quotations.. and gave their Acts the same force and effect. The court in the same case. 369. insane persons and person not known. or not in being. it is a most beneficient functions. The s overeign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. and ha s no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irrespons ible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic. Chancelor Kent says: In this country. acting as parens patriae. whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. but that it now resides in the legislative department. The court. Mass.. said: These remarks in reference to in facts. has the right to enforce all charities of public nature. 57) . or not in b eing. Comp . United States. Mr.

. there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature. 2109. The Supreme Court of the United States. under its present charter from the Government of the Philippin e Islands. S. supra. and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. in a measure. Manila. Therefor. They are quite numerous also. could have been ascertai ned. no individual could be found effectually to assert. 732. the public interest and the public right. the defendant is not the owner of the $80. The beneficiaries . however. in reversing this judgment and in holdin g the city liable for the old debt. as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and C hristian benevolence in like instances in the future. In fact. C.000. was the same juristic person. And no doubt a large number of the original s ufferers have died. little need be said for the reason that we have j ust held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the actio n. consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs. As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the cons titutionality of Act No. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Govern ment to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which i t was originally destined. said: The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected. to the specific purposes to which it wa s intended to be devoted. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. it is the privilege of the public that the cr own should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting . The action was brought upon the theo ry that the city. supra. in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1. sec. publi c property. and this Government is neither. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to e xercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. are the donors o r the cestuis que trustent. the successor of the old. 359. because it does not take property without due process of law.) To deny the Gov ernment's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy . in l aw. is not the true gr ound upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. and. Their whereabouts are unknown.000. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte. (2 Knet's Commentaries. 10th ed. as above indicated.. the present city is. The Act is not. U. it is true. The tr ue ground is that the money being given to a charity became. Lewin on Trusts. w hich. the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila a s it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States b y the Treaty of Paris of December 10. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different c orporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The impracticability of pursuing a different course. 417): Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust. In Vilas vs. (Mormon Church vs. on behalf on the public generally. as contende d by counsel. leaving various heirs." The earthquake fund was th e result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. the pl aintiff is not the proper party to bring the action.ton (1 Younge & C. 1898. 1902. even if the interest were such as to allow it. and liable upon the obligations of the old city. if it was unlawful. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover t he $80. only applicable. probably.) It is further urged. in every legal sense. Consequently.. but within those limits consecrated to the public use. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporati .

Miller. is not bound by any statute of limitations . which must necessarily act through numerous agent . (Section 50. 2109. when it was transferred to the account of t he "Sagrada Mitra. vs. 666. and that no time can bar his rights. That no laches can be imputed to the King. Upon this theory June." On March 31. and is. stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan.000 in 1883 "to be held under the same conditions as at present in the treasury. that the $80. 14 Pet. U. the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad in June.) But if counsels' theory is the correct one the action ma y have prescribed on May 3. for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31. S. citing and relying upon article 1961. 98 U. the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) becau se the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Governmen t. 1893. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-Genera l of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to o rder the reimbursement. unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so boun d. Code of Civil Procedure. vs.on. The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad rece ived the $80. 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the other hand.. and was founded on the principle of public policy. 1912. Fink vs. in fact.) In Gibson vs. 486.. 281. 1902.000. that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and servants. because more than ten full years had elapsed a fter March 31. (Lindsey vs. In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80. Act No. the Monte. 106 U . supra. said: It is settled beyond doubt or controversy upon the foundation of the great princ iple of public policy. (Sections 38 and 43. 1902. Gibson vs.. subject to all of its liabilities. and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed again st the Government and if the action had. vs." In compliance with t he provisions of the royal order of December 3. through its legal representati ve. 6 Pet. to return the $80. 272. 1893. S. prescribed. 2109 became effective January 30.000 were received as a loan. applicable to all governments alike. S. at the disposal of the relief board. asserting rights ve sted in it as a sovereign government. Thompson. (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe.. cannot be taken as the date when the statute of limitations began to run. 1912. to wit. 1893. the court said: It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run agains t the State. 1892. Nashville. the same was reviv ed by Act No. thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. the plaintiff's right of action had pre scribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3. O'Neil. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a re turnable loan until January 1.000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June. Knight. was the maxim of the common laws. S. (118 U. C houteau. Co de of Civil Procedure. S. without interest. 1899. The principle is applicable to all governments. 301. Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. 120. 13 Wall. U.) Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Co urt of the United States in U. S. Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action wa s one between individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to re cover an ordinary loan. 92. 1902. and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year. 125). which forbids that t he public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or ag ents to whose care they are confided that the United States. Choteau. in law. 1912..

etc. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and thing over which the State has jurisdiction. unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that it must necessarily be included. the rule. 3 Ont. Co. 1987 ALFREDO M. So ordered. Torres. TOLENTINO. ESGUERRA. J. vs.. No. Moreland. where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her citizens. RESURRECCION. concur. supra. TOLENTINO. ANA. . FLORENTINO G. 78059 August 31. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. In 25 Cyc. (U. whether state or federal. BENJAMIN B. B. and directs its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine currency. ROGE LIO J. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied a re of such a nature that the state must necessarily be included. MAGNO.R. DE LEON. Campbell. In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party becaus e it. HON. Midland R. JJ. the United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such stat utes. S. HON. vs. in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Ri zal. ROMEO C.) These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of publ ic policy" are. 1006.. Nashville. and TERESITA L. certain bonds of the State of Tennessee. RICARDO Z.. or since it bec ame the owner of such coupons. ANGEL S.. LACANIENTA. MEDINA. R. Rizal. TEO DORO V. in the very nature of things. PAZ.. G. vs. Co. with costs aga inst the appellant. ROSENDO S. vs.. either while it held them in trust for the Indians. 511 [following Reg. so that the latter is only a nominal party. C. STA. Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor do they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest. Q. or where a p arty seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or go vernment. is stated as foll ows: In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary.. Johnson and Araullo. respondents. in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay. The United States having in 18 52. (Greene Tp. is exercising its sovereign funct ions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Ph ilippine Islands were ceded to the United States. see also Atty. a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands. 11. supported by numerous authorities. in bringing and prosecuting this action.-Gen. the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of limitations o f Tennessee. 16 Ohio St. vs. Williams. applicable to the Philippine Gover nment. TIGAS.. DE LEON. purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that tribe.. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescr ibing periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself. did not sign. For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed. and is essential to a preservation of the interests and property of the publi c. REMIGIO M. petitioners. 39 7]. SALAMAT. 39 U.) So wh ere lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no right to sue. MARIO C.s. statute of limita tions do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or government. JOSE C.

respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum. respectively. Pasig. 1987 b e declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over the ir positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores. Taytay. 1 986. 1987. March 23. As required by the Court. That the above cited memorandum dated December 1. Rizal. J. petitioner Alfredo M. 1987. Metro Manila. It is also their position that wit . their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence o n June 7. Paz and Teresita L. Petition ers maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. de Leon received a Memorandum antedat ed December 1. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE. February 9. Municipality of Taytay. de la Rosa and Jose M. 1982. Rizal. Ricardo Z. 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. Tigas. I among others. Magno as Barangay Captain o f Barangay Dolores. have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memora ndum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay( s) in the Municipality of Taytay. Salamat. That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of responden t OIC Governor. On February 9. 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on F ebruary 8. 222. a nd petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment. 1986 was signed by me personal ly on February 8. Ana. petitioner Alfredo M. 1987. Resurreccion. Rogelio J. Sta. petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8. Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg.MELENCIO-HERRERA. De Leon wa s elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Roberto S." Also on February 8. Tolentino. Before us now. That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof. 1988. the pertinent portions of which read: xxx xxx xxx That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. Province of Rizal. otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Mario C. Jose C. Medina. 1987.: An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin r espondents from replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay Capta in and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores. Taytay. Lacanient a Teodoro V. respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition.1987. That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the followin g day. 222). The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government. antedated December 1." or up to June 7. In the Barangay elections held on May 17.

Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part: Sec. which shall be determined by law. respondents contend that the terms of offi ce of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners cont inued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their ter m of six years had not yet expired. 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervisi on" over local governments. 2 Similarly. Article III. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratificatio n by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. 4 Relevantly. shall be three years . The term of office of elective local officials. Section 8. there should be no question that petitioners.1986. we hold that Februa ry 8. . which provided: SECTION 2. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2. should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not De cember 1.h the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. as e lective officials under the 1973 Constitution. 1 Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution. 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline. the 1987 Constitution ensu res the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially consi dering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. By reason of the foregoing provision. 8. in keeping with the dictates of justic e. promulgated on March 25. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor. SECTION 27. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Co nstitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of thei r successors. But while February 8. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading. except barangay official s. there has been no procla mation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. thereof to designate respondents to the elective positi ons occupied by petitioners. Examining the said provision. Having become inoperative. On the other hand. and that the provision in the Barangay Elect ion Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provis ion of the Provisional Constitution.. may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have be en overtaken by Section 27. the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents t o replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25. respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2.1986 to which it was ante dated. Article III of the Provisional Constitution. 1986. 1987. T hus. the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been supers eded. therefore. 1987. respondents rely on Section 2. if such appointment is made within a period of one year from Febru ary 25. respondent OIC Governor no longer h as the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. 1977.. By that date.

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, there fore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern. Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the t erm of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Se ction 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of i nstructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitut ion shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 19 87 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, resp ectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no lega l force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respond ents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' posit ions subject of this Petition. Without costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring: The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratificati on was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratific ation was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines , Corazon C. Aquino. The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitutio n that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date. The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take eff ect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually pr oposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite." The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in unanimously approving (by thirty-fi ve votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Art

icle XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of wh at was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the Presid ent is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their v otes on the date of the plebiscite." The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1 MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other commissione rs who would like to present amendments. MR. DAVIDE. Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments. On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the fo llowing-. "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS." MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take up fir st his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now read y to comment on that proposed amendment. The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lie u thereof insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN R ATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions," add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS," The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we c annot accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions" becaus e the committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions, necessari ly it includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS." MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam P resident, may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the Co mmission would be able to appreciate the change in the first. MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that. MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHI N FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIO NS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE." MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee feels that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence would no t be exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a time frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would re call, Madam President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a prov ision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws shall be fa ithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and it says that there w ill be a proclamation by the President that the Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the provisio ns in the Article on the Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to

impose on the President a time frame within which she will make that declaration . It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that after the res ults shall have been canvassed by the COMELEC. Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the Gentleman is proposing, Madam President. MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an immediate proclamation of the results by the President. MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President. MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence. FR. BERNAS. Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized. FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendm ent which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the procl amation of the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the Presid ent. What is confusing, I think, is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In that particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the draft present ed to the people said that the amendment will be effective upon the proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put in there precisely to gi ve the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will be a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under th e supervision of the COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the an nouncement that, in fact, the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the Presiden t. MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions? FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President. MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified. FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were supposed to have been cast. MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vo te, then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete th e suggested amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution i s supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be? FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to say that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, the n the date for the effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987 . MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam President

NOLLEDO. t hat proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification. MAAMBONG. we would like to know from the proponent. that the date of the ratification is reckoned from the date of the casting of the ballots. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation. Thank you. . because "ratification" is the act of saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot. THE PRESIDENT. Madam President. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Cons titution The announcement merely confirms the ratification even if the results a re released two or three days after. Madam President. So it is either the President or t he COMELEC itself upon the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebi scite. therefore. It would not. I beg to disagree with Commissioner Dav ide. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date f or the effectivity of the Constitution. Madam President. Madam President? FR. REGALADO. Commissioner Lerum is recognized. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the voters. what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. Madam President. But it is necessary that there be a body which will make the formal a nnouncement of the results of the plebiscite. MR. THE PRESIDENT. LERUM. MAAMBONG. NOLLEDO. and I opted for the President. LERUM. Madam President. Yes. That cannot be the date o f reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. because an announcement is a mere confirmation T he act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. Suppose the announcement is delayed by. MR. MR. I am. MR.FR. Actually and technically speaking. DAVIDE. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas. even in civil law. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized. I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot su bscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself. MR. because the canvass thereafter is merely the mathematica l confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the procla mation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an ac t which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution wh en they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite. Madam President. in favor of the Davide amendment. 10 days or a month. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute? MR. BERNAS. BERNAS. it would be all right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of the ca nvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over th e country. Madam President. xxx xxx xxx MR. Madam President. say. Thank you. if he is insisting on his amendment. So that is the date o f the ratification. may I be recognized. THE PRESIDENT. MR. I think it is a fundamental principle in po litical law. I was precisely going to state the same support f or Commissioner Bernas. Commissioner Davide.

Commissioner Guingona is recognized. Yes. it would have no effect. Madam President. BERNAS. THE PRESIDENT. I thin k it is precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date ( of ratification that would have a definite date.So t hat even if the votes are cast in the morning. THE PRESIDENT. GUINGONA. But nevertheless. FR. I would only add that when w e say that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes. I would say there would be no necessity. are natural-born citizens. Madam President. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. MR. It is the Commission on Elections which announces the results. wh at we mean is that the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and ever y single second of that day. MAAMBONG. will there be a necessity fo r the President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitte d by the Commission on Elections? FR. BERNAS. GUINGONA. MR. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be imm aterial because under the law. MAAMBONG.MR. BERNAS. the children of Filipino mo thers or anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 1973. the President may make the proclamation. In other words. the Constitution is really effect ive from the previous midnight. no matter what time of day or n ight. And if what he says contradicts what the Com mission on Elections says. Could we. MR. MR. MAAMBONG. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized. would there be a necessity fo r the Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass? FR. Madam President. MAAMBONG. MAAMBONG. because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours. therefore. BERNAS. BERNAS. . MR. THE PRESIDENT. So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes the official announcement of the results. With the theory of the Commissioner. the President may. because there would be no defin ite date if we depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on Elections has declared the results of the canvass. which is January 17. I thank the Commissioner. MR. MAAMBONG. safely say that whatever date is the publicat ion of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the pl ebiscite? FR. MR. the President may or may not make the proclamation whether the Constitution has been ratified or not. MAAMBONG. FR. Madam President. Commissioner Maambong is recognized. Yes. the administration of all election laws is under an independent Commission on Elections. Thank you. MR.

2 . Commissioner Maambong is recognized MR. Thank you. Madam President. Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla. if ther e is a contract. MAAMBONG. And that is the date when the Constitu tion takes effect. please raise their hand. As many as are in favor. CONCEPCION. the validity does not begin on the date o f ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed. At the end of the day of election or pl ebiscite. MAAMBONG. Therefore. MR. V O T I N G THE PRESIDENT. (Several Member s raised their hands. MR. MR. I am against the proposed amendment of Commissione r Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the others because th e ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people. RAMA. DAVIDE. Section 12 is approved.) The results show 35 votes in favor and none against. the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the votes ca st in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. Madam President. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion t hat it will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite. (No Member raised his hand.) As many as are against. So that is the time when the ne w Constitution will be considered ratified and. I am withdrawing my amendment on the assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the P resident or the COMELEC will make the formal announcement of the results. effective. between an agent and a third person and that contract is c onfirmed or ratified by the principal. MAAMBONG. would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a giv en date was in favor of the Constitution. by a majority vote . MR. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting o n his amendment MR.MR. have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. say. although I would not say from the v ery beginning of the date of election because as of that time it is impossible t o determine whether there is a majority. we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by the committee. THE PRESIDENT. therefore. PADILLA. Madam President. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a major ity of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the ori ginal committee report as Section 12. please raise their hand. apart from the fact that the provision on the drafting or ame ndment of the Constitution provides that a constitution becomes effective upon r atification by a majority of the votes cast. Madam President. We ask for a vote. be it the COM ELEC or the President. THE PRESIDENT. the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution. Madam President. Even in civil law.

The official records of the Court show that the appointments of the s even Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1. is incorrect. the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the co nvening of the first Congress. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the appointments. 198 7 and they were all appointed on or before January 31. Duquing and Bayas cases.The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constit ution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on Febr uary 2.. 1987. Dissenting. 1987. 71 provincial fiscals and 55 c ity fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2. 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. A final note of clarification. . could be open to serious questions. February 2.. I yield to that better view and agree with her ponenc ia completely. She has written another persu asive opinion. 1987. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise. With due respect to the majority I register this dissent. that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25. While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2. 1987. no appointments to the Judiciary have bee n extended by the President. concurring. having acquired securi ty of tenure under the new Constitution. as indeed they provid ed for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVII I. etc. SARMIENTO." in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9. Justice Herrera would opt for February 2. as to the statement in the dissent that "the appo intments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices. 1987. In her quiet and restrained manner. 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. 1987. 1987 of the Con stitution. J. CRUZ.g. 1 987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1. the attempted rep lacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February 8. Whi le the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25. Justice Herrera is able to prove her point w ith more telling effect than the tones of thunder. 3 (Similarly. pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Co uncil. r espondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Article III of . the r ecords of the Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in comple tion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were made on January 31. as now expressly declared by the Court. I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-Presi dent to noon of June 30. Zamora. e. indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2. and I am delighted to concur. Hence. . they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article. 1987. 19 86 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same d ate February 2.) It is also a matter of record that since February 2. absent an y saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution. 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised. J. when the new Constitution was ratified. after the deadline set by the Fre edom Constitution. 1 987 as the effective date of the Constitution. 1987 . 1987 and (2) by and after said date. where I submitted that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced. this period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2. 1987. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on February 25. February 2. Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by t he Judicial and Bar Council created under the Constitution.

Such appointments need no confirmatio n. the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. 1987. a retired Member of th e Supreme Court. 1987. and not Febru ary 2. plebiscite day. vet determined. was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. had not. in particular. of the l987 Constitution. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be app ointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the J udicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. the date the same was proclaimed ratified pu rsuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines. a professor of law. Other than that. 1987. 1987 the government pe rformed acts that would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but w ould otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. and February 11. thus: Sec. as follows: SECTION 2. on the language of the 1987 Charter itself. when the will of the people as of that time. moreover. xxx xxx xxx Sec. . and could not have been. pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view. Since 1973. first and foremost. It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the dat e its ratification shall have been ascertained. 1986. I have no doubt that between February 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Co nstitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of thei r successors. 8. To my mind the 1987 constitutio n took effect on February 11. 9. and not at the time the people c ast their votes to approve or reject it. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman. and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2. For it cannot be logically said that Co nstitution was ratified during such a plebiscite. and a representative of the private sector. and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members. the Sec retary of Justice. 27. 1987. if such appointment is made within a period of one year from Febru ary 25. I recall. xxx xxx xxx such appointments could be open to serious questions. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall sup ersede all previous Constitutions. we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constit ution as well as the amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified. t he appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices. I rely. 71 provincial fiscals. as follows: xxx xxx xxx Sec. Article VIII.the Provisional Constitution with respect to the tenure of government functiona ries. a representative of the Integrated Bar. I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off period began on February 2. 1 Und er Sections 8 (1) and 9.

1976. the same: . Sitti ng as a Constituent Assembly. in its Resolutions Numbered Three. . On October 27. thus: SEC. although Mr.five and all amendments thereto. By virtue-of the powers vested s embodied in this certificate ferendum. 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodi ed in Batas Pambansa Blg. on J anuary 30. 21. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proc laimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the refer endum-plebiscite. and to Appropriate Funds There fore. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April 7. 1973. Sitting as a Constituent Assembly. The Proclamation provides: [t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes c ast in the plebiscite held. 1980. of the 1973 Constitution. the date our dec ision in Javellana v. . dated December 18. On April 7." It shall be noted. 1981. now Chief Justice. On April 1. the Amendment to the Constitution of the Ph ilippines. Proclamation No. 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17. for Ratification or Rejection.17. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification b y a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and. "Announcing the Rat ification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Consti tutional Convention. 1595. Teeha nkee would push its effectivity date further to April 17. inter alia. I hereby proclaim all the amendment as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the re 16-17. pr oclaiming the ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16. Article XVI of the Constitution.plebiscite held Oct. Third Regular Session. and One. as follows: . The Proclamation states. It shall be noted that under Amendment No. further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of t he date of this Proclamation. excep t as herein provided. and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immed iately." provides.shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2. the date Proclamation No. in declaring the said amendments duly appr oved." The Proclamation. Ar ticle X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and just ices). Manguera. 3 became final. Justice. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect. 1976 and are therefore effective and in fu date. It shall be noted that under Resolution No. Article XVII. 1973. which parented these amendments. together with the election for local officials. On the other hand. 1979. Batas Pambansa Blg. in this connection. 1976. then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1980. 1102. 9 of the said 1976 amendments. the pro posed amendment shall take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Mini ster shall proclaim its ratification. ll force and effect as of this in me by law. that under Resolutions Nos. Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. "An Act to Submit to the Filipino Pe ople. Executive Secretary. 16. Two. that. shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and t hirty." was issued. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa. 122. 1959. "Procla iming the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7. the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no.In Magtoto v. And this was so notwi thstanding Section 16.

. the remark was said in passing-we did not resol ve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life on February 2. that: The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Phili ppines shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes ca st in the plebiscite held for the purpose. at Malacanang Palace: . Aquino) proclaimed on February 11. 1987. 643). Ignalaga 5 in which we declared. We have. That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculi ar to the Marcos era. 2332. duly authen ticated and certified by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city. as shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted t their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the amended. 1987. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. Corazon C. finally. 105.. of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. The Commission on Elections. 110 and 11 2 and Section 9. 105. It carries out Resolution no. including the Ordinance appended thereto. albeit Resolutions Nos.SEC. that: These amendments majority of the o the people for Constitution. The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11. and 113 provide.1947. the 1987 Constitut ion not being then as yet in force. I now call for its re-exam ination. 104.. which states. 1987. has bee n duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full fo rce and effect. came into force and effect. 19 47 plebiscite called pursuant to Republic Act No. 110. in point of fact. but not later than three months from the approval of the amendments. in passi ng. that t he challenged dismissals done on February 8.. I hold that it took effect at no other time. that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Cons titutional Commission of 1986. 1987 were valid. The April 9...are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation. Batas Blg. "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Pl ebiscite of January 27. In any event. Proclamation No. was adopted on April 9. 111. consistent with the views expressed above. shad canvass and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it." It states t hat the amendments: . that the new Charter was ratified on February 2. sitting en banc. if we did. 1984. I am therefore of the opinion. 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive application. 111. 1946. 112 and 113. Accordingly. when the incumbent President (Mrs. 4 the 1987 Constitution. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18. does not in any way w eaken this dissent. I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. 7. As I stated.

" The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's judgment. 1987. MAAMBONG. Commissioner Davide is recognized." the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2.Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE. "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED. Justice Sarmiento. DAVIDE." This view was actually pr oposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations." The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1 MR. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of wh at was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the Presid ent is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their v otes on the date of the plebiscite. On line 2.. the date that the plebiscite for its ratificati on was held or whether it took effect on February 11. the committee would suggest that we take up fir st his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. Madam President. . THE PRESIDENT." And on the last line. Madam President. the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date. Madam President. MAAMBONG. 1987. MR. DAVIDE. Section 27 of the 1987 Constitutio n that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose. CJ. Corazon C. If Commissioner Davide is going to propose an additional sentence. Aquino. The Court's decision. concurring: The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2." add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS. with the lone dissent of Mr. 1987." MR. It shows that the clear. may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the committee as indicated in Section 12. Just a moment. MR. unless there are other commissione rs who would like to present amendments. holds that by virtue of the provision of Article XVIII. but was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite. The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take eff ect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the fo llowing-. May I propose the following amendments. unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in unanimously approving (by thirty-fi ve votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Art icle XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. 58 of the President of the Philippines . the date its ratific ation was proclaimed per Proclamation No. We are now read y to comment on that proposed amendment. after "constitutions.

I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an immediate proclamation of the results by the President." MR. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendm ent which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the procl amation of the President. in the approved Article on the Executive." add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS. the reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the draft present ed to the people said that the amendment will be effective upon the proclamation made by the President. As we would re call. Madam President. l will not insist on the second. In that particular case. after conferring with our chairman. I will not insist on the second sentence. DAVIDE. MR. When we approve this first sentence." The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. Yes. the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the provisio ns in the Article on the Executive which we have cited. the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the Gentleman is proposing. we regret that we c annot accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions" becaus e the committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions. Madam President. I think.The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lie u thereof insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN R ATIFIED. Commissioner Bernas is recognized. is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. DAVIDE. we should not make this dependent on the action of the President . MAAMBONG. necessari ly it includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHI N FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIO NS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE. However. not on the date of the proclamation of the Presid ent. It would be too much to impose on the President a time frame within which she will make that declaration ." MR. I have a suspicion that was put in there precisely to gi ve the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ratification or not. FR. Madam President. Therefore. MAAMBONG. What is confusing. DAVIDE. Madam President. MR. FR. BERNAS. MR. MR. there is a prov ision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws shall be fa ithfully complied. we can now do that. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification. BERNAS. THE PRESIDENT. Therefore. Madam President. Madam P resident. DAVIDE. the committee feels that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence would no t be exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a time frame on the President to make the proclamation." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions. With that understanding. With that explanation. may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the Co mmission would be able to appreciate the change in the first. Madam President. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that after the res ults shall have been canvassed by the COMELEC. MAAMBONG. But. MR. and it says that there w ill be a proclamation by the President that the Constitution has been ratified.

of the act of the people to be done under th should be the COMELEC who should make the an show that the Constitution was ratified and any proclamation on the part of the Presiden MR. So it is either the President or t he COMELEC itself upon the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebi scite. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself. 1987. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. FR. We present the Constitution to a plebiscite. MR. Yes. MAAMBONG. If we delete th e suggested amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED. if he is insisting on his amendment. MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing. that the date of the ratification is reckoned from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date o f reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. In other words. Willingly. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized. MR. Commissioner Davide. because "ratification" is the act of saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified. Madam President. in fact. I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot su bscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas. in clear terms. MR. It would not. and I opted for the President. the date when the Constitution i s supposed to be ratified or not ratified. MAAMBONG. BERNAS. MAAMBONG. Madam President. Madam President.since this will be a manifestation e supervision of the COMELEC and it nouncement that. . THE PRESIDENT. NOLLEDO. Madam President. MAAMBONG. the votes there should be no need to wait for t. if the President were to say that the plebiscite would be held. BERNAS. then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. we would like to know from the proponent." what would be. DAVIDE. Actually and technically speaking. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the voters. MR. But it is necessary that there be a body which will make the formal a nnouncement of the results of the plebiscite. the n the date for the effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions? FR. MR. 1987 . BERNAS. the people exercise their right to vo te. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were supposed to have been cast. Madam President? FR. it would be all right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of the ca nvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over th e country. Madam President. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas. as the case may be? FR. MAAMBONG. on January 19. xxx xxx xxx MR. BERNAS. Madam President. it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam President FR. for instance.

So that is the date o f the ratification. the President may. I think it is a fundamental principle in po litical law. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute? MR. Commissioner Lerum is recognized. BERNAS. because the canvass thereafter is merely the mathematica l confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the procla mation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an ac t which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution wh en they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite. Madam President. MR. In other words. MAAMBONG. therefore. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date f or the effectivity of the Constitution. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes the official announcement of the results. MR. FR. MAAMBONG. Thank you. MAAMBONG. MR. say. THE PRESIDENT. THE PRESIDENT. what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. NOLLEDO. MAAMBONG. MR. t hat proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification. MR. the President may or may not make the proclamation whether the Constitution has been ratified or not. in favor of the Davide amendment. would there be a necessity fo r the Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass? FR. FR. LERUM. I am. With the theory of the Commissioner. I would only add that when w . may I be recognized. BERNAS. MAAMBONG. REGALADO. Madam President. I was precisely going to state the same support f or Commissioner Bernas. THE PRESIDENT. I would say there would be no necessity. It is the Commission on Elections which announces the results. BERNAS. Madam President. Madam President. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation. will there be a necessity fo r the President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitte d by the Commission on Elections? FR. the administration of all election laws is under an independent Commission on Elections. Madam President. 10 days or a month. I beg to disagree with Commissioner Dav ide. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be imm aterial because under the law. even in civil law. Commissioner Maambong is recognized. MR. And if what he says contradicts what the Com mission on Elections says.MR. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on Elections has declared the results of the canvass. Suppose the announcement is delayed by. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Cons titution The announcement merely confirms the ratification even if the results a re released two or three days after. the President may make the proclamation. it would have no effect. because an announcement is a mere confirmation T he act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. MR. Yes. But nevertheless. LERUM. Thank you. BERNAS. Madam President.

I am against the proposed amendment of Commissione r Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the others because th e ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people.e say that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes. MR. apart from the fact that the provision on the drafting or ame ndment of the Constitution provides that a constitution becomes effective upon r atification by a majority of the votes cast. So that when we adopted the new rule on citi zenship. Therefore. effective. Madam President. are natural-born citiz ens. 1973. Commissioner Guingona is recognized. because there would be no defin ite date if we depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC. So that even if the votes are cast in the morning. the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the votes ca st in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. . MR. BERNAS. MR. because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours. safely say that whatever date is the publicat ion of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the pl ebiscite? FR. Madam President. MR. the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution. would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a giv en date was in favor of the Constitution. between an agent and a third person and that contract is c onfirmed or ratified by the principal. wh at we mean is that the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and ever y single second of that day. Even in civil law. PADILLA. Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite. Could we. Thank you. say. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized. if ther e is a contract. by a majority vote . And that is the date when the Constitu tion takes effect. CONCEPCION. have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. although I would not say from the v ery beginning of the date of election because as of that time it is impossible t o determine whether there is a majority. MR. Madam President. the children of Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effecti vity of the 1973 Constitution. I thin k it is precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date ( of ratification that would have a definite date. Yes. therefore. At the end of the day of election or pl ebiscite. which is January 17. Thank you. no matter what time of day or night. So that is the time when the ne w Constitution will be considered ratified and. therefore. GUINGONA. the Constitution is really ef fective from the previous midnight. MAAMBONG. MR. GUINGONA. THE PRESIDENT. MR. Madam President. be it the COM ELEC or the President. MAAMBONG. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla. Madam President. the validity does not begin on the date o f ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. THE PRESIDENT.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting o n his amendment MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion t hat it will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the P resident or the COMELEC will make the formal announcement of the results. MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by the committee. MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the ori ginal committee report as Section 12. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a major ity of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. We ask for a vote, Madam President. V O T I N G THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Member s raised their hands.) As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.) The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2 The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constit ution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on Febr uary 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25, 19 86 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same d ate February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent an y saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, r espondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted rep lacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. Whi le the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Con stitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provid ed for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVII I, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-Presi dent to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the co nvening of the first Congress, etc. A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appo intments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 c ity fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by t he Judicial and Bar Council created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court show that the appointments of the s

even Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 198 7 and they were all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3 (Similarly, the r ecords of the Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in comple tion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were made on January 31, 1 987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have bee n extended by the President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Co uncil, indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2, 1 987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared by the Court. CRUZ, J., concurring. In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point w ith more telling effect than the tones of thunder. She has written another persu asive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired securi ty of tenure under the new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Fre edom Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with her ponenc ia completely. SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting. With due respect to the majority I register this dissent. While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution with respect to the tenure of government functiona ries, as follows: SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Co nstitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of thei r successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from Febru ary 25, 1986. was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the 1987 constitutio n took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified pu rsuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not Febru ary 2, 1987, plebiscite day. I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus: Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall sup ersede all previous Constitutions. It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the dat e its ratification shall have been ascertained, and not at the time the people c ast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said that Co nstitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had not, and could not have been, vet determined. Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.

I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government pe rformed acts that would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but w ould otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, t he appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Und er Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows: xxx xxx xxx Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Sec retary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of th e Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. xxx xxx xxx 2Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be ap pointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no confirmati on. xxx xxx xxx such appointments could be open to serious questions. Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constit ution as well as the amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified. In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17, 1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Rat ification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Consti tutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice, Teeha nkee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our dec ision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so notwi thstanding Section 16, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus: SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification b y a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, excep t as herein provided, shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and t hirty- five and all amendments thereto. On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, pr oclaiming the ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states, inter alia, that. By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendment s embodied in this certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the re ferendum plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore effective and in ful l force and effect as of this date. It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proc laimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the refer endum-plebiscite. On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Procla iming the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Ar

for Ratification or Rejection. 110 and 11 2 and Section 9." It states t hat the amendments: . in declaring the said amendments duly appr oved. albeit Resolutions Nos. Sitti ng as a Constituent Assembly. the same: . Batas Blg. Article XVI o f the Constitution. Two. dated December 18. finally. sitting en banc. 1980. 643). which parented these amendments. 112 and 113. that: These amendments majority of the o the people for Constitution. On the other hand." The Proclamation. On April 7. 104. 105. shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority o f the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2. Sitting as a Constituent Assembly. further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of t he date of this Proclamation. "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Pl ebiscite of January 27." provides. 122." It shall be noted. as follows: SEC. on J anuary 30. and One. We have. in this connection. the Amendment to the Constitution of the Ph ilippines. as shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted t their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the amended. It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21.. 105. The Proclamation provides: [t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes c ast in the plebiscite held. and to Appropriate Funds There fore.. 110. but not later than three months from the approval of the amendments. "An Act to Submit to the Filipino Pe ople.. 1984.. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect. which states. of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immed iately. It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodi ed in Batas Pambansa Blg. together with the election for local officials. that: The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Phili ppines shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes ca st in the plebiscite held for the purpose. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa.are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation. 111. 7. 1981. Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. Batas Pambansa Blg. duly authen ticated and certified by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city. and 113 provide.ticle X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and just ices). shad canvass and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it. Third Regular Session. Proclamation No. 1979. That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculi . in its Resolutions Numbered Three.. the pro posed amendment shall take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Mini ster shall proclaim its ratification. Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April 7. that under Resolutions Nos. 111. The Commission on Elections. 2332.

Elma. Sarmiento.R. pages 620-623. 222.. Minerva ena Jr. 2 Section 2. I now call for its re-exam ination. p. 3 The seven yo. 1987. Benipa G. 3. BP Blg.. Magdangal B. at Malacanang Palace: . In any event. 3. p. 1986 forty forty-fiv e votes in favor and two against. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18. that t he challenged dismissals done on February 8. 1987. concurring: 1 Volume Five. Acc ordingly. April 10. Section 4. does not in any way w eaken this dissent. 2 The entire draft Constitution was approved on October 12.. Reyes. among others.. 3 Article 11. Feb. Nicolas Lap Justo P. Court of Appeals Justices referred to are Justices Alfredo L.1987. Sections 1. 1946. J. Jesus Elbinias. Pimentel G. 73770. 63 SCRA 4 (1975). the 1987 Constitut ion not being then as yet in force. BP Blg. 1. C. 222. 1987. p.J. that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Cons titutional Commission of 1986. 1987 were valid. I hold that it took effect at no other time. Feb. 1987. 6-7 Philippine Daily Inquirer. Teehankee. The April 9.. Torres. and January 9. emphasis supplied. vs. Feb. if we did. Jr. 14. in passi ng. Footnotes 1 Topacio. the remark was said in passing-we did not resol ve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life on February 2. 4 Article X. consistent with the views expressed above. cot 1. 1.ar to the Marcos era. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared. came into force and effect. and their appointments bear various dates from 1987 to January 31. No. 2 Nos. Section 25 and Article X. I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. 3720102 March 3. 1975. 3. col. has bee n duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full fo rce and effect. cols. As I stated. 1986. Malaya. including the Ordinance appended thereto. I am therefore of the opinion.1947. that the new Charter was ratified on February 2. 4 the 1987 Constitution. was adopted on April 9. Cecilio PE. when the incumbent President (Mrs. The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11. 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive application. Corazon C. . dissenting: 1 Manila Bulletin. 1. 1. 5 Section 3. in point of fact. Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates. Jr. Aquino) proclaimed on Fe bruary 11. 1987. 1987. 19 47 plebiscite called pursuant to Republic Act No. 2.

Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh. and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Co mmonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction. On January 2. FERIA. Courts of First Instance." A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Phi lippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic o f the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these I slands. who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts. by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judi cial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philip pine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines. G. And the same respondent. 4 Proclamation No. and J orge B. respondents. 1 and 4. A.R. contends that the government established in the P hilippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments." In said proclamation. an d on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administrati on under law over the districts occupied by the Army. was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs and ju dicial courts. The Chairman of the Executive Commission. 1973. No. 1944. 5 G. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23. it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits. shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past. J. DIZON. in conformity with the ins . based upon what had existed therefore. 50 SCRA 30 (1973). EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. 72301. as well as executive and judicial institut ions. No. issued Executive Orders Nos. respectively. petitioner. dated January 30 and Februar y 5. furthermore. L-5 September 17." and "al l public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully t heir duties as before. and that.3 Nos. in which the Supreme Court. as head of the central administrative organization. Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf. all the l aws now in force in the Commonwealth. 58 (1987). vs. L-36142. 3012 of said court. 1 issued on January 23. with approval of the said Commander in Chief. March 31. the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila. who was appointed Chairman thereof. in his answer and m emorandum filed in this Court.: This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge o f the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 1942. 1942. Court of Appeals. Judge of First Instance of Manila. Vargas. 1942. P.R. 1945 CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM). the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an en abling law granting such authority.1 Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.

that is. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Ph ilippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. orders. General MacArthur. by General Douglas MacArthur. and the Comm onwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands. a few days after the historic landing in Leyte. (2)Whether the procla mation issued on October 23. and (3) If the said judicial act s and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation. That all laws. ordinances and customs. and 3. the principal qu estions to be resolved in the present case may be reduced to the following:(1) W hether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippine s under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces. but no substantial change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdict ion of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Comm ission. s olemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution re stored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law. regulations and processes of any other government in the Phili ppines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal ef fect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." has invalidated all judgements and ju dicial acts and proceedings of the said courts. We shall now proceed to consider the first question. 1943. 1944. a nd continued during. concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative." In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history. . the sole and only gov ernment having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Phil ippines free of enemy occupation and control. regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippi nes free of enemy occupation and control. executive and judicial powers. 2. on behalf of the Government of the United States. . may co ntinue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces. 1945. the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated. Commander in Ch ief of the United States Army. and in the laws they administered and enforced. in which he declared "that all laws. which were the same court existing prior to. subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States. the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27. General Dou glas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which decl ared: 1." On October 14. 1944. whether or not und er the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the court s established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and t he Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid e ven after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States . On February 3. whether the pr esent courts of the Commonwealth. On October 23. 1945. 1942. 3 of February 20. .tructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commande r in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. S ection 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the administration organs an d judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is. the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines.

or w rongdoers. as far as possible. or usurps. in the case of Thorington vs. U. There are several kinds of de facto governments. occupied during the war with Mexico. supported more or less directly by military force. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and pro ceedings of the legislative. A like example is found in the case of Tampico. but they may be administered. 614). the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure.and Filipino forces. by the troops of th e United States . . Mexico. The first. by force or by the voice of the majority. he possesses all the powers of a de facto governme nt. If they were. S. for those acts. said: "But there is another description of government. The second is that which is established and maintained by militar y forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war. and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such chan . and against the rightfu l authority of an established and lawful government. reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . and Tampi co. called also by publicists a government de facto. which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812.. . or government de fac to in a proper legal sense. but which might. by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force. also. . do not become responsible. Page (9 Howard. and judicial departments of a de facto g overnment are good and valid. . while respecting. the rightful legal gove rnments and maintains itself against the will of the latter. but only with the second and third kinds of de fact o governments. public order and safety. is that government that gets possession and control of. such as the governm ent of England under the Commonwealth. Smith (8 Wall. that its existence is m aintained by active military power with the territories. unles s absolutely prevented. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhab itants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the prese nt case with the first kind. the laws in force in the country. though not warranted by the laws of the rightful gove rnment. first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. occupied during the war with Mexico. 253). 1). . perhaps. and (2). . an d which is denominated a government of paramount force. in Mine. Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind. They are usually administered directly by mil itary authority. The question to be determined is whether or not th e governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Exe cutive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military o ccupation or regime were de facto governments. civil authority. as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety du ring his military occupation. executive. which is a revision of the prov isions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant. . be more aptly denominated a government of para mount force. One example of this sort of gover nment is found in the case of Castine. 1. These were cases of temp orary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at war with th e country of which the territory so possessed was part. the judicial acts a nd proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberat ion or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. Rice (4 Wheaton. as the cases of Castine. that while it exis ts it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who. in Maine. vs." The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907. Fleming vs. the Supreme Court of the U nited States." According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1). by the troops of the United Sta tes.

. In that case. the right of assembly. and flows directly from the right to conquer. p. in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19. the muni cipal laws in force in the country. that is. it is not usual for the invader to take the whole adminis tration into his own hands. the local ordinary tribunals are author ized to continue administering justice. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck. . 2. and t he right to travel freely in the territory occupied. nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. and immediat ely operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants. nevertheless. such as. but he is enjoined to respect.) As to "de facto" government of the third kind. He. the freedom of the press. such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime. so far as possible. those laws which enforce public ord er and regulate social and commercial life of the country. the municipal laws of the conquered territory. This en lightened practice is. until they are susp ended or superseded by the occupying belligerent. therefore. to be adhered to on the present occas ion. but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by t he ordinary tribunals. during its military occupation. in the same case of Thorington vs. and can at his pl easure either change the existing laws or make new ones. X. We. p. the right to bear arms. continue to adminis ter the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American Commander in Chief. . and in practice they are not u sually abrogated. and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by th e President of the United States. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of jus tice may.1898. 209. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy and gove rn the territory of the enemy while in its military possession. excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. la ws of a political nature or affecting political relations. it wa s held that "the central government established for the insurgent States differe d from the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war. President McKinley. by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. and judges and other judicial officers a re kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the mili tary or civil authorities appointed. are considered as continuing in force. Smith. substantially as they were before the occupation. In practice. do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror. for aut hority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possessio n. so far as they are compatible with the new order of things. said in part: "T hough the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme. among others . unless absolute ly prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory. in his work on Inte rnational Law (Vol. Although the local and civil adm inistration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country i s militarily occupied. as established by the usage of the of the world. supra. . or the la ws which regulate private rights." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of Presiden t. continue in force during military occupation. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war." And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupie d territory. . o . which were later embodied in the said Hague Conventions.ges in the old as he may see fit. from the law of nations. are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. if they accept the authority of the United States. an d confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine. is one of the in cidents of war. but it was not. has all the powers of a de facto government. relatin g to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have consi dered the subject. On the other hand. The municipal laws of a conquered territory. recognized the governmen t set up by the Confederate States as a de facto government. . the Supreme Court of the United S tates.

less actual or less supreme. or do away with civil governmen t or the regular administration of the laws. and because transactions in the ordinary course o f civil society as organized within the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union. those laws alone determine the lega lity or illegality of its acts. is of no consequence. . where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Governmen t. Lo ckhart (17 Wall. p. marriages celebrated. 176. S. police r egulations maintained. Its char acter is the same and the source of its authority the same. to be treated as valid and binding. or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution. or by the United States in Tampico. 1942. was a civil government established by the military fo rces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. No one. . an d is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It wa s not different from the government established by the British in Castine. by the Command er of the Japanese forces." (Vol. S. the Supreme Court of the United States. As we said in Horn vs. In the case of William vs. Hunter (171 U.. estates settled. and the transfer and descent of property regulated. because the existence o f war between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience. 570. property protected. precisely as in the time of peace. he retained the existing administratio n under the general direction of a french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon . 1. issued on January 23. ser iously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectio nary States touching these and kindered subjects. nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regul ar administration of the laws. that we are aware of." In view of the foregoing. were without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or insu rrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states com posing the so-called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if the y were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of t he National Government. when Napol eon occupied the greater part of Prussia. in the case of Baldy vs. As Halleck says. crime prosecuted. 21 Law. 657): "The existence of a state of insurrect ion and war did not loosen the bonds of society. Order was to be preserved. and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world.n the account. As f ar as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of th e national authority. this. And we think that it must be classed among the governments of which these are examples. and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution'. held: "That what occured or was done in respect of such matters under the authority o f the laws of these local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to t he Union established by the national Constitution. 192). . Mexico. 388. the same general laws for the administ ration of justice and protection of private rights. 2. it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission . discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States. which was organized by Order No. contracts enforced. 400). remained during its continuance and afterwards.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Fi lipinos and not by Japanese nationals. the y are. Maine . The same d octrine has been asserted in numerous other cases. 466. Bruffy (96 U. "The government e stablished over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered. in general. In 1806." And the same court.. and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Cons titution. It is of little conseq uence whether such government be called a military or civil government. which had existed in the Sta tes prior to the rebellion. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war.. ed. sa id: "The same general form of government.

n otably those of Thorington vs. does not serve to transfer sovereignty ove r the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. based upon neither the free ex pression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United S tates. appointed their own officials. "under enemy duress. above quoted. For it is a we ll-established doctrine in International Law. . (Thirty Hogsh ead of Sugar vs. Bruffy. 505. taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American fo rces from the Islands. And as such. governing the Islands until possession thereof w as surrendered to the United States on February 22. (Calvo. Hunter. having first appointed a provisional government. was. even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who. th e Filipinos. when they invaded France in 1870. the belligerent occup ation. Boyle. recognize d as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. formerly in insurrection against Spain. a government established by the belligerent occupa nt or the Japanese forces of occupation. Page.. (Wellington Despatches. 246. . S 20. International Law. the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25. 1943. 1944. 1.) The formatio n of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude t he Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese ge sture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines. Indeed. Smith. at least in Alsace and Lorraine. 416). 4 Wheat. United States vs. Hall. it would have been a de facto government similar to t hat organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recogniz ed as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases. a portion of which has been already quo ted. 191. recognized in Article 45 of the Ha uge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occ upied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power).. in the same way. took possession of the Isla nds and established a republic. the Filipino people. and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of inva sion. on invading France.." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or tra nsfer the sovereignty of the United States to. and Badly vs. It was of the same character as the Phi lippine Executive Commission. Downes vs. but which might.. 9 Howard. the Duke of Willington. on the other hand. Bidwell. 1898. p. 307 . had organized an independent government under the name with the support an d backing of Japan. 9 Cranch. United States (299 U. and shortly afterwards. Williams vs. 2186-93. 1 898. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23. . be more aptly den . perhaps. 7 th ed. S. 25). and. And the said Supreme C ourt held in that case that "such government was of the class of de facto govern ments described in I Moore's International Law Digest. S.. such government would have been considered as one establishe d by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. The Germans. 603. in every department of adm inistration and of every rank. IV. or recognize the latent sovereign ty of. Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied nations. a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14. note 2. apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino peopl e. 'called also by publicists a government de facto. authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions. Fl eming vs. being essentially provisional.). and similar to the short-lived government established by the Fili pino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war. 345. ap parently without appointing an English superior. in truth and reality. and the ultimate source of its authority was the s ame the Japanese military authority and government. pars. XI. 182 U. before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. According to the facts in the la st-named case. Rice. It was established under the mistaken belief that by doing so.

for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio. as above indicated." That is to say. but also to administrative or legislative. administrat ive acts so done. according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings. and it would b e contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals shou ld be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government . Were it otherwise. were good a nd valid. 7th ed. The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only t o the judicial processes. "does not." (Hall. it would be hard for e xample that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored. that the govern belligerent forces in insurrection or rebelli upon the same principles as that of a territo an enemy at regular war with the legitimate p The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the P hilippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments. and the various acts done during the same time by private persons u nder the sanction of municipal law. postliminy applies . remain good.) That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments. which declares null and void all laws. when they are not of a political complexion.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case. which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted h is own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting indepen dence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippi nes. exc ept in a very few cases. which are not of a political complexion. force . (Taylor. '. processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other government al agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium ) in international law. p. rests ry occupied by the hostile army of ower.ominated a government of paramount ment of a country in possession of on against the parent state. is confirmed by the Proclamation i ssued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23. to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes o f any other government" as used in the above-quoted proclamation of General Doug las MacArthur of October 23. as well as constitutional. i t necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of ju stice of those governments. International Law. and could not have been. are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant. which are not of a political complexion. it should be presumed that it was not. 518. and. the whole so cial life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion. 2. 1944 that is. remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupa tion of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.. Taking in to consideration the fact that. p. whether it was the intention of the C ommander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during th e Japanese military occupation. Thus judicial acts done under his control. which a re not of a political complexion. According to that well-known principle in interna tional law. 615. . wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader. Intern ational Law. of the de facto governments during the Japanes e military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occup ied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign. 1944. in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in sai . the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty. and as between the s tate and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less. regulations and processes of the governments established in the P hilippines during the Japanese occupation. the intention of General D ouglas MacArthur.

And it is ano ther well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenie nce will result from a particular construction. who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23. in violation of said principles of international law. 37. from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship w ould result.d proclamation. "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese regime. and great public interests would be endangered and sacrificed. which has the force of law. 1944. and criminals mig ht easily become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared o r be no longer available. as a n agent of his government. or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed. C. to refer to judicial processes. is impliedly confirmed by Exec utive Order No. but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of section 3. for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or ves ted rights nullified. for it would have to be expected t hat litigants would not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgem ents or decisions may afterwards be annulled." It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation. is as broad as that o f the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation (alth ough the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of oc cupation). Article II. 1027. applied by t he Presidents of the United States. L. especially now that almost all court records in the Ph ilippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army. 1028. may set aside o r annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the belliger ent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military occupation. C. during th e military and before the restoration of the civil regime. and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907. pp. it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur.) The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy. L." Moreover. But even assuming that. under the law of nation s. and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of th e Nation. may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulga te new ones in the occupied territory. would be sufficient to paralyze the soci al life of the country or occupied territory. who was acting a s an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States. 1025." should not only reverse the international p olicy and practice of his own government. or great mischief done. p. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is tha t it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court pro ceedings.. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas MacAr thur. set fort h in 25 R. issued by the President of the P . as above indicated. or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended b y the makers of the law. "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of t he Commonwealth of the Philippines. for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction.. the legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberate s or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy. unless required by clear and unequivocal words. and criminals would not be deterre d from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside. sentences passed on criminals set aside. if and when the exigencies of the militar y occupation demand such action. such construction is to be avoided. which provides tha t "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy. did not in tend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence. of our Constitution. (25 R.

hilippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power veste d in him by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all ca se which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be tra nsmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recogniz es that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur o f October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which have b een duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases w hich had therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Cou rt of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed ca ses pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restor ation of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appe aled cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgment s rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime. The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid and under internatio nal law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remember ed that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that most matter s are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, is a q uestion that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule o f international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government the righ t of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it in its stead the ob ligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government." There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of t he acts of the occupier, such as the laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other governm ent" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not necessary to determine whet her or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgme nts and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question t o be determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the proclamation h ad, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial p rocesses of any other government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to d eclare them null and void. But the proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as C ommander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror. Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience, constitute or from th e law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International La w, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first question, impo ses upon the occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), se ction II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nat ionals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (D ecision of the Court of Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg

, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nation als thereof from asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendere d by said courts in their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for t o declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts th e right and action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupat ion thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a perso n to do something will not at the same time empower another to undo the same. Al though the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United St ates Army has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his co untry is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in construing and applying limitat ions imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "ar ise from general rules of international law and from fundamental principles know n wherever the American flag flies." In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United States in South Carolina after th e end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancer y in that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not wa rranted by the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and Jul y 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of milit ary officers in command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the c ourse of its decision the court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in ques tion. . . . The clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so exercised. . . . It wa s an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined . Whether Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a questio n we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the ex ercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall n ever be pushed beyond what the exigency requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoi nt indicated, we hold that the order was void." It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and vo id without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were co ntinued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippin es during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proc eedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. 3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and continued during, the Japane se military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-call ed Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceeding s in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoc cupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Go vernment was restored.

Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial a dministration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to a dminister the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely preven ted, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKi nley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be adm inistered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupa tion. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, execut ive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror t o continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be u nnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisi onal, and the government established by the occupant of transient character. Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be affective for the t ime being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their prese nt post and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine Exe cutive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chie f, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive O rders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Sup reme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of Febru ary 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philipp ines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the J apanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military admi nistration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of t he Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reest ablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hal l, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases th en pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisd iction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity, upon the r emoval of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and dut ies substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original s and subject to the same exception in ca hape upon removal of the external force, se of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.) The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in hi s conclusion that the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by him "ha s no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of this cas e) to final judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of th

" The court in the said case of U. it is a legal maxim. section III. vs. Reiter. if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant . "extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply a change made by th e invader in the legitimate sovereignty. (Wheaton. the Germans in France a ttempted to violate that rule by ordering. 13 Met. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty. The laws they enforced were. International Law. 102). nor needlessly to break the continuit y of their legal life. of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion o f the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power. Cases. War. 68. laws and courts of Japan. as already shown. G ermany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers occupying A lsace and Lorraine.. they must be allowed to give their sen tences in the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake. Chapman. did not become. Once crea ted. the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. of the sovereign nation t hat is militarily occupying the territory. Because. Conquest or colonizat ion is impotent to bring law to an end." As courts are creatures of statutes and laws which create and confer upon them uch laws. 7th English ed. According to Wheaton. III. Int. but they had become the laws and t he courts had become the institutions of Japan by adoption (U. This duty is neither to innovate in the political life of the occupied districts. in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cam bridge." upon the ground that the exercise of their p owers in the name of French people and government was at least an implied recogn ition of the Republic. Hence. What the court s aid was that. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the country occupied if continued by the conqueror or occupant. therefore. true enough. by adoption. s econd ed. belligeren t or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transf er the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. and so forever. The provision of Article 45 . From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primiti ve people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. if . Beale. not being a political nature. and the cases commenced and the left pending therein. Law. vs. gnty. "La w once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative pow er. the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting. become the laws and the courts. The laws and the c ourts of the Philippines. Part II. A proclamation that said is not necessary in order that they may their existence defends upon that of the their jurisdiction. 244. p. Such proclamation.) As the same author says. Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law.) Furthermore. and continue in force "ex proprio islative acts. When in 1870. Cases o n Conflict of Laws. The laws and institution or courts so continued remain t he laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory." (Joseph H. in spite of change of constitution. after the fall of the Emperor Napoleo n." but later offered to allow use of the name of the Emperor o r a compromise. 16146). that excepting that of a political nature. however. it is evident that s are not abrogated by a change of soverei vigore" unless and until repealed by leg laws and courts are expressly continued continue in force.e courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines. they become his and derive their force from him.S." is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth Government.. it persists until a change take place. citing Commonwealth vs. and when changed it continues in suc h changed condition until the next change. so far as the courts of justice are allowed to con tinue administering the territorial laws. No. as they became later on the laws and institutions of the P hilippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines. 1916. p. laws of t he Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation. 1944. in the sense that he may cont inue or set them aside. Summary Section 9. the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High German Pow ers occupying Alsace and Lorraine. by being continued as requi red by the law of nations. the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a ch ange.S. 27 F.

136 was substituted in lieu thereof. no enabling acts were enacte d during the Japanese occupation. and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had becom e the courts of Japan. it would have provided that all the cases whi ch had. as it is hereby abolished. They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their juri sdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cas es and proceedings commenced therein. 186. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same one whi ch had been functioning during the Republic. and continued after. When the Span ish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the p ossession of the United States. 3 as amended. almost all. and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pendi ng therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audienc ia" or Supreme Court was abolished. the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued a nd did not cease to exist. as we have stated in discussing the previous question. 136 wa s enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the Spanish-America n War of 1898. therefore. it necessarily follows t hat the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pen ding therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government." In so providing. when the criminal jurisdicti on of provost courts in the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. Similarly. 1942. and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of Act No. as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring ju risdiction upon them have continued in force until now. if not all. can continue the proceedings in cases pending t herein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred t o another court. As a consequence. Court of First Instance. 1945) been duly appealed to said court. the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. that is. been dully appeal . but that which had existed up to th e time of the Japanese occupation. . Said Executive Order provides"( 1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No." and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transm itted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . to the ju stices of the peace courts. must have been cases coming from the C ourts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. prior to and up to that occupation on January 2. be abolished. or Supreme Court having jur isdiction over them according to law. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases p ending therein upon the change of sovereignty. On the other hand. Therefore. during the American regime. in order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. And later on. unless and u ntil they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon th em are repealed by the said government. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former.made. That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our co nclusion in connection with the second question. 183 were transferred to th e latter. or which had theretofore (that is. of the cases pending therein. up to March 10 . which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines. when section 78 of Act No. the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that existed pr ior to. is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing tho se laws. for . until section 65 of the same Act No. the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil action s then pending in the provost courts to the proper tribunals. even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty ov er these Islands. the same section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the j urisdiction of the municipal court created by Act No. is confi rmed by Executive Order No. but a mere proclamation or order that the cour ts in the Island were continued. . are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignt y.

44 Law. pending in said court at the time of the restora tion of the said Government. 677.ed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for fi nal decision. having refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as presidi ng judge of that court. the universal practice is to turn to the writings of pu blicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries o f the world (The Habana.J. not of political complexion.S. concurring: The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the proceedings held in civil case No.. 146. C. 83 8). 146 U. to final judgment. 3012. In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue. it follows that the Court of First Inst ance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. So order ed... Colorado.. 185 U. in connection with the municipal law in force in this country. it is a part of the fundamental law of the land (Art icle II. Paras.. which involves civil rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government. in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manil a. under the now defunct Philippine Republic. obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue. Jaranilla and Pablo. 552. 13 Sup. 1944. concur. it must be ascertained and administered by this Court. The decision of this question requires the application of principles of International Law. Attril. 46 Law. As International Law is an integral part of our laws.S. J. No pronouncement as to costs. Having arrived at the above conclusions. as. therefore. and that the respondent judge of the court.. ed. and th e effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur. Ct. and to ascertain what these usages and customs are. pendi ng therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. during Japanese occupation. and this consent is evi denced chiefly by the usages and customs of nations. whenever questions of right depending upon it are p resented for our determination. Moran. 657. Ozaeta. . the proceedings in cases. 320). the proof of the existence of a given rule is to b e found in the consent of nations to abide by that rule. 290.. but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands. Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by nations as regul ating their mutual relations. Ed. Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of general law (Juntin gton vs. directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila . It is. ed. d ated October 23. 36 Law. Ct. Cit. sitting as an international as well as a domesti c Tribunal (Kansas vs. Separate Opinions DE JOYA. 20 Sup.S. especially taking into consideration the fact that the questio n of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular case.. 1123). section 3). 175 U. 224.. mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordina ry course of law. before and during Japanese occupation. and Interna tional Law is no alien in this Tribunal.. JJ. 3012. under the Constitution of the Commo nwealth of the Philippines. ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedi ngs in civil case No. 22 Sup. 3012 of said court.

955.S. public order and safety. pp.(Young vs. 416.. 18 21). 1 821. Col eman vs. 2 d ed. Westlake on International Law... pp. 3rd ed. ARTICLE XLIII. U. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant. 475. 476. the later shall take all steps in his power to reest ablish and insure. respecting laws and customs of war on land.. expre ssly declares that: ARTICLE XLII. 7th ed. [1874]. 330-332 335. II Oppenheim of International Law. 955. 416. The Hague Conventions of 1899. such as The Hag ue Conventions of 1899 and 1907. and partly because the latter are more competent to administer the laws in force within the territory and the military occupant generally keeps in their posts s uch of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing to serve under hi m... II.S. 413.. II. 9 9 U. the laws in force in the country. 1945. therefore.. and this authority will be exercised upon principles of international Law ( New Orleans vs.But while usage is the older and original source of International Law. There can be no question that the Philippines was under Japanese military occupa tion. U. (32 Stat. 39. on January 3. in so far as they do not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. ed. but only when in actual possession of the enemy's territ ory. great int ernational treaties are a later source of increasing importance. and permitting the local courts to function and administer such laws. as proclaimed in the City of Manila. Ct.. Lawrence on International Law. and in a position to assert itself. 6t h Edition [1909]. pp. from January. partly because it is eas ier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials. 412. U.S. 578. Hall on International Law. 465. 359. 57 Law Ed. unless absolutely prevented. 441.) The above provisions of the Hague Convention have been adopted by the nations gi ving adherence to them. in February. subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities. section 167). Taylor on International Law. sections 576. was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law. among which is United States of America (32 Stat. 57 Law.. 509. respecting the laws in f orce in the country. . Tennessee.. Sanders [1878]. up to the time of the reconquest by the armed forces o f the United States of the Island of Luzon. Kelly vs. 20 Wall. 1942. 992. 387. 331-37. The r egular judicial Tribunals of the occupied territory continue usual for the invad er to take the whole administration into his own hands. The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority. Holland on International Law pp. . pp. while respecting . as far as possible. MacLeod vs.. 1942. during Japanese occupation.S. 97 U. 356. 1260. 33 Sup.) It is. 229 U.. 1118. Davis.S. 1260. 121-23. Ct. pp. ed. Wilson on International Law. 33 Sup. by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces. It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded State continue i n force. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. 24 Law ed. 24 Law.S. 229 U. or by superi or civil authorities appointed by him. Steamship Co. Elements of International Law.S. evident that the establishment of the government under the socalled Philippine Republic. and partly bec ause it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials. MacLeod vs... The occupation applies only to be territory where such authority is established. 357. 464.

Said judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of America were considered legal and valid and enforceable. remained during its continuance and afterwards.) The government established in the Philippines. and enforceable in 1871(French vs. 7 id. by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force. Cas. merely settling the rights of private parties actually within their jurisd iction. Tennessee. 97 U. Lockhart. 459. 1861.." (William vs.. in accordance with the laws i n force within territory it must necessarily follow that the judicial proceeding s conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be consi dered legal and valid.. Law. which had existed in the States prior to the reb ellion. Sprott vs. as wrong-doers. the Court held "It is now settled law in this court that during the late civil war the same general f orm of government. Williams vs. [U. 99 U. ed. nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion had been declared val id and binding (Cock vs. Bruffy. No. for such acts of obedience (Thorington vs. No. during Japanese occupation. Buckley ([1878].. during the American Civil War. 96 U. under the Constitution. and (2) that whil e it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens w ho. for those acts. Coleman vs . 7 id. 1 Woods.S. Lockhart.. They are usually administered d irectly by military authority. 416. 509.S.. Buckley [1878]. also.. 20 id. 361). Sprott vs. 459. 24 Law.. Case. [N. 17 Wall.. called also by publicists. 118. even after said government establish by the military occu pant has been displaced by the legitimate government of the territory. even after t he termination of the American Civil War. White. Ketchum vs.. Oliver. or the just and legal rights of the citizens. 10 Am. 20 id. not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States.. though not warranted by the laws of th e rightful government. supported more or less directly by military force. 8 Wall.. because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. 5104). 437. (Macleod vs. 164. Te xas vs. was and should be considered as a de facto g overnment. Fed. United St ates [1913] 229 U. Bruffy. United States. Smith. but which might. In the case of Ketchum vs. the same general law for the administration of justice and th e protection of private rights.S. and did not become responsible.If the military occupant is thus in duly bound to establish in the territory und er military occupation governmental agencies for the preservation of peace and o rder and for the proper administration of justice. during Japanese occupation. and that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts which h . Horn vs. White.S. for the purchase money of slaves was held valid judgment when entered. 176 . 700. 188). 3.. 700. Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts. 17 Wall. Actual government of this sort are established over distr icts differing greatly in extent and conditions. United States. as wrong doers.]. S. As far as the acts of th e States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authorit y. perhaps. and against t he rightful authority of an established and lawful government. Fed. 99 U.. a gov ernment de facto. by civil auth ority. 9. but they may be administered. would seem to fall under the following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States: But there is another description of government. do not become res ponsible. Reg. Horn vs. 570. S. be more aptly denominateda governmen t of paramount force. 96 U. 641. 188). 19 Law.]. 176..) The government established in the Philippines. and the judgm ent of a court of Georgia rendered in November. The Confederate States were a de facto governme nt in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the government obedience in civil matters. ed. Texas vs. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1) that its existe nce is maintained by active military power within the territories. Tumlin.S. under the so-called Philippine Re public.S. 570. they ar e in general to be treated as valid and binding.

which have been sanc tioned by the Supreme Court of the United States. Coombs [1838]. Ct. such as the provisions of our Civil Code. 49 Law. 2 Phil.. Rep. 511. 36 Law. the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts of justice . as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and uncertainties. which would avoid results of this character. which have no political or military significance.. In re Guarina [1913]. 836). 358.. All laws should receive a sensible construction. includes the duty of avoiding a construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions. And it is also to be presumed that General MacArthur his acted. Massachussetts. 12 Sup. 461. In re Allen. 143 U. Brown [1884]. ed. Cas. Ge neral terms should be so limited in their application as not lead to injustice.. therefore. 46 P hil. under the provisions of the Civil Code. 643. vs.S. For the foregoing reasons. Now. 53 Law. should be considered legal. 385). vs. regula tions and processes of any other government of the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 630). are to be considered legal and valid and enforceable. 39. 25 Sup. The duty of the court in construing a statute. even after the liberation of this co untry by the American forces.. 482. ed. 29 Sup.. Ct. 19 Law. 278. S.. dated October 23." In other words. vs ... I concur in the majority opinion. 112 U. 527. S. Ltd.. the courts will always adopt the former (U. is unt enable.ad been established in this country. 125.. established here during Japanese military occupation.. vs. oppression or an absurd consequence. before and during Japan ese occupation. The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer t o the settlement of property rights.. 12 Pet. Ct. and would be highly detrimental to the pu blic interests.. valid and bi nding. 366. Bell & Co. as International Law is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land. as long as the said judicial proceedings had been conducted. and the legal doctri nes cited above. under the provisions of the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArth ur. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its l etter (U. petitioner demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur. ed. 3 Ann. 24 Phil. Church of Holy Tr inity vs. 226. 136). 40 Phil. as the nullification of all ju dicial proceedings conducted before our courts. 5 Sup. [U. always alive to the dictates of national welfare. 72. 261.. S. under the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.]. a contention which. U. ed.. one of which will maint ain and the others destroy it. during said Japanese occupation. Fuentes vs.. . 704. The judiciary. in force in this country under the Commonwealth government.. which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that which saves is constitutionality. merely applying the muni cipal law of the territory. 7 Wall. as said proclamation "nullifies all the laws.. Director of Prisons [1924]. Board of Supervisors of Granada County vs. Nativ idad [1919].. Kirby. ed. Ct. in acco rdance with said rules and principles of International Law.S. if it can be avoided (U. S. S. U. 1004.. It will always.. in our opinion. It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur is familiar with said rules and principles. ed. can properly incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which wi ll most effectively promote the public policy (Smith. 28 Law.S. 37. Jacobson vs. petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void. be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language. Del aware & Hudson Co. When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions. 1944. 9 Law. S. during Japanese occupation would lead to injustice and absurd results. 197 U. According to the rules and principles of International Law. 765.

whether for any other strong or valid reasons. decided to reestablish. The tiny and twinkl ing points of light set above us on the velvet darkness of the night will cease to inspire us with dreams of more beautiful and happier worlds. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as a commander in Chief o f the American Army. There are so many events. the American Armed Forces of Liberation landed successfully in Leyte. Lycurgus. 1944. whe ther against the policies of the American Government. so many pr oblem. and we might miss the nearest and most familiar things. it must not be evaded.. Nine centuries lat er Emperor Hung Wu. . known as the law-maker of heavens. his mission in life. Even the inorganic world has to conform the law. endowed with rebellious spirit. the first code was engrave in black diorite with cunie form characters. He might have thought of recognizing the validity of some of said acts. Thanks to them. but. On its supremacy depends the stability of states and nations.PERFECTO. his objectives. The preservation of the human race itself hinges in law. It is actual application to real issues which gives laws the breath of life. To keep the bonds of society. certainly. When victory in islands was accomplished. whether detrimental to the interests of the Am erican or Filipino peoples. in the cradle of the most ancient civilization. Draco. Planets and stars follow the laws discovered by Kepler. Since time immemorial. In the varied and confused market of human endeavor there are so many things tha t might induce us to forget the elementals. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION In October. the immediate result would be cosmic chaos. More than twenty-two centurie s before the Christian Era. in behalf of the United States. after the most amazing and spectacular war operations. so many preoccupations that are pushing among themselves to attract our a ttention. dissenting: Law must be obeyed. Even ruthless Genghis Khan used laws to keep discipline among the nomad ho rdes with which he conquered the greater part of the European and Asiastic conti nents. No government can prevail without it. compiled the Code of the Great Ming. I f. Shall we shrink? Shall we circumvent it ? Can we ignore it? The laws enacted by the legislators shall be useless if courts are not ready to apply them. like the man w ho went around his house to look for a pencil perched on one of his ears. whether inconsistent with military strategy and operations. Here is a law that we must apply. The laws of Manu were written in the verdic India. there were acts which he should declare null and void. Mose s received at Sinai the ten commandments. they should happen to challenge the law of un iversal gravity. on orders of the Assyrian King Hammurabi. man has relied on law as an essential means of attaining his purposes. Animal and plants species must follow the mendelian heredity rules and other bio logical laws to survive. Again we are called upon to do our duty. the chalk cliffs of the infusoria show the marvel of an animal so tiny as to be imperceptible to the naked eye creating a whole mountain. Then he was confronted with the question as to what policy to adopt in regards t o the official acts of the governments established in the Philippines by the Jap anese regime. the Commonwealth Government. Solon made laws in Gr eece. J.

That all laws. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is. After all. and 3. the Commander in Chief issued the following proclamation : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PROCLAMATION To the People of the Philippines: WHEREAS. when the Commonwealt h Government is already functioning. the sole and the only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. . based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the Unite d States. which to recognize. Judicial and Legislative powe rs of government over the people. the seat of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines has b een re-established in the Philippines under President Sergio Osmeña and the member s of his cabinet. So on October 23. as Commander in Chief of the military forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines. and which must validated. which acts and processes must be revived and validated in the public interest. with proper information.But. through its Congress. 2. United States Army. the military forces under my command have landed in the Philippines soi l as a prelude to the liberation of the entire territory of the Philippines. and judici al acts and processes under the Japanese regime. subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States. I. under enemy duress. a so-called government styled as the "Republic of t he Philippines" was established on October 14. Douglas MacArthur. and which not? He was not in a position to gather enoug h information for a safe basis to distinguished and classify which acts must be nullified. More pressing military matters were requiring his immediate attention. Now. and I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and extend to the peopl e of the Philippines the sacred right of government by constitutional process un der the regularly constituted Commonwealth Government as rapidly as the several occupied areas are liberated to the military situation will otherwise permit. He followed the safe course: to nullify all the legislative. and is purporting to exercise Executive. 1943. 1944. and WHEREAS. therefore. General. regulations and processes of any other government in the Phili ppines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal ef fect in areas of the Philippines free enemy occupation and control. and WHEREAS. executive. At the same time he had to take immediate a ction. The laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philipp ines and the regulation promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effec t and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. do hereby proclaim and declare: 1. he will be in a po sition to declare by law.

and his action as such in the case brought by the Union Bank against them were invalid. had been conquered by the arms of the United States as early as 1846. J. and form a civil government for the conquered country. with powers limi ted only by the receipts of the fundamental laws of his country. H. Shortly afterward the United States had military possession of all upper California.000. a complete system of government. The judgement of the District Court was agai nst the plaintiffs. volunteer aide-de-camp. The defense was taken that the judge had no jurisdiction over the civil cases. 164. he may abolish the said agencies. because in violation of the Consti tution of the United States. as constitutio nal commander in chief of the army and navy.) In May. A few days after this order the Union Ba nk lent to the plaintiffs the sum of $130. he may issue proclamations. S. California. In fact. provost judge of the city. Early in 1847 the President. orders. The same order appointed Capt. and they paid the money under protest . which vests the judicial power of the General gover nment in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obed ience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR General U. and to impose dut ies on imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the gove rnment. To this affirmance error is now assigned. . 1862. he is the supreme ruler and law-maker of the territory under his control. i nstructions. and subsequently. authorized the military and naval c ommander of our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a con queror. because the Provost Cou rt had no jurisdiction of the case. October 23. Cross of Harri son. issued a general order appo inting Major J. and directed that he should be obeyed and respected according ly. all with the full force of laws enacted by a duly constitut ed legislature. . Said Commander in Chief may establish in the occupied or reoccupied territory. the Capt. and under this constitutional provision they were entitled to immunity from liability imposed by the judgment of the Provost Cour . French provost marshal of the city. victory being paramount am ong them. after the capture of New Orleans by the United States Army. he may appoint officers and e mployees to manage the affairs of said government. he may set policies that should be followed by the public admini stration organized by him. then in command of the army at that place. 16 Howard. r egulations and other acts of their duly constituted government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil. but judgement was given against the borrowers. 189. M. Stafford deputy provost marshal. the loan not ha ving been repaid. of the division staff. the appointment of the judge. and of the army which has the conquest in possession. To recover it back is the object of the present suit. and the contention of th e plaintiffs is that the judgement was illegal and void. or the port of San Francisco. brought suit before the provost judge to recover the debt. u nder his control. Genera l Butler. Army Commander in Chief IS THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION LAW? In times of war the Commander in Chief of an army is vested with extraordinary i nherent powers. and this judgement was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. as a natural result of the nature of the military operations aim ed to achieve the purposes of his country in the war. The argument of the plaintiffs in error is that the establishment of the Provost Court. 1944. Bell.

in 1846. the jurisdicti on of which declared to embrace. and determine civil causes. as comman der in chief. "It becam e the duty of the National government. which military courts are not. But though these c ourts and this judicial system were established by the military authority of the United States. the contro lling question is whether the commanding general of the army which captured New Orleans and held it in May 1862. Assuming that the case is thus brought within our right to review it. with authority to hear. may be found a notable illustration. The duty of the National government in this respect was no other than that which dev olves upon a regular belligerent. this court ruled that they were lawfully established. without any legislation of Congress. " That clause of the Constitution has no application to the abnormal condition o f conquered territory in the occupancy of the conquering. as Comman der in Chief. to provide." Thus it has been determined that the power to establish by military authority co urts for the administration of civil as well as criminal justice in portions of the insurgent States occupied by the National forces. Upon the conquest of New Mexico. army. As was said in the opi nion of the court. wherever the insurgent power was overthro wn. It refers only t o courts of United States. in The Grapeshot. it is claimed. as far as possible. It was a military duty. a Federal question is presented. all criminal causes that should not othe rwise provided for by law. The ordinance created courts. The subject came under the considera tion by this court in The Grapeshot. first. and it was ruled that a court instituted by President Lincoln for the State of Louisiana. and secondly. the commanding officer of the conquering army. so long as the war continued. portions of the insurgent territory were occupied by the Nationa l forces. In Leitensdo rfer & Houghton vs. Webb. original and exclusive cognizance of al l civil cases not cognizable before the prefects and alcades. with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. to establish therein provisional courts for the hearing and determ ination of all causes arising under the laws of the States or of the United Stat es. to be performed by the President. . had authority after the capture of the city to establish a court and appoint a judge with power to try and adjudicate civil cau ses. where it was decided that when. was lawfu lly authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. it was within the constitutional authority of the President. try. Thus. occupying during war the territory of another belligerent. Did the Constitution of the United States prevent the creation of the civil courts in captured districts during the war of the rebellion. in virtu e of the power of conquest and occupancy. for the security of the persons and property and for the administration of justice. but it established a judicial sy stem with a superior or appellate court. our jurisdiction is inv oked. It did not undertake to change the municipal laws of the territory. during the late civil war.t. And there was no express order for their establishmen t emanating from the President or the Commander in Chief. Its establishment by the military authority was held to be no violation of the constitutional provision that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may form time to time ordain and establish. and with circuit courts. The ordinance was the act of the General Kearney the commanding officer of the army occupying the conq uered territory. and instructed as such with the direction of the military force by which the occupation was held. is precisely the same as t hat which exists when foreign territory has been conquered and is occupied by th e conquerors. and with the sanction and authority of the President. and their creatio n by military authority? This cannot be said to be an open question. and the territory which had been dominated by it was occupied by the Nationa l forces. ordained a provisional government for the country. and the highest court o f the State having decided against the immunity claimed. delivered by Chief Justice Chase. What that power is has several times been considered.

. it is declared that all laws. 588. or synonymous with. He was commissioned to carry on the war in Louisina. 89 U. however. also the means of accomplishing an end. that the President alone. as a Commander in Chief. process is synonymous with proceedings or procedures and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a judicial cause from it commencement to its conclusion. A writ. had such authority. 32 Am. subpoena. Co. that when General of the Army Douglas MacArthur issued on October Proclamation. warrant. the means or method pointed out by a stat ute. were the acts of his commander in chief. regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth. It must be presumed that he acted und er the orders of his superior officer. in civil. In fact. in case of conflict. valid. It is broadest sense it i s equivalent to. therefore.) There is no question. Consequently. and after indictment. Definition. (3 Bou vier's Law Dictionary. 48. He was.." and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its conclusion . still General Butler had no authority to establish such a court. W. the President. are null and void. 2731. Said proclamation has the full force of a law. Union Bank. T he establishment of such courts is but the exercise of the ordinary rights of co nquest. said proclamation is legal. and that his acts. St. not only the ordinary laws of the Commonwealth of the Ph ilippines. 276-298. in the prosecution of the war. Rep. They argue. 51 N. Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the means whereby a court compel . "proceedings" or "procedure. 1. had no constitutional immunity again st subjection to the judgements of such courts. was of e stablishing courts in conquered territory. 286.) A. S. and bin ding. The method taken by law to compel a compliance with the original writ or command as of the court. but also our Constitution itself while we remain under the American f lag. We do not concur in this view. so far as they were denied to him by the Commander in Chief. General Butler was in command of the conquering and the oc cupying army. [22 Wall. The plaintiffs in error. and among these powers. The means of compelling a defendant to appear in court aft er suing out the original writ. Havi ng been issued in the exercise of the American sovereignty. He did it as the official representative of the supreme authority of the Un ited States of America.In view of these decisions it is not to be questioned that the Constitution did not prohibit the creation by the military authority of court for the trial of ci vil causes during the civil war in conquered portions of the insurgent States. Process generally. there fore.]. of a paramount law. In Practice. 624). "PROCESS" IN THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION In the third section of the dispositive part of the October Proclamation. (108 Mo. that if thi s be conceded. or other formal writing issued by authority law. therefore. he did it in the legitimate exercise of his pow ers. in criminal case s. including judicial proceedings. Gollobitch v s. as we have seen. or used to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants. 567. p. PROCESS. it can even supersede. whether by writ or notic e. (Mechanics' etc . Wilson vs. As a legal term process is a generic word o f every comprehensive signification and many meanings.. W. R. 84 la. 18 S.. Rainbow. Bank vs. invested with all the powers of making war. Does the word "processes" used in the proclamation include judicial processes? In its broadest sense..

Bank vs.) Baron Comyn says that process. or which shall be issued in or upon any action. by writ or otherwise . 148. 50 A. it i s largely taken for all proceedings in any action or prosecution. 149. or by proceeding and warrant. body. duly attested and directed to some mun icipal officer or to the party to be bound by it. notice. J. State vs. comprehends the whole proc eedings after the original and before judgement. PP. 273. 442. rule order. at the commencement of an action or at any time during its progress or incident thereto. permanent edition. 329. Y. all writs. and orders of courts of justice or judicial of ficers. summonses. that it b e duly attested.. suit or proceeding shall be commenced.. (50 C. b ut it is not always necessary to construe the term so strictly as to limit it to a writ issued by a court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. or legal proceedings.) In a broad sense the word "process" includes the means whereby a court compels t he appearance of the defendant before it. or at least to writs or writing s issued from or out of court. (34 Words and Phrases. under the seal thereof. 73 Vt.. In a narrow or restricted sense it is means those mandates of the court intending to bring parties into court or to require them t o answer proceedings there pending. a uthority.. and returnable thereto. either i n deed or in law. under seal. E. court to answer. though usually. 1940 edit ion. and it is not restricted to mesne process.. 169. namely. 410.. in a large acceptance.] Hill. 869. summons. p. In some jurisdictions codes or statutes variously define "process" as signify ing or including: A writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings . but generally it imports the wr its which issue out of any court to bring the party to answer. or prohibiting the doing of some act. and a ny every writ. warrants. or any writ. and spirit of the statute in which it occur s.. It is called "process" because it proceeds or goes upon former matter. p. 43. App. and all process out of the King's court ought to be in the name of the Ki ng. the term is sometimes defined as a writ or other formal writing issued by authority of l aw or by some court. 199. of acquiring jurisdi ction of defendant or his property. or by a judge thereof. but not necessarily by the judge. Poitivint. or a compliance with it demands. 421. usually under seal of the court. that it run in the name of the sovereign of the state. commanding the commission of s ome act at or within a specified time. suit or proceeding. or decree. 198. 83 S. 15 Ga. 148. subject matter.. He says: "Process of law is two fold. or compelling him to appear in.. "Process" and "writ" or "writs" are synonymous i n the sense that every writ is a process. or for doing exec ution. 272. or of bringing defendant into. eithe r original or judicial.) Jacobs in his Law Dictionary says: "Process" has two qualifications: First. suit. but not alway s. 147. The cardinal requisites are that the instrument issue from a court of justice. permanent edition. Bird 15 Fla. 1940 edition. 170. 154. (Colquitt Nat. order. (34 Words and Phrases. and in a narrow sense of the term "pro cess" is limited to judicial writs in an action. permanent edition. 70 Ka n. Keystone Ironworks Co. declaration. 1940 edition. by the King's writ. and it is f requently used to designate a means.s a compliance with it demands. Watson vs. Shaw. (34 Words and Phrase s." (People vs. 74 P. or a judge thereof. without writ. p. As employed in the statutes the legal meaning of the word "process" varies accor ding to the context. and that it be directed to some one commanding or prohibiting the commission of an act.) A "process" is an instrument in an epistolary from running in the name of the so vereign of a state and issued out of a court of justice. 441. vs. or subpoena whereby any action . or proceeding by which a man may be arrested. or official having authority to issue it.) The definition of "process" given by Lord Coke comprehends any lawful warrant. Gilmer. Nevins [N. including any process of execution that may issue in or upon any action. real or person .

whether viva voce or in writing.. from the beginning to the end of the suit. The words "legal process" mean all t he proceedings in an action or proceeding. ga rnishment. McKenna vs." as used in the policy. and in a narrower sense is the means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing out the original writ in civil case and after the indictment in criminal cases. 165 Ala. Frequently its signification is lim ited to the means of bringing a party in court. permanent edition 1 940 edition. includes all judicial processes or proceedings." and m eans the entire proceedings in an action. 44 N. means what is known as a writ. (34 Words and Phrases. Perry vs. 1940. p.. and is purporting to th . Id. 1940 edition. secondly. 663. Ex parte Hill. Dict. 80. and also a writ. C o. In the C ode process issued from a court is meant. 662. by which the rest is directed or taken. permanent edition 1940 edition. 385. 45). as used in the October Proclamation. 98. Cordova. 365. "Judicial process" comprehends all the acts of then court from the beginning of the proceeding to its end. Tr imple. 101 P.. which ordinarily includes the proceedings.) "Process" in a large acceptation. p. or compliance with its commands . 176 N. p." based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States. before the judgement. 847. and. 349. is nearly synonymous with "proceedings. 787. and. or any change takes place in title or possession.) The term "process" as commonly applied. 6 Lans. perman ent edition. Cooper. N. 328. Y. civil or criminal. 1 N. quoting Hanna vs. all proceedings which may be had to bring testimony into court. Blair vs. and a means whereby courts compel the appearance of parties... W. 43 ). (Gil. may be considered the process of the court. In the Constitution process whic h at the common law would have run in the name of the king is intended. and covers all th e proceedings in a court. A policy of fire insurance contained the condition that if the property shall be sold or transfer red. 43. 2 Tyler.. that is termed t he "process" by which a man is called into any temporal court. including judicial proceedings. it is applied to the several judicial writs issued in an action. edition 149. 12 (23 Words and Phrases." states that so-called government styled as the "Republic o f the Philippines. 51 So. See. 12 Minn. 201. In a st ricter sense. Maxbass Security Bank of Max bass. The second "Whereas.. Russell. The intention of the author of the proclamation of including judicial processes appears clearly in the preamble of the document. D. permanent edition. Rich vs. also. Bou vs. Russel. then and in every such case the policy shall be void. as attachment or execution on the writs are usually employed to effect a change of title to property.) There is no question that the word process. from the beginning to the end.. 383. 149. Law. from the beginning to the end. They would necessarily embrace the de cree. "Process" in its broadest sense comprehends all proceedings to the accomplishmen t of an end. Tipton vs. and includes a summons. 80. 79 Kan.. (34 Words and Phrases. or execution. whether by legal process or judicial decree or voluntary transfer or convenience.al.. M. Strictly . 27 9.. and in every sense is the act of the co urt and includes any means of acquiring jurisdiction and includes attachment. The term "legal process. in thi s view. 786.. 12 Minn. Lorillard Fire Ins.) "Judicial process" includes the mandate of a court to its officers. 148.. but it has more enlarged signification. 86 (Gil. because the begin ning or principal part thereof. 204. (34 Words and Phrases. it is a proceeding after the original. H anna vs. they are or are amongs t the processes contemplated by the policy. 350.. Black Com. 199. Vt. intends that proceeding by which a party is called into court.

When the words of an instrument are free from ambiguity and doubt. We are not liberty to im agine an intent and bind the letter to the intent. 226 (1902) Upon questions of construction when arbitrary rule is involved. and he used. C. n o mere failure to provide for contingencies. Very strong expression have been used by the courts to emphasize the principle t hat they are to derive their knowledge of the legislative intention from the wor ds or language of the statute itself which the legislature has used to express i t. The language of a statute is its most natural guide. it is always mor e important to consider the words and the circumstances than even strong analogi es decisions. those of executive or administrative character. 95. in the e ffort to follow precedent. 102. 225. is very liable to end in perverting instruments from their plain meaning. THE WORDS OF PROCLAMATION EXPRESS UNMISTAKABLY THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHOR The October Proclamation is written in such a way that it is impossible to make a mistake as to the intention of its author. It is reasonable to assume that he might include in the word "process. The successive neglect of a series of small distinctions. there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. courts must be very cautious in allowing their imagination to give them a different one. the word laws.. the following: When the words in their literal sense have a plain meaning. There is a strong presumption in fav or of giving them words their natural meaning. as pertaining to the judicial branch of the government which functioned under the Japanese regime. It is true that there are cases in whic h the letter of the statute is not deemed controlling. . and simply seek to ascertain the will of the legislator. The courts have no function of legislation. Prest on. R . 451." (United States vs. . At any rate. In no other branch of the law (trusts) is so much discretio n required in dealing with authority. and against reading them as if th ey said something else. S. but the cases are few and exceptional and only arise where there are cogent reasons for believing that th e letter does not fully and accurately disclose the intent. Judicial. It is not allowable to interpret what n eeds no interpretation. Guild vs. 182 Mass. Goldenberg. in section 3 of he dispositive part. The Supreme Court of the United States said: "The primary and general rule of st atutory construction is that the intent of the law-maker is to be found in the l anguage that he has used. He is presumed to know the meaning of the words and th e rules of grammar. as pertain ing to the legislative branch. 103. clearly and distinctly the sense of the framer.e exercise Executive.. 135 Mass. No mere ommission. 18 S. 168 U. W alter. the word processes. which it may seem wise should have specifically provided for will justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute. . 455 (1883). and lastly. the word regulations. and Legislative powers of government over the pe ople. and express p lainly. as pertaining to the execut ive branch.. judicial processes cannot be excluded. (Merrill vs." It is evident from the above-mentioned words that it was the purpose of General MacArthur to declare null and void all acts of government under the Japanese reg ime." besides those judicial character. Oliver Wendell Holmes. perhaps the wisest man who had ever sat in the Supreme Co urt of the United States. which they are not fitted to express.

It was necessary to free that ideology from any Japanese impurity. by the signatures on the document of unconditional surrender affixe d by representatives of the Japanese government. the belligerents on both sides resorted to what may call war weapons of psychological character. and the common-sense rules of the American democratic way of life. which she tried to make us believe is the cause of the inhabitants of all East Asia. but also our spiritual patrimo ny. not only our territory. and there is absolutely no reason in trying to find differ ent meanings of the plain words employed in the document. 3.ep. b equeathed to us by our Malayan ancestors. the author of the proclamation thought that the laws. 1945. that is. So Japan. with the same deadly eff ects as the mines planted by the retreating enemy. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHES A CLEAR POLICY Although. might be a means of keepi ng and spreading in our country the Japanese influence. The government offices and agencies which functioned during the Japanese occupat . it migh t not be amiss to state here what was the policy intended to be established by s aid proclamation. had waged an intensive camp aign propaganda. procedures and proceedings. the true paradise in the western Pacific. natural that General MacArthur should take counter-measures to neut ralize or annul completely all vestiges of Japanese influence. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that in the global war just ended on Septem ber 2. which the imperial officers tried to present as the acme of oriental culture. ed. regulations. that wonderful admixture of sensible principles of human conduct. to crea te interest in all things Japanese. distinct ly. 394.. It was necessary to free. but to restore the full play of o ur ideology. Undoubtedly. regulations and processes of any other governme nt are null and void and without legal effect". intended to destroy the faith of the Filipino people in America . to restore in our country constitutional processes and the high ideals constitute the very es sence of democracy. the moral principles of the Christiani ty assimilated by our people from teachers of Spain.) That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be the sole and only government in our country. the true purposes of its author. and processes of all the branches of the governments established under the Japan ese regime. are provisions clearly. that our laws are in full force and effect and legally binding. and to arouse racial prejudice among orientals and occidentals. there is no possible mistakes as to the mea ning of the words employed in the October Proclamation. and the text of the docu ment expresses. in clear-cut sentences.. not only to restore to us the opportunity of enjoying the physical treasures which a beneficent Providence accumulated on this bountiful l and. including the one which is under our consideration . then. 42 Law. the annulled processes are precisely judicial processes . to induce the Filipinos to rally to the cause of Japan. as we have already stated. As we have already seen. if allowed to continue and to have effect. unmistakably expressed in the October Proclamation. specially those w hich might jeopardize in any way his military operations and his means of achiev ing the main objective of the campaign of the liberation. as to which there is no possibility of error. since its military forces occupied Manila. to wipe out all manifestations of American or occidental civilization. that "all laws. It is. It was necessary.

and. They were buried alive in circle up to the neck around the thomb and "for several days they died not. in vaded Manchuria. an Outline of History of Japan. 1912. on February 3.that he has the supreme comman d of the Army and Navy (Article 11).) General MacArthur sought to annul completely the officials acts of the governmen ts under the Japanese occupation. they initiated that they call China Incident. induced General Maresuke Nogi and his wife to practice the abhorr ent "junshi". 1703. At last they did not rotted . tha t the Emperor is sacred and inviolable (Article 3). There is no reason for allowing to remain any vestige of Japanese ideology. written b y a Japanese. The Pagean t of Civilization. the same which destroyed the independence of Korea. the ideology of a people which as confessed in a book we have at our desk. that he declares war. A t last they died not. and orders to be promulgated and executed (Article 6). 3500 years B. the ferocious inhabitants of Babylonia who. and conc ludes treaties (Article 13). s elected by the priests to partake of such abominable honor.) The practice shows that the Japanese are the spiritual descendants of the Sumeri ans. his attendants were assembled to from the hito-bashira (pilla r-men) to gird the grave. the 47 assassins who. in or der to avenge the death of their master Asano Naganori. that he is the head of the E mpire. which dest royed the fleet with which Kublai Khan tried to invade Japan was the divine wind of Ise. that believes that their Emperor is a direct descendant of gods and he him self is a god. Under chapter I of the Japanese Constitution. his ministers. they attacked Pearl Harbor treacherously. C. combining in himself the rights of the sovereignty (Article 4). we are told that. C.ion represented a sovereignty and ideology antagonistic to the sovereignty and i deology which MacArthur's forces sought to restore in our country. 50. that he e xercises the legislative power (Article 5). and notable men and women of his kingdom. makes peace. it is declared that Japan shall re igned and governed by a line Emperors unbroken for ages eternal (Article 1). they violated the trusteeship granted by the Treaty of Versailles by usurping tha mandated island s in the Pacific. died in 2 B. appeared in h istory as the first human beings to honor their patesis by killing and entombing with him his window. that he gives sanction to laws. (Broduer. by designating irresponsible Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo. the most bloody and repug nant from suicide.. pp. and initiated therein the deceitful system of puppet government s. in complete disregard of an elemental international dut y.. and example of which is offered to us in the following words of a historian: When the Emperor's brother Yamato Hiko. and committed a long series of the flagrant violations of international law that have logically bestowed on Japan t he title of the bandit nation in the social world. and on September 13. The conduct of the Japanese during the occupation shows a shocking an anchronism . It is the ideology of a people which insists in adopting the policy of self-delu sion. they violated the territorial integrity of China. It is an ideology which dignifies harakiri or sepukku." (Gowen. and that the typhoon which occured on August 14. that defies the heinous crime of the ronin. follo wing the occasion. ent ered stealthily into the house of Yoshinaka Kiro and killed him treacherously. Dogs and cows gathered and ate them. without war decl aration. 1281. but wept and wailed day night. the "Em pire of Morning Frehsness". 62-66. but wept and wailed day night. because they were done at the shadow of the Ja panese dictatorship. on the occasion of the funeral of Emperor Meiji. insists in doing many things precisely in a way opposite to that f ollowed by the rest of the world. therefore. p.

artillery base. The civil liberties of the citizens were annulled. citizens feel confident i n the protection of their liberties. all elemental principles of civilized conduct. They prom ised to respect our rights by submitting us to the wholesale and indiscriminate slapping. tortures. the lawyer who dared to intercede was also placed under arrest. procurers. civil equalit y becomes reality. justice is admnistered with more efficiency. treating the most prominent Filipinos in a much lower social and p olitical category than that of the most ignorant and brutal subject of the Emper or. and the accomplices in f raudulent transactions. and atrocious massacres. hangings. honor. which were the specialty of many naval and military Japa nese officers. and by compelling the gov ernment officials and employees to face and to bow in adoration before that cari cature of divinity in the imperial palace of Tokyo. torture chambers and zone. churches. and by disseminating all kinds of historical. the lowest citizen is not afraid of the highest official. Since they entered the threshold of our capital. the weak may face the p owerful. by establishing classes of rudimentary Japanese so as to reduce the Filipinos to the mental level of the rude Japanese guards. concubines. and the best lawyers for the unfortunate prisoners in Fort Santiago and othe r centers of torture were the military police. Invoking our geographical propinquity and race affinity. The Japanese offered themselves to be our cultural mentors by depriving us of th e use of our schools and colleges. so much so that the universities of the world could not conceive of higher honor that may be conferred than that of Doctor of Laws. There were judges who had to trample laws and shock their consci ence in order not to disgust a Nipponese. extra ction of teeth and eyes. When the Japanese arrested a person. depo sits of bombs and gasoline. establishments of redlight districts. and by profaning convents. aga inst the religious scruples and convictions of their members. repres ents a characteristics and well defined case of sociological teratology. they are just mere preludes of the pr omised paradised that they called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". In the prosecuting attorney's office s. diabolical zonings. by falsifying the contents of school texts. political. utilizing them as military barracks. the providers of war materials and shameful pleasures. machine gunning of women and children. seminaries. and other cult centers of the Catho lics. They promised religious liberty by compelling all protestant sects to unite. It was dangerous to practice the profession by which faith in the effectiveness of law is maintained. The most noble of all professions. by eliminating free press. the profession of law was annull ed. interment of alive persons. no one was safe. Witnesses and litigants were slapped and tortured during investigations. and democracy be comes the best system of government and the best guaranty for the welfare and ha ppiness of the individual human being. burnings of organs. they had the insolence of calling us their brothers. by destroying our books and other means of cu lture. Driving nails in the cranium. In fact. Even courts were not free from their di spotic members. more than a simple pathological state. and cultural falsehoods. th e radio. without the prejuce of placing of us in the catego ry of slaves. whose proper place must be found in an archeologic al collection. a reversion that. and dignity. became the most despised.of a modern world power which seems to be re-incarnation of one whose primitive social types of pre-history. munitions dumps. The courts and Filipino government officials were completely helpless in the que . It represents a backward jump in the evolution of ethical and jur idical concepts. looti ng of properties. and spies. the Japanese had announced that for every one of them killed they would kill ten prominent Filipinos. in one group.

selon less vicissitudes de histoire et suivan un rhythm m . The way found is to invoke international law. according to the viciss itudes of history. and to protect the same. international law is not invoked to challenge the legality or authori ty of the proclamation. the gallant soldier under whose authority the Emperor of the Japan. Certainly not because of the awe aroused by the looming figure of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. through an exceptional effort of the imagination. But because the proclamation will affect the interest and the rights of a group of individuals. is not a fixed nor im mutable science. On the country. Even then. the conqueror of Japa n. The big and resounding word is con sidered as a shibboleth powerful enough to shield the affected persons from the annulling impact. Le driot des gens. the "jus gentiun". ART. en effet. No suit at law. a way is being sought to neutralize the effect of the proclamation. the military hero. No challenge has been hurled against the proclamation or the authority of the au thor to issue it. Nobody dared challenge the authority of the military Commander in Chief who issu ed it. in the name of the Emperor. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law . it is perpetually changing in forms. might to segregated from the processes mentioned in the proclam ation. n'est point une science fixe est immuable: bein au contraire. the Liberator of the Philippines.. the gr eatest American general. May any one be surprised if General MacArthur decided to annul all the judicial processes? The evident policy of the author of the October Proclamation can be seen if we t ake into consideration the following provisions of the Japanese Constitution: ART. where torture or horrible death we re always awaiting the defenseless victim of the Japanese brutality. and following the monotonous rythm of the ebb and rise of the tide of the sea. 57. il change eternellement de formes. the Allied Supreme Commander. but only to construe it in a convenient way so that judi cial processes during the Japanese occupation. it is developing incessantly. who is su pposed to rule supreme for ages as a descendant of gods. An author said that the law of nations. which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authority .stion of protecting the constitutional liberties and fundamental rights of the c itizens who happen to be unfortunate enough to fall under the dragnet of the hat ed kempei. Even the highest government officials were not safe from arrest and i mprisonment in the dreaded military dungeons. is receiving orders wit h the humility of a prisoner of war. il se developpe sans cesse. 61. shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law. tour i l avance et il recule. because everybody acknowledges the full legality of its issuan ce. In each turn it advances or recedes. INTERNATIONAL LAW Nobody dared challenge the validity of the October Proclamation.

the drafters of our Constitution had to content themselves with "generally accepted principles. 236. 3. De l'existence d u driot international sous la republique romain.) Now let us see if any principle of international law may effect the enforcement of the October Proclamation. 233 N. are equally d estructive. (Sec. With the exception of international conventions and treaties and. in international law. we have retrograded. and n earer our own times. but in other points. if it is or can be a science at all. In a certain matters it is clear we have made substantial progress. The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece of Rome. 209." .." (Pound.. 241. In this study we should be cautioned not to allow ourselves to be deluded by gen eralities and vagueness which are likely to lead us easily to error. Vol. adopted in San Francisco Conference on June 26. like those of sc ience proper. human beings in a certain capacity. p. 50.) The characteristic plasticity of law is very noticeable. or can be. Shepard. unrelieved and unchecked. the Charter of the United Nations. in the middl e ages the oath was not always respected as faithfully as in ancient Rome. for example. p. that is. in view of the absence of codification and statutory provisions. Rest and motion. and "Life has relations not capable of division into inflexible co mpartments. The moulds expand and shrink. we have to rely on unsystemized judicial pronouncements and reasonings and on theories. and propositions that we may find in the works of auth ors and publicists. or enactments of its ru les. in the seventeenth century. dealing with the conduct of States. he (M. we cannot rely on merely legal precepts.) There being no codified principles of international law. final and unchanging. Due to that characteristic pliability and imprecision of international law." (Coleman Philippson. just recently. and in our more modern age the due declaration of war which Roman always conf ormed to has not been invariably observed. and differe nt ages make differently. Revon) maintains. if life is to continue. Art. The law. Vol. theses. Our Constitution provides: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy. the substance of international is actually made by man.) Another author has this to say: International law. p. 2.Y. 1. The substance of science proper is already m ade for man. (Coleman Philippson. 1945.) "Law must be stable. (M.onotone qui est comme le flux et le reflux d'un mer." (Glanzer vs. I. at most a reg ulative science." (The Growth of Law p. must find some pat h compromise. The Internationa l Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome. and adopts th e generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the N ation. and yet it cannot stand still. ) Justice Cardozo adds: "Here is the great antimony confro nting us at every turn. much more than in any o ther department. II. and its principles and prescriptions are not.) Law is just one of the manifestations o f human life. like human kind. Revon. Interpretations of Legal History. I. Grotius proclaims the unquestio ned right of the belligerents to massacre the women and the children of the enem y.

as its. as commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces of Libe ration. But those who are sponsoring the cause of said judicial processes try to achieve their aim. We must also be very careful in our logic. It must be our concern to avoid falling in so a great temptation. but they maintain that General MacArthur did not nd could not have in mind the idea of nullifying the judicial processes during he Japanese occupation. to declare null and void and without effect. principles. because that will be in violation of the principles of nternational law. that under t he principles of international law the judicial processes under an army occupati on cannot be invalidated. and proceedings of all courts under the Japanese regime. The word is being used very often in plural.We must insists. They accept and recognize the full authority of the author of the proclamation o issue it and all its parts. to be pointed out to us. It is stated more than once. the inescapabl e result will be the complete viodance and nullity of all judicial processes. The temptation of assuming the role of a legislator is greater in international law than in any other department of law. We awaited in vain for any one to dare deny General MacArthur the authority. but all the p rocesses of said governments. it can be pointed out. since there are no parliaments. or trying to find an exit in the thick dark forest where we are irretrievably lost . If the principle exists. If General MacArthur. the fanciful wandering of the imagination often impair the course of diali stics. und er international law. therefore. legislative assemblies which can enact laws and specific statutes on the su bject. to issue the proclamation. but we ne . it can stated specifically. had authority. not by direct means. congres ses. not only the laws and regulations of the governments under the Japanese regime. In so vast a field as international law. and reiterated with dogmatic emphasis. full and legal. If the law exist. It would be like building castles in the thin air. No principle of international law has been. that the principles should be specific and unmistaka bly defined and that there is definite and conclusive evidence to the effect tha t they generally accepted among the civilized nations of the world and that they belong to the current era and no other epochs of history. t a t i If we follow the reasoning of the majority opinion we will have to reach the con lusion that the world "processes" does not appear at all in the October Proclama tion. or could be invoked as a basis for d enying the author of the document legal authority to issue the same or any part thereof. But we waited in vain for the specific principle of international law. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Is there any principle of international law that may effect the October Proclama tion? We tried in vain to find out in the majority opinion anything as to the existenc e of any principle of international law under which the authority of General Mac Arthur to issue the proclamation can effectively be challenged. dangers are incalculable. including judicial processes. but by following a tortuous side-road. only one of those alluded to. pr ocedures.

that we confess our inability even to have a fleeting glimpse at th em through their thick and invulnerable wrappers. of the usurping government. executive and judicial. and by virtue of the principle of postliminium. is immediately qualified by the exception as to judicial acts and pro ceedings which are of a "political complexion. are haunting us with the dea fening bray of a trumpet. WEAKNESS OF THE MAJORITY POSITION In the majority opinion three questions are propounded: first. or the legal and indisputable authority of the restored legitimate government to refuse to recognize the official acts. At every turn international law. re main good and valid after the liberation. It is be noted that no authority. The imagined principles are so shrouded in a thick maze of strained analogies an d reasoning. by establishing an unexplained e xception as regards the judicial acts and proceedings of a "political complexion . were de facto governments." Besides. t he Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines. by stating from the beginnin g of the absolute proposition that all acts and proceedings of the legislative. but after the transient sound has fled away. the inte . and judicial departments of a de facto governments are good and valid . whether judicial acts and proceedings during the Japanese occupation are valid even after liberat ion. executive. legislative. stated as a premise in a sweeping way. absolutely no authority. absorbed by the resiliency of the vast atmosphere. second whether the October Proclamation had invalidated all judgement and j udicial proceedings under the Japanese regime." were good and valid. and third. that the governments established during the Japanese occupation. "it should be presumed that it was not. it is useless to try to find in the arguments of the majority anything that may challenge the power. that is. whether the present co urts of the Commonwealth may continue the judicial proceedings pending at the ti me of liberation. would disappear too with the lighting speed of a vanishing dream. the announced principles. and could not have been. No authority could be cited. "which are not of a political comp lexion. has been cited to sup port the absolute and sweeping character of the majority proposition as stated i n their opinion.ed only one to be convinced." So it is the majority itself which destroys the validity of what it maintains as a legal truism in political and international law. As regards the first question. the authority of a de jure government to annul the official acts of a de facto government. In the above reasoning we will see right away how the alleged legal truism in po litical and international law. the majority argues that the judicial proceedings and judgments of the de facto governments under the Japanese regime being good and valid. As to the second question. because the majority itself loses faith in the vali dity of such absolute and sweeping proposition. and that it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and pr oceedings of the courts of those governments. it is stated that it is a legal tourism in politi cal and international law that all acts of a de facto government are good and va lid. which are th e very soul of international law. as an abso lute rule. the blatant words. once the same is ousted.

or judicial processes. Therefore. we can see no logic in considering it bad with respect to legislative and executive processes. But." And now it is stated that in annulling the processes of the governments under Ja panese occupation. and that it only refers to government processes other than judicial processes or court proceedings. according th at said legal truism. legislative." That is. the inevitable concl usion is that General MacArthur did not declare null and void any processes. the legislative and executive processes. It is maintained that when General MacArthur declared the processes of the gover nments under the Japanese regime null and void." The weakness and absolute ineffectiveness of the argument are self-evident. because the same are valid and remained so under the legal truism anno unced by the majority to the effect that. General MacArthur referred to "processes other than judicial processes. whether legislative processes. ther e is no logic in holding that it is not good with respect to judicial processes. but not to judicial processes? If the argument is good so as to exclude judicial processes from the effect of t he October Proclamation. why should the same reasoning not apply to legislative and executive processes? Why does the majority maintain that. are valid. legislative and executive official acts of de facto govern ments are good and valid. if the argument of the majority opinion is good. when he used the last word in the October Proclamation. he could not refer to judicial p rocesses. and that the word "processes" used by him in the October Proclamation is a mere surplusage or an ornamental literary appendix. If the argument is bad with respect to legislative and executive processes. executive or judicial. executive processes. General MacArthur referred to the latter in his annull ing proclamation. which is but a mere legal pretense that cannot stand the least analy sis or the test of logic. The absurdity of the conclusion unmasks the utter futility of the position of th e majority. did not the majority maintain that all acts and proceedings of legislative and executive departments of a de facto governments are good and valid? Did it n ot maintain that they are so as a "legal truism in political and international l aw?" Now if the reasoning of the majority to the effect that General MacArthur could not refer to judicial processes because they are good and valid in accordance wi th international law. A great legal luminary admonished that we must have courage to unmasks pretense if we are to reach a peace that will abide beyond the fleeting hour. at all. "may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and prom ulgate new ones in the occupied territory if and when exigencies of the military . It is admitted that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation a s an agent of his government. But we have seen already how the majority excepted from said legal truism the ju dicial processes of "political complexion. notwithstanding the fact that. under political and international law.ntion of General Douglas MacArthur to refer to judicial processes. all official acts of a de facto government.

We cannot accept that the commanding general of an army of occupation. of an invading army. there are. in all countries. or of a usurping army. in the case to courts of a future invasions. We cannot refrain from feeling a paternal emotion for those who are trembling wi th all sincerity because of the belief that the avoidance of judicial proceeding s of the governments under the Japanese regime "would paralyze the social life o f the country. Untold sacrifices were always offered to atta in high ideals and in behalf of worthy causes. and that situation never caused despair to any one. and make completely powerles s the commander of an army of liberation to wipe out the official acts of the go vernment for usurpation. and the whol esale massacres and destructions in Manila and many other cities and municipalit ies and populated areas. And let us not forget that due to human limitations. there were. It is possible that some criminals will be let loose unpunished. It is insinuated that because of the thought that the representative of the rest ored sovereign power may set aside all judicial processes of the army of occupat ion. in the exercise of his constitutional powe rs of pardon and amnesty. We cannot agree with such legal travesty. but the shadow of the vanishing alleged principle of int ernational law is being brandished to gag. once restored in the territory wrested from the brutal invaders and aggress ors. We can conceive of inconveniences and hardships.occupation demand such action. should enjoy greater le gal authority during the illegal. We hope that Providence will never all . unde r all governments. and to inhabit in many islands so distantly located. and there will alw ays be unpunished criminals. but they are necessary contribu tions to great and noble purposes. although said acts might impair the military operation or neutralize the public policies of the restored legitimate government." but it is doubted whether the commanding genera l of the army of the restored legitimate government can exercise the same broad legislative powers. from Madagascar to the eastern Pacific. which made possible the wonderful resistance of Bataan and Corregidor. manacle. litigants will not summit thei r cases to courts whose judgement may afterwards be annulled. were not able to paralyze the social life of our people . that contributed some of highest morals fig ures that humanity has ever produced in all history. Let us not loss faith so easily in the inherent vitality of the social life of the people and country of Rizal and Mabini. but we cannot help smiling when we hear that chaos will reign or th at the world will sink. Broad and unlimited powers are granted and recognized in the commanding general of an army of invasion. had in the past released many criminals from imprisonm ent. can not have a soci al life so frail as to be easily paralyzed by the annulment of some judicial pro ceedings. in peace or in war. We are not unmindful of the interest of the persons who might be adversely affec ted by the annulment of the judicial processes of the governments under the Japa nese regime. but nobody has ever been alarmed that the President. iniquitous an d bestial occupation. of a rebe llious army. than the official representative of the legitimate governm ent. The Japanese vandalisms during the last three years of nightmares and bestial oppression. We beg to disagree with a theory so unreasonable and subversive. which inhabited by a race w hich was able to traverse in immemorial times the vast expanses of the Indian Oc ean and the Pacific with inadequate means of navigation. during the long period of our national slavery. and in the case of the Japanese. and criminals woul d not be deterred from committing offenses in the expectancy that they may escap e penalty upon liberation of the country." To allay such fear we must remind them that the country that pro duced many great hereos and martyrs.

" The far-fetched theory is advanced that this provision impliedly recognizes the court processes during the Japanese military occupation. Certainly no one wil l entertain the absurd idea that the President of the Philippines could have tho ught of abolishing the Court of Appeals under the government during the Japanese occupation. It is evident that the statement just quoted is a complete diversion from the pr inciple stated in the in an unmistakable way by Wheaton.ow the Philippines to fall again under the arms of an invading army." It can be clearly seen that Wheaton does not make any distinction or point out a ny exception. It is self-evident that the Executive Order could have referred only to the Commonwealth Court of Appeals. Said Court of Appeals disappeared with the ouster of the Japanese m ilitary administration from which it derived its existence and powers. p. pro viding "that all cases that have heretofore been appealed to the Court of Appeal s shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. it must be remembered that on crucial instances exist to show that if h is acts should be reversed." (Wheaton. What doe s happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the stored government. without stating any reas on therefore." The statement made by the respondent judge after quoting the above-mentioned pri nciple. regulations and processes other than the judicial of the government established by the belligere nt occupant. issued on March 10. such as the laws. but if such misfortune will happen. any international wrong would be c ommitted. is a question that is up to the restor ed government to decide. International Law. as exemplified by the Japanese. Without discussing the correctness of principle stated the majority opinion quot es from Wheaton the following: "Moreover when it is said that occupier's acts ar e valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent co nqueror. therefore. W ar. and that there is no rule of international law that den ies to the restored government the right to exercise its discretion on the matte r. wee are entitled to presume that it is concurr ed in and. on the false assumption that it refers to the Court of Appeals existing during the Japanese regime. in accordance with the rules of action of a civilized state. 1945. but the matter can hardly be put further than this. As the statement is not disputed. 1945. is quoted without discussion in the majority opinion. was the Commonwealth Court of Appeals and it was the only one tha t could be abolished. 7th English edition of 1944. The Court of Appeals existing on March 10. 37. as stated by Wheaton. especially if they should not conduct themselves. by limiting the right of the restored government to annul "most of the acts of the occupier" and "processes other than judicial. the qualifications made in the statement in the majority o . at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. One conclusive evidence of the untenableness of the majority position is the fac t that it had to resort to Executive Order No. 37. to the effect that whether the acts of military oc cupant should be considered valid or not. let the October Proclamation serve as a notice to the r uthless invaders that the official acts of the government of occupation will not merit any recognition from the legitimate government. which is the one declared abolished in said order. 245) Then it says that there is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier. any international wrong would be committed. who says in definite te rms that "it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts (the occupant's) should be reversed. But in the majority opinion the principle is qualified.

Between the duties imposed in the military occupant and the legal prerogatives o f the legitimate government there are no logical relationship or connection that might bind the ones with the others. It is absolutely contrary to all p rinciples of logic. as was the case during the Japanese oc cupation. discovered or revealed through presumptive operations. The military occupants is duty bound to protect the civil rights of the inhabita nts. property. except judicial processes political complex ion. did not annul the Japanese regime judicial processes. is bound to respect all the official acts of the governme nt established by the usurping army. Douglas MacArthur. to give relief to the victims of zoning and Fort Santiago tortures. if it is convinced th at said courts were absolutely powerless. his October Proclamation. it is a principle of interna tional law that said acts are valid and should be respected by the legitimate go vernment. And from said duties it is deduced that the legitimate government. This preference and predilection in favor o f the military occupant. if we have to say the leas t. PRESUMPTIONS AND SUPPOSITIONS AGAINST TRUTH AND FACTS The invading military occupant is duty bound to establish and maintain courts of justice in the invaded territory. . is simply disconcerting. Why should t he legitimate government validate the acts of said courts. a privilege wh ich is inversely denied to the last. and it is presumed tha t he had not the intention of declaring null and void the judicial processes of the government during the Japanese regime. and personal freedom? The majority opinion recognizes in the military occupant the power to annul the official acts of the ousted and supplanted legitimate government. but why should the legitimate government necessarily validate the measures adopted by the said occupant in the performance of this duty. in fact. So run the logic of the majority. and agains t the legitimate government. The reasoning calls for immediate opposition. that is in favor of the invader and usurper. General. THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON OCCUPANT ARMY ARE NOT LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHTS OF THE LEG ITIMATE GOVERNMENT The majority opinion is accumulating authorities to show the many duties imposed by international law on the military occupant of an invaded country.pinion seem to completely groundless. It is presumed that the restored legitimate government will respect the acts o f said courts of the army of occupation. Therefore. They don't mind the that General MacArthur speaks in the October Proclamation as follows: NOW. to stop the horrible abuses of the military police. I. THEREFORE. to protect the fundamental hum an rights of the Filipinos life. It is presumed that General MacArthur is acquainted with such principl e. once restored in his own territory. if the legitimate government believes his duty to annul them for weighty reasons? The military occupant is duty bound to establish courts of justice. Therefore. as Commanderin-Chief of the military forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines. declaring null and void and without effect "all processes" of said governments. for the protection of the inhabitants thereof . United States Army.

1935. conferring on the Commonwealth tribunals jurisdiction to continue the judici al processes or proceedings of tribunals belonging to other governments. that is. No. by supposition. but the majority insists o n reading differently. The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth tribunals is defined. including naturally judicial processes. No provision may be found in Act. Are we to adopt and follow the policy of deciding cases submitted to our conside ration.) The Commonwealth courts of justice are continuations of the courts established b efore the inauguration of the Commonwealth and before the Constitution took effe ct on November 15. . Courts of First Instance. such as the governments established during the Japanese occupation. of the governments under the Japanese regime. besides laws and regulation s. to exclude judicial proces ses. known as the Organic Act of the courts of justice of the Philippines. the majority shall insist on reading "not all". If where General MacArthur says "all". bec ause it is necessary. Act No. and the Supreme Court. is: "NOT ALL processes. 136. by presumption. he said "not all processes". by presumption and suppositions putting aside truths and facts? Are we t o place in the documents presented to us. that. and appor tioned by legislative act. regulations and processes of any other government in the Phili ppines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal ef fect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. diff erent words than what are written therein? Are we to read "not all". but it is possible to understand how they reached the unacceptable possible co nclusion which we cannot be avoid opposing and exposing. (emphasis supplied. THE COMMONWEALTH COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO CONTINUE JAPANESE REGIME JUDICIA L PROCESSES Now we come to the third and last question propounded in the majority opinion. supp ose. And their jurisdiction is the same as provided by exist ing laws at the time of inauguration of the Commonwealth Government.do hereby proclaim and declare: xxx xxx xxx 3. because the same has been abolished by Executive Order No. is the one that defines the jurisdiction of just ice of the peace and municipal courts. That all laws. nor in any other law of the Philippin es. Article VIII. 37. it is impossible to foresee the consequences of such so stubborn attitude . That is why we must insists that in the October Proclamation should be read what General MacArthur has written in it. he declared and proclaimed null and void "ALL PROCESSES". against the unequivocal meaning of simple and well known words. prescribed. in fact. It is not necessary to mention here the jurisdiction of the Court of App eals. 136 of the Philippine Commission. (Section 2. where it is written "all"? We are afraid to such procedure is not precisely the most appropriate to keep pu blic confidence in the effectiveness of the administration of justice." The majority presume. that. It is provided so in our Constitution. such as the October Proclamation. that when G eneral MacArthur said "all processes".) General MacArthur says categorically "all processes".

The provisions of the abovecited do not authorize. chapter V. and even thei r prejudices. any of the decisions and judgements of tribunals of the governments. appealed thereto. 57. Chapter IV. under the well. and so forth. of Act No. 136.established l egal doctrine. The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is provided in 17 and 18. Disposition of causes. their habits. actions. So it was done in regards to the transfer of the cases pending before the Spanis h Audiencia to the newly created Supreme Court. and w hich continued to function until they were substituted by the courts created by the Philippine Commission. 136 quoted as follows: SEC. papers. of the same Act. in case of appeal. causes. i n order that said processes could be continued and the Commonwealth tribunals co uld exercise proper jurisdiction to continue them. It needed specific enabling provisions in order that the new tribunals might con tinue the processes pending in the tribunals established by the Spaniards. or. proceedings. The existing Audiencia or Supreme Court is hereby abolished. in all the forms of the govenment and administrative provisions which they wer e authorized to prescribed. Chapter II. pending in the existing Supreme Court and in the "Contencioso Admi nistravo. or pe nding by appeal before the Spanish tribunal called "Contencioso Administravo. in the instructions given by President McKinley on April 7. Sections 64 and 65 of the same Act allowed the same procedure as regards the tra . it was stated that . Almost a half a century ago. and the Supreme Court provided by this Act is substit uted in place thereof. papers. has the same power and jurisdiction over them as if they had been in the first instance lodged. and appeals logged. 136." All records. The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance is provided in the sections 56. SEC. in sections 38 and 39 of Act No. 136. deposited. 38. even implicitly. nor to continue the processes or proceedings of sa id tribunals. i n order that said tribunals could take cognizance and continue the judicial proc eedings of the tribunals existing in the Philippines at the time the American oc cupation. and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs. actions. fi led. of Act No. the Commission should bear in mind that the governme nt which they were establishing was designed not for the satisfaction of the Ame ricans or for the expression of their of their theoretical views. or pending in the existing Audiencia or Supreme Court. to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the in dispensable requisites of just and effective government." a re transferred to the Supreme Court above provided for which. records. Abolition of existing Supreme Court. 1900. or pending therein.The jurisdiction of our justice of the peace and municipal courts is provided in section 68. but for the ha ppiness. prevailing not only in the Philippines. peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippines. proceedings. books. it was not enough for the Philippine Com mission to create and establish the courts of justice provided in Act No. Notwithstanding the policy so outlined. for the guidance of the Philippine Commission. 39. but also in the proper en abling law. appeals. NECESSITY OF ENABLING ACT UNDER THE LEGAL DOCTRINE PREVAILING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND IN THE UNITED STATES Taking aside the question as to whether the judicial processes of the government established during the Japanese occupation should be considered valid or not.

and appeals. 186. deposited. . in the same manner and with the same legal effect as th ough such actions had originally been commenced in the courts created" by virtue of said Act. SEC. which are conferred the jurisdiction t o continue said cases and proceedings. So on August 5. proceed ings. 1901. Although both courts were of the same jurisdiction. 64. Narciso Cabantag was convicted of murder by a military commis sion. actions. On December 26. MUNICIPAL COURTS UNDER ACT NO. 136) are authorized to try and determine the actions so transferred to them respectively from the provost courts. appealed thereto. books. They were courts with criminal jurisdiction or identical cases under the jurisdi ction of the justices of the peace then existing in Manila. 273.. Wolfe. 183. Courts of the First Instan ce and courts of the justice of the peace established by this Act (No. deposited. and appeals lodged. The existing Courts Fir st Instance are hereby abolished. section 2 of which provides that a ll criminal cases and proceedings pending in the justices of the peace of Manila are transferred to the municipal courts. expressly provided that said civil actions shall be transferred to the newly created trib unals. THE CABANTAG CASE On August 1. and the Courts of First Instance provided by t his Act are substituted in place thereof. papers. Two municipal courts for the city were created by section 40 of said Act. No. (Cabantag vs. filed.1902. 1901. causes. and his execution by hanging was set for January 12. 65. The same procedure has been followed by the Philippine Commission eventhough the courts of origin of the judicial processes to be transferred and continued belo nged to the same government and sovereignty of the courts which are empowered to continue said processes. which shall have the same power and jur isdiction over them as if they had been primarily lodged. one fo r the northern side of Pasig River and the other for the southern side. now pending in the existing Courts of First Instance. but surrendered to the authorities on July 18. 1901. All records. SEC. or c ommenced therein. the Philippine Commissi on considered it necessary to pas the proper enabling act. 1901. it enacted Act No. after the repeal of all acts conferring upon Ameri can provost courts in the Philippines jurisdiction over civil actions. Abolition of existing Courts of First Instance. and the proceedings may be continued by the same.) The decision was confirmed on December 10. And it provided specifically that "the Supreme Court.nsfer of cases and processes pending in the abolished Spanish Courts of First In stance to the tribunals of the same name established by the Philippine Commissio n. papers. 19 . the Philippine Commission enacted the Organic Act of the City of Manila. 6 Phil. in order that the criminal cases belonging to th e justice of the peace courts may be transferred to the municipal courts just cr eated. Disposition of records. So section 78 of Act No. or in case of appeal. or pending in the Court of First Instance a s now constituted of or any province are transferred to the Court of First Insta nce of such province hereby established. 136. he fled. 183 On July 30. 1901.

The same doctrine was adopted by the United States government as part of its int ernational policy. shown by the record. with the abolit ion of the military commission which convicted him. Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion. 1903. th ough still liable to the overthrown by the vicissitudes of war. the question presented to the Supr eme Court would have been different. by consent of parties. and was heard. From the decree an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court. confirmed also the same doctrine. and the co urts and officers of the United States were excluded from its limits. by proclam ation. h owever. and determine all causes in admiralty. as provided in Acts Nos. In effect. try. the Congress approved what the Philippine C ommission did as to the jurisdiction of the courts established and transfer of c ases and judicial processes. Upon the restoration of civil authority in the State. The commutation was approved by the Secretary of War. Whilst it continued. was originally instituted in the District Court o f the United States for the District of Louisiana. there was no existing tribun al which could order the execution of the penalty of imprisonment. It is evident that the doctrine is applicable. instituted a Provisional Court of the State of Louisiana. The suit. enacted on September 3. President Lincoln. 1862. 1898. and 865. The Supreme Court denied the writ. when in 1861. It is evident from the foregoing that this Supreme Court has accepted and confir med the doctrine of the necessity of an enabling act in order that our Courts of First Instance could exercise jurisdiction to execute the decision of the aboli shed provost courts and military commission. constituted. wherein it is provid ed that decisions rendered by the provost courts and military commission shall b e ordered executed by the Courts of First Instance in accordance with the proced ure outlined in said Act. THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES It is also evident that the Congress of the United States. the proceedings of the court were interrup ted by the civil war. In 1862.02. The natu re of this occupation and possession was fully explained in the case of The Vini ce. in Paris. in section 9 of said Act. Cabantag filed later a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that. where a decree was rendered f or the libellant. if the petitioner had filed the writ before the enactment of Act No. the National authority had been partially reestablished in the State. as could be seen in Article XII of the Treaty concluded with Spain on December 10. and a decree was again rendered in favor of the libellants. commuted the death penalty to 20 yea rs imprisonment. 1903. this cause was transferred into the Provisional C ourt thus. to hear. The Civil Governor on December 2. on the 20th of October. Subseq uently. Even in 1866 the Congress of the United States followed the same doctrine. but stated that. the Pro . The troops of th e Union occupied New Orleans. and held military possession of the city and such other portions of the State as had submitted to the General Government. 186. is enabling law. 1902. following instructions of the President. Act No. 865. 136. wher e the case was pending. by enacting the Bill of the Philippines on July 1. with more force. to the judicial processes coming from governments deriving their authority from a foreign enemy state. 865. among other powers. with authority.

vincial Court, limited in duration, according to the terms of the proclamation, by the event, ceased to exist. On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits, causes and proceedin gs in the Provisional Court, proper for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, should be transferred to that court, and heard, and determined therein; and that all judgements, order s, and decrees of the Provisional Court in causes transferred to the Circuit Cou rt should at once become the orders, judgements, and decrees of that court, and might be enforced, pleaded, and proved accordingly. It is questioned upon these facts whether the establishment by the President of a Provisional Court was warranted by the Constitution. xxx xxx xxx

We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana was properly establishe d by the President in the exercise of this constitutional authority during war; or that Congress had power, upon the close of the war, and the dissolution of th e Provisional Court, to provide for the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of its judgement and decrees, to the proper courts of the United States. (U . S. Reports, Wallace, Vol. 9, The Grapeshot, 131-133.) JUDGEMENTS OF THE REBEL COURTS IN LOUISIANA WERE VALIDATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISION During the civil war in 1861, the prevailing rebel forces established their own government in Louisiana. When the rebel forces were overpowered by the Union Forces and the de facto gove rnment was replaced by the de jure government, to give effect to the judgments a nd other judicial acts of the rebel government, from January 26, 1861, up to the date of the adoption of the State Constitution, a provision to said effect was inserted in said document. Section 149 of the Louisiana Constitution reads as follows: All the rights, actions, prosecutions, claims, contracts, and all laws in force at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith , shall continue as if it had not been adopted; all judgments and judicial sales , marriages, and executed contracts made in good faith and in accordance with ex isting laws in this State rendered, made, or entered into, between the 26th day of January, 1861, and the date when this constitution shall be adopted, are here by declared to be valid, etc. (U. S. Report, Wallace, Vol. 22, Mechanics' etc. B ank vs. Union Bank, 281.) EVEN AMONG SISTERS STATES OF THE UNITED STATES JUDGEMENTS ARE NOT EXECUTORY The member states of the United States of America belong to the same nation, to the country, and are under the same sovereignty. But judgements rendered in one state are not executory in other states. To give them effect in other states it is necessary to initiate an original judi cial proceedings, and therein the defendants in the domestic suit may plead bar the sister state judgement puis darrien continuance. (Wharton, on the Conflict o f Laws, Vol. II, p. 1411.) Under the Constitution of the United States, when a judgement of one state in th e Union is offered in a court of a sister state as the basis of a suit nil debet

cannot be pleaded. The only proper plea is nul tiel record. (Id., p. 1413.). It is competent for the defendant, however, to an action on a judgement of a sis ter state, as to an action on a foreign judgement, to set up as a defense, want of jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgement; and, as indicating such wa nt of jurisdiction, to aver by plea that the defendant was not an inhabitant of the state rendering the judgement, and had not been served with process, and did not enter his appearance; or that the attorney was without authority to appear. (Id., pp. 1414-1415.) The inevitable consequence is that the courts of the Commonwealth of the Philipp ines, in the absence of an enabling act or of an express legislative grant, have no jurisdiction to take cognizance and continue the judicial processes, procedu res, and proceedings of the tribunals which were created by the Japanese Militar y Administration and functioned under the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission of the Laurel Republic of the Philippines, deriving their authority from the Em peror, the absolute ruler of Japan, the invading enemy, and not from the Filipin o people in whom, according to the Constitution, sovereignty resides, and from w hom all powers of government emanate. The position of Honorable Asenio P. Dizon, the respondent judge of the Court of the First Instance of Manila in declaring himself without jurisdiction nor autho rity to continue the proceedings which provoked the present controversy, being a judicial process of a Japanese sponsored government, is absolutely correct, und er the legal doctrines established by the United States and the Philippine Gover nment, and consistently, invariably, and without exception, followed by the same . If we accept, for the sake of argument, the false hypothesis that the Commonweal th tribunals have jurisdiction to continue the judicial processes left pending b y the courts of the governments established under the Japanese regime, the court s which disappeared and, automatically, ceased to function with the ouster of th e enemy, the position of the Judge Dizon, in declining to continue the case, is still unassailable, because, for all legal purposes, it is the same as if the ju dicial processes in said case were not taken at all, as inevitable result of the sweeping and absolute annulment declared by the General MacArthur in the Octobe r Proclamation. In said proclamation it is declared in unmistakable and definite terms that "ALL PROCESSES" of the Japanese sponsored governments "ARE NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT", and they shall remain so until the Commonwealth, through its leg islative power, decides otherwise in a proper validating act. The fact that the Japanese invaders, under international law, were in duty bound to establish courts of justice during the occupation, although they made them c ompletely powerless to safeguard the constitutional rights of the citizens, and mere figureheads as regards the fundamental liberties of the helpless men, women and children of our people, so much so that said courts could not offer even th e semblance of protection when the life, the liberty, the honor and dignity of o ur individual citizens were wantonly trampled by any Japanese, military or civil ian, does not change the situation. "ALL PROCESSES" of said court are declared " NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT" in the October proclamation, and we do n ot have any other alternative but to accept the law, as said proclamation has th e full force of a law. The fact that in the past, the legitimate governments, once restored in their ow n territory, condescended in many cases to recognize and to give effect to judgm ents rendered by courts under the governments set up by an invading military occ upant or by a rebel army, does not elevate such condescension to the category of a principle, when Wheaton declares that no international wrong is done if the a

cts of the invader are reversed. Many irrelevant authorities were cited to us as to the duties imposed by the int ernational law on military occupants, but no authority has been cited to the eff ect that the representative of the restored legitimate government is a bound to recognize and accept as valid the acts and processes of said occupants. On the c ontrary, Wheaton says that if the occupant's acts are reversed "no international wrong would be committed." Following the authority of Wheaton, undisputed by the majority, General MacArthu r thought, as the wisest course, of declaring "NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT, " by official proclamation, "ALL PROCESSES" under the Japanese regime, that is l egislative, executive and judicial processes, which fall under the absolute adje ctive "ALL". That declaration is a law. It is a law that everybody bound to accept and respec t, as all laws must be accepted and respected. It is a law that the tribunals ar e duty bound to give effect and apply. We are not unmindful of the adverse consequences to some individuals of the annu llment of all the judicial processes under the Japanese regime, as provided in t he October Proclamation, but the tribunals are not guardians of the legislative authorities, either an army commander in chief, during war, or a normal legislat ure, in peace time. The tribunals are not called upon to guide the legislative a uthorities to the wisdom of the laws to be enacted. That is the legislative resp onsibility. Our duty and our responsibility is to see to it that the law, once e nacted, be applied and complied with. No matter the consequences, no matter who might be adversely affected, a judge m ust have the firm resolve and the courage to do his duty, as, in the present cas e, Judge Dizon did, without fear nor favor. We cannot see any reason why we shou ld not uphold him in his stand in upholding the law. It is our official duty, national and international duty. Yes. Because this Supr eme Court is sitting, not only as a national court, but as an international cour t, as is correctly stated in the concurring opinion of Justice De Joya, and we s hould feel the full weight of the corresponding responsibility, as the American courts with admiralty jurisdiction and the Prize Courts of England did feel. In fact, it is in the judiciary where, more than in any point of view is more press ing, more imperative, more unavoidable. Justice has no country. It is of all cou ntries. The horizon of justice cannot be limited by the scene where our tribunal s are functioning and moving. That horizon is boundless. That is why in our cons titution the bill of rights has been written not for Filipinos, but for all pers ons. They are rights that belong to men, not as Filipinos, Americans, Russians, Chinese or Malayan, but as a members of humanity. The international character of our duty to administer justice has become more specific by the membership of ou r country in the United Nations. And let us not forget, as an elemental thing, t hat our primary duty is to uphold and apply the law, as it is; that we must not replace the words of the law with what we might be inclined to surmise; that wha t is clearly and definitely provided should not be substituted with conjectures and suppositions; that we should not try to deduce a contrary intention to that which is unequivocally stated in the law; that we should not hold valid what is conclusively declared null and void. The October Proclamation declared "ALL PROCESSES" under the Japanese regime "AND VOID WITHOUT EFFECT", so they must stand. There is no possible way of evasion. "ALL PROCESSES", in view of the meaning of the absolute adjective "ALL", include "JUDICIAL PROCESSES". Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda.

5. Let us not allow ourselves to be deceived. in utter disregard of the most elemental principles of legal here meneutics. no international wrong being committed by the reversal by the legitimate government of the acts of the military invader. It is simple. the prima ry pillar of the nation. That respondent Judge Dizon did not commit the error complained of in the pe tition. That we have no right to attribute General MacArthur an intention different f rom what he has plainly. 2. That the Commonwealth tribunals have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of no r to continue the judicial proceedings under the Japanese regime. and the annulment of all the facts of the governments under the Japanese regime. clearly. and on a pinchbeck. 3. The issue confronting us is not of pa ssing importance. and that no principle of the international law is violated by said proclam ation. the cornerstone of the state. 4. It may dry the very foundation of social life. "are null and void and without effect". That the word "processes" includes judicial procedures. That said proclamation was issued in full conformity with the official polici es to which the United States and Philippine Governments were committed. executive. We refuse to follow the course of action taken by the majority in the present ca se. It is a course that leads to nowhere. during enemy occupation. 9. That when General MacArthur proclaimed and declared in the October Proclamati on "That all laws.". he meant e xactly what he said. and judicial. "All" and "som e" have incompatible meanings and are not interchangeable. 6. unmistakably expressed in unambiguous words wi th familiar meaning generally understood by the common man. "all processes" must include "all judicial processes. That the judicial proceedings here in question are included among those adver sely affected by the October Proclamation. and that the petition has no merits at all. . The issue is between the va lidity of one or more Japanese regime processes and the sanctity of the law. But it m ay shake the very foundation of society. proceedings.CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons we conclude: 1. That to exercise said jurisdiction an enabling act of the Congress is necessa ry. 7. It is a c ourse based on misconstruction or misunderstanding of the October Proclamation. 10. It is an issue of awesome magnitude and transcendency. 8. It is a course based on a mistaken conception of the principles of internati onal law and their interpretation and application. and cases. regulations and processes" of the Japanese sponsored governme nts. That where General MacArthur said "all processes" we must read and understand precisely and exactly "all processes". legisl ative. and justified by the wrongs committed by the Japanese. is legal. except to the brink of disaster. because it i s following the dangerous path of ignoring or disobeying the law. That General MacArthur had full legal authority to issue the October Proclama tion. processe s. the sour ce of vitalizing sap that nurtures the body politic. and not "some processes". Therefore. It goes to and reaches the very bottom. Lacking in complexities.

to be enshrined. Either the proc esses. or the law. at the lates. It is. It is a dilem ma that does not admit of middle terms. The proceeding involved in the case at bar were commenced by a complaint filed b y the instant petitioner. It is the alpha and the omega of the whole issue. surmises and conjectures. all laws..That is the question. no amount of speculative gymnastics. lest the oracle should fling at us the thunder of his prophetic anathema. Let us not dare to lay our profaning hands on her vestal virginity . It is Law with all its majestic grandeur which we are defying and intending to overthrow from the sacred pedestal where the ages had placed her as a goddess. which to uphold. We feel uneasy. Shall we inc lined the balance of justice to uphold the processes and defeat law. No amount of arguments and lucubration's. The respondent judge. and of the petition filed by respondent Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh. 1944. or vice ver sa? We feel jittery because some judicial processes might be rescinded or annulled. 19045. So it is better that we should shift to a more underst andable way. because some litigants in cases du ring the Japanese regime will be affected in their private interests. on M ay 31. hypostasis of the issue before us: Law. 1945. it is a simple dilemma that is facing us. with the a nnulment of some judicial processes. HILADO. on February 27 of the same year. the complaint bearing t his heading and title: "The Republic of the Philippines In the Court of First In stance of Manila" (Annex X of Exhibit A of petition for mandamus). of sentencing law to be executed by the guillotine. and venerated by men. second that the proceedings and processes had in the present case having been before a court of the Republic of the Philippines and in accordance . pursuant to the Constitution. but we adopt an attitude of complete noncha lance in throwing law overboard. J. obeyed. 1945 or. reduced to its ultimate terms. disposing of the petition dated May 25. held: " first. therefore. regulations and processes of any other government i n the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth became null and void and without legal effect in Manila on February 3. that which is conformable to the standard that the world expects in judicial action. n o amount of juggling of immaterial principles of international law. 1945 filed by petitioner. looming. pr oceed to state the reason for my dissent. We are in the cross road: which way shall we follow? The pr ocesses and the law are placed in the opposite ends of the balance. as a plaintiff in said case. as defendant therein. We have to select between two. as plaintiff. fa ncying chaos and paralyzation of social life. plain that the case had not been heard on the merits when the record was burned or destroyed. We cannot therefore vote except for the denial of the petition. on November 18. or of middle ways where we can loiter wi th happy unconcern . 3012 of the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila. This baffling attitude is a judicial puzzle tha t nobody will understand. no amount of dexterity in juridical exegesis can divert our attention from the real. was the filing by counsel for plaintiff therein of their opposition to a motion for dismissal filed by opposing counsel. in his order dated June 6. that by virtue of the proclamation of General MacAr thur quoted above. but we do not tremble with sincere alarm at the thought of putting the law under the axe. dissenting: I dissent from the opinion of the majority and. no amount of presumptions and suppositions. in civil case No. The farthest that said proceedings had gone before the record was burned or destroyed during the battle for Manila. simple. forever.

In stating the reasons for this dissent.with the laws and regulations of said Republic. 1944 (41 Off. Even consideration of policy of practical convenience militate against petiti oner's contention. 147. The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government. . 1943 "under enemy duress. 3012 are null and void under General o f the Army MacArthur's proclamation of October 23.." Petitioner prays that this Court declare that the respondent judge should not ha ve ordered the suspension of the proceedings in civil case No. . the same are now void and witho ut legal effect. The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and after the Japanese occupation. Gaz." the great Commander-in-Chief proclaimed and declared: xxx xxx xxx 3. 1944 (41 Off. 2. 4. and the causes commenced and left pending therein. the "Philippine Executive Commission "an d later as the Republic of the Philippines". regulations and processes of any other government in the Phili ppines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal ef fect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.. to the courts created and organized by virtue of the p rovisions of Act No. The proceedings in said civil case No. 36. and the judge who presided it was not a de facto judge. shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines. 5. In this proclamation. 3012 are null and void under General of t he Army MacArthur's proclamation of October 23. I The proceedings in said civil case No. Gaz. 148). established here by the Commander i n Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by his order was not a de-facto gover nment the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto court. 4007. 148) . after reciting certain now historic facts. until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. as now restor ed. the petition should denied. That all laws. 3. 147. we may divide the arguments under the f ollowing propositions: 1. is to be bound by the acts of either or both of those Japanese-sponsored gov ernments. In my opinion. as revived by Executive Order No. (a) The government styled as. 3012 and should c ontinue and dispose of all the incidents in said case till its complete terminat ion. and xxx xxx xxx . . in the manner and form p rovided by law. has no authority to take cognizance of and continue said proceedings to final judgement. among which was that the so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was e stablished on October 14. or for the vali dation of all proceedings had in said courts. first. that this Court as one of the different courts of genera l jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. third. based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States. (b) the rules of Interna tional Law regarding the establishment of a de facto Government in territory bel onging to a belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent ar e inapplicable to the governments thus established here by Japan.

Nine days after the inauguration of the so-called "Rep ublic of the Philippines. they would be dangerously standing on the dividing line between loyalty and d isloyalty to this country and its government. The second act was a hyphocritical a ppeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit. and to dispel any shadow of doubt which may still remain.I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obed ience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws. regu lations and other acts of their duly constituted government. were closely associated with Laurel in this movement. as follows: One of the fourtheenth of this month." Jorge Vargas. regulations and other acts of our dul y constituted government. but that they are null and void. but a decla ration of nullity denotes that the act is null and void ab initio the nullity pr ecedes the declaration. 1 944. i s no argument for giving them validity or effectiveness in the interregnum. I think. not in the future. 3012 was filed twenty-six days after the above -quoted proclamations of General of the Army MacArthur. a puppet government was set up in the Phil ippine Island with Jose P. the y could not very well be considered by the parties to be valid and binding. Annulment implies some degree of the effectiveness in the act annulled previous to the annulment. Indeed. 1944. wer e unquestionably "processes" of the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philipp ines within the meaning of the aforesaid proclamation of General of the Army Mac Arthur and. and processes in areas not yet free from enemy occupation and co ntrol upon the date of the proclamation. formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court. Mark that the proclamation did not provide that such laws. without said parties incurring in disobedience and contempt of the proclamation which enjoins them to render full respect for the o bedience to our Constitution and the laws. regulations an d processes thus condemned in so far as said areas were concerned. If so. consequently. regulations and processes. we need only consider the concluding paragraph of the proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief of the army liberation solemnly enjoined upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedien ce to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws. Laurel. fall within the condemnation of the proclamation. would attach thereto at a later date. By t he very terms of the proclamation itself. If the parties to said c ase were to consider the proceedings therein up to the date of the liberation of Manila valid and binding." President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United Sta tes declared in one of his most memorable pronouncements about the activities of the enemy in the Philippines. r egulations and other acts of their duly constituted government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil. th at as the different areas of the Philippines were progressively liberated. The proceeding in question. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. in choosing between these two courses of actio n. It will be noticed that the complaint in said civil case No. and was designed . as well as the United States Government. regulations and processes shall be or are annulled. The proclamation speaks in the present tense. and Benigno Aquino. they would hardly be complying with the severe injunc tion to render full respect for and obedience to our Constitution and the laws. regulations. also formerly a member of that cabinet. to my mind. as "president. onwards. This is all-inclusi ve it comprises not only the loyal citizens in the liberated areas but also thos e in areas still under enemy occupation and control. having been had before the liberation of Manila. The evident meaning and effect of the 3rd paragraph above quoted is. the d eclaration of nullity therein contained shall attach to the laws. the fact that the declaration of nullity as to the condemned law s. formerly as a member of the Commonwealth Ca binet. Bein g processes of a branch of a government which had been established in the hostil ity to the Commonwealth Government. regulations and other acts of our duly constituted government from October 23. that nullity had to date back from the inception of such laws. at l east after October 23.

But the court was careful to limit this to the time when that actual s upremacy existed. 94. It is a fact of contemporary history that while President Manuel L.) Because of its pertinence. a duty. 1814 to the Treaty of Peace in 1815. As President Roosevelt said in his above quo ted message. D. 719). in the interest of o rder. . with his exiled government. The most that I can concede is that while the Japanese Army of occupation was in control in the Islands and their paramount military strength gave those of our people who were within their reach no other alternative.C. a nd the consideration of Tampico as United States territory. 24 Law. 176. obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and.. so far as the effects of the acts of the provisional government maintained by the British in Casetine." (Emphasis ours.S. "In the face of an overwhelming for ce. I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Exe cutive Commission" nor the present "Philippine Republic " has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. unjustifiable. And once that paramount military strength disappeared.." as they had been established by or under orders of the Commander in Ch ief of the Imperial Japanese Forces. was limited to the period during which the British. were concerned. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT President of the United States (Form U. . from September. when it said: ." (Emphasis ours. it is beyond my comprehension to see how the p roceedings in question could be considered valid and binding without adopting an attitude incompatible with theirs. therefore.to confuse and mislead the Filipino people. With these two heads of the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines condemning the "puppet regime" from its very inception. as men tioned in the Thorington case. Smith. . but the only reason for such obedience would be that paramo unt military strength and not any intrinsic legal validity in the enemy's orders and decrees. in the second. and the United States. Quezon of th e Philippines was in Washington. 93.) The court there refers to its own former decision in Thorington vs. we beg leave to quote the following paragraph from th at leading decision: . he also repea tedly condemned both the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the "Philippine R epublic. No concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority ex ercised. Our symphaty goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Com monwealth that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy. retained possession of Tampico. 1943. As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs.S. Bruffy (96 U. "Our symphaty goes out to those remain loyal to the United States a nd the Commonwealth that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy. these had to obey their orders and decrees. the reason for the obedience vanished. 1943. Naval War College International Law Documents. individual resistance to its authority the n would have been futile and. in the first case. In referring to the Confederate Government during the Civil War.. and makes it clear that the doctrine in the Thorington cas e. ed. pp. . retained poss ession of Castine.). and obedience should likewise cease. . October 23. the court again says in effect that the actual su premacy of the Confederate Government over a portion of the territory of the Uni on was the only reason for holding that its inhabitants could not but obey its a uthority.

to the Treaty of P eace in 1815. mu st have produced in this rule in so far as the Philippines is concerned. in considering valid the proceedings in question. which con flicts with these views. and out of sheer physical compulsion this country would have had to bow to t he continuance of the puppet regime that she had set up here for an indefinite t ime. that as the actual supremancy of the Confederate Government existed over certa in territory. but simply because of the paramo unt military force to which our people would then have continued to be subjected . are examples. from September 1814. And. we will find that both met with ultimate failure. But fortunately for the Filipinos and for the entire civilized world. If the power to establish here such a provisional government is recognized in the Comm ander in Chief of the invasion army. the court observed." All that was meant by this language was . not because the acts of that government woul d then have intrinsically been legal and valid. No concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority exercised. why should we not recognize at least an equ al power in the Commander in Chief of the liberation army to overthrow that gove rnment will all of its acts. as well as in the Briand-Kellog Pact. but a duty. . Bruffy. let us set forth some considerations apropos of this conclusion of the majority. In that case. we admit that. and the majority holds that the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines was such a government. "Made obedience to its authority in civil and local ma tters not only a necessity. emphasis ours. the Confederate Government is characteriz ed as one of paramount force. unjustifiable. it was held that it must regarded and respected as their territory. and classed among the governments of which the one maintained by great Britain in Castine. the Am erican Commander in Chief represented the sovereignty of the United States. Smith (supra). (Will iams vs. Whilst the British retained possession of Castin e. as w ell as the Government of the Commonwealth.) The majority opinion. 719. Japan was defeated. If Japan had won this war. In such a case. Th e Confederate Government.. And I now ask: Now that Japan h as been defeated. at least of those of an executory nature upon the t ime of liberation? Considering the theory maintained by the majority. differed from these temporary gove rnments in the circumstance that its authority did not justifying acts of hostil ity to the United States. Why should at least an equal power be denied the Commander in Ch ief of the United States Army to overthrow the substitute government thus erecte d by the enemy with all of its acts and institutions which are still not beyond retrieve? Hereafter we shall have occasion to discuss the aspects of this questi on from the point of view of policy or the practical convenience of the inhabita nts. her paramo unt military supremacy would have continued to be exerted upon the Filipino peop le. it would s eem that they would recognize in the Japanese Commander in Chief the power to ov erthrow the Commonwealth Government. why should the Filipinos be still bound to respect or recogniz e validity in the acts of the Japanese-sponsored government which has been so se verely condemned by both the heads of the United States and our Commonwealth Gov ernment throughout the duration of the war? If we were to draw a parallel betwee n that government and that which was established by the Confederate States durin g the American Civil War. In the face of an overwhelming force. obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and. therefore. invokes the rule that when a belligerent army occupies a territory belonging to the enem y. Whilst the United States retained possession of Tampico. 24 Law ed.There is nothing in the language used in Thorington vs. has the power to establish thereon what the decisions and treaties have variously denominated provisional or milit ary government. Without prejudice to later discussing th e effects which the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy cont ained in our Commonwealth Constitution. the former through its Commander in Chief. If the Japanese Commander in Chief represented sovereignty of Japan. in the interest of order. and the one maintained by the United States in Tampico. individual resistance to its authority then would have been futile and. during our War with Mexico. and all of its acts and institutions if he had choosen to. the inhabitants were held to be subject to such laws as the British Governmen t chose to recognize and impose. a duty. they would have had to recognize as binding and obligatory the acts of the dif ferent departments of that government.

it utterly per ished. But even this passage clearly places the case at bar apart from the Court's pronouncement therein." In the first place. an examination of the decision will reveal that the controversy dealt with an act of the Confederate Government. instead of their laws. supra. which is a mere obiter dictum. and in the second place. the constitutional government which existed there under. and the whole fabric of its government broken in pieces. namely. 3. the contrary conclusion should legitimately follow. the vast resources it wield ed. failed in giving permanence to that government.) By analogy. an d in its failure its pretentions were dissipated. ordinances and t he Commonwealth Constitution (1 Official Journal of the Japanese Military Admini stration. therefore. the acts o f the individual States composing the Confederacy. which has existed in the States prior to the rebellion. the "activities" of the "administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing status. Order No. present an imposing spectac le well fitted to mislead the mind in considering the legal character of that or ganization. the refore. And. "In the case at bar. in the exercise of legislative. and with it all its enactments" (emphasis ours) The majority cite on page 9-10 of their opinion a passage from the same case of Williams vs. they were submitted to the arbitrament of war. The Court said among other things: The immense power exercised by the government of the Confederate States for near ly four years. to substitute a nd enforce those of its own enactment.in my opinion. page 34). It claimed to represent an independent nation and to posses sovereig n powers. as such to displace to jurisdiction and authority of the United States from nearly half of their territory and. Under the frame of government existing in this Commonwealth . 719. is not the case and if Japan had succeeded in permanently maintaining the government that she established in the Philippines. dated February 20. Bruffy. The quoted passage commences by stating that "The same general form of government the same general laws for the administration of justice and the protection of private ri ghts. emphasis our s. the conclusion to be drawn should be the same in both cases. the quoted pa ssage refers to something which was not in issue in the case. Its pretentions being resisted. ed. referring to the overthrow of the of the Confede racy. "when its military forces were overthrown. however. 1942 of the Commander in Chief of the Imperia l Japanese Forces to the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission directe d that. The majority opinion says that in this passage the Court was "discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States. which would have been the case had victory been hers. as an effect of the following acts and decrees of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces: 1. (24 Law. there would be more reason for holdin g the acts of that government valid. and the millions who acknowledged its authority. executive and judicial powers in the Phi lippines. Bruffy (supra). said. no t of the Confederate States individually. the same general form of th e Commonwealth Government did not continue under the Japanese. order. its armies scattered. remanded during (i ts) continuance and afterwards. its failure carried with it the dissipation of its pretentions and the breaking down in pieces of the whole fabric of its go vernment. but because Japan has lost the war and.. for the simple re ason that one of the first acts of the invaders was to overthrow the Commonwealt h Constitution and. the Court. refer ring to the Confederate Government. As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams vs. the territory over which it extended. The validity of legislation exercised by either contestant "depends not upon the existence of hostilities but upon the ultimate success of the party which it is adopted" (emphasis ours). if the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines had been lawful which. In that contest the Confederacy failed.

136. likewise. rebellion becomes revolution. The Court further says in Williams vs.. ed.. and in overthrowing the Constitution h e. ed. and ordinances" ment ioned by the Japanese Commander in Chief." a nd among other things required "The entire personnel shall be required to pledge their loyalty to the Imperial Japanese Forces.S. supra (24 Law. . 716. and the new government wi ll justify is founders. but by virtue of an agr eement between that Government and ours. particularly those of the Japanese-sponsored court in s aid civil case No. was rep ugnant to the frame of government existing here under the Commonwealth Constitut ion upon the date of invasion. in effect. Official Gazette. not by the mere will of the United States.C. quoting the language of the court in Shortridge vs. S. Chase. cited by Mr. all their acts hostile to the rightful gov ernment are violations of law. decided at the circuit... in all material respe cts like the one at bar. and originate no rights which c an be recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and existence have been alike assailed". "Those who engage in rebellion must consider the conseq uences. 718). U." (This is. edited at the Office of the Executive Commission) gav e the "Detailed Instruction Based on Guiding Principle of the Administration. for which the Federal Supreme Court was speaking in the Williams-Bruffy cas e. . Macon. 176. 58. repugnant to the Commonwealth Constitution and the to the Government of that Commonwealth Con stitution and to the Government of that Commonwealth which was expressly made su bject to the supreme sovereignty of the United States until complete independenc e is granted. "are violations of law. and since Japa n failed. Proclamation dated January 3. and we think unsuccesfully attempting to est ablish a separate revolutionary government have been sustained as a matter of le gal right. o . 3012. I Abb. Macon. 19452 of the Japanese Commander in Chief provid ed in paragraph 3 that "The Authorities and the People of the Commonwealth shoul d sever their relations with the U. 96 U. while the Japanese-sponsored governments of the "Philippine Executive Commiss ion" and the Republic of the Philippines" neither existed here before the war no r had received the recognition or sanction of either the United States or the Co mmonwealth Government nay.) The individual States of the Confederate and their governments existed prior to the Civil War and had received the sanction and recognition of the Union Governm ent. 1. 2. Bruffy. Justice Field in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra): No case has been cited in argument. all said acts. Instruction No. the Constitution was the very fountain-h ead of the validity and effects of all the "status. 24 Law. If they succeed. they had received the most vigorous condemnation of b oth. .. . 718.upon the date of the Japanese invasion.." (This. Dec. first.S. and. under the Tydings-McDuffie Act. And since the founding of the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines was designed to supplant and did actually supplant the rightful government and since all its acts could not but a hostile to the latter (howeve r blameless the officials who acted under enemy duress might be).S. overthrew all of them. of course.) (Emphasis ours. (Williams vs. As justly observed by the late Chief Justice in the case of Shortridg e vs.) I am of opinion that the principles thus enunciated for the case of an unsuccess ful rebellion should be applied with greater force to the case of a belligerent who loss the war. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration (Vol. If they fail. Bruffy. orders. the "Philippine Executive Commission" and l . and originate no rights which can be recognized b y the courts of the nation whose authority and existence have been alike assaile d. . usages 36 et seq. II (a) The government styled as.) 3..

171. But this is not all. supra. and embodied an e xpress renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy in the instrument that they drafted. and attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on tho se two fateful days of December 7 and 8. wi thin the meaning of the laws of war governing war-like operations on enemy terri . and. u nder the heading "Declaration of Principles". 1941. the United States and the Commonwealth Government could not possibly ha ve recognized in Japan any right. section 3. in this second World War. all the United Nations have exercised this free right in thei r Charter recently signed at San Francisco. at least the governments of the United States and France. cited in support of the power or right of a belligerent army of occupat ion to set up a provisional government on occupied enemy territory. consequently. the United States retains over the Philippines. that althou gh at the time of the Japanese invasion and up to the present. and the pertinent cases therei n cited.. that they shoul d thereafter renounce war as an instrument of national policy. This renunciation of war as an instruments of national policy f ollows an equal renunciation in the Briand-Kellog Pact. she employed war as an instrument of the national policy. as against them. Under the doctrine of Williams vs. Moreover. treacherously and wi thout previous declaration. of course. our C onstitution adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as a p art of the law of the Nation. (b) The rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de facto gov ernment in territory belonging to a belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the governments thus established here by Japan. The Constitution of this Commonwealth which has been expressly approved by the United States Government. through our Constitutional delegates. The authorities agree that such a power. in Article II. they could not have recognized in Japan power to set up in the Philippines the puppet government that she late r set up. 421. the pr esent war is purely defensive. established here by the Commander in C hief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by the his order was not a de facto gove rnment--the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto court and the who presided it was not a de facto judge. to employ that war as an inst rument of her national policy. Bruffy.) There can be no questi on that the United States and the Commonwealth Governments were free to refuse t o be bound by those rules when they made their respective renunciations above re ferred to. Article II. our own people. because such power would be a mere incident or consequence of the war itself. but even before thi s war occurred.) And our territory w as at the time of the Japanese invasion not a territory of the United States. under the cited rules. and they conseque ntly subscribed the Briand-Kellog Pact. at best. (67 C. who framed the Commonwealth Constitution also adopted the same doctrine. Those horrors and devastations were incr eased a hundred fold. it is only for certain specified purposes enumerated in the Tydings-McDufie Act of the Commonwe alth Constitution. As necessary consequence of this. is said to a right derived from war. It is plain that on the side of the Allies. this adoption is exclusive of thos e principles of International Law which might involve recognition of war as an i nstrument of national policy. above-cited. renounces war as an instrument of national policy.ater as the Republic of the Philippines". a certain measure of sovereignty. It is true that in section 3. if not more. sec. p. But. Under the Briand-Kellog Pact and our Commonwealth Const itution. it follows that we have no legal foundation on whi ch to base the proposition that the acts of that Japanese-sponsored government i n the Philippines were valid and binding.J. The rules of Internation al Law . (Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Indeed. but the horrors and devastations of that war conv inced. the short-lived provisional government thus established by the Japanese in the Philippines should be classified. those rules of International Law were no longe r applicable to the Philippines and to the United States at the time of the Japa nese invasion as a corollary. When Japan started said war. as a government of paramount force. were evolved prior to the first World War. I am of opinion.

Our territory is significantly called "The National Territory" in Article I of our Constitution and this bears the stamps of express approval of the Unite d States Government.. . President Roosevelt. the Japanese army. would bring down upon itself th e reprobation of civilized mankind. . . 149. . 1944. . edited at the Office of the Executive Commission. Nothing could be farther from the minds of the government and military leaders of the United States and the Philippines in adopting it than t o embark upon any aggressive or warlike enterprise against any other nation. pp. soon after the landing of Amer ican Forces in Leyte.tory. No acts of warfare may lawfully take place within them. Ther efore he may fulfill his engagements and yet preserve an exact neutrality. therefore. would not change the status of the neutral even if suc h promises were carried out. had our own national and territorial ide ntity previous to that invasion. If the establishment of a provinsio nal government in occupied territory by a belligerent is "a mere application or extension of the force by which the invasion or occupation was effected" (67 C. characterized Japan's invasion and oc cupation of the Philippines as "the barbarous. It is an old and honored rule dating as far back as the 18th century that even sole mn promises of assistance made before the war by a neutral to a nation which lat er becomes a belligerent.) If the Philippines was a neutral territory when invaded by the Japanese. Principles of International Law [7th ed.]. on the high seas. . in time." the meager and almost untrained forces of the Phi lippine Army had been inducted into the American Army. in his message to the Filipino people. did not change the neutra l status of the Philippines. Our nation was not at war with the Filipinos. 421. 1942. . The fact that shortly before December 8. which was its mere application or extention. Vol. p. the fol lowing principles from Lawrence. sec 171). Neutral land and neutral territorial waters are sacred. But in modern times it has been strickly enforced. We have already seen that. released Filipino war prisoners c aptured in Bataan.) The illustrious leader of the United Nations could not have in more unmistakable terms the utter illegality of that invasion and occupation. on October 20. thou gh this obligation was recognized in theory during the infancy of International law. 55. . said: . I. International Law (7th ed. . Gen." (Law rence.J . A nd line with this. . . are pertin ent: The Duties of Belligerent States Towards Neutral States. it was often very imperfectly observed in practice. and any State which knowingly ordered warlike operat ions to be carried on in neutral territory . To refrain from c arrying on hostilities within neutral territory.) . Hostilities may be carried on in the territo ry of either belligerent.. unprovoked and treacherous attack upon the Philippines. the illegality of the invasion. rather w e considered them as our friends who will join us has hand-in-hand in the establ ishment of an orderly Greater East Asia. Lt. the date of the "barbarous. (Official Gazette. . The Philippines has been recognized and admitted as a membe r of the United Nations.. Chief of Staff." (41 Off. 603. Maeda. Such was not the case with the Philippines. In the words of Vattel "when a sovereign furnishes the succor due in virtu e of a former defensive alliance. p. 586. Gaz.) (Emphasis ours. he does not associate himself in the war. That military measure had been adopted for purely d efensive purposes. we had not the slighest intensions to make your people our enemy. (Emphasis ours.) In all the cases and authorities supporting the power or right to set up a provi sional government. and in territory belonging to no one .). p. so long as they were made for purely defensive purp oses. We. 585. . 1941. unpro voked and treacherous attack. the belligerent had the right to invade or occupy the territo ry in the first instance." and he announced the American people's "firm determinati on to punish the guilty. in his speech of January 2. would necessarily permeate the government. Imperial Japanese Forces.

acted by virtue of that appointmen t under the same duress. firstly. from contemptible cowardice and fear. it would se em clearly to follow that its "Court of First Instance of Manila" was not a de f acto court.) Under these facts." If said Japanese-sponsored government was not a de facto government. taken together with the General of the Army MacArthur's accur ate statement that the "Republic of the Philippines" had been established under enemy duress. which he could not be. 866. And w hy? Because he must be presumed to know that the office to which he was thus app . 88. Good faith is essential for the existence of a de facto judge (Tayko vs. 89. and their territory occupied by the Japanese without resistance... 872). allowed their shores to be invaded. bravery. from the volunteer guard to the women's auxilliary service units. As said by President Osmeña. and robbed them of the tranquility and happi ness of their daily lives? And yet. 1945: xxx xxx xxx The time has come when the world should know that when our forces surrendered in Bataan and Corregidor. its judge had to be a de facto judge. Whole town and villages dared enemy reprisal to oppose the hate d invader openly or give assistance to the underground movement. . would be to give that much validity or effect to the acts of those same invaders. fro m the loyal local official to the barrio folk each and every one of those contri buted his share in the great crusade for liberation. to the lawless acts of the ruthless en emy who thus overran their country. such invasion occupation would undoubtedly have been considered in violation of International Law. as presently demo nstrated. on February 27. involved herein. To equalize the consequences of a lawful an d a wrongful invasion of occupation. to give any measure of validity or binding effect to the proceedings of the Japanese-sponsored Court of First In stance of Manila. and heroism to fight in defense of the sacredness of their land. The guerrillas knew that without the support of the civilian population. 53 Phil. But it should additionally be stated that for it be a de facto court . they co uld not survive.If the Filipinos had. uphol d the creed that might makes right. and secondly. . From the humble peasant to the barrio schoo l teacher. and adopt "the law of the jungle. Capistrano. whoever appointe d him. . Gaz. in whatever limited measure. resistance to the enemy was taken up by the people itsel f resistance which was inarticulate and disorganized in its inception but which grew from the day to day and from island until it broke out into an open warfare against the enemy. would be to equalize right and wrong. in replying to the speech of General of the Army MacA rthur when the latter turned over to him the full powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government. Should the Filipinos be punished for having had the patrioti sm. The fight against the enemy was truly a people's war because it counted with the wholehearted support of the masses. it must be presumed to say the least that the judge who presided o ver the proceedings in question during the Japanese occupation. th e sanctity of their homes. and conferred upon him a valid title to his office and a legitimate juris diction to act as such judge. to my mind. The very idea of enemy d uress would necessarily imply that but for the duress exerted upon him by the en emy he would have refused to accept the appointment and to act thereunder. accepte d his appointment under duress." that the Chairman of the "Philippine Executive Com mission" or the President of the "Republic of the Philippines". In such circumstances he could not have acted in the bo na fide belief that the new "courts" created by or under the orders of the Japan ese Military Commander in chief had been legally created--among them the "Court of first Instance of Manila. and the honor and dignity of their government by givi ng validity. (41 Off.

36 of the President of the Philippines. had to swear to support and defend the Commonwealth Constitution. states the prime concern of the government "to re -establish the courts as fast as provinces are liberated from the Japanese occup ation. the President and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. the Judges of first Instance and of all inferior courts were appoin ted by the Chairman of the Executive Commission.) How can our present courts legitimately recogniz e any efficacy in the proceedings of such an exotic judicial system. and a renunciation of his allegi ance to both. and later. in which case his acts would be null and void. the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. the decrees of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the laws of the so-called Legislat ure under the Republic. and the Judges of First Instance and of all inferior courts in the C ommonwealth judicial system. a nd that his acceptance of said office and his acting therein. 2." (Vo l. p. and. would have been no less than an open hostility to the very sovereignty of the U nited Sates and to the Commonwealth Government. There is no middle ground here. by the Pre sident of the Republic. The Chief Justice and Associate J ustices of the Supreme Court. 3. that of the Japanese-sponsored courts was defined and conferred by the orders and decrees of the Japanese Commander in Chief. 7. at first. The courts created here by the Japanese government had to look for the source of their supposed authority to the orders of the Japanese Military Commander in ch ief and the so-called Constitution of the "Republic of the Philippines. of course. how could those courts under the "Republic of the Philippines" be the cou rts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines when they were not functioning under the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laws enacted in pursuance of said C onstitution? The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth courts was defined and conferr ed under the Commonwealth Constitution and the pertinent legislation enacted the reunder. or maliciously in defia nce of said governments." which h ad been adopted in a manner which would shock the conscience of democratic peopl es. pursuant to the Commonwealth Constitution. which was not composed of the elected representatives of the people. And it was decreed that the Commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces "shall exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts. Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration. in its very first paragraph. Executive Order No. under the "Philippine Executive Commission" was appointed by th e Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces." If the courts under the Japanese-sponsored government of the "Republic o f the Philippines" were the same Commonwealth courts that existed here under the Constitution at the time of the Japanese invasion. while this was impossible under the Japanese-sponsored government . 1945 . The Justices and Judges of the Commonwealth courts had to be appoin ted by the President of the Commonwealth with confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 1. of the order of the respondent judge complained of and marked Exhibit H of the petition for mandamus. perhaps. Either the judge acted purely unde r duress. in which case his acts would be null and void for more serious reasons. President Osmeña would not be speaking of re-establishing those courts in his aforesaid Executive Order. The Chief Justice of th e Supreme Court. cited on p p. For s oothe. and which was designed to supplant the Constitution which had been duly adop ted by the Filipino people in a Constitutional Convention of their duly elected Constitutional Delegates. wherein the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces possessed the highest judici al jurisdiction? III The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth co urts before and after the Japanese occupation. without confirmation by the Commission on App ointments under the Commonwealth Constitution.ointed had been created by the enemy in open defiance of the Commonwealth Consti tution and the laws and regulation promulgated by our Commonwealth Government. if willfully done. and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. dated March 10.

36. The adverb "duly" would indicate that th e President foresaw the possibility of appeals not having been duly taken. to my mind. Indeed. If. were not and c ould not be automatically transfered to the Commonwealth courts which we re-esta blished under Executive Order No. and the entire Commonwealth Government. It should be reme mbered that in the Executive Order immediately preceeding and issued on the same date. IV The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government. But considering the determined and firm attitude of the Commonwealth G overnment towards those Japanese-sponsored governments since the beginning. the conclusion is unavoidable that any jurisdi ction possessed by the former and any cases left pending therein. not only upon the ground of the legal principles but also for the reasons of national dignity and international decency. to answer it most decidedly in the nega tive. is to be bound by the acts of either or both of those Japanese-sponsored govern ments. 37. which has won the admiration of the entire civilized world. in section 2 of Executive Order No. as re-established under the Commonwealth Constitution. a special legislation was necessary. does not. in the exotic judicial system implanted here by the Japanese. if a Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated. as held by the majority. T o propound this question is. if the dead or incapacitated incumbent s hould be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. without the successor swearing to support and defend the Commonw ealth Constitution. 37. ar e to be bound by the acts of the said Japanese-sponsored court and government. of course. if a Justice or Judge should die or incap acitated to continue in the discharge of his official duties. of course witho ut confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the Commonwealth Congress. Section 2 of that order simply provides that all ca ses which have been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted t o the Supreme Court for final decision. Executive Order No. his successor would be appoin ted by the Japanese Commander in Chief. In the Commonwealth judicial system. For the purpose. To answer the question in the aff irmative would be nothing short for legalizing the Japanese invasion and occupat ion of the Philippines. by the Chairman o f the "Executive Commission" or the President of the "Republic". it would be virtual submission to the dictation of an invader our people's just hatred of whom gave rise to the epic Philippine resistance movement. in deciding the question of validity or nullity of the pro ceedings involved herein. as now restored. and said successor had to swear to support and defend the Commonwea lth Constitution. or otherwise. it w ould seem inconceivable that the President Osmeña.. or from the Japanese-sponsored inferior courts. the Japanese-sponsored courts were not the same Commonwealth courts. V Even considerations of policy or practical convenience militate against petition er's contention. and. as we believe having conclusively shown. in my humble opinion. intended to include therein appeals taken to the Japanese-sponsored Cou rt of Appeals. the President speaks of re-establishing the courts as fast as provinces w ere liberated from the Japanese occupation. his successor was appointed by the Commonwealth President with confirmation by the Commission on A ppointments. imply that the President recognized as valid the proceedings in all cases appea led to the Court of Appeals. would come under the phrase "duly appealed" in this section of the Executi ve Order. All c ases appealed to the Court of Appeals before the war and the otherwise duly appe aled. In the last analysis. . we are confronted with the necessity to decide whether the Court of first Instance of Manila and this Supreme Court.

vs. but they had become the laws and th e Courts had become the institutions-of Japan by adoption (U. afraid to enter the cities and towns. 27 F . that the judicial system implanted by the Philippine E xecutive Commission and the Republic was the same as that of the Commonwealth pr ior to Japanese occupation. in constant hiding. the great majority of the people were very strongly adverse to traveling any consid erable distance from their homes and were. If dupli cation of work or effort. P. laws of th e Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation. And yet. the same persons who held the position prior to t he Japanese occupation. One of them is that said courts were of a government alien to t he Commonwealth Government. but up on the authority by virtue of which they acted. has the following to say: It is contended. one might say. and that even the judges who presided them were. or even if confussion. did so with no more legal power th an if he had acted as a mere lawyer applying the same laws to the case. cases or denial . principally because of the fact that most of them were in hiding or. at least .'s" or Ke mpeitai's" were a constant terror to them. the overwhelming majority of our people and other resident inhabitants wer e literally afraid to go any place where there were Japanese sentries. Under such conditions. Ad d to these circumstances. that the laws administered and enforced by said cour ts during the existence of said regime were the same laws on the statute books o f Commonwealth before Japanese occupation. Besides. that the feared Japanese "M. in many instances. I am of the opinion that the validity of the acts of the courts in the "judicial system implanted by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republ ic "would not depend upon the laws that they "administered and enforced". soldiers or even civilians. the respondent judge. It should be easy to realize how hard it was for instances. the fact of the practical absence of transportation fa cilities and the no less important fact of the economic structure having been so dislocated as to have impoverished the many in exchange for the enrichment of t he few and we shall have a fair picture of the practical difficulties which the ordinary litigant would in those days have encountered in defending his rights a gainst anyone of the favored few who would bring him to court. it should suffice to answer that the party so complaining in voluntarily resorting to such courts should be prepared to assume the conseq uences of his voluntary act. were found precisely in the cities and towns where the courts were located. Case No. I am firmly of opinion tha t whoever was the "judge" of the Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance of M anila who presided over the said court when the proceedings and processes in the dispute were had. as they became later on the laws and institution of the Phil ippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines. true enough. complain ed of. should be alleged to possibly a rise from a declaration of nullity or judicial proceedings had before those Japa nese-sponsored courts. in his order of June 6. Reiter.146). and lastly. but merely as lawyers. to procure the attendance of witnesse s. On the other hand. that the greater number w ho lived or had evacuated to places for from the Japanese. but other facts are just as stubbo rn and pitiless. The laws they enforced were. Let us set forth a few considerations apropos of this assertion. If the members of this Court wer e to decide the instant case in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth but not by the authority that they possess in their off icial capacity as the Supreme Court of the Philippines. in acting by virtue of the supposed authority which he was su pposed to have received from that government.In this connection. and as a consequence. his convenience should not be al lowed to visit upon the majority of the inhabitants of this country. t heir decision would surely be null and void. and also because of then generally diffi cult and abnormal conditions prevailing. All this may be true. No amount of ar gument or legal fiction can obliterate this fact. the dire co nsequences of a sweeping and wholesale validation of judicial proceedings in tho se courts. and that these sentries were posted at the entrance into citi es and towns and at government offices.S. It i s a fact of general knowledge that during the Japanese occupation of the Philipp ines. 1945. however. 16.

The situation is not without remedy. let us not equalize the conditions then prevailing in Manila to that pr evailing in the provinces. And I dare say that among such people would be found more th an seventeen million Filipinos. and subject to such o ther conditions as the special law may provide. where the greater number of the people where then liv ing outside the towns. but the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. see p. For instance. or any other constitutional or stat utory right of his. No.R. L-21049 December 22. particullarly. so that. These people constitute the g reat majority of the eighteen million Filipinos. let the legislature act in the pr emises. post. w ith its courts and other institutions. They were willing to wait for the restoration of their rightful government. would be more conducive to a maximu m of benefit and a minimum of prejudice to the inhabitants of this country. To them the semblance of an adm inistration of justice which Japanese allowed. in the farms and the hills. May in their common hardship and sufferings under yoke of foreign oppression. th ey had not much time to think of such differences. would be prejudiced than would be benefited by a wholesale validation of said proceedings. al l necessary safeguards should be provided to avoid that in any particular case t he validation should violate any litigant's constitutional right to his day in c ourt. 371. They ith in the arrival of American aid here and the final triumph of the Allied caus e. It might be because he did not recogn ize any legal authority in that court.of a party's day in court expected. validate the corresponding acts. and taking all the necessary safeguards. which is a legislative function. and in their own unique fashion. within the full meaning of the phrase. As to the public order why! any public order which then existed was not due to t he courts or other departments of the puppet government. those in Japanese-sponsored courts. after hearing al l the parties interested. the Congress may enact a law conferring a special jurisdic tion upon the courts of its selection. I am afraid. It was maintained at th e point of the bayonet by the Japanese army. whereby said courts may. or it might be his down-right repugnance of the hated enemy. for the settlement of their differences. processes or proceedings. he would have had to get near the feared Japanese. 1943 refers. Their undoubted hatred of the invader was enough to keep them away from the judicial system that said invader allowed to have. But they constituted the majority of loyal citizens to whom President Roosevelt's messag the majority of our people had an unshaken fa e of October 23. As the courts cannot create a new or specia l jurisdiction for themselves. I t might be party's fear to appear before the court because in doing so. to my mind. rath er than the procedure favored by the majority. G. and as the situa tion demands such new or special jurisdiction. Finally. 1923 . processes or proce edings. These are but a few of countless cause. Those who voluntarily wen t to the courts in those tragic days belong to the small minority. More people. Footnotes 1 Resolution on motion for reconsideration. was practically unknown. a pa rty's day in court or other constitutional or statutory right under the Commonwe alth Government should not be prejudiced by any of said acts. this aspect of the question has been und uly stressed. So that if some form of validation of such judicial proceedings were to be attempted. Much concern has been shown for the possible confusion which might result from a decision declaring null and void the acts processes of the Japanese-sponsored g overnments in the Philippines. if they did not utterly forge t them. Such denial might arise from many a cause. This. I think.

It reads in translation as follows: That on or about April 1. because he has recommended a bad administration in these Islands a nd has not made a good recommendation.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. defendant-appellant. like myself. they became engaged in a discussion regarding t he administration of Governor-General Wood. insult by word. corroborated the testimony of the first witness. 19 92." Higinio J. in the municipality of Pilar. What crime . Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee. the following phrases: "Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co. plaintiff-appellee. which resulted in Perez shouting a n umber of times: "The Filipinos. we have not obtained indepe ndence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off. J. did the accused commit? A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. Juan Lumbao. justice of the peace of Pilar. Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code. and convicted thereof. must use bolos for cutting off Wood 's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos. the municipal secretary of Pilar. and Fortunato Lodovice.: Isaac Perez. happening to meet on the morning of April 1. 1922. like myself. for he has killed our independence. in the presidencia of Pilar. Angust ia. Perez has app ealed the case to this court. Mario Guariña for appellant. ISAAC PEREZ. what Perez said on the occasion in question was this: "The Filipinos. The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April 1. MALCOLM. the said accused. Isaac Perez. the la . said Governor-General. At the trial of the case. Province of Sorsog on. unlawfully and wilf ully and with knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such authority. if any. Sorsogon. did criminally. two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on behalf of the defense. in which the accused participated. a citizen of that municipality. But they endeavore d to explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid. and Gregorio Cresenci o. The question presented for decision is. should get a bolo and cut off the head of GovernorGeneral Wood. 1922. and in a public place. another witness for the prosecution. like myself. Philippine Islands. while holding a discussio n with several persons on political matters. is as follows: "And the Filipinos. uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons. maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filip inas. vs. must us e bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the P hilippines. the municipal president of Pilar. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it i nto the sea. he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this reason. According to the first witness fo r the Government." which in English. on the contrary. in a written statement." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a vio lation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority. without his presence.

R. can properly be appended a corollary. then we . G. both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified. and we think with abundant reason. 887). 292 of the Philippine Commission. or libels. namely: Seditious words. No. that it had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information. and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamat ion. the accused was char ged with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256. In the case of United States vs. he stated that his words were the following: "We are but blaming the Nac ionalista Party which is in power but do not take into account that above the re presentatives there is Governor-General Wood who controls everything. with three members of the court holding tha t article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American so vereignty over the Philippines. but as to this point. the accused was charged with having uttered the following language: "To hell with the Presi dent of the United States and his proclamation!" Mr. and that under the information and the facts. In this court. The accused testified that the dis cussion was held in a peaceful manner." It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine. the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of la w that article 256 is still in force. or insult. Helbig ([1920]. may also have affected article 256. the question of law recurs as to the crime of which the accused should be convicted. article 256 of the Penal Code as having been infringed and the trial judge so found in his deci sion. we think that the words of the accused did not so much tend to defame. Perfe cto was acquitted by unanimous vote. In the case of People vs. while Perez a rgued that the Governor-General was to blame. abuse. and I told him that the day on which the Democrats may kill that Governor-General." The trial judge found as a fact. a person in authority. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case. the Treason a nd Sedition Law. or insult. 292. that until other wise decided by higher authority. and to this extent. Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code. to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster. Mr. On the witness stand. In o ther words. 14705 1). as they did to raise a disturbance in the community. and that what he wished to say was that t he Governor-General should be removed and substituted by another. the Treason and Sedition Law. and though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origi n for a new trial. so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as do es not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel La w. as will later appear. 43 Phil. the defenda nt was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the libel Law. constitute a violation of Act No. it is not necessary to make a pronouncement. abuse..tter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party. exist and must be enforced. The que stion of fact thus settled. It should be recalled that the fiscal named. in the information. The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Pena l Code is no longer in force. To which proposition. it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instanc e is not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. . Perfecto ([1922]. speeches. is found thi s significant sentence: "Act No. the Filipinos will install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes.

437. There is a seditious tendency in the words used. 292 of the Philippine Commission. 2127 et seq. U. the constitut ional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition mus t yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted au thority. U. the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds o f free speech was intended. unless the intention and effect be sed itious. or who shall print.S. People vs. 599. Perfecto. 1 Phil. 332. write. or who shall write. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious. 43 Phil. 64. wh ich is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. or the subversion of the Constitution.... (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violatio n of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engende rs it. and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. Apurado [1907]. This section reads as follows: Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches.. or do any act which tends to di sturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing hi s duty. vs.In criminal law.S. the Legislature. People vs. instead. Dorr [1903 ]. appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situa tion.) Section 8 of Act No.S. pu blish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands. 7 Phil. 292 must not b e interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippin e Islands.) Here. on the Executive. no matter how severe. It is a revolt ag ainst legitimate authority. vs. 422. Critici sm. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil autho rity in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. or the general public peace. of affording immunity from promiscuous comment. and the existence of th e State. pp. U. 169 2. Abad [1902]. shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years. is within the range of liberty of speech. or speech.. as amended by Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. (III Wharton's Criminal Law. there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primaril y against individuals. or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government. the supremacy of the constitution and the laws. Cr iticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. But i n this instance. and the Judiciary. 42 Phil. vs. like the Presidency of the United States and o ther high offices. seems rather to invite abusive attacks.) It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United Sta tes. 974. The offenses created and def ined in Act No. Cabrera [1922]. or who shal l knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities. The Organic Act v ests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordan ce with law. or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawfu l purposes.. 2 Phil. A seditious attack on the Go vernor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. His official position. (Concepcion vs. or both. or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. the author ity of the Government. supra. Among them is sedition. in the discretion of the co . publish utter or make any statement. yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws. Paredes [1921]. under a democratic form of government. whi ch could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling inc ompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to t he laws. but rather against the existence of the State.

The crime of which the defendant stands charged is that descr ibed by the facts stated in the information. Mr. p. 292 as amended.. we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. . in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico. 9. The designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact. and will. in accordance with the sentence of the lower court. responsive to. 456)." to use the expression of this court in a similar case in Gand ia vs.. Our course is justified when it is recalled that only last year. sufficiently punish the accused. 258 U. may be possible .urt. 292 as ame nded. the defendant an d appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. De Joya's Code of Criminal Procedure. Ostrand. an accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that des ignated in the information. Pettingill (222 U. 292 as amended. we think. 9. In the words of the law. is. He has made a stat ement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. He has made a statem ent and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together f or unlawful purposes. and based upon. JJ. p.) While our own sense of humor is not entir ely blunted. and on thes e facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 452. lighted by an irresponsible individual. Perez has uttered seditious words. observed: "A reading of the two articles rem oves the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant expressions of m eridional speech.S. 298. in effect. So ordered. the offense with which the defendant is charged. Chief Jus tice Taft of the United States Supreme Court. if such graver offense is included or described in t he body of the information.S. concur. and is afterwards justified by the proof presented d uring the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure. A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Ac t No. judgment is affirmed. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. Street. Indeed they are so excessive and outrag eous in their character that they suggest the query whether their superlative vi lification has not overleapt itself and become unconsciously humorous. Johns and Romualdez. it being under stood that. In accordance with our settled rule . That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves. Porto Rico [1922]. With the modification thus indicated." (Balzac vs. Separate Opinions . All of these various tendencies can be ascri bed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. The fugitive flame of disloya lty. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested an d incited rebellious conspiracies.) The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law. must be dealt with firmly before it endangers the general public peace.

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. in my opinion. b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macar iola. Macariola charged res pondent Judge Elias B. MACARIOLA. the Honorable Leonard Wood. Ruperto Reyes. Maca riola. a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Mrs. 1968 for investigation. or to disturb the peace of the community or the safet y and order of the Government which are the acts penalized by section 8 of Act N o. Anacorita Reyes. complainant. On the contrary. should not be convicted of the crime of sedition because there is no allegation in the complaint nor proof in the record. but not under section 8 of Act No. MAKASIAR. against Bernardita R. Bakunawa. Luz R. Justice Villamor. 1971 of th en Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Assoc iate Justice of the Supreme Court. VILLAMOR. and Priscilla Reyes. defendant. concurs. 292. J. 1968 Bernardita R. No. Macariola alleged among oth er things that. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. thus: Civil Case No. or to incite an y conspiracy or rebellion. unbecoming and improper of a law abiding citizen and highly detrimental and insulting to the a uthority of the Governor-General which is the thing prohibited and punished by a rticle 256 of the Penal Code.M.. she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with . concurring and dissenting: I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor with costs. JJ. to whom this case was referred on October 28." The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27. with "acts unbecoming a judge. Avanceña and Johnson. vs. 133-J May 31. it would appear evident th at the accused expressed himself in biting and poignant language. showing that w hen the accused uttered the words that gave rise to these proceedings. Bales was not a daughter of the deceas ed Francisco Reyes. Adela Reyes. HONORABLE ELIAS B. he had th e intention of inciting others to gather for an illicit purpose. the political rivalry between them and the difference of opinion that they entertained regarding the administration of the Governor-General. plaintiffs. under the provision s of article 256 of the Penal Code.. 1982 BERNARDITA R. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. now Ass ociate Justice of the Court of Appeals. 292. I cannot give assent to a doct rine which permits a complaint to be presented upon one theory and the trial to be carried through upon that theory and then to condemn the defendant upon a the ory which he nor the prosecution ever dreamed of. having due regard to the place and time when the discus sion arose between Lodovice and the accused. The accused. ASUNCION.JOHNSON.. the common father of the plaintiff and defendant. resp ondent. J. Bales. In her defenses to the complaint for partition. concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes . A. J: In a verified complaint dated August 6. concurring: I agree with the opinion of Mr. as imposed by the court a quo.

On June 8. Adela Reyes. the Court. Anacorita Reyes.] p. a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is mar ked Exh. Adela Reyes and Priscilla Re yes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Rey es Diaz to Irene Ondez. 5265. Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23. 4581. Anacorita Reyes. 892. 4892. 4892. 983. (9) D irecting the parties. 4474. 1963. the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of on e-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. and one part is to be adjudicated solely to d efendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother. quality. and on Octob er 16. 33). C]. Macariola. Macariola. Bales to have b een an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz. The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal. 4474. 4581. (3) Declaring Lots Nos. par 2. and (I 1) Dismissing all o ther claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. in such a way that the ex tent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. within thirty days after this judgment shall have become f inal to submit to this court. each of the latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate. a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil C ase 3010. 5265. 4475. 4581. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. whic . 1963. 5265. as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Dia z. Bishop of Jaro. in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named. and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the decea sed by his second marriage with Irene Ondez. and the remaining one-half ( 1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. kind.G. 4803. [3rd Ed. upon a preponderance of evid ence. 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the conj ugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras. and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Si nforosa R. those conjugal properties should fi rst be partitioned into two parts. and no properties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriag e. as surviving widow of Fran cisco Reyes Diaz. (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. 4506. for approval a project of partition of the heredit ary estate in the proportion above indicated. Bales. and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be div ided equally among his children by his two marriages. Luz R. (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lo t No. Ruperto Reyes. O. 4474. 4803. 528. 3416. (Ramirez vs. New Civil Code). (6) De claring the defendant Bernardita R. and in such manner as the parties may. being the only legal and forced h eir of her mother Felisa Espiras. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Fra ncisco Reyes Diaz. Diancin vs. (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez. Bakunawa. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signe d by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant. Ruperto Reyes. finds and so holds.Felisa Espiras. 996 in relation to Art. (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-ha lf (1/2) of Lot No. Felisa Espiras. (4) Dec laring Lot No. 1963. 4475. 4475. Bautista. 4803. New Civil Code ). deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into considera tion the location. 14 Phil. c) the properties left by the decea sed were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife. 4506 and onehalf (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisc o Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership. A. Bakunawa. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz. Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. ( 10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Macar iola to pay the costs of this suit. Felisa Es piras. the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS. by agreement. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. nature and value of the properties involved. and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintif fs Luz R. 4892. a hereditary share of. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. d) if there was any partition to be made.

Ruperto Reyes. October 16. documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights. Lots Nos. Tacloban City.quoted. ASUNCION Judge EXH. 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales.h for convenience is quoted hereunder in full: The parties. provided. to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition: l. therefore. The whole of Lots Nos. Lots Nos. 3416 consisting of 1. (SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. nevertheless. 1154. interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective parties. Ruperto Reyes. as above. finding the above-quoted Project of Part ition to be in accordance with law. A portion of Lot No. hereby approves the same. 3416 shall belong excl usively to Priscilla Reyes. Anacorita Reyes. 3416 consisting of 2. . 3416 after taking the porti ons awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa. B.834. 1963. and that both lawyers had represente d to the Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Proj ect of Partition. An acorita Reyes. are directed to execute such papers. SO ORDERED. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed thi s Project of Partition. the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case.373. it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated abo ve which is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be appro ved. 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernar dita Reyes Macariola. as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa. (SGD) ELIAS B. 2. Given in Tacloban City. through their respective counsels. 6. 1963. 4. 5. Lot No. this 23rd day of October. upon assurance of both counsels of the res pective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition.49 square meters along the east ern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares . The parties. h ad been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendan t approving the above Project of Partition. for the Defendant Tacloban City (SGD) ZOTICO A. Macariola. the Court. presented to this Court for appr oval the following project of partition: COMES NOW. A portion of Lot No. there fore. WHEREFORE. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares.55 square meters along the west ern part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales. 3. TOLETE Atty. 4803. however that the remaining portion of Lot No. and to perform such other acts as are lega l and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.

Asuncion. Anacorita Rup erto. Jaime Arigpa Tan. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Sec urities and Exchange Commission only on January 9. and the latter's wife. as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Asuncion (Exh. and Canon 25 of the Canons of Jud icial Ethics. r ec. while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2. 1965. At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan. [2] that he likewise violated Article 14. by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. Victoria S. w as adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz.5 sq. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. and [4] that th ere was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respond ent Judge (pp. 1968 by herein complainant. Anota. was amended on November 11.5556 sq. to wit: [1] that responde nt Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491. Adela. After hearing. the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27. spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respecti ve shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing I ndustries Inc. a stenographer in Judge Asuncion' s court (Exhs. 378-385. Victoria S. F-1 and V-1). paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce. 1968 his answer to which a repl y was filed on October 16.306 sq.172. The Ar ticles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. 11). E-4 to E-7). Complainant Bernardita R. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rath er one-half thereof with an area of 15.The above Order of October 23. F).. report and recommendation. U). Macariola filed on August 9. rec. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 1968 alleging four causes of action. Dr. On March 6. Inc. Judge Asuncion. of the New Civil Code in a cquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1963. V). E) [pp. 1184-E which was one of those properti es involved in Civil Case No. F. Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24. meters was sold on July 31. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife. with Judge Asuncio n as the President and Mrs. Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. 1968 the instant complain t dated August 6.]. Sect ion 12.162. paragraph 5. 2) who was is sued transfer certificate of title No. In c. 3019. 1-7. 1968. 12). 1964 to Dr. 1971 recommending . of R. 1963. We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Cou rt of Appeals. and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares. Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules. 3010 decided by him. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. Humilia Jalandoni Tan. In Our resolution of Octo ber 28. This lot. only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyt e to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective ad judicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. On August 31. which accordi ng to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes. paragraph H. meters." (Exit 15 & 16). for investigation. 1966.A. 1967 (Exh. Section 3.). which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. and when the proj ect of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 118 4 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. [3] that respondent was guilty of coddlin g an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in t he Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar.

Catalina Cabus. and her counsel. 4234 was filed. (c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50. having already co nveyed on March 6.000. Inc. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31.001 for exemplary damages. plaintiff. 4235. rendered a decision. (a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400. seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Cas e No. 481. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN.000. Ben Barraza Go.that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the fir st cause of action alleged in the complaint. Bernardita R. 477." which was docketed as Civil Case No. plaintiff therein. FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN (1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the h eirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin. et al. Justice P alma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated. Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla. Likewise. The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11. On November 2. the case against Dr. Ramento. Macariola. 1969 by the then Secretary (no w Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. On the third and fourth causes of action. It appears. Alfredo R.000. (3) adjudging the plaintiff. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same. (2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. .00] for Attorney's Fees. entitled "Bernardita R. 1968 (pp. 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries. Inc. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under th e law to engage in business. B.00] for moral damages. who was directed and authorized on June 2. the dispositive porti on of which reads as follows: A. Celestial. Similarly. Mrs. that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. versus Sinforosa R. Inc.00] for nominal damages. Judge Jose D. and for the second cause of action. Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. 1970. Asuncion. 4234. 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Indus tries. the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismisse d on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. Salvador Anota an d Enriqueta Anota and Atty. defendants. (b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200. the cas es against defendants Serafin P. Celestial and Pilar P. r ec. Bal es.).. however. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein. 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on Augus t 31.3"] a pproving the partition. Asuncion.. Jesus Perez. ASUNCION (1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has ju risdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the P roject of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by h er and respondent Judge from Dr.000. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longe r a real party in interest when Civil Case No. For one. and (d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0. Zotico A.

1971. when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6. at the time of the sale on March 6. paragraph 5. Her rer. with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [em phasis supplied]. this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall a pply to lawyers. BALES. 88 SCRA 51 3. 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal wi thin the reglementary period. Luz R. SO ORDERED [pp. ET AL.. D.. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase. the lot in question was no longer subject o f the litigation. Ma cariola. 1963 and the amended order dated November 11. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in C ivil Case No. 3010. 1965. the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective fun ctions.(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the hei rs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.. Eng and Ruperto O. In the case at bar. Anacorita R. C. either in person or through the mediation of another: xxx xxx xxx (5) Justices. the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litiga tion involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. 1 . 519 [1979]. (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit. I WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. 3010 which he rendered on June 8. judges. clerks of superior and inferior cou rts. of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purc hase a portion of Lot No. 646 [1978 ]). Ababa et al. Moreover. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO (1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo. rec. WE have already ruled that ". the decision in Civil Case No. WHO WERE PLAINT IFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8. 'That Article provides: Article 1491. Priscilla R. Bales. for the prohibition to operate. 3010 (1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. prosecuting attorneys. and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justi ce. 1965 a porti on of Lot 1184-E. Bakunawa. Solis. 531-533. 86 SCRA 641. The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified t herein. even at a public or judicial action. Rosario vda. Court of Appeals. de Laig vs. Reyes.] It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated t o the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22. 1963 ap proving the October 16. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. respondent 's order dated October 23. Adela R. that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncio n violated Article 1491. under her first cause of action. hence..

3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition. 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wif e who declared the same for taxation purposes only. 1964 of Lot 11 84-E to Dr. We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justic e thus: And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfe r of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wi fe the Secretary. 4234 can no l onger alter. 3010 but from Dr. and Luz R. 1964 to Dr. Galapon fo r which he was issued TCT No. is of no moment. respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6. 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs. the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having tak en place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary. Furthermore. Luz Bakunawa. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of parti tion. now Court of Appeals Justice. The subsequent filing on November 9. Adela Reyes. 1963 and November 11. as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances. Therefore. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31. was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders. 3010.963 decision. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition. hence. change or affect the aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to re spondent Judge. Galapon had acted. t ook place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. Exh. It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31. seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same. 196 8 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case N o. an d on March 6. Adela Reyes and Luz R. Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions b etween the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E. 1963 in Civil Case No. Article 149 1 of the New Civil Code. and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A t o 1184-E. The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6. and he insists that t here is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. 4234. In this connection. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more sp ecifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes. Priscilla Reyes. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes. Inc. 3010 and his two questioned or ders dated October 23. the property was n o longer subject of litigation. 1965 a portion of L ot 1184-E from Dr. however. As aforestated. after the finality of the decision wh ich he rendered on June 8. Adela Reyes.. the same. in mediation for him and his wife. and not during th e pendency of the litigation. While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11. Consequently. namely. in the purcha se of Lot 1184-E. was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving th e project of partition. Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31. had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders. A. Arcadio Galapon. 1965 d irectly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of p artition. 14 of Respondent's . Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares an d interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industrie s. 1963. The subsequent sale on Augus t 31. or 11. 1968 of Civil Case No. (See p. there was no violation of paragraph 5.

whatever error was committed by respo ndent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he w as assured by Atty. 1963. Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record s howing that Dr. or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. as follows: 1. Counsel for complainant stresses the view. credible and sincere. R amo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent.Memorandum). 9-e). Decena on October 22. On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties. 7-A). U ) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh . however. 1963. 24. A. C-3 & C-4). however. W e quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice. Tha t he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition. 3010 (Exh. xxx xxx xxx On this point. Macariola. 10. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. conveying to Dr. rec. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature o f the parties more particularly that of Mrs. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22. While it is true that such written authorit y if there was any.fourth of Lot 1154 be longed to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fo urth was the share of complainant's mother. and that she gave her conformity thereto. which was approved by respondent on O ctober 23. 1963. Such contention is absurd because fr om the decision. the same havi ng been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Re yes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 9-a). certain actuations of Mrs. followed by an amending Order on November 11. his affidavit being the o nly one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 9-D). It is this 1/4 share in L ot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. 1963 (see Exh. 1963. (Exh. 1963 (Exh. 1963. I refer to the following documents: 1) Exh. Exh. 391. Macariola. 1963. 1969). Dr. The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3. Macariola on the project of partiti on submitted to him for approval. January 20. and I believe him when he testified th at he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Re yeses without any intervention of. the counsel of record of Mrs. it is clear that one-half of one. Hector Decena the one-fourth sh are of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. was not presented by respondent in evidence. Bonifacio Ramo. in other words.). several days a fter the preparation of the project of partition. In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the pr oject of partition dated October 16. that the latter sold her one -fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not b ecause of the project of partition. In this deed of sale the vende e stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share.394. 2) Exh. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiri ng Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Exh. Complainant became the owner of the entire . nor did Atty. On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11. (See Exh. B and tsn p. Felisa Espiras. C. M acariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the pro ject of partition. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a r espectable citizen. the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herei n complainant (see Exhs. Exh. A.

rec. nor can they hold any office or have any direct. 1963." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: ". In this pa rticular case of respondent.. Justices of the Supreme Court. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the partie s to the litigation. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5. if Mrs. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. but also in his everyday life. it was for no other re ason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her de ceased father as per Exhs. the lawyers practisin g in his court.). Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tac loban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. The conduct of r espondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010. but his actuations must be such as not give cause for do ubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition. Exh. or towns in which they discharge their duties: 1. the assessed and market value of said properties. 395396. to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in on e way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the dist ribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. so that not only must he be truly honest and just. while it is. Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the p roperties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquire d a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his cou rt and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife wer e ranking officers at the time of such transfer. rec. administrative. and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of h is actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. Said Article provides that: The following cannot engage in commerce. not only upon the bench an d in the performance of judicial duties. 386389. however. did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real propertie s when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area. provinces. Theref ore. Nov ember 28. however. 92. as a stockholder and a ranking officer. said corporation having been organized to engage in business. A. It is also significant at this point to stat e that Mrs. Finally. Decena (tsn p. the complainant alleged that respond ent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5. Com plainant. or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the dist ricts. One who occupies an exalted pos ition in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22. he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for him self and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were financia lly involved. judges and officials of the department of publ . Ar ticle 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184E which was in litigation in his court.). II With respect to the second cause of action. Inc. it was. 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignor ant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition. either in person or by proxy Article 14 . improper for him to hav e acquired the same. and his personal behavior.. he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. A and B. should b e beyond reproach. locatio n. Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when h e associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. kind.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on fr om the United States to the Republic of the Philippines. xxx xxx xxx 5.ic prosecution in active service. upon the cession of territory by one nation to anoth er. (Ely's Adminis trator vs. Ed. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory. or by Congress in time of peace. Thus. par.. 897 [1922]). 887. municipal judges. Article 14 of the Code of C ommerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulate s the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence. (Opinion. it. Atty.. 220. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885. may be c ontinued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the co mmander-in-chief during the war. with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codifica cion de las Provincias de Ultramar. political in essence. either following a conquest or otherwise. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. 43 Phil. . 14). While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the. Chief Justice Marshall said: On such transfer (by cession) of territory. Gen. 311 [1912]) th at: By well-settled public law..] 511. 1888. 1888. whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign. 43 L. are automatically abrogated. In the case of American and Ocean Ins. vs. lik e justices and judges. Ed. July 10. and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1. It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law. It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporate d in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippine s. administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. the political laws of the former sovereign. United States.S." which was extended to the Philippines by th e Royal Decree of August 6. those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immedi ately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. 171 U. Perf ecto. and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by ch ance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. This provision shall not be applicable to mayo rs. Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define t he relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign. 142). 34. l aws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirma tive act of the conqueror. 7 L. 542. however. 189 9). chap. the political laws do not. Cos.S. Specifically. [26 U. (Halleck's Int. 315. law of public corporations. 330. unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. However. We held in Roa vs. Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty. it has never been held that the rela . Law. 242). partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the re lationship between the government and certain public officers and employees. Collector of Customs (23 Phil.

Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect a nd cannot apply to the respondent. Co nsequently. this Court stated t hat: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territo ry the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. the business of the corporation in which re spondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. it is necessary that by reason of his office. Corrupt practices of public officers. 134. cited by Justice R amon C. Meneses. In the case at bar. and th e law which may be denominated political. or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest. In addition to acts or omissions o f public officers already penalized by existing law.' (People vs. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Co rrupt Practices Act. e . Macariola. "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subje ct to this crime. transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it. It is undisputed that there was no cas e filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in whi ch the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No.created power of the State. Likewise. versus Sinforosa O. until altered by the newly. is necessarily changed. no w Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. 11th Supp. Section 3 of Republic Act No. and. which provides that: Sec. Bales. contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity.A. Inc. the following shall constit ute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawf ul: xxx xxx xxx (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any busines s. Their relations wit h their former sovereign are dissolved. plaintiff. Perfecto (43 Phil. remains in f orce. the official who intervenes i n contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit t his crime. hence. " There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of t he aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. then Judge of the Court of First Instance. 887. It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained a ny undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financia l involvement in it. Vol. 1174. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Aquino. The same act which tra nsfers their country. 3. although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals. in People vs. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Pen al Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or i ndirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his off icial duty to intervene. C. 3019. p.G. he has to interv ene in said contracts or transactions. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent inter venes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.tions of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H. 897 [1922]). 40 O. and new relations are created between th em and the government which has acquired their territory. 11 [1976]). Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because t here is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official ca pacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries.

vocation.. 1970 by CFI Judge Jo se D. credit. Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Cor rupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohib ition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the proje ct of partition. which alone is authorized. No. as heretofore stated. 1973 Constitution. as amended. 1967. under Section 77 of said law. cannot apply to respondent Judge b ecause the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of h is decision in Civil Case No. Article X. 1968 and decided on November 2. municipal judges may engage in teachin g or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but wit h the permission of the district judge concerned. the power to remove or dismiss judges was then ves ted in the President of the Philippines. serious misconduct and inefficiency. not in the Commissioner of Civil Servic e. Under sai d Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private busin ess. and only on two grounds. vocation. Thus. Moreover. deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America. particularly S ection 12 of Rule XVIII. 4234 was file d only on November 9 or 11. engaging in private business without a written permission from the Depart ment Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law. however. the property was no longer subject of litigation. respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines.. having disposed of his interest therein on January 31. nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engagi ng or having interest in any lawful business. Article 1491 of the New Civil Code aga inst the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties. agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department. and upo n the recommendation of the Supreme Court.t al. do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. In addition. or profession or be connected with any commercial. the same." It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent. Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engagin g in commerce is.. Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pur suant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the c ivil service from engaging in any private business. Furthermore. As a matt er of fact. although Section 12. namely. as amended. upon its o wn motion. 296. It must be noted. Under Section 67 of said law. credit. also known as the J udiciary Act of 1948. is covered by Republic Act No. hence. otherwise known as the Jud iciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7. th at is." wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the afo resaid corporation. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporat ion. agricu ltural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of D epartment . It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. because it is political in nature . that Civil Case No. the prohibition in paragraph 5. however. a vio lation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service. does not contain any prohibition to that effect. 296.A. Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules. being a member of the Judic iary. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder. Likewise. On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12. or profession or b e connected with any commercial. may not fall within the purview of paragraph h. or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to con . We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R .

. Ang-Angco vs. only the Supr eme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary." Thus. for. serious misconduct and inefficiency. guideli nes and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis suppli ed). so far as reasonably possible.. Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959. And under Sections 5. 20. Art. after his accession to the bench. Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by jo ining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. It is desir able that he should. and prescribe standards. judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or em ployees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Servi ce.A. as a stockholder an d a ranking officer. suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six m onths' salary. 1973 Constitution). would be adding another ground for the disci pline of judges and. refrain from all relations w hich would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bia . to have final authority to pass upon their removal. Besides. sepa ration. Article X of the 1973 Constitution. it is the Commis sioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide . under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959. he should not retain such investments previously made. the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. No. 6 and 7. remove any subor dinate officer or employee from the service. Clearly. 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).. It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissi oner may. and efficiency of such officers and employees. a violation of Section 12. we emphasized that only permanent of ficers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusi ve jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. and. as aforestated. within one hundred twenty days. and under the 1973 Constitution. discipline. and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct. There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassi fied service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. Moreover. X. R. the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges. violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of re asonable office regulations. 2260. However. 15 SCRA 710. Inc. in interpret ing Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. exc ept as provided by law. all administrative cas es against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service. a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for di sciplinary action against civil service officers and employees. Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal. for .duct the corresponding investigation. Zaldivar. demote him in rank. 2260) [1959]). 1. Castillo. the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestio nable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that: A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court. certainly. Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recogn ize the same as applicable to them. WE have already ruled that ". is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Co de of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as w ell as Section 12.. namely. or in the interest of the service. and. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the S upreme Court (Sec. longer than a peri od sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss.713 [1965]. after submission to it.

I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. Su ch disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporatio n only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation. complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum. or that he used his influence. and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein responden t gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the lat ter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with responden t. It has bee n shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and th e words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. Canons of Judicial Ethics). Tan's child at baptism (Exh. 30. however. Ta n and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said per sons were concerned. WE are not. and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as fol lows: The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent a ssociated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publi cly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs.. I. indicates that respon dent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their re spective shares to third parties. that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unles s it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuatio . Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as muc h as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorney s and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or busine ss relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial cou rse" (par. up to its incorporation on January 9. 1967 from said corporation. I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Atto rneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. 1967. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant t hat respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. and it was b ut natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that s tatement on its face value. on the Judges of the other bran ches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan. K. I and 1.1) to indicate his office. however. that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commenda tion for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and be fore it became involved in any court litigation III With respect to the third and fourth causes of action. and it appears also that the aforesaid corpora tion did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as th ere was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance o f Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the co rporation on March 12. or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife ha d withdrawn on January 31. M & M-1). 1966.. with the recommendation of the Investigating Justic e that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless. WE agree. The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and c laims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of th e bar.s his judgment. if he had any. but if a Judge does have social relat ions. and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard fo r ethics. .

concur. In conclusion. Concepcion Jr. BARREDO.R. Plana. J. J. rec. C.... Melencio-Herrera. J.J. is on leave. Fernando.. concurring and dissenting: I vote with Justice Aquino. concurring and dissenting: I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.. JJ.. L-6 November 29. now Associate Justice of the Cou rt of Appeals.. . BARREDO. Separate Opinions AQUINO. took no part. because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be c haracterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion. De Castro. he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. 403-405. did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a p rivate corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent. Separate Opinions AQUINO. No. Guerrero. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS.ns with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. concurring and dissenting: I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration. J. WHEREFORE. while respondent Judge Asuncion. Vasquez. petitioner.). Relova and Gut ierrez. Martinez for petitioner. Teehankee. SO ORDERED. THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY RE MINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. 1945 ANICETO ALCANTARA. G.. vs. Abad Santos and Esolin JJ. concurring and dissenting: I vote with Justice Aquino. Buenaventura B.. J. respondent.

Therefore. as modified by the Court of Appeals o f Northern Luzon. prov ided that such judgments do not have a political complexion. Obviously. 113. The petitioner does not ques tion the validity of said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of Genera l Douglas McArthur of October 23. 23) of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physic al injuries. which according to our decision in the c ase of Co Kim Cham vs. the Revised Penal Code. in accordance with the authorities therein cited. and June 23. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra. except those a political complexion. on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the s o-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands.R. were good and valid and remain good and valid.G. L-5 (p. G. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court create d by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him. In that the same case th is Court held that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japan ese occupation. and there fore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines. ante). was the same Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occu pation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. th e judgments of such court. He was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the munici pal law of the Commonwealth. petitioner c ommenced serving his sentence. In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. 37. 1944. or acts already penalize d by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government. A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penali zes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws. Ilocos Sur. 1944. is valid and enforceable.R. like those of the court which were continued during t he Japanese occupation. but taken out of t he territorial law and penalized as a new offenses committed against belligerent occupant. 790)and sentence the petitioner to an indetermin ate penalty of from four months four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years. that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No .FERIA. do es not refer to judicial processes. No. J. the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complex ion. nine months and three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September 12. this Court ruled t hat the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commi ssion established in the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof wer e good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Common wealth Government. Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal cas e No. and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting in each division. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon. incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occ . Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. and that only the two Justices constituted the m ajority which promulgated the decision in question. the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modif ied said sentence (CA. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio. The division of the C ourt of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals. No. 1945. as this court held in its decision in the abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Upon appeal.: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the relea se of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan. the regime of the so-called Republ ic effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.

. to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare.. 320. Since International Law is a body of rules accepted by nations as regulating the ir mutual relations.. J. The Hague Conventions of 1899. ed. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the . and nine months and three d ays of prison correccional. Moran. expre ssly declare that: ARTICLE XLII. 552. XLII. concurring: The principal question involved in this habeas corpus case is the validity of th e judicial proceedings held. as found in the writings of publicist and in the dec isions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The Habana . which were made crimes against the b elligerent occupant. 22 Sup. sec. during the Japanese occupation. Pablo and Bengzon. said pe titioner was found guilty of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious phy sical injuries. in the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Ct. on appeal. Jaranilla.upied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied .. etc. and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the us ages and customs of nation. But while usages and customs are the older original source of International Law. Colorado. 44 Law. sedition. The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established . 290. the crimes against nation al security . were crimes against the Commonwealth or United Stat es Government under the Revised Penal Code. C.). and sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from four moths and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years.. dated October 24 1944. 838). They are acts pe nalized for public rather than private reasons. acts which tend.. etc. International Law is par t of the Fundamental law of the land (Article II.S. such as The Hogue Conventions of 1899 and 1907. whenever question of right depending upon it are presented for our determ ination (Kansas vs. 185 U. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. ed. espionage. ART. concur. such as treason. and the effect on said proceedings of the proclamati on of General Douglas McArthur. respecting laws and customs of war on land.. 175 U. 677. such a s rebellion. 20 Sup. of the belligerent occupant. safety and security. The decision of this ques tions requires the application of principles of International Law. directly or ind irectly.. great international treaties are a latter source of increasing importance. and against public order. Ct. in which. Separate Opinions DE JOYA. Paras. 46 Law. Ozaeta. S. 146.. and in the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon. 3). In view of the foregoing. it must be ascertained and administered by this Court. As International Law is an integral part of our law. and in a position to assert itself. in connection with the municipal law of this country. in which herein petitioner was accused of frustrated mur der. the proof of their existence is to be found in the consent of the nations to abide by them.. As example. Under the Constitution Commonwealth of the Philippines. JJ.J.

on January 3. 576. 412. 57 Law. while respecting. 335. 7th ed. 476. 33 Sup Ct. by the French army. 441. 464. pp. 167). MacLeod vs. 461. MacLeod vs.. Westlake. 1821).S. 97 U. International Law. Kelly vs. 509. Upon appeal to the French Court of Cassation. 57 La w. 24 Law. on the gro und that the courts of the territory within which the crime had been committed h ad exclusive jurisdiction to try the case and that "the occupation of Catalonia by French troops and its government by the French authorities had not communicat ed to its inhabitants the character of French citizens. afterwards. and that such character could only be acquired by a solemn act of incorporation which had not been gone through. 39. 955. 1260. II. was in accordance with the rules and principles of Intern ational Law.. International Law. as far as possible. because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials. The r egular judicial tribunals of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation. International La w. 331-337. 3d ed. 387. among which is the United States of America (32 Stat.hands of the occupant.. International Law. public order and safety. pp... 9 9 U. Tennessee. u nless absolutely prevented. 97 U. France. 955.S. The above provisions of the Hague Conventions have been adopted by the nations g iving adherence to them. 330-332. and is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. nor to their territory t he character of French territory. Steamship Co. as proclaim in the City of Manila. during Japanese occupation. 465. 229 U. 359. a French man.. 121-123). The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority. in accordance with the local laws.. sec. Davis. United States. pp. 475. International Law. evident that the establishment of the government under the nam e of the Philippine Executive Commission.). secs. and permitting our courts to function and administer said laws.S. subjecting them only to supervision by the mil itary authorities. Sanders [1878]. even after said government established by the military occupant had been disp . 182 1. 20 Wall. and also because the latter are mor e competent to administer the laws of the territory.. the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestabl ish and insure.S. United States. 6th ed. in so far as they do not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. therefore. 413. 416. 1942. respecting the laws in force in the coun try. Elements of Internationa l Law. by the commander in chief of the Japanese Imperial Force s. 1260 Taylor. accused of the murder of a Catalan in that province. 416.) It is. It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded state continue i n force. United States 229 U. or the so-called Philippine Republic. 1118. and this authority will be exercised upon principles of International Law ( New Orleans vs. 2d ed. Spain. Hall. p. II.. ed 992. [1909]. it must necessarily follow that the judicial proceeding conducted before t he courts established by the military occupant must be considered legal and vali d. In 1811. 578. 357.. Wilson. [1874]. Part II.. but only when in actual possession of the enemy's territ ory.S. II Oppenheim on International Law. International Law. 6th ed. and the military occupant g enerally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers a s are willing to serve under him. Coleman vs. pp.. Inter national Law. was tried and convicte d by the assize Court of the Department of the Pyrenees Orientales. ed . 2 4 Law ed. Holland.. 33 Sup Ct. the laws in force in the country. If the military occupant is thus in duty bound to establish in the territory und er military occupation governmental agencies for the preservation of peace and o rder and for the proper administration of justice. pp. ed." (Hall. or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. the conviction was quashed. (32 Stat. 356. Lawrence. during the occupation of Catalonia.

and enforceable in 1871 (French vs. in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the government obedience in ci vil matters. Horn vs. 509. Buckley ([1878]. and that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts has been established in this co untry. by civil a uthority. under the Philippine Executive Co mmission or under the so-called Philippine Republic. 188). White. Ketchum vs. 188). Tumllin. not only tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United Sta tes. was and should. 1118. they are in general to be treated as valid and binding. United States [1913]. 416. be considered as a de facto government. 1861.. 20 Wall.] 9. Sprott vs. Tennessee. 99 U.. Bruffy. for those acts though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Lockhart. In the more recent case of Ketchum vs. Colem an vs.S. he more aptly denominated a government of paramount force." (Williams vs. had been declare d valid and binding (Cook vs. as a long a said judicial proceedings had been conducted.. even after the liberation of this country by the American f orces.S.. White 7 Wall. for such act of obe dience (Thorington vs. Cas.. . 17 Wall. the Supre me Court of the United States held-. No. which had existed in the States prior to t he rebellion. but they may be administered. 229 U. during Japanese occupation. also. because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. during said Japanese occupation. called also by publicis ts a government de facto. 7 Wall.S. and are should be considered as legal an d valid enforceable. Actual governments of this sort are established over di stricts differing greatly in extent and conditions. merely setting the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdi ction. under the Constitution. for the purchase mon ey slaves was held valid judgment when entered. 361).S. Tex as vs. 96 U. Fed. or the just rights of the citizens.S. Law. Fed."It is now settled law in this court that d uring the late civil war the same general law for the administration of justice and the protection of private rights...) The government established in the Philippines.) The government established in the Philippines.. 700. and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citiz ens who by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force. therefor.. even after the ter mination of the American Civil War. in accordance w ith the law of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 1 76. 3.S. [U. Buckley [1878]. They are usually administere d directly by military authority. Smith. 17 Wall. ed. 10 Am. United States. 164. and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in November. Williams vs. United States. 96 U.. 641. nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion. do not become responsible. Reg. 5104). 570. 1 Woods. As far as the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national au thority. would seem to fall under the following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States: But there is another description of government de facto. 19 Law ed.24 Law. 20 Wall. Case. 459. 459..S. No. and did not become responsible. 700. as wrong-doers.. Bruffy..S. The judgments by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of the America were considered legal and valid and enforceable. 97 U. 176 . Horn vs. remained during its continuance and afterwards. during the American Civil War. Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts. Lockhart. and agai nst the rightful authority of an established and lawful government. but which might. Its distinguishing characteristics (1) that its e xistence is maintained by active military power within the territories.. supported more or less directly by military force. T exas vs. as wrongdoers.laced by the legitimate government of the territory. 437. [N. during Japanese occupation. The Confederate States were a de facto government. Sprott vs.]. (MacLeod vs. 570. perhaps. 8 Wall. 99 U. Oliver.

213 U.. ed. United States.. Ltd.].. in accordance with said principles of International Law. always alive to the dictates of national welfare.. one of which will maintain and the others destroy it.S. therefore. 29 Sup. 22. 358. the judicial proceedings conducted before the court of the just ice.. for the crime of frustrated mu rder. 9 Law. 12 Sup. ed. as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts. 40 Phil. a contention which. J. Ct. petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void.. can properly incline the scales of i ts decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the p ublic policy (Smith. in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Bell & Co. 511. Delaware & Hudson Co. established here during Japanese military occupation. 72. 136). unde r the provisions of the proclamation issued by General Douglas McArthur dated Oc tober 23. Church of Holy Trin ity vs. ed. and the petition for habeas corpus filed in this case should. which would avoid results of this character. in our opinion. 53 Law.. 36 Law..S.. Trinidad [1925].. 19 Law. 226.S. 197 U.. 39. The duty of the court in construing a sta tute. 49 Law. In re Guariña [1913]. 125 . dissenting: . I concur in the majority opinion. is unt enable. It will always. 24 Phil.. Now. 385). 527. as International Law is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land.. In other words petition demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation is sued by the General Douglas McArthur. Ct. ed. Ct. Director of Prisons [1924].S.. 3 Ann. According to the rules and principles of International Law. Board of Supervisors of Grenad a County vs. 630). under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. 1004. as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and uncertainties. 46 P hil. Rep.. The judiciary. It is to be presumed t hat General Douglas McArthur knows said rules and principles of International La w. includes the duty of a avoiding a construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions.The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer t o the prosecution of the petitioner in this case. 7 Wall [U. merely applying the p rovisions of the municipal law of the territory. And it is also to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur has acted.S. For the forgoing reasons.. 765. Natividad [1919]. Coombs [1838]]. as the provisions of the Revise d Penal Code in the instant case which have no political or military significanc e. which was reduced to illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physi cal injuries. oppress ion or an absurd consequence. 112 U. 704. be denied.. 1944. be presumed that the le gislature intended exception to its language.. Ct. Kirby. 5 Sup. 482. Yu Cong Eng vs. Fuentes vs. regulations and pro cesses of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 25 Sup. in force in this c ountry under the Commonwealth government. 366. 37. 278.. ed. if it can be avoided (Unite d States vs. 47 Phil. which have been sanction by the Supr eme Court of the United States. 2 Phil. and the legal doctri nes cited above. 461. PERFECTO. the Courts will always adopt the former (United States v s. before and during Japanese occupation.. Jacobs on vs. and that the accused should be immediately released from the custody. 261. Brown [1884]. during the Japanese occupation would be highly det rimental to public interests. Cas. 28 Law. vs. In re Allen. which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that which s aves its constitutionality. 12 Pet. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (U nited States vs. All laws should receive a sensible construction as not to lead it injustice. 836). as said proclamation nullifies all the laws. ed. Massachussetts. are and should be considered legal.. valid and binding. therefore. 143 U. When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions.. 643.

MIRLANDO H. LIESES. R OEL S. SR. JUL IUS S. BAE MLO MO-BEATRIZ T. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NAT URAL RESOURCES. VIRGILIO CAYETANO. TIMOL. 355. L-49 respectively. L-49. SAWAY. LUMANDONG. SALOME P. MANSANG-CAGAN. ANDRES MENDIOGRIN. SAWAY. the proceedings attacked by petitioner belong to the judicial processes declared null and void in the proclamation issued by G eneral McArthur on October 23. BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY.. JOSEPHINE M. NARCISA M. MAURO VALONES. JUAN M . EDWARD M. MORENO MALID. ALBESO. SARZA. DATU RAMON BAYAAN. DATU MANTUMUKAW T EOFISTO SABASALES. BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PAQUITO S. 153. LANGLEY SEGUNDO. dissenting: Upon the grounds stated my main dissenting opinion. No. NORMA MAPANSAGONOS.FLAVIER. AMOS. ALFREMO CARPIANO.R. GIRON. The writ of habeas corpus sought by petitioner sh ould be granted because the nullity of the judgment and proceedings under which he has been imprisoned and restrained of his liberty. BUGNAY. SAMMY SALNUNGAN. EDTAMI MANSAYANG AN. RENATO T. JIMMY UGYUB. EMBA. RODOLFO C. GUINOSAO. SAWAY. No. As stated in the majority opinion. DESCAGA. MENDI. LOURDES D. ESTEVEZ. ante). LADRA. and therefore. ANTONIO D. SATUR S. JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES.R. MA DION MALID. intervenors. SAMIE SATURNO. BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO. OFELIA T. vs. 199. 135385. CARLING DOMULOT. GERARDA. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONER S OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS. BENITO CARINO. represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA. EL IZABETH L. M ANUEL T. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. L-5 Co Kim Cham vs. PEPE H. No. DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY. TIWAN. and in my concurring opinion in G. VENANCIO APANG. FILIPE G. RAFFY MALINDA. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. respondents. December 6.R. in G. YAOM TUGAS. we vote the granting of the writ of habeas corpus prayed for. EMUY.. WALTER N. DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. TERESA GASPAR. INC. rep resented by her father CORNELIO MALID. PULA BATO B LAAN TRIBAL FARMER S ASSOCIATION. TIMUAY MACARIO D. HOGGAN G. DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON. PERFECTO B. HON. and had b een pronounced by the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon upon appeal from a judgment of conviction by the Japanese sponsored Court of First I nstance of Ilocos Sur. ATONG. L5 and G. GAB IN. CONCHITA G. 1944. DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. DATU JOEL UNAD. FELIPE P. 334. BAY INAY DAYA-MELIN DA S. .. MANUEL S. DAVI. I dissent from the o pinion of the majority herein. Peralta vs. JERSON P. TIMUAY EDWIN B. No. MARIO MANGCAL. SARING MASALONG. ROSEMARIE G. COLAS. LEONARDA SAWAY. MALUDAO. represented by her father TONY MALID. GILBERT P. BAGON. REYMUNDO. LIBERATO A. ABASALA. SELEN. MATERNIDAD M. ante). No. 1944. DATU EDUAARDO BANDA. ODETTE G. PANGAN. FELAY DIAMILING.R.R . AGUILAR. BAYANI ASCARRAGA. ENDING. LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL. SALVADOR TIONGSON. PE. JENNYLYN MALID. ante). petitioners. ALFREDO ABILLANO S. MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO. MANGKULINTAS. NENENG MALID. BASILIO WANDAG. HILADO. MINORS MARICEL MALID. EVANGELISTA. Director of Prisons (p. 2000] ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA. INTER-PEOPLE S EXCH ANGE. BAGON. LADRA. JESSIE ANDILAB. ROMEO A. SUSAN BOLANIO. Director of Prisons (p. ONALAN. ROMEO SALIGA. SAW AY. MIA GRACE L. LINDAHAY. the sentence against him became final on September 122. G. ante). PONCIANO BENNAGEN. HON. represented by her fa ther MONICO D.Following our opinions in this cases of Co Kim Cham vs. RICO O. ARIE L M. DATU SAHAMPONG M ALANAW VI. JR. EN BANC [G. SR. MORANTE S.. SULATAN. MARCELINO M. HERMINIA S. SOLEDAD M. TIMUA Y JOSE ANOY. LEVY ESTEVES. LEOPOLDO ABUGAN. and Peralta vs. SALACAO. OND. GERADA. EVELYN DUNUAN. OSCAR DALUNHAY. SUKIM MALID. DALUPINES. J. VICKY MAKAY. DANILO M.

respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Managemen t (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions. assailing the constitutionality of certain p rovisions of Republic Act No. (Haribon . 1999.[1] In compliance. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the respon sibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disad vantage like indigenous peoples. Ponciano Bennagen. 8371 (R. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed. in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.). 1998. The Solicit or General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. composed of Sen. Mr. filed on October 13. et. the parties and interv enors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments add uced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing. a member of the 1986 Constit utional Commission. IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURA L RESOURCES. On March 22. Oral arguments were heard on April 13. another group. On October 19. that IPRA is consistent with the Con stitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal o f the petition. and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peop les (Flavier. On March 23. composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources. otherwise known as the Indigenou s Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). 8371). Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful depriv ation of the State s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals . 1999. 1998. a group of intervenors. Thereafter.. filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. INC.A. intervenor. Juan Flavier. the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. Inc. The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were gran ted. respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). et al. one of the authors of the IPRA. R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers.COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. T hey agree with the NCIP and Flavier. the Court required respondents to comme nt. intervenor. In its resolution of September 29. al). 1999. 1998. et al. filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. On November 10. 1998 their Comment to th e Petition. and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

[2] Petitioners also content that. (6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in th e harvesting. by providing for an all-encompassing definition o f ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas. and Section 3(b) which. wilderness. claims of ownership. the jurisdiction of said officials over said area te rminates. Article XII of the Constitution: (1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains. (3) Section 63 which provides the customary law. Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the Nation al Development Corporation. develop. which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands. in violation of the regalian doctrine embo died in Section 2. in turn. protected areas. (2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a parti cular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officia ls. in relation to section 3(a). development or exploration of minerals and other natur al resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains. (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peopl es over the ancestral lands. and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of t he indigenous peoples. and (7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain.[4] These provisions are: (1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognit ion of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to deline ate ancestral domains and ancestral lands. mangroves. and the rig ht to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and u tilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years. traditions and practices of indi genous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights. Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landown ers. defines ancestral lands. Secretary of Int erior and Local Governments. wildlife sanctuari es. (2) Section 5. forest cover or reforestation. . extraction.[3] In addition. the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. ren ewable for not more than 25 years. (3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. mineral and other resource s found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indig enous peoples. bodies of water.and other natural resources therein. namely. protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds. (4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous people s over the ancestral domains. hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes. petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlem ent of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground th at these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

58. and 66 of the law . whic h the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion. 59. Quisumbing.(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to re solve disputes involving indigenous peoples. 2. and (5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment an d Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State s constituti onal mandate to control and supervise the exploration. [5] Finally.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid. Part II.A. the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA. and Section 5 7 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the largescale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with S ection 2. 63. 5.A. utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opini on expressing the view that Sections 3(a). 7 (a)(b). 6. which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose right s may have been violated by the IPRA. 8371 and its Implementing Rules. Justice Mend oza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the con stitutionality of R. which provides that the administ rative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coor dination. 5. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President s power of cont rol over executive departments under Section 17. petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII. development. Justice Panga niban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b). 8. 8371. sust aining the validity of the challenged provisions of R. 52[I]. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. 8371.A. 7. 6. 1 . 59.A. On the other hand. and (5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and dispu tes involving rights of the indigenous peoples. Article VII of the Constitution . 65 and 66 a nd other related provisions of R. the members of the Court voted as follow s: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. 8371 are unconstitu .[6] Petitioners pray for the following: (1) A declaration that Sections 3. series of 1998.A. Part II.A. and related provisions of R. [7] After due deliberation on the petition. Justice Puno als o filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1. He rese rves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58. 1. Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. (3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Departme nt of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing De partment of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 65. (2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissio ners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions o f R. 8. and 57 of R. and Santiago join. 8371. series of 1998. 8371 are unconstitutional. 7. (4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and M anagement to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementatio n of the assailed provisions of R. 57. series of 1998. Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No.

and Panganiban. Jr. [2] Petition. the petition is DISMISSED. p. the case was redeliberated upon.tional. was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. concur. pursuant to Rule 56. 1944. whic h he commenced to serve on August 21. procurement and distributi on of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the Na tional Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. J. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not ob tained.. pp. 16-23. by the Court of Special and Exclusiv e Criminal Jurisdiction. Gonzaga-Reyes.: Petitioner-defendant. 25-27. pp. PERALTA. pp. Kapunan. Buena. Gonzaga-Reyes. Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Jus tices Puno. Mendoza. Mendoza and Panganiban JJ. Peralta in his own behalf. 1999. Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent. Buena. FERIA. petitioner. [5] Rollo. respondent. and De Leon join in the sep arate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. [3] Id. 65 of the same Assembly. 7 promulgated by . after redeliberation. Jr. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS.R. Yn ares-Santiago. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Accordingly. However. 1945 WILLIAM F. Vitug. Quisumbing. Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 5-6. Pardo. and De Leon. City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae.J. Davide.. Rollo... see separate opinion -------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Rollo. Puno. SO ORDERED. Justices Melo. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. JJ. Vitug. Kapunan. Pardo. a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charge d with the supervision and control of the production. at 23-25. Bellosillo. William F. liberty or property without due process of law. created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 114. Melo. [6] Id. vs. G. the vot ing remained the same. L-49 November 12. [7] Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13. at 27-28.. [4] Section 1. C. Article III of the Constitution states: No person shall be depriv ed of life. No.

Home Insurance Co. for the reasons expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines. 570. L-22 (p. in response to an urgent necessity. for said Court was created.the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. i n his own opinion. defendantappellee. (22 Wall. Benedicto Jose y Santos. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III. and impairs the Constitutional righ ts of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are. liberty. states that. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission.. in his answer in behalf of the respondent. and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revis ed Penal Code. 700. pursuant to the auth ority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. No. In his me morandum he submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the followi ng grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and th e Acts. 743). 581). and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curiae." that the provisions of said Ordinance No. post). 612. R. vi olates the Constitution of the Commonwealth. that if from the fac ts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is gu . creating it are not of a political comp lexion. United States vs. assailed by th e petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before tri al in order to clarify the points in dispute. null and void ab initio. 7. 7. United States (20 Wall. made a pplicable to the trial violations of said Act No. accord ing to the preamble of Ordinance No." The Solicitor General. vs. that th e petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political pu rpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines. the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resul ted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner. 104). Ordinances and Executive Orders.. that the Court of Special an d Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created. 99. the aims a nd purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the C ommonwealth of the Philippines. t hat the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. and therefore. and the summary procedure prescribed therefor. as well as those of the United States of America . and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily. should now be d enied force and efficacy. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter I I of Executive Order No.. the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United S tates in the cases of Texas vs. 65 by section 9 thereof and se ction 5 of said Ordinance No. section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army.. plaintiff-appellant. And he cites. and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippi nes and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights". 7 does not afford a fair trial. to the effect that no person sha ll be compelled to be a witness against himself. Horn vs. G. 7. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. or property without due process of law. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission are tinged with political complexion. The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. Spro tt vs. Lockart (17 Wall. that the right to appeal in a criminal c ase is not a constitutional right. that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him. in supp ort of this last proposition. by said Ordinance No. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life. White (7 Wall. 459).

"under enemy duress. a nd is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It w as not different from the government established by the British in Castine. Main e. 113. the questio n involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitutio n of the Commonwealth Government. Mexico. And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision. 1943. he may be immediately convicted. and the ultimate source of its authority was the s the Japanese military authority and government. during its occupation by the British forces and as that of Tampico. apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino peopl e. speaking through the Justice who pens this decision. Mexico. Before proceeding further. based upon neither the free ex pression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United S tates. 1942. or recognize the latent sovereign ty of the Filipino people. was. and in order to determine the law applicable to the q uestions involved in the present case. in truth and reality. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legisl ative acts of the Confederate States. or by the United States in Tanpico. held: In view of the foregoing. ante).) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by F ilipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the se cond kind (of paramount force). It was of the same character as the Phi lippine Executive Commission. L-5. 466. before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. It is of little conse quence whether such government be called a military or civil government. 2 p. a portion of which has been already quo ted. was a civil government established by the military f orces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercis e all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered. a government established by the belligerent occupa nt or the Japanese forces of occupation.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or tra nsfer the sovereignty of the United States to. it is evident that the Philippines Executive Commissio n." (vol. 127. issued on January 23. occ upied during the war with that the country by the United State Army. this Court. recently decided. as the government established in Castine. this Court said: The so-called Republic of the Philippines. No. because the belligerent occupant was totally i ndependent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the adm inistration over said territory. considered as de facto governments of the . a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14. it is necessary to bear in mind the natur e and status of the government established in these Islands by the Japanese forc es of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines. and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable. which was organized by Order No. by the Comman der of the Japanese forces. pp. Maine.ilty. 1. 1944. As General MacArthur stated ame in his proclamation of October 23. As Halleck says. except in case of death penalty which cannot be exe cuted unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Suprem e Court composed of three Justices. Its cha racter is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it i s a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it concerns the inhabita nts of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the le gality or illegality of its acts.

Bruff y. the sove reignty of the United States in the territory was.. 1944.) The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United State s (in the cases of Texas vs. says that. and were bound by such laws. while the Constitution of the Commonwealth Go vernment was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces of the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States. or were in conflict with those constitutions.. 176 United States vs. and thirdly. 20 W all. White. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the conc ession (of belligerency) made to the Confederate Government . United States. if they were then valid. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to th e British government. and of the summary procedure adopted for that court. 7. And Oppenheim. 57 0. In the case of United States vs. Horn vs." (Sprott vs. United States. In fine. if not in all instances.. and others) that the judicia l and legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired the rights of th e citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States.. Rice (4 Wheaton. remained unimpaired durin g the War of Secession (Texas vs.third kind. since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant. in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its in habitants. and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be ob ligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occu pant. stand in the foreg round of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions . the constitution of eac h state and that of the United States or the Union continued in force in those s tates during the War of Secession. the Supreme Court of the United States held that. (1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Cri minal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. Lockart.. (Vol. is not applicable to the present case. secondly. merely transferred the existing state organiz ations to the support of a new and different national head. since occupation is an aim of warfare. the effect on s aid punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. "the (belligerent) occupant is totally independent of the constitutio n and the laws of the territory. . 342. Bruffy. 700. the same constitutio n. Home Insurance Co. The question which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the la w of nations are. supra). 17 Wall. subject to the Constitution of the United States. and the maintenance and safety of his forces. and the purpose of war. sanctioned no hostile legislation . of course. Sprott vs. White. does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippi nes which is a de facto government of paramount force. supra).that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble. the validity of the creation of the Court of Special an d Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. first. and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal and citizens as they existed at the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. Maine. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction establish ed by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws . the validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Jap anese military occupation. in his Treatise on International Law. Williams vs. whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the la w martial as defined in the usages of nations. by the military occupation of Castine. because in the case of the Confederate States. . 246). S. II. Sixth Edition. and such only. 96 U. Revised. 249. The Constitution of the s o-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied. the same laws for the protection of the property and personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers. . 20 Wall. supra) and that the Confederate States "in most. suspended.. . p. 459. and the obligation of al legiance to the to the estate and obedience to her laws and the estate constitut ion. the only factor to be considered is the a uthority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. 7 Wall. as it chose to recognize and impose. were null and void.

. are those imposed by the Hague Regulations. as we have already stated. especially the criminal law as w ell as the laws regarding procedure. for his security also. to be punishable. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occ upant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones. so far as is necessary for mi litary purposes. so far as it is necessary for military purp oses. depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. on the basis of which justice is adm inistered as well as the laws regarding procedure. for it is less objectionable. . p. it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. as to the validity of the creation of the court in que stion.) No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused und er that Constitution. for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion. for it is mere a govern mental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction." (Oppenheim's International L aw.of the conquering or conquered state. II. p." (Taylor. there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent oc cupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. and in case. 598. the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscien ce. s eventh edition. 7. he may nevertheless. set up military courts instead of the or dinary courts. (2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner . had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction.. even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure than the proce dural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe. whose authority and procedure is defined in t he military code of the conquering state. and in so far as.349. International Public Law. and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of a ny one doing such acts. not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country. unless the words employed show a clear intention tha t it should have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. or for the maintenance of public order and safety temporarily a lter the laws. There is no r oom for doubt. 1944. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience. and followed i n the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitione r. and cases quoted and cited in the footnote). Nor may said Constit ution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philip pines by virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate prospectively only. Vol. For "the invader deal s freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . the usages established by civilized nations. or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines. being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant. . he declares certain acts. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political complexion. sixth edition. because the latter was not in force during the period of t he Japanese military occupation. he admits the administration of ju stice by the ordinary courts. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. therefore." (Hall's International Law. that is. especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violat e those precepts. especially the Criminal Law. or through the ordinary courts and aut horities of the occupied district. seventh ed. page 97. p. 5000). A bel ligerent "occupant may where necessary. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals.

procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries. incident to a state of war. the t erritorial law in general.) From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of t he belligerent occupant to promulgate. the protection and safety of the army of occupation. and generally to administer ju stice through such agencies as the found expedient. to life imprisonment o r death as maximum. they were altered and penalized by said Act No. of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the occupant consist of. as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity. and the penalties imposed upon . The term merely signifies that the body of l aw actually applied. p. to fix penalties. and the success of its operations. 77. (Pub. that is. that acts co mmitted to their detriment shall not only lose what justification the territoria l law might give them as committed against enemies. and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them. those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the prote ction of the army. the term "martial law. The They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. so that a ny needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader is enjo ined to have in view. by whomsoever administered. War. that is. first. to establish tests for ascer taining the guilt of offenders. International Law. The words "martial law" are doubtless suggestiv e of the power of the occupant to share the law as he sees fit. but shall be repressed more severely than the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow su bjects. Section III. which penali zes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the ma ximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgat ed by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum. 65 of the said Assembly. II. so far as it may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the regulations made by the invaders.) According to Hyde (International Law. Act No. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the invaded. And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupan t may promulgate such new laws and regulations as military necessity demands. 65 with different and heavier p enalties. or to a special agency entrusted with its administration. may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to what is called m artial law. 1940. does not refer to a particular code or system of law." in so far as it is used to describe any fact in relation to belligerent occupati on. an d in this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military rule. to dete rmine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts. and it is none the less so when applied by civil courts in matters devoid of s pecial interest to the occupant. 65 are those committed by persons charg ed or connected with the supervision and control of the production." (Westlake. it being necessary for the protection of the latter. through the National Assembly of the so-c alled Republic of the Philippines. Such variations will naturally be greatest in wh at concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the invading army and its followers. criminal acts penalized by said Act No. for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for th e security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations.Westlake says that Article XLIII. 386). and secondly. is essentially m artial. 76. Vol. pp. and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant. 96. Part II. All law. as that which stands to the public order and social a nd commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation. in an occupied district martial law . its support and efficiency. such variations of the territorial law as ma y be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any of the r ules which will come before us. having the sanction of military authority. p.

p. such as rebellion. etc. correspondence with hostile country.. to wit: treason. cycles. was good and valid. ar e defined and also penalized by the territorial law Revised Penal Code. pi racy. LII. Such offenses. that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly fo r their supply upon the produce of this country. that is whether or not. for they were not penalized before u nder the Revised Penal Code when committed against the belligerent occupant or t he government established by him in these Island. Hague Conventio ns of 1907). not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" wh ich were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the co untry. because the acts constituting those o ffenses were punished. of horses. they bec ame inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islan ds by the Japanese forces. wearing uniforms without due authority. when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government.." (Wheaton's International Law. and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of na tions for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. Sec. traveling without a permit. III. vehicles. without a permit. evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law a nd made punishable by said Ordinance No. therefore. as they did. overcharging for goods. going out of do ors between certain hours. (3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government. were specified in the Japanese regulations made in the Rus so-Japanese war. Thus. 7 an d placed under jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Juris diction are all of a political complexion. inciting war. ammuniti on. and referred to what i s called martial law by international jurists. in the Anglo-Boer war. hindering those in exe cution of military orders. They are also considered by so me writers as war crimes in a broad sense. in order. flight to enemy's country. etc. 65 as well as the crimes against national securi ty and the law of nations. espionage. illegal possession of firearms and other. as are all political offenses. imposing upon him the p enalty of life imprisonment. In this connection Wheaton observes t he following: "Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite. spreading alarmist reports. The crimes penalized by Act No. holding meetings other than those allowed. in case of necessity. the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition the m.) It is. Especially taking into consideration the fact. but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that. 1944. together with several others. being in possess ion. and the crimes against public order. defined above by Hyde. of which this court may take judicial notice. sending prohibited goods. since it was within the admitte d power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizi ng the crime of which petitioner was convicted. The acts penalized by said Act wer e taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code. the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law. using seditious language. seventh edition. . safety and security of the belligerent occupant. sedition and dislo yalty. Being in possession of arms. 7. the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving f ell through or ceased to be valid from that time. by the principle of postliminy. 2 42. penalized by Ordinance No. violation o f neutrality. injuring military animals or stores. War. and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and against the welfare . depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or forbidden to be done in the martia l law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying commander. trespassing on defense works.the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Rev ised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. for public rather than pri vate reasons. While it is true that these o ffenses.

" (Hall's International Law. It is sufficient to quote the opinion on the su bject of several international jurists and our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. The invaded state is not subject to th e indignity of being obliged to execute his commands. alienation of the domains of the S tate or the sovereign). no redress can be had f or what has been actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the oc cupant's legislation. to sentences for 'war treason' and 'war crimes. when they are not of a political complexion. the cast of th e occupant possess legal validity. speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for off enses such as the one in question. and will bind as between them all and their national government. opines "that jud icial acts done under this control. 65. administrative acts so done. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. and no civi l right conferred by it can be further enforced. p. Valde z Tan Keh and Dizon. the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. w ill bind any member of the occupied population as against any other member of it . (Westlake. But the law made by the occupant within his admitted power. 518.) And Wheaton. who.In order to resolve this last question. no reparation is legally due for what has already been car ried out. pp. . which is within the admitted power or compete nce of the belligerent occupant to punish. War." (Wheaton's International Law. remain good. The enemy's law depends on him for enforcement as well as for enactment. not indeed so as to be d ebarred from carrying out his will without notice. as above stated. supra. and under international law should not be abr ogated by the subsequent government. and the various acts done during the same time by priva te persons under the sanction of municipal law.) Westlake.' to acts of a political character. commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the belligerent occupant. The execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the mun icipal law of the state. 98. . A prisoner detained under it must be released. it is not necessary to enter into an ela borate discussion on the matter. or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. 97. says: "In general. when required by military nec essity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment.) We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. that all judgments of political complexion of the co urts during the Japanese regime. so far as it produces an effect during the occupation.. considers as war crimes such offenses as thos e penalized in Ordinance No. Part II. ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the duty of giv ing sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations. seventh edition. Applying that doct rine to the present case. supra. such for example as acts directed against the security or control of the invader. but always remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous. p. Political act s on the other hand fall through as of course. Wh en occupation ceases. International L aw. 7 and Act No. says that: "To the extent to which th e legal power of the occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of hi s occupation. 245. Hall. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power (e. When the occupation comes to an end th e authority of the national government is restored. whether they introduce any positi ve change into the organization of the country. and to those that beyond the period of occupation. either by the progress of op erations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace. .g. supra. to the extent that they take effect during the con tinuance of his control. whether morally justifiable or not. .

. He now petitions this Court for the writ of habeas corpus." The case was argued before us on September 21 and 22. He commenced to serve the sentence on August 21. The Solicitor General. which courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and determi ne crimes and offenses penalized by Act No. J." was null and void ab initio. by which the Cour t of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was created and which was promu lgated on March 8. Accused of robbery in the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction o f Manila. 7. alleging that Ordinance No. falsification. There is hereby created in every province and city throughout the Phi lippines one or more courts of special criminal jurisdiction as the President of the Republic of the Philippines may determine upon recommendation of the Minist er of Justice.. 1944. concurring: Amidst the forest of opinions that have cropped up in this case it would seem un necessary to plant an additional tree. the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby gra nted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith. To justify our effort lest we seem intent to bring coal to Newcastle we ought to state that the following opinion had bee n prepared before the others were tendered. answering the petition on be half of the respondent Director of Prisons. concurs in the result.J. 65. expressed the opinion that "the acts and proceedings taken and before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Crimin al Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein prisoner should now be denied force and efficacy." and recommended "that the wri t of habeas corpus prayed for be granted and that the City Fiscal be instructed to prepare and file the corresponding information for robbery against the petiti oner herein in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Separate Opinions OZAETA. although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forc es. We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration. Section 1 of the ordinance in question reads as follows: SECTION 1. Moran. bribery. a sentence which. illegal . So ordered. frauds. C. ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. In view of all the foregoing. Pablo and Bengzon. by the First Assista nt Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent and the City Fiscal as amicus c uriae the former impugning and the latter sustaining the validity of said Ordina nce No. by the President of the "Republic of the Philippines. of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted. had already beco me null and of no effect. 1945. It has been impossible for the Court to reconcile and consolidate the divergent views of its members although they a rrive at practically the same result. in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petiti oner under said law.It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and prope r to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and voi d all laws. concur. among them Act No. JJ. before the proclamation. the petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. 65 entitled "An Act imposing heavier penalties for crimes involving robbery. 1944. without pronou ncement as to costs. 7.. Jaranilla.

in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court c omposed of the three members to be designated by the President of the Republic o f the Philippines. The summary procedure provided in Act No. and shall aim at their expeditious and prompt disposition. any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 2 hereof. inconsistent with the provi sions hereof. by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him or his principal. The accused or his representative may be examined by the court." as referred to i n section 5 above quoted. upon the promulgation of a d ecision imposing the death penalty. when committe d by public officers and employees. SEC." Section 2 confers upon the court mentioned in section 1 exclusive jurisdiction a lso to try the following crimes as defined in the Revised Penal Code: crimes aga inst national security and the law of nations. SEC. dated May 18. rules or orders. Section 3 provides for the appointment of one judge of first instance to preside over the court above mentioned and of a special prosecutor in each special court. 9. including those whi ch may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Order even if such artic les or objects are not included among those described in section 2. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its promulgation. for the crimes and offenses mention ed in section 2. is in turn that established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. 65 insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance. malversation of public funds and infidelity as defi ned in the Revised Penal Code and violations of food control laws. 18. or imprisonment for l ife or death where not already fixed by law. crimes against public order. brig andage. authorizing peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant. illegal detention committe d by private individuals and kidnapping of minors. 5. shall be summ ary in procedure. which shall d ecide the case within fifteen days from the receipt of the records thereof. of the Rules of Court. The clerk of each special court. 1943. or parts thereof. The summary procedure provided in Act No. Rule 122. and for similar offenses when committed by p rivate individuals or entities. Said cases shall be decided within four days after the same are submitted for decision. The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death. All laws. are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. and illegal possession of fir earms. The trial of the cases arising sections 1 and 2 hereof shall be started within two days after the filing of the corresponding information. and either may app ly to the judge for the examination of the co-accused or the representative of t . 6. or u investigations for. the privileges of the wri habeas corpus are hereby suspended with respect to persons accused of. Under said procedure (section 17) "search warrants may be issued by t he court or by any prosecuting officer. 65 of the "Republic. 8. The interest of public safety so requiring it. arson and other crimes involving destruction. 157 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission.exactions and transactions. as defined in an executive order. t of nder and 7." Section 18 reads as follows: SEC. and wit h the permission of the court. The remaining sections read as follows: SEC. and providing for a summary procedure for the tr ial of such offenders. shall immediately forward the records of the case to the special division of the Supreme Court herein created. shall gove rn the trial of the cases enumerated in said sections 1 and 2 hereof. SEC. SEC. Section 4 authorizes the court to im pose a longer term of imprisonment than that fixed by law. Tec hnicalities shall be avoided and all measures calculated to serve this end shall be taken by the trial judge.

ed. (Wheaton's International Law. 21 having escaped. a nd the judge shall interrogate the accused and the witnesses as to the facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and those w hich are admitted.) Judicial or legislative acts in the insurrectionary states were valid where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority o f the national government. and other Acts of like nature.. irrespective of the circumstances under which they we re made. (c) Except for justifiable reasons. it should appea r that the accused is guilty of the crime charged in the information. (e) Unjustified absence of an accused who has been released on bail. 24 0.. the judge shall dictate an order distinctly specifying the facts admitted by the accused and those which are in dispute. (Horn vs. the court shall immediately cause to be explaine d to the accused the facts constituting the offenses with which he is charged. 570-581. are null and without effect as against the leg itimate government.. or of the states. 74 U. Section 21 provides for the summary trial in the following manner: Such trials shall be conducted according to the following rules: (a) After arraignment and plea. or in any other information. The records shows that during their existence the courts of special and exclusiv e criminal jurisdiction created by the ordinance in question convicted and sente nced a total of 94 individuals. 245. and did not impair the rights of citizens under the C onstitution. shall be admissible in evidence if material to the issue. In synthesis. and that of the 94 convicts only 3.. the argument of the Solicitor General is as follows: Acts of the m ilitary occupant which exceed his power tested by the criterion set forth in art icle 43 of the Hague Regulations. White. a sentence of conviction may be immed iately rendered against the accused. S. for spe cial reasons. 37 having b een released. or the representative of the accused or a person act ing in a similar capacity. the accused shall not be allowed to plead an d assert defenses that are inconsistent with each other. Lockhart. or in any other information subs equently filed by the prosecuting officer. 99-104 . which were not hostile to the Union or to the authority of the General Gover nment and which were not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. (b) Refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him. Otherwise. 55 of whom had been prosecuted for illegal posse ssion of firearms and 15 for robbery. unless the judge. (d) If from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogation. or of his r epresentative shall not be a ground for interrupting the proceedings or attackin g the validity of the judgment. or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens.. or in any other information. must. p. 660. in general.) Acts in furt herance or support of rebellion against the United States. The Home Insurance Co.he latter in matters related to the defense of the accused. ed. and the trial shall be limited to the latter. otherwise directs. have the same validity as if they had been enactments of legi timate legislatures. includ ing the herein petitioner. 22 Wall. 17 Wall.) All the e nactment of the de facto legislatures in the insurrectionary states during the w ar. his co-accused. 7th ed. 733. remain in confinement. b e regarded as invalid and void. and 33 having died.. (Texas vs. 21 Law.. (United States vs. The provisions of Rules 115 to 117 of the Rules of Court shall be suppletory to the foregoing insofar as they are not in conflict therewith. 19 Law. Statements made by t he accused.

Ordinance No. In substance.. and the rigid enforcement of the food control measures was not intended to insure t he procurement of supplies by said army. the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures or agencies established by the "Republic" because the Japanese forces t hemselves commandeered what they needed or sent out their own agents to purchase it for them at prices even much higher than those fixed by the "Republic". the City Fiscal argues that the heavier penalty for the illegal po ssession of firearms than that fixed by the Administrative Code was not directed toward the suppression of underground activities against the Japanese army. 1944 (41 Off. that the procedure prescribed afforded a fair trial and did not violate any fundamen tal rights. that he could abrogate all of t hem and promulgate new ones if he so chose... that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a con stitutional but a purely statutory right which may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the state. that the military occupant was not in duty bound to respect the cons titution and the laws of the occupied territory. 7 must be declared void (1) because it favored the forces of occupation and the civilian Japanese inasmuch as it provided an excessively heavy penalty for t he summary trial of possession of firearms and violations of food control regula tions and (2) because it impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution inasmuch as the procedure therein prescribed withdrew the privilege of the accus ed against self-incrimination and his right to appeal to the Supreme Court even where the penalty imposed was life imprisonment or death. The decisions invoked would be applicable if the so-called Republic of the Phili ppines should be considered as a government established by the Filipino people i n rebellion against the Commonwealth and the Sovereignty of the United States. finally. Invoking decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in cases involving the validity of Acts of the Confederacy and of a rebel state as a de facto gover nment during the Civil War." for there were even cas es where the offenders were already in the hands of the police or courts of the "Republic" but they were unceremoniously taken from said agencies by the Japanes e military police and punished or liquidated by it at Fort Santiago or elsewhere . 22 Law. and. There is no question that in virtue of that of the proclamation of General MacAr thur of October 23. the ordinance satisfies all the requirement s of said Constitution. 7 is no longer of any force and effect since the restoration of the Government of the Common we alth of the Philippines.) Tested by these principles of international law. The question before us is whether said ordinance ever a cquired any force and effect or was null and void ab initio. the Solicitor General maintains that the ordinance i n question was null and void because it impaired the rights of citizens under th e Constitution and because it was hostile in its purpose to the United States an d the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 148). and as regards food control. that even assuming that it should be judged by the standard or t he Constitution of the Commonwealth. because in any event the Japanese milit ary occupant freely exercised the power to go after and punish his enemies direc tly without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic. T he decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring invalid Acts of a rebel state or of the Confederacy which were in furtherance or support of reb ellion against the United States or which impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution. that the cases cited by the Solicito r General are not applicable because they deal with the validity of acts and pro cesses of the governments of the rebel states during the Civil War and are based upon the indissolubility of the Union. rest on the proposition that the Union is perpetual and indiss oluble and that the obligations of allegiance to the state. 818. Gaz. that the supposed invalidity of the senten ce imposed against the petitioner cannot be raised by habeas corpus. that the validity or nullity of the ordi nance in question should be judged in the light of the provisions of the Constit ution and the laws of the "Republic" and of generally accepted principles of int ernational law. Ordinance No. and obedience to her . 147. ed.

in truth and reality. William vs. Justice Field. and laws which affe ct the welfare and safety of his command.) It will be seen then that in a war between independent nation the army o f occupation has the right to enact laws and take measures hostile to its enemy. In the recent case of Co Kim Cham vs. being essentially provisional.) Obviously. 171 U. p. It has no application to the case of a war between an established government and insurg ents seeking to withdraw themselves from its jurisdiction or to overthrow its au thority. ed. ed.R. White. Hunter. 74 U. this Court speaking through Justice Fe ria. 113. 367. 24 Law. a government established by the belligerent occupa nt or the Japanese forces of occupation. 176. ed. vol. 2. Fo r it is a well-established doctrine in internal law. does not se vere to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure . On the other hand. The court further stated that the concession of belligerent rights made to the Confederate Government sanctioned no hostile legislation and impaired in no respect the rights loyal citizens as they had existed at the commencement of hostilities.S. "under enemy duress a was established on October 14. It was of the same character as the Phi lippines Executive Commission. 253. although not abrogated (United States vs.laws. supra. remained unimpaired dur ing the War of Secession. Let us now look into the nature and status of the government styled "Republic of the Philippines "in order to determined the criterion by which the validity of its enactments should be tested. and during that possession the obligations of the inhabitants t o their country are suspended. Bruffy. speak ing though Mr. Such territory is possessed temporarily so possessed tempora rily by lawful government at war with the country of which the territory so poss essed is a part. No. According to the Rules of Land Warfare he will naturally alter or suspend all l aws of a political nature as well as a political privileges.. 388. 208. applies only to cases of regular war between independent nations. Rice. 1944.. ante). for its purpose was to harass and subdue the latter.S.. whatsoever is permitted to the one in virtue of war is also permitted to the other. reco gnized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsio n of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power). subject to the Constitution of the United States. Valdez Ta n Keh Dizon (G." He many "suspend the existing laws and pro mulgate new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action. apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino peopl e. that belligerent occupation. that the jus tice of the cause between two enemies being by law of nations reputed to be equa l. 1943. that proposi tion does not hold true with respect to a de facto government established by the enemy in an invaded and occupied territory in the course of a war between two i ndependent nations." (Hyde on International Law.. the court. As General McArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23. 716. base upon neithe r the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States. observed: "The rule stated by Vattel. Baldy vs.. 4 Wheat. was.) In the case of Williams vs. in a war between independent nations "the rights of the occup ant as a law-giver have broad scope. 96 U. and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. Bruffy. 43 Law. before its military occupation and posse ssion of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sove reignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. 19 Law. 700. (See Texas vs. L-5. 227.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Phili ppines or transfer the sovereignty of the United State to. p . or recognize the late nt sovereignty of.S.. a portion of which had been already quo ted. recognized in the law.. the Filipino people. 210. had occasion to comment upon the nature of said government in the following words: The so-called Republic of the Philippines. Page 9 How. 237. and it is not bound to res pect or preserve the rights of the citizens of the occupied territory under thei r Constitution. 614. Fleming vs.

246. therefore. is whether or not it was w ithin the competence of the military occupant to pass such a law. we may add that.S. hoping ther eby to secure their willing cooperation in her war efforts. in practice the Japanese military autho rities in the Philippines never treated the "Republic of the Philippines" as an independent government after its inauguration. says: In consequence of his acquisition of the power to control the territory concerne d. The question. 4 Wheat.. To show further the fictitious character of much -propagandized "independence" which Japan purported to grant to the Philippines through the establishment of the "Republic". while in theory and for the purpose of propagand a Japan professed to be a benefactor and liberator of the Filipinos. as she saw that the latter remained loyal to the United States. 368. while respecting. Japan would secure the cooperation or at least th e neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and oth er allied nations. " As a climax of their continual impositions. The Japanese mil itary police arrested and punished various high officials of said government. United St ates vs. She found that the Filipinos merely feigned cooperat ion as their only means of self-preservation and that those who could stay beyon d the reach of her army of occupation manifested their hospitality by harassing and attacking that army. as far as possible.government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise i ts rights as such. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides as follows: ART. 9 Howard. Thus Japan continued to oppress and tyrannize the Filip inos notwithstanding the former's grant of "independence" to the latter. So. as matter of conte mporary history and of common knowledge. It woul d therefore be preposterous to declare that the "Republic of the Philippines" wa s a government established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the Commo nwealth and the sovereignty of the United States. It was established under the mist aken belief that. p ages 366. in December 1944 the Japanese mili tary authorities placed the President and the members of his Cabinet under the " protective" custody of the military police. The only measure they did not succeed in imposing upon the "Republic" wa s the conscription of the Filipino youth into an army to fight with the Japanese against the United States. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the h ands of the occupant. the laws in force in the country. 191. 603. 9 Cranch. the occupant enjoys the right and is burdened with the duty to take all the m easures within his power to restore and insure public order and safety. 367. in cluding the First Assistant Solicitor General. volume 2. 345. unl ess absolutely prevented. by doing so. 182 U. Bidwel l. Page. We reaffirmed those statements. and on the 22nd of the month forced them to leave the seat of the government in Manila and hide with them in the mou ntains. public order and safety.. Fleming vs.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude of the Filipino people into believing in the appar ent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the righ ts of governments into the hands of Filipinos. Downes vs. in practice she cont inued to enslave and oppress the Filipinos. They continued to impose their wi ll on its executive officials when their interests so required. The said government being a mere instrumentality of the Commander in Chief of th e Japanese army as military occupant. 43. and paid no attention to the prot ests and representations made on their behalf by the President of the "Republic. In so do ing he is given great freedom may be partly due to circumstance that the occupan . the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablis h and insure. Commenting upon this article. Rice. the ordinance question promulgated by the President of the "Republic" must be deemed as an act emanating from the power or authority of said occupant. Boyle. Hyde in his work on International Law.

must use his power within the limits defined by the fundamental notion of occupation.t is obliged to consider as a principal object the security. (7th edition). and success. and the fact of occu pation draws with it as of course the substitution of his will for previously ex isting law whenever such substitution is reasonably needed. in other words he has the right of exercising such control. the occupant is called upon to respect. and also the replace ment of the actual civil judicial administration by the military jurisdiction. 7th ed. or which regulate t he moral order of the community. but in so far as that ordinance varied radical ly our law of criminal procedure and deprived the accused of certain rights whic h our people have always treasured and considered inviolate." In the exercise of his powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and h is experience and a high sense of justice. Order to the Sec retary of War. Dig. and implies no change in the legal position of the invader with respect to the occupied territory and it s inhabitants. Tested by this criterion. we are of the that it transcended his power or competence. in force in the country. and with due reference to its transien t character. the rights which he possesses over them are those which in the sp ecial circumstances represent his general right to do whatever acts are necessar y for the prosecution of his war. "unless absolutely pre vented. his power is qualified b y the transient character of his administration. p. . having only a right to such control as is necessary for his safety and the success of his operations. . According to the Hague Reg ulations of 1907. 1898. . discussing the extent of th e right of a military occupant. But in affairs which do not affect the secu rity. and civil and criminal. he is bound to la ws. 245.) We deduce from the authorities that the power of the occupant is broad and absol ute in matters affecting his safety. (Wheaton's International Law. efficiency. . He is therefore forbidden as a general rule to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations. support. (Pages 498. the laws in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws which do not conf lict with security of his army or its support. and such control only. within the occupied territory as is require d for his safety and the success of his operations. states: If occupation is merely a phase in military operations. VII. I n its exercise however this ultimate authority is governed by the condition that the invader. . efficiency and success of his own force in a hostile land inhabited by nationals of the en emy." Unless absolutely prevented. He is forbidden "to vary or sus pend laws affecting property and private personal relations.) Acts of the military occupant which exceed his power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations. 7? In so far as said ordinance created new court of special criminal jurisdiction we think his power to promulgate and enforce it during the occupat ion cannot be seriously disputed. efficacy. (President McKinley. . on the occupation of Santiago de Cuba by the Ameri can forces. 261. xxx xxx xxx The right to legislate is not deemed to be unlimited. was it within the power or competence of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army of occupation of the Philippines to promulgate Or dinance No. .) Hall in his Treatise on Internal Law. [1944]. are null and without effect as ag ainst the legitimate government. p . We base this opinion upon the following considerations: . . On occupying a country an invader at once invest himself with absolute authority. July 18. . and success of his military operations. Moore. 499. or which regulate the moral order of the community.

thereby also depriving hi m of his right to meet the witnesses face to face and of his privilege against s elf-incrimination. repugn ant to the humanitarian method of administering criminal justice adopted by all progressive. we think. In this case. the accused is interrogated by the judge as to the facts and circumstances of the case. issue a search warr ant for the seizure of documents and articles which may be regarded as evidence of an offense in violation of section 2.1. therefo re. after the arraignment and before the presentation o f any proof for the prosecution. 7 was inquisitorial. He answers in the affirm ative but says that he is not the owner of the revolver and he does not know how it placed there. Asked if he has other witnesses to support his claim. Rule 114. Rule 122 of the Bill of Rights containe d in the Constitution of the Commonwealth. he answer that he has none. The crimes over which the said court was v ested with jurisdiction were mostly crimes against property penalized in our Rev ised Penal Code. The app lication or nonapplication of said law did not affect the security. which crimes did not affect the army of occupation. Juan is arrested and an information for illegal possession of firearms is filed against him by the fiscal. devoid of that high sense of justice by which the military occupant must be guided in the exercise of his powers. efficacy. The summary procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 2. the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures or agencies established by "Republic". on his own volition and even without probable cause. (b) The trial must be commenced within two days after the filing of the informat ion in violation of section 7. As to the i llegal possession of firearms the City Fiscal himself. and effects against unreason able searches and seizures. the conviction of the acc . and he further informs us that "as regards food control. This concept is. houses. and if from the facts obtained by such interrogation it should appear (to the judge) that accused is guilty a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against him. which is likewise guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. the evidence of guilt is complete. and there being no further evidence to be presented that may change the result the accused may b e then and there sentenced by the court. is violated in that. an d success of his military operations. The City Fiscal justifies this feature of the procedure by giving the following hypothetical case: "In the house of Juan and under his bed a policeman finds a r evolver. Asked whether he knows of anybody who could have placed the re volver under his bed." and prohibits the issuance of warrants except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or aff irmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. As may be seen. borne out by an examination of the following features of said procedure: (a) Under the rule of procedure embodied in said ordinance any prosecuting offic er may. and freedom-loving countries of the world. The occupant was not absolutely prevented from respecting our law of criminal procedure and the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal jurisdiction. which guarantees "the right of the pe ople to be secure in their persons. he answers that it might have been place there by a guest who slept on his bed the night previous to its discovery by the polices. but he refuses t o answers. informs us that the occupant did not avail himself of said court but p unished his enemies direct without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic". He is a sked to give the name of the guest reffered to and his address. which give the accused at least two day s after the plea of not guilty within which to prepare fort trial. He is asked whether or not he admits that the revolver was found in his house. (c) The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in all criminal prosecu tions until the contrary is proved. He is brought before the judge of the corres ponding special court for the preliminary interrogatory. nor di d they make use of them. democratic. who the validity of the o rdinance. papers. and.

principally the policeman. In that he way he could have satisfactory explained how and by whom the revolver was placed under his bed. an offense punishable under the ordinance in question with impr isonment for six to twelve years. Volente non fit injuria . ( f ) Section 7 of the Ordinance suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas c . for according to him th e revolver was not his and he did not know how it got into his house. If the law of criminal procedu re had been followed. either to the fact that there was no such guest. Suppose that the policeman should say that his informant as to the presence of the revolver under the bed of the accused was a houseboy of t he latter. He had no time to investigate and try to find out whether the policeman himself or some th e other person who wished to do him harm had planted it there. He was accused of illegal posses sion of firearm. His lawyer could have cross-examined the poli ceman and found out from him whether he had any grudge against the accused and h ow he happened to search the latter's house. all persons accused of any offense have the right to appeal to the Court Appeals or to the Supreme Court." But to us that hypothetical case is a good illustration of the injustice of such procedure. for his refusal to reveal the identity of his alleg ed guest may due. or that the c ause for concealing his identity is worth suffering for. under the circumstances. be yond reasonable doubt. he could not have been deprived by law of that right. in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consult a to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be des ignated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. There the accused was convicted not because the prosecution had prov ed his guilt but because he was unable to prove his innocence. and suppose that houseboy was really the one who planted the revolver because of some grievance he had against his master but that the latter had not suspected before that his houseboy had any revolver." Under our law of c riminal procedure. He could have consulted a lawyer. which the military occupant was bound to respect unless absol utely prevented. and he was denied the right to have that sentence reviewed by the Supreme Court. At the trial he would not have been required to answer to any proof in his defense until the prosecution had presented its w itness. (d) Section 6 of the Ordinance in question provided: "The decisions of the speci al courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is deat h. His inability to prove who the owner of the revolver was. He pleaded not guilty. (e) In the instant case the penalty imposed upon accused by the special court. did not to our mind prove him guilt. he would have had ample time to reflect and endeavor to un ravel the mystery. as in the cases inv olving life imprisonment and death penalty. But under the procedure in question as outlined by th e City Fiscal. In view of the revelation of the policeman he would had been able to investigate and ascertain that fact. a fter a summary trial was life imprisonment. section 2. From the testimony of the policeman the accused might have been enlightened as to how and by whom the revolver was place in his house. altho under sub-section 4. and he would have been enti tled to at least two days after the information was read to him to investigate t he facts and prepare for the trial.used is reasonable and fair. It is true that as rule that right is statutory and may be withdrawn by the legislature except in certain cases where the right to appeal is provided in the Constitution itself. Article VIII of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. the accused was of course utterly unable to do that and was conse quently doomed to at least six years' imprisonment for a crime he had not commit ted. sooner was the re volver seized than he was brought before the court and interrogated about it whe n he was naturally dazed and in a state of alarm. but the question here is not whether the legislative department of the legitimate government has the power to abroga te that right but whether it was within the competence of the military occupant to do so.

" (Preamble Charter for Peace adopted by the United Nations at San Francisco. unreasonable searches and seizures. The same discriminati on holds true with reference to the other features already noted above.. C alifornia. and other wise made life unbearable. but we think and in this we ar e supported by the actual result it was unattainable thru the means and methods prescribed in said ordinance. destroyed our means of communication. June 26. against which that war was fought and won the cost of million of lives and untol d sacrifices.orpus with respect to persons accused of or under investigation for any of the c rimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2. summary trial. and medicine and other necessities of life. and economic structures. punished and tortured innocent men and women. The case involves the interpretation not of constitution but of international law. clothing." (Principles of International Lawrenc e. and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . and parricide. The result of such partial suspension was that persons a ccused of or under investigation for any of the offenses specified in section 1 and 2 could be held in detention indefinitely. self-incrimination. the ordinance in question was p romulgated in response to "an urgent necessity for waging an immediately and rel entless campaign against certain classes and expediting the trail and determinat ion thereof in order to hasten the re-establishment of peace and other throughou t the country and promote a feeling of security among the people conducive to th e earlier return of normalcy in our national life. and "he who in such a case bases hi s reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doub t in accordance with humanity and justice. 7th ed. such for example as theft . between facism and democracy. homicide. The suspension by the ordinance was not motivated by any one of these cases but by the necessity f or waging a campaign against certain classes of crime. they are strange and repugnant to the people of the democratic countries which united together to defeat said aggressors and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human person. physical injuries. or rebellion when the public safety requires it. Such discriminati on was unwarranted and unjust and was contrary to the concept of justice prevail ing in all democratic countries. 3. 1945. pp. robbed t he people of their food. in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. . denial of the presumption inn ocence.) The recent global war was a clash between two antagon istic ways of life. and the suspension of habeas corpus did not apply to all persons living in the specified territory (as should have been done if the public safety required such suspension) but only to those accused of or investigated for certain specif ied crimes or offenses. Peace and order and normalcy could not be restored unless the root cause of their disturbance were eliminated first. The Constitution of the Commo nwealth prohibit the suspension of that privilege except in cases of invasion. murder. namely. martial law was not decla red. had the right to demand th eir release by habeas corpus after the lapse of six hours. 13. where every person is entitled to the equal pro tection of the laws. . Before concluding this opinion we deem it pertinent to comment on the remark of the City Fiscal that. which functions under a democratic government that fought with the ot her democratic nations in that war. i nsurrection. which wrecked our political. It is apparent from the foregoing examination of the main features of the ord inance that while the methods thus adopted may not be unusual under totalitarian governments like those of the aggressor nations in the recent global war. e jected them from their own homes. The relative rampancy of the crimes mention . 12. and denial of the right to appeal.) We think the contentions for the petitioner against the validity of the ordinance in question are in accord with humanity and justice. which "is based on usage and opinion". whereas person accused of or unde r investigation for crimes other than those specified. 4. That cause wa s the presence in the country of the Japanese army. . It would be strange indeed if his Court. should sanction or approve the way of life." We concede that the objectiv e of the author of the ordinance was commendable. as stated in its preamble. social.

althoug h at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounc ed and the convict is serving the same. He commenced to serve the term on August 21.") After General of the Army Douglas McArthur had issued the Proclamation dated Oct ober 23. who is not a habitual criminal. Robberies and other crimes against property increase d as a resulted of hunger and privation to which the people were subjected by th e rapacity of the Japanese. 1944. the petitioner herein was found guilty and sentence to suf fer life imprisonment. Ordinance No. inasmuch as that procedure was inseparable from the first part of the ordinance which creates the special court and prescribes the jurisdiction th ereof. Mora n (Phil.. the basis of the informa tion was Act No. which provides as follows: Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: The penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor in its medium period in oth er cases. People vs. after said laws have been repealed by subsequent legislation.ed in said ordinance was but the effect of that cause. 44 387). paragraph 5. and the original provisions of the Revised Penal Code restored. The cornering and hoardin g of foodstuffs would not for the scarcity produced by the Japanese army and the disruption of our commerce and industries on account of the invasion. 65. as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code.. and also repeatedly relea sed on writs of habeas corpus prisoners who. 4 103 and 4225 ). People vs. This Court has already dismissed cases wherein the defendants were charge with t he violation of law in force at the time of the commission and trial of the crim e." In the absence of other details. In accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts Nos. the ordinance in question results untenable. Tamayo (61 Phil. Inasmu ch as he was a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary. the Act under which the petitioner was charged and convicted stan ds nullified. 1944. By virtue of article 22 of the said Code. we are constrained to declare the whole ordinance null and void ab initio . even from the point of view of the Filipino people and not of the Japa nese army of occupation. The trial was hel d by the then existing Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction whic h was authorized to conduct proceedings in a special manner. it may here be assumed that the offense committ ed is that defined in article 294. PARAS. passed during the Japanese sponsored Republic of the Philip pines and amending certain articles of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently the proceedings in said court which resulted in the conviction an d sentence of the petitioner are also void. It was a delusion to expect peace and normalcy to re turn without eliminating the cause of their disturbance or destruction of the Ja panese army in the Philippines an objective to which the ordinance was not addre ssed. 7 of the "Republic. The posse ssion of firearms was rendered desirable to many person to defend themselves aga inst or attack the invader. So. 226 ).. were given the benefit of subsequen . Having reached the conclusion that the enactment of the procedure embodied in sa id ordinance for the special court therein created was beyond the competence of the occupant. J. concurring in the result: Charged with robbery. the maximum penalty that can be imposed is six months of arresto mayor. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive eff ect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony.

but they may be administrated. as wrongdoers. Elements of International Law [3d. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1). and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government.) Under a de facto government.R. ante). because the responsibility of maintaini ng peace and public order. No. and of punishing crime. And in the performance of this duty. In the present case. DE. the courts of the country. There can be doubt that the government established in this country by the Comman der in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces. the conquering power has a right to displace the pre-exis ting authority. supported more or less directly by military force. S. United States [1913. and the effect on said proceeding of the proclamation of General Douglas McArthur. called also by publicists a gove rnment de facto. In said criminal case. 1944. Prisoners who behave well are almost always liberated upon the expiration of the minimum penalty fixed in the judgments of conviction or within a reasonable tim e thereafter. 1944. As this is the effect of the decision of the majority. he m ay proclaim martial law (Davis. he should be rel eased. under the name of the Philippine E xecutive Commission. there being no information that the double th e period of the minimum penalty that could be imposed upon him. 330-332 ). but which might. Directo vs. 66 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Crimi nal Jurisdiction. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon.. concurring: The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the judicial pro ceeding held in criminal case No. also. It may appoint all the necessary officers and clothe them with designated powers. pp. perhaps.t legislation either repealing statute under which they had been convicted or mo difying the same by imposing lesser penalties.] 229 U. for those acts. 692). was a de facto government. (MacLeod vs. I concur in the re sult. by civil au thority. and (2). 1945 (p.]. Director of Prisons (56 Phil. under the authority of Ordinance No. Santos (56 Phil.. that its exist ence is maintained by active military power within the territories. in the following language: But there is another description of government. during Japanese occupation. according to its plea . In occupied territory. 7. under military occupatio n. support ed by the military force of the invader. that wh ile it exist it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who. Actual governments of this sort are established over dist ricts differing greatly in extent and conditions. as already held by this Court in civil case G. Escalante vs. be more aptly denominated a governmen t of paramount force.. though not warranted by the laws of th e rightful government. do not become re sponsible. Said government possessed all the char acteristics of a de facto government as defined by the Supreme Court of the Unit ed States. the subordinate officers of th e local administration should be allowed to continue in their functions. and to assume to such extent as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. 133. issued by the President of the so-calle d Philippine Republic. L-5 entitled Co Kim Cham vs. herein petitioner was accused of the crime of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force. 4 83). deci ded on September 17. established in the City of Manila. JOYA. should be kept open. J.. 416. on August 21. dated October 23. and whenever practicable. They are usually administered directly by military authority. falls directly upon the comma nder in chief of the occupying forces.

wh ich however. had the semblance of permanency. International Law. that they should continue to carry on the ordinary administra tion under the invader. and it is also his duty. 287. is unusual in the practices among civilized nations. which give him a claim as of right to the obedien ce of the conquered population. save thos e which are found in the laws and customs and usages of war (Cross vs. its exercise is limited by the qua lification which has gradually become established. 9 Wall. and it is not customary for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands.[ U. Part II. he is a lso bound to alter or override the existing laws as little as possible (Hall.. 460). because said go vernment was of a temporary character. It will thus be readily seen that the municipal law of the invaded state continu es in force. It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the ene my.S . 164 .]. 16 How.sure. It may prescribe the revenues to be paid. But it was somewhat different from that established under the Philippine Executive Commissi on. unless absolutely prevented. in so far as it does not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. at least. in establish ing governments for the maintenance of peace and order and the administration of justice. the invader himself is not left equally free. Steamship Co. so long as it is based upon occupation. 20 Id.S. but the latter has no right to force them to do so. 20 Wall. Harrison. The Grapeshot. under mi litary occupation. nevertheless. It is generally the better course for the inhabitants of the territory. There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such cases. so far as necessary for maintaining order and the continuanc e of the daily life of the territory: other purposes. p. modify the permanent institutions of the country (Hall. International La w. was also of the nature of a de facto government. and apply them to its own use or otherwise. The government subsequently established under the so-called Philippine Republic. In ternational Law. as a genera l rule. as these of the superior j udicial offices. with a new constitution. Though the fact of occupation imposes no duties upon the inhabitants of the occu pied territory. is confessedly temporar y. War. If t hey decline. he is bound to take whatever means are required for the security of public order. 121-123). 176. lays down (Arts. as it was established under the authority of th e military occupant and supported by the armed forces of the latter. adopted at The Ha gue in 1899.. can bide their time (Westlake. is to replace them by app ointees of his own. the original national character of the soil and of th e inhabitants of the territory remains unaltered.. as it is easier to preserve order throu gh the agency of the native officials. New Orleans vs.]. Leitensdorfer vs. The Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 476). [1874]. [ U. and his rights of control spring only from the necessity of the case. Under military occupation. under similar circumstances. Webb. 6th ed. pp. In addition to codifying the accepted law. 6th ed. it provides that the occupant must respect.. th e laws in force in the country. that he must not. and although the invader is in vested with quasisovereignity. T he regular courts of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecti ng the military occupation.. The government established here under the Philippine Executive Commission was mo re in consonance with the general practice among civilized nations. 129.. because the former apparently. 43) definite rules concerning military authori ty over the territory of a hostile state. in ac cordance with International Law. in territories of the enemy under military occupation. 42. his only rights. and as his presence. and also because the latter are more comp . 2d ed. As it is a consequ ence of his acts that the regular government of the country is suspended..

. creating the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. . 465. 388. without violating . S. Sp rott vs. 576. Tennessee. 171 U. 97 U. 20 Wall. W estlake. ed. secs. 96 U. 992. 7th ed. 890. 97 U. 15 Sup. and so far as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority. . subjecting them only to supervision by the military authori ties. Ketchum vs. as de facto governments. 371) When the military forces of the Confederate states were destroyed. Surget. perished. 618. prescribing summar y rules of procedure. ed. 1018.. But the legislative acts of the se veral States forming the Confederacy stood on a different ground. S. 97 U. valid and binding (Coleman vs. 335. 24 Law.. no t tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States. under the municipal law of the territory. 229 U... and with it all its enactments. The judicial proceedings conducted.) Under the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur. International Law. as with them the de facto government s. La wrence. Ins. S. Co. generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial officers as are willing to serve under him. said Ordinance No. and did not impa ir the rights of citizens under the Federal Constitution. pp. o r the just rights of citizens under the Federal constitution. International Law.. But there are other considerations equally important why judicial proceedings he ld and conducted before the courts established by said de facto governments. Tennessee. Coleman vs. had been declared legal. their governm ent perished. Thus the judgment rendered by the Confederate courts.. Hunter.188. International Law. 65 of the puppet re public. 21 Law. Part II. 1118. United States vs.]. 24 Law. (1909). Elements of Internationa l Law. dec laring null and void all laws. 7 promulgated on March 8. 22 Law. ed. 99 U. 24 Law. the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed that the ju dicial and legislative acts of the rebellious States. ed. 1260. ed. Horn vs. judicial precedents or public policy.. 18 Sup.. during the Civil War. S.. 3rd ed. Transit Co. S 509. they were consider ed as legal. S..475. settled principles. Williams v s.. prescribing heavier penalties.. nor in fu rtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion... became null and void.. ed. successively established under them. if they were not hostile in their purpose or m ode of enforcement to the authority of the national government. 24 Law. 249. International Law . dated October 23. 97 U. 1944.. 421-413. 331-337. Ford vs. regulations and processes issued and promulgated by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic. und er laws promulgated by them. 121-123). 464. United States. United States. pp.. and Executive Commission. or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. 22 Law.. 99. (Baldy vs. 177. 955. should be declared null and void. Johnson vs. ed. s hould be respected by the courts. 570. Bruffy. 716. pp. Bruffy.etent to administer the laws of the territory. Law. S. I. 330-332. 816. 24 Law. Lockhart. International Law... 96 U. theref ore. ostensibly for the speedy reestablishment of peace and order. ed. International Law.. and with them all their enactm ents and processes of a hostile character.476. Ct. Law. 1944. such as Act No. 578.. 176. 356-57. once the Japanese a rmies in the Philippines had been defeated.. 57. 6th ed. even after the government established by the invader had been displa ced by the legitimate government of said territory. S. 660. Atlantic G. United States . 416. Wilson. 22 Wall. pp.. MacLeod vs. 520). 156 U. and other allied laws. 1118. Buckley [1878]. [ U.. pp. 509. 33 Sup. pp. 594. in the least. S. War 2d ed. Ct. 208. ed. 17 Wall. Holland. valid and binding (Williams vs.. be fore the court established by the military occupant are general considered legal and valid. during Japan ese occupation. S. Davis. 39. & W. 359. mere ly settling the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction. ed. Ct.. In the later case. S. Hall.. and the military occupant. Taylor.

"the phrase 'due process of law' used in the Phil ippine Bill should receive a comprehensive interpretation. 18 Phil. And the inclusion under said Ordinance No. except where the dea th penalty was imposed. and no procedure shou ld be treated as unconstitutional which makes due provision for the trial of all eged criminal before a court of competent jurisdiction. 7 and Act No. that had been receiving arms from the forces of liberation across the seas. the persons accused were depriv ed of liberty without due process of law. for giving hi m an opportunity to be heard. Said laws are contrary to the principles of Democracy. and they are. By the imposition of excessive penalties . whenever possible. 122). in their purpose and mode of enforcement and execution said laws were hostile to the authority of the Commonwealth Government and that of t he United States of America. of political character and compl exion. as well as said Act No. and by denying them the right of appeal to the highest court of the land. In the language of this Court. an d whose heroes and martyrs now lie in graves still unknown and whose names remai n unsung. 65 of the National Assembly of the puppet republic. Violation of food-control laws were included and used as a pretext and justifica tion for the seizure and confiscation of food provisions so badly needed by the invader. by the denial of the remedy of habeas corpus. it ife principal crimes mentioned in said Ordinance No. robbe violations of food-control laws.Said Ordinance No. a nd for an appeal from such judgement to the highest tribunal" (United States vs. for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet. championed by North Ameri ca. 7 adopted as integral parts thereof said Executive Order No. and made possible our participation in the councils of free and liberty-loving peoples and nations. The pet ry. whose gigantic efforts and heroic sacrifices have vindicated human rights. and was under said laws that herein petitioner was prosecuted and sentenced to l imprisonment for the crime robbery. They violate the fundamental principles of . by compelling the accused to testify against themselves. Kennedy.. 7 of the crime of bribery and other w as used as a cloak to conceal its venom and make said law look innocent. therefore. for the deliberation and judgement of the court. The penalty of twelve years' imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms was directed mainly against those underground forces. said Ordinance No. 157. and the supremacy of the authorit y of the legitimate Government. h uman dignity and human freedom. falsification malversation and bribery. and consecrated them anew all over the earth wit h the generous blood of her children. The penalty of life imprisonment or death for robbery was aimed principally at t he underground forces resolute and determined to seize and remove stores of food provisions. but whose heroic efforts and sacrifices have made immortal the legends of Filipino resistance. as they had been promulgated in furtherance of the war aims of the enemy. to prevent them from falling into the hands of t he enemy. Those repressive laws were aimed at the men and women who had kept the faith. and by its summary procedure. In their conception. prescribing exceptionally heavy penalties for the crimes enumerated therein. 7 and t he other allied laws impaired and defeated the just and legal rights of Filipino citizens under the Commonwealth Constitution. Under said laws. 65 of the pup republic and the other allied laws are illegal possession of firearms.

concurring: On October 21. regulations and processes of any other government in the Phili ppines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal ef . That all laws. and now seeks a writ of habeas corpus in order that his liberty may be restored to h im. 1943. in the Muntin glupa Prison Camp. I concur in the dispositive part of the opinion prepa red by Mr. ORDINANCE NO. appearing in behalf of respondent Director of Prisons. to enable each and everyone to live a nobler and more wort hy life and realize the justice and prosperity of the future. a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Court of Speci al and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. At the hearing held on September 21. I. Peralta began to serve. and therefore. Commander in Chief o f the Philippine-American Forces. and before joining it. created by Ordinance No. 1944. Petitioner alleges that sometime in the month of September. he wa s for several times arrested and maltreated as a guerrilla member. 1944. under the benign leadership of Tota litarianism and given all the nations of the earth a new birth as well as a new character of freedom. J. and followed political and military activities in open allegianc e to the Commonwealth Government and the United States of America. 7 issued by Pre sident Laurel of the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese regime. petitioner William F. issued a proclamation dec laring: 1. and 22. against his will. but because he joined the guerrilla organization. The Solicitor General. which fought in Bataan and later liberated the whole Philippines. not because he committed any crime. who sustained the validity if the said Ordinance and the proceeding by virtue of which petitioner was sentenc ed to life imprisonment. and that he was prosecuted. the sole and only gov ernment having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Phil ippines free of enemy occupation and control. For the foregoing reasons. there appeared to argue the F irst Assistant Solicitor General. and the City Fiscal of Manila. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is.Justice for which civilized Mankind stands.. deserted the Const abulary forces. 7 . impugning the validity of said Ordinance No. recommended that the writ prayed for be granted. an swered the petition agreeing that the acts and proceedings taken and had before said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied force and efficacy. 2. subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States. PERFECTO. 7 was null and void ab initio because it was of a political complexion and its provisions are violative of the fundamenta l laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. he being then a minor only 17 years old. contending that said Ordinance No. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Ph ilippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. as an aftermath of the liberation. and 3. he joined the Constabulary forces as a private. 1945. 7 AND PROCESSES UNDER IT NULLIFIED BY THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL MACARTHUR On October 23. Justice Feria. as amicus curiae.

S. L-5. we will see immediately how such law and the processes held under it are incompatible with the fundamental principles and essential safeguards in crimin . October 23. 7 in question has been issued under the Japanese r egime and that the judicial process under which petitioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment. It is fortunate that all the members of the Supreme Court arrived at a unanimous conclusion as to the absolute nullity of the process under which petitioner is now being held in prison. 1943 FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT President of the United States (From U. became null and void and without effect since October 23. formerly a member of the Philippine Commonwealth C abinet and Benigno Aquino. No. pp. also formerly a member of that cabinet. It appears that Ordinance No. by virtue o f the above-quoted October Proclamation of General MacArthur. . I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Exe cutive Commission" nor the present Philippine Republic has the recognition or sy mpathy of the Government of the United States. ante). . There are indications that more processes held under the Japanese regime will co me to our knowledge. a puppet government was set up in the Philippin e Islands with Jose P. Jorge Vargas. in keeping with the following official statement of the President of the United States: On the fourteenth of this month. were closely associated with Laurel in this movement. 1944. by a mere perusal of the ordinance in qu estion. and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino people. 93. the wisdom of the decision of General MacArthu r in nullifying in a sweeping manner all judicial processes held during enemy oc cupation. . Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. revealing strong grounds for their annulment. formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Cour t as president. and we deem it unnecessary to repeat what we stated in said opinion. We have explained at length our position as to the effects of said October Procl amation in our dissenting opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Our sympathy goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Com monwealth that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy. having been held in a court not belonging to the Commonwealt h of the Philippines but organized and established under the authority of the en emy. . Laurel. 1943. l ike the process here in question. . . 7 and the processes he ld under it show once more how General MacArthur was absolutely right and justif ied in issuing the October Proclamation. The second act was a hypocritical ap peal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit. 94. The shocking character of the provisions of Ordinance No. 153. The October Proclamation is. Naval War College. R.) Putting aside the October Proclamation. International Law Documents. justifying. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan.fect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.

) . houses. (2) By trespassing the limits established by section 2. dated May 18. papers. when the public safety requires it. considered as a necessary element to make the warrant reasonable. or und er investigation for. "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any pros ecuting officer.) This constitutional provision is violated by the summary. III." T his provision is repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warra nts of search and seizure. 1. sec. Constituti on of the Philippines. and effec ts against unreasonable searches and seizure shall not be violated. w hich." III. 14. (Art. and political atmosphere of the e ra of darkness. 1943. sec. i n any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.al procedure. 1. which provides that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended only in case of "invasion. 7 provides that cases arising under it shall follow t he summary procedure provided in Act No. of the Rules o f Court. and arbi trary procedure provided under the authority of the ordinance in question: (1) By authorizing "any prosecuting officer" to issue search warrants. (3) By authorizing the search and seizure of articles or objects not described i n warrant. III. or rebellion" and only "when the public safety requires it. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Section 5 of Ordinance No. to be determined by the judge after exa mination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and witnesses he may produce . and the persons or thing s to be seized. insurrection. 65 of the Laurel Philippine Republic. unreasonable. in turn. No. of the Rules of Court. authorizing peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant. which is the real meaning of the words "including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Ordinance. DISCRIMINATORY AND INIQUITOUS SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Section 7 of Ordinance No. insurrection." The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in case s of invasion. Under said procedure. Rule 122. sense of right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in the following words of our fundamental law: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 an d 2 hereof. or rebellion. No. cultural. including those which may be regarded as e vidence of an offense under this order even if such articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2. 157 of the Chairman of the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission. Constitution of the Philippines. II. 7 in question provides that "the privileges of the wr it habeas corpus are hereby suspended with respect to persons accused of. (Art. and no warra nts shall issue but upon probable cause. and particularly describing the place to be searched. is the same as that established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. 3. Rule 122. when unde r our Constitution such search warrants should be issued only by a judge." This provision is also violative of one of the fundamental guarantees establishe d in the Constitution of the Philippines. universally recognized in civilized modern nations and how such or dinance and processes can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary m entality developed under the social.

or torture. 1. (4) That not only the accused. and with the permission of the co urt. in cases falling under the or dinance in question." (Emp hasis ours. which is not denied to the accused in all other cases: No person shall be deprived of life. may be examined by the court or by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer. (6) That statements made by any person acting in a similar capacity as a represe ntative of the accused which may be a relative or a friend or. whose perso nal security was jeopardized under the Japanese regime). "the accused or hi s representative may be examined by the court." In th e same section it is also provided that "refusal of the accused to answer any qu estions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him. (5) That the statement made by said representative or attorney. (Art. shall be admissible in evidence. (2) That the refusal of the accused to answer may be considered unfavorable to h im." (Emphasis ours. 157. above mentioned. . "irrespective of the circumstances unde r which they were made" (that is. sec. intimidation. but "his representative" (his lawyer. or exacted through brutal kempei tortures). . even under third degree procedure. shall be admissible in evidence. his co-accused. but because it flagrantly violates the fundamental principle of equality before the law. or the representative of the accused or a person acting in a similar capacity. after arraignment and plea. irrespe ctive of the circumstances under which they were made shall be admissible in evi dence if material to the issue. 1. by depriving the accused. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF. No. not only because it suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.) It is also provided that "statements made by the accused. 157. III ." From the foregoing. although exacted under duress.) IV. as to facts and circumstances of the cas e in order to clarify the points in dispute and those which are admitted.) Under the same section the absence of an accused or of his representative "shall not be a ground for interrupting the proceedings or attacking the validity of t he judgment. liberty. without the circumstances which can only justify s aid suspension. even an impostor who might pose as a representative to assure the doom of the accused." (Emphasis ours. It is so.Again. (3) That statements made by the accused. Constitution of the Philippines. of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. it appears: (1) That the accused may be examined by the court or any prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him. "irrespect . "the ju dge shall interrogate the accused . or property without due process of law. it is evident that the ordinance in question is repugnant to the deep sen se of right of our people. as if said representative o r attorney is facing the same criminal prosecution instituted against his client .) Under section 21 of Executive Order No.INCRIMINATION Under section 18 of Executive Order No. by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or u nfavorable to him of his principal. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

the undeniable reality of human experience sho ws conclusively the absolute need of such guarantee if justice must be served. alleged witches were burned at the stake. there are officers of the law who cann ot resist temptation of using their power to compel. sec. not very long ago. and that the terroristic menace of its rakes was abolished in Spain. Idem. in his honor.) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. among criminal c ases we have under consideration. in the a rguments of those who are championing the suppression of the constitutional guar antee against self-incrimination. however innocent he may be. to h ave a speedy and public trial. (8) That trial shall proceed in the absence of his attorney or other representat ive. 1. as a means of compelling them to confess their fantastic compacts with the devil. III . No matter what merits can be found. (Art. to meet the witnesses face to face. Constitution of the Philippines. had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. It is evident that the procedure established violates the following provisions o f our fundamental code: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents th e law were often heard.) The procedure is so revolving. sec. (Art. under the twentieth century lights. We must not forget how an inst itution created in the twelfth century was the cause of so much tortures and suf ferings. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and cou nsel. This very Supreme Court. just before the last global war started. It is beyond our comprehension how a man. which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice. through third degree method s. endowed with reason. could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure. so nauseating.ive of the circumstances under which they were made (that is. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self-incriminati on. (7) That trial shall proceed in the absence of the accused. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. or in the same circumstances under which masked spies decreed the death of innocent citizens pointed by them during zoning concentrati ons). in his life. E ven with the existence of such guarantee. only in 1834. We must not forget how. there is evidence of confessions exacted throu gh cruel and brutal means. th at it takes a real courage to keep our equanimity while we are compelled to anal yze it. No. No. in the thirteen colonies of Ame rica. We must not forget that that constitutional guarantee was a cquired as a result of protest against all inquisitorial and third degree proced ures. and no man. 18. shall be secure in his person. in hi s liberty. not only once. from the theoretical point of view. shall be admissible in evidence. even if made in th e absence of the accused. Even today. We must not forget that during normal times. and to have c ompulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. an d therefore in Philippines. We must be very careful to retain zealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. and so opposed to human nature. . 17. in the United States of America and in the Philippines. 1. III. innocent or guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses.

The fact that the provisions of section 2. under the specific provisions of the Constit ution. came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable human weaknesses. or toll. 1. sec. No. 5. Constitution of the Philippines. it was the prevailin g theory in judicial decisions that the right of appeal is not a fundamental one .) (3) In all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue. No. not for the benefit and well-being of the people.) (4) In all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprison ment. sec. Idem. (Art. assessment. VIII. certiorari. (Art. all accused are entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) In all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty. in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be desi gnated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. reverse. Idem. believed himself to be the victim of a wrong in any inferior court. have been ena cted by our Constitutional Convention." This provision is a clear violation of the fundamental right of appeal. taught by the unerring lessons of human experi ence. ordinance. impost.) Before the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines. in the specified cases. VIII. law. . No. or affirm on appeal. s ec. It is one of the means considered necessary by our Constitution to better serve the supreme interest of the people. the Supreme Court is just one of the instrumentalities created by the C onstitution in the service of the people. Under the Constitution of the Philippines. (Art. provide that the Supreme Court may not be depriv ed of its jurisdiction to review. VIII. considered it necessary to establis h constitutional guarantees to reduce to its minimum the effects of such innate human weakness by providing that the appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused. constitu tionally guaranteed to all accused in the Philippines. revise. Idem. but it is a mere privilege or mere statutory grant.V. final judgments and decrees of inferior courts. VIII. No. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF APPEAL TRAMPLED UPON In section 6 of Ordinance No. 4. In fact. or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide. sec 2. 2. of the Constitution. 2. 2. The drafters of our Constitution. (Art. who. The Supreme Court is not an entity or institution whose rights and privileges must be constitutionally guaranteed. 3. No.) (2) In all cases involving the legality of any tax. or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. modify. 2. does not impa ir nor diminish the fundamental character of the right of appeal of the accused to the Supreme Court. It is only a means.) (5) In all cases in which an error or question of law is involved. 7. or executive order or regulations is in question. The drafters of our Constitution. 2. it is provided that "the decision of the specia l courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death . therefore. VIII. Idem. (Art. sec. of the Constitution. The provisions of section 2. instead of stating that the accused shall not be denied of the right of appeal in the cases mentioned therein. of Article VIII. of Article VIII.

under the Japanese regime. the privilege of the wr it of habeas corpus enjoyed by the accused in other cases. under Ordinance No. 1943. June 21. to which t he respondent belonged. under the sword of Damocles of an unfavorable presumptions.As a matter of fact. the Federal Supreme Court declared: These would indeed be significant changes in our governmental structure changes which it is safe to say are not desired by the majority of the people in this co untry but whatever our personal views. but we be arrogant indeed if we presume that a government of laws. as judges we cannot say that person who a dvocates their adoption through peaceful and constitutional means is not in fact attached to the Constitution those institutions are not enumerated as necessary in the government's test of "general political philosophy". except when sentenced of death is imposed. (2) By depriving the accused. The Senate has not g one free of criticism and one object of the Seventeenth Amendment was to make it more responsive to the popular will. no one shall be deprived of the "equal protection of the . 7: (1) By the fact that the accused therein are victims of search warrants speciall y provided for them. by entrusting the power to revised said sentence to small minority of the Supreme Court. It is that this Court has played a large in the unfolding of the constitutional plan (sometimes too so in the opinion of some observers). this Court at various lines its existence has not escaped the shafts of crit ics whose sincerity and attachment to the Constitution is beyond question critic s who have accused it of assuming functions of judicial review not intended to b e conferred upon it. or of abusing those function to thwart the popular will. (Schneiderman vs. and it is conceivab le that "orderly liberty" could be maintained without them. advocated the abolition of the supreme Court. an d who advocated various remedies taking a wide range. in cases where the sentenced imposed is death. of the Sen ate and the veto power of the President. and replacement of congressional distri cts with "councils of workers" in which legislative and executive powers would b e united. ABRIDGMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is evidently abridg ed in the summary procedure in criminal cases under Ordinance No. (5) By placing the accused. 7. with protection for minority groups would be impossible without it. The unicameral legislature is not unknown in the country. under Ordinance No. In a case of denaturalization wherein the Government of the Un ited States sought to deprive a person of his American citizenship. where the righ t of appeal is retained for them. the Supreme Court of the United States itself declared that the elimination of said tribunal is not incompatible with the existence of a go vernment of laws. should he refuse to answer any question that th e court or any prosecuting officer might propound to him. and a minority of three justices t o be specially called out by the President of the Laurel Philippine Republic. (4) By discriminating against the accused. on the groun d that the 1928 platform of the Communist Party of the United States. (3) By depriving the accused. 7. that is. under the Ordinance No. in the case in question. 7 of the fundamental right of appeal in all cases.) VI. Under our constitution. un doubtedly with the evident purpose of the confirmation of the conviction of the accused. Like other agencies of governme nt. where the guarantees against unreasonableness in search war rants issued against other accused are specially eliminated. and to make the appeal en consulta just an empty gesture to make the si tuation of the accused more pitiful by lengthening is days of agony. United S tates of America.

(Arts. ORDINANCE NO. adopted by the Hague in 1899." If we have to keep democracy in our country. 7. being violative of international law. sec. Constitution of the Philippines. by substantially subverting the ju dicial procedures in the special criminal cases instituted under said ordinance. This principle is the opposite of that prevailing under autocracies. beyond any reasonable doubt. 1. unless absolutely prevented. they were submitted to preventive tortures and long months of imprisonment. During the Japanese occupation all persons who mig ht fall under the suspicion of any Japanese or their spies and lackeys. the legitim ate government. ) The provision of the Convention has been flagrantly violated when. Even then. enjoys the absolute freedom of not recognizing or of nullifying any and a ll acts of the invader. once restored to its own territory.) VII. . propounded by the court or any officer. under the most elemental principles of law. For this reason. it is provided that the refusal of the accused to answer a ny question. No. That guarantee was consecrated in our Constitution: In all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until t he contrary is proved. The situatio n is exactly the same as that of the owner of the house who can do anything in i t that pleases him. sec. VIII. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. III. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS VI OLATED Since the American flag began to fly over our soil. just in case t hey might think later of committing any offense against the Japanese or their co llaborators. including those internationally legal ones. 7 VIOLATED THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1899 In the convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land. including the fundamental one. No. 1. 42 and 43. after expelling the bandit who was able to usurp its possess ion for a while. the fundamental guarantee th at in all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. were pre sumed to be guilty of any imaginary crime until they were able to convince their victimizers of the contrary. under the ene my occupation the Laurel Philippine Republic enacted Ordinance No. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and coun sel. II I. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. "may raise unfavorable pres umption against him. it is provided that the military occupant must respect the laws in force in the occupied country. 7 which suspe nded our laws. after expelling the enemy in vader. we must be vigilant in upholding th e constitutional principle that all persons shall be presumed to be innocent unt il the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Constitution of the Philippines. to ha ve a speedy and a public trial. (Art.) This guarantee is undoubtedly violated when. was null and void ab initio. or under fa cist or totalitarian regimes. has been implanted in our countr y to remain forever. in the summary procedure establishe d by Ordinance No. Under international law. (Art. to meet the witnesses face to face. 17. 1. said ordinance.laws".

R. 48. This theory is confirmed by sections 47 and 48. is as follow s: (a) In case of a judgement against a specific thing. the judicial process maybe it is bett er to say injudicial process which resulted in the imprisonment of petitioner. (b) In case of a judgement against a person. But even without the October Proclamation. THE DECISION CONVICTING THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AU THORITY IS UNENFORCEABLE The decision by which petitioner William F. or clear mistake of law or fact. 47. SEC. Effect of record of a court of the United States. p. which was null and vo id ab initio. THE STUNNING FACTS REVEALED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. 5. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. Effect of foreign judgments. ante) Said decision. that the authority of a guardian. and ac ting under the authority of a foreign State. IX. fraud. as we ha ve shown in our opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Rule 39. want of notice to the party.General McArthur exercised correctly that power by the sweeping nullification de creed in his October Proclamation. or administrator does not extend beyon d the jurisdiction of the Government under which he was invested with his author ity. having been rendered under Ordinance No. it is unenforceable within the Philippines or under the Commonwealth. collusion. A forei gn decision can only be enforced through the institution of an action before our tribunals. is unenforceable. and except. No. being a foreign decision. of the Rules of Court. except that it can o nly be enforced here by an action or special proceeding. It has. the Emperor of the Imperial Governm ent of Japan. or in the States or territory where it was made. which read: SEC. carries the same vice as the ordinance under which it was rendered . the nature of a foreign decision or judgment. The effect of a judic ial record of a court of the United States or of a court of one of the States or territories of the United States. respondent Director of Prisons was required to subm it statistical data concerning the number of prisoners and the various crimes fo . Peralta was convicted and is being c onfined for life having been rendered by a tribunal created. still it cannot be enforced. But even admitting arguendo that said decision is valid. X. 7. The effect of a judgement of a tribunal of a foreign country. having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgement. 153. m ust be shorn of all effects because it had taken place under the authority of an ordinance which was null and void ab initio. At the hearing of this case. therefore. Even decisions of a court of the United States or of any of its Stat es or territories can be enforced in the Philippines only by the institution of an action or special proceeding before our own courts. For that reason . because it is so under international law. is the same in the Philippines as in the Unit ed States. and is not included in the nullification decreed by General D ouglas MacArthur. the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing. also. or executor. functioning. the judgement is presumptive eviden ce of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subse quent title. but the judgement may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdic tion.

the Solicitor General. from the ruthless cruelty of the proceedings and of the penalties imposed. In submitting said statistical data. among them the petitio ner in this proceeding. that the wardens themselves. It is striking that so many prisoners died. Of the other two remaining prisoners serving sentence. 25 of those convicted for illegal po ssession of firearms. if not outright massacre. there must be something physically or mor ally fatal in said proceedings. wa s not explained to us. the court cannot compel him to answer under menace of puni . that is more than one-half. If a tree must be judged by the fruits it bears. The fact that a big number of the prisoners. 25 died. 66. and 6 escaped. He even goes to the e xtent of maintaining the theory that such constitutional guarantee is not essent ial for the protection of the substantial rights of an accused. thus dissipating the unfounded fear entertained by the C ity Fiscal of Manila. calls our attention to the fact that. moved by pity. almost 50% of them. May we ask if they died bec ause they were executed? Of those who died. which exacted from the mouth of t he First Assistant Solicitor General. This unusual and shocking percenta ge of mortality is worth inquiring into and. so fatal. that fact does not speak very highly of their proceedings. out of the 92 prisoners committed b y said courts to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement. and this is the reason why only one remains in confi nement. and 25 of possession of firearms. alleging that. cannot be counted very f avorably to judicial proceedings which eventually lead to such wholesale death. directly or indirectly helped the escape? More than one-third of the prisoners committed by the said courts in confinement to the Bureau of Prisons. 33 of the total of 94 prisone rs committed. one of robbery. how shall we judge proceedings so deadly. so wantonly inhuman as the proceedings had in the special c ourts in question? The City Fiscal of Manila exerted great efforts to show that the fact that in th e proceedings in question "the refusal of the accused to answer any question mad e or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him. were able to escape. and that only 3 are now actually in confinement serving sentences. one was convicted of profiteering in rice." does not violat e the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. one has been committed fo r evasion of service of sentence. 33 of them died. if the accused chooses to refuse to answer. that is. who appeared to argue the case in behalf o f the respondent. whose liberty and mixing with society will endanger public peace and order. Is it reasonable to surmise. 23 we re released. fifty-five (55). or more than one-third of them. to the effect that a pronouncement by this Supreme Tribuna l that the sentences of the courts in question are null and void. His argument centered on the alleged freedom of the accused to refuse to answer any question made or allowed by the court. four of crimes against public order. one of violation of certain s ections of Act No. the adjective "ferocious". and the other for illegal possession of firear ms. certainly. If the accused died by natural death. as counsel for respo ndent. Of the 55 prisoners convicted for illegal possession of firearms. were convicted of illegal possession of firearms.r which they were convicted by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Juris diction. one of kidnapping of minor. will signify t he release of hundreds of criminals. If all of them were executed by virtue of sentences rendered by th e courts in question. 21 of them. that is.

like a cobra with fangs overflowing with venom. But the value of such a moot question. If the refusal to answer can be considered unfavorably to the accused. and crush its head with one hammer blo w. It seems that we are still smelling the stench of human flesh burned in the stakes. the better. is one of the hatef ul vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually pe rverted and debased. principles. is nil. which could only happen once the flambeau of reason has ceased completely to burn. Such proc edure has absolutely no place in the framework of our juridical system. to be immedia tely released. if we s hould permit ourselves to fall into the weakness of abetting it even for a momen t. The City Fiscal seems to labor under the belief that the fact that the silence o f the accused "may be considered unfavorable to him". The process and judgement under which petitioner has been convicted and is now undergoing an unjust imprisonment. waiting for its victims. To ferret it out from the hole where it lurks. between a dagger and a wall? Either way. and of which he was unjustl y deprived through means most abhorrent to human conscience. where suspected witches suffered iniquitous death. Behind and under said criminal process stealthily crawls and trundles the Nippon psychosis . We must not hesitate for one moment to do our duty in this case. The sooner we c omply with it. The transgressions of the bill of rights in all its phases cannot be hidden even to a chela in constit utional law. That past is not f ar away. No one but the truckling lackeys of the arrogant enemy could have the serv ility of applauding the implantation of the criminal procedure in question. when accused and suspects were submitted to the most bruta l torture to compel them to confess real or imaginary crimes. is an imperative measure of national self-defense. and creed. so that he can once again enjoy a life of freedom. XI. which is the n atural boon to law-abiding residents of our country. It is not impossible to open a debat e upon the abstract question whether the constitutional guarantee against self-i ncrimination should not remain. The constitutional guarantee had to be adopted as a protest against inquisitoria l method of the past. TO IMMEDIATE RELE ASE After showing the absolute nullity of the judicial process under which petitione r has been convicted to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. the inevitable consequence is that he is entitled. It is the very negation of the administration of justice.shment for contempt or through any other coercive or minatory measures. We must not lose time to wipe out such vestiges if we must protect oursel . There is no doubt that the procedure in question shows the purpose of pandering to the most flagitious doctrines in criminal proceedings. Such belief can logically be entertained alone by ignoring completely the lesson s of experience in human conduct. All arguments and dissertations are useless to conceal the real fact. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED. he will always find himself under the inexorable sword of Damocles of sure punishment. is of no consequence at al l. for purpo ses of this case. is not th at the same as placing him on the hard predicament of choosing between testifyin g self-incriminating and risking the fatal effects of a legal presumption of gui lt? Is not that the same as placing him between the two steel cages of a dilemma : self-incrimination or presumption of guilt? Is not that the same as placing hi m between Scylla and Charybdis. The seriousness of this matter cannot be viewed with insouc iance. AS A MATTER OF ABSOLUTE RIGHT. whether he testifies or refuses to testify. as a matter of absolute right. We will feel mere whifflers in our professed convictions.

We cannot understand how any one can justify the summary process in question und er the principles embodied in our Constitution. Giordano Bruno. all poss ible means. conceived the dia bolical idea of condemning their victims to an advanced version of hell in this life. but the veiled remembrance alone of this reality. It ignores completely and debases the high purpos es of a judicial procedure. or in the stratified mentality of Japanese cullions. not the earth and the elements. what. upon the pretex t of combating and persecuting heresy to save souls from hell. Vandals. it i s not their living world that fate preserves and gives us with those works of an cient art. but. too. that is given us. after preaching moral virtues. who. I t is a virus that must be eliminated before it produces the logical disaster. not the spring and summer of that ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened. and among those who suffered under the same spirit of intolerance and bigo try which was its very essence are counted some of the greatest human characters . We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay t he democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country.ves against their poisonous effects in our political. at the same time. not the tree that bore them. under which we are enjoying the blessings of freedom and with which we hope to assure the well-being and happiness of the unending generations who will succeed us in the enjoyment of the treasures accumulated by a bountiful nature in this Pearl o f the Orient. and Girolamo Savonarola. retroversion. It represents a hylistic ideology which proclaims th e supremacy of the state force over fundamental human rights. Our sense of national self-preservation compels us. Philippine race. nor t he change of seasons which controlled the process of their growth. and Teutons. on an cient art. It is reproducing the crooked mentality of Torquemada. to obliterate even the memory of the inquisitorial summary procedure depicted in the present case. and from his games and festival s. To allow any vestige any vestige of such p . nor the climate that determined their constitutive character. a kindly fate has passed on those works to us. The y are themselves now just what they are for us beautiful fruit broken off the tr ee. wh ile the hymns of praise are words from which all belief has gone. is just sheer hypocrisy. the greatest work of genius that the nineteenth century has produced: The statues set up are corpses in stone. The works of the muse lack the force and energy of the Spirit which derived the cer tainty and assurance of itself just from the crushing ruin of goods and men. as a maiden might offer such fruit off tree. to accept and justify such kind of criminal mis carriage of justice. Huns. We must never allo w the neck of our people to be haltered by the lethal string of that ideology. That procedure might find justification in the thick heads of the Avars. according to Kohler. If we allow such vestiges to remain we are afraid that some historian may write about Philippine democracy. or perversio n of elemental human concepts. if the same must be saved. whence the animating soul has flown. Such procedure exhibits either inversion. subversion. Hegel said in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit". not o nly to restore immediately the petitioner to his personal liberty. social. Su ch ideology is a cancerous excrescence that must be sheared. as an imperative duty. such as Galileo. man no more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the Divine Being. completely extirpat ed. which constituted thei r substance. So. the sanguinary Roman Emperor. justified without any compunction the a ct of Nero. and cultural patri mony. The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food and drink. from the live tissues of our body politic. of murdering in cold blood his own mot her. It is not their actual life as they exist. and Philippine culture. It is a repetition of what Seneca did when. To profess attachment to those p rinciples and. but not in a healthy mind of a cultured person of modern times.

199. of Rizal. of Mabini. Secondly. when their personal security and their life were hanging by the t hin of chance. It is with joy and pride that we agree with all our brethren in unanimously gran ting petitioner the redress he seeks in his petition. L-5. for all ones and light y ears to come. he did so against his will. in all time. and laying aside for the moment the reas ons to the contrary set forth in my aforesaid dissenting opinion. that the rules of International Law regarding the power of a belligerent army of occupation to establish a provisional government in an occupied enemy territory. the importance and transcendence of the le gal principles involved justify further elaboration. and that he had never voluntarily submitted to the Japanese forces in his c ivil capacity. which had been organized under orders of the Ja panese Army in the Philippines. No. concurring: I concur in the result. ante). as well as in the reasons stated in the majority opinion not inconsistent with the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in G. R. I would additionally base my conclusion upon broader grounds. HILADO. If we analyze the different adjudications and treatises which have been cited in support of the validity or binding force of the acts of such provisional govern ments. Even granting for the sake of argument. are still bi nding upon the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. engendered by members of our race who justifie d such abhorrent summary procedure and allowed themselves to become a party to t he execution of a scheme only acceptable to the undeveloped mentalities of the d ark ages. yet such r ules would not be any avail to bind the herein petitioner by the laws. under and by virtue of which said petitioner has been convicted to life imprisonment by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila in Crimina l Case No.rocedure to remain is tantamount to reviving the situation during which our citi zens endured sleepless nights in constant fear of the hobnail terror stalking in the darkness. tried and convic ted. could accept procedures representing the b rutal ideology which is the very opposite of the humane. and from the reco rd nothing appears which may tend to gainsay them. However. it can be deduced that the petition er William F. From the allegations of the petition herein. process and other acts of the so-called "Republic of the Philippines". Firstly. Co Kim Cham vs. lofty.. regulatio ns. We wish a way could be found to free completely our people of the sense of shame . J. and dignified id eology that placed said heroes and martyrs among the purest and noblest specimen s that humanity produced in all countries. Even when he was forced tempo rarily to join the Constabulary. which have been variously called de facto governments. or governments of paramount force. 66 thereof. I reiterate here by reference the arguments advanced in said dissenting opinion in additional support of the conclusion that the writ of mandamus herei n sought should be granted. It is a shame that makes our blood boil when we think that countrymen of Father Gomez. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. with a view to finding the real ground and philosophical justif . Peralta was a "guerrillero" when he was arrested. which they cannot help feeling. No attempt is made in the Solicitor General's answer to controvert the facts all eged in the petition from which the foregoing deduction flows.

Page (9 Howard. 363. suspende d. ed. 19 Law. 281.). sometimes called temporary allegiance. Emphasis ours. hills and other places beyond the ef fective reach of the Japanese military garrisons. 13 Law. and to the very date of liberation refused to accept th e alleged protection or benefits of the puppet governments of the "Philippine Ex ecutive Commission" and the "Republic of the Philippines. This is plain common sense. and owe d to the United States nothing more than the submission and obedience. do not become responsible. S. processes and other acts of the government that the occupying belligerent establishes are made binding only and precisely upon those inhabitants from whom obedience could be effectively exacted. and the like.ication for the doctrine therein announced. 364. before one cou ld think of civilly governing them. in the farms. the inhabitants were still foreigners and enemies. the overwhelming majority of the people never submitted to the Japanese invaders. or country places.) It results from the above-quoted pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the Unit ed States that the laws. Rice (4 Wheat.. 562): The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was. Emphasis ours. we will see that reason tification are made to consist in the submission of the inhabitants e said acts have been held to be of obligatory or binding force. for those a cts. when he surre nders to a force which he is unable to resist. (P. or residing there in without adequate facilities for escaping from or evading said invaders.. 361) That while it (government of paramount force) exists. regulations. Smith (8 Wall. further mil itary operations would be necessary to reduce them to submission. The authority of the United States over the territory was suspended. Excerpts from Fleming vs." The majority of our p eople lived in the provinces. 1. rendered in submission to such force.]. [U.. or be oblig atory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conqueror. to occupation. In the Philippines. [U. (P. those who remain within the effective reach of the occupying forces and submit to them. Emphas is ours). S. As to them. S. namely. reaso ns of ill health. during the occupation by the Japanese of Manila and certain other portions of the Archipelago. Those who conceived and developed the doctr ine could not logically have thought of the army of occupation setting upon a ci vil government for those who still continued resistance. 4 Law. such as their having been caught in Manil a or other parts of the Island occupying government positions. Only a small minority submitte d to the invaders for various reasons. and never recognized any legality in the in vasion of their country. we quote the cerpts from three leading cases decided by the Supreme Court of the s: and that jus upon whom th the army of following ex United State Excerpts from Thorington vs. and the law s of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there. and not in their own. to cite just a few typical examples. 246. by acts of obedience. Emphasis ours.) Excerpts from United States vs. 603. ed. or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conqu erors. as wrong-doers. 564. Thus. ed. 276): While it (Tampico) was occupied by our troops.].]. hil ls. . they were in an enemy's country. and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced ther e. though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government (p. of course. (P. [U. it must necessarily be obe yed in civil matters by private citizens who. disabling them from living the hard life of the mountains. which is due from a conquered enemy.

violated the rule providing for the necessity of declar ing war as established at the Hague Conference of 1907 (Lawrence. far from requiring the establishment of such government. processes and oth er acts of those two puppet governments. successively on December 7 and 8. of opinion that there is another important consideration which argues against the recognition of the said government as a de facto government or government of paramount force during the Japanese occupation of the Philippin e Islands. but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments. or binding upon. and. in starting and prosecuting this war against the United States and her allies by breaking the most vital rules of civilized warfare as prescri bed by International Law. and suffered much above their private comfort." They su but they placed that ideology and that cause high ffered. with its courts and other departments. 7th ed. 321-322. If it did. regulations. Among them we find the petitioner William F. Japan. she has infringed the rule requir ing that war prisoners be cared for and treated with humanity (Ibid. yes. 522. They not only did not need the suppose d benefits of such a government. to Japan. by the laws. Who knows but that their a ttitude was based upon the renunciation of war as an instrument of national poli cy by their respective peoples. was in the very nat ure of things positively opposed thereto. the rule interdicting bombing of open and defenseless cities (Ibid. and in the latter's speech of February 27. If these historic utterances should seem incompatible wi th any provision of the Hague Convention. but they actually reputed them as inimical to t he larger interest of the very ideology and cause for which they were continuing their resistance to those who would extend here the brutal power and pernicious influence of the now exploded "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. upon the ground that such provisions does not support the wrongful acts of Japan in the Philippines? Another reason advanced to justify the creation of a provisional civil governmen t. 1941. that of the majority or that of the minority? Are we going to force those free citizens of this free country to accept the all eged benefits and assume the burdens of a government they have never consented t o own? I am furthermore. 377). with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institution s on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and th e Commonwealth Government. pp. Peralta. 1943. Principles of International Law. If this governmen t is democratic. whose will and whose convenience should prevail. the United States and the Philippines.To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never s ubmitted to the Japanese oppressors. 523) when she bombed Manila after it had been declared an open city and all its milit ary defenses had been removed. and when it comes to a question of convenience. Pr esident Roosevelt and President Osmeña would not have so heartily commended the Ph ilippine resistance movement and so enthusiastically extolled the firm stand of those who participated therein. must be deemed to have forfeited the right to invoke t hat law in so far as specific provisions thereof would favor her or her acts. 1945. if only tempora ry. we should understand from them that bo th Presidents must have considered such provision as no longer applicable to. The surrende r of the Fil-American forces in Bataan and Corregidor did not matter so far as t his was concerned.. in the former's message of October 23. would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal. which renunciation necessarily includes all the "rights" or "powers" which may be claimed to be delivered from war so employed? Or else. Let us not penalize them for it. is the al leged convenience of the civil population. th e rule imposing the obligation to properly tend the sick and wounded (Ibid. 325). 384) . Much less did that surrender obligate all the civil populatio n to submit to the Japanese. cited in the writer's above mentio ned dissenting opinion. It can immediately be asserted in rep ly that the convenience of the above-mentioned overwhelming majority of our peop le. in occupied enemy territory. p. the rule exempting noncombatants from personal in . to owe allegiance. on the other. Ja pan in treacherously attacking Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. and obey all their future dictations.

" A casual comparison of these two instruments cannot fail to reveal a most revolutionary transformation of the political organization of the country. and were climaxed by the ignominious and indescribabl e atrocities of the mass massacre of innocent civilians during the battle for Ma nila. . sec. as it existed upon the date of the Japanese invasion. To begin with. in the very preamble of the constitutio n of the "Republic" the independence " of the Philippines is proclaim. III. VI. in his work cited above. And International Law in many of its details is peculiarly liable to disputes and d oubts. for the purposes spec ified in the ordinance appended thereto. because it is based on usage and opinion. If a point of Municipal Law is doubtful. and all judges of interior courts. 2). under the constitution of the "R epublic" the President (no Vice-President is provided for) was elected "by major ity of all the members of the Assembly" (Art. sec. under the constitution of the "Republic" that power was vested in a unicameral National Assembly (Art. by the Presid ent with the advice of the Supreme Court (Art. one might say. is to base our reasoning "on high considerations of morality ". sec. III. VI. While und er the Commonwealth Constitution the President and Vice-President are elected "b y direct vote of the people "Art. indeed. VI. In the interpretation of doubtful provisions of International Law. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the Senators are chosen at large by the qualified electors of the Philippines (Art. the Commonwealth C onstitution was completely overthrown. one from each and every province and chartered city (Art. While under the Commonwealth Constitution. It would seem that to deny Japan benefits. as in the cases where such a government was deemed to exist. the members of Supreme Court and all judges o f inferior courts are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commiss ion on Appointments of the Congress (Art. or to a supreme legislature for an interpreting statute." In other words (even if we applied said rules to the instant case). . under the circumstances of this case. II. (Pp. sec. unless. He who in such a case bases his reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in accordance with humanity and justice. but if a poi nt of International Law is doubtful. during her three and a half years of tyranny and o ppression in this country. In additional to what has been said above. These changes and innovations can be multiplied many times. because she has refused to carry the burdens of the law. Japan. 1). 13. let us see if the Japanese-sponsored "Republic of the Philippines" did not introduces such fundamental and drastic ch anges in the political organization of this country. men resort to supreme court for a decision. 12. executive. "in accordan ce with humanity and justice. sec. judicial. they can resort only to general reasoning f or a convincing argument. there be. VI. they settle the question by blows. IV. While under Commonwea lth Constitution the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of Representatives (Art. has the following to say: . sec. but the foregoing wi .). under the constitution of the "Republic" the members of the Supreme Court were appointed by the President with the advice of the Cabinet. r especting the Judicial Department.). under the constitution of the "Republic" the National Assembl y was composed of the provincial governors and city mayors as members ex-oficio. 2) and the Representatives by the qualified electors in the respective districts (Art. VII. and legislative. and of delegate elected every three years.jury (Ibid. 2). sec. It was replaced by the so-called constitu tion of the "Republic. 5). as to the point in question. or a government of paramount force. and to resolve any doubt. could not be hea rd to say that the government which she established here was a de facto governme nt. sec. 397) her violations of one or the other of which were matters of dai ly occurrence. 1). as to vitiate with invalidity the acts of all its dep artment. Doctor Lawrence. 2). While under the Commonwealth Constitution the retention of American sovereignty over the Philippines is expressly recognized. 2) and the Representative by the qualified electors in the respective distr icts (Art. sec. VII. 4).

Of course. sincere . to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control. Que todas las leyes. or whether they only suspend the w orking of that already in existence. has been appropriately called "puppet" by the civilized government of the world. concurrente: El mandamiento de habeas corpus que se solicita debe concederse. and Vichy. and that "Republic" thereunder. But what happened in this country during the Japanese occupation? When the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14. reza en parte lo siguiente: 3. I cannot believe that those wh o conceived and developed the doctrine of de facto government or government of p aramount force. La proclama del General McArthur de 23 de Octubre de 1944. The Americans es tablished another such government in Tampico. (Hall. BRIONES.) Finally. i nevitably had to be contaminated by the same vitiating defect. or acts of a political complexion of a de facto government of paramount force. Recientemente se ha discutido mucho en esta jurisdiccion sobre si la anulacion d . Emphasis ours. when they are not of a political comp lexion. frankly.. exe cuted a political act so fundamental and basic in nature and operation that all subsequent acts of the new government which of course had to be based thereon. Burma. whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country. . Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course. The British established such a gove rnment in Castine. I disagree with those who so hold. are the only ones vitiated with nullity. from begi nning to end. 1943. and honest in their deeds as well as in their words. ever intended to include therein such a counterfeit organization as the Japanese contrived here an organization which. . upon closed scrutiny. But behind the curtain. M. Nanking. The Confederate States established a like government in the seceding State s.. 6th ed. . under duress exerted by the Japanese Army.. like its counterparts in Manchukuo. But ev en by this test the "Republic" or. and sincerely say that government was being es tablished under their orders and was to be run subject to their direction and co ntrol? Far from it! They employed all the means they could conceive to deceive t he Filipino people and the outside world that they had given the Filipinos their independence. and ran it is a purely British organization. remain good. International Law. the Imperial Japanese Forc es which gave it birth in thus introducing such positive changes in the organiza tion of this country or suspending the working of that already in existence. and various acts done during the same time by pr ivate persons under the sanction of municipal law. which is the same. 483. we will find that all of the de facto governments or governments of paramount force which have been cited in all this discussion were at the same time bona fide governments. did the Japanese openly. regulaciones y procesos de cualquier otro gobierno en Fi lipinas que no fuera el del Commonwealth son nulos e invalidos y carecen de efec to legal en areas de Filipinas liberadas de la ocupacion y control del enemigo. They were all frank. administrative acts so done. lanzada cuatro dias d espues de su desembarco en Leyte con las fuerzas libertadoras. and ran it as the Government of the Confederacy. It has been said constantly in this discussion that political acts.ll suffice for our purpose. and ran it as an American organiza tion. there was the Imperial Japanese Army giving orders and instruction s and otherwise directing and controlling the activities of what really was thei r creature for the furtherance of their war aims. Thus judicial acts done under his control. p.

Hay en dicha ley ciertos aspectos decididamente repuls ivos para una conciencia disciplinada en las normas y pricipios de una democraci a constitucional. excepto cuando la pena impuesta fuera la de muerte. garantido por la constitucion. Este es un derecho fundamental. Bajo nuestro sistema procesal el acusado tiene derecho a que no se le ponga en s ituacion de acriminarse. No. a mi jui cio. R. cualquier acusado convicto ante el Ju zgado de Primera Instancia tiene el derecho de apelar de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal superior de revision. Asi que el derecho del condenado a reclusion perpetu a o a muerte para que se revise su cuasa por el Tribunal Supremo es constitucion al y. a quien se le habia impuesto esta pena por el alergado delito de robo. o debemos anularla ahora que esta en nuestr as manos el poder hacerlo." (Seccion 21. no puede ser abolido por un simple fiat legislativo. el Tribunal Supremo es el llamado a revisar la causa. he opinado afirmativamente.e que trata dicha proclama puede referirse tambien a actuaciones judiciales ( ju dicial processes). De modo que en esta ordenanza no solo se suprimia de una plumada el derech o de apelar reconocido y establecido por la legislacion procesal del Commonwealt h aun en los casos de delitos y penas ordinarios. 157. bajo el sistema procesal en controversia las sentencias de los tribun ales o sumarias eran de caracter final. la sentencia de reclusion perpetua impuesta al recurrente bajo la ocupacion militar japonesa es de aquellos actos judiciales del passado regimen que por su naturaleza y circunstancias reclaman una decidida y pronta accion de parte nues tra en el sentido de anularla y dejarla sin efecto. ante). Reafirmo ahora mi opinion y con mayor vigor y enfasis si cabe. 7 de la llamad a Republica de Filipinas por la que se crearon las tribunales especiales o sumar ios). restablecida como esta enteramente la normalidad juri . Esta jurisdiccion del Tribunal Supremo en los casos de condena a reclusion perpetua y a muerte no se halla est atuida simplemente por una ley ordinaria. En cambio. Parece innegable que la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado y convicto el r ecurrente durante la ocupacion japonesa era absolutamente incompatible con las s alvaguardias y garantias de un proceso justo. Mis razones se exponen a con tinuacion. sino que inclusive quedaba abo lido el derecho de apelar otorgado por la constitucion del Commonwealth al acusa do condenado a reclusion perpetua. por ende. G. Orden Ejecutiva No . 133. y en los casos de condena a reclusion perpetua o a muerte. En el asunto de Co Kim Cham contra Valdez Tan Keh y Dizon. imparcial y ordenado que la consti tucion y legislacion procesal del Commonwealth de Filipinas otorgan a todo acusa do en una causa criminal." Bajo el sistema procesal del Commonwealth. no pudo apelar de al se ntencia para ante el Tribunal Supremo.) Bajo este mismo sistema el caracter sumarisimo del proceso llega a tal e xtremo que "una sentencia condenatoria puede dictarse inmediatemente contra el a cusado siempre que los hechos discubiertos en el interrogatorio preliminar demue stren que el acusado es culpable. Porque. Por este motivo el recurrente. siendo compul soria la revision en el caso de condena a muerte. en cuyo caso los autos se elevaban en consulta a una division especi al del Tribunal Supremo compuesta de tres miembros (Ordenanza No. Tiene a derecho a callarse sin que esto pueda astribuir sele cargo inculpatorio alguno. "la negativa del acusado a const estar cualqueira pregunta formulada por el tribunal o permitida por el mismo. La cuestion que ahora tenemos que determinar y resolver es si debemos reconocer validez y eficacia en la sentencia por la cual el recurrente se halla extinguien do su condena de reclusion perpetua. sino que esta proveida en la misma con stitucion del Commonwealth. Empero bajo el sistema procesal que se discute. que el alcance de esa proclama puede extenderse a veces a ciertos actos o procesos judiciales. esto es. L-5 (pag. pu ede ser considerada en contra de dicho acusado.

(H all. 570-581. 17 Well. 7th ed.. peo ejemplo. las sentencias por "crimenes de guerra" o "delitos politico s" cometidos durante la ocupacion son. revolucion o guerra civil porque evidentemente la llamada Republica de Filip inas instaurada durante la ocupacion militar japonesa no tenia este caracter. n ulas e invalidas al restablecerse la soberania legitima. Treatise on International Law. ed. invalido s y nulos (Texas vs. o las leyes que regulan el orden moral de la comunidad. Como regla general. o encaminados a anular los justos derechos de los ciudadanos. A esteefecto se ha declarado. En otras palabras. Lo que se hace fuera de e stas limitaciones es en exceso de su competencia y es generalmente nulo al rstau rarse la soberania legitima. Otra limitacion a los poderes de un gobierno de ocupacion militar es que elejerc icio de tales poderes debe extenderse tan solo hasta donde fuese necesario para su seguridad y el exito de sus operaciones.733. que los actos en fomento o apoyo de unarebelion contra l os Estados Unidos. 2 Law. que la regla tiene sus excepciones.. [1944]. Se alega que en estos casos el dere cho no tiene mas remedio que ceder a la fuerza. p. Horn vs. por razones pecfetamente comprensibles. 245.." (Wheaton's International Law. 498. White. esto es. que aun admitiendo el caracter inquisitorial . era el mismo gobierno militar de ocupacion con fachada filipina arreglada y arbitrada coercitivamente. S. rebelion. sino que era simple producto de la coaccion y estaba mediatizada con . deben ser considerados. al invasor se le pr ohibe alterar o suspender las leyes referentes a la propiedad y a las relaciones personales privadas. En otro caso se ha declaro la validez de ciertos actos judiciales o legislativos en estados insurre ccionados. ed. 74 U. 660. En favor de la validez de dicha sentencia se arguye que fue dictada por un tribu nal creado por un gobierno de jure. en disfrute de plena autonomia. teniendo particularmente en cuental el caracter transeunte de su occupacion. 7th ed.) Visto el caso que nos ocupa a la luz de estas doctrinas. sin embargo.499). que la aludida re publica no tenia caracter insurreccional ni revolucionario. por lo general. ¿cual de ellas debemos ad optar para determinar si es o no valida la sentencia por la la cual el recurrent e sufre ahora pena de reclusion perpetua y pide ser liberado mediante peticion d e habeas corpus? Se aservera que no procede aplicar al presente caso la doctrina establecida en l a jurisprudencia americana sobre gobiernos de facto resultantes de una insurecci on. o no conculcaren derechos de los ciudadanos bajo la Constitucion. y que. Una de allas esque " los actos del ocupante militar que rebasen su poder a tenor del criterio estable cido en el articulo 43 de las Regulaciones de La Haya. siempre que su proposito o modo de operacion no fuerte hostil a la au toridad del gobierno nacional. Otra excepcion es la que se refiere a los actos de un gobierno de facto resultan te de una insurreccion. las se ntencias por "crimenes de guerra" o delitos politicos" generalmente validas aun despues de restablecido el gobierno de jure. revolucion o guerra civil. y otros actos de igual indole. anti democratico de la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado el acusado. Tambien quedan comprend idos bajo esta excepcion los denominados actos de caracter o complexion politica .. son nulos y sin efecto co n relacion al gobierno legitimo.) Segun esto. Lockhart. si no que era mas bien un gobierno establecido mediantefuerza y coaccion por los mi smos invasores para promover ciertos designios politicos relacionados con sus fi nes de guerra.dica y constitucional en nuestro pais. aceptando la realidad de los hec hos consumados. el gobierno de facto era dueño de establecer los procedimientos legales que quisiera . Mientras estoy conforme con una parte de la asercion. segun las reglas y doctrinas conocidas de derecho international. Se admite. 19 Law. 240).

revolucion o guerra civil. ya no se hace preci so examinar si los actos conculcatorios fueron motivados por razones o exigencia s de las seguridad y exito de las operaciones del ocupante militar. el enemigo invasor incio la agresion de una ma nera inicua y traicionera y la ejecuto luego con vesania y sadismo que llegaron a extremos inconcebibles de barbarie. no hay absolutamente ninguna razon para no aplicarle una restriccion qu e se estimabuena para el insurrecto o revolucionario. o al ordenmoral de la comunidad? ¿No son en cierto se ntido hasta superiores? Por tanto. o de los derechos garantidos por la constitucion co bra proporciones de mucha mayor gravedad porque viene a ser tan solo parte de un vasto plan de rapiña. mas que justific ada por los avances y conquistas del moderno derecho internacional." Dar validez a esa sentencia ahora. Treatise on International Law. es que desde cualquier angulo que se mire la sentencia impuesta al recurrente por el tribunal sumario de la llamada republica de Filip inas debe ser declarada nula. Si a un gobierno de factode este ultimo tipo gobierno establecid o. en cuanto no conculcaren los derechos justos de los c iudadanos. despues de todo. Par a citar solamente algunos ejemplos los mas destados. como regla general. tenemos el enjuiciamento de los llamados criminales de la guerra. a los derechos garantidos por la constitucion. en este caso. Ya hemos visto que al ocupante militar en el curso de unaguerra internaci onal se le prohibe. y la responsabilidad que se exige a los j efes militares por las atricidades cometidas por las tropas bajo su mando. En este caso la conculcacion de los justos derechos de los ciudadanos. sino parece ser una logica inferenciade los m ismos. Es unainclusion y perfectamente natural. por compatriotas. sino tambien po r la mas apremiante y poderosa de las razones. en plena atmosfera de libertad que respiran a . rebelion o guerra civil a gobiernos de facto est ablecidos como incidente en el curso de una guerra entre dos naciones independei entes enemigas es que. es como el foragido que se coloca fuera de toda ley. acotando las palabras delProcurador General. en tanto son validos.por conciudadanos se le coarta con la restr iccion de que sus actos legislativos o judiciales. "no s olo por razones fundadas en principios de derecho internacional. E l invasor. supra. o de los garantidos por laconstitucion para los efectos de decla rarlos validos o nulos al restablecerse el gobierno de jure. Y la raz on es sencilla.la de preservar y salvaguardar a n uestros ciudadanos de los actos del enemigo.a nadie debe chocar que la prohibicion se exti enda a estas materias. en su caso como el de Filipinas. frente a casos de conculcacion de los justos derechos de los ciudadanos. o las rel aciones personales privadas. Po r tanto. Mi conclusion. devastacion y atrocidades de todo genero cometidas contra l a humanidad y contra las leyes y usos de la guerra entre naciones civilizadas. por tanto. alterar o suspenderlas leyes referentes a la propiedad y a las relaciones personales privadas. aquella que declara inaplic able la conocida doctrina americana mencionada arriba sobre gobiernos de facto e stablecidos en el curso de una insurreccion. la razon de nulidad es mucho mas poderosa y fuertecuando. Notese que e n las fraguas de esta ultima guerra se han forjado unas modalidades juridicas ha rto originalesque denotan el esfuerzo supremo y gigante dela humanidad por super ar la barbarie y por dar al traste con las formulas arcaicas. Esta forma de racioncinio no solo no es heterodoxa a la luz de los pincipiosesta blecidos de derecho internacional.) Ahor a cabe preguntar: ¿Son los justos derechos de los ciudadanos.tinuamente por el invasor. En realidad. sino que la piedra de toque de la validez o nulidad viene a ser tan solo el acto positivo mi smo de la conculcacion. al rest aurarse el regimende jure. (Hall. parece que no existe n inguna razon por que no se ha de aplicar la misma restriccion al gobierno de fac to establecido como incidente de una guerra entre dos naciones independientes y enemigas. La ventaja de extender hasta cierto punto la doctrina sobre gobiernos de facto r esultantes de una insurreccion. difiero de la otra parte. o los fundamentales garantidos por la constitucion inferiores en categoria a la propiedad. olas leyes que regulan el orden moral de la comunidad. reaccionarias.

She was ten years old at the time the compl aint was filed on October 10. defendant-appellant. 1964. is the bro ther of the deceased. the plaintiff. FRANCISCO PILAPIL. Ciertamente no nos hemos librado de la opresion para llegar a tan irrisorioresul tado. Concedase el remedio pedido. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle. J. " 1 The insured. the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of the law. This is all the more likely considering that t he child is with the mother. with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. his child. the lower court in a decision of May 10. seeking the delivery of such sum. The lower court apply ing the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother. for defendant-appellant. In addition. We have to affirm. with a married wom an. The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. Francisco Pilapil. equivaldria a sancionar laideologia totalitaria. Melchora Cabanas. She filed the bond requ ired by the Civil Code. FERNANDO. Defendant uncle appealed. Seno. Upon his de ath. Hence this complaint by the mother. 1974 MELCHORA CABANAS. the former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention to her. medieva l contra la cual nuestro pueblo lucho tan heroicamente jugandose todo. Millian Pilapil. vida libe rtad y bienes materiales. the pl aintiff in this case.R. There are no circumstances then that did militate a gainst what conforms to the natural order of things. L-25843 July 25. did weigh in the b alance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of th e child called for the mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. Emilio Benitez. vs. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary .:p The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insur ance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. Florentino Pilapil had a child. with an even g reater stress on family unity under the present Constitution. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State as parens patriae. No. it must h ave taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. 1965. As noted. the proceeds were paid to him.pulmon lleno de resto de nuestros conciudadanos menos el recurrente y otras que corrieron su suerte durante la ocupacion japonesa. Jr. despotica. 2 After trial duly had. even if the language of the law were not as clear. Es mas. with who m the child is living. plaintiff-appellee. The defendant. G. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of th e amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.equivaldria tanto como prolon gar el regimen de opresion bajo el cual se tramito y se dicto la referida senten cia. The dispute centers as to who of them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee. rendered ju dgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question .

The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. therefo re. 6 So it must be in this case. and in usufruct to the plaintiff. con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis adelante. and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. the decision must stan d. the conclusion will re main unaltered." 5 It is very clear. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocid a de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina. belongs to the minor child in ownership. 1. was of that view: Thus "El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimoni o de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con mas cariño y solicitude q ue los padres. que se refiere a la ley 24. So it was in the appealed decision. XIII de la Partida 5. however. It is in consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and 3 21 have been worded. 4 Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appeal ed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary.. It is further fortified by the assumption. the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code . In order. as mentioned at the outset. insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the def endant-appellant 7 to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so plainly an d so unqualifiedly. her mother . With the adde d circumstance that the child stays with the mother. T heir meaning is unequivocal. that unless the applicabilit y of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed. is the welfare of the child. tit . considering the above. Sp. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio l os Codigos extranjeros.00. y asi se desprende de la sentencia d el Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code.000.. No. T he former provides: "The father. not the uncle." 8 2. The words are rather clear. The trust. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. belongs to the child in ow nership." 3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry. this Court has left no doubt t hat where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical language. Time and time again. It may . or in his absence the mother. the task be fore it is not one of interpretation but of application. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5. In the event that there is less than full measure of concern f or the offspring. It is but tressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary. commenting on Art icle 159 of the Civil Code of Spain. the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. Even if it were a question of policy. is pro tanto null and void. to protect the rights of the minor. both logical and natural. Millian Pilapil . . is called upon whenever a pending suit of litiga tion affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. is the legal admi nistrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to possession. that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle.to plaintiff. therefore. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. without any evidence of lack of maternal care. Manresa. Proc. the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings. or by any lucrative title. the p laintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. the father or mother shall gi ve a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. the protection is supplied by the bond required. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. h er mother. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff. What is paramount. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. Said property. If t he property is worth more than two thousand pesos.

Commissioner of Customs. L-28463. 30. Pamaran. Gonzaga v. v. Inc." 10 If. there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. 1965 is affirmed. Vasquez. v. 20 SCRA 1164. 1974. v. 9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State. L-23894. 22 SCRA 1352. Pacis v. Ariola. 28. 5 Decision. 30. L-27948 and 28001-11. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred.. whether that power is lodged i n a royal person or in the legislature. 1968. July 3 1. 8 2 Manresa. Diocares. 24. 2 Cf. 38 (1944). Aug. It is a mother asserting priority. L-29203. concur. v. L-27757. Such is not the case at all. 24-25. L-23996. WHEREFORE. Caparas. of the Phil. Ibid. Oct. 1974. Commissioner of Customs. June 28. 8-9. as the Constitut ion so wisely dictates. 31. Allied Brokerage Corp. Jun e 29. 23 SCRA 1349: Garcia v. March 28. . 40 SCRA 70. 29 SCRA 656. Davao Stevedore Termin al Co. 1969. It reads: "The State sha ll strengthen the family as a basic social institution. 1971. L-2922 6. L-21881. 3 Article 320 of the Civil Code (1950). 53 SCRA 139. 28 SCRA 1085. Pacific Oxygen & Ac etylene Co. 30 SCRA 111. 32 SCRA 553. 1968. L-27641. 31. 55 SCRA 261. 1969. Padilla v. Certainly the judiciary as the instr umentality of the State in its role of parens patriae. In a recent case. took no part. still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. Endaya. that family relations may press their respective c laims. April 30. it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened. 196 9. it could have bee n different if the conflict were between father and mother.. 1971. Mapa. Jalandoni v. 1967. JJ. L-25659. L-26808. Costs against defendant-app ellant. J. cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea. Vda. May 31. as it did occur here. v.. Republic Flour Mills.happen." What is more. 40 SCRA 555. 1969. and has no affinity to those arbitrary p owers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detrime nt of the people and the destruction of their liberties. L-27489. L-26371. City of Pasay L-24039. Antonio. July 26. Inc. Jan. L-27455. Mobil Oil Phil. 1971. Inc. 27 SCRA 50 5. Zaldivar (Chairman). de Macabenta v. 6 Cf. Sept. v. Maritime Co. Record on Appeal. the decision of May 10. 4 Article 321 of the Civil Code (1950). 39 SCRA 269. La Peria Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. March 28. Re parations Commission. Co urt of Appeals. Sept. March 1. March 15. 24. Footnotes 1 Decision. 7 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant... Aug. Record on Appeal. 51 SCRA 381. Vallangca v. it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the u ncle. 1973. Central Bank. Codigo Civil Español. 1973. 1968. De Garcia. Fernandez and Aquino. People vs. 1970. Luzon Surety Co. L-22301. Barredo. Lop ez.. 27. Dequito v. 22 SCRA 917.

Lorenzo. 44 SCRA 431. .9 Nery v. April 27. Section of the Constitution. L-23096. 10 Article II. 1972. 438-439.

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