I L LI NOIS LI BERT Y PAC, a Political Action )
Committee registered with the I llinois State Board )
of Elections, )
Plaintiff, )
v. )
LISA M. MADI GAN, Attorney General of the State )
of I llinois; ) Judge Gary Feinerman
WI L LI AM McGUF F A GE, Chai rman ) Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox
of the I llinois State Board of Elections; )
JESSE R. SMART, Vice-Chai rman of the I llinois ) No. 12 CV 05811
State Board of Elections; )
HAROLD D. BYERS, Member of the I llinois )
State Board of Elections; )
BE T T Y J. COF FRI N, Member of the I llinois )
State Board of Elections; )
ERNEST L. GOWEN, Member of the I llinois State )
Board of Elections, )
JUDI T H C. RI CE, Member of the I llinois )
State Board of Elections; )
BRYAN A. SCHNEI DER, Member of the I llinois )
State Board of Elections; and )
CHARL ES W. SCHOL Z, Member of the )
I llinois State Board of Elections, all in thei r )
official capacities, )
Defendants. )


I. I ntroduction

Plaintiff Illinois Liberty PAC ('Illinois Liberty PAC¨) is a not-for-profit pro-liberty
political action committee ('PAC¨) that supports candidates for public office who embrace
public policy rooted in the principles of liberty and free enterprise. (Decl. of Matthew Besler, ¶
5, attached as Exh. 1.) Illinois Liberty PAC brings this Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or
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Permanent Injunction to enjoin the enforcement of certain portions of the Disclosure and
Regulation of Campaign Contribution and Expenditures Act ('the Act¨), 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(a)-(d),
because they violate Illinois Liberty PAC`s and other nonparty political speakers` rights to Iree
speech and equal protection under law pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.
The Act establishes a series of contribution limits on nonparty political speakers,
including Illinois Liberty PAC, while exempting political parties from these same limits. This
disparate treatment, along with the Act`s overall scheme that includes exemptions and instances
where limits are entirely eliminated, evince that its contribution limit scheme does not serve the
only interest the Supreme Court has recognized for justifying such limits, preventing quid pro
corruption or the appearance of corruption. See Wis. Right to Life PAC v. Barland, 664
F.3d 139, 153 (7th Cir. 2011) ('WRTL¨). For these reasons, the Act`s contribution limits on all
political speakers and committees should be enjoined and struck down as unconstitutional. In the
alternative, the contribution limits on Illinois Liberty PAC should be enjoined and struck down.
I I. Statement of Facts
In January 2009, Illinois enacted its first-ever campaign contribution limits for statewide
general and primary elections, which took effect January 1, 2011. 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5.
Specifically, the Act limits contributions that individuals, political action committees ('PACs¨)

and other nonparty political speakers may make to candidates during a general election $5,000,
$50,000, and $10,000 respectively while expressly exempting political party contributions to

'The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.¨ Federal
Election Commn v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
PACs are defined as a group of persons that accepts contributions, makes expenditures or
electioneering communications during any 12-month period in an aggregate amount exceeding
$3,000 on behalf of or opposition to a candidate(s) for public office. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(d).
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candidates and other political parties. Id. Both the bill and its subsequent July 2012
amendments thereto were passed on party-line votes, with Democrats, including the House
Speaker and Senate Leader, supporting the bill, and most Republicans, including the House and
Senate Minority Leaders, opposing it. (See Exh. 2.)
The only limits the Act places on political party contributions to candidates apply solely
during primary elections. However, in statewide elections these limits are forty times the amount
that individuals may contribute ± $200,000 versus $5,000 ± and four times the amount PACs can
make ± $200,000 versus $50,000.
Currently there are limits on what a party can receive in a
primary election ± $50,000 from a candidate and $50,000 from another party ± but the Act
eliminates these limits entirely effective July 1, 2013. 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(c).
While there are
limits on what individuals, PACs and other nonparties can contribute to political parties, parties
may receive unlimited contributions from candidates and other political parties. § 5/9-8.5 (b),
The Act also contains a provision that eliminates all contribution limits in a race if a self-
financed candidate spends more than $250,000 for a statewide race or more than $100,000 for
any other elective office. 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(h). In July 2012, an amendment to the 2009 Act was
passed that eliminates all contribution limits in a race if an independent expenditure committee
spends more than $250,000 (for a statewide race) or more than $100,000 (for any other elective
office). § 5/9-8.5(h-5). The Act does not, however, eliminate contribution limits based on what
a political party spends in any race, including when a political party spends more than $250,000

Other disparate party-versus-nonparty contribution limits apply to primary races including
Senate, House, First District judicial candidates, and other municipal and county office holders.
See generally 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(b).
See also 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(c), a legislative caucus political committee may not accept
contributions from another political party established by a legislative caucus.
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in a statewide race or more than $100,000 in any other race. In fact, political party contribution
spending in Illinois races has far surpassed these limits. (See Exhs. 3-5, party to candidate
contributions and Exh. 7, foundational Decl. of Robert T. Isham.)
Political Parties as Defined under the Act
Political parties are reIerred to as 'political party committees¨ under the Act and include
the state and county central committees of a political party, a legislative caucus committee, and a
committee formed by a ward or township committeeman of a political party. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(c).
A 'legislative caucus committee¨ is a committee established Ior the purpose oI electing
candidates to the General Assembly by the President of the Senate, Minority Leader of the
Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Minority Leader of the House, or a committee
established by 5 or more members of the same caucus of the Senate or by 10 or more members
of the same caucus of the House. Id. All of these party committees are empowered to give
unlimited contributions to candidates (with the limited exception of during primary elections as
noted above). Id.
The Act expressly prohibits individuals and other groups of persons (e.g., committees,
associations, corporations), from forming more than one political action committee. 10 ILCS
5/9-2(d). The Act does not prohibit a public official or candidate for public office from serving
as the officer of both a candidate committee and another committee, such as a party or legislative
committee, nor does it prohibit an individual from serving as an officer of multiple party
committees. Accordingly, while the Act prohibits officers of Illinois Liberty PAC from forming
another PAC, the Act does not, for example, prohibit Speaker Madigan from serving as the
Treasurer of his own candidate committee, Friends of Michael J. Madigan, while also serving as
the chairman of two party committees, the Democratic Party of Illinois and the Democratic
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majority which, in fact, he does. (See Exhs. 3,7.) Further, the Act`s statutory scheme
expressly ensures that the Speaker can make unlimited contributions from his candidate
committee to the party committees he chairs, 10/9-8.5(c), and then make unlimited contributions
from his political parties to candidates which in fact he does.
Id. (See Exhs. 3, 7.)
For example, Friends of Michael J. Madigan gave the Democratic Party of Illinois
$2,350,000 in the 2009-2010 election cycle. The Democratic Party then made contributions to
candidate committees ranging from $234,321 to the Senator Demuzio candidate committee, to
$1,475,000 to Kilbride Ior Supreme Court Judge (which represented 54° oI the Judge`s total
contributions received during this cycle). (See Exhs. 3,7.) Contributions from the Democratic
Party of Illinois and the Senate Democratic Victory Fund constituted 65% of the total
contributions made to Senator Demuzio`s candidate committee. (See Exhs. 3,7.)
Further, of the $796,667 in total contributions that Citizens for Unes received in the
2009-2010 election cycle, 63.7% of these contributions came from a combination of Minority
Leader Cross` candidate committee, the House Republican Organization, and the Illinois
Republican Party. (See Exhs. 5, 7.) In the case of the candidate committee Sam McCann for
State Senate, that committee received $23,875 from the Citizens for Christine Radogno candidate
committee. However, Senator Radogno`s candidate committee also contributed more than
$1,130,000 to the Republican State Senate Campaign Committee, of which Senator Radogno is
chairwoman, and the Republican State Senate Campaign Committee gave $428,352 to Sam
McCann`s state senate candidate committee. (See Exhs. 6-7.)

The Senate President has a like arrangement, where he is both the chairman of his candidate
committee and the chairman of the Senate Democratic Victory Fund party committee. (See Exhs.

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This history shows that the state knew both before the 2009 Act was passed and the 2012
amendments that political parties and the elected leaders who were contributing well beyond any
of the caps the Act imposes on other speakers, including Illinois Liberty PAC. This history also
shows that the candidate committees oI party leaders are able to circumvent the Act`s limits on
candidate contributions to other candidate committees, 10 ILCS 9-8.5(b), by using the party
committees they control as a conduit for contributions to other candidate committees.
But for the Act, Illinois Liberty PAC would make contributions that exceed the Act`s
contribution limits. (Exh. 1, ¶¶ 11-16, Besler Decl.) Further, but for the contribution limits,
Illinois Liberty PAC would have the freedom to direct its in-kind and monetary contributions in
a manner that best advances its principles and strategic purposes. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Moreover, it
would not be forced, as it now is, to make smaller contributions to candidates than it wishes or
decline to contribute at all if Illinois Liberty PAC determines that a smaller contribution (at or
below the Act`s limits) would not make an impact in a race. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Illinois Liberty PAC
is ready, willing and able to make contributions in excess oI the Act`s limits. (Id. at ¶ 12.) In
addition, but for the Act, Illinois Liberty PAC would be ready and willing to accept donations in
excess of what the Act allows. (Id. at ¶ 13.) At present, Illinois Liberty PAC has at least one
donor who has given Illinois Liberty PAC the maximum aggregate contribution of $10,000 for
the current election cycle, who would donate more but for the Act. (Exh. 10, ¶¶ 1-7, Bachrach
I I I. Summary of the Argument
The Act was enacted in 2009 under the guise of campaign finance reform, but in reality
operates to increase political party power in the state. Far Irom targeting Illinois` 'long history
oI political corruption,¨ and those who 'wish for political favors in exchange for their financial
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support oI candidates or oIIicials¨ (DeIs.` Opp. to PlIs.` Mot. Prelim. Inj., at 6, Personal PAC v.
McGuffage, 12 CV 1043 (Feb. 24, 2012))
(Exh. 8), the Act`s party exemptions exacerbate the
threat of corruption and apparent corruption that the contribution limits on individuals and PACs
are purportedly aimed at reducing. See Federal Election Commn v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440-45 (2001) ('Colorado II¨). In Iact, the evidence
shows that the same political leaders who voted for the Act and its 2012 amendments, including
Speaker Madigan and Senate Leader Cullerton, are the very political leaders who benefit from
the Act`s exemptions. (See roll call votes on the 2009 Act and 2012 amendments, Exh. 2.) In
legislating themselves above the law, the political leaders literally sanctioned their own control
over the flow of campaign spending throughout the state in 2009, then further solidified it in
20012. As Representative Suzanne Bassi remarked in the 2009 floor debate on the Act:
Without those caps, the new reform is not only business as usual but make
matters worse. The four Legislative Leaders controlled at least $25 million
in each of the last three election cycles. Other limits on contributions to
candidates are meaningless when Party Leaders can continue to give
unlimited amounts of cash to their chosen candidate. Ill. H.R., 96
Legis. Day, at 130-31 (Oct. 29, 2009) (Exh. 9).

Accordingly, the Illinois campaign finance scheme, with its series of loopholes, party
exemptions and selective contribution-limit-lifting triggers, disparately treats Plaintiff Illinois
Liberty PAC and other nonparty political speakers, fails to serve an anti-corruption purpose, and
therefore should be enjoined and stricken as unconstitutional.
I V. Standard of Review
In order to prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must demonstrate: 1)
some likelihood of success on the merits; 2) no adequate remedy at law exists; and 3) irreparable
harm if the injunction is not granted. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir.

See Personal PAC v. McGuffage, 2012 WL 850744 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012).
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2001). If these conditions are met, the Court must then balance the hardships the moving party
will suffer in the absence of relief against those the nonmoving party will suffer if the injunction
is granted. Id. Finally, the Court considers the interests of nonparties in deciding whether to
grant injunctive relief. Id. The Court weighs all these factors 'sitting as would a chancellor in
equity,¨ using a 'sliding scale` approach: the more likely it is the plaintiff will succeed on the
merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side; the less likely it is
the plaintiff will succeed, the more the balance need weigh towards its side.¨ Abbott Labs v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992).
V. Argument
A. The Act violates I llinois Liberty PAC¶Vright to Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment denies states the power to 'legislate that different treatment
be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute.¨ Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). A
classification that implicates a fundamental right, including the right to free speech, must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18
(1982) (classifications that impinge upon exercise of a fundamental right subject to strict
scrutiny); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) ('Ireedom
oI speech¨ a Iundamental right Ior equal protection analysis).
Thus, in order to sustain the Act`s disparate treatment oI PlaintiII and political parties, the
state must show that doing so serves a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court has
recognized only one state interest sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on campaign
contributions: preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.
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See WRTL, 664 F.3d at 153. Thus, the state must show that any scheme that restricts campaign
contributions serves this purpose.
Here, the state cannot show that the Act is narrowly tailored to combat corruption
because it declines to place limits on and thereby enhances the potentially corrupting
activities of political parties while restricting all other nonparty political speakers. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Colorado II, political party contributions to candidates have the
same potential to corrupt as nonparty contributions. 533 U.S. at 452. In that case, the National
Republican Party argued that it should not be subject to federal limits on coordinated party
expenditures as PACs and other nonparty political speakers are. The Party argued that 'because
a party`s most important speech is aimed at electing candidates and is itselI expressed through
those candidates, any limit on party support for a candidate imposes a unique First Amendment
burden.¨ Id. at 445. But the Court rejected the Party`s argument because it found that parties,
like PACs, can 'act as agents Ior spending on behalI oI those who seek to produce obligated
office holders.¨ Id. at 452. The Court concluded that '|t|his party role . . . provides good reason
to view limits on coordinated spending by parties through the same lens applied to spending by
donors, like PACs, which can use parties as conduits for contributions meant to place candidates
under obligation.¨ Id.; see also Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 572 (8th Cir. 1998) (Disparate
limits, assessed based on whether a PAC accepted small versus large individual donations,
violated equal protection because they 'ignored the possibility that the small-donor PAC . . .
will seek to control a given candidate.¨ '|I|f any contribution is likely to give rise to a reasonable
perception of . . . corruption . . . it would be from an entity permitted to contribute two-and-a-half
times the amount that others are allowed to contribute.¨).
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As the Supreme Court explained in Colorado II, there is nothing inherent in political
parties that warrants treating their speech more favorably than that of PACs or other nonparties.
Moreover, nothing about the political party power structure in Illinois in particular provides any
basis for treating parties more favorably than other political speakers by exempting them from
nearly all of the Act`s contribution limits. See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 454-55.
In addition, even if parties were deemed differently situated from PACs and other
nonparties that is, iI the parties` speech were not considered to be potentially corrupting the
Illinois scheme would still violate equal protection. Under the Act`s 2012 amendments, all
contribution caps in a race are lifted when independent expenditures in the race exceed certain
amounts. The caps are not lifted, however, when party expenditures exceed these (or any)
amounts. If independent expenditures are not corrupting (which, as a matter of law, they are not,
see Citizens United v. Federal Election Commn, 130 S.Ct. 876, 909 (2010)), and if one assumes
that party expenditures also are not corrupting, then the state has no justification for lifting caps
in response to independent expenditures but not in response to party expenditures. Thus, even if
one assumes that party expenditures are not corrupting, and thus no limits are necessary, the Act
is not narrowly tailored to prevent corruption.
In fact, the legislative history of the 2012 Amendments shows that the General Assembly
enacted the independent expenditure amendment in the wake oI the Supreme Court`s decision in
Citizens United and the Seventh Circuit`s decision in Personal PAC (supra), which prohibit the
state from imposing contribution limits on independent expenditures such as from Super PACs.
Il. H.R., 97th Gen. Assemb.-SB 3722, 2nd & 3rd, at 7:10-24. (May 30, 2012) (Exh. 9).
Representative Currie explained: 'it would be an outrage not to help the other candidates not
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benefited by the super PAC [by] not . . . giving them the opportunity to level the playing Iield.¨
But if the state is eliminating contribution limits in response to independent expenditures
in order to "level the playing field," then the state should eliminate contribution limits in
response to party expenditures too. As Leader Currie observed:
[w]e already provide an end to caps when somebody is running against you is
spending $100,000 of his or her own money to defeat you. We give you the
opportunity to avoid the contribution cap. This new provision [regarding
independent expenditures] is totally analogous to the circumstance where a self-
funder is spending huge sums of money. (Id. at 7:18-23)

What the state does not 'give¨
candidates is this same freedom from contribution limits
when faced with the flood of party money into a race. And this not only favors political parties
in violation of equal protection, it fails to serve any anticorruption interest, and therefore the
contribution limit scheme violates Illinois Liberty PAC`s and other nonparties` First Amendment
rights to free speech as well.
B. The Act violates I llinois Liberty PAC¶V)LUVW$PHQGPHQWright to f ree speech
Ever since Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between restrictions on expenditures for political speech and restrictions on
contributions to candidates. Although '|s|pending Ior political ends and contributing to political
candidates both fall within the First Amendment`s protection of speech and political
association,¨ Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440, the Court has generally applied a more lenient
standard of review in cases involving First Amendment challenges to limits on contributions.
The scrutiny that is appropriate for a contribution limit considers 'whether the restriction is

The state does not bestow or gift individual liberty to its citizens. 'A free people [claim] their
rights as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief magistrate.¨ Thomas
Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, July 1774 Papers 1:121 35.
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closely drawn` to match what [the Supreme Court has] recognized as the suIIiciently
important` government interest in combating political corruption.¨ Id. at 456.
While Plaintiff submits that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, should be overruled because
'|p|olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection,¨ Nixon v. Shrink
0LVVRXUL*RY¶W3$&, 528 U.S. 377, 410-11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and deserves the
highest of constitutional protections, this Court need not ignore Buckley in order to find the entire
Illinois scheme unconstitutional.
7KH$FW¶VORRSKROHVDQGH[HPSWLRQVundercut any purported anticor ruption interest
'[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as
justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited¨ that is, when it is underinclusive. Florida Star v.
B.J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring) (internal marks and citation omitted).
Here, the Act`s preIerential treatment oI parties through exemptions and loopholes its 2012
amendments that eliminate direct contribution limits depending on the amount of independent
expenditures in a race, and its elimination of limits relating to self-funded candidates all evince
that the Act is so 'woeIully underinclusive as to render the belieI [that the Act or its limits serve
an anticorruption interest] a challenge to the credulous.¨ See Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002). The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a
regulatory scheme is not narrowly tailored if it is underinclusive. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995) ('exemptions and inconsistencies in labeling ban
[brought its purpose] into question¨ and 'ensure[d] that [it would] Iail to achieve that end¨); City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425 (1993) (ordinance banning certain
sidewalk newsracks unconstitutional because, among other reasons, the city had 'asserted an
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interest in esthetics, but respondent publishers` newsracks [were] no greater an eyesore than the
newsracks permitted to remain¨).
Here, there is similar fatal underinclusiveness: The Act`s elimination oI direct
contribution limits in response to independent expenditures in a race can serve no anticorruption
interest precisely because the Supreme Court held 'as a matter of law that independent
expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.`¨ WRTL, 664 F.3d at 154
(citations omitted). Because the 2012 amendment treats contribution limits as expendable, it
stands as a tacit admission either that contribution limits are obsolete in the wake of Citizens
United and thus serve no anticorruption interest or that the limits never served an anticorruption
interest in the first place. See 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(c-5), (h-5). If the state were truly seeking to
prevent corruption or the appearance thereof with contribution limits, it would not have
exempted political parties from these limits, nor would it have eliminated these limits in response
to Citizens United. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 911. (federal statute underinclusive because
if Congress had been seeking to protect dissenting shareholders, it would have banned corporate
speech in only certain media within 30 or 60 days before an election).
Simply put, Illinois cannot at once directly advance its presumed stated interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance thereof through limits, while on the other hand creating
an irrational regulatory scheme that favors political parties at the expense of all other political
speakers while also eliminating limits altogether in selected races in response to speech that is
noncorrupting speech. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488 ('The failure to prohibit the disclosure of
alcohol content in advertising [but not labels on alcohol containers], makes no rational sense if
the Government's true aim is to suppress strength wars.¨) Such a scheme belies any government
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof.
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VI. I llinois Liberty PAC Will Suffer I r reparable Harm If an I nj unction Is Not

As set forth above, Illinois Liberty PAC has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
Without a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm because 'any post-
election remedy would not compensate . . . for the loss of the freedom of speech.`¨ Personal
PAC v. McGuffage, 2012 WL 850744 *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (quoting Brownsburg Area
Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1998)). Indeed, '[t]he loss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.¨ Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, Illinois, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir.
2004) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
Illinois Liberty PAC is seeking to make donations to candidates in amounts greater than
the Act`s limits allow. (Exh. 1, ¶¶ 11-16, Besler Decl.) Campaign season for the November
2012 general election is underway and it is critical that the Act`s unconstitutional provisions be
enjoined so that Illinois Liberty PAC can be free to exercise its right to support through
contributions the candidates of its choice in a manner that most effectively advances its mission.
See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 895 (noting the importance oI speech 'in the weeks
immediately beIore¨ an election and that a 'speaker`s ability to engage in political speech that
could have a chance of persuading voters is stifled if the speaker must first commence a
protracted lawsuit¨).
An I nj unction Will Not Harm Defendants and Will Further the Public I nterest.

While Illinois Liberty PAC will suffer irreparable harm from the loss of its First
Amendment freedoms in the absence of an injunction, the government cannot suffer harm from
being prevented from enforcing an unconstitutional statute. Joelner, 378 F.3d at 619.
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Moreover, 'it is always in the public interest to protect First Amendment liberties.¨ Id. (internal
marks and citations omitted).
The Court Should Waive The Bond Requi rement Under F. R. C.P. 65(c).
It is within the Court`s discretion to waive Rule 65(c)`s security requirement where it
finds such a waiver to be appropriate in the circumstances. See Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027,
1035 (7th Cir. 1972); Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp. 567 F.2d 692,
701 (7th Cir. 1977). In non-commercial cases, courts often waive the bond requirement where
the likelihood of harm to the non-moving party is slight and the bond requirements would
impose a significant burden on the moving party. See, e.g., Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201,
219 (3d Cir. 1991). Waiver of the bond requirement is particularly appropriate in cases
involving constitutional rights. See Smith v. Bd. Of Election Commrs, 591 F. Supp. 70, 71 (N.D.
Ill. 1984).
Illinois Liberty PAC is currently and will continue to be irreparably harmed if the Act is
not enjoined. As set forth above, Illinois Liberty PAC respectfully requests that this Court grant
its motion for preliminary and/or permanent injunction.
DAT ED: JUL Y 23, 2012
Respectfully submitted,

By: s/Diane Cohen
Diane S. Cohen (6199493)
Peter G. White (6294072)
Jacob Huebert (6305339)
Attorneys for Plaintiff Illinois Liberty PAC

190 S. LaSalle St., Ste. 1630
Chicago, Illinois
(312) 263-7668
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