XXIII.

SLOVENSKI POLITOLOŠKI DNEVI
XXIII. SLOVENIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE CONFERENCE

POLITIČNA KULTURA V FOKUSU POLITIČNIH ZNANOSTI
POLITICAL CULTURE IN FOCUS OF POLITICAL SCIENCES

CONFERENCE PROGRAM AND COLLECTION OF ABSTRACTS

PROGRAM IN ZBORNIK POVZETKOV

Portorož, 31. 5. – 2. 6. 2012

SLOVENSKO POLITOLOŠKO DRUŠTVO
SLOVENIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION KARDELJEVA PLOŠČAD 5, 1000 LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA TEL.: ++386 (1) 5805 207; FAX: ++386 (1) 5805 101 e-mail: spod.fdv@fdv.uni-lj.si; homepage: www.spod.si

POLITIČNA KULTURA V FOKUSU POLITIČNIH ZNANOSTI (zbornik povzetkov) POLITICAL CULTURE IN FOCUS OF POLITICAL SCIENCES (Collection of Abstracts) Urednika (Editors) Marinko BANJAC in Cirila TOPLAK Izdajatelj (Publisher) SLOVENSKO POLITOLOŠKO DRUŠTVO Copyright © SPOD 2012, Ljubljana. Fotokopiranje in razmnoževanje po delih in v celoti je prepovedano. Vse pravice pridržane.

Programski in organizacijski odbor konference “Slovenski politološki dnevi 2012” (Programme and Organising Committee of the Slovenian Political Science Conference 2012) Dr. Cirila Toplak, izredna profesorica, predsednica društva, Fakulteta za družbene vede Dr. Miro Haček, izredni profesor, podpredsednik društva, Fakulteta za družbene vede Dr. Marjan Brezovšek, izredni profesor, član izvršilnega odbora (IO), Fakulteta za družbene vede Dr. Milan Brglez, docent, član IO, Fakulteta za družbene vede Dr. Jernej Pikalo, izredni profesor, član IO, Fakulteta za družbene vede Prof. dr. Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, predsednica ECPSA, University of Leipzig-Halle, Nemčija Dr. Felix Wurm, generalni sekretar ECPSA, German Political Science Association Prof. dr. András Bozóki, član IO ECPSA, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary Prof. dr. Didier Georgakakis, član IO ECPSA, Université de Strasbourg, France Prof. dr. Oddbjørn Knutsen, član IO ECPSA, University of Oslo, Norway Prof. dr. Pablo Oñate, član IO ECPSA, University of Valencia, Spain Marinko Banjac, generalni sekretar društva, Fakulteta za družbene vede

PROGRAM KONFERENCE / CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Četrtek, 31. 5. 2012
Dvorane Tartini, Largo in Moderato

12h-14h: 14h-14.30:

Registracija Otvoritev: izr. prof. dr. Cirila Toplak, predsednica SPOD; prof. dr. Bojko Bučar, dekan FDV (dvorana Tartini) Otvoritveni govornik: prof. dr. Oscar Gabriel, How to Use Political Culture in a Meaningful Way in Political Analysis Razprava: Političnost politične kulture (dvorana Tartini) Koordinatorja: doc. dr. Andrej Kurnik in doc. dr. Žiga Vodovnik Sodelujoči: izr. prof. dr. Jernej Pikalo, Politična kultura med novim institucionalizmom in globalizacijo doc. dr. Žiga Vodovnik, Onkraj politične kulture: politologija, status quo, infrapolitika Jernej Prodnik in Jure Lesjak, Politična kultura in politična socializacija med hegemonijo in post-hegemonijo doc. dr. Andrej Kurnik, Politizacija kulture in podružbljanje politike: produkcija skupnega in rekonceptualizacija politike asist. Blaž Ilc in asist. Marinko Banjac, Politična kultura v krizi, kriza politične kulture Seminar: Upravljavska sposobnost slovenskih občin (dvorana Moderato) Koordinator: izr. prof. dr. Miro Haček Sodelujoči: predstavniki Skupnosti slovenskih občin, Združenja slovenskih občin, Friedrich Ebert SFT Zagreb ter posamezniki iz slovenskih občin, izr. prof. dr. Marjan Brezovšek, Simona Kukovič in Lea Nahtigal

14.30-16.30:

14.30-16.30:

14.30-16.30:

Razprava: Political Culture(s): Comparative Perspectives and Case Studies (dvorana Largo) Koordinator: prof. dr. Oscar Gabriel Sodelujoči: doc. dr. Tomaž Deželan in Maja Sever, Framing the Political Culture of the Slovenian National Assembly: An Analysis of the Roll-Call Votes dr. Jiri Dušek in doc. dr. Lubomír Pána, Negative Election Campaign as a Part of Political Culture in the Czech Republic prof. dr. Deon Geldenhuys, Political Culture and Foreign Policy: A South African Case Study prof. dr. Lidija Kos Stanišić, Political Culture in Central America Attitudes Towards Democracy prof. dr. Andras Bozóki, The Tyranny of the Majority: Crisis of Liberal Democracy in Hungary Odmor za kavo Osrednja okrogla miza: Politična kultura v prostoru nekdanje SFRJ (dvorana Tartini) Koordinator: izr. prof. dr. Andrej A. Lukšič Sodelujoči: prof. dr. Igor Lukšič, Ravni politične kulture na primeru razmerja individuum : država prof. dr. Žarko Puhovski, Vlast u sandwichu: između demokratske legitimacije i autoritarne prakse mag. Nelida Kalanj, Politička kultura – odnos između političke kulture i demokracije – postoje li naznake krize demokracije? prof. dr. Nermina Mujagić in prof. dr. Asim Mujkić, Politička kultura etnonacionalizma: primjer Bosne i Hercegovine prof. dr. Sonja Tomović Šundić, Identitet, vrijednosti i politička kultura u Crnoj Gori Organizirana večerja v Dragonji Govornik: nekdanji poslanec Državnega zbora RS Tone Partljič

16.30-17h: 17h-19h:

20h:

***

Thursday, May 31 2012
Tartini, Largo and Moderato Halls

12h-14h: 14h-14.30:

Registration Introductory Greetings: Assoc. Prof. Cirila Toplak, PhD, President of SPSA; Prof. Bojko Bučar, PhD, Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences (Tartini Hall) Opening Speech: Prof. Oscar Gabriel, PhD, How to Use Political Culture in a Meaningful Way in Political Analysis Panel: The Politics of Political Culture (Tartini Hall; in Slovene) Chairs: Assist. Prof. Andrej Kurnik, PhD, Assist. Prof. Žiga Vodovnik, PhD Participants: Assoc. Prof. Jernej Pikalo, PhD, Political Culture between New Institutionalism and Globalisation Assist. Prof. Žiga Vodovnik, PhD, Beyond Political Culture: Political Science, Status Quo, and the Infrapolitics Jernej Prodnik and Jure Lesjak, Political Culture and Political Socialization between Hegemony and Post-hegemony Assist. Prof. Andrej Kurnik, PhD, politicization of culture and socialization of politics: production of commons and reconceptualization of politics Assist. Blaž Ilc and Assist. Marinko Banjac, Political Culture in the Crisis – the Crisis of Political Culture Seminar: Administrative Capacity of Slovenian Municipal Administration (Moderato Hall; in Slovene) Chair: Assoc. Prof. Miro Haček, PhD Participants: Representatives of SOS, ZOS, Friedrich Ebert SFT Zagreb, Representatives of Slovenian municipalities, Assoc. Prof. Marjan Brezovšek, PhD, Simona Kukovič and Lea Nahtigal Seminar: Political Culture(s): Comparative Perspectives and Case Studies (Largo Hall; in English) Chair: Oscar Gabriel Participants: Assoc. Prof. Tomaž Deželan, PhD, and Maja Sever, Framing the Political Culture of the Slovenian National Assembly: An Analysis of the Roll-Call Votes

14.30-16.30:

14.30-16.30:

14.30-16.30:

Jiri Dušek, PhD, and Assist. Prof. Lubomír Pána, PhD, Negative Election Campaign as a Part of Political Culture in the Czech Republic Prof. Deon Geldenhuys, PhD, Political Culture and Foreign Policy: A South African Case Study Prof. Lidija Kos Stanišić, PhD, Political Culture in Central America Attitudes towards Democracy Prof. Andras Bozóki, PhD, The Tyranny of the Majority: Crisis of Liberal Democracy in Hungary 16.30-17h: 17h-19h: Coffee Break Round table: Political Culture in the Region of Former Yugoslavia (Tartini Hall, in Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and Slovene) Chair: Assoc. Prof. Andrej A. Lukšič, PhD Participants: Prof. Igor Lukšič, PhD, Levels of political culture in the case of relations between individual – state Prof. Žarko Puhovski, PhD, Power in the Sandwich: between the Democratic Legitimacy and the Authoritarian Practices Nelida Kalanj, MA, Political Culture - the Relationship between Political Culture and Democracy - Is There Any Evidence of Crisis of Democracy? Prof. Nermina Mujagić, PhD, and Prof. Asim Mujkić, PhD, Political Culture of Ethnonationalism: the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina Prof. Sonja Tomović Šundić, PhD, Identity, Values and Political Culture in Montenegro Conference Dinner in Dragonja Speaker: former Member of the Slovenian Parliament Tone Partljič

20h:

Petek, 1. 6. 2012
Dvorane Tartini, Largo in Moderato
10h-12h: Okrogla miza: Slovenija v preteklih in prihodnjih mednarodnih odnosih (dvorana Tartini) Koordinator: prof. dr. Marjan Svetličič Sodelujoči: prof. dr. Anton Bebler, prof. dr. Dimitrij Rupel, prof. dr. Marjan Svetličič, doc. dr. Sabina Kajnč, doc. dr. Miro Kline Okrogla miza Študentskega društva Polituss: Politična kultura slovenske levice (dvorana Largo) Koordinator: Ana Štromajer Sodelujoči: Urban Jakša, Sašo Furlan, Luka Mesec, Tim Dobovšek Razprava: Political Culture and Cultural Practices (dvorana Moderato) Koordinator: Prof. dr. Cristina Montalvão Sarmento, Director of Political Observatory Lisbon Sodelujoči: Dr. Maria Joao Cabrita, Political Culture and Institutional Stability Teresa Furtado, The Place for Oneself in Democratic Culture Carlos Vargas, Who Dominates Culture? Political Readings in Portugal Patrícia Oliveira, Political Culture Through Film-Documentary (Portugal, 1974-1976) Raquel Duque, Cultural Diplomacy, Soft Power Challenges Catarina Gama, Culture and Politics. Portuguese Language Policy Odmor za kosilo Okrogla miza: Mednarodni odnosi med teorijo in prakso (dvorana Largo) Koordinator: doc. dr. Milan Brglez Sodelujoči: izr. prof. dr. Milan Jazbec, izr. prof. dr. Petra Roter, izr. prof. dr. Iztok Simoniti, doc. dr. Milan Brglez in Andrej Dernovšček, univ. dipl. pol.

10h-12h:

10h-12h:

12h-14h: 14h-16h:

14h-16h:

Razprava: Dimenzije politične kulture (dvorana Tartini) Koordinator: asist. Blaž Ilc Sodelujoči: Leo Sokolovič, Popularna kultura in politično: Nekaj refleksij o oddaji Big Brother mag. Maja Bahor in dr. Simona Bezjak, Zeleno, ki te hočem, zeleno!: okoljski diskurz in nova politična suverenost ljudstva kot elementa politične kulture Tomaž Pušnik, Vpliv mobilnosti kot oblastne prakse na vzpostavljanje evropske politične kulture mag. Adriana Dvoršak, Razvoj strategije kibernetske obrambe med zunanjo prisilo in slovensko politično kulturo mag. Sanjin Uležić, Politična vloga kolektivnega spomina (s poudarkom na postkonfliktnih območjih) Odmor za kavo Osrednja okrogla miza: Razvoj (znanosti na) FDV: vloga prof. dr. Vlada Benka v besedah sodelavcev (dvorana Tartini) Koordinator: prof. dr. Zlatko Šabič Sodelujoči: akad. prof. dr. Zdravko Mlinar, akad. prof. dr. Slavko Splichal, prof. dr. Bojko Bučar, prof. dr. Anuška Ferligoj in prof. dr. Niko Toš Večerja v Grand Hotelu Metropol

16h-16.30: 16.30-18.30:

19.30:

***

Friday, June 1 2012
Tartini, Largo and Moderato Halls
10h-12h: Round Table: Slovenia in Past and Future International Relations (Tartini Hall; in Slovene) Chair: Prof. Marjan Svetličič, PhD Participants: Prof. Anton Bebler, PhD, Prof. Dimitrij Rupel, PhD, Prof. Marjan Svetličič, PhD, Assist. Prof. Sabina Kajnč, PhD, Assist. Prof. Miro Kline, PhD

10h-12h:

Round Table organized by Students’ Association POLITUSS: Political Culture of Slovenian Left (Largo Hall; in Slovene) Chair: Ana Štromajer Participants: Urban Jakša, Sašo Furlan, Luka Mesec, Tim Dobovšek Panel: Political Culture and Cultural Practices (Moderato Hall; in English) Chair: Prof. Cristina Montalvão Sarmento, PhD, Director of Political Observatory Lisbon Participants: Maria Joao Cabrita, PhD, Political Culture and Institutional Stability Teresa Furtado, The Place for Oneself in Democratic Culture Carlos Vargas, Who Dominates Culture? Political Readings in Portugal Patrícia Oliveira, Political Culture Through Film-Documentary (Portugal, 1974-1976) Raquel Duque, Cultural Diplomacy, Soft Power Challenges Catarina Gama, Culture and Politics. Portuguese Language Policy Lunch Break Round Table: International Relations in Theory and Practice (Largo Hall; in Slovene) Chair: Assist. Prof. Milan Brglez, PhD Participants: Assoc. Prof. Milan Jazbec, PhD, Assoc. Prof. Petra Roter, PhD, Assoc. Prof. Iztok Simoniti, PhD, Assist. Prof. Milan Brglez, PhD and Andrej Dernovšček

10h-12h:

12h-14h: 14h-16h:

14h-16h:

Panel: Dimensions of Political Culture (Tartini Hall; in Slovene) Chair: Blaž Ilc Participants: Leo Sokolovič, Popular Culture and the Political: Some Reflections on the Big Brother Show Maja Bahor, MA and Simona Bezjak, PhD, Green, How I Want You, Green!: Environmental Discourse and the New Political Sovereignty of the People as Elements of Political Culture Tomaž Pušnik, Mobility as European Union Governing Practice and its Influence on Constitution of (European) Political Culture Adriana Dvoršak, MA, Development of Cyber Defense Strategy between External Pressures and Political Culture in Slovenia Sanjin Uležić, MA, The Politics of Collective Memory (with an Emphasis on Post-conflict Areas) Coffee Break Round Table: Scientific Research at the Ljubljana Faculty of Social Sciences: the Part of Prof. Vlado Benko, PhD in the Words of his Colleagues (Tartini Hall; in Slovene) Chair: Prof. Zlatko Šabič, PhD Participants: Prof. Zdravko Mlinar, PhD, Prof. Slavko Splichal, PhD, Prof. Bojko Bučar, PhD, Prof. Anuška Ferligoj, PhD and Prof. Niko Toš, PhD Dinner at the Grand Hotel Metropol

16h-16.30: 16.30-18.30:

19.30:

Sobota, 2. 6. 2012
Dvorani Tartini in Largo
10h-12h: Okrogla miza v organizaciji študentskega društva Agora: Politično komuniciranje in politična kultura (dvorana Tartini) Koordinator: Vito Babič Sodelujoči: Ivana Grgić, Tamara Simončič, Sanja Bajramović, Denis Striković in Sebastjan Jeretič (Nevro PR) Okrogla miza European Confederation of Political Science Associations: Common European Political Science Curriculum (dvorana Largo) Koordinator: prof. dr. Suzanne Schüttemeyer Sodelujoči: prof. dr. Didier Georgakakis, prof. dr. Andras Bozóki, prof. dr. Pablo Oñate, prof. dr. Oddbjorn Knutsen, Felix Wurm, prof. dr. Jerzy Wiatr, prof. dr. Attila Agh, prof. dr. Jozsef Bayer Zaključek konference

10h-12h:

12.30-13h:

***

Saturday, June 2 2012
Tartini and Largo Halls
10h-12h: Round Table organized by the Students’ Association Agora: Political Communication and Political Culture (Tartini Hall; in Slovene) Chair: Vito Babič Participants: Ivana Grgić, Tamara Simončič, Sanja Bajramović, Denis Striković and Sebastjan Jeretič (Nevro PR) Round Table organized by the European Confederation of Political Science Associations: Common European Political Science Curriculum (Largo Hall; in English) Chair: Prof. Suzanne Schüttemeyer, PhD Participants: Prof. Didier Georgakakis, PhD, Prof. Oscar Gabriel, PhD, Prof. Andras Bozóki, PhD, Prof. Pablo Oñate, PhD, Prof. Oddbjorn Knutsen, PhD, Felix Wurm, Prof. Jerzy Wiatr, PhD, Prof. Attila Agh, PhD, Prof. Jozsef Bayer, PhD Closing of the Conference

10h-12h:

12.30-13h:

POVZETKI PRISPEVKOV (po abecednem redu avtorjev) ABSTRACTS
(In alphabetical order of authors)
***
Agora – društvo študentov politologije APJU 1: POLITIČNO KOMUNICIRANJE IN POLITIČNA KULTURA Politična kultura je vedenje, vedenje in vedenje o sferi političnega. V ta široko pomenljiv stavek spadajo tako politični akterji, kot tudi ostale državljanke in državljani, njihova informiranost, angažiranost, prepoznavanje, oblikovanje mnenj in udejstvovanje na političnem področju. Posredno in neposredno, bolj in manj aktivno. Tekom predvolilne kampanje, naj si bo za državnozborske volitve, lokalne volitve ali referendume, postanejo težnje političnih strank in drugih političnih akterjev pri njihovem boju za oblast ali vpliv najbolj vidne, naj si bo v načinu vodenja kampanje ali v vključevanju posameznikov (državljanov) v proces izbire, saj je sam pojem politične kulture vezan na demokratične procese. Slovenija ne premore Hollywooda, ne premore velikih zvezdniških imen, tako prostor v medijih pogosto zapolnijo politiki. Politiki so zvezdniki, vsake toliko, v času volilnih kampanj pa je še to toliko bolj očitno. Živimo v demokratičnem okolju, upravičeni smo do širokega nabora človekovih pravic, do svobode govora. Razvoj politične kulture potrebuje posrednika, ki med ljudi širi informacije, na podlagi katerih si oblikujejo mnenja, stališča. To je vloga medijev. Uspešni politiki so tisti, ki so uspešni v komunikaciji z javnostmi in si na ta način zgradijo pozitivno javno podobo. Javno mnenje in javna podoba o politikih, kandidatih sta še toliko bolj pomembni v času volilnih kampanj. Vez med mediji ter politiki predstavlja področje političnega PR ter političnega marketinga. Tako rekoč leva in desna roka politikov. To je področje kreativnosti, domiselnosti, ki nima meja v domišljiji. To področje skrbi, da mediji posredujejo državljanom takšne informacije, ki vodijo v dobro prepoznavnost in oblikovanje pozitivne podobe politika, politične stranke v javnosti. Iz politika oz. političnega kandidata pa oblikuje človeka, ki bo znal razumeti potrebe in želje državljank in državljanov. Študentska okrogla miza bo obravnavala vprašanja politične kulture in političnega PR, predvolilnega diskurza, vodenega s strani strank, razlike glede na spol,

1

Agora – društvo študentov politologije APJU, Ljubljana. Agora – Association of Students of Political Science – Policy Analysis and Public Administration, Ljubljana.

medijski vpliv, kakor tudi diskurz vidnih posameznikov, ki se vključujejo v dogajanje. Volilno kampanjo bomo osvetlili iz različnih paradigmatskih (teoretičnih) zornih kotov predvsem politološkega, kakor tudi komunikološkega, v debato pa vpeljali tudi posameznike, ki imajo s tematiko neposredne praktične izkušnje. Agora – Association of Students of Political Science – Policy Analysis and Public Administration: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL CULTURE Political culture can be defined as behavior, awareness and knowledge about the political sphere. The broad definition includes political actors, as well as other citizens, the quality and quantity of information they posses, their engagement and participation in politics – no matter if we are referring to it directly or indirectly, with more or less intensity. During the election campaign, whether we are discussing the parliamentary elections, local elections or referenda, the aspirations of political parties and other political actors become even more visible, clearly seen in the manner those actors formulate their campaigns or in the way they include individuals (citizens) in the process of choosing their preference. Nevertheless, the mere idea of political culture is always connected with the democratic processes. Slovenia is not known for having Hollywood like celebrities, therefore media is always full of politicians and their mundane activities. Politicians have taken up the role of celebrities, the fact made even more obvious in the time of campaigning. We live in a democratic environment with a full range of human rights, among them the freedom of speech. The progress of political culture requires a medium for spreading the information which then leads to the formation of people’s reactions and opinions towards a number of issues. Such assignment is given to the media. The success of a single politician is measured by his accomplished communication with the public, his ambition to create a positive public opinion and a positive image, which gains in importance during the period of campaigning. The link between the media and the politicians is the so called political PR, or in other words, political marketing – the necessary ingredient in the life of every successful politician. It is a field of creativity and imagination which knows no boundaries. By using the methods of political marketing, the media is given the necessary information to create familiarity and a positive association with the name of a certain politicians or political party in the eyes of the public. Moreover, it is responsible to transform a politician, a candidate into a person with a broad understanding of the needs and desires of its citizens. The student's panel will take a closer look at the question of political culture and political PR, pre-election discourse of political parties concerning gender related issues, the impact of the media, along with the activities of the prominent individuals who are involved in the process. The election campaign will be analyzed using various paradigmatic (theoretical) approaches in the field of political science and communication studies, with the expertise of professionals who have gained practical experience, working on past election campaigns.

***
Bahor Maja 2 in Bezjak Simona 3: ZELENO, KI TE HOČEM, ZELENO!: OKOLJSKI DISKURZ IN NOVA POLITIČNA SUVERENOST LJUDSTVA KOT ELEMENTA POLITIČNE KULTURE Okolje kot koncept ni obstajal vse do poznih šestdesetih let 20. stoletja, ko se je zgodilo nekaj prelomov, ki so okoljska vprašanja naplavili na politični dnevni red. Načelu eksponencialne rasti: 'hitreje, večje, močneje' se je po robu postavil del javnosti, združen v okoljska gibanja, ki so od političnih odločevalcev terjala ukrepanje pri stranskih učinkih politik, del znanosti, pa je začel preizpraševati samoumevnost tehnološkega napredka kot rešitelja razvojnih težav. V tej kompleksnosti dogajanja je dobil zagon tisti del predvsem družboslovne znanosti, ki je začel preizpraševati pogoje preživetja in se artikuliral v diskurzu omejitev. Katastrofičnem diskurzu oz. diskurzu omejitev je dal največji zagon Rimski klub z izidom dela Meje rasti, v katerem so pozivali k radikalnim ukrepom, predvsem z repertoarjem močnih vladnih (administrativnih) ukrepov, ki so jih takoj napadli zagovorniki industrijskega gospodarstva – poimenovani 'prometejanci', v katerih samoumeven red stvari, je katastrofizem vnesel nemir. Prepir med obema diskurzoma se nadaljuje, vendar se je v devetdesetih letih preteklega stoletja pojavil bolj spravljivi diskurz trajnosti, ki je navidezno obrisal ostro ločnico med katastrofizmom in prometejanci. Navkljub spravljivemu diskurzu trajnosti, pa je katastrofističnemu diskurzu uspelo v politični prostor vnesti občutek negotovosti, politika ni (bila) več razumljena kot tista, ki bo poskrbela za gotovost (varnost) v prihodnosti. Spričo tega dejstva je nastal politični prostor za zeleni radikalizem, ki se je najpogosteje oblikoval v političnih strankah, ki so del volilnega polja že več kot 30 let in so v številnih državah (tudi v Sloveniji) bile del vladnih koalicij. Sčasoma je spravljivi del zelenih političnih strank zgubil zeleni radikalni naboj, kar se odraža v razdorih v samih strankah (npr. Die Grünnen v Nemčiji) ali v razpadu zelenih strank (npr. v Sloveniji) in ne daje zadovoljivih odgovorov volilnemu telesu. Danes se zdi upoštevanje zelenih vrednot v reprezentativnem (strankarskem) modelu demokracije prekratko. Iščejo se nove poti, ki ne temeljijo zgolj na senzibilnosti posameznika (individualistični pristop) ali na diskurzu vrnitve v »predindustrijski raj«, ampak predvsem v spremembi družbenih, političnih in gospodarskih odnosov, struktur in načinov delovanja. Prispevek bo izpostavil nekaj ključnih vidikov, kako se tovrstni diskurzi manifestirajo, kako vplivajo na politični kulturo, sooblikujejo prakse na ravni političnega sistema in kakšno vlogo imajo pri tem koncepti in prakse novega političnega ljudstva.

mag, Maja Bahor, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Mag. Maja Bahor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. 3 dr. Simona Bezjak, Inštitut Hevreka!, Ljubljana. Simona Bezjak, PhD, Hevreka! Institute, Ljubljana.
2

Bahor Maja and Bezjak Simona: GREEN, HOW I WANT YOU, GREEN!: ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE AND THE NEW POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE AS ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL CULTURE Given the unique structural and logistical characteristics of the Internet, for many the medium has, since its early beginnings, been viewed as providing real opportunities for democratization and political transformation. The development of social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter and their role in recent popular movements from Iran to Tunisia seems to only confirm the view that the Internet allows politically disenfranchised groups to communicate with like-minded or sympathetic audiences. Furthermore, particularly in regimes where the freedom of the mainstream media is restricted either by direct regulation and legislation or indirectly as a result of conservative corporate ownership, the Internet has become an alternative medium through which opposition groups have been able to have a voice. Consequently, building on earlier work on this subject, this paper examines the impact of the Internet in Asia, and evaluates whether the new information technology truly is a tool for democratization and political liberalization, especially in countries with strong restrictions on freedom of speech and expression. The paper will explore both quantitatively and qualitatively the socio-political impact of the Internet using data from Asia Barometer and the World Values Survey database in order to determine if the social capital of the Internet is both exaggerated and increasingly offset by the commercialization of the Internet.

***
Bozóki Andras 4: THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY Since May 2010, Hungary has a government which enjoys the support of 2/3rd majority in the Parliament. Using this majority the government led by Viktor Orban fundamentally reshaped the political institutions, changed the electoral law, the judicial system, tightened the control over the media and unilaterally passed a New Constitution without consulting the opposition. Several decisions and policies of the government aim to eliminate checks and balances and to establish a hegemonic party system for long. This rapid reconstruction of the system was called "revolution" and can be characterized by power politics, opportunism, centralization, and constitutional coup d'état. It seems like a regime change: not simply a move from consensual democracy to majoritarian democracy but more: a process of de-democratization, a transition from liberal democracy to illiberal one. Freedom House degraded the status of civil liberties from 1 to 2, and reevaluated the freedom of the press from "free" to "partly free". Analysts try to catch a moving target and the real question is whether the new Hungarian political regime moves towards a form of "hybrid regime" within the EU or consolidates its illiberal democracy.

***

4

Prof. Andras Bozóki, PhD, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.

Dušek Jiří 5 and Pána Lubomír 6: NEGATIVE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AS A PART OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC A negative campaign or an “attacking election contest” is mostly historically connected with political events in the USA. The primary objective of this campaign is to destroy or at least weaken the opponent, in this case the political counter-candidate. Even though the use of a negative campaign is unethical and in some countries even forbidden, it is increasingly often becoming a part of European election campaigns. Negative campaign became a part of the Czech political scene and of election campaigns in 2006, when the left-leaning Social Democrats (ČSSD) hired a professional agency called Penn, Schoen & Berland (PSB) as their election advisors. Gradually, other parties also started using services of foreign specialists, most notably the main political rivals of the Social Democrats, the conservative Civic Democrats (ODS). The election deadlocks between the left and the right in the last few years logically lead to more intensive and harder-fought election campaigns, to astronomically rising expenditure and to deterioration of political culture in the whole country. All this has a major negative impact on election turnout and leads to weariness (sometimes even disgust) with politics among the citizens of the Czech Republic. This contribution aims to analyse the history, success rate and effectiveness of this tool of political marketing, including its impact on the political culture in the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic, the use of negative political campaign is a relatively new and still exceptional way of conducting election campaigns, including the hiring of specialists from abroad. If this concept of "blackening" your opponent proves to be effective, it will be copied and used by other political parties as part of their election campaigns. The impact on the political culture and trust of people in politics will be immense and it could reflect not only in lower election turnouts, but also in election results on both the national and local levels.

***
Dvoršak Adriana 7: RAZVOJ STRATEGIJE KIBERNETSKE OBRAMBE V OKVIRU SLOVENSKE STRATEŠKE KULTURE Avtorica prispevka pojmuje postopke odločanja, po katerih nastaja strategija kibernetske varnosti, kot pomemben člen strateške kulture. Manjši del kibernetske varnosti predstavlja kibernetska obramba, ki razvitim državam predstavlja vedno večji izziv skupaj z razmahom kibernetskega bojevanja. Strateško kulturo skupaj z varnostnimi cilji in sredstvi za doseganje teh ciljev sooblikujejo družbene silnice kot so skupna prepričanja, predpostavke o (ne)varnosti, pripovedi, ki oblikujejo kolektivno identiteto in odnose do drugih skupin. Strateška kultura v Sloveniji na začetku 21. stoletja temelji na
Jiří Dušek, PhD, College of European and Regional Studies, Czech Republic. Assist. Prof. Lubomír Pána, PhD, College of European and Regional Studies, Czech Republic. 7 Mag. Adriana Dvoršak, Vodja področja partnerstev, marketinga in stikov pri Britanskem svetu. Adriana Dvoršak, MA, Partnerships, Marketing, and Communications Manager at British Council.
5 6

nekaterih konkretnih dogodkih in sosledjih dogodkov: nastanku države, procesih vzpostavljanja kolektivne identitete, načinu, kako se vrednote skupnosti preoblikujejo v politike, dejavnostih civilne družbe in sprejemanju mednarodnih norm. Slovenija ni razvila svoje velike strategije, ki bi združevala velike zunanjepolitične in vojaške cilje, njena zgodovinska izkušnja je močno vpeta v asimetrično delovanje in formalno so se spremenile strani v tej asimetriji šele pred kratkim, z vstopom v Severnoatlantsko zavezništvo. Sčasoma se bo pojavilo tudi vprašanje, ali obstaja evropska strateška kultura v okviru Evropske unije in kako se razlikuje od strateške kulture Severnoatlantskega zavezništva. Le-ta se je spremenila po terorističnem napadu 11. septembra 2001 kot rezultat proučevanja strateške kulture nasilnih nedržavnih akterjev, ki v 21. stoletju združujejo teroristična dejanja s kibernetskim bojevanjem in s spletnim kriminalom. Funkcionalno je strategija kibernetske varnosti usmerjena k preprečevanju kibernetskega kriminala, strategija kibernetske obrambe pa k zagotavljanju integritete kritične infrastrukture. Pri obeh prepoznamo več dimenzij – nacionalno, evropsko in globalno, pri strategiji kibernetske obrambe pa še severnoatlantsko. V Sloveniji je potrebno poudariti nacionalne cilje kibernetske obrambe, saj nacionalna in mednarodna raven pogosto nista ločeni in za nacionalne strategije se je v preteklosti izkazalo, da so le odziv na mednarodne dogodke. Izhajajoč iz slovenskih okoliščin so ključni dejavniki uspeha strategije kibernetske varnosti vzpostavitev učinkovitih zmogljivosti za upravljanje incidentov in ustrezna javno-zasebna partnerstva. Drugi dejavniki uspeha so ustrezna organiziranost kibernetske varnosti, ustrezen pravni okvir, oblikovanje uradne strategije, širitev članstva Sveta za nacionalno varnost na druge zainteresirane deležnike, v okviru kibernetske obrambe pa razjasnjena vloga parlamenta pri odobritvi morebitnega napada v okviru Severnoatlantskega zavezništva. Civilna družba kot determinanta strateškega kulture igra pomembno vlogo pri spodbujanju vrednot na področju nadzora kibernetskega prostora, pri odnosu do tehnologije in modernizacije družbe. V odnosu do regije kot akterja v globalnem upravljanju pa bodo Evropejci in Slovenci morali začeti resno razmišljati o evropski strateški kulturi. Dvoršak Adriana: DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER DEFENSE STRATEGY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SLOVENIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE The author of the paper considers as an important element in the strategic culture the decision making processes involved in cyber defense. A sub strategy of cyber security strategy is a cyber defense, which is becoming a significant challenge to the developed western countries together with the cyber warfare. Some major social forces that are shaping the strategic culture are shared beliefs, assumptions, narratives that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, as well as the ends and the means for achieving security objectives. Strategic culture in Slovenia is based on the following determinants: state formation, collective identity, the pattern of turning values into

policies, civil society, and acceptance of international norms. Slovenia does not have a grand strategy, its historic experience is strongly embedded in asymmetric war and only recently the sides in the asymmetry have changed formally. At one point in history the question will occur if the strategic culture of European Union exists and how it differs from NATO strategic culture which came into existence after 9/11 as a result of analysis of the strategic culture of violent nonstate actors who are prone to combine terrorist acts with cyber warfare and/or cybercrime. Functionally, cyber security strategy aims at cyber crime prevention whereas strategy of cyber defense aims at security and integrity of critical infrastructure. Both of them extend over more than one dimension, namely national, European, and global; and over North Atlantic dimension in the case of cyber defense strategy. For Slovenia it is of high importance to underline the national goals of cyber defense as the national and international level are often not enough distinguished and national strategies turn out to be a response to the international threats. Upcoming from the Slovenian situation, the key success factors of national cyber-security strategy are effective incident management capabilities and the right partnerships to ensure incident management capabilities. Further success factors are appropriate organization of cyber-security, appropriate legal framework, formulation of official strategies, expansion of membership of the national Security Council to other stakeholders, and clarified role of the Parliament in the authorization of a possible cyber attack according to Article 5 of NATO Treaty. Civil society as a determinant of strategic culture is playing its role in promoting values in the field of securitization of cyberspace, the attitude towards technology and in modernization of society. In relationship to regional activities Europeans and Slovenians will have to start thinking about European strategic culture.

***
Gabriel Oscar 8: “HOW TO USE POLITICAL CULTURE IN A MEANINGFUL WAY IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS” The concept of Political Culture is among the most important theoretical innovations in modern Political Science. Introduced into the discipline in the 1950s, it aimed to explain why stable and well performing democracies had established in several modern societies, but not in others. According to the traditional political culture hypothesis, socio-economic modernity was only a necessary, but not sufficient condition of democratic stability and performance. The “fit” between democratic structure on the one hand and democratic political culture on the other was considered as distinctive characteristics of good versus poor democratic regimes. As will be shown in the lecture, the basic idea of political culture research is still relevant for political analyses, particularly in the consolidation of newly established democracies. However, some of the conceptual weaknesses existing from the beginning need to be overcome in order to improve the analytical power of the concept. The lecture will focus on three research problems not yet dealt with in an appropriate way in research. Conceptual clarification: What are the necessary characteristics of a democratic political culture and how should they be distributed in a democratic political community? What –on the other hand – are the attitudes that should be used for the
8

Prof. Oscar Gabriel,PhD, University of Stuttgart, Germany.

description of different types of democratic political cultures? According to my thesis, broad, unambiguous and stable support of the idea, values and norms of democracy prevailing in all segments of the political community should be regarded as the core elements of a democratic political culture. The distribution of attitudes such as political trust, satisfaction and involvement make democracies well performing in practice and therefore are important as well, but they do not constitute core elements of democratic identity. Political behavior as linkage between individual attitudes and systemic properties: How do political attitudes – which are latent personal characteristics – become relevant for the stability and performance of a political system? Traditional political culture research did not much contribute to answering this question, but made simplistic assumptions on the impact of culture and structure. However, culture and structure both are macro-level concepts, which are not directly related to each other but need to be mediated by individual level characteristics. In order to state more meaningful assumptions on the impact of political attitudes on systemic characteristics, the role political behavior as a mediator variable needs to be taken into account. The causal status of Political Culture and Political Regime: In traditional political culture research, political culture was regarded as antecedent of systemic stability and performance. On the other hand, as shown by broad empirical research, the attitudes making up political culture are strongly influenced by system level characteristics. The history of West Germany and Austria after World War II underline the crucial role of economic performance to the generation of political support, while the poor political performance of Britain and the US were regarded as determinants of the decline of the civic culture in the two countries. The direction of the causal path from political culture to political stability and performance is far from being clear – at the individual as at the systemic level – and needs to be elaborated more carefully. This includes not only reasoning on the question whether political culture should be regarded as explanans (independent variable) or as explanandum (dependent variable) but also what systemic characteristics should be explained by political culture.

***
Geldenhuys Deon 9: POLITICAL CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY: A SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY The renewed scholarly interest since the late 1980s in political culture as an approach to the study of politics, has not been as pronounced among students of international relations or foreign policy analysis more specifically. In 1997 Valerie Hudson remarked that ‘[t]he least developed angle of analysis in the subfield [of foreign policy analysis] is the study of how societal culture affects foreign policy choice’. Fifteen years later this observation still holds true. Drawing mainly on the work of Ebel, Taras & Cochrane (1991), the proposed paper will explore the nexus between South Africa’s foreign policy and its political culture. South Africa offers a fascinating case study because its transition from pigmentocracy to non-racial democracy in 1994 represented thoroughgoing regime change at home and a sea-change in its foreign relations. With a new ruling elite

9

Prof. Deon Geldenhuys, PhD, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

supported by the vast majority of the population came a new political culture finding expression in the country’s foreign policy. While there have been numerous studies of South Africa’s postapartheid foreign policy and a few on the new (post-apartheid) state or national identity influencing its international relations, few scholars have probed the link between its foreign policy and political culture. Consisting of “the values, attitudes, and behaviour of a nation in the political arena”, political culture’s influence on states’ foreign policies is widely acknowledged but rarely measured (Ebel, Taras & Cochrane, 1991: 27). The proposed paper is not of a quantitative nature, nor does it suggest that political culture is the exclusive factor determining South Africa’s foreign policy. Instead, it is an attempt at establishing “a general association, not a causal relationship” between political culture and foreign policy (Ebel, Taras & Cochrane, 1991: 5) in the case of South Africa. More specifically, the paper will try to relate South Africa’s declaratory or aspirational foreign policy – expressed in a set of key tenets – to a particular segment of political culture, namely that of the elite (rather than the “middle segments” and masses, as identified by Ebel, Taras & Cochrane (1991: 10)). The foreign policy tenets include the promotion and democracy and human rights, solidarity with the Global South, liberatory solidarity, developmentalism and revisionism. Finally, South Africa’s foreign policy is not merely of academic interest; as a leading African state, it is pursuing a highly ambitious and moralistic international agenda that has often brought it into conflict with other African states and Western powers, and provoked criticism at home and abroad that its actions contradict its values.

***
Haček Miro 10 in Kukovič Simona 11: UPRAVLJALSKA SPOSOBNOST SLOVENSKIH OBČIN Kakovostno opravljanje temeljnih funkcij in nalog občinske uprave je osnovni pogoj za obstoj in razvoj vsake dejavnosti, kar seveda ne velja zgolj za tržno naravnane organizacije, ampak tudi za javni sektor. V Sloveniji občine nimajo sprejete splošne politike kakovosti, kar pomeni, da je težko govoriti o optimizaciji dela v občinski upravi, o učinkovitosti, racionalnosti dela, zmanjšanju stroškov, kot tudi ni mogoče vrednotiti dela uprave in ne posameznega uslužbenca, ki je v njej zaposlen. V posebnem seminarju »Upravljavska sposobnost slovenskih občin« bomo predstavili izsledke empirične raziskave o upravljavski spodobnosti med direktorji občinskih uprav, opravljene v letih 2008 in 2012 ter vsebinsko interpretacijo v okviru (re)organizacije lokalne uprave. S pomočjo indeksa upravljavske sposobnosti bomo ocenili stopnjo upravljavske sposobnosti občin glede na različne neodvisne spremenljivke ter ugotavljali kakšna mora biti občina (glede na število prebivalcev, ipd.), da je upravljavsko sposobna.

izr. prof. dr. Miro Haček, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Assoc. Prof. Miro Haček, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. 11 asist. Simona Kukovič, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Asist. Simona Kukovič, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
10

Haček Miro and Simona Kukovič: ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY IN SLOVENIAN MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION A suitable quality level of the main functions and tasks of municipal administrations is a fundamental condition for the existence and development of every activity, not only for marketoriented organisations but also for the public sector. Municipalities in Slovenia have not adopted a general policy on quality and it is therefore difficult to speak of the optimisation of work in a municipal administration, the efficiency and rationality of work, cost reduction, nor to evaluate the performance of an administration and the individual civil servants it employs. In special seminar “Administrative capacity of Slovenian municipal administration” will intend to present the results of an empirical research projects on administrative capacity carried out in both 2008 and 2012 among the directors of Slovenian municipal administrations and an analysis of the topic in the context of (re)organisation of local administrations. By means of the Administrative Capacity Index, we will evaluate the degree of individual municipalities’ administrative capacities and establish when should a municipality (according to its population, etc.) be regarded as administratively capable.

***
Ilc Blaž 12 in Banjac Marinko 13: POLITIČNA KULTURA V KRIZI - KRIZA POLITIČNE KULTURE Pričujoči prispevek bo poskušal na eni strani ponuditi refleksijo transformacij političnih kultur Zahodnih liberalno-demokratičnih družbeno-političnih ureditev, ki so v zadnjem obdobju v kontekstu splošne politične in gospodarsko-finančne krize priča prvega večjega kontinuiranega upora proti do sedaj vladajočim koordinatam delovanja in razvoja teh ureditev temelječih na logiki komodifikacije, individualizacije, privatizacije in financializacije. Na drugi strani pa bo prispevek podal refleksijo transformacij in potencialnih transformacij političnih kultur avtokratičnih družbeno-političnih ureditev Severne Afrike in Bližnjega Vzhoda. Pri tem bodo refleksije obeh tesno povezanih kontekstov transformacij političnih kultur reflektirane tako na epistemološki v smislu samega osmišljanja koncepta politične kulture v sodobnem kontekstu kot ontološki ravni v smislu dejanskosti političnih praks, struktur, institucij, identitet in miselnih okvirov dojemanja političnega, ki so se transformirali in vzpostavili. Na epistemološki ravni bomo koncept politične kulture osmislili preko foucaultovskega koncepta dispozitiva s katerim je možno misliti dinamičnost, heterogenost, multidimenzionalnost, historično genezo, presegajoč nacionalne okvire ter strateške funkcije političnih kultur in njihovih specifičnih elementov. Z drugimi besedami bomo poskušali preseči statična razumevanja politične kulture v smislu zbira določenih težko spremenljivih vzorcev političnega
asist. Blaž Ilc, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Asist. Blaž Ilc, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. 13 asist. Marinko Banjac, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Asist. Marinko Banjac, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
12

obnašanja, miselnih okvirov dojemanja političnega ter političnih institucij in struktur. Na ontološki ravni pa bomo premislili do sedaj skoraj da nezamisljivo politično aktivnost v kontekstu krize in v smislu novih in starih upornih praks in premislekov ter novih identitet družbeno-političnih skupin v Zahodnih, Severnoafriških in Bližnjevzhodnih družbah, ki so destabilizirala do sedaj kot stabilne, nespremenljive, statične razumljene vzorce političnega ravnanja zaznamovane z apatičnostjo, atomizmom in strahom. Ilc Blaž in Banjac Marinko: POLITICIAL CULTURE IN THE CRISIS – THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL CULTURE The paper will interrogate the transformation(s) of political cultures, which are taking place in the Western liberal democracies that are after a long period of relative stability facing in the context of the present socio-political and economic crisis first continuous resistance against the dominant coordinates of development and functioning based upon the logic of commodification, individualization, privatisation and financialization. Furthermore, the paper will reflect upon the transformations of political cultures that have and are occurring in the authoritarian systems in Northern Africa and the Middle East. The reflection of both tightly interlinked contexts will be carried out at the epistemological and ontological level. At the epistemological level we will, by employing the foucaultian concept of dispositif, try to move beyond the static and inherently conservative understanding of political culture as a specific set of almost unchangeable or hardly changeable patterns of political conduct, frames of political perception, political structures and institutions. At the ontological level we will strive to rethink, up until recently, unimaginable political activity in the context of the crisis and in the sense of development of new and reactivation of old practices of political resistance and new political identities that have destabilised as stable and unchangeable perceived patterns of political ‘activity’ characterised by apathy, atomism and fear.

***
Kalanj Nelida 14: POLITICAL CULTURE - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY - IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY The aim of this paper is to point out the basic issues faced by countries in transition and recent democracies - in the development of political culture: Is there a democratically elected government in the "new" democracy to actually guarantee a stable and effective democratic governance? What does it (not) do to ensure stable development of political culture, which guarantees the success of the democratic model in the country? What are all the issues and the importance of civic education on the development of democratic political culture? How to influence and encourage the political elite but also educational institutions to devote serious effort to improving the quality of education for democratic citizenship, as a powerful means of promoting democratic political culture? These questions raise further issues of capacity building and development of political culture, as a matter

14

Nelida Kalanj, MA, Udruga Horus/Horus Association, Croatia.

of public interest and citizen participation in the political sphere, as well as the willingness and interest of the ruling political elite, and their position on education as a means of maintaining the stability of state organization. Already identified shortcomings in the political culture of young people in a considerable number of European countries, diminishing political participation of citizens, as well as electoral participation - suggest the problems faced even by otherwise stable democratic systems that require a deeper analysis and reflection on the causes of these phenomena in democratic societies. The withdrawal of citizens from the public and political life or their exclusion in a certain degree endangers the stability of a democratic polity. Moreover, states that have adopted democracy in the past two decades (or less) as a principle of organization of the political system, face the additional problem of poorly developed democratic political culture.

***
Kos-Stanišić Lidija 15: POLITICAL CULTURE IN CENTRAL AMERICA – ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE COUNTRIES Northern Triangle countries - Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador are the new electoral democracies that are currently most violent countries outside active war zone. The mortality rate is significantly higher than it was during the 1980s civil wars. Most elementary human and civil rights is the right to life, and what exactly is at risk. Research shows that the number of murders in the democracies that have collapsed are three times higher than in the democracies that have survived, and that social disorder and high level of crime, causes people to be more inclined undemocratic political behavior. In my presentation I will analyze the consequences of feeling of citizens insecurity on their perception of democracy, its legitimacy - the desirability and effectiveness - satisfaction with the way it works. I will use Latinobarometro data, non-profit organization that performs most true test of public opinion in Latin America, and show that citizens feel that their country is not able to provide minimal human and civil rights, which leads to low support for democratic institutions and the acceptance of repressive methods of resolving the uncertainty and violence.

***
Kurnik Andrej 16: POLITIZACIJA KULTURE IN PODRUŽBLJANJE POLITIKE: PRODUKCIJA SKUPNEGA IN REKONCEPTUALIZACIJA POLITIKE Moderna politična znanost, čeprav nastane na valu sekularizacije, se v svojem kasnejšem razvoju zapre za družbene inovacije in potrebe ter postane znanost ravnovesja in reda. Kultura je bila v moderni večinoma razumljena kot inovacij nesposobna reprodukcija družbenih odnosov. Kultura na eni ter politika na drugi strani sta bili v podobnem medsebojnem odnosu kot človek in državljan. Tako človek kot kultura sta naturalizirani
15 16

Lidija Kos-Stanišič, PhD, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia. doc. dr. Andrej Kurnik, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Assist. Prof. Andrej Kurnik, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

mesti posredovanja državljana in politike. To je politična zgradba zaprte totalnosti. Takšno moderno politično zgradbo utemeljitve reda na osnovi hipostazirane družbene realnosti, izzivajo kulturne in politične prakse, ki zavračajo dualnost družbe, kulture in politike. Gre za politizirane kulturne prakse in/ali podružbljene politične prakse, ki jih lahko razumemo kot produkcijo skupnega. Tak primer je digitalno skupno, ki postaja aktualno v bojih za digitalne pravice in ga lahko razumemo kot kulturne in politične prakse, ki izzivajo kanonsko pojmovanje politike in spodbujajo politično znanost, da se odpre in vrne k svojim izhodiščem, kot jih je definiral Machiavelli. Kurnik Andrej: POLITICIZATION OF CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION OF POLITICS: PRODUCTION OF COMMONS AND RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICS Modern political science, which was among the first secularized modern activities, latter became closed for social innovations and needs to be the science of equilibrium and order. Culture in modernity was understood as reproduction of social relations incapable of innovations. The relationship between culture and politics is analogous to the relationship between man and citizen. Man and culture are naturalized sites that mediate citizen and politics. For this reason we deal with political edifice of closed totality. Such modern political edifice of order, based on hypostasized social reality is challenged by cultural and political practices that reject duality of society, culture and politics. Those are politicized cultural practices and/or socialized political practices, which could be understood as production of commons. Such an example is digital commons that springs out in the struggles for digital rights. It could be understood as cultural and political practices challenging canon notion of politics and inciting political science to open itself and restart from its beginnings defined already by Machiavelli.

***
Lukšič Igor 17: RAVNI POLITIČNE KULTURE NA PRIMERU RAZMERJA INDIVIDUUM – DRŽAVA Ključno vprašanje politične kulture je konstrukcija občega iz partikularnih posamičnosti: kako iz posameznika zraste politika in hkrati kako se v posameznika naseli politika. Za zdravo pamet obstaja samo ena raven razmerja med državo in individuom, to je nepomirljivo nasprotje, v katerem država ogroža individua. Za politologijo je teh ravni več. Prva, strukturna raven, zadeva stopnjo indivudualizacije v posamezni družbi, družbeni skupini in državi. Moderni individuum je nastal v političnem procesu razpada fevdalnega korporativizma v njegove sestavine: v naravnega človeka, člana občanske družbe na eni strani in na državljana na drugi. Druga zadeve pripoznanje tega individua v pravnofromalnem sistemu države, v podobi pravic individua. Tretja raven zadeva stopnjo izgrajenosti družbenih in političnih struktur, v katerih poteka realna politična socializacija realnih individuov. Četrta raven pa obsega raven vedenja in primernega
17

prof. dr. Igor Lukšič, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Prof. Igor Lukšič, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

obnašanja, ki se v določeni družbi razume kot izkaz politične kulture. Peta raven pa zadeva bonton ali lepo obnašanje v politiki. Lukšič Igor: LEVELS OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE CASE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL – STATE The basic question of political culture is construction of the general from particular individualities: how from the individual the politics has been born and at the same time how politics has been embodied in the individual. For the common sense only one level of political culture exists, political science should recognize more of them. First, structural one, considers level of individualization in the given society, social group or state. Modern individual has been appeared in the political process of destroying feudal corporatism in its constitutive parts: natural individuals, members of the civil societies on the one hand, and citoyen on the other. The second level means inclusion of that individual in formal system of the state in form of rights of man. Third level is considering the level of societal- and political-structure building, in which the political socialization of real individual takes part. Forth level deals with knowledge and adequate behavior, which are in particular nation recognized as political culture. Fifth level considers good behavior in politics on individual level.

***
Mujkić Asim 18 and Mujagić Nermina 19: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ETHNONATIONALISM: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA In this text authors inquire the key features of the political culture of contemporary society of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been moulded in the context of ethnic conflict, religious intolerance and various discriminatory practices for two decades now. The ethnonationalist political culture, on the other hand, has proved itself to be compatible with the democratic procedures in general sense, and as such it reflects the wider crisis of the democratic political culture within which the co-existence of various authoritarian and discriminatory practices, now with a democratic legitimacy, and democratic procedures has become acceptable. Authors inquire what kind of political culture is being generated by the existing democratic political institutions founded on the ethnic criteria and what kind of political practices have been generated by such a political culture in return. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the first multi-party elections, it was expected that the political culture would be developed in the direction of a democratic emancipation, prosperity, and that it would, according to then contemporary currents of the development of political culture throughout the world, contribute to a stable, safe and functional new political order. However, by utilizing mere procedural democratic forms, new political culture has been fulfilled only with nationalist content which, today, represents the above all security threat not only to Bosnia and Herzegovina but also to the wider region. The lack of emancipatory, egalitarian and wider axiological content prevents the ruling ethno-national order in Bosnia and
18 19

Prof. Asim Mujkić, PhD, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prof. Nermina Mujagić, PhD, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Herzegovina from obtaining its full legitimacy which, on the other hand, results in further desocialization, retraditionalization and development of phantasm of creation of national states.

***
POLITUSS – študentsko politološko društvo 20: POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE LEFT IN SLOVENIA In times of the global economic crisis, when the world is being rocked by numerous protests and revolutions (the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, student protests and university occupations, mass protests against austerity measures, etc.), a question is often being posed in our own political space: is there a possibility of emergence and success of mass protest or even revolutionary movements? Besides objective-material circumstances, the political culture of the country – especially the political culture of the left - is also a crucial factor when it comes to answering this question. The concept of political culture encompassess the citizens' perception of politics and the relation towards the political practice. In Mediterranean countries like Greece, Italy, France and Spain, the political culture of the left is founded on a strong tradition of workers' struggles, tradeunionism, general strikes and revolutionary movements. In Scandinavia and in parts of Central Europe a corporatist political culture of agreement rather than of open conflict between labor and capital is dominant. The main characteristics of political culture of the left in post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe are passivity and either submission to the neoliberal paradigm or desparate attempts to maintain what is left of the welfare state. Is it possible, in this context, to talk about a political culture of the left (institutional and non-institutional) in Slovenia and if yes, what are its characteristics? Historically and politically, the political culture in Slovenia was formed by three crucial factors: 1) the periferal political and economic position in the worldsystem, 2) the smallness of the nation and its territory and 3) the lack of domestic elites and centers of power. Due to this facctors a proverbially menial national political identity was formed throughout centuries. One of the most important brakes with this tradition occured with the coming of the Second World War, which saw the emergence of the resistence against the nazi occupation. With the resistance movement and the mobilisation of the massess, and above all, with the start of an open class confrontation, a process of transformation of the national political culture in the direction of activism, revolution and class struggle, internationalism and socialist selfmanagement begins under the influence of the Liberation Front of the Slovene People and the Communist party. After the demise of Yugoslavia, it seems that the political culture of the majority of the political left has drowned in defetism, passivity and uncritical acceptance of neoliberal formulas. Some events in recent years (massive trade union protests against Janša's government's attempts to introduce a flat tax, student protests against tuition fees and student labor market reforms, protests of the erased and of migrant workers) and above all in the last few months (We Are the University and 15o movements) and a relatively strong support of the public to these initiatives, presents us with a different image and more hope. Are these events just
20 Študentsko politološko društvo POLITUSS, Ljubljana. Association for Political Science Students POLITUSS, Ljubljana.

responses to the global economic crisis and daily political decisions, or can they be interpreted as fundamental shifts in political culture of the left in Slovenia? Can we expect to see a more participatory and radical political culture emerge on the left?

***
Prodnik Jernej 21 in Lesjak Jure 22: POLITIČNA KULTURA IN POLITIČNA SOCIALIZACIJA MED HEGEMONIJO IN POST-HEGEMONIJO Koncept politične kulture se je zgodovinsko utrjeval sočasno s svetovno hegemonijo ZDA, najpogosteje pa se ga je obravnavalo nereflektirano in brez zavedanja, da je sam po sebi močno političen (Lukšič 2006). Utemeljitelja modernega pristopa, Gabriel Almond in Sidney Verba, sta tako v svoji teoretizaciji prevzemala predpostavke elitističnih avtorjev, kot sta Joseph Schumpeter in Walter Lippmann. Avtorja se bosta v prispevku opirata na dele teoretskega aparata Staneta Južniča (1973; 1989), ki je v jugoslovanskem prostoru med prvimi sistematično preučeval politično kulturo. Osredotočila se bosta predvsem na vlogo politične socializacije, katere namen je med drugim »oblikovanje državljanov«, da sprejemajo norme in vrednote političnega in družbenoekonomskega sistema. Ena izmed pomembnih Južničevih tez je, da je naloga politične socializacije zato ohranjanje stabilnosti in kontinuitete političnega sistema, s čimer efektivno prispeva k vzdrževanju družbenega in kulturnega statusa quo. Politično socializacijo lahko torej vidimo kot pomemben vir konservativnosti specifičnih zgodovinskih družbenih sistemov. Eden izmed razlogov za potencialno konservativnost je v tem, da inkulturacijski proces obvladuje vladajoči razred oziroma oblastna elita, kar ji omogoča občuten družbeni nadzor. Posameznik se s to socializacijo torej ne le »očloveči«, ampak se nanj skoznjo izvaja tudi pritisk konkretnega družbenega, gospodarskega, kulturnega in političnega sistema. In če od politične socializacije pričakujemo stabilnost, ki je odvisna predvsem od družbenega konsenza, »je ta trdnost prav lahko prikrit interes vladajočih slojev, ki želijo po tej poti obvarovati sistem pred neljubimi spremembami.« (Južnič 1973, 82) Ta izhodišča bosta avtorja navezala na konceptualizacijo hegemonije pri Antoniu Gramsciju (1973), ki se zaradi inovativne reinterpretacije Marxove metateoretske predpostavke o bazi in nadstavbi pogosto dojema kot alternativa konceptu ideologije. S tem hegemonija povezuje pogosto ločene elemente analize: institucionalno in ekonomsko plat povezuje z vprašanji ideologije, kulture in vrednotnih sistemov. Eden ključnih prispevkov Gramscijeve konceptualizacije, ki izhaja iz specifičnega pojmovanja družbene vloge filozofije, je v raziskovanju kompleksnega odnosa med prostovoljno privolitvijo in prisilo (pa tudi med voditelji in vodenimi), kar je še posebej pomembno za demokracije v kapitalističnih družbah. Če parafraziramo Giovannija Arrighija (2009, 29-30), je
asist. Prodnik Jernej, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Asist. Prodnik Jernej, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. 22 asist. Jure Lesjak, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Asist. Jure Lesjak, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
21

hegemonija sposobnost nekega akterja ali skupine, da uveljavi funkcijo vodenja ali upravljanja z nekim sistemom. A vodilne vloge ne vzpostavi preprosto z gospostvom, ampak s trditvijo, da predstavlja splošne interese. Obseg inkluzivnosti in participacije lahko pri hegemoniji seveda drastično variira, kar nakazuje tesno povezavo s politično socializacijo in predvsem okvirom njenega umevanja demokratičnosti (predvsem v odnosu do oblik hegemonije, do katerih je bil Gramsci kritičen). Podobno kot avtorji, ki so koncipirali teorijo politične kulture, se je tudi Gramsci zavedal, da je politično s svojimi temelji (kako razumemo svet), ustvarjeno onkraj zidov institucionalne politike. A kjer so nekateri avtorji vzpostavljali predvsem apologetske pristope, ki so služili reprodukciji elitistične politike in obstoječih razmerij v družbi, Gramsci kot oster nasprotnik elitizma (podobno kot kasneje C. Wright Mills) ponuja možnosti za alternativne pristope. V zadnjem delu prispevka bosta avtorja ta konceptualni okvir historično kontekstualizirala z navezavo na obstoječe družbene razmere, predvsem vstajniška družbena gibanja in proteste proti aktualnim družbenim in politično-ekonomskim razmeram (cf. Južničeva opredelitev diskontinuitete). Obstaja možnost, da ti upori igrajo vlogo »kanarčka v rudniku«, ki nakazuje ne le konec hegemonije neoliberalne politično-ekonomske doktrine, ampak tudi prehod v povsem novo historično epoho. Avtorja bosta te dogodke poizkusila umestiti v različne opredelitve post-hegemonije (npr. Day 2005; BeasleyMurray 2010). Prodnik Jernej in Lesjak Jure: POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION BETWEEN HEGEMONY AND POST-HEGEMONY The modern conceptualization of political culture has historically been consolidated at the same time as global hegemony of the US. In most cases it was treated without reflection and with no necessary awareness that it is a highly political notion (Lukšič 2006). The founders of the approach, Almond and Verba (developing the concept of “civic culture”), assumed an elitist approach based on arguments by authors such as Schumpeter and Lippmann. Authors of this paper will base their arguments on the theoretical framework constructed by Južnič (1973, 1989), who was one of the first authors in the former Yugoslavia to study political culture. Their primary focus will be on the role of political socialization, whose fundamental purpose is “to form citizens” in such a way as to accept the norms and values of the existing political and socio-economic system. One of the important theses made by Južnič was that the role of political socialization is to maintain stability and continuity of the political system, thus effectively contributing to the maintenance of social and cultural status quo. Political socialization could therefore be seen as an important source of conservatism in specific historical social systems. One of the key reasons for this potential conservatism lies in the fact that “inculturation process” is dominated by the ruling class or the power elite, which guarantees these groups a considerable degree of social control. Individual is therefore not only “subjectivised” as a human being through political socialization, but is simultaneously also pressured by a concrete social, economic, cultural and political system. If one is therefore expecting stability because of political socialization, which is dependent primarily on the social consensus, “this stability could quite possibly be a concealed interest of the ruling class, who wishes to protect the system against the changes they do not want.” (Južnič

1973, 82). Authors will link these starting points to the conceptualization of hegemony made by Gramsci (1973), which is often considered as an alternative to the concept of ideology, because of his innovative reinterpretation of Marx’s metaphor of “base and superstructure”. Hegemony can link together often separated elements of analysis, e.g. institutional and economic questions can be connected to ideology and culture. One of the key contributions made by Gramsci, which originates in his understanding of the social role of philosophy, is to explore complex relationships between consent and coercion (as well as that between leaders and led), which are essential dilemmas of democracies in capitalist societies. To paraphrase Arrighi (1994, 27-28), hegemony is the ability of a certain actor or a group to exercise functions of leadership and governance over a specific social structure. This power is different from pure “dominance”, because it is gained by virtue of group’s capacity to demonstrate their own interests as being of universal value. The scope of inclusivity and participation can of course vary drastically, which furthermore suggests a close link with political socialization and especially with its understanding of what democracy is (particularly in relation toward the forms of hegemony Gramsci was critical of). Similarly to the authors who conceived the modern theory of political culture, Gramsci was well aware that political, with its foundations (people’s perception of the world) originates well beyond the walls of institutional politics. But in opposition to the authors that promoted apologetic approaches, which served reproduction of elitist politics and existing social relations, Gramsci was a sharp opponent of elitism (similarly to Wright Mills) and offered many possibilities of constructing alternatives. In the last part of the contribution, authors will historically contextualize this conceptual framework and apply it to the existing social relations, especially to the insurgent social movements and sharp protests against political-economic global order and attempts of austerity measures. There is an apt possibility that these movements are playing the role of the “canary in the mine”, indicating not only a possible end to the hegemony of neoliberal political-economic doctrines, but also an end of a certain historical epoch. This social context will be applied to the theories of post-hegemony (e.g. Day 2005, Beasley-Murray 2010).

***
Pušnik Tomaž 23: VPLIV MOBILNOSTI KOT OBLASTNE PRAKSE NA VZPOSTAVLJANJE EVROPSKE POLITIČNE KULTURE Prispevek naslavlja dojemanje mobilnosti v Evropski Uniji pri državljanih kot najbolj pozitivnega učinka evropskih integracijskih procesov in percepcijo enačenja Evropske Unije s “svobodo gibanja in dela”. Institucionalno je mobilnost v Evropski uniji vzpostavljena kot prost pretok ljudi, kapitala, blaga, storitev in predstavlja mehanizem ter podlago za integracijo nacionalnih držav in vzpostavljanje evropske identitete med državljani. V našem prispevku bomo mobilnost naslovili prek teoretskega aparata gouvernementalité in izpostavili pogled, da mora biti mobilnost v Evropski uniji dojeta kot zbir specifičnih oblastnih praks. V prvem delu bomo prek institucionalne ureditve
23

Tomaž Pušnik, raziskovalec na Fakulteti za družbene vede. Tomaž Pušnik, researcher, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

mobilnosti v EU reflektirali kako le-te zajamejo in omogočajo mobilnost samo določenim skupinam ljudi in posameznikom, nadalje pa bomo predstavili kako programi EU mobilnosti vzpostavljajo točno določene pogoje za delovanje evropskih državljanov. Vzpostavljanje tržnih odnosov in posameznikov, ki se naj bi v vseh aspektih življenja odločali na podlagi stroškov in koristi, bo predstavljeno prek dveh najbolj izpostavljenih oblastnih tehnologij mobilnosti v zadnjih letih, posebnega modula Evrobarometra o mobilnosti in Evropske službe za zaposlovanje EURES. V okviru teh dveh tehnologij bomo predstavili tudi pojmovanje mobilnosti pri državljanih Evropske unije in izpostavili neoliberalno teorijo vladanja od daleč prek oblikovanja osebnih želja in potreb posameznikov oz. upravljanje njihovega delovanja ter odločanja. Na podlagi tega moramo mobilnost percipirati ne samo kot vzpostavljanje pogojev za mobilnosti s strani EU, temveč ali predvsem kot vpliv mobilnosti na družbena razmerja in posameznike. V drugem delu bomo analizirali Erasmus študentsko izmenjavo kot najbolj uspešen program mobilnosti v Evropski uniji, ki omogoča študentom da pod določenimi pogoji del študija preživijo v drugi državi EU. Na ta način se institucionalno vzpostavijo pogoji delovanja študentov, določajo želje in omogočajo priložnosti, s čemer se neposredno vpliva na oblikovanje študijskih odločitev in usmerja študente na točno določen način. Erasmus program »v okviru potreb družbe preko izobraževanja, disciplinira in usmerja študenta na specifičen način« (Fejes in Nicoll 2008, 11). Naš namen je predstaviti namene, logiko in racionalnost študentske mobilnost ter kakšne družbeno-politične odnose vzpostavlja. Namen je analizirati usmerjanje in discipliniranje študentov, ter kako študenti prek lastnih potreb in želja perpetuirajo vzpostavljena družbena razmerja in kako jih z upornimi praksami spreminjajo ter sooblikujejo. Študenti so prepoznani kot najpomembnejša skupina ter ključni imaginarni bodoči subjekti ki bo oblikovali prihodnost Evropske unije, zato je pomen Erasmus programa še toliko bolj izpostavljen. V zaključku bomo predstavili razmerje mobilnosti in politične kulture ter vpliv mobilnosti na vzpostavljanje skupne Evropske politične kulture. Kot pravi Južnič (1989, 189) je v družbah, v katerih je mobilnost posebej pogosta, verjetnost diskontinuitete/sprememb veliko večja, saj so večje možnosti, da bodo posamezniki izpostavljeni delovanju različnih socializacijskih okoliščin in pritiskov. Posledično naj bi bila družbena mobilnost zaradi fluidnosti in različnih vplivov vir sprememb politične socializacije in na ta način element spreminjanja politične kulture. Na podlagi analize programov EU mobilnosti, ki spodbujajo določeno organiziranje in delovanje v družbi bomo predstavili vpliv neoliberalne racionalnosti na (EU) politično kulturo. Pušnik Tomaž: MOBILITY AS EUROPEAN UNION GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE AND IT`S INFLUENCE ON CONSTITUTION OF (EUROPEAN) POLITICAL CULTURE Article addresses one-dimensional perception of mobility among European citizens which is perceived as the most positive effect of European integration and as a synonym for European Union. Mobility in the EU is institutionalized as free movement of people, goods, services and capital, and exposed as the core mechanism and a principle that enables integration of nationstates and fosters European identity among citizens. We will analyse mobility through theoretical

apparatus of governmentality and expose mobility as a specific set of EU governmental practices. In the first part we will reflect institutionalization of mobility and implementation through mobility programmes that establish specific conditions how citizens of European Union can or should act. More specifically mobility provides opportunities and conditions for functioning of citizens as rational and competitive subjects. Establishment of market relations as organizational principles in the EU through mobility programmes exposes neoliberal rational which will be presented by two specific and most exposed technologies in recent years, special module of Eurobarometer on geographical and labour market mobility and EURES - European Employment and Job Mobility Network. Those two technologies will also serve to present, through personal stories of citizens about mobility, how European Union is governed without governing from the centralised authority and is instead governed from the distance through shaping personal aspirations, desires and needs, or in Foucault`s words the “conduct of conducts”. In this relation mobility should be recognized as one of the main arenas of the struggle for power and control in the EU, therefore not only as "socially shaped but also socially shaping« (Söderström 2010, 15). In the second part Erasmus student exchange as the most successful mobility programme in the EU is analysed. Erasmus enables students, under specific conditions, to study in another EU member state, and as such provide conditions to conduct and regulate student’s educational path, construct new opportunities, their choices, behaviour and desires. Education and institutional organization of education mobility through Erasmus programme involves exercise of power to regulate students “in accordance to the need of society through schooling in which power operates on the body (discipline) as to shape it in specific ways” (Fejes and Nicoll 2008, 11). Our goal is to present and expose this intention, logic or rational of student’s mobility, what kind of sociopolitical environment establishes and analyse how it regulates and disciplines students, especially because of the common perception of students as crucial imagining mobile subjects that will construe the future in the European Union. In conclusion we will address relation of mobility and political culture and impact of mobility to establish common European political culture. As Južnič (1989, 189) presents it is a higher possibility in mobile societies that persons or citizens will be exposed to variety of different socialization circumstances and effects which consequently lead to different impacts and sources of political socialization, which is one of the crucial elements of change in political culture. On the basis of analysis of EU mobility policies and programmes that foster particular organizational principles and predict specific conducts of citizens, we will present how this neoliberal rational or logic effects on (EU) political culture.

***
Sever Maja 24 in Deželan Tomaž 25: TEORETSKA UMESTITEV SLOVENSKE PARLAMENTARNE POLITIČNE KULTURE: ANALIZA POIMENSKIH GLASOVANJ POSLANCEV DRŽAVNEGA ZBORA
24 25

Sever Maja, Statistični urad Republike Slovenije. Maja Sever, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. doc. Dr. Tomaž Deželan, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Asist. prof. Tomaž Deželan, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

Skupek predstav o tem, kaj politika je, kaj se lahko od države pričakuje, kakšne so lastnosti ljudi, ki se aktivno podajo v politiko, in na kakšen način se dejansko odvija politični proces, močno določa politično kulturo. Slednja determinira delovanje celotnega političnega sistema (Elazar, 1984: 112), tako ravnanje državljanov, način spoštovanja zakonov kot tudi ravnanja vladajočih. Narava parlamentarnega procesa tako presega golo parlamentarno areno in ima precejšen vpliv na delovanje celotnega političnega sistema, kot tudi na delovanje ostalih podsistemov. S postavljanjem standardov političnega vedenja poslanci sodoločajo celostni tonus politične aktivnosti – vplivajo na sistem političnih interakcij, sistem zahtev (inputs), podanih s strani državljanov, hkrati pa tudi na njihovo prevajanje v produkte sistema (outputs) (Patterson, 1968: 191). Prispevek pod drobnogled postavlja slovensko parlamentarno politično kulturo s pomočjo analize poimenskih glasovanj poslancev Državnega zbora Republike Slovenije skozi več mandatnih obdobij. Na podlagi splošno sprejete triadne tipologije politične kulture, ki prepoznava individualistični, moralistični in tradicionalistični način delovanja poslancev (Elazar, 1984), prispevek identificira prevladujoče vzorce slovenske parlamentarne politične kulture ter posledično tudi značaj impulzov, ki jih Državni zbor širi po političnem sistemu. Sever Maja in Deželan Tomaž: FRAMING THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE SLOVENIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLL-CALL VOTES Political culture is one of the dominant factors shaping a country's political structures, electoral behaviour and modes of organization for political action (Elazar, 1984: 109). As a pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded and rooted in the cumulative historical experiences of particular groups of people, a political culture consists of a framework of values that establishes cultural limits on individual and group political behaviour, thus shaping the style of political activity in a society (Hanson, 1980: 18). Though there is no unambiguous definition of political culture in the political science literature (see Elazar, 1984; Hanson, 1980; Patterson, 1968; Easton, 1965; Pye and Verba, 1965; Almond and Verba, 1963; etc.) the concept clearly entails the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process, encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity, and is a manifestation of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics (International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 1968: 218). The set of perceptions of what politics is and what can be expected from government, the kinds of people who become active in politics and government, and the actual ways in which government is practiced by politicians, public officials and citizens stand out as particularly influential aspects of the political culture for the operations of the political system (Elazar, 1984: 112). These three aspects of what, by whom and how politics and governance are done impact significantly, therefore, on society’s civic behaviour and the character of law abidingness, as well as the actions of government (ibid.). The nature of parliamentary activity therefore transcends the scope of the parliamentary arena to have a significant bearing on the mode of operation of the entire political system and subsystems.

Particularly in ‘moralistic’ political cultures, as Elazar notes, in setting the standards of conduct, parliamentarians significantly codetermine the overall tone of the political activity, thus influencing the system of political interactions, input demands of the citizenry and the conversion of system outputs (Patterson, 1968: 191). As a result, any parliamentary political behaviours that tend to rank personal gains and preferences of socio-economic elites over the well-being of the commonwealth are likely to induce behaviour hostile to apparently much needed reforms of the state. This paper, examines Slovenian parliamentary political culture by analysing roll-call votes of MPs. By analysing deputy voting behaviour in various fields of public policies over a lengthy period of time, we identify the prevailing patterns of parliamentary political culture according to Daniel Elazar’s (1984) established triadic typology of individualistic, moralistic and traditionalistic political culture, thus explicating the nature of the motivations that the Slovenian parliamentary arena disperses to the wider political system.

***
Sokolovič Leo 26: POPULARNA KULTURA IN POLITIČNO: NEKAJ REFLEKSIJ O ODDAJI BIG BROTHER Prispevek je poskus analize popularnosti in političnih učinkov oddaje Big Brother v njenem razmerju s političnim. Analize se lotevamo, da bi poudarili ključno vlogo fenomenov popularne kulture v njeni politični dvojnici, torej pri kognitivnih in afektivnih percepcijah ter moralnih sodbah o političnem. Izhajajoč iz interpretativne psihoanalize in komunikoloških študije oddaje razumemo Big Brother kot vozlišče popularne kulture in političnega, kot metaforo neke politične realnosti, ki se udejanja s pomočjo novih tehnologij nadzora. Ko preučimo učinke maksime transparentnosti tako na politično realnost kot tudi na samo popularno oddajo vidimo, da je to strukturno načelo obeh. Vendar pa to načelo, ker je povezano s sposobnostjo vida, proizvaja številne težavne domneve o političnem, izmed katerih je bistvena naravna domneva o obstoju centralnega mesta moči. To centralistično razumevanje delovanja politične moči je zelo konzervativno in antipolitično, v smislu, da onemogoča kakršnokoli politično delovanje, ki bi bilo sposobno vplivati na obstoječa razmerja moči. Ravno skozi to nesposobnost političnega delovanja oddaja pridobi specifični politični pomen kot nadomestna tvorba. Nov forum, kjer je mogoča participacije in kjer ta participacija prinaša otipljive in zelo posamične učinke. Oddaja prav tako postane kraj socialnega učenja in mesto vzornikov za gradnjo lastnega sebstva. Sokolovič Leo: POPULAR CULTURE AND THE POLITICAL: A FEW REFLECTIONS ON THE BIG BROTHER SHOW This contribution is an essay of an analysis of the popularity and the political effects of the Big Brother show in its relation with the political. The analysis is undertaken in order to emphasize the
26

Leo Sokolovič, podiplomski študent na Fakulteti za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Leo Sokolovič, graduate student at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

key role of the phenomena of popular culture in its political counterpart, that is in the cognitive and affective perceptions of and moral judgements of the political. Drawing from interpretative psychoanalysis and communicological studies of the show, we view Big Brother as a knotting of popular culture and the political, as a metaphor of a political reality that is coming into being with the help of new surveillance technologies. As we examine the effects of the maxim of transparency on both the political reality and the popular show itself we see that this is the structural principle of both. However this principle, as it is connected to the faculty of sight, produces a range of problematic presumptions about the political. The essential one among them is the natural assumption of the existence of a central locus of power. This centralistic understanding of the workings of political power is very conservative and antipolitical. In the sense that it disables any political action that would be able to affect the existing power relations. It is through this inability of political action that the show receives its specific political meaning of a substitutive formation. A new forum where participation is possible and where this participation brings about tangible and very individual effects. The show also becomes a place of social learning and a place of role models for the building one’s self.

***
Uležić Sanjin 27: POLITIČNA VLOGA KOLEKTIVNEGA SPOMINA (S POVDARKOM NA POST-KONFLIKTNIH OBMOČJIH) Osrednja teza predstavljene raziskave je, da kolektivni spomin v post-konfliktnih državah, katerih politični prostor je razpet med tradicionalno-romantičnim nacionalističnim pogledom na državo ter modernim pro-zahodnjaškim pogledom, ne služi preprosto kot socialno-refleksivna komponenta izvornega mita tiste specifične družbe, ampak predstavlja tudi opus ustaljenih diskurzivnih tematik, z naslavljanjem katerih se vrednote in cilje iz izvornega mita prestavi iz refleksivne v aktivno fazo - ta pa lahko obsega vse od udeležbe na političnih manifestacijah v podporo specifičnim konservativnim političnim ciljem, do zbiranja podpore med volilno kampanjo, in drugih oblik političnega udejstvovanja. Ker govorimo o razmerju med izvornim mitom, katerega v preučevanih družbah predstavljajo vojne za neodvisnost ob razpadu Jugoslavije, ter modernim političnim prostorom, je potrebno nasloviti dve vprašanji: prvič, katere so regionalnooziroma državno-specifične institucije refleksije, ki ohranjajo medgeneracijsko kontinuiteto vrednot, iz katerih izhaja oblikovanje vedenja personae politicum, ki nimajo ,izkustvenega spomina‘ o dogodkih izvornega mita, ter drugič, kako se manifestirajo te prej omenjene vrednote, če pa izvorni mit teh držav temelji na (agresivnem) izključevanju ,drugega‘, ki ga v teh primerih predstavljajo državljani sosedske države? Sledim raziskovalnemu pristopu, ki pravi, da vsaka politična manifestacija, ki vključuje elemente izvornega mita, ki temeljijo na izključevanju
27

mag. Sanjin Uležić, Oddelek za politične in družbene vede, Univerza Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. Sanjin Uležić, MA, Department of Political and Social Science, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona.

segmenta obstoječe populacije znotraj države, ali pa na izključevanju neke druge populacije kot celote preprosto na podlagi državljanstva ali verske pripadnosti, negativno vpliva na dolgoročno spravo med temi družbami. Ker je kolektivni spomin povezava s preteklostjo - povezava, ki so jo številni teoretiki konceptualizirali kot ključen element stabilnosti vseh družb - je potrebno vpeljati vprašanje, če nista interna stabilnost ter možnost miroljubnega sodelovanja med post-konfliktnimi državami v določenih segmentih nasprotujoči si sili? Seveda tukaj ne govorimo o agresivnosti celotnih populacij držav, ampak o segmentu, ki se ga omenja kot nosilca tradicionalno-romantičnega nacionalističnega pogleda na koncept države. Vendar pa je ključno, da je ta segment vse prej kot pa zanemarljiv. Eksogeni šoki v obliki obmejnih sporov, aretacij in sojenj vojnim zločincem ter (celo) športni izgredi lahko služijo kot aktivator za agresivnost širšega segmenta populacije. Na to nas opozarja že sama agresivna retorika članov političnih vrhov v teh državah ob kakšnem takem incidentu. Ta pregled temelji na aspektu institucij refleksije, kjer je potrebno izpostaviti izobraževalni sistem kot enega izmed treh ključnih sistemov za ohranjanje stika z izvornim mitom pri mlajših generacijah. Vprašanje se tukaj postavlja samo - kakšno sliko o pripadnikih drugih narodnosti pri mladostnikih ustvarja učenje zgodovine o vojnah v regiji, ter kakšne so manifestacije teh sprejetih vrednot? Uležić Sanjin: THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY (SPECIFICALLY IN POSTCONFLICT AREAS The leading thesis of the presented research is that in post-conflict states, whose political sphere is divided onto a traditional romantic-nationalist view of what the state and a pro-western view striving for concord, the collective memory of these states does not serve simply as a socially reflective component of the origin myth of that specific society. Rather, it represents also an opus of established discoursive themes, with the addressing of which the values and goals stemming from the origin myth are transferred from a reflective into an active phase, which can be represented as anything from participation in political manifestations in support of specific conservative political goals, to collecting support during an electoral campaign and other forms of political participation. Because we are addressing the relation between an origin myth - which is represented in the studied societies as the wars of independence during the dissolution of Yugoslavia - and a modern political space, it is necessary to address two questions: first, which are the regionally- or nationally specific institutions of reflection, that maintain the intergenerational continuity of values, from which stems the shaping of the behaviour of the personae politicum, that have no experiential memory of the events of the origin myth, and secondly, how do these aforementioned values manifest themselves, if the origin myth of these nation-states is based on an (aggressive) exclusion of „the other“, which in these cases is represented by citizens of a neighbouring state? I follow a research approach that maintains that every political manifestation, which contains elements of the origin myth that are based on the exclusion of a segment of an existing part of the population within the primary state, or on the exclusion of another population as a whole based on a national or religious affiliation, will negatively affect the long-term concord between these societies. Because collective memory represents a link to the past - a link that many conceptualize

as the key factor of stability of all societies - a question needs to be raised, if the internal stability and the option of peaceful cooperation between post-conflict states are in certain segments not opposing forces? Of course, with this we are not addressing the aggressive nature of entire state populations, but only that of a segment, which is mentioned as the carrier of the traditional romantic-nationalist view of the concept of the state. Yet it is crucial to note that this segment is all but benign. Exogenous shocks in the form of border clashes, war crime tribunals and (even) rioting at sporting events can serve as an activator for the aggressiveness of a wider segment of the population. We are warned of that even by the aggressive rhetoric of members of the political elite in these states when such incidents occur. This view is based on the aspect of the institutions of reflection, where it is important to expose the system of education as one of the three crucial systems for maintaining a contact with the origin myth in younger generations. The question here presents itself - what image of members of other nationalities is instilled in the youth through approaches to teaching history of the regional wars, and subsequently, what are the manifestations of these accepted values?

***
Vodovnik Žiga 28: ONKRAJ POLITIČNE KULTURE: POLITOLOGIJA, STATUS QUO, INFRAPOLITIKA Prispevek obravnava koncept politične kulture, kjer kritika ne cilja zgolj na ideološko obteženost koncepta, ki je pogojena z njegovo iznajdbo v specifičnih političnih razmerah sredine 20. stoletja. Kritika v večji meri zadeva konservativno predstavo demokracije, kjer je koncept politične kulture pogosto razumljen kot sredstvo za ohranjanje statusa quo in/ali za marginalizacijo in trivializacijo vseh političnih praks in struktur, ki niso v skladu s hegemonsko predstavo liberalne demokracije. V drugem delu se prispevek tako osredotoča na omejitve legalističnega razumevanja demokracije, ki demokracijo nivelira na pravni koncept brez performativne dimenzije. Pri tem avtor izhaja iz koncepta infrapolitike, ki politično delovanje širi onkraj institucionalizirane politike. Infrapolitika namreč ni zgolj rezultat politične nuje v primeru nedemokratičnih političnih sistemov, pač pa je čedalje bolj tudi “tihi partner” javnega delovanja v modernih demokracijah. Teza, ki iz tega sledi je, da se demokratične spremembe pogosto vršijo ravno preko navidezno “nepomembnih” in “nepolitičnih” dejanj, ki jih aktualne razprave o politični kulturi nikoli ne detektirajo. Vodovnik Žiga: BEYOND A POLITICAL CULTURE: POLITICAL SCIENCE, STATUS QUO, AND THE INFRAPOLITICS The paper critically examines the concept of political culture, where the target of critique is not only ideological overload of the concept, resulting from the invention of the political culture in specific political circumstances of the mid-20th Century. It rather targets the conservative
28

doc. dr. Žiga Vodovnik, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Assist. Prof. Žiga Vodovnik, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

interpretation of democracy, where political culture is often understood solely as a mean to maintain the status quo and/or to marginalize and trivialize political praxes and structures that are not in line with the hegemonic notion of liberal democracy. In the second part, the paper focuses on the limitations of a legalistic reading of democracy that levels it to a legal concept without a performative dimension. Here the paper builds on the idea of infrapolitics that broadens political agency beyond institutionalized politics. Namely, the infrapolitics is not only a product of political necessity under the conditions of tyranny within non-democratic regimes, but also the “silent partner” of public activity of modern democracies. The thesis that follows is that democratic changes are realized exactly via “unimportant” and “apolitical” acts, which are, in fact, never detected in contemporary discussions on political culture.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful