Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-18463 October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant. Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter. Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.: The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force. About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows: Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered. To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment. In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more. After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all. The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may? The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery. The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said: This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . . The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined by proper authority. In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language: In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has

held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine. In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day ofarresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances. The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this decision. It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again been elevated to this court. There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision. This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government. Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just mentioned.

ante. are hereby repealed. printing. . it is evident that Act No. or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive. in or by means of anything capable of being a libel. or reputation.) The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction. cannot be gainsaid. 277. may also have affected article 256. the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria. . (People vs. it is not necessary to make a pronouncement. were abrogated by the Libel Law. contempt or ridicule. . 842. but as to this point. and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code. . — Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American . — The Libel Law. or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority. Act No. Phil. The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article. 292 of the Philippine Commission. in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate." Recently. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. expressed either in writing. shall defame. are within the range of the liberty of the press. specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code. 2131." etc. or public theatrical exhibitions. p. covering the subjects of calumny and insults." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force. thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred. abuse. which is exactly libel. art. tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty. or the like. Act No.. and thereby expose him to public hatred. dealing with calumny and insults. the Treason and Sedition Law. virtue. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation. on a legislature. as defined by the Libel Law. as for instance article 256. recall that article 256 begins: Any person who. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such. The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. Garcia Valdez ([1902]. 1. or insults by writing.1. 277. or by signs or pictures. and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject. which may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty. 2. previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. contempt. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law. by . 465. must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. were in conflict therewith. writing. criticisms.) With these facts and legal principles in mind. p. Sir J. . or ridicule. 267. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation. F." That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect. on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. Castro [1922]. and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered. Act No. 468). was enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. naturally in writing. virtue." (Digest of Criminal Law. The well-known rule of statutory construction is.) For identical reasons. that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts. Indeed. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code.) But in the United States. unless the intention and effect be seditious. no matter how severe. abuse. p. so far as the same may be in conflict herewith. while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law.

would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect. Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. in which article 256 is found. abuse. McGlinn [1885]. shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor. more specifically stated. (American Insurance Co. Hagan [1845]. as before stated. 3 Hos.sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. or. the last being the title to Chapter V. Title II of the same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste. ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character. Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge. and insults. impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives. sedition. Canter [1828].S. whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political law. crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state. McGlinn. or any person in authority. 1 Pet. and threats against their agents and other public officers. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago." — that is. crimes against theCortes and its members and against the council of ministers. It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. 1898. provided that the offensive minister or person. by treaty or otherwise. injurias. crimes against international law. injurias. 210." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could. and contempts of ministers of the crown. or writing. while engaged in the performance of official duties. Title III of the same Book. punishes the crimes of rebellion. vs. and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame. or the offensive writing be not addressed to him. or threathen a minister of the crown. 542. and. and threats against persons in authority. Chicago. It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason. Collector of Customs [1912]. Our present task.) On American occupation of the Philippines. and the crime of piracy. must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government. abuse. is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate. and not according to those of the government ceding it. the defamation. lese majeste. the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press. vs. or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments. The with an article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening. crimes against the form of government. comes article 256. shall defame. are not longer in force. and contempts. all laws. and he like. insults. insult. 315. by word. by treaty or otherwise.. Roa vs. the municipal laws of the .. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. It reads as follows: "Any person who." (Pollard vs. and by proclamation of the latter. 23 Phil. now being weighed in the balance.. therefore. abuse. and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. or by reason of such performance. sedition. by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28. and their agents. Thus. Every nation acquiring territory. Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. religion and worship.. he said: "As a matter of course. assaults upon persons in authority. 114 U. or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain. supra. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason. rebellion. deed. or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America). including crime against religion and worship. institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. 511. or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority. vs. and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.) Mr. is the opinion of three members of this court. upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the former — to the United States.

habits. 349). it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness.. Weems vs. except as precise questions were presented. 273. there was not and could not be. vs. and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs. a careful consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system..' " But when the question has been squarely raised." From that day to this. In part. U. to follow the language of President McKinley. the President said: In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe. Balcorta [1913]. U. The courts have naturally taken the same view. that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law. and royal protection for that authority. however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. 533. the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American constitutional principles. With the change of . Sweet [1901]. According to our view. and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands. and even their prejudices. and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent. and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges.) The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty. But President McKinley. 217 U.. vs. demand obeisance to authority. U. the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective." Therefore. Justice Elliott. in the case of United States vs.. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind. the Commission should bear in mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views. 15 Phil. It is evident that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules. to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. unfortunately. 25 Phil. said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American are familiar.S. Bull ([1910]. which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom. in his instructions to General Merritt.S. peace. and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness. Balcorta [1913]. 25 Phil. speaking for our Supreme Court. S. Mr.S. and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs. article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. but for the happiness. vs. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910]. 1 Phil. was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power.. and of which they have. been denied the experience possessed by us. 7). his instructions to the Commission. (U. their habits. supra. 18. 1900. of April 7.S. and prejudices. peace. that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system.. and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand.conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.

) Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. so long as it is notmalum in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others. become obsolete. and a new theory of government. Our official class is not. R. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due. the Congress. 1aw ph!l. Shepherd [1903].) It is true that in England. 99 A. as in monarchies. as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the public. In the early days of the American Republic. 680. from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived. instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws. as set up in the Philippines. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin. a sedition law was enacted. however. as for instance. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority. and makes. The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. every man is a sovereign. is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. making it an offense to libel the Government. Every man may lawfully do what he will." (State vs. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein. the Emperors Augustus. although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Slander and Libel. have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands. Sillars vs. the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. The Crown of England. 6 L. 151 Mass. although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. Collier [1890]. 50. 624. High official position. 3d ed. 245. took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns.net From an entirely different point of view. there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum.. or the President of the United States. 177 Mo. and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. p." (Newell. unfortunately. if he is qualified. without proof of any special damage. These English statutes have. that it was soon repealed.R. long since. and Tiberius. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag. The demands which the new government made. an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks. it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials.. 205. and has equal rights with every other man. under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown. . These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. Caesar. S. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized. while in the United States.. seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it. and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words.. but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo. It was in no sense a continuation of the old. a new government.sovereignty. but the law met with so much popular disapproval.. on the individual citizen are likewise different. We have no rank or station.A. except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance. a ruler and a freeman.

" whom we do not have in our Government. outside of his presence. or insult committed against an authority by writing or printing. it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny.. injuria. although for different reasons. and to calumny. concur. concur. concurring: I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision. by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof. Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.. Avanceña and Villamor. for the sole reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. So ordered. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. by deed or word. which he commenced to serve on August 21. C. that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted. as was that inserted in the said information. Ostrand and Johns. procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. J.. concurring: I concur with the result. injuria.J. 65 of the same Assembly. City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae. JJ. Peralta in his own behalf. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. committed against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof. or insult. the result is. or insult. with costs de officio.To summarize. 1944. J. I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force. Street. Separate Opinions ARAULLO. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal Code or under the Libel Law. ROMUALDEZ.. respondent. by writing or printing. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. with the acquittal of the accused. that all the members of the court are of the opinion. pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. JJ. Johnson. that is. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order . William F. injuria.: Petitioner-defendant. a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production. created in section 1 of Ordinance No. for although that article is in force with respect to calumny. except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown. FERIA. which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.

and the summary procedure prescribed therefor. by the Commander of the Japanese forces. in his own opinion. he may be immediately convicted. L-22 (p. 104). 612. creating it are not of a political complexion. that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right.. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission. or property without due process of law. and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. Sprott vs. recently decided. the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner. and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable. G. issued on January 23. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army. speaking through the Justice who pens this decision. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curiae. in response to an urgent necessity. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices. It . In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. liberty. 7. the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Texas vs. and therefore. it is necessary to bear in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines. Home Insurance Co. No. pp. nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life." that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial. and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines. Lockart (17 Wall. 700. made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. for the reasons expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines. it is evident that the Philippines Executive Commission. and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. 99. ante). in support of this last proposition. should now be denied force and efficacy. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights". that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him..United States (20 Wall. The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. No. that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created. Benedicto Jose y Santos. section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 743). In his memorandum he submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the Acts. 581). 459). this Court." The Solicitor General. R..No. 113.. according to the preamble of Ordinance No. Ordinances and Executive Orders. held: In view of the foregoing. 1. for said Court was created. violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth. and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the present case. (22 Wall. post). R. that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty. 7. United States vs. Before proceeding further. states that. in his answer in behalf of the respondent. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are. 127. assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute. And he cites. vs. and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. L-5. null and void ab initio. was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. White (7 Wall. and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily. defendant-appellee. as well as those of the United States of America. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III. 570. 7. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission are tinged with political complexion. plaintiff-appellant. 1942. by said Ordinance No. which was organized by Order No. Horn vs.

in truth and reality. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23. Maine. (Vol. Revised.. 17 Wall. considered as de factogovernments of the third kind. and such only. 96 U. Lockart. 459. . p. In the case of United States vs. 342. 20 Wall. 570. and the purpose of war. or were in conflict with those constitutions. as the government established in Castine. Mexico. based upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government. during its occupation by the British forces and as that of Tampico. suspended. Rice (4 Wheaton. and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States. and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the concession (of belligerency) made to the Confederate Government . "under enemy duress. 700. or recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino people.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to. Sixth Edition. S. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts. 7 Wall. since occupation is an aim of warfare. a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14." (vol. And Oppenheim. . "the (belligerent) occupant is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory. in his Treatise on International Law. apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people. by the military occupation of Castine. 2 p.) The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of Texas vs. since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant. 1944. . sanctioned no hostile legislation . And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision. and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal and citizens as they existed at .. and others) that the judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired the rights of the citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States. and the maintenance and safety of his forces. the Supreme Court of the United States held that. 246). was.was not different from the government established by the British in Castine.. is not applicable to the present case. as it chose to recognize and impose. United States. in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants. Horn vs. of course. 176 United States vs.White. and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. 466. were null and void. As Halleck says. 1944. and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. occupied during the war with that the country by the United State Army.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force). because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory. before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. and were bound by such laws. Mexico. Home Insurance Co. "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered. the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was.. a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied. 249. says that.. Williams vs. Sprott vs. 20 Wall. whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. or by the United States in Tanpico. a portion of which has been already quoted. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. . Maine. Maine. 1943. the question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government.. II. this Court said: The so-called Republic of the Philippines. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions. Bruffy.

so far as is necessary for military purposes. the same laws for the protection of the property and personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers. so far as it is necessary for military purposes. . the validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation. the usages established by civilized nations. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones. or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district. he declares certain acts. had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. 1944.the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate prospectively only. first. for his security also. supra). the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.349. remained unimpaired during the War of Secession (Texas vs. because in the case of the Confederate States. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state. supra) and that the Confederate States "in most. 5000). and in so far as. set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts. or for the maintenance of public order and safetytemporarily alter the laws. merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head. as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. the same constitution." (Oppenheim's International Law. International Public Law.that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble. United States. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political complexion. there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army. secondly. page 97. p.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines. The question which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are. or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. if not in all instances." (Hall's International Law. and in case. sixth edition. and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one doing such acts. especially the Criminal Law. are those imposed by the Hague Regulations. because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation. as we have already stated.) No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution. for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction." (Sprott vs. therefore. and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner. In fine. on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure. Bruffy. seventh edition. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion. he may nevertheless. if they were then valid. and cases quoted and cited in the footnote). The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals. that is. not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country. supra). 598. being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant. — it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. and the obligation of allegiance to the to the estate and obedience to her laws and the estate constitution. the constitution of each state and that of the United States or the Union continued in force in those states during the War of Secession. White. especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.. he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts. and of the summary procedure adopted for that court. seventh ed. 7. (1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. p. the laws of humanity and the requirements of public . subject to the Constitution of the United States. II. . while the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces of the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States. There is no room for doubt. A belligerent "occupant may where necessary. whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state. p. 7." (Taylor. Vol. to be punishable. and thirdly. especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure.

in order. through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. 1940. may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to what is called martial law. and secondly. The term merely signifies that the body of law actually applied. so far as it may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the regulations made by the invaders.conscience. to fix penalties. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code.) From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production. Act No. is essentially martial. II. incident to a state of war. pp. that is. to determine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts. those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the protection of the army. 386). and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists. Part II. does not refer to a particular code or system of law. by whomsoever administered. as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity. or to a special agency entrusted with its administration. and generally to administer justice through such agencies as the found expedient. All law. its support and efficiency. having the sanction of military authority." (Westlake. War. that is. 77. the territorial law in general. the term "martial law. defined above by Hyde. International Law. for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. but shall be repressed more severely than the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow subjects.) According to Hyde (International Law. that acts committed to their detriment shall not only lose what justification the territorial law might give them as committed against enemies. And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such new laws and regulations as military necessity demands. which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum. for it is less objectionable. of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the occupant consist of. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them. 76. Such variations will naturally be greatest in what concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the invading army and its followers. and it is none the less so when applied by civil courts in matters devoid of special interest to the occupant. depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. such variations of the territorial law as may be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any of the rules which will come before us. 96. procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries. and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant. 65 with different and heavier penalties. and the success of its operations. — The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. The words "martial law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the occupant to share the law as he sees fit. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code. p. p. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. Section III. the protection and safety of the army of occupation. Vol. and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. it being necessary for the protection of the latter. and in this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military rule. as that which stands to the public order and social and commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation. they were altered and penalized by said Act No. so that any needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader is enjoined to have in view. even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe. (Pub. (2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience. to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the invaded. Westlake says that Article XLIII. 65 of the said Assembly. first. to establish tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders. not only to prevent food and ." in so far as it is used to describe any fact in relation to belligerent occupation. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. in an occupied district martial law.

While it is true that these offenses. p. to wit: treason." (Wheaton's International Law. whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country. were specified in the Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war. imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. ammunition. but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that. because the acts constituting those offenses were punished. In order to resolve this last question. opines "that judicial acts done under this control. Such offenses. wearing uniforms without due authority. correspondence with hostile country. remain good. espionage. sending prohibited goods. violation of neutrality. without a permit. using seditious language. safety and security of the belligerent occupant. as are all political offenses. as they did. trespassing on defense works. 518. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law and made punishable by said Ordinance No. and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. spreading alarmist reports. penalized by Ordinance No. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. are defined and also penalized by the territorial law Revised Penal Code. traveling without a permit. The crimes penalized by Act No. such for example as acts directed against the security or control of the invader. evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner. — Being in possession of arms. flight to enemy's country. that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country. when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government. in case of necessity. Especially taking into consideration the fact. commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the belligerent occupant. vehicles. supra. of which this court may take judicial notice. In this connection Wheaton observes the following: "Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite. it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter. such as rebellion. 7 and placed under jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a political complexion. depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying commander. etc. illegal possession of firearms and other. of horses.other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country. to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control.. and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and against the welfare. for public rather than private reasons. Thus. was good and valid. together with several others. . administrative acts so done. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations. . since it was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted. and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law. cycles. III. for they were not penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the belligerent occupant or the government established by him in these Island. the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time. Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course. . LII. in the Anglo-Boer war. piracy. seventh edition. 7.. and the crimes against public order. (3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government. 1944. Sec. They are also considered by some writers as war crimes in a broad sense. etc. they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese forces. Hague Conventions of 1907). War. The execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state. 242. It is sufficient to quote the opinion on the subject of several international jurists and our recent decision in the case ofCo Kim Cham vs. going out of doors between certain hours. overcharging for goods.) It is. sedition and disloyalty. that is whether or not.) . when they are not of a political complexion. Hall. seventh edition. injuring military animals or stores. inciting war. being in possession. the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them. or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. hindering those in execution of military orders. the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law. holding meetings other than those allowed. therefore. p. by the principle of postliminy." (Hall's International Law.

when required by military necessity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment. considers as war crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance No. no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out. whether morally justifiable or not. Part II. ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. pp. so far as it produces an effect during the occupation.. When the occupation comes to an end the authority of the national government is restored. Applying that doctrine to the present case. that all judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime. the cast of the occupant possess legal validity. JJ. concurs in the result. no redress can be had for what has been actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's legislation.J. p. says: "In general. The enemy's law depends on him for enforcement as well as for enactment. 98. C. But the law made by the occupant within his admitted power. J.. among them Act No. before the proclamation." (Wheaton's International Law. It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all laws. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power (e. either by the progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace. concur.) And Wheaton. says that: "To the extent to which the legal power of the occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of his occupation. a sentence which. Moran. 65.' to acts of a political character. and no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced. When occupation ceases. 97. had already become null and of no effect.) We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. supra.Westlake.g. without pronouncement as to costs. The invaded state is not subject to the indignity of being obliged to execute his commands. and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. and to those that beyond the period of occupation. Pablo and Bengzon. Separate Opinions OZAETA. of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted. 7 and Act No. although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces. 245. In view of all the foregoing. A prisoner detained under it must be released. as above stated. and will bind as between them all and their national government. ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Jaranilla. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon.. 65. alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign). War. but always remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous. So ordered. will bind any member of the occupied population as against any other member of it. International Law. the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the duty of giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations. who.. to sentences for 'war treason' and 'war crimes. the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. supra. not indeed so as to be debarred from carrying out his will without notice. concurring: . which is within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to punish. in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petitioner under said law. We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration. speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for offenses such as the one in question. (Westlake.

expressed the opinion that "the acts and proceedings taken and before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein prisoner should now be denied force and efficacy. and for similar offenses when committed by private individuals or entities. 6. The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death. brigandage. shall govern the trial of the cases enumerated in said sections 1 and 2 hereof. upon the promulgation of a decision imposing the death penalty. crimes against public order. frauds. 65 entitled "An Act imposing heavier penalties for crimes involving robbery. The remaining sections read as follows: SEC. Section 1 of the ordinance in question reads as follows: SECTION 1. 7." The case was argued before us on September 21 and 22." Section 2 confers upon the court mentioned in section 1 exclusive jurisdiction also to try the following crimes as defined in the Revised Penal Code: crimes against national security and the law of nations. 5. by the First Assistant Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent and the City Fiscal as amicus curiae — the former impugning and the latter sustaining the validity of said Ordinance No. alleging that Ordinance No. and shall aim at their expeditious and prompt disposition. 7. shall be summary in procedure. The clerk of each special court. and providing for a summary procedure for the trial of such offenders. Technicalities shall be avoided and all measures calculated to serve this end shall be taken by the trial judge. He now petitions this Court for the writ of habeas corpus. the petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment." and recommended "that the writ of habeas corpusprayed for be granted and that the City Fiscal be instructed to prepare and file the corresponding information for robbery against the petitioner herein in the Court of First Instance of Manila. in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of the three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. answering the petition on behalf of the respondent Director of Prisons. 1944. 1944. The summary procedure provided in Act No. Section 3 provides for the appointment of one judge of first instance to preside over the court above mentioned and of a special prosecutor in each special court. It has been impossible for the Court to reconcile and consolidate the divergent views of its members although they arrive at practically the same result. as defined in an executive order. arson and other crimes involving destruction. SEC." was null and void ab initio. He commenced to serve the sentence on August 21. bribery. There is hereby created in every province and city throughout the Philippines one or more courts of special criminal jurisdiction as the President of the Republic of the Philippines may determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice. illegal detention committed by private individuals and kidnapping of minors. by which the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was created and which was promulgated on March 8. malversation of public funds and infidelity as defined in the Revised Penal Code and violations of food control laws. which shall decide the case within fifteen days from the receipt of the records thereof. shall immediately forward the records of the case to the special division of the Supreme Court herein created. for the crimes and offenses mentioned in section 2. Section 4 authorizes the court to impose a longer term of imprisonment than that fixed by law. or imprisonment for life or death where not already fixed by law. by the President of the "Republic of the Philippines. which courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and determine crimes and offenses penalized by Act No. when committed by public officers and employees. Said cases shall be decided within four days after the same are submitted for decision. falsification. . 1945. The Solicitor General. 65 insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance. To justify our effort — lest we seem intent to bring coal to Newcastle — we ought to state that the following opinion had been prepared before the others were tendered. The trial of the cases arising sections 1 and 2 hereof shall be started within two days after the filing of the corresponding information. illegal exactions and transactions. Accused of robbery in the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila. and illegal possession of firearms.Amidst the forest of opinions that have cropped up in this case it would seem unnecessary to plant an additional tree.

unless the judge. by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him or his principal. the court shall immediately cause to be explained to the accused the facts constituting the offenses with which he is charged. or the representative of the accused or a person acting in a similar capacity. and with the permission of the court. (c) Except for justifiable reasons. or of his representative shall not be a ground for interrupting the proceedings or attacking the validity of the judgment. a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against the accused. and the judge shall interrogate the accused and the witnesses as to the facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and those which are admitted." as referred to in section 5 above quoted. SEC. The provisions of Rules 115 to 117 of the Rules of Court shall be suppletory to the foregoing insofar as they are not in conflict therewith. Section 21 provides for the summary trial in the following manner: Such trials shall be conducted according to the following rules: (a) After arraignment and plea. (e) Unjustified absence of an accused who has been released on bail. including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Order even if such articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2. is in turn that established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. of the Rules of Court. the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus are hereby suspended with respect to persons accused of. (b) Refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him. and the trial shall be limited to the latter. The accused or his representative may be examined by the court. Otherwise. 7. 9. rules or orders. 65 of the "Republic. or in any other information. (d) If from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogation. The interest of public safety so requiring it. or in any other information. the accused shall not be allowed to plead and assert defenses that are inconsistent with each other. or parts thereof. are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Statements made by the accused. his co-accused. 157 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission. and either may apply to the judge for the examination of the co-accused or the representative of the latter in matters related to the defense of the accused. . The summary procedure provided in Act No. any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2 hereof. authorizing peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant.SEC. All laws. shall be admissible in evidence if material to the issue. it should appear that the accused is guilty of the crime charged in the information. the judge shall dictate an order distinctly specifying the facts admitted by the accused and those which are in dispute. Rule 122. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its promulgation. for special reasons. 8. dated May 18. or under investigations for. irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made. Under said procedure (section 17) "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any prosecuting officer. 18. SEC. or in any other information subsequently filed by the prosecuting officer. 1943." Section 18 reads as follows: SEC. otherwise directs. inconsistent with the provisions hereof.

have the same validity as if they had been enactments of legitimate legislatures. and 33 having died. are null and without effect as against the legitimate government. Ordinance No. that the cases cited by the Solicitor General are not applicable because they deal with the validity of acts and processes of the governments of the rebel states during the Civil War and are based upon the indissolubility of the Union. (United States vs. be regarded as invalid and void.. Gaz. ed. and other Acts of like nature. remain in confinement. and that of the 94 convicts only 3. 19 Law.) Judicial or legislative acts in the insurrectionary states were valid where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the national government. and the rigid enforcement of the food control measures was not intended to insure the procurement of supplies by said army. White. 37 having been released.The records shows that during their existence the courts of special and exclusive criminal jurisdiction created by the ordinance in question convicted and sentenced a total of 94 individuals. or of the states. There is no question that in virtue of that of the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23. 147. 240. ed. S. In substance. 55 of whom had been prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and 15 for robbery. 21 Law... that even assuming that it should be judged by the standard or the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Lockhart. that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional but a purely statutory right which may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the state. 22 Wall. In synthesis. 7 is no longer of any force and effect since the restoration of the Government of the Common wealth of the Philippines. p. the City Fiscal argues that the heavier penalty for the illegal possession of firearms than that fixed by the Administrative Code was not directed toward the suppression of underground activities against the Japanese army. 74 U..) Acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States. including the herein petitioner. and. 245. Ordinance No. finally. 17 Wall. 660. (Texas vs. . 1944 (41 Off. The question before us is whether said ordinance ever acquired any force and effect or was null and void ab initio. 733.. must. 22 Law. the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures or agencies established by the "Republic" because the Japanese forces themselves commandeered what they needed or sent out their own agents to purchase it for them at prices even much higher than those fixed by the "Republic". that the supposed invalidity of the sentence imposed against the petitioner cannot be raised by habeas corpus. 570-581.. (Wheaton's International Law. 21 having escaped. that the military occupant was not in duty bound to respect the constitution and the laws of the occupied territory. 7 must be declared void (1) because it favored the forces of occupation and the civilian Japanese inasmuch as it provided an excessively heavy penalty for the summary trial of possession of firearms and violations of food control regulations and (2) because it impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution inasmuch as the procedure therein prescribed withdrew the privilege of the accused against self-incrimination and his right to appeal to the Supreme Court even where the penalty imposed was life imprisonment or death. the Solicitor General maintains that the ordinance in question was null and void because it impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution and because it was hostile in its purpose to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. and as regards food control. that the validity or nullity of the ordinance in question should be judged in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the "Republic" and of generally accepted principles of international law. or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens. (Horn vs. 818.) Tested by these principles of international law. Invoking decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in cases involving the validity of Acts of the Confederacy and of a rebel state as a de facto government during the Civil War. and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution..) All the enactment of the de factolegislatures in the insurrectionary states during the war." for there were even cases where the offenders were already in the hands of the police or courts of the "Republic" but they were unceremoniously taken from said agencies by the Japanese military police and punished or liquidated by it at Fort Santiago or elsewhere. The Home Insurance Co.. the argument of the Solicitor General is as follows: Acts of the military occupant which exceed his power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations. that he could abrogate all of them and promulgate new ones if he so chose. in general. because in any event the Japanese military occupant freely exercised the power to go after and punish his enemies directly without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic. 99-104. ed. which were not hostile to the Union or to the authority of the General Government and which were not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. 148). 7th ed. that the procedure prescribed afforded a fair trial and did not violate any fundamental rights.. the ordinance satisfies all the requirements of said Constitution.

and obedience to her laws. being essentially provisional. in truth and reality. 208. Fleming vs. apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people. subject to the Constitution of the United States. William vs. a portion of which had been already quoted. that the justice of the cause between two enemies being by law of nations reputed to be equal. the Filipino people. L-5. 603.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude of the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of governments into the hands of Filipinos. 700. White. rest on the proposition that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble and that the obligations of allegiance to the state.. Page 9 How. or recognize the latent sovereignty of. United Statesvs. ed. 253.) In the case of Williams vs. 227. 113. and it is not bound to respect or preserve the rights of the citizens of the occupied territory under their Constitution. 2.S. Downes vs. 182 U.. p. by . base upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States. 43 Law. was. "under enemy duress a was established on October 14. According to the Rules of Land Warfare he will naturally alter or suspend all laws of a political nature as well as a political privileges. Fleming vs. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring invalid Acts of a rebel state or of the Confederacy which were in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States or which impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution. The court further stated that the concession of belligerent rights made to the Confederate Government sanctioned no hostile legislation and impaired in no respect the rights loyal citizens as they had existed at the commencement of hostilities. Hunter. remained unimpaired during the War of Secession. Boyle. that proposition does not hold true with respect to a de facto government established by the enemy in an invaded and occupied territory in the course of a war between two independent nations. recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power). 1943..R. As General McArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23. vol. (See Texas vs. 9 Cranch. p. 176.. Rice. does not severe to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. Bidwell. before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. ed." (Hyde on International Law. the court. observed: "The rule stated by Vattel. in a war between independent nations "the rights of the occupant as a law-giver have broad scope. Valdez Tan Keh Dizon (G. recognized in the law.S. It was established under the mistaken belief that. and during that possession the obligations of the inhabitants to their country are suspended. 210. In the recent case of Co Kim Cham vs.. Page. speaking though Mr. 1944. 96 U. 345. had occasion to comment upon the nature of said government in the following words: The so-called Republic of the Philippines. a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. 191. 4 Wheat. 237.. 716. 74 U. and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. Baldy vs. 19 Law. Justice Field. It was of the same character as the Philippines Executive Commission.The decisions invoked would be applicable if the so-called Republic of the Philippines should be considered as a government established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the Commonwealth and the Sovereignty of the United States. Let us now look into the nature and status of the government styled "Republic of the Philippines "in order to determined the criterion by which the validity of its enactments should be tested.S. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. No. 24 Law. For it is a well-established doctrine in internal law. although not abrogated (United States vs. 367.. 246. 388. ed. that belligerent occupation. Bruffy. It has no application to the case of a war between an established government and insurgents seeking to withdraw themselves from its jurisdiction or to overthrow its authority.. 171 U. 9 Howard. and laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command. Bruffy.. for its purpose was to harass and subdue the latter. supra. ante). 4 Wheat. Such territory is possessed temporarily so possessed temporarily by lawful government at war with the country of which the territory so possessed is a part.) Obviously." He many "suspend the existing laws and promulgate new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action.) It will be seen then that in a war between independent nation the army of occupation has the right to enact laws and take measures hostile to its enemy. this Court speaking through Justice Feria. applies only to cases of regular war between independent nations.S. Rice. 614. On the other hand.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United State to. whatsoever is permitted to the one in virtue of war is also permitted to the other.

According to the Hague Regulations of 1907. July 18. In so doing he is given great freedom may be partly due to circumstance that the occupant is obliged to consider as a principal object the security. and on the 22nd of the month forced them to leave the seat of the government in Manila and hide with them in the mountains. the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure. efficiency and success of his own force in a hostile land inhabited by nationals of the enemy. To show further the fictitious character of much-propagandized "independence" which Japan purported to grant to the Philippines through the establishment of the "Republic". as far as possible. the occupant enjoys the right and is burdened with the duty to take all the measures within his power to restore and insure public order and safety. volume 2." In the exercise of his powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience and a high sense of justice. is whether or not it was within the competence of the military occupant to pass such a law. We reaffirmed those statements. including the First Assistant Solicitor General. and paid no attention to the protests and representations made on their behalf by the President of the "Republic. and success. while in theory and for the purpose of propaganda Japan professed to be a benefactor and liberator of the Filipinos." As a climax of their continual impositions. as she saw that the latter remained loyal to the United States. The question. 367. hoping thereby to secure their willing cooperation in her war efforts. pages 366. the occupant is called upon to respect. The said government being a mere instrumentality of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army as military occupant. as matter of contemporary history and of common knowledge. support. The Japanese military police arrested and punished various high officials of said government. 1898. . .doing so. Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied nations. She found that the Filipinos merely feigned cooperation as their only means of selfpreservation and that those who could stay beyond the reach of her army of occupation manifested their hospitality by harassing and attacking that army. says: In consequence of his acquisition of the power to control the territory concerned. Moore. 261. They continued to impose their will on its executive officials when their interests so required. the laws in force in the country. p. Hyde in his work on International Law. Order to the Secretary of War. 43. So. 368. "unless absolutely prevented. in December 1944 the Japanese military authorities placed the President and the members of his Cabinet under the "protective" custody of the military police. the ordinance question promulgated by the President of the "Republic" must be deemed as an act emanating from the power or authority of said occupant. the laws in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws which do not conflict with security of his army or its support. The only measure they did not succeed in imposing upon the "Republic" was the conscription of the Filipino youth into an army to fight with the Japanese against the United States. on the occupation of Santiago de Cuba by the American forces. Thus Japan continued to oppress and tyrannize the Filipinos notwithstanding the former's grant of "independence" to the latter. . efficiency. Dig.) . in practice she continued to enslave and oppress the Filipinos. while respecting. xxx xxx xxx The right to legislate is not deemed to be unlimited. we may add that. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant. VII. unless absolutely prevented. It would therefore be preposterous to declare that the "Republic of the Philippines" was a government established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the Commonwealth and the sovereignty of the United States. public order and safety. (President McKinley. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides as follows: ART. in practice the Japanese military authorities in the Philippines never treated the "Republic of the Philippines" as an independent government after its inauguration. therefore. Commenting upon this article.

The occupant was not absolutely prevented from respecting our law of criminal procedure and the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal jurisdiction. (Wheaton's International Law. and implies no change in the legal position of the invader with respect to the occupied territory and its inhabitants. informs us that the occupant did not avail himself of said court but punished his enemies direct without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic". discussing the extent of the right of a military occupant. Tested by this criterion. 2. must use his power within the limits defined by the fundamental notion of occupation. and. . This concept is.Acts of the military occupant which exceed his power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations. nor did they make use of them." and prohibits the issuance of warrants except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. (7th edition). are null and without effect as against the legitimate government. On occupying a country an invader at once invest himself with absolute authority. houses. the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures or agencies established by "Republic". 7th ed. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. we think. and success of his military operations. his power is qualified by the transient character of his administration. efficacy. and freedom-loving countries of the world. within the occupied territory as is required for his safety and the success of his operations. The summary procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. (Pages 498. He is therefore forbidden as a general rule to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations. As to the illegal possession of firearms the City Fiscal himself. . We base this opinion upon the following considerations: 1. we are of the that it transcended his power or competence. 499. repugnant to the humanitarian method of administering criminal justice adopted by all progressive. states: If occupation is merely a phase in military operations. having only a right to such control as is necessary for his safety and the success of his operations. democratic. The application or nonapplication of said law did not affect the security. and success of his military operations. efficacy. therefore. who the validity of the ordinance. and also the replacement of the actual civil judicial administration by the military jurisdiction. was it within the power or competence of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army of occupation of the Philippines to promulgate Ordinance No. or which regulate the moral order of the community. The crimes over which the said court was vested with jurisdiction were mostly crimes against property penalized in our Revised Penal Code. . he is bound to laws. in force in the country. In its exercise however this ultimate authority is governed by the condition that the invader. But in affairs which do not affect the security. borne out by an examination of the following features of said procedure: (a) Under the rule of procedure embodied in said ordinance any prosecuting officer may. issue a search warrant for the seizure of documents and articles which may be regarded as evidence of an offense — in violation of section 2. [1944]." Unless absolutely prevented. 7? In so far as said ordinance created new court of special criminal jurisdiction we think his power to promulgate and enforce it during the occupation cannot be seriously disputed. or which regulate the moral order of the community. . and with due reference to its transient character. which crimes did not affect the army of occupation. He is forbidden "to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations. 245.) Hall in his Treatise on Internal Law. Rule 122 of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth. . the rights which he possesses over them are those which in the special circumstances represent his general right to do whatever acts are necessary for the prosecution of his war. in other words he has the right of exercising such control. devoid of that high sense of justice by which the military occupant must be guided in the exercise of his powers. which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons. . and civil and criminal. p. and he further informs us that "as regards food control. 7 was inquisitorial.) We deduce from the authorities that the power of the occupant is broad and absolute in matters affecting his safety. on his own volition and even without probable cause. and the fact of occupation draws with it as of course the substitution of his will for previously existing law whenever such substitution is reasonably needed. papers. but in so far as that ordinance varied radically our law of criminal procedure and deprived the accused of certain rights which our people have always treasured and considered inviolate. . and such control only.

" But to us that hypothetical case is a good illustration of the injustice of such procedure. the accused was of course utterly unable to do that and was consequently doomed to at least six years' imprisonment for a crime he had not committed. Rule 114. But under the procedure in question as outlined by the City Fiscal. (d) Section 6 of the Ordinance in question provided: "The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death. Volente non fit injuria. He answers in the affirmative but says that he is not the owner of the revolver and he does not know how it placed there. but the question here is not whether the legislative department of the legitimate . In view of the revelation of the policeman he would had been able to investigate and ascertain that fact. but he refuses to answers. he would have had ample time to reflect and endeavor to unravel the mystery. principally the policeman. In this case. As may be seen. beyond reasonable doubt. At the trial he would not have been required to answer to any proof in his defense until the prosecution had presented its witness. thereby also depriving him of his right to meet the witnesses face to face and of his privilege against self-incrimination. The City Fiscal justifies this feature of the procedure by giving the following hypothetical case: "In the house of Juan and under his bed a policeman finds a revolver. and there being no further evidence to be presented that may change the result the accused may be then and there sentenced by the court. the accused is interrogated by the judge as to the facts and circumstances of the case. and suppose that houseboy was really the one who planted the revolver because of some grievance he had against his master but that the latter had not suspected before that his houseboy had any revolver. It is true that as rule that right is statutory and may be withdrawn by the legislature except in certain cases where the right to appeal is provided in the Constitution itself." Under our law of criminal procedure. His lawyer could have cross-examined the policeman and found out from him whether he had any grudge against the accused and how he happened to search the latter's house. in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevateden consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. He could have consulted a lawyer. the evidence of guilt is complete. for according to him the revolver was not his and he did not know how it got into his house. an offense punishable under the ordinance in question with imprisonment for six to twelve years. all persons accused of any offense have the right to appeal to the Court Appeals or to the Supreme Court. did not to our mind prove him guilt. He is asked whether or not he admits that the revolver was found in his house. he answer that he has none. He is brought before the judge of the corresponding special court for the preliminary interrogatory. as in the cases involving life imprisonment and death penalty. (c) The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in all criminal prosecutions until the contrary is proved. under the circumstances. Juan is arrested and an information for illegal possession of firearms is filed against him by the fiscal. which is likewise guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. either to the fact that there was no such guest. Suppose that the policeman should say that his informant as to the presence of the revolver under the bed of the accused was a houseboy of the latter. for his refusal to reveal the identity of his alleged guest may due.(b) The trial must be commenced within two days after the filing of the information — in violation of section 7. which give the accused at least two days after the plea of not guilty within which to prepare fort trial. He was accused of illegal possession of firearm. In that he way he could have satisfactory explained how and by whom the revolver was placed under his bed. and if from the facts obtained by such interrogation it should appear (to the judge) that accused is guilty a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against him. and he would have been entitled to at least two days after the information was read to him to investigate the facts and prepare for the trial. He is asked to give the name of the guest reffered to and his address. which the military occupant was bound to respect unless absolutely prevented. His inability to prove who the owner of the revolver was. From the testimony of the policeman the accused might have been enlightened as to how and by whom the revolver was place in his house. He had no time to investigate and try to find out whether the policeman himself or some the other person who wished to do him harm had planted it there. Asked whether he knows of anybody who could have placed the revolver under his bed. he answers that it might have been place there by a guest who slept on his bed the night previous to its discovery by the polices. sooner was the revolver seized than he was brought before the court and interrogated about it when he was naturally dazed and in a state of alarm. If the law of criminal procedure had been followed. is violated in that. after the arraignment and before the presentation of any proof for the prosecution. or that the cause for concealing his identity is worth suffering for. There the accused was convicted not because the prosecution had proved his guilt but because he was unable to prove his innocence. the conviction of the accused is reasonable and fair. Asked if he has other witnesses to support his claim. He pleaded not guilty.

had the right to demand their release byhabeas corpus after the lapse of six hours." We concede that the objective of the author of the ordinance was commendable. . denial of the presumption innocence. insurrection. murder. after a summary trial was life imprisonment. Such discrimination was unwarranted and unjust and was contrary to the concept of justice prevailing in all democratic countries. unreasonable searches and seizures. social. which functions under a democratic government that fought with the other democratic nations in that war. namely. . clothing. and "he who in such a case bases his reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in accordance with humanity and justice. or rebellion when the public safety requires it. The suspension by the ordinance was not motivated by any one of these cases but by the necessity for waging a campaign against certain classes of crime. 3. and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. ( f ) Section 7 of the Ordinance suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons accused of or under investigation for any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2. Before concluding this opinion we deem it pertinent to comment on the remark of the City Fiscal that. and economic structures. but we think — and in this we are supported by the actual result — it was unattainable thru the means and methods prescribed in said ordinance. The possession of firearms was rendered desirable to many person to defend themselves against or . That cause was the presence in the country of the Japanese army. against which that war was fought and won the cost of million of lives and untold sacrifices." (Preamble Charter for Peace adopted by the United Nations at San Francisco. where every person is entitled to the equal protection of the laws. in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. robbed the people of their food. Article VIII of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. martial law was not declared. and other wise made life unbearable. It is apparent from the foregoing examination of the main features of the ordinance that while the methods thus adopted may not be unusual under totalitarian governments like those of the aggressor nations in the recent global war. 13. pp." (Principles of International Lawrence.government has the power to abrogate that right but whether it was within the competence of the military occupant to do so. destroyed our means of communication. 7th ed..) The recent global war was a clash between two antagonistic ways of life. which "is based on usage and opinion". ejected them from their own homes. and medicine and other necessities of life. It would be strange indeed if his Court. June 26. The cornering and hoarding of foodstuffs would not for the scarcity produced by the Japanese army and the disruption of our commerce and industries on account of the invasion. whereas person accused of or under investigation for crimes other than those specified. and he was denied the right to have that sentence reviewed by the Supreme Court. California. self-incrimination. homicide. The case involves the interpretation not of constitution but of international law. The same discrimination holds true with reference to the other features already noted above. he could not have been deprived by law of that right. The relative rampancy of the crimes mentioned in said ordinance was but the effect of that cause. punished and tortured innocent men and women. such for example as theft. The Constitution of the Commonwealth prohibit the suspension of that privilege except in cases of invasion. (e) In the instant case the penalty imposed upon accused by the special court. and denial of the right to appeal. 12. summary trial.) We think the contentions for the petitioner against the validity of the ordinance in question are in accord with humanity and justice. which wrecked our political. The result of such partial suspension was that persons accused of or under investigation for any of the offenses specified in section 1 and 2 could be held in detention indefinitely. section 2. and the suspension of habeas corpus did not apply to all persons living in the specified territory (as should have been done if the public safety required such suspension) but only to those accused of or investigated for certain specified crimes or offenses. Peace and order and normalcy could not be restored unless the root cause of their disturbance were eliminated first. . the ordinance in question was promulgated in response to "an urgent necessity for waging an immediately and relentless campaign against certain classes and expediting the trail and determination thereof in order to hasten the re-establishment of peace and other throughout the country and promote a feeling of security among the people conducive to the earlier return of normalcy in our national life. physical injuries. they are strange and repugnant to the people of the democratic countries which united together to defeat said aggressors and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human person. 1945. altho under subsection 4. between facism and democracy. should sanction or approve the way of life. and parricide. 4. as stated in its preamble.

the basis of the information was Act No. passed during the Japanese — sponsored Republic of the Philippines and amending certain articles of the Revised Penal Code. and the original provisions of the Revised Penal Code restored.attack the invader. Escalante vs.. Inasmuch as he was a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary. who is not a habitual criminal. So. As this is the effect of the decision of the majority. I concur in the result. Robberies and other crimes against property increased as a resulted of hunger and privation to which the people were subjected by the rapacity of the Japanese. In accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts Nos. the petitioner herein was found guilty and sentence to suffer life imprisonment. Ordinance No. 226 ). after said laws have been repealed by subsequent legislation. Director of Prisons (56 Phil. although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. J. 4103 and 4225 ). which provides as follows: Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: The penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. . 1944. concurring in the result: Charged with robbery. paragraph 5. Consequently the proceedings in said court which resulted in the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are also void. PARAS. 1944. were given the benefit of subsequent legislation either repealing statute under which they had been convicted or modifying the same by imposing lesser penalties. we are constrained to declare the whole ordinance null and void ab initio. He commenced to serve the term on August 21. The trial was held by the then existing Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which was authorized to conduct proceedings in a special manner. Directo vs. Santos (56 Phil." In the absence of other details. Having reached the conclusion that the enactment of the procedure embodied in said ordinance for the special court therein created was beyond the competence of the occupant.. there being no information that the double the period of the minimum penalty that could be imposed upon him. even from the point of view of the Filipino people and not of the Japanese army of occupation. Tamayo (61 Phil. By virtue of article 22 of the said Code.") After General of the Army Douglas McArthur had issued the Proclamation dated October 23. 483). inasmuch as that procedure was inseparable from the first part of the ordinance which creates the special court and prescribes the jurisdiction thereof. it may here be assumed that the offense committed is that defined in article 294.. the ordinance in question results untenable. People vs. the Act under which the petitioner was charged and convicted stands nullified. 692). It was a delusion to expect peace and normalcy to return without eliminating the cause of their disturbance or destruction of the Japanese army in the Philippines — an objective to which the ordinance was not addressed. 44 387). and also repeatedly released on writs ofhabeas corpus prisoners who. as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code. the maximum penalty that can be imposed is six months of arresto mayor... Moran (Phil. This Court has already dismissed cases wherein the defendants were charge with the violation of law in force at the time of the commission and trial of the crime. 65. In the present case. he should be released. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony. 7 of the "Republic. People vs. Prisoners who behave well are almost always liberated upon the expiration of the minimum penalty fixed in the judgments of conviction or within a reasonable time thereafter.

It may prescribe the revenues to be paid. that while it exist it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who. as already held by this Court in civil case G. 1944. perhaps. herein petitioner was accused of the crime of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1944. established in the City of Manila. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. L-5 entitled Co Kim Cham vs.. supported more or less directly by military force. 9 Wall. No. under the name of the Philippine Executive Commission. according to its pleasure. do not become responsible. Harrison. And in the performance of this duty. In said criminal case. decided on September 17. called also by publicists a government de facto. Leitensdorfer vs. by civil authority. 16 How. but the latter has no right to force them to do so. Webb. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1). is confessedly temporary. 20 Id. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. 416. that they should continue to carry on the ordinary administration under the invader. New Orleans vs. In occupied territory. and (2). but which might. ante). JOYA.[ U. There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such cases. S. As it is a consequence of his acts that the regular government of the country is suspended.]. 20 Wall. under military occupation. and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government. also. was a de facto government.. but they may be administrated. in the following language: But there is another description of government. save those which are found in the laws and customs and usages of war (Cross vs.].R. 66 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. 164 . War. Steamship Co. Part II. The Grapeshot. so far as necessary for maintaining order and the continuance of the daily life of the territory: other purposes..) Under a de facto government. and whenever practicable. the invader himself is not left equally free. 133. pp. It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. Though the fact of occupation imposes no duties upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory. so long as it is based upon occupation. issued by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic. is to replace them by appointees of his own. dated October 23. his only rights. 1945 (p. for those acts. during Japanese occupation. 2d ed. on August 21. and of punishing crime. that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories.. under the authority of Ordinance No. the courts of the country. International Law. can bide their time (Westlake. and his rights of control spring only from the necessity of the . and the effect on said proceeding of the proclamation of General Douglas McArthur.. pp. If they decline. because the responsibility of maintaining peace and public order. be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force.. as these of the superior judicial offices.. and it is also his duty. as wrongdoers. J. United States [1913. supported by the military force of the invader. [1874]. by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force. Said government possessed all the characteristics of a de facto government as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States. and apply them to its own use or otherwise.]. he may proclaim martial law (Davis. [ U. 121-123). the conquering power has a right to displace the pre-existing authority. It may appoint all the necessary officers and clothe them with designated powers. should be kept open. falls directly upon the commander in chief of the occupying forces. though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. They are usually administered directly by military authority. concurring: The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the judicial proceeding held in criminal case No. 129. It is generally the better course for the inhabitants of the territory.S.] 229 U.S. 176. 7. the subordinate officers of the local administration should be allowed to continue in their functions. under military occupation. 330-332). 287.DE. and as his presence. Elements of International Law [3d. he is bound to take whatever means are required for the security of public order. (MacLeod vs. There can be doubt that the government established in this country by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces. and to assume to such extent as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government.

under similar circumstances. ed. ed.. S. Lockhart.. Holland. with a new constitution. International Law. Under military occupation. 578. in territories of the enemy under military occupation.. valid and binding (Coleman vs. Law.476.. pp. ed. 97 U. United States. 1018. lays down (Arts. S. Hall. 249. 33 Sup. S. 460). International Law. in establishing governments for the maintenance of peace and order and the administration of justice. as it was established under the authority of the military occupant and supported by the armed forces of the latter. pp. ed. 97 U. pp. The government subsequently established under the so-called Philippine Republic. 7th ed. p. 330-332. pp. . Davis. Ford vs. 6th ed. 464. 39.. International Law. they were considered as legal. Part II. ed. United States vs. Bruffy. International Law. 24 Law. S. Bruffy. as a general rule.. 43) definite rules concerning military authority over the territory of a hostile state. 331337. 1118.. Wilson. 594. 177. unless absolutely prevented. 20 Wall. valid and binding (Williams vs. Elements of International Law. International Law.. Thus the judgment rendered by the Confederate courts. ed.Tennessee. nevertheless. secs. 96 U.. 121-123). 57. The government established here under the Philippine Executive Commission was more in consonance with the general practice among civilized nations. 716. Ct. Westlake. modify the permanent institutions of the country (Hall. United States. [ U. therefore. 22 Wall. ed. that he must not. 229 U. 992. S 509. Taylor. (1909). he is also bound to alter or override the existing laws as little as possible (Hall.. the original national character of the soil and of the inhabitants of the territory remains unaltered. 21 Law. 6th ed.. Lawrence. at least. 371) When the military forces of the Confederate states were destroyed. But it was somewhat different from that established under the Philippine Executive Commission. was also of the nature of a de facto government. 24 Law.. 335. merely settling the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction. and with it all its enactments. International Law. even after the government established by the invader had been displaced by the legitimate government of said territory. 97 U. 24 Law. 416.. 509. 17 Wall. it provides that the occupant must respect. 955. 465. 576. which give him a claim as of right to the obedience of the conquered population. 1118. International Law. In addition to codifying the accepted law. MacLeod vs. Surget. 570. and although the invader is invested with quasisovereignity. But the legislative acts of the several States forming the Confederacy stood on a different ground. Horn vs. Sprott vs. ed. pp. 356-57. The Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.. 3rd ed. or the just rights of citizens under the Federal constitution. 24 Law..]. before the court established by the military occupant are general considered legal and valid. its exercise is limited by the qualification which has gradually become established. and also because the latter are more competent to administer the laws of the territory. their government perished. because said government was of a temporary character...case. in so far as it does not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably.. 96 U... pp. subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities. It will thus be readily seen that the municipal law of the invaded state continues in force. S. during the Civil War. the laws in force in the country. under the municipal law of the territory. International Law. The judicial proceedings conducted. as it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials. S. is unusual in the practices among civilized nations. which however. generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial officers as are willing to serve under him. Coleman vs. 421413. S. had the semblance of permanency. and so far as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority. 660. or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. Co. 176. Tennessee. in accordance with International Law.. United States. 1260. nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion.. The regular courts of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation.. not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States. Williams vs. 476). and the military occupant. 42. 97 U. adopted at The Hague in 1899. 22 Law.. Ins.475. 99. 359. War 2d ed. because the former apparently. and it is not customary for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. 24 Law. had been declared legal. 6th ed.

during Japanese occupation.. and Executive Commission. Ct. 15 Sup. by compelling the accused to testify against themselves. ed. without violating. judicial precedents or public policy. Ct. in the least. 156 U.. Under said laws. regulations and processes issued and promulgated by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic. that had been receiving arms from the forces of liberation across the seas. once the Japanese armies in the Philippines had been defeated. 7 of the crime of bribery and other was used as a cloak to conceal its venom and make said law look innocent. Johnson vs. perished. Violation of food-control laws were included and used as a pretext and justification for the seizure and confiscation of food provisions so badly needed by the invader. 157. for bringing the accused into court and . 618. and by its summary procedure.. and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Federal Constitution. falsification malversation and bribery. and no procedure should be treated as unconstitutional which makes due provision for the trial of alleged criminal before a court of competent jurisdiction. robbery. 171 U.. 65 of the puppet republic and the other allied laws are illegal possession of firearms. as well as said Act No. But there are other considerations equally important why judicial proceedings held and conducted before the courts established by said de facto governments. S. 65 of the National Assembly of the puppet republic. said Ordinance No. the persons accused were deprived of liberty without due process of law. by the denial of the remedy of habeas corpus. "the phrase 'due process of law' used in the Philippine Bill should receive a comprehensive interpretation. should be respected by the courts. whenever possible. 1944. violations of food-control laws. 7 promulgated on March 8. By the imposition of excessive penalties . and the supremacy of the authority of the legitimate Government. declaring null and void all laws... under laws promulgated by them. 890. The penalty of twelve years' imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms was directed mainly against those underground forces. to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. and it was under said laws that herein petitioner was prosecuted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the crime robbery. 65 of the puppet republic. creating the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. such as Act No. Transit Co. (Baldy vs. and by denying them the right of appeal to the highest court of the land. 99 U. as with them the de facto governments.. the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed that the judicial and legislative acts of the rebellious States.) Under the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur. should be declared null and void.. Atlantic G. became null and void. ostensibly for the speedy reestablishment of peace and order. 7 and the other allied laws impaired and defeated the just and legal rights of Filipino citizens under the Commonwealth Constitution.188. dated October 23. and other allied laws. Ketchum vs. prescribing summary rules of procedure.22 Law. And the inclusion under said Ordinance No. as de facto governments. prescribing heavier penalties. successively established under them. 520). The penalty of life imprisonment or death for robbery was aimed principally at the underground forces resolute and determined to seize and remove stores of food provisions. except where the death penalty was imposed. 7 and Act No. said Ordinance No. 388. & W. Said Ordinance No. 208. 18 Sup. if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the national government. In the language of this Court. In the later case. ed. and with them all their enactments and processes of a hostile character. Hunter. 1944. The principal crimes mentioned in said Ordinance No. 7 adopted as integral parts thereof said Executive Order No. I. 816. Law. prescribing exceptionally heavy penalties for the crimes enumerated therein. S. settled principles. Buckley [1878]. S.

notifying him of the cause he is required to meet. ORDINANCE NO. created by Ordinance No. J. championed by North America. whose gigantic efforts and heroic sacrifices have vindicated human rights.Kennedy. and before joining it. and therefore. For the foregoing reasons. 7 issued by President Laurel of the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese regime.. In their conception. and the City Fiscal of Manila. and for an appeal from such judgement to the highest tribunal" (United States vs. and now seeks a writ ofhabeas corpus in order that his liberty may be restored to him. 18 Phil. and they are.. not because he committed any crime. and consecrated them anew all over the earth with the generous blood of her children. and followed political and military activities in open allegiance to the Commonwealth Government and the United States of America. in the Muntinglupa Prison Camp. They violate the fundamental principles of Justice for which civilized Mankind stands. Petitioner alleges that sometime in the month of September. recommended that the writ prayed for be granted. under the benign leadership of Totalitarianism and given all the nations of the earth a new birth as well as a new character of freedom. therefore. PERFECTO. Said laws are contrary to the principles of Democracy. a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. against his will. human dignity and human freedom. 1945. to enable each and everyone to live a nobler and more worthy life and realize the justice and prosperity of the future. and that he was prosecuted. there appeared to argue the First Assistant Solicitor General. he being then a minor only 17 years old. 122). concurring: On October 21. he was for several times arrested and maltreated as a guerrilla member. 7. Justice Feria. I concur in the dispositive part of the opinion prepared by Mr. The Solicitor General. and made possible our participation in the councils of free and libertyloving peoples and nations. appearing in behalf of respondent Director of Prisons. of political character and complexion. petitioner William F. as they had been promulgated in furtherance of the war aims of the enemy. 7 AND PROCESSES UNDER IT NULLIFIED BY THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL MACARTHUR . contending that said Ordinance No. I. and whose heroes and martyrs now lie in graves still unknown and whose names remain unsung. 1944. Peralta began to serve. answered the petition agreeing that the acts and proceedings taken and had before said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied force and efficacy. deserted the Constabulary forces. who sustained the validity if the said Ordinance and the proceeding by virtue of which petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the hearing held on September 21. Those repressive laws were aimed at the men and women who had kept the faith. he joined the Constabulary forces as a private. in their purpose and mode of enforcement and execution said laws were hostile to the authority of the Commonwealth Government and that of the United States of America. as amicus curiae. for giving him an opportunity to be heard. but because he joined the guerrilla organization. impugning the validity of said Ordinance No. 1943. 7 was null and void ab initio because it was of a political complexion and its provisions are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. and 22. for the deliberation and judgement of the court. but whose heroic efforts and sacrifices have made immortal the legends of Filipino resistance.

That all laws. L-5. No. and 3. 1943 . and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino people. formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court as president. which fought in Bataan and later liberated the whole Philippines. the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. like the process here in question. revealing strong grounds for their annulment. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. by virtue of the above-quoted October Proclamation of General MacArthur. justifying. The shocking character of the provisions of Ordinance No. became null and void and without effect since October 23. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. The October Proclamation is. were closely associated with Laurel in this movement. Laurel. and we deem it unnecessary to repeat what we stated in said opinion. regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. 153. Jorge Vargas. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Islands with Jose P. Commander in Chief of the Philippine-American Forces. as an aftermath of the liberation. in keeping with the following official statement of the President of the United States: On the fourteenth of this month. October 23. 1944. Our sympathy goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth — that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy. R. It appears that Ordinance No. issued a proclamation declaring: 1. There are indications that more processes held under the Japanese regime will come to our knowledge. 7 in question has been issued under the Japanese regime and that the judicial process under which petitioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. formerly a member of the Philippine Commonwealth Cabinet and Benigno Aquino. . I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the present Philippine Republic has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. . That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is. It is fortunate that all the members of the Supreme Court arrived at a unanimous conclusion as to the absolute nullity of the process under which petitioner is now being held in prison. . 1944. also formerly a member of that cabinet. having been held in a court not belonging to the Commonwealth of the Philippines but organized and established under the authority of the enemy. 2. subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States. The second act was a hypocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit. . the wisdom of the decision of General MacArthur in nullifying in a sweeping manner all judicial processes held during enemy occupation. .On October 23. 7 and the processes held under it show once more how General MacArthur was absolutely right and justified in issuing the October Proclamation. . ante). We have explained at length our position as to the effects of said October Proclamation in our dissenting opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs.

or rebellion" and only "when the public safety requires it. pp. "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any prosecuting officer. considered as a necessary element to make the warrant reasonable. and the persons or things to be seized. 3." . and effects against unreasonable searches and seizure shall not be violated." This provision is repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure. 93. which is the real meaning of the words "including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Ordinance. 1. when under our Constitution such search warrants should be issued only by a judge. Rule 122. which. 65 of the Laurel Philippine Republic. 1943. Naval War College. insurrection. cultural.FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT President of the United States (From U. unreasonable. sense of right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in the following words of our fundamental law: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. (Art.) Putting aside the October Proclamation. houses. by a mere perusal of the ordinance in question. including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this order even if such articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2. any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2 hereof. and arbitrary procedure provided under the authority of the ordinance in question: (1) By authorizing "any prosecuting officer" to issue search warrants. II. 1943. universally recognized in civilized modern nations and how such ordinance and processes can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social. is the same as that established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. of the Rules of Court. papers. and particularly describing the place to be searched. (2) By trespassing the limits established by section 2. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. Under said procedure. 7 in question provides that "the privileges of the writ habeas corpus are hereby suspended with respect to persons accused of. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and witnesses he may produce. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Section 5 of Ordinance No. Constitution of the Philippines. International Law Documents. sec.) This constitutional provision is violated by the summary. of the Rules of Court. No. or under investigation for. 7 provides that cases arising under it shall follow the summary procedure provided in Act No. dated May 18. and political atmosphere of the era of darkness. Rule 122. DISCRIMINATORY AND INIQUITOUS SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Section 7 of Ordinance No. S." This provision is also violative of one of the fundamental guarantees established in the Constitution of the Philippines. authorizing peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant. in turn. which provides that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended only in case of "invasion. 94. III." III. we will see immediately how such law and the processes held under it are incompatible with the fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure. (3) By authorizing the search and seizure of articles or objects not described in warrant. 157 of the Chairman of the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission.

) Under section 21 of Executive Order No. or rebellion." From the foregoing. above mentioned. without the circumstances which can only justify said suspension. even under third degree procedure. or exacted through brutal kempei tortures). liberty. or torture. in cases falling under the ordinance in question. shall be admissible in evidence. by depriving the accused. which is not denied to the accused in all other cases: No person shall be deprived of life. it is evident that the ordinance in question is repugnant to the deep sense of right of our people. sec." In the same section it is also provided that "refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him. III. . (5) That the statement made by said representative or attorney." (Emphasis ours. No. 14. "the accused or his representative may be examined by the court. Constitution of the Philippines. 1. 157.The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion. in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. III.) It is also provided that "statements made by the accused. after arraignment and plea. may be examined by the court or by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer. "the judge shall interrogate the accused . (2) That the refusal of the accused to answer may be considered unfavorable to him.) IV. sec. even an impostor who might pose as a representative to assure the doom of the accused. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF. not only because it suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. his co-accused. (6) That statements made by any person acting in a similar capacity as a representative of the accused which may be a relative or a friend or.) Again. of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is so. No. or property without due process of law.INCRIMINATION Under section 18 of Executive Order No. "irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made" (that is. intimidation.) Under the same section the absence of an accused or of his representative "shall not be a ground for interrupting the proceedings or attacking the validity of the judgment. even if made in the absence of the accused. ." (Emphasis ours. shall be admissible in evidence. but "his representative" (his lawyer. but because it flagrantly violates the fundamental principle of equality before the law. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. "irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made (that is. 1. or the representative of the accused or a person acting in a similar capacity." (Emphasis ours. 1. although exacted under duress. 157. (4) That not only the accused. irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made shall be admissible in evidence if material to the issue. when the public safety requires it. (Art. as if said representative or attorney is facing the same criminal prosecution instituted against his client. Constitution of the Philippines. and with the permission of the court. it appears: (1) That the accused may be examined by the court or any prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him. whose personal security was jeopardized under the Japanese regime). by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him of his principal. as to facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and those which are admitted. (Art. insurrection. . (3) That statements made by the accused.

Idem. We must not forget that during normal times. so nauseating. denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents the law were often heard. and that the terroristic menace of its rakes was abolished in Spain. alleged witches were burned at the stake. that it takes a real courage to keep our equanimity while we are compelled to analyze it. It is evident that the procedure established violates the following provisions of our fundamental code: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved." This provision is a clear violation of the fundamental right of appeal. shall be admissible in evidence. 17. and so opposed to human nature. just before the last global war started. No matter what merits can be found. shall be secure in his person. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. in the thirteen colonies of America. 1. 7. in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. (Art. only in 1834. V. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. We must be very careful to retain zealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. sec. to meet the witnesses face to face. had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. among criminal cases we have under consideration. there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means. in his life. No. No. It is beyond our comprehension how a man. We must not forget that that constitutional guarantee was acquired as a result of protest against all inquisitorial and third degree procedures. all accused are entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court: . in his honor. to have a speedy and public trial. as a means of compelling them to confess their fantastic compacts with the devil. in the United States of America and in the Philippines. We must not forget how an institution created in the twelfth century was the cause of so much tortures and sufferings. Even with the existence of such guarantee. Even today. in his liberty. it is provided that "the decision of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death. which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice. constitutionally guaranteed to all accused in the Philippines. III. from the theoretical point of view. under the twentieth century lights. This very Supreme Court.or in the same circumstances under which masked spies decreed the death of innocent citizens pointed by them during zoning concentrations). to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. innocent or guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF APPEAL TRAMPLED UPON In section 6 of Ordinance No. the undeniable reality of human experience shows conclusively the absolute need of such guarantee if justice must be served. not only once. could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure. (7) That trial shall proceed in the absence of the accused. 1. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self-incrimination. through third degree methods. Under the Constitution of the Philippines.) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. sec. not very long ago. Constitution of the Philippines. (Art. there are officers of the law who cannot resist temptation of using their power to compel. III. We must not forget how.) The procedure is so revolving. in the arguments of those who are championing the suppression of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. 18. and no man. (8) That trial shall proceed in the absence of his attorney or other representative. and therefore in Philippines. endowed with reason. however innocent he may be.

It is that this Court has played a large in the unfolding of the constitutional plan (sometimes too so in the opinion of some observers). it was the prevailing theory in judicial decisions that the right of appeal is not a fundamental one. sec 2. the Supreme Court is just one of the instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. (Art. revise. and it is conceivable that "orderly liberty" could be maintained without them. Idem. provide that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review. No. therefore. Constitution of the Philippines. certiorari. Idem. or toll. but we be arrogant indeed if we presume that a government of laws. VIII. taught by the unerring lessons of human experience. or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide. of Article VIII. or executive order or regulations is in question. VIII. In a case of denaturalization wherein the Government of the United States sought to deprive a person of his American citizenship.) (5) In all cases in which an error or question of law is involved.) (4) In all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. as judges we cannot say that person who advocates their adoption through peaceful and constitutional means is not in fact attached to the Constitution — those institutions are not enumerated as necessary in the government's test of "general political philosophy". As a matter of fact. (Art. have been enacted by our Constitutional Convention. Idem. VIII. and replacement of congressional districts with "councils of workers" in which legislative and executive powers would be united. The drafters of our Constitution. In fact. 2. the Federal Supreme Court declared: These would indeed be significant changes in our governmental structure — changes which it is safe to say are not desired by the majority of the people in this country — but whatever our personal views. assessment. believed himself to be the victim of a wrong in any inferior court. on the ground that the 1928 platform of the Communist Party of the United States. to which the respondent belonged. 2. sec. 5. final judgments and decrees of inferior courts. sec. modify. with . No. of the Senate and the veto power of the President. instead of stating that the accused shall not be denied of the right of appeal in the cases mentioned therein. sec. impost. under the specific provisions of the Constitution. 2. It is one of the means considered necessary by our Constitution to better serve the supreme interest of the people. Idem.) (2) In all cases involving the legality of any tax.) (3) In all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue. The unicameral legislature is not unknown in the country. of Article VIII. The Supreme Court is not an entity or institution whose rights and privileges must be constitutionally guaranteed. 2. who. advocated the abolition of the supreme Court. in the specified cases. of the Constitution. No. The fact that the provisions of section 2. It is only a means. 3. or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. The provisions of section 2. 1. The drafters of our Constitution. but it is a mere privilege or mere statutory grant. 2. not for the benefit and well-being of the people. came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable human weaknesses. VIII. 4.) Before the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines. VIII. or affirm on appeal.(1) In all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty. No. of the Constitution. sec. considered it necessary to establish constitutional guarantees to reduce to its minimum the effects of such innate human weakness by providing that the appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused. (Art. (Art. ordinance. (Art. No. reverse. The Senate has not gone free of criticism and one object of the Seventeenth Amendment was to make it more responsive to the popular will. law. does not impair nor diminish the fundamental character of the right of appeal of the accused to the Supreme Court. the Supreme Court of the United States itself declared that the elimination of said tribunal is not incompatible with the existence of a government of laws.

no one shall be deprived of the "equal protection of the laws". under Ordinance No. Under our constitution. sec. in the case in question. in the summary procedure established by Ordinance No. under the Japanese regime. That guarantee was consecrated in our Constitution: In all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. 1943. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. (5) By placing the accused. under Ordinance No. the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus enjoyed by the accused in other cases. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS VIOLATED Since the American flag began to fly over our soil. and a minority of three justices to be specially called out by the President of the Laurel Philippine Republic. 7. or of abusing those function to thwart the popular will. should he refuse to answer any question that the court or any prosecuting officer might propound to him.) This guarantee is undoubtedly violated when. propounded by the court or any officer. to meet the witnesses face to face. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. to have a speedy and a public trial. that is. the fundamental guarantee that in all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.) VII. and who advocated various remedies taking a wide range. June 21. where the guarantees against unreasonableness in search warrants issued against other accused are specially eliminated. under the sword of Damocles of an unfavorable presumptions.protection for minority groups would be impossible without it. and to make the appeal en consulta just an empty gesture to make the situation of the accused more pitiful by lengthening is days of agony. 17. 7: (1) By the fact that the accused therein are victims of search warrants specially provided for them. (2) By depriving the accused. by entrusting the power to revised said sentence to small minority of the Supreme Court.) VI. (Schneiderman vs. (Art. where the right of appeal is retained for them. 1. 7. 1. (4) By discriminating against the accused. No. III." . except when sentenced of death is imposed. this Court at various lines its existence has not escaped the shafts of critics whose sincerity and attachment to the Constitution is beyond question — critics who have accused it of assuming functions of judicial review not intended to be conferred upon it. "may raise unfavorable presumption against him. Like other agencies of government. No. United States of America. (Art. undoubtedly with the evident purpose of the confirmation of the conviction of the accused. (3) By depriving the accused. Constitution of the Philippines. 1. ABRIDGMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is evidently abridged in the summary procedure in criminal cases under Ordinance No. Constitution of the Philippines. 7. 7 of the fundamental right of appeal in all cases. III. in cases where the sentenced imposed is death. under the Ordinance No. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. it is provided that the refusal of the accused to answer any question. sec. has been implanted in our country to remain forever.

the nature of a foreign decision or judgment. under the most elemental principles of law. For that reason. because it is so under international law.R. THE DECISION CONVICTING THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY IS UNENFORCEABLE The decision by which petitioner William F. It has. carries the same vice as the ordinance under which it was rendered. adopted by the Hague in 1899. being violative of international law. 7 which suspended our laws. 42 and 43. just in case they might think later of committing any offense against the Japanese or their collaborators. being a foreign decision. (Arts. the judicial process — maybe it is better to say injudicial process — which resulted in the imprisonment of petitioner. they were submitted to preventive tortures and long months of imprisonment. beyond any reasonable doubt. by substantially subverting the judicial procedures in the special criminal cases instituted under said ordinance. including those internationally legal ones. ante) Said decision. therefore. IX. No. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. enjoys the absolute freedom of not recognizing or of nullifying any and all acts of the invader.If we have to keep democracy in our country. 153. having been rendered under Ordinance No. Even then. or under facist or totalitarian regimes. 7. But even without the October Proclamation. must be shorn of all effects because it had taken place under the authority of an ordinance which was null and void ab initio. ORDINANCE NO. after expelling the bandit who was able to usurp its possession for a while. Peralta was convicted and is being confined for life having been rendered by a tribunal created. it is unenforceable within the Philippines or under the Commonwealth. and acting under the authority of a foreign State. we must be vigilant in upholding the constitutional principle that all persons shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 5. functioning. Even decisions of a court of the United States or of any of its States or territories can be enforced in the Philippines only by the . including the fundamental one. But even admitting arguendo that said decision is valid. General McArthur exercised correctly that power by the sweeping nullification decreed in his October Proclamation. was null and void ab initio. said ordinance. p. During the Japanese occupation all persons who might fall under the suspicion of any Japanese or their spies and lackeys. as we have shown in our opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. the legitimate government. the Emperor of the Imperial Government of Japan. Under international law. and is not included in the nullification decreed by General Douglas MacArthur. 7 VIOLATED THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1899 In the convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land. after expelling the enemy invader.) The provision of the Convention has been flagrantly violated when. The situation is exactly the same as that of the owner of the house who can do anything in it that pleases him. still it cannot be enforced. is unenforceable. This principle is the opposite of that prevailing under autocracies. under the enemy occupation the Laurel Philippine Republic enacted Ordinance No. were presumed to be guilty of any imaginary crime until they were able to convince their victimizers of the contrary. A foreign decision can only be enforced through the institution of an action before our tribunals. VIII. it is provided that the military occupant must respect the laws in force in the occupied country. which was null and void ab initio. unless absolutely prevented. For this reason. once restored to its own territory.

In submitting said statistical data. were convicted of illegal possession of firearms. or executor. having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgement. and the other for illegal possession of firearms. 66. out of the 92 prisoners committed by said courts to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement. Is it reasonable to surmise. thus dissipating the unfounded fear entertained by the City Fiscal of Manila. the Solicitor General. fraud. May we ask if they died because they were executed? Of those who died. that is more than one-half. This unusual and shocking percentage of mortality is worth inquiring into and. except that it can only be enforced here by an action or special proceeding. that the authority of a guardian. 23 were released. one of violation of certain sections of Act No. whose liberty and mixing with society will endanger public peace and order. that is. 21 of them. were able to escape. This theory is confirmed by sections 47 and 48. but the judgement may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction. and that only 3 are now actually in confinement serving sentences. (b) In case of a judgement against a person. or in the States or territory where it was made. . Of the other two remaining prisoners serving sentence. one of kidnapping of minor. 48. the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing. which read: SEC. if not outright massacre. The fact that a big number of the prisoners. and 6 escaped. and this is the reason why only one remains in confinement. to the effect that a pronouncement by this Supreme Tribunal that the sentences of the courts in question are null and void. one of robbery. is the same in the Philippines as in the United States. collusion. calls our attention to the fact that. that the wardens themselves. — The effect of a judgement of a tribunal of a foreign country. or clear mistake of law or fact. fifty-five (55). Rule 39. and except. certainly. or administrator does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Government under which he was invested with his authority. one was convicted of profiteering in rice. that is. which exacted from the mouth of the First Assistant Solicitor General. also. as counsel for respondent. 47.institution of an action or special proceeding before our own courts. SEC. moved by pity. Effect of record of a court of the United States. or more than one-third of them. X. Effect of foreign judgments. was not explained to us. the judgement is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. Of the 55 prisoners convicted for illegal possession of firearms. want of notice to the party. who appeared to argue the case in behalf of the respondent. from the ruthless cruelty of the proceedings and of the penalties imposed. one has been committed for evasion of service of sentence. 25 of those convicted for illegal possession of firearms. will signify the release of hundreds of criminals. — The effect of a judicial record of a court of the United States or of a court of one of the States or territories of the United States. almost 50% of them. of the Rules of Court. 33 of them died. cannot be counted very favorably to judicial proceedings which eventually lead to such wholesale death. 25 died. among them the petitioner in this proceeding. respondent Director of Prisons was required to submit statistical data concerning the number of prisoners and the various crimes for which they were convicted by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. is as follows: (a) In case of a judgement against a specific thing. It is striking that so many prisoners died. the adjective "ferocious". THE STUNNING FACTS REVEALED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. 33 of the total of 94 prisoners committed. At the hearing of this case. directly or indirectly helped the escape? More than one-third of the prisoners committed by the said courts in confinement to the Bureau of Prisons.

If all of them were executed by virtue of sentences rendered by the courts in question. We will feel mere whifflers in our professed convictions. There is no doubt that the procedure in question shows the purpose of pandering to the most flagitious doctrines in criminal proceedings. he will always find himself under the inexorable sword of Damocles of sure punishment. so wantonly inhuman as the proceedings had in the special courts in question? The City Fiscal of Manila exerted great efforts to show that the fact that in the proceedings in question "the refusal of the accused to answer any question made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him. for purposes of this case. Such procedure has absolutely no place in the framework of our juridical system. to be . waiting for its victims. The transgressions of the bill of rights in all its phases cannot be hidden even to a chela in constitutional law. and crush its head with one hammer blow. which could only happen once the flambeau of reason has ceased completely to burn. Behind and under said criminal process stealthily crawls and trundles the Nippon psychosis. TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE After showing the absolute nullity of the judicial process under which petitioner has been convicted to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. If a tree must be judged by the fruits it bears. His argument centered on the alleged freedom of the accused to refuse to answer any question made or allowed by the court. It is the very negation of the administration of justice. is of no consequence at all. and 25 of possession of firearms. when accused and suspects were submitted to the most brutal torture to compel them to confess real or imaginary crimes. alleging that. XI. If the accused died by natural death. that fact does not speak very highly of their proceedings. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED. All arguments and dissertations are useless to conceal the real fact. That past is not far away. No one but the truckling lackeys of the arrogant enemy could have the servility of applauding the implantation of the criminal procedure in question. whether he testifies or refuses to testify. between a dagger and a wall? Either way. the inevitable consequence is that he is entitled.four of crimes against public order. if the accused chooses to refuse to answer. so fatal. as a matter of absolute right. The constitutional guarantee had to be adopted as a protest against inquisitorial method of the past. is nil. is an imperative measure of national self-defense. is not that the same as placing him on the hard predicament of choosing between testifying self-incriminating and risking the fatal effects of a legal presumption of guilt? Is not that the same as placing him between the two steel cages of a dilemma: self-incrimination or presumption of guilt? Is not that the same as placing him between Scylla and Charybdis. AS A MATTER OF ABSOLUTE RIGHT. The City Fiscal seems to labor under the belief that the fact that the silence of the accused "may be considered unfavorable to him"." does not violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. and creed. where suspected witches suffered iniquitous death. To ferret it out from the hole where it lurks. the court cannot compel him to answer under menace of punishment for contempt or through any other coercive or minatory measures. Such belief can logically be entertained alone by ignoring completely the lessons of experience in human conduct. But the value of such a moot question. It seems that we are still smelling the stench of human flesh burned in the stakes. He even goes to the extent of maintaining the theory that such constitutional guarantee is not essential for the protection of the substantial rights of an accused. principles. if we should permit ourselves to fall into the weakness of abetting it even for a moment. how shall we judge proceedings so deadly. If the refusal to answer can be considered unfavorably to the accused. there must be something physically or morally fatal in said proceedings. It is not impossible to open a debate upon the abstract question whether the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should not remain. like a cobra with fangs overflowing with venom.

which constituted their substance. at the same time. retroversion. . the better. if the same must be saved. not only to restore immediately the petitioner to his personal liberty. The sooner we comply with it. or in the stratified mentality of Japanese cullions. not the spring and summer of that ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened. from the live tissues of our body politic. but. to obliterate even the memory of the inquisitorial summary procedure depicted in the present case. Vandals. subversion. whence the animating soul has flown. nor the climate that determined their constitutive character. The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food and drink. To profess attachment to those principles and. The seriousness of this matter cannot be viewed with insouciance. while the hymns of praise are words from which all belief has gone. which is the natural boon to law-abiding residents of our country. Our sense of national self-preservation compels us. as an imperative duty. and of which he was unjustly deprived through means most abhorrent to human conscience. If we allow such vestiges to remain we are afraid that some historian may write about Philippine democracy. We must never allow the neck of our people to be haltered by the lethal string of that ideology. but not in a healthy mind of a cultured person of modern times. so that he can once again enjoy a life of freedom. and from his games and festivals. the greatest work of genius that the nineteenth century has produced: The statues set up are corpses in stone. Hegel said in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit". The process and judgement under which petitioner has been convicted and is now undergoing an unjust imprisonment. justified without any compunction the act of Nero. is just sheer hypocrisy. It is reproducing the crooked mentality of Torquemada. man no more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the Divine Being. Such ideology is a cancerous excrescence that must be sheared. as a maiden might offer such fruit off tree. not the earth and the elements. what. It represents a hylistic ideology which proclaims the supremacy of the state force over fundamental human rights. on ancient art. and Teutons. So. all possible means. They are themselves now just what they are for us — beautiful fruit broken off the tree. according to Kohler. It is not their actual life as they exist. but the veiled remembrance alone of this reality.immediately released. a kindly fate has passed on those works to us. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country. It is a virus that must be eliminated before it produces the logical disaster. Such procedure exhibits either inversion. Giordano Bruno. and cultural patrimony. under which we are enjoying the blessings of freedom and with which we hope to assure the well-being and happiness of the unending generations who will succeed us in the enjoyment of the treasures accumulated by a bountiful nature in this Pearl of the Orient. not the tree that bore them. the sanguinary Roman Emperor. that is given us. is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. too. social. Philippine race. We must not lose time to wipe out such vestiges if we must protect ourselves against their poisonous effects in our political. We must not hesitate for one moment to do our duty in this case. The works of the muse lack the force and energy of the Spirit which derived the certainty and assurance of itself just from the crushing ruin of goods and men. it is not their living world that fate preserves and gives us with those works of ancient art. conceived the diabolical idea of condemning their victims to an advanced version of hell in this life. of murdering in cold blood his own mother. It ignores completely and debases the high purposes of a judicial procedure. upon the pretext of combating and persecuting heresy to save souls from hell. and Girolamo Savonarola. to accept and justify such kind of criminal miscarriage of justice. when their personal security and their life were hanging by the thin of chance. Huns. completely extirpated. after preaching moral virtues. We cannot understand how any one can justify the summary process in question under the principles embodied in our Constitution. It is a repetition of what Seneca did when. nor the change of seasons which controlled the process of their growth. such as Galileo. who. and among those who suffered under the same spirit of intolerance and bigotry which was its very essence are counted some of the greatest human characters. To allow any vestige any vestige of such procedure to remain is tantamount to reviving the situation during which our citizens endured sleepless nights in constant fear of the hobnail terror stalking in the darkness. or perversion of elemental human concepts. That procedure might find justification in the thick heads of the Avars. and Philippine culture.

it can be deduced that the petitioner William F.We wish a way could be found to free completely our people of the sense of shame. ante). No. he did so against his will. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. as well as in the reasons stated in the majority opinion not inconsistent with the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in G. It is with joy and pride that we agree with all our brethren in unanimously granting petitioner the redress he seeks in his petition. yet such rules would not be any avail to bind the herein petitioner by the laws. L-5. engendered by members of our race who justified such abhorrent summary procedure and allowed themselves to become a party to the execution of a scheme only acceptable to the undeveloped mentalities of the dark ages. to cite just a few typical examples. 199. to the army of occupation. I would additionally base my conclusion upon broader grounds. of Mabini. and laying aside for the moment the reasons to the contrary set forth in my aforesaid dissenting opinion. 66 thereof.. under and by virtue of which said petitioner has been convicted to life imprisonment by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila in Criminal Case No. Secondly. No attempt is made in the Solicitor General's answer to controvert the facts alleged in the petition from which the foregoing deduction flows. It is a shame that makes our blood boil when we think that countrymen of Father Gomez. I reiterate here by reference the arguments advanced in said dissenting opinion in additional support of the conclusion that the writ of mandamus herein sought should be granted. which they cannot help feeling. and dignified ideology that placed said heroes and martyrs among the purest and noblest specimens that humanity produced in all countries. ed. R. Firstly. which had been organized under orders of the Japanese Army in the Philippines. HILADO. From the allegations of the petition herein. Co Kim Cham vs. and from the record nothing appears which may tend to gainsay them. of Rizal. with a view to finding the real ground and philosophical justification for the doctrine therein announced. are still binding upon the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Thus. process and other acts of the so-called "Republic of the Philippines". Smith (8 Wall. we quote the following excerpts from three leading cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States: Excerpts from Thorington vs. lofty. which have been variously called de facto governments. 19 Law. Even when he was forced temporarily to join the Constabulary. [U. Even granting for the sake of argument. regulations. Peralta was a "guerrillero" when he was arrested. the importance and transcendence of the legal principles involved justify further elaboration. that the rules of International Law regarding the power of a belligerent army of occupation to establish a provisional government in an occupied enemy territory. However. 1. If we analyze the different adjudications and treatises which have been cited in support of the validity or binding force of the acts of such provisional governments. and that he had never voluntarily submitted to the Japanese forces in his civil capacity. S.]. 361) . could accept procedures representing the brutal ideology which is the very opposite of the humane. for all ones and light years to come. concurring: I concur in the result. or governments of paramount force. in all time. tried and convicted.. J. we will see that reason and that justification are made to consist in the submission of the inhabitants upon whom the said acts have been held to be of obligatory or binding force.

and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there. those who remain within the effective reach of the occupying forces and submit to them. and obey all their future dictations. with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions — on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government. and to the very date of liberation refused to accept the alleged protection or benefits of the puppet governments of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the "Republic of the Philippines. In the Philippines. the overwhelming majority of the people never submitted to the Japanese invaders. Emphasis ours). hills and other places beyond the effective reach of the Japanese military garrisons. such as their having been caught in Manila or other parts of the Island occupying government positions. Excerpts from Fleming vs. The surrender of the Fil-American forces in Bataan and Corregidor did not matter so far as this was concerned. (P. or be obligatory upon the inhabitants whoremained and submitted to the conquerors. in the former's message of October 23.]. as wrong-doers. S. 564. by acts of obedience." The majority of our people lived in the provinces. (P. Who knows but . do not become responsible. 4 Law. cited in the writer's above mentioned dissenting opinion. Page (9 Howard. (P. during the occupation by the Japanese of Manila and certain other portions of the Archipelago.) It results from the above-quoted pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States that the laws. the United States and the Philippines. 562): The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was. ed. Rice (4 Wheat. and owed to the United States nothing more than thesubmission and obedience. The authority of the United States over the territory was suspended. S. If it did. or country places. President Roosevelt and President Osmeña would not have so heartily commended the Philippine resistance movement and so enthusiastically extolled the firm stand of those who participated therein. If these historic utterances should seem incompatible with any provision of the Hague Convention. Those who conceived and developed the doctrine could not logically have thought of the army of occupation setting upon a civil government for those who still continued resistance. and in the latter's speech of February 27. 1945. 276): While it (Tampico) was occupied by our troops. regulations. they were in an enemy's country. Emphasis ours. in the farms. which is due from a conquered enemy. 13 Law. on the other. regulations.. Emphasis ours. further military operations would be necessary to reduce them to submission. Much less did that surrender obligate all the civil population to submit to the Japanese. sometimes called temporary allegiance. or binding upon. suspended. rendered in submission to such force. ed. Only a small minority submitted to the invaders for various reasons. and the like. 603. 363. to owe allegiance.].. hills. for those acts.That while it (government of paramount force) exists. and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there. but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments. when he surrenders to a force which he is unable to resist. reasons of ill health. 364. before one could think of civilly governing them. namely. processes and other acts of those two puppet governments. of course. To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors. 281. to Japan. we should understand from them that both Presidents must have considered such provision as no longer applicable to. disabling them from living the hard life of the mountains. and never recognized any legality in the invasion of their country. by the laws. Emphasis ours. Among them we find the petitioner William F. 246. or residing therein without adequate facilities for escaping from or evading said invaders. processes and other acts of the government that the occupying belligerent establishes are made binding only and precisely upon those inhabitants from whom obedience could be effectively exacted. it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who. and not in their own. or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conqueror. the inhabitants were still foreigners and enemies. and. [U. though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government (p. 1943. [U.) Excerpts from United States vs. if only temporary. As to them.). Peralta. would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal. This is plain common sense.

523) when she bombed Manila after it had been declared an open city and all its military defenses had been removed. violated the rule providing for the necessity of declaring war as established at the Hague Conference of 1907 (Lawrence. Doctor Lawrence. 377). upon the ground that such provisions does not support the wrongful acts of Japan in the Philippines? Another reason advanced to justify the creation of a provisional civil government. men resort to supreme court for a decision. or to a supreme legislature for an interpreting statute. and suffered much — but they placed that ideology and that cause high above their private comfort. pp. far from requiring the establishment of such government." In other words (even if we applied said rules to the instant case). . but if a point of International Law is doubtful. . as to vitiate with invalidity the acts of all its department. yes. whose will and whose convenience should prevail. To begin with. 1941.). and when it comes to a question of convenience. is to base our reasoning "on high considerations of morality". and were climaxed by the ignominious and indescribable atrocities of the mass massacre of innocent civilians during the battle for Manila. executive. 13. judicial. was in the very nature of things positively opposed thereto. there be. as to the point in question. and to resolve any doubt. because it is based on usage and opinion. He who in such a case bases his reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in accordance with humanity and justice. "in accordance with humanity and justice. the rule imposing the obligation to properly tend the sick and wounded (Ibid. Japan. in his work cited above. could not be heard to say that the government which she established here was a de facto government. because she has refused to carry the burdens of the law. has the following to say: . 7th ed.. they settle the question by blows. and legislative. In additional to what has been said above. as it existed upon the date of the Japanese invasion. It would seem that to deny Japan benefits. during her three and a half years of tyranny and oppression in this country. she has infringed the rule requiring that war prisoners be cared for and treated with humanity (Ibid." They suffered. unless. they can resort only to general reasoning for a convincing argument. It can immediately be asserted in reply that the convenience of the above-mentioned overwhelming majority of our people. (Pp. successively on December 7 and 8. 384). or a government of paramount force. in occupied enemy territory. of opinion that there is another important consideration which argues against the recognition of the said government as a de facto government or government of paramount force during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. one might say." A casual comparison of these two instruments cannot fail to reveal a most revolutionary transformation of the political organization of the country. 397) — her violations of one or the other of which were matters of daily occurrence. Japan in treacherously attacking Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Let us not penalize them for it. indeed. If this government is democratic. In the interpretation of doubtful provisions of International Law. under the circumstances of this case.that their attitude was based upon the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy by their respective peoples. as in the cases where such a government was deemed to exist. the rule exempting noncombatants from personal injury (Ibid. 12. must be deemed to have forfeited the right to invoke that law in so far as specific provisions thereof would favor her or her acts. the rule interdicting bombing of open and defenseless cities (Ibid. 321-322. is the alleged convenience of the civil population. the Commonwealth Constitution was completely overthrown. They not only did not need the supposed benefits of such a government. let us see if the Japanese-sponsored "Republic of the Philippines" did not introduces such fundamental and drastic changes in the political organization of this country. Japan. While under the Commonwealth . in starting and prosecuting this war against the United States and her allies by breaking the most vital rules of civilized warfare as prescribed by International Law. with its courts and other departments. If a point of Municipal Law is doubtful. 522. that of the majority or that of the minority? Are we going to force those free citizens of this free country to accept the alleged benefits and assume the burdens of a government they have never consented to own? I am furthermore. It was replaced by the socalled constitution of the "Republic. but they actually reputed them as inimical to the larger interest of the very ideology and cause for which they were continuing their resistance to those who would extend here the brutal power and pernicious influence of the now exploded "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 325). p. Principles of International Law. And International Law in many of its details is peculiarly liable to disputes and doubts. which renunciation necessarily includes all the "rights" or "powers" which may be claimed to be delivered from war so employed? Or else.

to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control. frankly. sec. sec. VI. or acts of a political complexion of a de factogovernment of paramount force. the members of Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress (Art. 4). But even by this test the "Republic" — or. under the constitution of the "Republic" that power was vested in a unicameral National Assembly (Art. While under Commonwealth Constitution the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of Representatives (Art. VI. While under the Commonwealth Constitution. Nanking. IV. respecting the Judicial Department. administrative acts so done. under duress exerted by the Japanese Army. executed a political act so fundamental and basic in nature and operation that all subsequent acts of the new government which of course had to be based thereon. The British established such a government in Castine. one from each and every province and chartered city (Art. VI. Thus judicial acts done under his control. whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country. and ran it as the Government of the Confederacy.. . the Imperial Japanese Forces which gave it birth — in thus introducing such positive changes in the organization of this country or suspending the working of that already in existence. and sincerely say that government was being established under their orders and was to be run subject to their direction and control? Far from it! They employed all the means they could conceive to deceive the Filipino people and the outside world that they had given the Filipinos their independence. under the constitution of the "Republic" the National Assembly was composed of the provincial governors and city mayors as members ex-oficio. . and ran it as an American organization. sec. 1). there was the Imperial Japanese Army giving orders and instructions and otherwise directing and controlling the activities of what really was their creature for the furtherance of their war aims. It has been said constantly in this discussion that political acts. . sec. I disagree with those who so hold. 2). . VII. p. Emphasis ours. ever intended to include therein such a counterfeit organization as the Japanese contrived here — an organization which. has been appropriately called "puppet" by the civilized government of the world. but the foregoing will suffice for our purpose. III. and ran it is a purely British organization. are the only ones vitiated with nullity. sec. 1). 6th ed. sec. II. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the Senators are chosen at large by the qualified electors of the Philippines (Art.Constitution the retention of American sovereignty over the Philippines is expressly recognized. in the very preamble of the constitution of the "Republic" the independence " of the Philippines is proclaim. upon closed scrutiny. sec. These changes and innovations can be multiplied many times. and of delegate elected every three years. Burma. III. International Law. when they are not of a political complexion. (Hall. The Americans established another such government in Tampico. VI.). 2). under the constitution of the "Republic" the members of the Supreme Court were appointed by the President with the advice of the Cabinet. or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. But what happened in this country during the Japanese occupation? When the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14. 2) and the Representatives by the qualified electors in the respective districts (Art. sincere. like its counterparts in Manchukuo. we will find that all of the de facto governments or governments of paramount force which have been cited in all this discussion were at the same time bona fide governments. and honest in their deeds as well as in their words. for the purposes specified in the ordinance appended thereto. VII. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the President and VicePresident are elected "by direct vote of the people "Art.) Finally. 2). and all judges of interior courts. which is the same. under the constitution of the "Republic" the President (no Vice-President is provided for) was elected "by majority of all the members of the Assembly" (Art. did the Japanese openly. and that "Republic" thereunder. from beginning to end. The Confederate States established a like government in the seceding States. remain good. They were all frank. 2) and the Representative by the qualified electors in the respective districts (Art.. and Vichy. Of course. But behind the curtain. by the President with the advice of the Supreme Court (Art. sec. 1943. 483. inevitably had to be contaminated by the same vitiating defect. 5). and various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law. I cannot believe that those who conceived and developed the doctrine of de facto government or government of paramount force. sec. Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course.

puede ser considerada en contra de dicho acusado. he opinado afirmativamente. no pudo apelar de al sentencia para ante el Tribunal Supremo. a mi juicio. R. sino que inclusive quedaba abolido el derecho de apelar otorgado por la constitucion del Commonwealth al acusado condenado a reclusion perpetua. concurrente: El mandamiento de habeas corpus que se solicita debe concederse..) Bajo este mismo sistema el caracter sumarisimo del proceso llega a tal extremo que "una sentencia condenatoria puede dictarse inmediatemente contra el acusado siempre que los hechos discubiertos en el interrogatorio preliminar demuestren que el acusado es culpable. siendo compulsoria la revision en el caso de condena a muerte. no puede ser abolido por un simplefiat legislativo. "la negativa del acusado a constestar cualqueira pregunta formulada por el tribunal o permitida por el mismo. por ende. Tiene a derecho a callarse sin que esto pueda astribuirsele cargo inculpatorio alguno. y en los casos de condena areclusion perpetua o a muerte. En el asunto de Co Kim Cham contra Valdez Tan Keh y Dizon. excepto cuando la pena impuesta fuera la de muerte. Esta jurisdiccion del Tribunal Supremo en los casos de condena areclusion perpetua y a muerte no se halla estatuida simplemente por una ley ordinaria. La proclama del General McArthur de 23 de Octubre de 1944. sino que esta proveida en la misma constitucion del Commonwealth. Por este motivo el recurrente. lanzada cuatro dias despues de su desembarco en Leyte con las fuerzas libertadoras. Empero bajo el sistema procesal que se discute. Este es un derecho fundamental.G. que el alcance de esa proclama puede extenderse a veces a ciertos actos o procesos judiciales. bajo el sistema procesal en controversia las sentencias de los tribunales o sumarias eran de caracter final. De modo que en esta ordenanza no solo se suprimia de una plumada el derecho de apelar reconocido y establecido por la legislacion procesal del Commonwealth aun en los casos de delitos y penas ordinarios. En cambio." (Seccion 21. garantido por la constitucion.BRIONES. Que todas las leyes. cualquier acusado convicto ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia tiene el derecho de apelar de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal superior de revision. L-5 (pag. Reafirmo ahora mi opinion y con mayor vigor y enfasis si cabe. imparcial y ordenado que la constitucion y legislacion procesal del Commonwealth de Filipinas otorgan a todo acusado en una causa criminal. Orden Ejecutiva No. 7 de la llamada Republica de Filipinas por la que se crearon las tribunales especiales o sumarios). el Tribunal Supremo es el llamado a revisar la causa. Bajo nuestro sistema procesal el acusado tiene derecho a que no se le ponga en situacion de acriminarse. Hay en dicha ley ciertos aspectos decididamente repulsivos para una conciencia disciplinada en las normas y pricipios de una democracia constitucional. M. esto es. en cuyo caso los autos se elevaban en consulta a una division especial del Tribunal Supremo compuesta de tres miembros (Ordenanza No. a quien se le habia impuesto esta pena por el alergado delito de robo. regulaciones y procesos de cualquier otro gobierno en Filipinas que no fuera el del Commonwealth son nulos e invalidos y carecen de efecto legal en areas de Filipinas liberadas de la ocupacion y control del enemigo. Mis razones se exponen a continuacion. la sentencia de reclusion perpetua impuesta al recurrente bajo la ocupacion militar japonesa es de aquellos actos judiciales del passado regimen que por su naturaleza y circunstancias reclaman una decidida y pronta accion de parte nuestra en el sentido de anularla y dejarla sin efecto. No. 133. . Recientemente se ha discutido mucho en esta jurisdiccion sobre si la anulacion de que trata dicha proclama puede referirse tambien a actuaciones judiciales ( judicial processes). Porque." Bajo el sistema procesal del Commonwealth. Parece innegable que la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado y convicto el recurrente durante la ocupacion japonesa era absolutamente incompatible con las salvaguardias y garantias de un proceso justo. reza en parte lo siguiente: 3. ante). Asi que el derecho del condenado a reclusion perpetua o a muerte para que se revise su cuasa por el Tribunal Supremo es constitucional y. 157.

La cuestion que ahora tenemos que determinar y resolver es si debemos reconocer validez y eficacia en la sentencia por la cual el recurrente se halla extinguiendo su condena de reclusion perpetua, o debemos anularla ahora que esta en nuestras manos el poder hacerlo, restablecida como esta enteramente la normalidad juridica y constitucional en nuestro pais. En favor de la validez de dicha sentencia se arguye que fue dictada por un tribunal creado por un gobierno de jure; que aun admitiendo el caracter inquisitorial, anti democratico de la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado el acusado, el gobierno de facto era dueño de establecer los procedimientos legales que quisiera; y que, segun las reglas y doctrinas conocidas de derecho international, las sentencias por "crimenes de guerra" o delitos politicos" generalmente validas aun despues de restablecido el gobierno de jure. Se alega que en estos casos el derecho no tiene mas remedio que ceder a la fuerza, aceptando la realidad de los hechos consumados. Se admite, sin embargo, que la regla tiene sus excepciones. Una de allas esque "los actos del ocupante militar que rebasen su poder a tenor del criterio establecido en el articulo 43 de las Regulaciones de La Haya, son nulos y sin efecto con relacion al gobierno legitimo." (Wheaton's International Law, 7th ed. [1944], p. 245.) Segun esto, las sentencias por "crimenes de guerra" o "delitos politicos" cometidos durante la ocupacion son, por razones pecfetamente comprensibles, nulas e invalidas al restablecerse la soberania legitima. Tambien quedan comprendidos bajo esta excepcion los denominados actos de caracter o complexion politica. Otra limitacion a los poderes de un gobierno de ocupacion militar es que elejercicio de tales poderes debe extenderse tan solo hasta donde fuese necesario para su seguridad y el exito de sus operaciones, teniendo particularmente en cuental el caracter transeunte de su occupacion. Como regla general, al invasor se le prohibe alterar o suspender las leyes referentes a la propiedad y a las relaciones personales privadas, o las leyes que regulan el orden moral de la comunidad. (Hall, Treatise on International Law, 7th ed., 498,499). Lo que se hace fuera de estas limitaciones es en exceso de su competencia y es generalmente nulo al rstaurarse la soberania legitima. Otra excepcion es la que se refiere a los actos de un gobierno de facto resultante de una insurreccion, rebelion, revolucion o guerra civil. A esteefecto se ha declarado, peo ejemplo. que los actos en fomento o apoyo de unarebelion contra los Estados Unidos, o encaminados a anular los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, y otros actos de igual indole, deben ser considerados, por lo general, invalidos y nulos (Texas vs. White, 74 U. S.,733; 19 Law, ed., 240). En otro caso se ha declaro la validez de ciertos actos judiciales o legislativos en estados insurreccionados, siempre que su proposito o modo de operacion no fuerte hostil a la autoridad del gobierno nacional, o no conculcaren derechos de los ciudadanos bajo la Constitucion. — Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Well, 570581; 2 Law. ed., 660.) Visto el caso que nos ocupa a la luz de estas doctrinas, ¿cual de ellas debemos adoptar para determinar si es o no valida la sentencia por la la cual el recurrente sufre ahora pena de reclusion perpetua y pide ser liberado mediante peticion de habeas corpus? Se aservera que no procede aplicar al presente caso la doctrina establecida en la jurisprudencia americana sobre gobiernos de facto resultantes de una insureccion, revolucion o guerra civil porque evidentemente la llamada Republica de Filipinas instaurada durante la ocupacion militar japonesa no tenia este caracter, sino que era mas bien un gobierno establecido mediantefuerza y coaccion por los mismos invasores para promover ciertos designios politicos relacionados con sus fines de guerra. En otras palabras, era el mismo gobierno militar de ocupacion con fachada filipina arreglada y arbitrada coercitivamente. Mientras estoy conforme con una parte de la asercion, esto es, que la aludida republica no tenia caracter insurreccional ni revolucionario, en disfrute de plena autonomia, sino que era simple producto de la coaccion y estaba mediatizada continuamente por el invasor, difiero de la otra parte, aquella que declara inaplicable la conocida doctrina americana mencionada arriba sobre gobiernos de facto establecidos en el curso de una insurreccion, revolucion o guerra civil. Y la razon es sencilla. Si a un gobierno de factode este ultimo tipo — gobierno establecido, despues de todo, por compatriotas,por conciudadanos — se le coarta con la restriccion de que sus actos legislativos o judiciales, en tanto son validos, al restaurarse el regimende jure, en cuanto no conculcaren los derechos justos de los ciudadanos, a los derechos garantidos por la constitucion, parece que no existe ninguna razon

por que no se ha de aplicar la misma restriccion al gobierno de facto establecido como incidente de una guerra entre dos naciones independientes y enemigas. En realidad, la razon de nulidad es mucho mas poderosa y fuertecuando, en su caso como el de Filipinas, el enemigo invasor incio la agresion de una manera inicua y traicionera y la ejecuto luego con vesania y sadismo que llegaron a extremos inconcebibles de barbarie. En este caso la conculcacion de los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, o de los derechos garantidos por la constitucion cobra proporciones de mucha mayor gravedad porque viene a ser tan solo parte de un vasto plan de rapiña, devastacion y atrocidades de todo genero cometidas contra la humanidad y contra las leyes y usos de la guerra entre naciones civilizadas. El invasor, en este caso, es como el foragido que se coloca fuera de toda ley. Por tanto, no hay absolutamente ninguna razon para no aplicarle una restriccion que se estimabuena para el insurrecto o revolucionario. La ventaja de extender hasta cierto punto la doctrina sobre gobiernos de facto resultantes de una insurreccion, rebelion o guerra civil a gobiernos de facto establecidos como incidente en el curso de una guerra entre dos naciones independeientes enemigas es que, frente a casos de conculcacion de los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, o de los garantidos por laconstitucion para los efectos de declararlos validos o nulos al restablecerse el gobierno de jure, ya no se hace preciso examinar si los actos conculcatorios fueron motivados por razones o exigencias de las seguridad y exito de las operaciones del ocupante militar, sino que la piedra de toque de la validez o nulidad viene a ser tan solo el acto positivo mismo de la conculcacion. Esta forma de racioncinio no solo no es heterodoxa a la luz de los pincipiosestablecidos de derecho internacional, sino parece ser una logica inferenciade los mismos. Ya hemos visto que al ocupante militar en el curso de unaguerra internacional se le prohibe, como regla general, alterar o suspenderlas leyes referentes a la propiedad y a las relaciones personales privadas, olas leyes que regulan el orden moral de la comunidad. (Hall, Treatise on International Law, supra.) Ahora cabe preguntar: ¿Son los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, o los fundamentales garantidos por la constitucion inferiores en categoria a la propiedad, o las relaciones personales privadas, o al ordenmoral de la comunidad? ¿No son en cierto sentido hasta superiores? Por tanto,a nadie debe chocar que la prohibicion se extienda a estas materias. Es unainclusion y perfectamente natural, mas que justificada por los avances y conquistas del moderno derecho internacional. Notese que en las fraguas de esta ultima guerra se han forjado unas modalidades juridicas harto originalesque denotan el esfuerzo supremo y gigante dela humanidad por superar la barbarie y por dar al traste con las formulas arcaicas, reaccionarias. Para citar solamente algunos ejemplos los mas destados, tenemos el enjuiciamento de los llamados criminales de la guerra, y la responsabilidad que se exige a los jefes militares por las atricidades cometidas por las tropas bajo su mando. Mi conclusion, por tanto, es que desde cualquier angulo que se mire la sentencia impuesta al recurrente por el tribunal sumario de la llamada republica de Filipinas debe ser declarada nula, acotando las palabras delProcurador General, "no solo por razones fundadas en principios de derecho internacional, sino tambien por la mas apremiante y poderosa de las razones,la de preservar y salvaguardar a nuestros ciudadanos de los actos del enemigo." Dar validez a esa sentencia ahora, en plena atmosfera de libertad que respiran a pulmon lleno de resto de nuestros conciudadanos menos el recurrente y otras que corrieron su suerte durante la ocupacion japonesa,equivaldria tanto como prolongar el regimen de opresion bajo el cual se tramito y se dicto la referida sentencia. Es mas, equivaldria a sancionar laideologia totalitaria, despotica, medieval contra la cual nuestro pueblo lucho tan heroicamente jugandose todo; vida libertad y bienes materiales. Ciertamente no nos hemos librado de la opresion para llegar a tan irrisorioresultado. Concedase el remedio pedido.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1648

August 17, 1949

PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, petitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE, ET AL., respondents. Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner. J. A. Wolfson for respondent. MONTEMAYOR, J.: For the purposes of this decision, the following facts gathered from and based on the pleadings, may be stated. The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments located at 1131 M. H. del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar and 1188 A. Mabini Streets, respectively. About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor of the United States of America at a monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartment, and P3,335 for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be "for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United States of America." The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area. In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding General, United States Army, Philippine Ryukus Command, Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the Manila Theatre, was said to control the occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the United States Government to assign officers of the U. S. Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the command of defendant Moore was in direct charge and control of the lease and occupancy of said three apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and Tillman themselves did not occupy any part of the premises in question. Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings to them, but were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. The predecessors in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute new leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947." Not being in conformity with the continuance of the old leases because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U.S. Government would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the three apartment buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands. The

S. Lee. counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez. As a matter of fact. It conceded that under the doctrine laid down in the case of U. and May 31. the plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments. 1947. 1947 to March 19. 167 U. who feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a foreign country has the right to demand that the Philippine Government study his claim and if found meritorious. Wesley. 1209. and that the matter included or involved in the action should be a proper subject matter of representations between the Government of the Government of the United States of America and the Philippines.. The municipal court dismissed the action with costs against the plaintiffs with the suggestion or opinion that a citizen of the Philippines. March 31. 1947. Moore and Tillman filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. and that defendants Moore and Tillman be permanently enjoined against ordering any additional parties in the future from entering and occupying said premises. 1947. that under the well settled rule of International Law. On October 30. Sanchez. to say nothing of the damages claimed. but also to collect back rents. informed this Court that the North Syquia Apartments. petitioners filed a petition which. as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received from that Government. 106 U. Government and not the individual defendants named in the complaint. found that the war between the United States of America and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other. the defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per apartment from January 1. S. that it was clear from the allegations of the complaint that although the United States of America has not been named therein as defendant. The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us on a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to order the Municipal Court of Manila to take jurisdiction over the case. inclusive. ed. Government even though no suit can be brought against the Government itself. On March 4. 196 and affirmed in the case of Tindal vs. respectively. Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action. 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment. had not yet terminated and. Sanchez.. plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Manila. the municipal court of Manila in an order dated April 29. among other things. 1947. the period or term of the three leases had not yet expired. S. each occupants to pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January 1.. then under the rule laid down in the case of Land vs. a judgment in these proceedings may become a charge against the U. a foreign government like the United States Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent. specially by citizens of another country. but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are bringing this action against officers and agents of the U. and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. consequently. Treasury. 1947. the present suit must be regarded as one against the United States Government itself. counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez. affirmed the order of the municipal court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. said apartments were actually vacated on the dates already mentioned and were received by the plaintiff-owners. Government not only to recover the possession of the three apartment houses supposedly being held illegally by them in the name of their government. it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case. courts have jurisdiction over cases where private parties sue to recover possession of property being held by officers or agents acting in the name of the U. On the basis of this petition and because of the return of the three apartment houses to the owners. to permit plaintiffs access to said apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages sustained as the result of the occupancy by defendants. the South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments would be vacated by their occupants on February 29. as a result of which. 91 Law. that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on said property. where the motion to dismiss was renewed. S. Not being satisfied with the order. S. 204 ordinarily. vs. Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant of the Judge Advocate. Dollar. and that in the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a month and/or the damages sustained by said property. S. 1948. S. 1948. Moore and Tillman filed a petition to dismiss the present case on the ground . not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into by the United States of America but in excess of said rate. and/or the damages sustained by said apartments. The case was orally argued on November 26. take such diplomatic steps as may be necessary for the vindication of rights of that citizen. which cannot be sued without its consent. The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July 12.thirty-day period having expired without any of the defendants having complied with plaintiffs' demands. because the real party in interest was the U.

) From a careful study of this case. We accept the suggestion of petitioners and shall proceed to discuss the facts and law involved and rule upon them. Tindal.that it is moot.. Counsel for the petitioners answering the motion. S. to recover possession of said property. Because the prime purpose of the action had been achieved. apart from the fact that the rentals amounting to P109. The considerations or rentals was always paid by the U. particularly the question of jurisdiction. that following the doctrine laid down in the cases ofU. Lee and U. 1209. sue as individuals. In such a case the officials or agents asserting rightful possession must prove and justify their claim before the courts. The original action in the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. Counsel for the petitioners however. that the question of law involved in this case may again come up before the courts when conflicts arise between Filipino civilian property owners and the U. reserving all of their rights against respondents including the right to collect rents and damages. namely. the petitioners will be unable to enforce collection. a private citizen would be helpless and without redress and protection of his rights which may have been invaded by the officers of the government professing to act in its name. and. Consequently. Dollar. officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally witholding the same from him. S. particularly on the question of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the original action. The philosophy of this ruling is that unless the courts are permitted to take cognizance and to assume jurisdiction over such a case. vs. counsel for respondents alleging that both respondent Moore and Tillman had long left the Islands for other Army assignments. However. not only for the satisfaction of the parties involved but also to serve as a guide in future cases involving cases of similar nature such as contracts of lease entered into between the Government of the United States of America on one side and Filipino citizens on the other regarding properties of the latter. far from dismissing the case. 91 Law. Army authorities concerning contracts entered into in the Philippines between said Filipinos and the U. and the court may entertain such a suit altho the Government itself is not included as a partydefendant. S. this Court. insists that a decision be rendered on the merits. ed. 1947. as already stated. a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may. vs. Of course. The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreement themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. the Government is not bound or concluded by the decision. that should this case be now dismissed. The recovery of rentals as submitted by the very counsel for the petitioner was merely incidental to the main action. when it is made to appear in the suit against them that the title and right of possession is in the private citizen. the recovery of the possession of the premises. considering the facts involved therein as well as those of public knowledge of which we take judicial cognizance. we are convinced that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of America. S. said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government. then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself. Army Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of P109. though in doing so. Government with respect to the three apartment houses. S. but with the reservation that said acceptance should not be construed as jeopardizing the rights of the petitioners in the case now pending in the courts of the Philippines or their rights against the U.S. that they have not been paid rents since January 1. and this is important. On June 18.895 had been paid to the petitioners and accepted by them though under reservations. that respondents admitted that there is a total of P109. Government. S. consequently. Government. should decide it. and now that both the possession of the three apartments in question as well as the rentals for their occupation have already been received by the petitioners renew their motion for dismissal on the ground that this case has now become moot.895 as rentals for the three apartments. it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government. We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance. supra. claimed that the plaintiffs and petitioners possession of the three apartment houses. where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government. through a "petition to amend complaint" counsel for the petitioners informed this court that petitioners had already received the U. In view of this last petition.S. the contracts of lease were . this Court may now well dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the questions involved therein have become academic and moot. 1949. Government not only because. according to the petitioners. The main purpose of the original action in the municipal court was to recover the possession of the three apartment houses in question. (See case of Land vs.895 in rentals due and owing to petitioners.

in obedience to order or direction from his superior. neither do we believe nor find that defendant Moore can be held personally liable for the payment of back or increased rentals and alleged damages. was also made by the predecessors in office of Moore. Said assignments or billets may well be regarded as orders. Army wanted and in fact continued to occupy the premises was made not by Moore and Tillman but by predecessors in office. these lease agreement had already been negotiated and executed and were in actual operation. Army will vacate the premises prior to February 29. could be held personally liable for the payment of rentals or increase thereof. It is even to be presumed that when demand was made by the plaintiffs for the payment of increased rentals or for vacating the three apartment buildings. but he was under the command of defendant Moore. could they later be held personally liable for any back rentals which their government may have failed to pay to the owners of the building. he was not in a position to pay increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease agreements. Under such circumstances. It must be remembered that these army officers when coming to their station in Manila were not given the choice of their dwellings. The three apartment buildings were occupied by army officers assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. Office of the District Engineer. specially in the absence of proof that such damages to property had been caused by them and not by the previous occupants. according to the complaint he was Chief. not a lawyer by profession but a soldier. Army. S. and he had reasons to believe that he could continue holding and using the premises theretofore assigned for that purpose and under contracts previously entered into by his government. The assurance that the U. and that his action in declining to pay the increased rentals or to eject all his army officers from the three buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and counsel of his legal division. was made to. The notice and decision that the U. As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments involved. At least. Both of these army officials had no intervention whatsoever in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises both of which were effected thru the intervention of and at the instance of their predecessors in office. and whether their occupancy of their rooms or apartments was legal or illegal? And if they dismissed these seemingly idle speculations. . We cannot see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to occupy apartments in the three buildings. and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in office. occupied the rooms assigned to them. We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman could be held individually responsible for the payments of rentals or damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses in question. All that he must have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to changes in station. or for any damages to the premises incident to all leases of property. or damages said to have been suffered by the plaintiffs. S. As to the defendant Tillman. 1947. without the approval of his government. unless he personally assumed financial responsibility therefor. and. and continued to live in their apartments unless and until orders to the contrary were received by them. and was in direct charge and control of the leases and occupancy of the apartment buildings. and whether the period of lease between their government and the owners of the premises had expired. The refusal to renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners was made not by Moore but by his predecessors in office according to the very complaint filed in the municipal court. and all that those officers did was to obey them. as long as and until orders to the contrary were received by him. when he assumed his command in Manila. With respect to defendant General Moore. They were merely assigned quarters in the apartment buildings in question. S. defendant Moore. accordingly. Real State Division. also army officers who are not now parties defendant to this suit? Incidentally it may be stated that both defendants Moore and Tillman have long left these Islands to assume other commands or assignments and in all probability none of their 64 co-defendants is still within this jurisdiction. He found these apartment buildings occupied by his government and devoted to the use and occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his command. there is less reason for holding them personally liable for rentals and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs. must have consulted and sought the advise of his legal department.entered into by such Government but also because the premises were used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the terminations of hostilities. defendant Moore. his superior officer. The original request made by the petitioners for the return of the apartment buildings after the supposed termination of the leases. U. can it be supposed or conceived that such army officers would first inquire whether the rental being paid by the government for the rooms or apartments assigned to them by order of their superior officer was fair and reasonable or not. assuming that they ever entered their minds. Under these circumstances.

We regret that. for purposes of the jurisdiction of our courts. The very fact that the government of the United States of America had entered into a private contract with private citizens of the Philippines and the deed executed in our country concerns real property located in Manila. we are constrained to limit ourselves to a synthesis of the reasons for our stand. If said government is the real property defendant and had intended to impugn the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila. The U. to avoid further delay in the promulgation of the decision in this case. S. dissenting: The petition must be granted.. To said effect we have to waive the opportunity of elaborating on our arguments. it must have done so through its diplomatic representative in the Philippines. soon after this case had been submitted for our decision. which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. . the present action must be considered as one against the U. Moreover. C. e. should be considered as the real party defendant in the ejectment case. Case dismissed. the American Ambassador. Government. S. this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent. Government. Tuason and Reyes. J.On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her. So that this opinion may be released immediately. on the same legal level of the lessors. Feria. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. that simple fact does not deprive our courts of justice of their jurisdiction to try any legal litigation relating to said contract of lease. Dollar already cited. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The principles of the law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. place said government. therefore.J. we are making it as short as possible. i. The contention that the Government of the United States of America is the real party defendant does not appear to be supported either by the pleadings or by the text of the contract of lease in question.. JJ. Moran. In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed no error in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and that the Court of First Instance acted correctly in affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal. and on what we have already stated. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. This is the conclusion we have arrived at long ago. S. We are of the opinion that both the municipal court and the Court of First Instance of Manila erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint and the majority of the Supreme Court have given their exequatur to such grievous error. though not in name.. It does not appear that the American Ambassador had intervened in the case in any way and we believe no one appearing in the case has the legal personality to represent said government. Paras. That jurisdiction is the same whether the true defendants are those specifically mentioned in the complaint or the Government of the United States. Bengzon. concur. Separate Opinions PERFECTO. that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. In the hypothesis that the Government of the United States of America is the lessee in the contract in question and.. without pronouncement as to costs. There is no question that the Municipal Court of Manila had and has completed jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case initiated by petitioners.

To give validity to such contract is to sanctify bad faith. 1991 of the Regional Trial Court. generally. such foreign government cannot shield its non-performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak of non-jurisdiction. of said Government would appear as sham. fraud. Under such situation. soon after liberating the Philippines from the invading Japanese forces.. 1991 and September 19. Metro Manila in Civil Case No. had entered with the petitioners in to the lease contract in question with the knowledge that petitioners could not bring an action in our courts of justice to enforce the terms of said contract is to hurl against said government the blackest indictment. QUIASON. To advance the proposition that the Government of the United States of America. Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES. We cannot believe that the Government of the United States of America can in honest conscience support the stand of respondents in this case. To place such foreign government beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give approval to the execution of unilateral contracts. and that such contracts are enforceable through the help of the courts of justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any violation of such contracts if he same had been entered into only by private individuals. Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent. including governments and the most powerful of them. 90-183. THE HON. Siguion Reyna.R. graphically described in Spanish as "contratos leoninos. No. A contrary view would simply run against all principles of decency and violative of all tenets of morals. Makati. Once a foreign government enters into a private contract with the private citizens of another country. JR. INC.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20. Padilla Law Office for petitioner. vs. J. such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government enters into private contracts with the citizens of the court's jurisdiction. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. deceit. democracy. 1994 THE HOLY SEE. Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and applicable as well with regard to private individuals as with regard to governments either domestic or foreign." because one party gets the lion's share to the detriment of the other. respondents.. liberty. as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.Although. all the vociferous avowals of adherence to the principles of justice. ROSARIO. foreign governments are beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice. We prepare to adhere to the thesis that all parties in a private contract. . petitioner. ERIBERTO U. are amenable to law. We cannot believe that said government is so callous as not to understand the meaning of the shame entailed in the legal stand of non-jurisdiction intended to place said government beyond the reach of our courts of justice. Branch 61. 101949 December 1.

proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100. without notice to private respondent. Domingo A. through Msgr. and Tropicana on the other. Private respondent. one over Lot 5-A. . 90-183). Starbright Sales Enterprises. (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters. a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.. but in view of the sellers' breach. Msgr. sold the lots to Tropicana. (5) thereafter. Cirilos.The Order dated June 20.000. Cirilos. private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court.1991 Order. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1. Domingo A.. and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Inc. acting as agent to the sellers. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6. transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana.. while the Order dated September 19. (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. Italy. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1. (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question. (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots. however. 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers.000.240. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup. to no avail.000 square meters (Lot 5-A. petitioner and the PRC. (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Jr. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent. (4) in the same month. (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots. 90-183. I On January 23.00 per square meter. Msgr. Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. (8) private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers. (2) the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest money of P100.000.240. Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand. (7) Msgr.150. 1989. Jr. Branch 61. Transfer Certificate of Title No. Jr. and (11) private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project. Msgr. and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled. 1990. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque.00 per square meters. Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment.00.00 to P1. and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same. 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. it lost profits of not less than P30. private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots. Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. Makati. represented by the Papal Nuncio.. the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No. and three other defendants: namely. on behalf of petitioner and the PRC. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters. Cirilos. Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale. Later. The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17. and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D. and specific performance and damages against petitioner. agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A. but later discovered that on March 30. and (4) damages.000. Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land. 1988.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash. Cirilos.

petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative. 206 SCRA 582 [1992]. pp. and Msgr. petitioner and Msgr. In England. 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. 22). Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations. Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts. petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense. . the Papal Nuncio. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo. it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial. In Public International Law. In its petition. only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell. p. In the United States." where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. pp. petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based. In such a case. a similar procedure is followed. the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. On July 12. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. II A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. 1991. 1991. and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner. the trial court issued an order denying. when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court. it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. 186-190). Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration. petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. 87). p. 1991. On October 1. petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo. On June 20. I International Law 130 [1965]. the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo. Florendo. Cirilos for being an improper party. in turn. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity. The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo. But the general rule admits of exceptions. the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion. 2021). Civil Service Commission. Zagada v. asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. both parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda. On August 30. In compliance with the resolution of this Court. among others.On June 8. he. 1991. and that it "adopts by reference. 1991. Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. On December 9. 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]). 1990. a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved. 50 [1945]. Cruz. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make. The Holy See Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability. 75 Phil. and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick. the Pope was the monarch and he. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. the Vatican City represents an entity . a brief look into its status as a sovereign state is in order. 80 Phil. being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae. Aquino. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108. Public International Law 36-37 [1992]). The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell. In Baer v. of its own free will. the position of the Holy See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap. International Law 124-125 [1948]. the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Tizon. where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Questions and Problems In International Law. Calleja. Zambales. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity. In 1929. supra. was considered a subject of International Law. private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when. International Law 37 [1991]). the U. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office. 190 SCRA 130 (1990). it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines. and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia.S. in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City. Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty. In the case at bench. The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states. United States of America v. 262 [1948]. Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870. as the Holy See. it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. the Department of Foreign Affairs. In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty. InWorld Health Organization v. Miquiabas v. III The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner. A. I International Law 311 [1965]). In a community of national states. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons — the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap. Public and Private 81 [1948]). the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. On the other hand. Philippine-Ryukyus Command. In some cases. Bradford. 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). a "suggestion" to respondent Judge.7 acres. 57 SCRA 1 (1974). Guinto. to send its own diplomats to foreign countries. 48 SCRA 242 (1972). informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.In the Philippines. through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats. 37).

the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick. B. The Holy See. which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity. 87). in conformity with its traditions. Despite its size and object. Ruiz. The Status of the Holy See in International Law. Indeed. The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions.organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]). 312 [1949]. This appears to be the universal practice in international relations. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity. such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations (United States of America v. the Vatican City has an independent government of its own. we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. p. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and international trading. which defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. Kelsen. with the Pope. has created problems of its own. Even without this affirmation. without its consent." The restrictive theory. (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United . the Papal Nuncio.." Furthermore. 125. One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication — that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality (Kunz. Sovereign Immunity As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Coquia and Defensor-Santiago. the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state. According to the classical or absolute theory. Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo. is of a "commercial character. each widely held and firmly established. Principles of International Law 160 [1956]). This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez. Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. Guinto. be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. one can conclude that in the Pope's own view. who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church. as the Holy See or Head of State. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii. 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). Public International Law 194 [1984]). 84 Phil. a sovereign cannot. and the demands of its mission in the world. it is the Holy See that is the international person. According to the newer or restrictive theory. through its Ambassador. supra. act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature. the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act. 136 SCRA 487 [1987]. rather than by reference to its purpose.

in a receiving state. (supra): There is no question that the United States of America. However. In the case at bench. which in this case is the Holy See. necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property. 20-22). . a bakery. 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. like any other state. This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15. In Article 31(a) of the Convention. As held in United States of America v. and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. a cafeteria. and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. Veridiano. has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo. with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself. 27). or an incident thereof. Rodrigo. consisting of three restaurants. The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. Certainly. if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. then it is an act jure imperii. 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center. and (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v. 1965. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function. real or personal. the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy. and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. On the other hand. we have to come out with our own guidelines. Guinto.States of America v.). pp. Ruiz. Guinto. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis. tentative they may be. The donation was made not for commercial purpose. 26. surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. a store. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity. supra. petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

C. Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim. J. the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Judge Tirso Velasco. Book IV. 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Kapunan and Mendoza. No. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. pp. In view of said certification. a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Padilla. particularly the admission of private respondent. Narvasa. Melo.. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED. Puno. Sec. 1994). As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice. is on leave. we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. G. through the Foreign Office. to espouse its claims against the Holy See. As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization. 1 Hudson. 109645. Davide. in the person of its subjects. Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905. 156-157). the forerunner of the International Court of Justice: By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf. Of course. the latter ceases to be a private cause. Bidin. IV Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Vitug. 3).R. Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States.J. J. 919 [1964]). Calleja. Private respondent can ask the Philippine government.. Title I. the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights. the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. July 25..The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings. concur. . Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch. Partnership v. Besides.. took no part. privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo. the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. Feliciano. JJ. 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). WHEREFORE. World Court Reports 293. Regalado.. Romero. the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young. Ltd. Ordinarily. a State is in reality asserting its own rights — its right to ensure. Aquino. 302 [1924]). Jr. Bellosillo. SO ORDERED. respect for the rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions. it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law. such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co.

JR.00) PESOS.. 1987. without proper board resolution and in disregard of better offers. did then and there. Mapa. Jr.000. and Fernando Balatbat. Inc. docketed as Case No. Jose C. Estelito P.. Fernando Balatbat. Araneta III. together with Gregorio Ma. Jr.. Dominador Lopez. son-in-law of former President Ferdinand E. Aviado. acting in various capacities as management officials of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Inc. all government-owned and controlled corporations. conspiring and confederating with one another and with accused Gregorio Ma. respondent.. Crisanto. as well as Dolores Potenciano of BLTB. Jr. Jr. in Metro Manila. the facts. SANDIGANBAYAN.R. Jr.. Dominador Lopez. Jr. 1994 PLACIDO L. which the accused knew to be a newly organized paper corporation with a purported paid-up capital of only FIVE MILLION (P5. with manifest partiality and evident bad faith. acting in concert in the performance of their duties. promote and facilitate the sale of a major portion of the public utility assets of the Pantranco Express. Philippine Currency. 11960 in the respondent court. willfully and unlawfully. Jr. Lorenzo Vergara. PUNO.A. On January 20. Jr. for a consideration of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION (P775. National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and/or Pantranco North Express Inc. as follows: That on or about and during the period from March 1985 and March 1986. Mapa.000. Jr. LORENZO VERGARA.00) PESOS and owned and controlled by accused . Mendoza for Placido L. First. petitioners Placido L.. and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan..Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio EN BANC G. No. 3019) as amended. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara. the right of the State to prosecute all persons who appear to have committed a crime and its prerogative to revoke the immunity it has granted to an accused for breach of agreement.. Ramon F..000. 100295 April 26. vs. Fernando Maramag. MAPA. to the North Express Transport.. and Jose Crisanto. Fernando Maramag. Filemon Flores for J. J. Araneta III. and the extent of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as an impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity extended by the PCGG to an accused. were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.: The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who has been granted immunity is the core issue posed in this petition. accused Placido L. Lorenzo Vergara. Jr. in utter neglect of their fiduciary responsibilities. petitioners. Philippines.. Marcos and therefore related to the deposed President by affinity within the third degree. (NETI).000. and J. Ramon Aviado. (PNEI). On balance are important rights in conflict: the right of an individual who has surrendered his constitutional prerogative to be silent to the State to be exempt from further prosecution. J. and with intent to gain.

et al. the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. the Philippine Government through the PCGG. The agreement with petitioner Mapa provided: WHEREAS. and such other amounts as may be awarded by the Court.00) PESOS before the actual payment of the agreed FIFTY-FIVE MILLION (P55. Ferdinand E. all the accused in Criminal Case No. thereby allowing NETI to derive an income from said operation between the period of actual delivery and execution of the Purchase Agreement of the sum of EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND. on the basis of MAPA's express intent to make himself available as witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs." more particularly in the ongoing trial of the case.Gregorio Ma. thereby giving accused Gregorio Ma. THEREFORE.000. et al. REPUBLIC has requested MAPA to make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. inducing and/or unduly influencing the Board of Directors of PNB. Marcos. They agreed.. 1989 also by Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas. 1988. Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa. even before the execution of the said Purchase Agreement. NOW. the parties agree as follows: 1. inter alia. Ferdinand E. advantages and/or preferences and causing undue injury to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED MILLION (P400. by misleading.689. Their trial started on September 20.000. Marcos were charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States and concealing the investment of money through cronies and offshore organizations. petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the former First Couple.180. WHEREAS. rules and regulations. On May 16. NIDC and PNEI into approving a Memorandum of Agreement and later a Purchase Agreement with manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions which made possible the premature delivery of said PNEI assets to NETI without any down payment." and in light of REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of the civil and criminal cases which it has filed or intends to file against MAPA under the terms and conditions herein below set forth.000." . Petitioner Mapa was interviewed on November 14. for and in consideration of the foregoing premises. not only the PNEI assets subject of the proposed sale. In the interim. 1988 and August 11. WHEREAS. CONTRARY TO LAW. They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution. the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses.000. After their interviews. 1990. Araneta III unwarranted benefits. ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P85. and which. MAPA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. et al. Araneta III. Ferdinand E. Marcos. and the petitioners formalized their separate agreements in writing. MAPA is a defendant or respondent in several civil and criminal cases which the REPUBLIC has filed or intends to file in relation to this participation in various contracts that are alleged to have resulted in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in violation of Philippine laws. 11960 were arraigned.00) PESOS. Imelda R. To insure the conviction of the Marcoses. Except for petitioner Araneta. Petitioner Vergara was interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and by United States Prosecutor Charles La Bella.00) PESOS down payment. but also other utility buses and properties of PNEI not covered by the sale.. Marcos. allowed NETI to operate PNEI's franchises and utilize.

Araneta. 11960 entitled "People vs. Marcos. Marcos." more particularly in the on-going trial of the case. WHEREAS. 5. WHEREAS. the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation. 2. 3. Marcos.. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution to MAPA and his exclusion from PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigations has been undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Order Nos. now pending before the Sandiganbayan. Second Division. et al. NOW. and of no force and effect." and in the light of REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of VERGARA's participation in Criminal Case No. 2. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to MAPA on the basis of and relying on MAPA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In consideration of the same. In case of breach of his commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. . prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his testimony and information are given. for and in consideration of the foregoing premises. directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information is used as basis thereof. VERGARA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Gregorio Ma. the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked. Marcos. Ferdinand E. the parties agree as follows: 1. prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his testimony and information are given." 2.2. et al. nothing herein shall be construed as an admission by MAPA of any criminal or civil liability. REPUBLIC grants MAPA immunity from investigation. 11960. REPUBLIC grants VERGARA immunity from investigation. 14 and 14-A. 1. the REPUBLIC approved to grant immunity to VERGARA under the terms and conditions hereinbelow set forth. including any offense and commission of which any information. on the basis of VERGARA’s express intent to make himself available as witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. including any offense and commission of which any information. Accordingly. et al. Ferdinand E. except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony. Likewise. except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony. and in light of REPUBLIC’s review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file against MAPA within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. The agreement with petitioner Vergara stated: WHEREAS.. Ferdinand E. In consideration of the same. REPUBLIC has requested VERGARA to make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information is used as basis thereof.".". Vergara is a defendant in Criminal Case No. in consideration of such cooperation. 1. 14 and 14-A. Ferdinand E. et al. 4. THEREFORE. et al.

the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked. in consideration of such cooperation.) M.T. 11960 of the Sandiganbayan. We affirm that if. 2.". Mr. Likewise.S. May 16. On the same day. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to VERGARA on the basis of and relying on VERGARA's promise of cooperation as described herein. We also affirm our understanding that we shall arrange with the U. 5. 11960 has been undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Orders Nos. Gregorio Ma. We understand that in that case the prosecution is in the process of closing its evidence with the submission of its offer of documentary evidence and that it is your intention thereupon to submit a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the prosecution to prove its case. Laya.3. nothing herein shall be construed as a admission by VERGARA of any criminal liability. In case of breach of h is commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. because of the situation of the case. al. and of no force and effect. 14 and 14-A. Ferdinand E. Caparas . and in light of REPUBLIC’s review of VERGARA’s participation in Criminal Case No. we would like to confirm that among the criminal cases which the Republic agrees to cause the dismissal of the case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. prosecutors the grant of immunity in your favor no less broad or extensive than that granted to Mr. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from civil and criminal prosecution to VERGARA and his exclusion from Criminal Case No. 1. Marcos. then we shall upon submission of your Motion to Dismiss offer no objection to its favorable consideration by the court in relation to you. 1990. Jaime C. former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote to petitioner Mapa the following letter: Dear Sir: With reference to the agreement executed between yourself and the Republic of the Philippines on May 16. 11960. the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal of VERGARA from Criminal Case No. Araneta III. 11960. 4.. et. et al. it would not be possible for the Republic to file the necessary motion to cause the dismissal thereof.A. V e r y t r u l y y o u r s . " Criminal Case No. 1990. Accordingly. (SGD.

But despite their availability and willingness to testify. defendant or an accused in an action involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth? 2.d. Jr. Is it necessary that information furnished the PCGG.. and J. The deputized prosecutors again filed a Manifestation reiterating PCGG's acquiescence to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Lorenzo Vergara were granted immunity by the Presidential Commission on Good Government from criminal liability arising from cases which PCGG had or intends to file against them. Respondent court. and Jesus Lorenzo Vergara immunity from investigation. Mapa. The result was a debacle for the US prosecutors and the PCGG. the PCGG somersaulted from its stance supporting the petitioners. Placido L. therefore. 1991. It denied petitioners' motions. however. Hence.00. Mapa.00. and J. They travelled to New York to testify against the Marcoses. 11960-PCGG by reason of the immunity aforestated. David Castro as Chairman of PCGG. 1991. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations were even furnished by the PCGG. Despite PCGG's concurrence. Does the fact that the information provided by petitioners to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) did not refer to Criminal Case No.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury. Jr. interposes no objection to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by accused Placido L.00. Its Comment states: 1. 1992. The Presidential Commission on Good Government has indeed granted Messrs. Deputized PCGG prosecutors Vivencio B.00. Earlier. This was followed on May 23. Jr. 1Petitioners were undaunted. the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. petitioners filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on October 22. The PCGG. the prosecution in Criminal Case No. be submitted to the Sandiganbayan in order that it may determine whether such information is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or liability of a respondent. this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. prosecution and punishment . Dionido and Angel J. by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. Mrs. they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. viz: That herein accused Placido L. In its Comment dated January 6. Parazo filed a Manifestation interposing no objection to petitioners' Motion. Mapa. The legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Case No. refused to budge from its prior position.b. which would become basis of the grant of immunity. On the basis of the immunity granted to them. 11960 before the respondent court. On April 8. 1990. the respondent court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss. by a vote of 4-1. Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present petitioners as witnesses abrogate the immunity granted to them? 2. They pose the following issues: 2. Lorenzo Vergara in Criminal Case No. 11960 had already rested its case?" The proceedings before us took a new wrinkle with the appointment of Atty. 11960? 2. Was the immunity granted to petitioners too late considering that when it was granted. former President Marcos was delisted as an accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.a. 11960 make the immunity granted to them inapplicable to Criminal Case No.c.A similar letter was sent to petitioner Vergara.

section 3 provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent. We begin with the Constitution which expressly grants some of these immunities. further. viz: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall. or accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided. Cruz explains the rationale for this immunity in the following manners: ". Jr. Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of crimes with high political. and Jesus Vergara to testify in favor of the government and against other defendants on matters referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph nullifies the immunity granted to both defendants (emphasis supplied). as amended. We find merit in the petition. . 2. It further stressed that "[T]he granting of 'Immunity' from criminal liability and/or prosecution is a matter subject to the court's judicious determination and approval. It reiterated its breakaway from petitioners in its Comment to the Reply of petitioners dated June 10. PD 749 provides: Section 1. corruption and other forms of official abuse. 14 and 14-A but such immunity is conditional. there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided. rules and regulations punishing acts of graft. 2." The classic justification for the non-suability of the State is that provided by Mr. and some accused or respondents immunity from suits. 211. 1991. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. where it adopted the respondent Sandiganbayan's questioned Resolution and Concurring Opinions dated March 6. The conditions for giving such immunity is the cooperation said petitioners shall give to said Commission by way of information and testimony in cases now pending or to be filed before the Sandiganbayan against other defendants therein to prove the latter's acquisition or accumulation of property or properties in violation of existing laws.for any offense for which civil and criminal cases have been or to be filed against them within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 212 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is intended to ensure representation of the constituents of the member of the Congress by preventing attempts to keep him from attending its sessions. Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned. he is given more leeway than the ordinary citizen in the ventilation of matters that ought to be divulged for the public good." 2 Article VI. Some of these statutory grants are related in the impugned Resolution. 3019. Justice Isagani A. and who willingly testified. Thus. 1. Failure on the part of petitioners Placido Mapa." The Solicitor General defended the stance of the PCGG and the respondent court. That this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and the testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice. . The second enables the legislator to express views bearing upon the public interest without fear of accountability outside the halls of the legislature for his inability to support his statements with the usual evidence required in the court of justice. section 11 of the Constitution also grants parliamentary immunities. after applying the test of compliance and the standard of reasonableness with the rigid requirements for such grant under Section 5 of Executive Order No. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "." 3 The President was also immunized from suit during his tenure in the 1973 Constitution. such violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given. social and economic impact against the people. In other words. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210. and other laws. . Republic Act No. be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. Article XVI. . as amended. its officials. The practice of granting government." Mr. 3. in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment. That this immunity may be enjoyed . Aside from the Constitution. 14-A. 1992. has a long history.

by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the public official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 1951. 1886 states: No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books. 5 In Kastigar vs. Provided. a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. They are the transactional immunity and the used-and-derivative-use immunity. Our immunity statutes are of American origin. and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 4. documents. 4 In contrast. And. 1886. In the United States. 3. but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction. viz: The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence . the Agrava Fact Finding Board. 602. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above. A similar but not identical power is given to the prosecution under section 9. xxx xxx xxx . and 5. Likewise. correspondence. . Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points. was given the power to compel testimony of a witness. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer. The power to compel testimony. papers or other records and documents before the Secretary of Labor or a Wage Board. are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him. or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture. By its grant. Section 5 of said PD No. US. Indeed. In exchange for his testimony. created to conduct a fact-finding inquiry in the Aquino-Galman double murder case. there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. R. establishing a minimum wage law. a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. nor shall he be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. and the corresponding duty to testify. finally. such a witness was extended transactional immunity from later prosecution. . matter or thing concerning which he is compelled. rules and regulations. records. by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity. .A. after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce evidence. That the following conditions concur: 1. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. as early as April 16. . extended transactional immunity to persons who testify or produce books. 6the rationale of these immunity grants is well explained. under PD No. 2. nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.mentioned provisions of law. Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused to be utilized as a state witness.

The commentators. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the Commission. are not incompatible with these values. and this Court on several occasions. 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. Indeed. 3. to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the witness believes that such testimony or provision of information would tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution. their origins were in the context of such offenses. the Sandiganbayan may order the witness to testify or provide information. and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty.' Sec. It can be asserted in any proceeding. to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. 14. except a prosecution for perjury. and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime. has one of more such statutes. . and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses . The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination. or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case. investigatory or adjudicatory. . . 14 dated May 7. as amended. they seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify. as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations. defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. . 5.But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. 14 dated May 7. or otherwise failing to comply with the other. Immunity statutes. 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege. . Upon such refusal. The pertinent sections provide: xxx xxx xxx Sec. Section 4 of Executive Order No. which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence. the most important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. administrative or judicial. have characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal statutes. Rather. The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony. There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial duty. 2. but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony. We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. civil or criminal. 4. giving a false statement. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent. (E)very State in the Union. Section 5 of Executive Order No.

then claimed their immunity via a motion to dismiss addressed to the respondent court. it will give a warrant to the respondent court to change the judgment made by the PCGG that the witness' information or testimony is "necessary" to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent. they were extended immunity from prosecution by the PCGG. We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. xxx xxx xxx The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited. The first issue is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners. petitionerintervenor herein. It should also be noted that the respondent court has already acquired jurisdiction to try and decide Case No. Likewise." In contrast. The prosecution failed to convict Mrs. however. In return. No. On the other hand. Neither the text nor the texture of E. under section 5. 14. Section 5 of E.O.e. Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses. section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can wield to secure information from a friendly witness. 14. as amended. the friendly witness is completely immunized from prosecution. 14. the hostile witness compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. 14. No. He can still be prosecuted but "no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case . pushes the proposition that said power of review is plenary in reach.e. We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent court. and we held: We first ascertain whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to look into the validity of the immunity granted by the PCGG to Jose Y. Its jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth must be within the parameters stated in Executive Order No. The rest is history. with the conformity of PCGG. The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under section 5. It is not disputed that they furnished information to the PCGG during their interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers and US prosecutor La Bella. 80-81. The submission will warrant the respondent court in examining the intrinsic quality of the given information or testimony. To be sure. Jr.. It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to reverse the grant of immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting the latter's judgment. Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can use to compel an unwilling witness to testify. Marcos. No. thru the Solicitor General. The motion to dismiss is thus a mere incident well within the jurisdiction of the respondent court to resolve. gauging the range of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion of the PCGG granting immunity to petitioners pursuant to section 5 of E. It has started receiving the evidence of the prosecution against the petitioners. As they were witnesses for the prosecution. Due to their cooperation. Jose Campos. the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten wealth cases must include the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG exceeded its power to grant immunity pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. we have grappled with this once slippery issue in the case of Republic vs. as amended.O. defendant or accused. Campos which was extended to his son.14. as amended. Under section 4.O. . whether it truly establishes the "unlawful manner" in which the respondent. vests no such role in .. their expenses were shouldered by the PCGG itself. . Sandiganbayan. Petitioners. Necessarily. lends color to the suggested interpretation. supra. they flew to New York to testify in the RICO trial of Imelda Marcos.There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PCGG under sections 4 and 5. Respondent court. defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question. 173 SCRA 76. The next issue is a finer and more difficult one. i. At the last minute. i. . US prosecutor La Bella decided to dispense with their testimony. 11960 where petitioners stand accused of violating RA 3019.

section 5 of E. where the intent is to endow courts of justice with the power to review and reverse tactical moves of the prosecution. the law confers the power in clear and certain language. 14. otherwise. will probably elude the long arm of the law. Thus. defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question. 2. the power of the respondents court can go no further than to pass upon itsprocedural regularity. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. Every now and then. Such a reading adopted by the respondent court is unduly . The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. The rule is crafted as to leave no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere with the discretion of the prosecution on the matter. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. under section 9 of Rule 119. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal. the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. 14 and 14-A. are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. as amended.respondent court. Nor is its exercise subject to the approval or disapproval of another agency of government. the timing of its grant. Prescinding from these baseline propositions. In the case at bench. In instances. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies. Legitimate power can not arise from a vacuum. 14. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised. They collaborated with the prosecution. who should be extended the privilege. as amended. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who. any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. They gave the information in the course of interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US prosecutor Charles La Bella. defendant or accused. We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity. and (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG. The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG. such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent. 1. Respondent court cannot substitute its judgment to the discretion of the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice. confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority. This silence argues against the thesis that the respondent court has full and unlimited power to reverse PCGG's exercise of discretion granting a section 5 immunity. E. The exercise of the power is not shared with any other authority. as amended. and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. The basic reason for vesting the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principles of separation of power. but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify. Applying this standard. we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section 5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners. the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent. The respondent court should only ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions. the prosecution in the exercise of its discretion may tactically decide to discharge an accused to be a state witness but its decision is made subject to the approval of the court trying the case. 14. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas. It does not limit said information to be given only in a case where the informant is himself an accused or a respondent. No. we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted by the PCGG under section 5 of E. It has to file a proper motion and the motion may be denied by the court if the prosecution fails to prove that it has satisfied the requirements of the rule on discharge of a witness. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which PCGG can prosecute as mandated by the Constitution and E. is eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion by the PCGG granting a section 5 immunity. Due process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.O. Sec. Nos.O.O.O.

. even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language. The PCGG itself does not appear certain and confident of the strength of its evidence against the petitioners in said criminal case. Indeed. after a change of Chairman. as amended. 14. Similarly. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court. it can be invoked at any time after its acquisition and before his final conviction. PCGG appears to have sensed the sterility of its efforts of continuing their prosecution. Under section 5 of E. establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired or accumulated their properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt. petitioner Vergara was granted immunity ". as if it was gifted by the government. initially. we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. . M. "the Republic shall cause the dismissal of Vergara from Criminal Case No. All these circumstances prove the judgment of the PCGG that the pieces of information given by petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired their wealth. justice and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity. "the Republic shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation. flip-flopped in its position.T. Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own. and they did. It was even the PCGG that shouldered their expenses." In the case of petitioner Vergara. 11960. It simplistically characterized the grant as special privilege. No. . Caparas. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO case. 14. 1990 letters to the petitioners. as amended. This section 5 immunity frees and releases one from liability. ex . ." In his May 16. When the respondent court denied the motion. and as it inures to the benefit of an accused. Under their Memorandum of Agreement. 11960 has yet to be established beyond doubt. It was brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses." This is a patent admission that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has merit and that the PCGG cannot prove its case against the petitioners in Criminal Case No. in light of Republic's review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file against . In the case of petitioner Mapa. It is only in this petition for review on certiorari that PCGG. offer no objection to its favorable consideration. 11960 . PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again joined the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration.O. Finally. It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the judgment of the PCGG. . we have consistently held that laws that decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing agreements. and they did." This commitment was reiterated by former Chairman Mateo Caparas of PCGG in his May 16. the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No. The records show that petitioners Mapa was granted immunity not only because of the information he gave to the prosecution but also ". as amended. They constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of the appearance of their guilt. learned that petitioners would file a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. Their failure to testify was not of their own making. the PCGG was obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the petitioners. .restrictive of the intendment of section 5 of E. their duty was to give information to the prosecution. It forthwith signed and sealed an agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from prosecution. The parties' agreements were then implemented." him. after their interview. the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity. No. It joined the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners in the respondent court. Its former chairman. as related above. "for failure of the prosecution to prove its case.O. Thus. 11960. We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. Thus. 1990 letters to the petitioners. the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise this power at any stage of the proceedings. the PCGG itself adopted the posture that the immunity of petitioners stayed and should not be disturbed. .A. . 11960. . Section 5 of E. he assured them that "we shall . As long as the privilege of immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater objectives.O." After reviewing its evidence against the petitioners. . they promised to make themselves available as witnesses in the said RICO cases. 11960 after PCGG rest its evidence. To be sure. The totality of the circumstances of the case established this element. 14. Our regard for the rights of an accused dictates this result. Petitioners travelled to New York to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses. does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already charged in court and undergoing trial. . in light of Republic's review of Vergara's participation in Criminal Case No.

p. Seizures and Immunities. The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. Puno Vitug. 205 US 349. No costs. C. these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Cipriano A. 115. Regalado. Associate Justices Jose S. Searches. de Leon. Criminal Law and Procedure.. however.. as heretofore discussed. Bidin. the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. In taking this posture. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality. Escareal. it misread the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against selfincrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes. 1991 are annulled and set aside and the Amended Information against the petitioners in Criminal Case No... Jr. p. 3 Philippine Political Law. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self-incrimination. IN VIEW WHEREOF. 6 406 US 441 [1992]. 11960 is ordered dismissed. pp. Quiason. #Footnotes 1 The Resolution was written by Associate Justice Romeo M. 336. Grospe dissented. To accommodate the need. del Rosario and Sabino R. the resolutions of the respondent court dated March 7. wrote separate concurring opinions. 5 Ibid.J. 731-733. the right against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries. Cruz. See also Joseph Varon. JJ. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC . Dobbs-Merrill Co. Romero. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against selfincrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Narvasa. came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public welfare.. Jr. concur. Associate Justice Nathanael M. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. Over the years. a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity. Feliciano. 4 Dr. Bellosillo. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method. Davide. Rolando del Carmen. 1993 ed. Melo. Polybank.. and Kapunan. 2 Kawanakoa vs. Quite clearly. and June 3. rightly. Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it — the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Balajadia.gratia. Padilla. SO ORDERED. The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it..

p. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees. that is why. The procedural issue is whether petitioners. public policy and order. C. 7. Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR." But the petitioners think otherwise. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11. they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869. Amended Petition. which is recognized by law. 91649 May 14. No. J. respondent. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph. Aguirre. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling. can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. EDILBERTO BALCE. together with prostitution. . Second Amended Petition. 12 and 13 of Article II. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy. in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy. and because — A. B. Rollo). This. PARAS. 2. (p. Rollo) In their Second Amended Petition. Basco & Associates for petitioners. 1991 ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO. Sec. and toward free enterprise and privatization. p. Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners. as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila). the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees.petitioners. D. H.R. of the present Constitution (p. 21. drug trafficking and other vices.:p A TV ad proudly announces: "The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming.B. SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ. because it is allegedly contrary to morals. while most other forms of gambling are outlawed.G. 3. vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR). petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution.

beautification. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration.D.494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide. and (3) minimize. all the evils. .2 Billion. PAGCOR was created under P. 20 N. Manuel. operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. football.43 Billion. decrees. 1067-B also dated January 1. 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II. amended or modified. government's income share. Under its Charter's repealing clause. and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights). 1989. 1869) To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.5 Billion in form of franchise tax. No. under the following declared policy — Sec.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. such as flood control programs. malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4.D. executive orders. In addition.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance. including sports gaming pools. are questioning the validity of P. PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.D. Declaration of Policy. next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. rules and regulations. No. (basketball. on July 11. PAGCOR earned P3. all laws. are accordingly repealed.The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P. 1869. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives: (a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled. public policy and public order. (b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos. (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions. Nutritional Programs. (Section 1. for amusement and recreation. Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. P. Martinez. 1983. In 1989 alone. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist. Tulungan ng Bayan Centers. administered and supervised by the Government.494) families. involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government. 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.C.D. sewerage and sewage projects." (State v. But the petitioners. etc. if not totally eradicate. which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects. 1399 was passed on June 2.D. It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue. 1. thus. 144." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects. 146 SCRA 323). P. 1977 "to establish. 1977 and was granted a franchise under P. lotteries. This challenge to P. Population Control and such other essential public services. PAGCOR was employing 4. inconsistent therewith. Subsequently. As of December 31. and other private associations and organizations. 1067-A dated January 1. and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2. Lozano v.D. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court. the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share." monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy". PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies.

And even if. Jarencio.As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle. under the 1987 Constitution. Martinez. 162 SCRA 521. 82 SCRA 30. to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition. . Justice Zaldivar underscored the — . and in keeping with the Court's duty. v. 539. 2nd 660. (Danner v. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power. Sec. 194 N. has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution. there is first. policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 125 SCRA 220. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines. v. Hass. of Agrarian Reform. justice. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter. the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. 739 [1970]. that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. Spurbeck v. is generally prohibited. . Commission on Elections.W. In the first Emergency Powers Cases. 540) Of course. it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis. as fall it must. 59 SCRA 54. . 2nd 534. 55 [1978]. 163 SCRA 371) With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us. on the offending statute (Lozano v. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition. Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar. Having disposed of the procedural issue. et al. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely. that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute. see also e. ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. 175 SCRA 343). the Court thru Mr. In Victoriano v. that a statute is presumed to be valid. Tan. Energy Regulatory Board.g.W. Inc. We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. unless allowed by law. the procedural issue. 663. deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence. 59 SCRA 66. one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. We will now discuss the substantive issues raised. Statton. 46 SCRA 734. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom. thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. if we must technicalities of procedure. Gambling in all its forms. Salas v. Peralta v. supra). brushing aside. 106 N. We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily.

being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes.D. What was the reason behind the enactment of P. 105 Phil.D. 1978). PD 1869). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is .D. it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property. as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form. Ericta. With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government. whether National or Local. "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v.D. regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny. purposely. established or collected by any municipal. 870. (Tribe. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change. v. 660. 12 SCRA 62). ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times. to whom the expression has been credited. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters. 487) As defined. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. National. 1869? P. 35 SCRA 481. Provincial Board of Mindoro. even to anticipate the future where it could be done. then. Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons: (a) The City of Manila. 83 Phil. provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]). It is not capable of an exact definition but has been. except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. v. 163 SCRA 386). income or otherwise. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR. shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation. As was subsequently proved. The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity. whether National or Local. fees or assessments of any kind." (2) Income and other taxes. Villanueva." (Edu v. City of Iloilo v. charges or levies of whatever nature. 337. PD 1869). supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause. refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". levies. income or otherwise as well as fees. it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. (Edu v. They must be referring to Section 13 par. City of Baguio. and illimitable of powers. levied. regulation. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain. Marshall. Thus.The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. (2) in order to foster the common good. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form. provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. Petitioners contend that P. Drilon." (Smith Bell & Co. Municipality of Caloocan.D. Public welfare. supra) It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause. veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (2) of P. 39 Phil. Inc. American Constitutional Law. nature or description. 708) It is "the most essential. lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896. 323. insistent. nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation. that the exemption clause in P. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees. as well as fees. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. charges or levies of whatever nature. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. Santos v." (Rubi v. Ericta. City of Baguio. 7 SCRA 643). 40 Phil. Its scope. the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated.

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise. No. licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P. 28 Phil. speaking for the Supreme Court. 3. capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities. G. burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. 1. 1983 ed. 1950). 579) This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments. (d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision . The latter role is governmental. only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. has long been revoked. Lacson. Being an instrumentality of the Government. impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. (c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling. Therefore. jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters. maintain and establish. the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila. Yriantes. its operation might be burdened. Orandia. PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus: Sec. Regulatory Power. Merdanillo v. Vol. 9124. Sec. 5 SCRA 541). impede.R. but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. p. 9. thus: Sec. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. 4 Wheat 316.D.superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas. 67. made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch. Maryland. all permits or franchises to operate. 1. 445). 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding. . to retard. Congress. maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks. horse and dog race tracks. Title II. PAGCOR has a dual role. Otherwise. the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. January 18. authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section. As early as 1975. 2. the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise. except only with respect to original incorporation. changes in corporate term. 4 L Ed. and shall exercise all the powers. . (b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. to operate and to regulate gambling casinos.R. 7909. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. Marland. structure. including. has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Necessarily. No. PD 1869. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license. PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. permit or other form of franchise to operate. G. therefore. Justice Holmes. in that way (taxation) at least. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities. July 2. jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution. No. Hereafter. Reyes.

p. What is settled is that the matter of regulating. (emphasis supplied) The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. 162 SCRA 539). mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U. First Ed. 435-436. 1987 Constitution). 1988. 107 So. 88 Cal. Vol. As gambling is usually an offense against the State. Cals. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. In a unitary system of government. p. Energy Regulatory Board. or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Such taxes. . 11 LRA 480. (Antieau. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. It is therefore a political question. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon. . Modern Constitutional Law. 25 PAC 974. 3 Ibid. fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. 1869. Art. consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy.can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities. (Ligan v. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides: Sec. its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. emphasis supplied) . repealed or revoked" (Sec. local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation. 9. 5. fees. XVIII. v." Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission. it cannot be an imperium in imperio. supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.S. Vol. Gadsden. Maryland. 440. In the absence of express grant of power to enact. as cited in Bernas. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes. legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio. Besides. 22 Am St. 340 US 42). and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide. II. such as the government under the Philippine Constitution.. Ala App. 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You. ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. (emphasis supplied) As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy. as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. This is a pointless argument. 374). (e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P. which concerns wisdom. it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.D. 2. Sanchez. 3. 280. 140. pp. p. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 548. emphasis supplied) Otherwise. Rep. 99.

drug trafficking and other vices" (p. (Valmonte v. No. Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P. On the issue of "monopoly. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. policies. 1155). Palomar. suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and.D. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.D.G. 43 O. The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. likewise. the Constitution provides that: Sec. lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.R.D. 306 as amended by RA 983). 101 Phil. 1869. If. 89572. the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Again. 2847).D. Just how P. Under our system of government. this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.Petitioners next contend that P. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. On petitioners' allegation that P. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III. PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. National Economy and Patrimony) It should be noted that. find no valid ground to sustain this contention. . sweepstakes. Misa. Palomar. while others are prohibited. P. 170 SCRA 256). As such. Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. Rollo)." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. unconstitutional. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. G. 25 SCRA 827). 25 SCRA 827) The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way. San Diego.D. 1869 for one. December 21. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Hernandez. Jr. 82. 249 US 2651). it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws. XII.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions. indeed. If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt. monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P. (Dominican Hotel v." however. does not render the applicable laws. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II. Arizona. Belmonte. 19. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. We. as the provision is worded. while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution.D 449) horse racing (R.. (Art. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. (Gomez v.A. 1989). policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power.

Trinidad. 1956. in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. Jarencio. However. the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental. Medialdea. As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. 162 SCRA 521 — Presidential Decree No. Salas v.J. as amended by Executive Order No. Narvasa. WHEREFORE. Comelec. 2) Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. In other words. Cruz. Jr. (Peralta v. issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. 387. . Comelec. This Court. the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. SO ORDERED. the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 47 Phil. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. therefore. Energy Regulatory Board. role of youth and educational values" being raised. drink. 137 has. 1869. Bidin. exercise. their petition must fail.but certainly not necessarily the cause. Gutierrez. physical health. is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. Vol. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food. Peralta v. JJ. Feliciano. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and the Congress. work. for PD 1869 to be nullified. privatization as well as the state principles on social justice. Parenthetically. Regalado and Davide. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. II. or parts thereof. and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive.. supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law. Otherwise. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. 82 SCRA 30. C. trend to free enterprise. not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality. is up for Congress to determine. mental control. 48 SCRA 734. inevitable. The dismissal of this petition is therefore. Gambling may have been the antecedent. social.. Gancayco. In general. or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes.they are basically not self-executing. further. Therefore. Jr. But as to whether P. 179 SCRA 287). p. Sarmiento.D. and even sex..D. (Bernas. Comelec. in any case. Abbas v.. however. concur. The Court notes. it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral. Fernan. justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF. Griño-Aquino. and spiritual outlook on life. monopoly.

in the long run.. Separate Opinions PADILLA. the political departments of government. as a fundamental state policy. morality or expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall within their authority. in return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects. liberty or property of the individual. One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein as gambling. and "regulated" by the government. and the sooner the executive implements such policy. control.Separate Opinions PADILLA. The courts. the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling. the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling. Also. Justice Paras.. with the activity known asprostitution. the political departments of government. concurring: I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. J. franchised. Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. J. which in the long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. cannot inquire into the wisdom. and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy. it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national development. answers itself. except only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life. The revenues realized by the government out of "legalized" gambling will. . such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question. It demeans the human personality. control. J." It is. which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government. and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy. concur. This means that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition. and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. This case does not involve such a factual situation. Melencio-Herrera. I believe. concurring: I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law. Justice Paras.. therefore. be more than offset and negated by the irreparable damage to the people's moral values. therefore. I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. namely. the better it will be for the nation. However. as the decision states. This means that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition. the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling. destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's self-respect. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and homes. namely." It is.

. J. 2008 by danabatnag Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case. be more than offset and negated by the irreparable damage to the people's moral values. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments.The courts. Whether or not the October 23. cannot inquire into the wisdom. except only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life. those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation. This case does not involve such a factual situation. lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). and the sooner the executive implements such policy. it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national development. with the activity known asprostitution. The revenues realized by the government out of "legalized" gambling will. the better it will be for the nation. 2. concurs. 3. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law. morality or expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall within their authority. regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts. Melencio-Herrera. Also. saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and homes. with the Court of First Instance of Manila.. 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws. which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government. as a fundamental state policy. The court resolved three issues: 1. liberty or property of the individual. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur‟s proclamation. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case. franchised. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling. However. answers itself. I believe. without an enabling law. in the long run. Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Posted on December 4. and "regulated" by the government. such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question. the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate. in return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects. It demeans the human personality. One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein as gambling. I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. as the decision states. destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's self-respect. Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. initiated during the Japanese occupation. supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. which in the long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character.

according to international law.Municipal laws and private laws. such construction is to be avoided. IF. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war. 2. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant. laws and courts of Japan. usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Since the laws remain valid. It is a legal maxim that.” Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law. hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. or great mischief done. until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. they become his and derive their force from him. even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines. Therefore. denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila . or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law. non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated. as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now. it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. unless required by clear and unequivocal words. then it could not have been MacArthur‟s intention to refer to judicial processes.” Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction. 3012. which would be in violation of international law. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become. And if they were not valid. The second question. excepting of a political nature. of course. Civil obedience is expected even during war. and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan. “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments. Summary of ratio: 1. the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. 3. then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. by being continued as required by the law of nations. the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. however. or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. the court said.” In the case of US vs Reiter.” Until. for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments.

& MRS. & MRS. NESIA ALSADO. JUTA CUMON. FELIPE PINO. No. AMOS TANTOG. EVIE LUMAKANG and JUAN LUMAKANG. MARICRIS ALFAR. represented by her parents MR. PERGEBRIEL GUINITA & CHAREN GUINITA. SERGIO CARMELOTES. and MAGDALENE MAHINAY. & MRS. RENE LAUDE. EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU TABLASON. FELIX MAHINAY. & MRS. & MRS. MAXIMO EBRALINAG represented by his parents MR. JEMIL OYAO & JOEL OYAO. & MRS. represented by her parents MR. ABELARDO ALSADO. & MRS. SUZETTE NAPOLES. MANUEL F. 1995 MAY AMOLO. VIRGILIO SARSOZO.R. & MRS. IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO. MARTINO VILLAR. No. represented by her parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and ESTRELLITA CABUYAO. GERALDINE ALSADO. LEONIDES DOOP. LYDIO SEQUINO. represented by their parents MR. represented by her parents MR. ALBERTO TANGAHA. SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA. represented by their parents EMERLITO TABLASON. represented by his parent ILUMINADA TANGAHA. NOEMI . represented by their parents MR. FAUSTO OSTIA. represented by their parents MR. MANUEL MONTECILLO. & MRS. MR. PAQUITO EBRALINAG. BIONGCOG. FLORENCIO MONARES. ISAIAS AMOLO. represented by their parents MR. & MRS. represented by their parents MR. ALVIN DOOP represented by his parents MR. vs. and LEAH DEMOTOR. represented by their parents MR. MARY GRACE MAHINAY. EMILIO SARSOZO & PAZ AMOR SARSOZO. REU ALSADO and LILIBETH ALSADO. EMILY EBRALINAG. & RUDYARD ALSADO represented by their parents MR. & MRS. 1995 ROEL EBRALINAG. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU. represented by their parents MR. & MRS. EVELYN MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA represented by their parents MR. NAPTHALE TUNACAO represented by his parents MR. LEONARDO DEMOTOR. ROBERTO TANGAHA. JUSTINIANA TANTOG.R. represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON. & MRS. & MRS. & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO represented by their parents MR. RHILYN LAUDE represented by her parents MR. represented by her parents MR. GENEROSO ALFAR. represented by her parents MR. JONELL HOPE MAHINAY. & MRS. represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER OYAO. GODOFREDO DIAMOS. & MRS. MICHAEL JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH. 95887 December 29. JOVENIANO VILLA. represented by their parents. & MRS. JONALYN ANTIOLA and JERWIN ANTIOLA. G. represented by parent ANNIE JOSEPH. & MRS. RAQUEL DEMOTOR. LEONARDO EBRALINAG. represented by her father. represented by their parents FELIPE ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA. & MRS. represented by their parents MR.EN BANC G. TORIBIO MACAPAS. JESICA CARMELOTES. & MRS. represented by parents MR. represented by their parents MR. & MRS. and MR. respondents. & MRS. LUMAKANG. REDFORD ALSADO. JOEL ALSADO. GENARO VILLAR. & MRS. CESAR GUINITA. petitioners. represented by her parents ISMAILITO NAPOLES and OPHELIA NAPOLES. JURELL VILLA and MELONY VILLA. represented by their parents MR. MERCY MONTECILLO. & MRS. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO. MANUEL TUNACAO PRECILA PINO represented by her parents MR. represented by their parents MR. GIDEON CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON. JANETH DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS. RUWINA ALFAR. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR. LEOREMINDA MONARES represented by her parents MR. represented by their parents ABDON ALFAR ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR. MARIA CONCEPCION CABUYAO. Cebu District Supervisor. FREDESMINDA ALFAR & GUMERSINDO ALFAR. & MRS. BABY JEAN MACAPAS. 95770 December 29. JOEBERT ALSADO. & MRS.

TURNO represented by her parents MANUEL TURNO and VEVENCIA TURNO. The decision therefore is susceptible to the very criticism that the grant of exemption is a violation of the "non-establishment" provision of the Constitution. SOLOMON PALATULON. on behalf of the public respondent. 1955 and by Department Order No. The Solicitor General. referring to the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in U. 1265 . furthermore contends that: The accommodation by this Honorable Court to a demand for special treatment in favor of a minority sect even on the basis of a claim of religious freedom may be criticized as granting preference to the religious beliefs of said sect in violation of the "non-establishment guarantee" provision of the Constitution. Furthermore. vs. SALMERO PALATULON and ROSALINA PALATULON. 1955 issued by the Department of Education. respondents. the decision of the Court constitutes a special favor which immunizes religious believers such as Jehovah's Witnesses to the law and the DECS rules and regulations by interposing the claim that the conduct required by law and the rules and regulation (sic) are violative of their religious beliefs. a collision course with the "non-establishment guarantee. he maintains that the State's interests in the case at bench are constitutional and legal obligations to implement the law and the constitutional mandate to inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Finally. in public schools. He stresses that the issue here is not curtailment of religious belief but regulation of the exercise of religious belief. Republic Act No. Aimed primarily at private educational institutions which did not observe the flag ceremony exercises. represented by their parents MARTILLANO PALATULON and CARMILA PALATULON." Additionally the public respondent insists that this Court adopt a "neutral stance" by reverting to its holding in Gerona declaring the flag as being devoid of any religious significance. 8. O'Brien. in violation of the "Establishment Clause" of the Constitution. Jehovah's Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who were expelled from their classes by various public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag. and members of the sect. SANGUTAN. to grant an exemption to a specific religious minority poses a risk of collision course with the "equal protection of the laws" clause in respect of the nonexempt. and ANTONIO A. Surely. 1265 of July 11. dated July 21. R E SO L U T I O N KAPUNAN. 1 II All the petitioners in the original case 2 were minor school children. the Jehovah's Witnesses. sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.: The State moves for a reconsideration of our decision dated March 1.S. petitioners. 1993 granting private respondents' petition for certiorari and prohibition and annulling the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents therein on the ground that the said decision created an exemption in favor of the members of the religious sect. and. vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU. J.

Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. They point out that as citizens. 7 by not engaging in antigovernment activities of any kind. an emblem of national sovereignty. Upholding religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest protection among human rights. The religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect. the Jehovah's Witnesses are widely known and are equally widely disseminated in numerous books." this Court. . in Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 4 re-examined our over two decades-old decision in Gerona and reversed expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution. Sustaining these expulsion orders. refuse to perform an act (or acts) which they consider proscribed by the Bible. they aver that they show their respect through less demonstrative methods manifesting their allegiance. magazines. much less to a follower of said group or sect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government. The implementing regulations issued by the Department of Education thereafter detailed the manner of observance of the same. by their simple obedience to the country's laws. 5 From our decision of March 1. The basic assumption in their universal refusal to salute the flags of the countries in which they are found is that such a salute constitutes an act of religious devotion forbidden by God's law. 8 and by paying their taxes . Immediately pursuant to these orders. the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. brochures and leaflets distributed by their members in their house to house distribution efforts and in many public places. Secretary of Education 3 held that: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines. . After all. while members of Jehovah's Witnesses. they contend that such refusal should not be taken to indicate disrespect for the symbols of the country or evidence that they are wanting in patriotism and nationalism. After a careful study of the grounds adduced in the government's Motion For Reconsideration of our original decision. 1993.penalizes all educational institutions for failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony with public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit on second offense. there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers. of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. on the basis of religious convictions. otherwise. Their refusal to render obeisance to any form or symbol which smacks of idolatry is based on their sincere belief in the biblical injunction found in Exodus 20:4. the public respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on grounds hereinabove stated. This assumption. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect. against worshipping forms or idols other than God himself. they have an excellent record as law abiding members of society even if they do not demonstrate their refusal to conform to the assailed orders by overt acts of conformity. 6 And yet. we find no cogent reason to disturb our earlier ruling. however. the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. this Court in the 1959 case of Gerona vs.5. while "bizarre" to others is firmly anchored in several biblical passages. On the contrary. school officials in Masbate expelled children belonging to the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses from school for failing or refusing to comply with the flag ceremony requirement. .

" 17 The essence of the free exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious dogma. not the exception. not civil immunity. nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. the tendency to exact "a hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards. 13 Recognizing these values. this Court will not find it difficult to sustain a regulation. 20 Where the governmental interest clearly appears to be unrelated to the suppression of an idea. underscored that a generation of Filipinos which cuts its teeth on the Bill of Rights would find abhorrent the idea that one may be compelled. No doubt. to salute the flag sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge during a flag ceremony. it is enough to re-emphasize that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities. However." The teaching of these values ranks at the very apex of education's "high responsibility" of shaping up the minds of the youth in those principles which would mold them into responsible and productive members of our society. the constitutional right to education and the unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates of their conscience and their sincere religious beliefs. It gave religious equality. To view the constitutional guarantee in the manner suggested by the petitioners would be to denigrate the status of a preferred freedom and to relegate it to the level of an abstract principle devoid of any substance and meaning in the lives of those for whom the protection is addressed. the writer of the original opinion." 19 III The ostensible interest shown by petitioners in preserving the flag as the symbol of the nation appears to be integrally related to petitioner's disagreement with the message conveyed by the refusal of members of the Jehovah's Witness sect to salute the flag or participate actively in flag ceremonies on religious grounds. may in its application. the government's interest in molding the young into patriotic and civic spirited citizens is "not totally free from a balancing process" 12 when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause.and dues to society as self-sufficient members of the community. for no less fundamental than the right to take part is the right to stand apart. neutral on its face. the State possesses what the Solicitor General describes as the responsibility "to inculcate in the minds of the youth the values of patriotism and nationalism and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. 10 The religious beliefs. 14 "This coercion of conscience has no place in a free society". 16 In the context of the instant case. practices and convictions of the members of the sect as a minority are bound to be seen by others as odd and different and at divergence with the complex requirements of contemporary societies. hands on their side. 9 While they refuse to salute the flag. Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino. it did not create new privileges. in order not to disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who believe differently. a religious doctrine or practice or an expression or form of expression. However. 18 Moreover. 15 The State's contentions are therefore. unacceptable." 11 is seductive to the bureaucratic mindset as a shortcut to patriotism. they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully at attention. and the zone of protection . regulations involving this area are generally held against the most exacting standards. the freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution should be seen as the rule. not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. As to the contention that the exemption accorded by our decision benefits a privileged few. Against those who believe that coerced loyalty and unity are mere shadows of patriotism. on pain of expulsion. particularly those societies which require certain practices as manifestations of loyalty and patriotic behavior. the suggestion implicit in the State's pleadings to the effect that the flag ceremony requirement would be equally and evenly applied to all citizens regardless of sect or religion and does not thereby discriminate against any particular sect or denomination escapes the fact that "[a] regulation.

Supreme Court held that the "State's asserted interest in preserving the fag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity was an interest related to the suppression of free expression . as a whole has important interests. shared by the entire community of Jehovah's Witnesses and is intimately related to their theocratic beliefs and convictions. . in the case of a regulation which appears to abridge a right to which the fundamental law accords high significance it is the regulation." 25 To the extent to which members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect assiduously pursue their belief in the flag's religious symbolic meaning. It is worth repeating that the absence of a demonstrable danger of a kind which the State is empowered to protect militates against the extreme disciplinary methods undertaken by school authorities in trying to enforce regulations designed to compel attendance in flag ceremonies. secular symbol expresses a majoritarian view intended to stifle the expression of the belief that an act of saluting the flag might sometimes be — to some individuals — so offensive as to be worth their giving up another constitutional right — the right to education. In the case at bench. Those who attempt to coerce uniformity of sentiment soon find out that the only path towards achieving unity is by way of suppressing dissent. While conceding to the idea — adverted to by the Solicitor General — that certain methods of religious expression may be prohibited 26 to serve legitimate societal purposes. The message conveyed by their refusal to participate in the flag ceremony is religious. The methods utilized to impose them breed resentment and dissent.accorded by the Constitution cannot be violated. It bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly constitutes a danger so grave and imminent as to warrant the state's intervention. 22 While the very concept of ordered liberty precludes this Court from allowing every individual to subjectively define his own standards on matters of conformity in which society. such attempts only find the "unanimity of the graveyard. 23 Compelling members of a religious sect to believe otherwise on the pain of denying minor children the right to an education is a futile and unconscionable detour towards instilling virtues of loyalty and patriotism which are best instilled and communicated by painstaking and non-coercive methods. In a case involving the Flag Protection Act of 1989. Their treatment of flag as a religious symbol is well-founded and welldocumented and is based on grounds religious principle. the records of the case and the long history of flag salute cases abundantly supports the religious quality of the claims adduced by the members of the sect Jehovah's Witnesses. which is the exception and which requires the court's strictest scrutiny. that it would prompt legitimate State intervention. without thereby transgressing constitutionally protected boundaries. which respondents point out attained legislative cachet in the Administrative Code of 1987. 24 In the end. the State cannot. except upon a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a right to protect. the government has not shown that refusal to do the acts of conformity exacted by the assailed orders. . would pose a clear and present danger of a danger so serious and imminent. The subsequent expulsion of members of the sect on the basis of the regulations assailed in the original petitions was therefore clearly directed against religious practice. refusal to participate in the flag ceremony hardly constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as to prompt legitimate State intervention. the view that the flag is not a religious but a neutral. only serve to inspire the opposite.S. Refusal of the children to participate in the flag salute ceremony would not interfere with or deny the rights of other school children to do so. Individuals or groups of individuals get from a symbol the meaning they put to it. impose the contrary view on the pretext of sustaining a policy designed to foster the supposedly far-reaching goal of instilling patriotism among the youth. 21 Stated differently. Coerced loyalties. Furthermore. after all. . not the act (or refusal to act). It is obvious that the assailed orders and memoranda would gravely endanger the free exercise of the religious beliefs of the members of the sect and their minor children. because the State's concern with protecting the flag's symbolic meaning is implicated only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates some message. the U.

if we were to refer (as respondents did by referring to the test in O'Brien) to the standards devised by the US Supreme Court in determining the validity or extent of restrictive regulations impinging on the freedoms of the mind. Narvasa. because the Court therein was emphatic in stating that "the government interest (should be) unrelated to the suppression of free expression. cited by respondent. WHEREFORE. Moreover. Padilla.R.Finally. The issue rather is whether it is permissible to compel children in the Nation's schools to salute the flag as a . a more demanding standard is applied. Romero.. nationalism. the instant Motion is hereby DENIED. and moral uprightness is a responsibility shared by the State with parents and other societal institutions such as religious sects and denominations. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu). Jr. 28 The responsibility of inculcating the values of patriotism. If a relationship exists. Separate Opinions MENDOZA. Davide." We have already stated that the interest in regulation in the case at bench was clearly related to the suppression of an expression directly connected with the freedom of religion and that respondents have not shown to our satisfaction that the restriction was prompted by a compelling interest in public order which the state has a right to protect.. good citizenship. are the price we pay for the freedoms we enjoy. No. expressions of diverse beliefs. C.. J. the respondents' insistence on the validity of the actions taken by the government on the basis of their averment that "a government regulation of expressive conduct is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government (and) furthers an important and substantial government interest" 27 misses the whole point of the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in O'Brien..J. Melo. Provided that those influences do not pose a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to society and its institutions. 1 March 1993. no matter how upsetting they may seem to the majority.. premises considered. J. The manner in which such values are demonstrated in a plural society occurs in ways so variable that government cannot make claims to the exclusivity of its methods of inculcating patriotism so all-encompassing in scope as to leave no room for appropriate parental or religious influences. Francisco and Hermosisima. SO ORDERED. concur. concurring: The value of the national flag as a symbol of national unity is not in question in this case. JJ. then the O'Brien standard is hardly appropriate because the standard devised in O'Brien only applies if the State's regulation is not related to communicative conduct. Regalado. Bellosillo. took no part.. J. 219 SCRA 276.. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in G. Panganiban. Vitug. 95770 (Ebralinag vs. Jr. Puno.

It is noteworthy that while the Constitution provides for the national flag. Legitimate ends . a compulsion to bow down before a graven image. 7 it does not give the State the power to compel a salute to the flag. 6 In determining the validity of compulsory flag salute. because thought control is a negation of the very values which the educational system seeks to promote. there is no compelling reason for resorting to compulsion or coercion to achieve the purpose for which flag salute is instituted. 8 It trivializes great principles to assimilate compulsory flag salute to a form of command to worship strange idols not only because the flag is not a religious symbol but also because the salute required involves nothing more than standing at attention or placing one's right hand over the right breast as the National Anthem is played and of raising the right hand as the following pledge is recited: Ako'y nanunumpang magtatapat sa watawat ng Pilipinas at sa Republikang kanyang kinakatawan — isang bansang nasa kalinga ng Dios buo at hindi mahahati. not through compulsion or coercion but through persuasion. 2 submit to vaccination 3 or give their children elementary school education 4 on the ground of conscience. They are places for the nurturing of ideals and values. But unlike the refusal to pay taxes or to submit to compulsory vaccination. 1 render military service. we must determine which of these polar principles exerts a greater pull. The imposition of taxes is justified because. Persuasion and not persecution is the means for winning the allegiance of free men. at one end of which is the obligation to pay taxes and. the existence of the State itself may well be endangered. (I pledge allegiance to the flag and to the nation for which it stands — one nation under God indivisible. That is why the Constitution provides that the development of moral character and the cultivation of civic spirit are to be pursued through education that includes a study of the Constitution. Schools are places where diversity and spontaneity are valued as much as personal discipline is. the refusal to salute the flag threatens no such dire consequences to the life or health of the State.) In sum compulsory flag salute violates the Constitution not because the aim of the exercise is doubtful but because the means employed for accomplishing it is not permitted. teaching the rights and duties of citizenship and. at the other. an appreciation of the role of national heroes in historical development. na may kalayaan at katarungan para sa lahat. religious instruction to be taught by instructors designated by religious authorities of the religion to which they belong. unless support for the government can be exacted. with liberty and justice for all. On the other hand. Consequently. The compulsory vaccination of children is justified because unless the State can compel compliance with vaccination program there is danger that a disease will spread. compelling flag salute cannot be likened to compelling members of a religious sect to bow down before a graven image. But public school children may not be compelled to attend religious instruction 5 or recite prayers or join in bible reading before the opening of classes in such schools.means of promoting nationhood considering that their refusal to do so is grounded on a religious belief. To regard it otherwise because a religious minority regards it so would be to put in question many regulations that the State may constitutionally enact or measures which it may adopt to promote civic virtues which the Constitution itself enjoins the State to promote. Compulsory flag salute lies in a continuum. Indeed schools are not like army camps where the value of discipline justifies requiring a salute to the flag. at the option of parents and guardians. Members of a religious sect cannot refuse to pay taxes. The flag is not an image but a secular symbol.

not through compulsion or coercion but through persuasion.. at the option of parents and guardians. J. an appreciation of the role of national heroes in historical development. at one end of which is the obligation to pay taxes and. Members of a religious sect cannot refuse to pay taxes. The flag is not an image but a secular symbol. because thought control is a negation of the very values which the educational system seeks to promote. 7 it does not give the State the power to compel a salute to the flag. Consequently. 2 submit to vaccination 3 or give their children elementary school education 4 on the ground of conscience. On the other hand. They are places for the nurturing of ideals and values. The imposition of taxes is justified because. at the other. To regard it otherwise because a religious minority regards it so would be to put in question many regulations that the State may constitutionally enact or measures which it may adopt to promote civic virtues which the Constitution itself enjoins the State to promote. religious instruction to be taught by instructors designated by religious authorities of the religion to which they belong. Compulsory flag salute lies in a continuum. 6 In determining the validity of compulsory flag salute.cannot be pursued by methods which violate fundamental freedoms when the ends may be achieved by rational ones. For this reason I join in holding that compulsory flag salute is unconstitutional. But public school children may not be compelled to attend religious instruction 5 or recite prayers or join in bible reading before the opening of classes in such schools. It is noteworthy that while the Constitution provides for the national flag. a compulsion to bow down before a graven image. we must determine which of these polar principles exerts a greater pull. compelling flag salute cannot be likened to compelling members of a religious sect to bow down before a graven image. unless support for the government can be exacted. The compulsory vaccination of children is justified because unless the State can compel compliance with vaccination program there is danger that a disease will spread. Schools are places where diversity and spontaneity are valued as much as personal discipline is. 8 . the refusal to salute the flag threatens no such dire consequences to the life or health of the State. Indeed schools are not like army camps where the value of discipline justifies requiring a salute to the flag. the existence of the State itself may well be endangered. Persuasion and not persecution is the means for winning the allegiance of free men. concurring: The value of the national flag as a symbol of national unity is not in question in this case. 1 render military service. teaching the rights and duties of citizenship and. Separate Opinions MENDOZA. But unlike the refusal to pay taxes or to submit to compulsory vaccination. there is no compelling reason for resorting to compulsion or coercion to achieve the purpose for which flag salute is instituted. That is why the Constitution provides that the development of moral character and the cultivation of civic spirit are to be pursued through education that includes a study of the Constitution. The issue rather is whether it is permissible to compel children in the Nation's schools to salute the flag as a means of promoting nationhood considering that their refusal to do so is grounded on a religious belief.

(United States v. with liberty and justice for all.It trivializes great principles to assimilate compulsory flag salute to a form of command to worship strange idols not only because the flag is not a religious symbol but also because the salute required involves nothing more than standing at attention or placing one's right hand over the right breast as the National Anthem is played and of raising the right hand as the following pledge is recited: Ako'y nanunumpang magtatapat sa watawat ng Pilipinas at sa Republikang kanyang kinakatawan — isang bansang nasa kalinga ng Dios buo at hindi mahahati. Legitimate ends cannot be pursued by methods which violate fundamental freedoms when the ends may be achieved by rational ones. 3 106 Phil. O'Brien. Daniel 3: 1-30. case: A government regulation of expressive conduct is sufficiently justified if it is within the Constitutional power of this government. 391 U. 10. 1993. 9 Id. . 7 Rollo. 4 Supra. Footnotes 1 "To this end.R.S. 6 See. 95887 March 1. 8 Id. As succinctly outlined in one U. note 2. (I pledge allegiance to the flag and to the nation for which it stands — one nation under God indivisible. it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. No. 367)" 2 G.. 10 Rollo. p. 95770. for e. at 272-273 (1993).) In sum compulsory flag salute violates the Constitution not because the aim of the exercise is doubtful but because the means employed for accomplishing it is not permitted. "a government regulation of expressive religious conduct which debases the constitutional mandate for citizenship training is justifiable.g. For this reason I join in holding that compulsory flag salute is unconstitutional. 5 Id. 8. and G. p. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.R. na may kalayaan at katarungan para sa lahat. 219 SCRA 256 (1993).S." the motion states. 2 (1959). No.

(emphasis supplied). 19 Sherbert v.S.S. The statement. and being allegedly concerned "about the adverse effect that the world's influence can have on our children".. In making these points. Society of Sisters 268 U. The consequent want of interest in public affairs came thus from the outset to be a noticeable feature in Christianity. the Motion makes this tongue-in-cheek observation. a government cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity . Pierce v. 23 Supra. See also. "Recognizing that the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First Amendment . 22 U. "Because of their religious conviction that they" are not part of this world. 7. p. 16 L. p. at 339 (1942). 14 Ebralinag.11 State of Wisconsin v. 240 and "anti-social" Id. . 534 (1925).S. their citizenship was in heaven. GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY. . 24 Id. Annex "B". "not part of this world" was deliberately taken out of context.. 18 Id. at 275. 398 (1963). 13 Id." Rollo. 31 (1985). be exempted from participating in almost all school activities and social function (sic) which. "seditious" Id.G. Yoder 40 LW 4476 (1972). the kingdom to which they looked was not part of this world. Here is what the paragraph from the sect's manual says: As one might expect. separate from the world. Cruz J. v. TRIBE. 15 Id. Hardy noted in his book Christianity and the Roman Government: "The Christians were strangers and pilgrims in the world around them. 25 Id. 229. 21 West Virginia v. (Concurring).. 510. at 270. . the Jehovah's Witnesses ask that their children . as they pointed out below are contrary to Bible (sic) principles. 17 See supra note 15. at 640. at 641. this view of the future also had a significant effect on the first Christians. As the historian E. 110 L ed 2d 287 (1990). Eichman 496 US 310. supra. Barnette 319 US 624. p. note 4. 313. citing Justice Frankfurter.. Id. 20 For instance. 12 Id.. Verner. the Motion for Reconsideration characterizes the practices and observations of the sect as "bizarre. . 374 U. It caused them to be a distinctive people.

11 (1904). 26 Raising the "Children of God" caper. concurring: 1 United States v. Lee. Supreme Court in Texas v. MENDOZA. 27 Supra. 293 U. through his writings entitled "The Law of Love" and "Growing in Faith. Cf. 66 Phil.." See.S. held: We must first determine whether Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct permitting him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction. 455 U. 595 (1927). United States. J. Johnson. at 403. 2 Gillette v. 197 U. 245 (1934). XIV. offering free sex. 25 (1982)." Despite the crusades of Cardinal Sin and the Aquino government." Will this Honorable Court also recognize and allow their communal free love and sex orgies to continue unabated as part of their religious belief and protected by their constitutional right of freedom of religion. Director. 835 (1936). Sosa. 28 Referring to the test devised in O'Brien the U. 491 US 397 at 400 (1989). Id. Lorenzo v. If his conduct was expressive. People v. 406 U." 5 Art. 205 (1972). note 1. CONST. 62 Phil. Johnson. PHIL. §2(2) provides that "elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age. we next decide whether the State's regulation is related to the suppression of free expression." . If the state's regulation is not related to expression. 13 (1938). 50 Phil. Massachusetts. Hamilton v. thereby sideswiping the present Government's program to prevent the spread of venereal diseases and the dreaded AIDS through the use of condoms?" Rollo. also known as Future Visions of Family which engages in free love and sex sharing among its members by way of obedience to the biblical injunction "to love your neighbor and love yourself" as interpreted by its founder. Moses David Berg. supra. Regents of the University of California. XIV. 437 (1971). §3 (3) only provides "for optional religious instruction on public elementary and high education is compulsory for all children of school age. Therefore. and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson's conviction under a more demanding standard. 245. 3 Jacobson v. that very same government cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of approved messages to be associated with that symbol when it cannot mandate the status or feeling the symbol purports to represent. 4 Wisonsin v.S. Yoder. Art.S.in its citizens.S. O'Brien for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls. p. this self-styled sex cult has gain (sic) foothold and spread in numbers in this country. then the less stringent standard we announced in United States vs. Texas v..S. the Solicitor General's brief states: How about the Children of God. If it is then we are outside O'Brien's test. People v..S. Lagman and People v. cutely termed as "flirty fishing to win people for the Lord. 401 U. Abad Lopez.

SEN. petitioners suggest that the two.cf. JOVITO R. Schempp. petitioners contend. JOSE CUNANAN. RAOUL V. in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in the present case. acted otherwise than according to law. 1995 KILOSBAYAN. REP. INCORPORATED. FERNANDO SANTIAGO. JOSE ABCEDE. petitioners. v. and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION.S. II. SALONGA. with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the . The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. DOROMAL. QUINTIN S.6 Engel v. ARROYO. CHRISTINE TAN. 203 (1963). RESOLUTION MENDOZA. FERNANDO. MORATO. EPHRAIM TENDERO. APOLO. Art. 472 U. Abington School Dist. RAFAEL G.. 1169. They cite the following statement in the opinion of the Court: The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one. Art. §1. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R. ERME CAMBA. 421 (1962). 118910 November 16. these questions can no longer be reopened. MANUEL L. J. WIGBERTO TAÑADA. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. In addition.S. Jaffree. XVI. 8 See Art. SEN.. VICTORINO.S. JOKER P. respondents. there have been changes in the membership of the Court. in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. 374 U. JR. 7 CONST. vs. Consequently. Vitale. No. 307 U. §13. EMILIO C. XIV. FREDDIE WEBB. They insist that the decision in the first case has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan.A. Inc. as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. with seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case. CAPULONG. RIGOS. §3(2). 38 (1985). JOSE T.R.: Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. Wallace v. No. CIRILO A.

Their attempt at psychoanalysis. except a conviction on the part of the five." implying some ulterior motives on the part of the new majority in reexamining the two questions. No.) and the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco. a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of the features which made the first contract objectionable.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed. "why should it be so?" Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. JJ. 1169. J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R. what the PCSO said in its manifestation in the first case was the following: 1. 1995. Quiason. 1994. perhaps a Freudian slip. Vitug and Kapunan. The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO. 1169. J. hi-tech lotto. res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment. Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz. v. It is argued that. J. detecting a Freudian slip where none exists.P. The eighth Justice (Padilla. a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin. Moreover. it was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first ruling.appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco.A. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with the authority of PCSO under its charter (R." And petitioners ask.) thought the previous ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be barred by stare decisis. 1994. It is simply meant to explain that because the five members of the Court who dissented in the first case (Melo. No. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated May 5. For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain — rather than to justify — the majority's decision to overrule the ruling in the previous case. that the two new appointees. who had been members of the Court at the time they dissented in the first case. or law of the case. The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. Guingona. in any case. 1169.A." To be sure. a copy of which was received on May 6. JJ.A. as amended) and with the Decision of the Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line. Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion. and the two new members that the previous ruling was erroneous. may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find motives where there are none which they can impute to some members of the Court. Puno. Blg. No. et al. as amended by B. 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case. 2. . regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing. the answer is: None. 42) and conformable with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its Decision of May 5.

if not reversed. Sept. wrote the opinion of the Court. which were passed during the Civil War. In People v. Lee. For this reason it gave the accused the benefit of the doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she assumed office. the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling were noted without anyone — much less would-be psychoanalysts — finding in the statement of the Court any Freudian slip. supra.R. therefore. It can. this Court. as explained in the decision. 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election" in §2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of age on the date of the election. The possibility of change in the rule as a result of change in membership was accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused. 23. made U. be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be so?" Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested. Aquinas. according to the majority in the Feliciano case. Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis.) and the fact that the vote in the first case was a narrow one (6 to 5). voting 6-5. holding that while the statement that the accused was eligible was "inexact or erroneous. 888 (1960). in a subsequent case because of change in the membership of a court. Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the retirement of two members (Recess and Flex. the Court ruled she could not. Petitioners ask. Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by the parties. No. who dissented in the first case. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. On the other hand. L-10201.) who had taken part in the decision in the first case and their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-David. 457 (1871). Yang. we simply assume for the purpose of this decision that the doctrine stands. Aquinas. a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decision.There was thus no "formal commitment" — but only a manifestation — that the parties were not filing a motion for reconsideration. G. res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case. held in Feliciano v. Feliciano v. Justice. despite the presence of new members. later Chief Justice. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment. the dissenters argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumed office. 12 Wall. notes (greenbacks) legal tender for the payment of . because the question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on the day of the election or whether it was sufficient that they attained it at the beginning of the term of office] has not been discussed anew. as a candidate for municipal councilor stated under oath in her certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she assumed office. the Court allowed that the continuing validity of its ruling in the first case might well be doubted. the first decision was erroneousand no legal doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. The Legal Tender Acts. The question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. Benison. In that case. JJ." the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on their contrary view on the question of standing.S. JJ. This was the lesson of Knox v. Less than three years later." the accused could not be held liable for falsification. "Why should this be so?" Because. Indeed. In 1957. the same question was before the Court again. they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight. 107 Phi.

debts, public or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts, as applied to preexisting debts, was challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The Court was then composed of only eight (8) Justices because of Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others, including Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. A private memorandum left by the dissenting Justices described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm member of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts invalid. On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases, as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the former majority. There were allegations that the new Justices were appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal Tender Acts, just as there were others who defended the character and independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the overruling of the Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal Tender Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation from what Chief Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds." 1 We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration. I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds. The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read: Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and thepromotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegalper se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]). It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise. Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16) These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional Commission, explaining the provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech, however, which supports their claim of standing. On the contrary, the speech points the way to the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather than to the courts, as the appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views. 2 Indeed, the provisions on independent people's organizations may most usefully be read in connection with the provision on initiative and referendum as a means whereby the people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by Congress. For the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the contract in question is nothing more than an opposition to the government policy on lotteries. It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing. Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994])Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 [1967]) Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358

(1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16, 1995 (Mendoza,J., concurring)) Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit: While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. (Emphasis added) Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits. Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to question government contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or not. In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The case was dismissed by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res judicata and pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's standing. On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by the government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road construction equipment. The question of standing was not discussed, but even if it was, petitioner's standing could be sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank, which was one of the defendants in the case. In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council were allowed to sue to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city government for the purchase of road construction equipment because their contention was that the contract had been made without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an interest in seeing to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by law. But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by the President of the Philippines.

although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing.A. not only that the law is invalid. petitioners have not shown why. No. R. 1169. B." had no direct and personal interest in the lottery.P No . (Emphasis) In contrast.R. As for the petitioners. we have not stopped there and dismissed their case. petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. who claimed to be a "citizen. II. programs. II. Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation of timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art. taxpayer and father of three minor children. We said: "He must be able to show. whether a party has a cause of action and. in such frequency and manner. lotteries and other similar activities. in Valmonte v. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. and shall have the authority: A. §16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the courts. therefore. and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Nine. as amended. projects and activities which may be . and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. That provision states: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators. Jr." In the case at bar. For in the view we take. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements. No. The case of Oposa v. petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral. 1987. unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case. lawyer. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races. as amended by B. G. For this reason the Court has not ducked the substantive issues raised by petitioners. This is not. 78716. they should be accorded standing to bring this suit. however. hereinafter designated the Office. a legal issue. but a policy matter for Congress to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity. and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors. states: §1. Indeed. shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs. who are members of Congress. 42. medical assistance and services and charities of national character. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. PCSO. is a real party in interest or one with standing to raise a constitutional question must turn on whether he has a right which has been violated. as already stated. to engage in health and welfare-related investments. as shall be determined. Nevertheless. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such categorization. but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Finally. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. we threw out a petition questioning another form of lottery conducted by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner. September 22. Factoran. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.Thus.

programs." This interpretation.2 [3rd Ed. but also the phrase "by itself. MELTZER. including the expansion of existing ones.P. and/or charitable grants: Provided. under paragraph (B). association or joint venture" with any other party but also "by itself. Indeed. programs. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law of this case because the parties are the same and the case involves the same issue. Petitioners also say that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. the PCSO is prohibited from "engag[ing] in . 42 was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain investments. 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that this exception is inapplicable in this jurisdiction. as it were." In other words. association. the meaning of this statutory provision. the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first case. as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1(A) and in this manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1(A). D. for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs. by itself or in collaboration.profit-oriented. . association or joint venture with any other party because of the clause "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of §1.S. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058. United States. BATOR. That such investments will not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority. however. except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A). association or joint venture with any person. because the exception clause ("except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph [A]") "operates. SHAPIRO. 210 (1979). investments. petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself or in collaboration.. Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano.e." Obviously. this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts these activities itself.2d 147. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2d. (Montana v. ON JUDGMENTS. MISHKIN AND D. P. when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority. association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only §1 (B) but also §1 (A). 59 L. lotteries and other similar activities not only "in collaboration. projects and activities" if these involve sweepstakes races. paragraph (B) would prohibit. company or entity. medical assistance and services. because this case is not a continuation of the first one. is subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two actions involve substantially different claims.Ed. This is generally accepted in American law from which our Rules of Court was adopted. projects and activities for the purpose of raising funds for health programs and charity. That is why the law provides that such investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development . The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable. fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B. The general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment. §28. As already stated. the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are substantially different from those involved in the prior case between the parties. lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration." however. . P. The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO under paragraph (A). Blg. but rather the authority granted to it by paragraph (B). what paragraph (A) authorizes the PCSO to do. Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes.. i. whether domestic or foreign. 440 U. Otherwise. n.

The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract. that the clause on upgrading of equipment would enable the parties after a while to change the contract and enter into something else in violation of the law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis for judging the validity of the contract." Justice Davide. Speaker. v. It is prohibited from doing so whether "in collaboration. As a mater of fact. it must be presumed that §5 reflects the true intention of the parties. (2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA. ZAMORA. Speaker. 6. materials and equipment to the government or to any of its branches." This seems to be the only possible interpretation of §1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history. Insular Government. lotteries and other similar activities. Sept. 166 [1908]) It cannot simply be judged from what one of them says. III.Authority. that the "contemporaneous interpretation" of PGMC officials of this provision is otherwise. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services or for furnishing of supplies. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. Art. lotteries and the like does not detract from the validity of this interpretation. For instance. made a proposal which was accepted. Mr. That there is today no other entity engaged in sweepstakes races. 10 Phil. Mr. In the absence of proof to the contrary. Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be determined by facts and not by what some officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. p. 1979. IV. which were considered to be features of a joint venture agreement.O. DAVIDE. Thank you." (Art. They cite the testimony of Glen Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate committee to the effect that under the ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery system "side by side" with PCSO personnel as part of the transfer of technology. Consequently. §5 of the ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery. On the other hand. the committee accepts the proposed amendment. had been removed in the new contract. agencies or instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale. 1371. Atlantic Gulf Co. 1007) Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes races. MR. The following excerpt from the Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the subject of the discussion: MR. however. the claim of third parties. like petitioners." Petitioners claim. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". Thus. provided that the determination of whether the private sector's activity is already adequate must be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority. the PCSO must employ "its own competent and qualified personnel. reflecting the understanding that the bill they were discussing concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others. association or joint venture" with others or "by itself. The intention of the amendment is not to leave the determination of whether it is adequate or not to anybody. a lease of . DAVIDE. No. And my amendment is to add after "adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." The intention of the parties must be ascertained from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts. then an Assemblyman. Mr. It is contended that §1 of E. it will strengthen the authority to invest in these areas.

This is just like purchasing the equipment through negotiation when the question is whether the purchase should be by public bidding. materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. namely. there should be a public bidding before the government can enter into a contract for the lease of bulldozers and dredging equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas ravaged by lahar because. the exception to public bidding in paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the furnishing of "supplies. which does away with the requirement of public bidding "whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times. 301. a contract for the lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no bids because. there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E." Again. 301 on leases. . no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies. which is entitled "Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts" and by the fact that the only provisions of E. — Any provision of law. §1 covers both contracts of sale and lease agreements and (2) that the words "supplies. materials and equipment and of considering the words "supplies. or danger to." "materials. No. lease contracts are covered by the general rule and. first. Paragraph (d)." however. Unless "supplies" is construed to include "equipment. following the theory of the petitioners.O. public bidding is not required "whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service. either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications. 301 applies to any contract whereby the government acquires title to or the use of the equipment and (2) that the words "supplies." Following petitioners' theory. Indeed. For example.O. the exception to public bidding in paragraph (b) covers only "supplies" but not equipment. No. the lease of heavy equipment needed for rescue operations in case of a calamity will have to be submitted to public bidding before it can be entered into by the government. agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding. decree. under paragraph (b) of §1. not to mention the fact that the power to expropriate may not be exercised when the government can very well negotiate with private owners." "materials" and "equipment" to be not interchangeable. Thus. except under any of the following situations: a." and "equipment" are distinct from each other so that when an exception in §1 speaks of "supplies. No. To take still another example. which provides that a contract for the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is exempt from public bidding. concern the lease of buildings by or to the government." Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting §1 as applicable to any contract for the furnishing of supplies. 301 does not cover the lease of equipment avoids these fundamental difficulties and is supported by the text of §1. like the ELA. executive order or other issuances to the contrary notwithstanding.equipment." it cannot be construed to mean "equipment. life and/or property.O. must be submitted to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is based on two premises: (1) that §1 of E. second. first.O. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss of. the term "supplies" is used in paragraph (a). second." Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. lease contracts are governed by the general rule on public bidding and. Thus the text of §1 reads: §1. In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to expropriation. Our ruling that §1 of E. §§6 and 7. paying compensation afterward. No." "materials" and "equipment" can not be interchanged.

subject to compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines established pursuant to Section 6 hereof by the DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly authorized representative in accordance with existing rules and regulations. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. required consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the Department Head concerned and the approval of the President of the Philippines before contracts for the furnishing of supplies.O. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government to be determined by the Department Head concerned. Negotiated contracts involving P2. promulgated on August 12. 1940. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of reviewing negotiated contracts of purchase for the furnishing of supplies. No. and f. xxx xxx xxx §7. compliance with the standards or guidelines prescribed in Section 1 hereof. E. . and to enter into such lease contracts without need of prior approval by higher authorities. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times.000. negotiated contracts for public services or for furnishing supplies.O. shall have authority to determine the reasonableness of the terms of the lease and the rental rates thereof.b. No. materials and equipment as well as lease contracts of buildings. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the government.O. without need of prior approval by higher authorities. or to lease out government-owned buildings or spaces for private use. c. 301 changed this by providing as follows: §2. E. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government. — The heads of agency intending to rent privately-owned buildings or spaces for their use.000 shall be signed by the Secretary and two other Undersecretaries. the purpose for promulgating E. materials and equipment could be made on a negotiated basis.000 up to P10. Theretofore.000. without public bidding. 298. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service. and to the audit jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in accordance with existing rules and regulations. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. subject to availability of funds. — In line with the principles of decentralization and accountability. materials or equipment may be entered into by the department or agency head or the governing board of the government-owned or controlled corporation concerned. d. e. either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exhorbitant or non-conforming to specifications. No. Indeed.

3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including — everything except real estate. 301. No. as well as trucking.O. The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason for implying that the rule on public bidding applies not only to government purchases but also to lease contracts. No. §1 and of P. that E. janitorial. §1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable to P. it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of contracts of purchase and sale because of "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not have been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Thus. No. such as copying machines. This provision reads: §12.D. For the fact also is that the government leases equipment. 298.D. stationery. or personal property of any sort." By specifying "procurement of supplies" and excepting from the general rule "purchases" when made under certain circumstances. Procurement without public bidding. P. No. Finally. §§1 and 12. make it clear that only contracts for the purchase and sale of supplies. P. not of equipment. §12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to contracts of purchase and sale. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies. materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule concerning public biddings. Even if it applies. 526 requires local governments to hold public bidding in the "procurement of supplies. 1974. and it was merely to change the system of administrative review of emergency purchases. (3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors. — Procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit of public bidding in the following modes: (1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants. No. 526. project. personal computers and the like. Sec. including non-personal or contractual services such as the repair and maintenance of equipment and furniture.O.O. 301.In sum. furniture. No. and (5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments. or in the pursuit of any undertaking. and therefore does not govern the lease contract in this case. 301 was issued on July 26. . No. whether of the nature of equipment. No. which is in pari materia. it does not require public bidding for entering into it. without going through public bidding. materials and equipment.D. Our holding that E.O. No.O. E. and related or analogous services. (2) Emergency purchases. the texts of both E. 1987. which may be needed in the transaction of public business. security. as theretofore prescribed by E. or activity. hauling. 526. promulgated on August 2. Part B of this Executive Order applies to leases of buildings. Obviously these credit and tax constraints can have no attraction to the government when considering the advantages of sale over lease of equipment. materials for construction. 526. (4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination.D.

. Jr. Kapunan. WILLIAMS.R. 393 (1857) (which invalidated an act of Congress forbidding slavery in the South) and Pollack v. Narvasa. JJ. JJ. and Panganiban . Puno. JJ. Sanford. A. Davide. Jr. Williams. SUPREME COURT FIRST DIVISION MAXIMO CALALANG.FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS. D. x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION LAUREL. 158 U. JJ. Constitution) C.. 157 U. Respondents. -versus. maintained their separate concurring opinion.. Feliciano. maintained their dissenting opinion. in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila.. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-54 (1928). 2 That is why in the main decision it was pointed out that petitioners might try the Commission on Audit. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.J. SO ORDERED.: Maximo Calalang. 47800 December 2..S. No. J. Padilla and Vitug. C. The rules on standing do not obtain in these agencies. J.. 601 (1895) (which held a tax on income derived from property to be a tax on the property itself which had to be apportioned according to population under the U. as Chairman of the . Footnotes 1 The two other cases were Dred Scott v. Romero and Bellosillo.. ET AL.S. 19 How. HUGHES. the Ombudsman or the Solicitor General. 1940 A. the Ombudsman or the Solicitor General (except that in this case the latter has found nothing wrong with the contract) in airing their grievances. petitioners can file their complaints there ex relatione. the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality. Melo. a point apparently overlooked by Davide.G. Petitioner. 429.S. brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.. in his dissent noting an alleged inconsistency in the majority's ruling that petitioners have no standing in the courts but that they can complain to the COA. D. concur. Francisco and Hermosisima. took no part. Regalado.

& Z. Eulogio Rodriguez. is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.m.. may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. 700). to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts. to 12:30 p. the Director of Public Works.m. approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles. 1940. to 5:30 p. 548 by which the Director of Public Works. as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the „necessity‟ of the case. to the latter no valid objection can be made. the Director of Public Works. R. as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. Comm‟rs. resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street. Clinton County. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works. to 11 p. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof. 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned. with the approval of the President. chanroblespublishingcompany It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission. 660. that as a consequence of such enforcement. or for a specified period. as Director of Public Works. which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil.National Traffic Commission. recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid. chanroblespublishingcompany It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. “The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney.” chanroblespublishingcompany . and avoid obstructions on. Southard (10 Wheat. with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. 548 reads as follows: “SECTION 1. Sergio Bayan. 88. from 7:30 a. with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. namely: „The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law.m. (U.m. 248 Fed. from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. vs. Kinkead. as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Vicente Fragante. that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission.) Discretion. 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. that on August 2.m. with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. and since followed in a multitude of cases. 1 Ohio St. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works. This contention is untenable. that on August 10. and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street. between the points and during the hours as above indicated. final on questions of fact. Co. 1940. To promote safe transit upon.... shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution. to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. from 7 a.. Such rules and regulations. and from 1:30 p. roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines.” chanroblespublishingcompany Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. on July 18.S. all animaldrawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. in its resolution of July 17. The first cannot be done. in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. as Mayor of the City of Manila. 1940. and Juan Dominguez.m.‟ (Cincinnati. W. with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. 141. vs.

47065. then. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Gomez Jesus. by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated. a menace to public safety. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then .” (Field vs. therefore. 31 Phil. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic.R. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.” not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. Nos. therefore. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes. Ed. and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. G. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act. which is. chanroblespublishingcompany The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. health. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery. 46076 and 46077. must. or to things future and impossible to fully know.” The delegated power. to wit. 694. to say the least.. not only in the execution of the laws. in order to secure the general comfort. In enacting said law. therefore. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. in the interest and convenience of the public. As was said in Locke‟s Appeal (72 Pa.” The proper distinction the court said was this: “The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law. No.S. but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. Clark. The Public Service Commission. is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed. 294. Commonwealth Act No. within certain limits. 218). 36 L. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. or intends to make. the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation. “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on. Public welfare. and prosperity of the state (U. Rosenthal and Osmeña. and with business and occupations. the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has. 143 U.) In the case of People vs. in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power. S. Accordingly. and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law. 649. its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. promulgated June 26. 1940. giving rise to the adoption. aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads. and. with the growing complexity of modern life. because it is made to depend on a future event or act. G. been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials.R. but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest. is not the determination of what the law shall be. and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty. but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. promulgated June 12. this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments. 1939. is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. if at all. to a large extent.The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. vs. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic. the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations. chanroblespublishingcompany Said Act. 491): “To assert that a law is less than a law. with property. of the principle of “subordinate legislation.

and a business lawful today may in the future. consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health.” And in People vs. and quiet of all persons.” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. the rapidly increasing population. have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. Pomar (46 Phil. is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. 440).J. Diaz and Horrilleno. 169). through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. through the adoption of measures legally justifiable. Imperial. the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied. because of the changed situation... and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number. however. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs. The development of civilization.. concur. the growth of population or other causes. C. The promotion of social justice. Avanceña. . So ordered. with costs against the petitioner. Los Angeles (195 U.the individual will fall into slavery. 49 L. chanroblespublishingcompany Social justice. nor anarchy. which means peace and order and happiness for all. JJ. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government. nor despotism. through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community.S. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people. nor atomism. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. or extra-constitutionally. therefore. comfort. constitutionally. ed. Social justice is “neither communism. 238.” chanroblespublishingcompany The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. the growth of public opinion. become a menace to the public health and welfare. it was observed that “advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life. the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society. chanroblespublishingcompany The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. 223.” chanroblespublishingcompany IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. and be required to yield to the public good. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline. “the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one. so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium. with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state. logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people.

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