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Social Justice Society vs dangerous drugs act Facts: constitutionality of sec.

36 RA 9165, otherwise known as comprehensive dangerous drug act of 2002, it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public ofc, students of secondary and tertiary schools, persons charged before prosecutors ofc, among other personalities, is put in issue. Comelec issued resolution 6486, prescribing the rules and regulation of mandatory drug testing of candidates for 2004 election. Issue: Pimentel claims that sec36 (g) and comelec resolution is illegal for adding additional requirements for senator Held; sec36 (g) of ra9165 should be, as it is hereby delared, as unconstitutional. It is basic that If a law or admin rule violates any norm of the constitution, that issuance is null and void. PARTY LIST CASES Veterans federation vs comelec Facts: congress enacted ra 7941 and declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of PLR in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that will bereft them. It, however, deemed it necessary to require parties, org and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system in order to be entitled to a party list seat. Those garnering more than 2% threshold requirement could have additional seats in proportion to their total # of votes furthermore, no winning party can have more than 3 seat in the HOR. Issue:is the 20% allocation is mandatory or merely a ceiling? Are the 2% and 3 seat limit provided in ra 7941 constitutional Held: Art VI, sec 5(2) is not mandatory, it merely provides a ceiling. The constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the HOR reserved for PLR.

2% threshold is mandatory. In imposing 2% threshold, congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having sufficient # of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in congress. The 2% threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the consti and the law, but with the very essence of representation How to determine how many how many party list each party are entitled to? Rank all the participating parties accdg to the # of votes they obtained. All those garnered at least 2% of the total votes cast shall have an assured seat in HOR. Additional seat for first party: 6% bench mark, no rounding off. If 6% 2 addtl seats, if less than 6% 1 addl seat, if less than 4% no addtl seat. Additional seat for other qualified parties:

Ang bagong bayani vs comelec Facts: two petitions under rule 65 of the rules of court, challenging Omnibus resolution # 3785 which approved the participation of 154 organization, parties including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 PL election. Petitioners seek the disqualification of the private respondent, arguing mainly that PL system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties. Issue: won non political parties may participate in PL elections, WON PL system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented, WON comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus resolution 3785. Held: 1. Yes. Under consti and RA 7941 private respondents cannot be disqualified from the PL election merely on the ground that they are political parties. Sec 5 art 6 of consti provides that members of HOR may be elected through a PL system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties. 2. no. political parties are not disqualified, they must however show that they represent the interest of the marginilized and underrepresented.

Banat vs comelec Facts: barangay association for national advancement and transparency assails the resolution promulgated by comelec. The resolution approved the recommendation of Atty. Dalaig, head of national board of canvassers to deny the petition of banat for being moot. Banat filed before the comelec a petition to proclaim the full number of PLR provided for in the consti. Issues: is 20% allocation mandatory or just a ceiling// is the 3-seat limit constitutional// is the 2% threshold constitutional // how are PL allocated Held: 20% is mandatory but 2% is unconstitutional. The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacles to the full implementation of sec 5(2) art 6 and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral, group in HOR.\ GERRYMANDERING cases Tobias vs abalos Facts: nvoking their rights as taxpayers herein petitioner assail the constitutionality of ra 7675 otherwise known as an act converting the municipality of mandaluyong into highly urbanized city to be known as city of mandaluyong . pursuant to local government codeof 1991, a plebiscite was held, the people of mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of conversion under ra 7675. The turn out only 14.4%, 18621 voted yes, and 7911 voted no. ra 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Issues:/ ruling: violates one subj-one bill rule (art 6 sec 28.1) liberal construction of one title one bill rule, there is sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to the general subject// violates the 250 composition of HOR (sec6 sec 5.1)- 250 limit is not absolute, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of congress may be increased, if congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment // it preempt the right of congress to reapportion legislative districts the congress itself drafted, deliberated upon, and enacted the assailed law, congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Montejo vs comelec Facts: petitioner montejo representing the 1st district of leyte, pleads for the annulment of sec 1 resolution 2736 of the comelec, redistricting certain municipalities in leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequality, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of tolosa from his district to to the 2nd district of the province. Issue; won the comelec has the constitutional power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district in the province of leyte. Held: consistent with the limits of its powers to make minor adjustments, sec3 of ordinance did not also give the respondent comelec any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by sec 3 to the respondent comelec is to adjust the numbers of its members (not municipalities) apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of juris when it transferred municipality of capoocan of Mariano vs comelec Facts: 2 petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of ra 7854, an act converting the municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city to be known as the city of Makati as unconstitutional. Issues; ruling: reapportionment cannot be made by special law it can be made through a special law, such as charter of a new city.// the addition of a new district is not expressed in the title- it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.// makatis population is only 450,000- a city with atleast 250,000 shall have at least one representative, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the population requirement of 250k.

the 2nd district and the municipality of palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of leyte. Bagabuyo vs comelec Facts: the petitioner insist that ra 9371 converts and divides the city od cdo as a local govt unit and does not merely provide for the citys legislative apportionment. This is a misunderstanding of consti concept of apportionment of legislative district and division of local govt units. Blacks law: legislative apportionment- determines the # of representative which a state, country or other subd may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in legislative body in proportion to the population. Reapportionment realignment or change in the legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RESIDENCE CASES Gallego vs verra Facts: this case is a review which declared illegal the election to the office of municipal mayor of abuyog leyte on the ground that he did not have the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of abuyog, he run for mayor in abuyog leyte but was defeated. After his defeat he find himself in debt and unemployed so he went bukidnon and immediately found employment. During his stay here his wife and children remained in leyte, the govt offered him a house there but he never took his family there. Neither did he accept the offer of parcel of land. He and his wife acquired a property in abuyog during his stay in bukidnon. He registered as voter in bukidnon and voted there for assemblyman. In his residence cert it stated there that he stayed in there for 1 yrs. Petitioner alleges that gallego acquired a residence or domicile of origin in bukidnon and had lost his domicile of origin in leyte at the time he was elected as mayor and therefore his election was void. Issue: won gallego lost his domicile of origin in abuyog leyte and acquired a new domicile in bukidnon. Held: no. the term residence as used in the election is synonymous with domicile which imports not only

intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In order to acquire domicile by choice, there must concur 1. Residence of bodily presence in a new locality 2. An intention to remain there 3. An intention to abandon the old domicile. Sc beloeved that he did not reside in bukidnon with the intention to remain there indefinitely and of not returning to abuyog. His departure therefrom after his defeat in that election was temporary and only for the purpose of looking for employment to make up for financial drawback he had suffered. Romualdez-marcos vs comelec Facts: Imelda marcos was born and raised in tacloban leyte. In 1952 she went to mnila. In 1954 she married Ferdinand and they lived in san juan mnila. When marcos became president, they lived in malacanang palace, part of san Miguel mnila. In 1986 they were exiled in Hawaii. In 1995 she filedf for her certificate of candidacy for congress in 1st district of leyte. Montejo, representative of 1st district of leyte filed a petition for disqualification with comelec alleging that marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement of 1 yr residency. As evidenced of declaration made by her in certificate of candidacy which she indicated u7 months residency. Issue: won marcos has met the 1 year residency requirement to run for congress Held. Yes. Although she held various residences in the last 4 decades, none of this purposes unequivocally point out to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in tacloban leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in mnila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her father. Another is that she did not lose her domicile of origin by operation by law when she married Ferdinand marcos. Aquino vs comelec Facts: butz Aquino decided to run for congress in 2nd district of Makati. He resided in Makati by renting a condo unit while he was in senate. Butz Aquino was born in conception tarlac, he was a resident of the same 52 yrs immediately preceding the election.

Issue: won Aquino is qualified to run for congress in 2nd district of Makati Held: no. he is not considered a resident of Makati. There is no showing thathe has abandon his domicile of origin which is tarlar. He has no intention to establish a new domicile in Makati as evidenced by just leasing a condo unit, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. Domino vs comelec Facts: the comelec 2nd division promulgated a resolution declaring domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of legislative district of sarangani. Domino maintains that he he complied with the 1-yr residency requirement . based on his voters registration recorded june 22 1997 his address was indicated as ayala heights balara qc. Counting therefore from that day up to and until the may 11, 1998 elections respondent clearly lacks 1 yr residency requirement. Issue: won domino is qualified to run for congress in sarangani Held: no. records show that petitioners domicile was candon ilocos syr and sometime in 1991 he acquired a new domicile of choice in qc, as shown in his COC for the position of representative of 3rd district of qc in 1995 elction. His actual presence in sarangani in dec 1996 and his leasing of house, the affidavit and certification under oath that he is a resident of sarangani is not sufficient to show that he established a new domicile. While residence simply requires a bodily presence in a given place, domicile requires not only such bodily presence but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent abode, ones home.

Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32

aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered theSenate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution. HELD: The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime

administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate. But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator? In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended? The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses

or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

Romualdez-marcos vs comelec

Facts: Petitioner Imelda RomualdezMarcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the sameposition, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutionalrequirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement forcandidates for the House of Representatives. Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residencyrequirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution


For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor

follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or acceptingcommission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.


Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen.


Bengzon vs hret


Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act

Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Abbas vs set

On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight. HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. Lazatin vs comelec Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that theHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus ElectionCode, was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the solejudge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system

canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simplycorrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction. HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras petitioned arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong. ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter. HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Limkaichong vs comelec Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs dad. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election daycame and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a winning candidatehas been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the HOR, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the

COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latters election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted. HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the billwas not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Astorga vs villegas In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city governmentas well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to ViceMayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with theprovisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the ViceMayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to

Casco vs gimenez Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production ofplywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea andformaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: xxx xxx xxx XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in Congresscontained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congressintended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.

HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea andformaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Us vs pons Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were

charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914. HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case. HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court. Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution? There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The

Avelino vs cuenco On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his

answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. **Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA. Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session? The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949) Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bindthemselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. Justice Feria: (Concurring) Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required

concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twentythree (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Paredes vs sandiganbayan On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court). The three allegedlyconspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:

Philconsa vs enriquez This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994. This case also involves the power of Congress as far as the pork barrel fund is concerned. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In another case, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid. HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. Veto on special provisions The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme

x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each Houseof Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a

in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations,

and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, theOmbudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the

conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities. Tio vs videogram Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram RegulatoryBoard with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject. HELD: The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfiedif all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any

number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.

Demetria vs alba Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer anyfund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included inthe General Appropriations Act or approved after its

enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional. HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done

Tolentino vs sec of finance Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after