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Is a Transatlantic view of Asia-Paciﬁc possible?
EDITOR’S NOTE - TIAGO MAURÍCIO
Researcher at Kyoto University and Orient Institute
cuts are providing great debates regarding developed to address the fundamental Washington's global strategy and the problems of 21st century Asia. Resorting to evolving security concerns in the Asia- old ideas will most likely result in old Paciﬁc, following the "rebalancing" solutions. Indeed we may be facing more discourse. As the services battle for transformative issues now than in the maintaining key programs and capabilities, immediate post-Cold War period. Therefore the danger of sequestration looms large, it must not be surprising that so much of which could further hinder the capacity of the Cold War thinking persisted until now. the US to re-adjust to the current strategic Following these debates on US environment. At the moment, emphasis is strategic capabilities and budgets, being placed on fostering partnerships, countries like Japan, South Korea, Russia, maintaining a technological edge and China, India, and even international planning capabilities for the next decade, organisations such as ASEAN and the EU, not for the next year or two. However, it is ought to be developing their own solutions still early to tell what America's military to the common threats and challenges they commitments to Asia-Paciﬁc will look like. all face. We must go beyond the US-China More important than the capabilities nexus and expand our views into more and the budget, these discussions have integrated and comprehensive solutions. the potential to reshape the complex And for this purpose, undertaking sound network of alliances and partnerships in strategic assessments is the pre-requisite the region. As China continues to rise, for any mildly constructive analysis of along with several other key countries, it is these issues.
Discussions on US military spending high time that more innovative solutions are
US at crossroads The US is facing substantial cuts to military spending which are forcing the revision of its strategic interests
The Atlantic Community ought to have a coordinated view toward Asia-Paciﬁc
“The long-anticipated joint EU-U.S. statement that American and European ofﬁcials have been talking about for months has ﬁnally emerged. Announced on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on July 12, 2012, the statement puts an end to the political toing and froing that both sides of the Atlantic have been engaged in for the past several months. What should come next are concrete actions. The joint statement touches upon several important issues for the region’s stability: North Korea’s denuclearization, democratization in Burma, territorial claims in the South China Sea, and human rights. What stands out from the peace and security section of the statement is the EU’s pledge to support cooperative solutions for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Given Europe’s vested interests in maritime security and the freedom of navigation, Brussels decision to adopt the United States’ procedural approach –we do not take sides but we want this dispute resolved peacefully- vis-à-vis the South China Sea was a wise choice. The transatlantic partners managed to keep the security part of the statement quite balanced. However, striking the right tone in the trade and economics section appeared to be a more daunting task. Behind phrases such as working together ”to improve reciprocal market access for goods and services including government procurement…and to protect intellectual property rights” one can only read China.”
over the disputed islands and adjacent waters in the Sea and sovereign rights over relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof — a claim in accordance with Law of the Seas (LOS) norms. But operationally, China’s oceanic law enforcement agencies have unilaterally, and at times forcefully, enforced their writ across the more expansive political perimeter bounded by the ‘nine-dashed line’. Plainly, these legal and political claims overlap but do not coincide. However, endless dwelling on the supposedly impenetrable logic of the nine-dashed line’s extremity is side-tracking attention from what ought to be the central premise of this issue: that China’s claim to the primary land elements lying within the nine-dashed line — the Spratlys and the Paracels — is markedly superior to those of its rival claimants.”
ﬁrst lady. In the process, the world's last totalitarian state has received a soft-focus, Entertainment Tonight makeover.” “North Korea's Extreme Makeover” (Blaine Harden - Foreign Policy). A record of blunders in the South China Sea
“Tensions in the South China Sea have risen to their highest level in at least two years in the wake of the disastrous breakup of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting in Phnom Penh. Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, an eternal optimist, admitted that the summit was an "unprecedented" failure in ASEAN's history, and Indonesia's foreign minister rushed to mediate tensions between ASEAN members lest they explode again. At nearly the same time, a Chinese naval frigate ran aground in a “China’s South China Sea jurisdictional disputed area of the sea, raising regional claims: when politics and law suspicions that Beijing was trying to bolster collide” (Sourabh Gupta - East Asia Forum). its claim to the entire South China Sea.” Tectonic changes are rocking the North Korean boat “South China Sea: From Bad to Worse?” (Joshua Kurlantzick - Asia Unbound).
Forget about cyberwar, there's nothing new under the Sun “Strong stuff. And certainly there is reason to harden U.S. infrastructure against cyber attack. In doing so, however, we should avoid cyber hysteria. Earlier this year, Thomas Rid of King's College London published an important article on cyberwarfare in The Journal of Strategic Studies (which, in the interests of full disclosure, I edit). Rid argues, persuasively in my view, that it is misleading to talk about "cyberwar" when, in fact, all politically motivated cyber attacks to date are merely more sophisticated versions of three traditional activities: sabotage, espionage, and subversion. Stuxnet clearly falls into the ﬁrst category; Flame into the second.”
“For a 20-something supreme leader, Kim's feel for small-ball symbolism seems unusually shrewd -- and seductive to Westerners. He allowed women to wear pants at public events. In the company of the smartly dressed woman we now know to be his wife, he enjoyed a live Mickey Mouse performance and gave a thumbs-up to a concert rendition of the theme from "Rocky." This clearly calculated narrative has “America and Europe's Paciﬁc performed public relations magic. Around Partnership” (Eleni Ekmektsioglou & Patryk the world, inquiring minds are eager for “Why cyberwar isn't the warfare you should Pawlak - Paciﬁc Forum CSIS). more images. Kim Jong Un is "trending" worry about” (Tom Mahnken - Foreign and headline writers are creating eye-candy Policy). for the Web. A headline from MSN Now The gap between legal precepts and teases "Sorry, ladies, your favorite North political realities Korean dictator is off the market." We are devouring thinly sourced reports about the “Legally, China claims sovereignty self-possessed "mystery woman" turned
And not just China. For a long time, Washington was notably lukewarm towards ASEAN's ambitions for a wider regional role, for the simple reason that ASEAN's model of collective and consultative regional leadership was incompatible with America's view of its own leadership role in Asia. Indeed one could argue that America only became enthusiastic about ASEAN's wider role in Asia when it started to worry about China's challenge to its own regional leadership. Likewise, Beijing promoted ASEAN's role when ASEAN has offered ways to promote China's position in Asia at “The policy opinion has a slight “ripped America's expense, as the ASEAN+3 from the headlines” feel, reﬂecting the initiative did. Now Beijing sees it differently.” threats that must be looming large for Chinese policymakers. There is a large “As power shifts, ASEAN stumbles” (Hugh section that deals with strengthening White - The Lowy Interpreter). industrial control systems for nuclear facilities, aviation, oil and petrochemicals control networks, electrical systems, and Thinking strategically about defence transportation systems that immediately spending? Contradiction in terms? brings Stuxnet to mind. Another section focuses on securing government and other “Putting aside Galrahn's dismissive conﬁdential information systems that could attitude about Romney's defense and be the target of espionage exploits like foreign policy (based seemingly on the 4% Flame, or Anonymous and other political ﬁgure), he raises an interesting point--is hacktivists. And the large-scale data there anything "strategic" about the 4% breaches that were part of the attacks on ﬁgure. I'd never thought about it in those Tianya, China Software Developer Network, terms before today, but now that I have, I and 360buy.com are covered in a section would like to make an argument that it is on protecting personal information and user indeed strategic, but probably in terms that data. There is, however, also a great deal of are unsatisfying to most military strategists. continuity with earlier plans for information 1. All defense strategies ARE security. The 2003 “Document 27: Opinions SHAPED BY resource decisions. We for Strengthening Information Security purists wish that it were not so, but it is. Assurance Work,” for example, also Sometimes those decisions are speciﬁc (as stressed the protection of critical in "cut $487B from what you were infrastructure, and both the 2003 and 2012 previously planning to spend and shape a opinions note the need for dynamic new strategy to do it), some are not monitoring of the Internet as well as talent speciﬁc at all. But the REASON you have a development and greater leadership and strategy in the ﬁrst place is to lend priority coordination.” to the money that you ARE given. Strategy would be unnecessary with inﬁnite “China Moves Forward on Cybersecurity resources, right? You'd just buy everything Policy” (Adam Segal - Asia Unbound). you need and as many as you could man. So if EVERY strategy FOLLOWS a resource decision, the question then is how is that The workings of ASEAN reﬂect balance of resource decision made?” power politics “Is There Anything Strategic About 4% of “First, we should not be too surprised GDP to Defense?” (Bryan McGrath that China does not much like ASEAN. It is Information Dissemination). not just about the South China Sea but about China's wider ambitions in Asia. Any great power that aims for regional leadership will always be somewhere between lukewarm and hostile towards an institution that promotes collective regional decision-making.
Though China is still beeﬁng up its cyber capabilities
Russia steps up its game toward China and the US “As the geopolitical competition between China and the US intensiﬁes, other actors must decide how they will position themselves in this power struggle. Of these, Russia is arguably one of the most crucial ‘swing states’ in the contemporary global arena. Russia and China have been close ‘strategic partners’ since the late 1990s, but there is speculation that Russia will eventually abandon China and choose to align itself — or even ally with — the US-led west. As Russia increasingly feels the threat from a rising China, it will have no choice but to move closer to the US and the EU.” “Russia: between the US and China” (Artyom Lukin - East Asia Forum).
Is there a role for Australia to play in the South China Sea? “As I argued in the Snapshot, ASEAN's Code of Conduct is part of the problem. Beijing refuses to deal with any of the Southeast Asian claimants unless they abandon a search for a common position. To think that increasing the pressure on China to accede to an ASEAN-determined Code of Conduct will simply prompt Beijing to roll over and accept is a serious misunderstanding of how China works. Worse, I have a suspicion that American support for ASEAN's Code of Conduct efforts makes them even less palatable to Beijing. By simply adding its name to the ASEAN-US position, Australia contributes nothing to resolving this dispute, and in fact marginally pushes a solution further away. Australia has in the past played a key role in helping broker a way out of regional and global stand-offs. One example was the confrontation over Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, with Vietnam and the Soviet Union on one side and ASEAN, China and the US on the other. Foreign Minister Bill Hayden understood that this was a pressing issue for Australia, even if we didn't have a direct involvement. His efforts to bring Vietnam and ASEAN closer together were roundly criticised by ASEAN and China, but paid off in the end.” “South China Sea: Our diplomatic timidity” (Michael Wesley - The Lowy Interpreter).
JAPAN IS COMMITTED TO CONTINUE ITS COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF ADEN
The Plan may now have Land Attack Cruise Missiles onboard ships
An assessment of Japan-Europe relations “Both the FTA and joint defence development represent large steps toward a reinvigoration of the bilateral relationship between Japan and Europe. And they are a signal that – despite superﬁcial appearances – Europe's interest in Japan is stronger than sometimes perceived.” “A View from Europe: Reinvigorating Relations with Japan” (Miha Hribernik - JFPO). Japan remains committed to counter-piracy efforts “While announcing the extension, Japan’s Minister of Defense Satoshi Morimoto insisted, “Regarding the piracy issue in the Gulf of Aden off the Coast of Somalia, when looking at the number of cases, there was a decrease for this year in comparison to the previous year. However, the situation still unpredictable.”” remains IMCMEX 12, Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto said on 20 July (Yomiuri Shimbum and Jiji Press). An MSDF minesweeper and its mother ship, along with 180 MSDF MCM experts, will participate in the drill, Morimoto told a news c o n f e re n c e . U n d e r J a p a n ’s Constitution, MSDF minesweeping activities on the high seas are limited to neutralizing abandoned mines because of the government’s interpretation of the Constitution about the use of force and exercising the right of collective self-defense. The types of exercises that the minesweeper can participate in are also limited. The MSDF took part in a multinational minesweeping exercise in Arabian Gulf waters near Bahrain last October.” “Preparing for Counter Mine Operations: IMCMEX 2012” “Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will also participate in (Scott Truver - Second Line of Defense).
“Measuring Stick: Japan’s Anti-Piracy Campaign – Analysis” (Jonathan B. Miller - Eurasia Review).
The Maritime Self-Defence Forces exercise Counter-Mine Ops
China's revisionism targets Japan's Okinawa “While the Western media has at times taken great delight in publishing somewhat fantastical stories about the inﬂuence that Japanese ‘nationalists’ hold over the contemporary Japanese imagination, China’s own home grown group with questionable interpretations of history for the most part seemed to escape the attention of analysts and journalists – until recently. Part of this is due to a lack of sophistication in analysis of China- it was assumed for a long period of time that non-democratic CCP China was a homogeneous entity with homogeneous IR and domestic policy preferences, and deviations from the ofﬁcial line were mere lapses of discipline. We have however thankfully seen more focus on contending and diverse political elements as China’s importance increases. Some of this has been to emphasize the ‘reformist’ elements in the CCP, which of course do exist to some degree. Others have focused on the more hardline elements rising through the system. The Financial Times for example has just published an interesting piece on how some actors in the Chinese political system see questioning the legitimacy of Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa (Ryukyu) as justiﬁed.” “Financial Times: China Eyeing Okinawa in the Long-term?” (Corey Wallace - Japan Security Watch).
cooperation with Japan, this being an the disputed islands–which are also election year, the DUP aimed to impose claimed by the Japanese, who call a higher political cost.” them the Senkaku–with a variety of weapons and obstacles.” “An Eye to the Future of Japan-South Korea Relations” “All the Rage: China-Japan Diaoyu Dispute, Now an iPad Game” (Scott Snyder - Asia Unbound). (Paul Mozur - Japan Realtime). History is still an open book waiting to be reinterpreted “In the beginning of 2012, an example of it occurred between the sister-cities of Nagoya and Nanjing. According to the periodic “Japan Times”, “the event, scheduled for Friday (Mar. 2nd), was to feature a ceremony marking the second anniversary of the construction of the China-Japan Friendship Judo Stadium in Nanjing” and will be followed by an one week event, called “Japan Week in Nanjing”. With extreme important meanings after the events at World War II, both events were canceled after a very controversial remark made by N a g o y a ’ s m a y o r, M r. Ta k a s h i Kawamura. The mayor of one of biggest cities in Japan afﬁrmed that he believes only “conventional acts of combat” were realized during the also controversial invasion of Nanjing in 1937. ” “Controversial Remarks” (Marina Magalhães - JFPO).
China may have developed LACMs for PLAN
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: The Game
Are Japan-Korea relations at a standstill? “South Korea’s Democratic United Party (DUP) failed yesterday in its motion to dismiss South Korea’s Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik for the Lee Myung-bak administration’s handling of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan last month. South Korean public opposition not only forced the Lee administration to suspend the signing of this GSOMIA, but also cost the administration the resignation of one senior ofﬁcial. Despite the Lee administration already shelving its controversial plans to pursue
“The PLAN, on the other hand, is the only branch of the Chinese military capable of projecting power far beyond China’s shores. While it is debatable whether the PLAN may not seek the same sort of global reach as the United States Navy, the possession of shiplaunched LACMs would essentially enable Chinese warships to conduct long range precision attacks against land targets around the Indian and Paciﬁc Oceans. For China’s neighbors, PLAN surface combatants could now execute attacks on Taiwan, Japan and most of Southeast Asia without the need to venture far from Chinese waters. American bases across the Indo-Paciﬁc region could also be vulnerable to conventional cruise missile attack. Facilities in Guam, Hawaii, Diego Garcia and Darwin, strategic locations that were traditionally safe from anything short of a Chinese nuclear strike, could now be potentially brought within the ﬁring range of PLAN ships armed with the DH-10.” “Chinese Navy Tests Land Attack Cruise Missiles: Implications for AsiaPaciﬁc” (Wilson Chau - Japan Security Watch).
“Forget about Angry Birds. One new videogame for China’s iPad users is all about the angry words ﬂung back and forth between China and Japan over a series of small islands in the East China Sea. The new game, called Defend the Diaoyu Islands, challenges players to defend Chinese military positions on
JAPAN NEWS CLIPS
routes said to overlap endangered species' habitats” in Wall Street Journal seeks U.S. support for Senkaku purchase plan” law change shelved”
may deploy forces to East China Sea disputed islands” with China eyed to avoid clashes at No change to Osprey ﬂights” isles”
“Peacekeeping “China “SDF
appoints ofﬁcers to South Sea garrison”
to defend Senkakus if necessary: Morimoto” China Eyes Indian Ocean, Japan and India Pair Up on Defense” out to amend paciﬁst constitution”
heads down dangerous path with provocative moves” military works with Japan in Tokyo earthquake preparations” law to improve Japan peacekeeping operations” key to a bright future of East Asia”
self-defense forces only theoretical possibility: Japan's gov't spokesperson” looks to cement relationship with Russia”
says Japan may send SDF to Senkakus” meddling in maritime disputes detrimental to Asia-Paciﬁc peace” hints at using SDF to defend Senkaku Islands”
of a Japan Self-Defense Force Instructor to the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya” U.S. F-16s cleared to ﬂy after crash off Hokkaido” to deploy F-22 ﬁghters to Okinawa” hold talks on deployment of Osprey
“Japan, U.S. aircraft”
View from Europe: Reinvigorating Relations
with Japan” by Miha Hribernik
Post: Controversial Remarks” by Marina
On our website this week
EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIGEST
Editor: TIAGO MAURICIO Editor’s Mailbox: mauricio.tiago.47x(at)st.kyoto-u.ac.jp Kyoto, Japan
East Asia Security and Defence Digest covers expert analysis and news highlights on East Asian Security and Defence Affairs. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of JFPO. JAPAN FOREIGN POLICY OBSERVATORY (JFPO) HTTP://WWW.JAPANFPO.ORG/
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