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Maxwell E. Gigle
The paper that you are about to read touches upon the nature of US-Iranian political and economic relations. As of the moment, Iran’s nuclear program happens to be the largest debated issue between the two great powers. Some feel that Iran continues the program for the development of an atomic weapon; an accusation that Iran officially denies. Whether or not this is the case, the United States must assume the worst in order to plan for the worst, thus the following US policy recommendations take into account the capability of Iran as well as the future nuclear weapon possibilities in lieu of said capability. Realizing that this estimation may be found to be an overshot in retrospect, the policy proposals included in this paper will not, much less cannot, be damaging to US-Iranian relations in general. That being said, this paper will introduce the assumed problem and then make a statement as to where and how the United States should address the supposed increasing nuclear Iran. The decisions of world leaders would be much easier if all the issues that faced them fell into a black or white category to be decided by simple option number one or option number two. Unfortunately, this is never the case, for individual actors and issues always have one more facet decision makers must take into account. Today the United States finds itself confronted by yet another issue of opacity shrouded in a mess of gray minutiae: the scope of Iran’s nuclear program. Due to the serious nature of the United State’s accusations against the extent of Iran’s nuclear program, a black and white relationship has been created; Iran should not be allowed to continue nuclear research as it will only lead to the creation of a nuclear weapon. Based on Iran’s successful opacity of its nuclear research and development, United States policy towards a potential weapons grade program must prepare for a worst-case scenario: black, if you will. On the other hand, Iran’s white pleas of nuclear innocence may be justified if more evidence materializes to support Iran’s claim. Either way, the United States must embrace the reality of black while keeping in mind the possibility of white. For the best results in the long run, the United States must juggle each side and decide upon a solution that would address a mixture of each possibility; a solution in gray. In order to understand why such this topic must be handled with such gravity, a worst-case scenario in regards to Iranian nuclear capability and intention will be framed within the context of an Iranian internal governmental memo. Known history and determined capacity will be taken into account by the time the United States’ perspective on the complicated issue comes into play. By the conclusion of this report, several policy recommendations will have been proposed. In a perfect world, Iran would be kept from joining the Nuclear Club; yet our time for useful action may have
Maxwell E. Gigle is a graduate of the University of Connecticut with double majors in Political Science and International Relations as well as minor concentrations in Middle Eastern Studies and History. He has practical experience working with U.S.-Turkey political relations through the American Turkish Council and currently works on the Senate side of Capitol Hill.
In theory. Due to this lack of room for error. . 4 In order to correctly interpret this memo. As with many governments around the world. and approves the nation’s budget. the Supreme National Security Council. foreign policy recommendation. the “Iranian Perspective” analyzed is a worse-case-scenario perspective for the United States. as well as who may be appointed to the position of Supreme Leader. efforts have failed to stem or at least pierce the opacity of Iran’s nuclear research program. They alone have the power to interpret the Constitution and place laws into accordance with sharia (Islamic law). Supreme Leader Ali Khameini controls Iran’s security forces including the army. To the ire of many Iranians. The United States needs to move away from today’s closed model of relations to a more open. In recent years. Of course.S. U.2 passed. So far. in your wisdom. the Supreme Leader holds supreme rule by holding a monopoly over the dictation of policy. controlling civil rights and determining those who form the judicial branch of government. Close on its heels is the desire for individual survival within the government. the Assembly of Experts is the only group that has any power over the Supreme Leader. the group has never gone against the wishes of the Supreme Leader. Iran’s 1979 fundamentalist coup completely overthrew many positive under-pinnings of the previous pro-American government by setting up a theocratic republic in Iran. Saheed Jalil writes to Supreme Leader Khameini. the United States can expect better results from any attempt of negotiation with Iran. a mock memo from Supreme National Security Council Secretary Saheed Jalil 3 to Supreme Leader Ali Khameini has been prepared and included before the inclusion of the U. Once a firmer base is set. the Majiles is held in check by the Council of Guardians. both actions require a bit of risk while keeping a firm hold on security. 1387 Asr be Kheyr. but in the end. Keeping in mind that the author is neither Iranian nor part of the Supreme Leader’s inner council. ratifies treaties. the great nation of Iran has slowed down if not paused in its 1 2 The Majiles. United States’ policy must reflect a win-win situation while moving towards a compromise mutually beneficial to Iran as well as the United States. as well as Iran’s elite guard. inclusive relationship holding respect to the Iranian perspective. it must be kept in mind that the number one goal of an Iranian governmental official is state survival. Though Iran has a functional Parliament 1 . all given proposals will benefit the United States’ strategic position in the world whether or not the Iranian application of nuclear research can be reversed. constitution and a Presidential system. the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. This group of clerics and learned academics hold the power to determine who runs for office in the Majiles. commanding the military. With this in mind. In order to comprehend the Iranian perspective 2 on the potential use of the Iranian nuclear program. as already explained.S. are still tied to the will of the Supreme Leader through inherent restrictions of the system. The Majiles and Executive Branch may hold a great deal of power. thus negating any real threat the Assembly holds over the Supreme Leader (Iran Chamber Society 2008). The 290 member unicameral legislative body drafts legislation. the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). Today. 3 Personal advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and personal friend of Iranian President Ahmadinejad. you have set us on the correct path for the future with your recommendations. the future of Iranian policy as formulated by you has been discussed by the Council and decided upon. an oversight body personally selected by the Supreme Leader. Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosayni Khameini. As you requested. 4 ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺮاﯼ ﭼﺸﻤﻬﺎﻳﺘﺎن 21 Tir. In reality though.
000 P-2 uranium enrichment centrifuges across the nation (Gerami 2008). our reactor at Arak coupled March 4.3 nuclear research towards a working atomic weapon (National Intelligence Council 2007). the United Nations announced that measures would be taken to limit our ability to acquire new industrial technology. limit individual’s passage and access to private assets abroad (Dareini 2008). 2003. As you know from previous briefings. Based on your recommendations. if our Western enemies knew of our current level of nuclear weapon research and development. In 1382 6 . As for fear. Of course. the resulting panic would certainly hold dire consequences for Iran. it would also vilify Israel and question any further action against our hollowed land. our uranium conversion facility at Isfahan and our heavy water reactor at Arak (Baxter and Mahnaimi 2007). including our research center at Natanz. Though these statistics are four years old. much needs to be taken into account before making a final decision on Iran’s nuclear future. thus Iran is not afraid. A wise leader must realize public sentiment should always be taken into consideration when deciding policy. the heavy water method is our best way to produce plutonium 8 . 7 In order to enrich uranium for nuclear uses. the people will always have the final option of revolution and coup. The whole world is well aware of the opacity of proof against our government. Though such a strike would greatly hamper our ability to move forward with indigenous nuclear research. one begins with subliminated natural uranium being spun in centrifuges in order to separate U2-35 from the rest. a general consensus tells us that we will be able to successfully test a nuclear device in five years. As always. We pray that this vital information assists your respected analysis resulting in a final. roadblocks appear between our current status as a non-nuclear entity and nuclear realization. a reaction not to be taken lightly. As you know. even with foreign intervention” (Clawson 2004). 6 5 . Recent estimates say that it would take only one year for 1. thus the new sanctions have ruffled many domestic feathers. Israel has threatened to strike key Iranian nuclear sites. 7 Currently today we have around 15. for as much as we work to stifle negative opposition to our government. 2008. it must be assumed that some of that sentiment still festers within our people. all pertinent operational facts are laid out for your convenience within this memo. As a benchmark to what our capabilities exceed. Though a deliverable nuclear device would greatly enhance Iranian regional security and power. you realize the implications of such a decision.200 working centrifuges to produce enough enriched uranium for one atomic weapon (Albright and Shire 2008. This fact highlights the extreme need for program secrecy as much as it heralds Iranian pride for our people. 1). the Supreme National Security Council has decided the most prudent path to pursue would be to immediately continue clandestine Iranian research towards a deliverable nuclear device. On 13 Esfand 1386 5 . A 5% completion of this process will create nuclear fuel used for nuclear energy while an 85% completion of the process will produce highly-enriched uranium for the use in nuclear weapons (Gerami 2008). esteemed decision. as you are a wise leader. increase monitoring of Iranian finances and international trade. there are two ways to develop a working nuclear weapon: uranium enrichment as well as plutonium processing. The people of Iran hold the United Nations in high regard. Israel has no legitimate right or enough evidential proof to enact any type of strike against Iranian facilities of any type. “Heavy water” from nuclear power plants contains small amounts of the plutonium molecule needed for an atomic weapon the water becomes processed whereupon plutonium is gained for the use in nuclear weapons (FAS 1998). 8 Basically what happens is a distilling process. Another potential obstacle materializes with Israel’s rhetoric machine chugging to life once again. Though estimates vary between our nuclear experts. In order for a completely knowledgeable final decision to be made. an official poll by our own Yas-e Now newspaper concluded that 45% of the polled populace were in favor of “change in the political system.
and Russia may also react in favor to a popular Iranian coup. Though many are excited about the possibilities presented by the increase of Iranian power and prominence within the Middle East. Nearly two-thirds of the population is under the age of 30 (BBC 2008). planning. Though outside actors may invade. 10 9 . our success hinges upon the functioning of all processes. the idea of an Iranian nuclear weapon is a bit more contested (Lynch 2006). sanctions may be laid. Beyond the obvious reaction of jubilee from the United States and Israel. Though Iranian pride runs strong for our nuclear program.g. If the public reaction to the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapon is not as positive as expected.470 kilometers 9 . we. a popular movement against our government may very well materialize. Our complete disregard of the NPT and IAEA standards has enraged many nations already. To as much as 8. creation. and erection of a deliverable nuclear weapon. our only option would be to capitulate to the will of the masses. some analysts speculate that an Iranian detonation would effectively destroy the core of the NPT. thus the emergence of yet another nuclear entity would not bode well for the relative power of current nuclear powers. Taking into account the necessary research. As our main concern is survival of the state and our god-fearing administration. and regimes may change. opening the door for other nations to contemplate nuclearization (Lutes and Yaphe 2005. 44-48). development. Currently. our best surface-to-air method of delivery would be on a Shahab-6 liquid and solid propellant three-stage missile. Iran does have the capability to surprise the entire world with a working nuclear weapon quite sooner than expected. our existing capabilities could easily be improved upon with the continuation of the program. our nuclear device could be detonated over any enemy in the Middle East or surrounding states (Vick 2000). If the movement gains the support from an outside instigator such as the United States. 11 Though no such movement currently exists. Supreme Leader Khomeini insightfully placed checks against the general population in order to keep radicals restricted to a limited profile among the people. Research and development into the delivery of such a weapon has slowed in recent years. the reaction of actors who may change the statue-quo must be attended to first. 11 Nearly half of Iran’s 71 million person population is under the age of 25. 12 E. With a range of over 5. Though the recent American National Intelligence Estimate predicts a contradictory window of ten years. the Supreme National Security Council.: United Nations sanctions. In fact. many are wary of the international reaction to such an advance. Much as the students and academics (backed by the military) carried and implemented our glorious revolution in 1358 10 . the people of Iran have the final say as to who rests in the seat of government. minority groups often find them somewhat abrasive. if the entire population of young Iranians were to be galvanized against our present government.000 kilometers. a reasonable time frame of two to five years could be set for Iran’s admittance into the Nuclear Club. At the same time. clandestine supporters such as Pakistan. All states value self-preservation over alliances. As seen by the recent increase of indigenous human rights NGOs. must present exactly what reaction we feel will emerge with the presentation or detonation of an Iranian nuclear device. so can they change government again. Just imagine the reaction! Now that your Excellence has been reminded as to the extent of our capabilities. more and more Iranians are pressing for societal change if not for governmental as well. history has shown how the largest of reactions can be spawned in the briefest spans of time when the necessary stimulus is applied. China. 12 Though our policies successfully control the general public. 1979. Of course. our virtuous government might very well fail.4 with our IR-40 can produce 16 to 18 tons of heavy water every year (Global Security 2006).
and Saudi Arabia have previously considered following in our footsteps. Turkey. the Bikini Atoll. the power that accompanies a nuclear weapon goes far beyond the pure destructive nature of an atomic detonation. cripple whole economies. If Iran were to emerge as a nuclear superpower. Syria. condemnation and limited military sanctions accompanied North Korea’s Mehr 17. Iran would finally hold the attentive ear of the international community. Palestine. General U. stagnation or effective response. reaction will probably affect Iran poorly. deter aggressive state entities and terrorize entire nations with a single threat. the natural leader of the Middle East. Jordan. 16 HAMAS.S. the Supreme National Security Council still advises an opaque path to nuclearization for the glory of our nation. your Excellence must reflect upon the ramifications of our neighbors trying to the powerful legacy we will inevitably create (Lutes and Yaphe 2005. Iran will be able to count it as a success towards regional hegemony (Truscott 2007). terrorist organizations. Allahu Akbar! Also. Qatar. Though our nuclear weapon would ultimately be considered an Iranian weapon and not a Muslim bomb. Ancient Persian glory will once again rest in Iran. Iran’s long-sought goal of regional hegemony would finally come within grasp. but our status as a pawn in China-U. Beloved Leader. The United States’ response is another story. etc. Iraq. Finally. . Egypt. India. Two perspectives accompany this debate: U. one may look to the U. The United States’ indirect involvement could also hurt Iranian power as economic and commercial ties between the Great Satan and Lebanon.N. Libya. 15 October 9. United Arab Emirates. With the correct delivery system. an enemy of an enemy may be a friend. 1385 15 detonation. power struggles may be used to our advantage.N. an ill advised move based on their level of pressure and unmatched capability of stronger India (Global Security 2004 and BBC 1/2008). Nagasaki. China and Russia may disrupt our drive towards hegemony through economic measures. 40-43). the largest 13 14 Syria. the threat of nuclear secret sales to Muslim freedom fighters worldwide would hold as much power as a detonation in and of itself. Finally.S. If Muslims were allowed to gamble. 2006. The reasoning is simple: we have more to gain than to lose. Whether in the form of military hard power or a less noticeable usage of soft power. Libya. Israel might publicly reveal its own nuclear program. if any of the big three loses relative power.’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear emergence. Saudi Arabia. Though Iran would greatly value the nature of sole ownership over our nuclear secrets. a resulting arms race might ensue between those who can develop 13 or outright buy 14 nuclear capability. thus one may speculate a similar response for Iran (Kerr 2006). the United Nations’ and United States’ reaction must also be taken into consideration.N. Of course. And yet. I might almost wager money on a detrimental reaction from the United States. Turkey.5 Muslim brethren in other Middle East nations such as Syria. If the United Nations is willing to take strict measures against Iran even before we have nuclear capability. China. Alternatively. In the name of balance of power. and Russia-U. even in light of all potential harm to our glorious nation and government. Pakistan might turn its missiles to the West.S. Though Iran would enjoy the power that is attached to the bomb. Kuwait. Hiroshima. Several actors will have to react against their own interest in order to counter our regional hegemony. Iran would have the capability to destroy any city in the world. alienating the United States into acting equally against both Iran and Israel. one can only imagine what the response would be to a successful detonation. First and foremost. any direct U. and Nevada will never be the same. and Russia could severely influence their leaders’ future decision making against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Egypt and like-minded interstate organizations 16 may defend the emergence of Iranian power.
and neither the United States of America nor the United Nations can stop our progress as a nation. the United States cut relations with us many years ago. then one might never know how similar the previous memo is to its real version. selected patterns arise from all relations. Only a handful of states have ever successfully detonated a nuclear device. Interest. but the desire to develop a nuclear weapon still resounds in our hearts as a feasible opportunity. We have successfully deterred weapons inspectors in the past. thus the pride of the Iranian people would swell upon our inclusion on such a short and exalted list. and political corruption still rocks the government (Clawson 2007). Iran’s strong economy will be able to absorb any sanctions placed upon them by either the United States or as the United Nations. Recently.N. our energy sector will need the peaceful nuclear capabilities to supplement our oil industry. Iran can stand on its own in this new age. Great Leader. Iran does not have to give up our sovereignty over our land by allowing inspectors into our facilities. please pass on your decision as to whether or not Iran may resume their strides towards the glorious prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon. True. especially since two of their main two proximity rivals (the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Ba’ath Party in Iraq) have been neutralized. even the mighty United States would be hard pressed to find the support to attack a modernized nation such as ours. the United States would have to make serious concessions to use of ground forces or bombing campaigns on yet another uncertain target. Lastly and more relevantly. Now that you have received our view of the pros and cons relating to the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapon. and we can do it again. Our strong oil trade has sustained Iran through hard times before and will continue to do so in the future.S. the Supreme National Security Council would like to impress upon your judgment our perception of the actual marshaling capabilities of the United States of America. the Whether or not this is true. military action.N. fear and the lack thereof all play on relations in much the same way. our strongest enemy. Iran’s GDP will still receive a hit. sentiment already against unilateral U. or the U. Iran can cast its smoke screen across the international body with our innocent messages of the “Iranian Right” for peaceful nuclear energy.17 Diplomatically. thus reviving ties with the Great Satan can do us no good. this is a correct assessment. Iranian economic supremacy through oil is a common view among Iranian government officials. A more realistic analysis of Iran’s economy lies in the facts that despite oil revenue skyrocketing. ﺧﺪا هﻤﻴﺸﻪ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ اﺳﺖ راهﻨﻤﺎﻳﯽ ﺑﮑﻨﺪراﯼ ﺗﺼﻤﻴﻤﺘﺎن Your faithful advisor. power. At the same time. 17 . With U. Known information about Iran’s nuclear capabilities.9% of the population uses narcotics. U. With world sentiment already firmly against American interests in the world.3% (an eight year low).S. nuclear inspectors cannot stop our progress towards a nuclear weapon. Iran’s unemployment fell to 10. the IAEA. When viewing the past. Upon your approval of research continuation. pride. Theoretically.6 reason why Iran should pursue a nuclear weapon is for the resulting glory to our nation. be they diplomatic or personal. The United States does not have the physical strength to break through our national defenses without marshalling an unobtainable amount of military tied in conflict around the world. Secretary Saheed Jalil ﻣﻠﯽ اﻣﻨﻴﺖ ﻋﺎﻟﯽ ﺷﻮراﯼ Unless one is privy to the inside messages of the Iranian government. with this background information to further light your illuminated judgment. Iran’s oil prices have only gone up in recent years. 2. And so.
S. a larger followup must be quickly taken in order to pursue U. no matter how minute. or sponsored coup attempts would not work to our advantage due the lack of power the United States holds in-state: the odds do not favor success. bombing campaigns.S. the embassy serves as a shrine to antiAmericanism as well as another training facility to the Guard. By opening relations and encouraging democratic reform. Physically controlling the situation with military action. In this instance. The following policy recommendations highlight a new perspective as well as a fresh approach to the fairly old quandary of how the United States should respond to the potential future breach of international security. 4).S. the resulting competition often becomes petty and useless for a working government]. and individual survival (Lutes and Yaphe 2005. Though this might be a good first step to establish contact.S. The following policy recommendations will address the possibility of U. interest. policy to peacefully encourage a change in Iranian opinion. In Iran. policy cannot roll over and pretend the issue has no credence to the future of U. military. Central Intelligence. . One is to forcibly control the situation while the other lies in letting events run their natural course. it would open the door for desperately needed intelligence from within the heart of Iran (Weinberg 2007). Re-buying and re-staffing the American Embassy in Tehran is the best way to establish solid contact and open relations with Iran.S. impotency against the Iranian nuclear issue while still realizing that U.S. the use of ambiguous language and behavior to either cover political misdoings or to pad egos. it must be U. The only foreseeable situational blowback would be for another hostage crisis to take place. furthering international sentiment 18 The previous memo was written with the following known characteristics about governmental decision making in Iran: the government’s healthy fear of their supreme leader’s power constantly battling with their realized responsibility to the nation for factual evidence and decent guidance. there is another one strongly vying for the power and attention that comes with the Ayatollah’s favor. the United States must re-open diplomatic relations with Iran and discontinue the feud-mindset of current relations. the power play between government institutions in Iran [The creation and pressure shadow networks play on the government. Iranian Americans and American Iranians would rejoice for an easier avenue for inter-state travel. could easily procure the building once again and move the necessary State Department.S. the fact that any decision. Since Iran does not see an Iranian nuclear weapon as a problem. regime. thus the end does not justify the means. In this atmosphere. and a leaning towards the worst-case scenario were used to craft the previous Iranian memo of nuclear policy suggestion. the ‘bad-guy’ would be Iran. The main goal of U. and the view that it is more important to be involved with those making decisions than it is to be making decisions [“Organized Chaos”]. The U.-Iranian relations. must have the go-ahead by the Ayatollah in order for that decision to be implemented. Beyond showing the Iranian people that the United States wants to resume open relations. In order to take the first step towards a solution. the United States must work with Iran to solve the problem together or at least present the façade of working in Iran’s interest. In order to succeed.7 assumptions about an Iranian official’s psychological and institutional driven decision making 18 . Domestically. and support personnel into its quarters. Two solutions present themselves. the all-important need for state. To realize the scope of such a project. Seized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard after the 1979 revolution. policy should be to negate any effects Iran’s nuclear program might pose to the United States. the goals of the following recommendations are explained. publicly allowing events to run their course in an environment manipulated by the United States. During the Clinton administration it was suggested that a consulate could be opened on the small Iranian island of Keesh (Afrasiabi 2000). fostering future diplomatic and nuclear cooperation. a peaceful precedent may be set between two enemies. Though the complex is still owned by the American Government. the building itself has been priced at $550 million and may soon be sold on the open market (Theodoulou 2007). for every government institution working directly with the central government.
private-sector companies were to successfully approach Iran with a contract to invest in all of Iran’s reconstruction efforts as well as supply the contractors for the work itself. the strengthening of peaceful bilateral cooperation. Germany. 3). opening up a whole new can of worms. thus Iran might find it easier to work with the private arm of the Great Satan: after all.S. United Kingdom. international support. the United States could lead the world by example. 20 No solution within international politics ever ignores the impact of economics upon the problem. Each state holds existing economic ties to Iran but is not interested in watching another nuclear power emerge in the same region. In fact. SALT. business is business. Although $20 billion has already been signed to Iran from foreign companies and governments. 19 . At the same time. Iran’s most apparent weakness could be found in its economic life support system: their aging and yet bountiful oil industry. burning bridges is never a good idea in a political arena built on relationships.700-2. 19 It is up to the United States as the ‘bigger’ nation to enact the ‘first step’ by reestablishing diplomatic relations in order to regain the populace’s trust once again. Oman. paving the way for the second policy recommendation. Spain. the following proposal is a tweaked version of Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grotto’s “Contain and Engage” proposal (Cirincione and Grotto 2007). ears. Furthering the aims of the START. most of their domestic usage comes from oil imports. Though this one economic partnership effort may alienate allies of ours. China. History has shown that private endeavors often precede public economic partnerships. Malaysia.8 against the Islamic Republic. A promise to lower the United States’ nuclear warhead count once again might entice each state to agree politically with the United States. “The policy of attracting new investment for fundamental projects of refining industry is based on participation of the domestic and foreign private sector…This will be an appropriate opportunity for cooperation between Iranian and foreign companies in macro and long-term projects…to administer Iranian refineries" (Payvand 2007). Netherlands.200 warheads by 1012 (VCI 2002). the United Possibly to the extent of military action. the overall loss must not completely push supporters away from American efforts for bilateral peace. Thailand. Belarus. 22 The current goal of the United States is to be down to 1. 20 Several Iranian nuclear situation policy packages have been publically presented for consideration. the United States must push away all existing offers from the table and monopolize the contract 21 as any third-parties’ cooperation will split Iranian focus off of the United States’ intended goal. Norway. further negating many entities’ fear and suspicion of supposed U. and SORT treaties 22 . most of the investments have yet to be confirmed and paid. South Korea. and strength. and physical capability to militarily control the situation. Brazil. nuclear hypocrisy. another policy recommendation would be to stay in close contact with current allies of the United States. In order to fully take advantage of this prospect. Though Iran exports billions upon billions of dollars worth of oil. Speaking in Tehran at 2007’s Iran Oil Refining Forum. whereupon the United States might have the legitimacy. Iranian Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh related that Iran would be looking for foreign investment in their faulty gasoline-refinery system. an action that would ‘kill four birds with one stone’. If U. thus Iran’s economic situation must be considered as one point of access to an otherwise closed system. 21 France. it would seem that Iran is handing out the opportunity for control on a silver platter. Japan. and Iraq (GAO 2007). Our allies are our future eyes. Russia and China should be major considerations for this recommendation. In fact. the United States would have the opportunity to tie itself directly to the Iranian economy. If Iran takes to the previous policy recommendations and encourages a stronger future relationship. an eventuality questioned by some experts (GAO 2007.S. economic partnerships would be the next step after diplomatic relations. so to speak. Australia. Italy.
the United States should start funneling government funding into pro-democratic Iranian NGOs once the two nations have established a degree of economic and diplomatic cooperation.S. in respect to the general health of the human race. 50). in order to directly deal with the Iran’s nuclear program. if Iran does not have a constant pressure from sanctions. it is a moral decision action to take. As columnist explains. It costs only $70. private investment would have a high rate of failure. further lending clarity as to the use of state’s nuclear program as well as giving the United Nations or other multinational entities a legitimacy to use preventative force. as well as other networks that can foster civic norms. While the United States will need to concede a degree power to Iran through negotiation. Today the United States continues to support import sanctions against all Iranian goods except those less than $100 in value. the United States should keep current sanctions due to the bargaining leverage they may present in the future. thousands do not provide extra protection. mass media. U. and think tanks. Currently./IAEA/U. informational materials.S. a lowered nuclear capability does not equate to less American ‘hard power’: when a handful of warheads could wreak incalculable damage to a state. law (U. As many might suggest. weapons inspections. a document continually weakened by Iranian disregard for sanctions and U.S. Individual states are more apt to listen. pursue the public interest. Finally. The goal of this policy recommendation is to help financially nudge the Iranian people past their tipping point through the creation of political NGOs. actions that have proven to work in the past (GAO 2007. An added bonus will be the re-strengthening of the Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT]. whereupon more Iranian citizens will strive towards a more In 1998 alone the United States spent $35 billion on nuclear weapon upkeep and research (Brookings 1998. 1). In fact. “For democracy to triumph…citizens must build links across ethnic and regional divides to challenge elitist hierarchies and rule by strongmen. 3). financial. Between 1997 and 1999. should further restrict Iranian banking systems as well as continue to strengthen all efforts to block illegal weapon and nuclear equipment proliferation to Iran from non-state and state actors. Finally. break the bonds of clientelism. foodstuffs. In between now and then. and economic sanctions. international leadership against the illegal proliferation of nuclear supplies must not be given up at any cost. The remaining $50 million needs to be supplied before September 2008 or else funding will be withdrawn (NTI 2007). 49).N. Such a stockpile would give developing nations no excuse to indigenously enrich uranium. the new U. 23 . the U. Iran spent nearly $1. and current American economic embargo sanctions. U. raise citizen consciousness. scrutinize government conduct. agree. vigorous civil societies. At the same time. including banking transactions and any materials that might be used to support Iran’s nuclear program. $100 of the $150 million needed to create the stockpile has been supplied. the United States is just wasting money holding onto weapons that will never be used. banking. and lobby for good-governance reforms” (Diamond 2008.5 billion on weapons (State Department 1999). much of Iran’s +$46 billion imports go towards the procurement of weapons and equipment for nuclear research (GAO 2007.S. 4). Today. the United States should lead a multilateral charge in building and maintaining an International Nuclear Fuel Bank. All exports to Iran. the less nuclear warheads this planet must deal with the cleaner and safer our lives will be in the future. As proposed by former Senator Sam Nunn. with independent organizations.N.S. are forbidden under U. and the famous Persian textiles used as tapestries and rugs. such a fuel bank would create a closely monitored IAEA managed low-enriched (5%) uranium stockpile for nations wishing to pursue nuclear energy. In order to start the process of democratic reform. This requires dense. The United States should continue to support sanctions on all nuclear equipment imported to Iran.000 to dismantle one nuclear warhead (Brookings 1998. 3). Dept of Treasury 2006.S. and work with a fair and equal power instead of a preferential determiner.9 States would save money by dismantling its aging stockpile 23 and putting it to use in under-funded military or domestic programs. Finally.
Besides an automatically strengthened relation with Iran. If need be the United States may also be able to cut the Iranian government’s feet out from underneath them by restricting their own oil production and capability. Other policy recommendations that would help promote the U. 24 By funding pro-democratic NGOs. Upon a change of government. non-partiality from the United States would resound deeply within the Iranian people by promoting the acceptance of the United States as a reemerging benevolent power. stronger and clearer actions against illegally proliferating states will have a precedent to work with. a safe supply of nuclear energy will be available for all eligible nations. interest. Finally. the IsraeliPalestinian conflict will be closer to conclusion. the United States should take more of a leadership role in equally mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact.S. all plans will come to fruition. an acceptable endeavor in most constitution-based states. the populace should react in a manner similar to U. the United States’ image will still have improved in the international eye. If the Iranian situation does not change upon implementation of the listed policy recommendations. Though not useful towards the Iranian nuclear issue. At the very least. the United States will have a new economic and strategic partner in the Middle East: not so bad an alternative with Iran’s newly updated oil refining industry. and the United States will have again resumed the position of the respected leader of the free world. religious and democratic nature of the nation. a goal directly targeting the future of U.’ public image for the specific goal of Iranian acceptance include promoting student and cultural and academic exchange programs.S. Currently. Once this tipping point has been achieved. 1979 26 Previous example: Libya in 2004. $1. eventually bringing the United States back to square one 25 . Iran may feel that it does not need a nuclear weapons program26 to further its goals in the world. a number that has only risen in recent years. the United States can assist in the efforts of emerging leaders by pushing reform and public diplomacy through the open NGO connection and reestablished Embassy. Once the Iranian people have passed their democratic tipping point and are determined to bring about a more egalitarian government. . Once a more pro-democratic government takes power. most groups take the form of pro-civil and feminine rights but eventually pro-democratic NGOs will start to emerge from underground (WWICS). the role of the United States would be purely advisory. Despite Iranian restrictions. American and Iranian students will have a broader world-view through the enrollment in exchange programs.-Iranian relations. 7. One can only hope that this global improvement will include specific adjustments within the Iranian corner of the planet. once United States policy has been carried out.5 billion should be requested for 2008 and depending on the success of funding more should be requested for the years ahead. less primed nuclear warheads will inhabit the world.10 democratic Iran than support the current regime.000 Iranian NGOs surfaced in 2003. In 2006.S. Secretary of State Rice requested $75 million more tacked on to the previous year’s $10 budget for this exact purpose (The State Department 2006). depending on prospect. Governmentencouraged academic planning should touch upon what improvements can be made to the Iranian constitution while taking into consideration the cultural. As the number of democratic institutions increase in Iran. 24 25 $1 billion or $2 billion. the United States will have the opportunity as an encouraging actor to be able to push reform without having to physically wade into whole situation. horizontal accountability increases while the average citizen’s desire for a restrictive government decreases. the only act the United States would be guilty of would be funding prodemocratic entities within Iran. A budget of $10 million has been requested and approved for this endeavor but an additional 10% increase should be added to this allocation until relations improve (Lantos 2007). historical. At this point. the students of today. as direct control of the coup or constitutional reform would bite into Iranian sovereignty.
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