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ART 19, 20, 21 Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs.

Court of Appeals 217 SCRA 16 (1993) FACTS:

AEC delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (GII) GII paid AEC, 2575.00 check drawn from EL Woodworks. Check was signed by some Eugenio Baltao Check bounced because account closed AEC verified from SEC that EL Woodworks is registered under E. Baltao. AEC verified from Pacific Banking Corp that signature is from E. Baltao AEC demanded from E. Baltao the payment in replacement of the bounced check, the latter denied issuing the check & advised that GII no longer exists; hence could not have transacted. Apparently E. Baltao III was the one who manages EL Woodworks Baltao filed at the RTC a complaint for damages against AEC, its owner & one of its employees As per AEC, it is a malicious prosecution, advised absence of malice on their end (DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA damage resulting from legitimate exercise of right, is a loss w/o injury)

Issue: Can E. Baltao recover damages? RULE: NO. 1. What prompted AEC to file case against E. Baltao is their failure to collect payment due to bounced check which they believed was issued by Baltao 2. Baltao did not immediately clarify the case of mistaken identity w/ AEC when the latter made extrajudicial demand for the payment 3. The criminal complaint filed by AEC was a sincere attempt to collect the payment due 4. AEC acted in good faith in filing a complaint before the provincial fiscal 5. Error in proceeding against the wrong individual is an innocent mistake & cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith 6. Civil action for damages against malicious prosecution is allowed given that: a. Defendant was himself the prosecutor b. In bringing the action, the prosecutor acted w/o probable cause c. Prosecutor was impelled by legal malice *** b & c were not present in this case. The presence of probable cause signifies that there is no malice.

ART 29 Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan 202 SCRA 309 (1991) FACTS:

As a result of massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees resigned including Curio, Perez, Asucena, and Javier. They were required to apply for PCA clearance to claim their benefits As per clearance (a) condition, it shall only be signed when there are no pending items under Pending Accountability Amidst condition (a) Perez & Asucena were approved by PCA officers, including Atty. Llorente. Same with Javier. Atty Llorente disapproved Curios clearance because he still had accountabilities Between Dec 1981 1986,k Curio was unable to get a job due to lack of clearance Curio filed a complaint against Atty Llorente for Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act Sandigangbayan aquitted Llorente but held him civilly liable

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Llorente should be civilly liable RULE: 1. 2. 3.

If rule proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil action lies nonetheless Though Llorente did not act w/ evident bad faith because he was bound by the laws to refuse clearance for those w/ unsettled accounts. However, from previous occurrences, clearance was nonetheless approved and the unsettled obligations are then deducted from the gratuity benefits.. hence that may still be considered as acting in bad faith

ART 21 Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals FACTS: 219 SCRA 115 (1993)

Gashem Iranian citizen exchange student taking a medical course at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. 1987, he courted Marilou Gonzales & proposed to marry her. Marilou accepted his love on the condition that they would get married.

They agreed to get married at the end of the sem, Oct 1987 Gashem visited Marilous parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval of marriage Aug 1987, Gashem forced Marilou to live w/ him @ Lozano apartments. She was a virgin then His attitude changes & began to maltreat her, at the confrontation before barangay captain of Guilig Gashem denied their plan to marry Gashem claimed he is already married Marilou filed a complaint for damages

ISSUE: Is Gashem liable for the damages RULE: YES 1. When a mans promise to marry is the reason for the womans acceptance of his love, & the reason for the woman to give up her womanhood, when in fact, he had no intention to marry the woman, then the man is liable under Article 21 due to fraud & deceit 2. In the case @ hand, Marilou surrendered her virginity to Gashem w/ the latters promise to marry. Gashem was only deceiving Mariou from the start because he is already married.

ART 20, 21 Constantino vs. Mendez FACTS: 209 SCRA 18 (1992)

Amelita waitress in Tonys restaurant. Met Ivan there st Ivan working at Hotel Enrico. Invited Amelita to dine w/ him at hotel Enrico the following day of their 1 meeting. While dining, Ivan professed his love to Amelita & courted her That same evening on Aug 1974, w/ the promise of marriage, the 2 had intercourse After the act, Ivan confessed that hes already married They repeated sexual contact on Sept & Nov 1974. Amelita got pregnant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ivan is liable for the damages against Amelita RULE: 1. 2. 3.

Damages could only be awarded if the intercourse is not a product of voluntariness & mutual desire At the time Amelita met Ivan, she was already 28 years old & admitted to be attracted to Ivan Her repeated intercourse w/ Ivan on Sept, Oct, Nov, indicates that passion & not the promise to marry was the reason why she submitted herself to Ivan

ART 20 CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. vs. USHIO Realty and Development CorporationG.R. No. 138088 January 23, 2006 FACTS:

USHIO Realty alleges that CAR COOL leased the property from the former owners, spouses Lopez, since 1972. On June 15, 1995, Hector Lopez wrote to CAR COOL informing the latter of his intention to sell the property. Hector Lopez gave CAR COOL the option to buy the property before offering it to prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to the offer. On June 28, 1995, Hector Lopez terminated the lease agreement and gave CAR COOL until August 31, 1995 to vacate the property. In a letter dated August 31, 1995, USHIO Realty informed CAR COOL that it had purchased the property from the spouses Lopez. CAR COOL continued to occupy the property despite USHIO Realtys demand. This prompted USHIO Realty to file a complaint for ejectment. CAR COOL, on the other hand, alleges that Hector Lopez agreed to renew the lease agreement for another two (2) years covering the period from January 1, 1995 to December 1996. CAR COOL further claims that it had paid in advance to Hector Lopez the monthly rentals covering the 2-year period.

ISSUE: Whether or not to award damages by way of rentals in favor of USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL. RULE: 1. 2.

The payment of damages in the form of rentals for the property does not constitute unjust enrichment. The court finds that the allegations of the complainant (USHIO Realty) are true.


March 1968 Lorera Serrano bought jewelry worth 48,500 from Niceta Ribaya March 21, 1968 Serrano instructed her private secretary, Josefina Rocco, to pawn the jewelry Long Life Pawnshop where jewelry was pledged at 22,000 Yu An Kiong principal owner & general manager of the pawnshop Rocco runaway w/ the pawnshop ticket & the 22,000 3 months later, Gloria Duque & Amalia Celeste saw the jewelry from the pawnshop & informed Niceta Ribaya that those might be the jewelries sold to Serrano Serrano confirmed that they were her missing jewelries. She informed Yu An Kiong not to permit anyone to redeem the jewelries because they were stolen from her July 9 1968 Serrano went to Manila Police Dept to report the loss & file complaint against Rocco Same date, Detective Corporal Oswaldo Mateo went to the pawnshop to show petitioners report & to advise to hold the jewelries & report should anyone try to claim them July 10 1968 Yu An Kiong permitted Tomasa de Leon to claim the jewelries upon presenting the ticket Oct 1968 Serrano filed a complaint against Long Life Pawnshop for failure to hold the jewelry & to notify police & petitioner Decision was in favor of petitioner awarding 26,500.00 as actual damages w/ legal interest from the date of filing, 2,000.00 attys fees CA reversed the decision

ISSUE: Did Long Life Pawnshop acted in bad faith? RULE: YES 1. After having been informed that the jewelry pawned were either stolen or involved in an embezzlement of the proceeds of the pledge, Long Life Pawnshop is duty bound to hold the jewelry & to inform the police or the petitioner should anyone try to redeem it. 2. The indication that the pawnticket is redeemable by the bearer does not dissolve the duty stated in #1 3. The pawnbroker acted in wreck less disregard of that duty & therefore should bear the consequences w/o prejudice to its right to recove damage from Josefina Rocco

ART 24
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals 168 SCRA 623 (1988)


Carlos Telosa, a fisherman and farmer with a very limited education, obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Lucena sometime in 1960. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land with an area of 50,000 square meters. When the Monetary Board placed the Rural Bank of Lucena under liquidation, the account of Telosa was found in the inventory. Per the Banks records, the principal amount of the loan of Telosa was P5,000.00. Demand was made upon Telosa to pay. Because Telosa knew that his obligation to the rural bank was only P300.00, he executed an affidavit protesting the demand. Telosa paid a total of P411.25. Claiming that the payments made did not satisfy the whole amount due because the record still showed a balance of P9,032.22, the Central Bank caused the foreclosure of the mortgage. To restrain the foreclosure, the heirs of Telosa (who died earlier) filed a complaint seeking the nullification of the mortgage and/or its reformation to state the real intention of the parties. The heirs invoked the provisions of Article 24 of the Civil Code.

RULE: 1.

The heirs are entitled to the relief prayed for. This was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the officers of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The latter took advantage of the very limited education of Carlos Telosa.

ART 26 St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 133 SCRA 179 (1984)


St. Louis Realty Corporation (SLRC) published an advertisement in the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968, with a heading WHERE THE HEART IS, whereby the residence of a doctor was erroneously depicted as the residence of a family (different from that of the doctors) that had recently moved into the Brookside Hills community. Noticing the mistake, the doctor called the attention of the advertiser whose officer subsequently offered his apologies but without however rectifying the published item.

However, when the lawyer of the doctor demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages from the advertiser on account of the erroneous publication, the advertiser published a new advertisement, in the Manila Times of March 18, 1969, wherein the same family as in the original advertisement was depicted with its real house but no apology to the doctor or an explanation of the error in the original advertisement was made. Moreover, after the doctor had filed a complaint for damages, the advertiser published a Notice of Rectification in a space 4 by 3 inches, claiming that its print ad Where the Heart Is which appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969 was a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times (Sunday Times) issue of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969, wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside homeowner was mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner. In the lower court, the judge ruled that the advertiser committed a mistake which violated the complainants right to privacy and should have immediately published a rectification and apology, but because of its mistake and utter lack of sincerity, defendant had caused complainant to suffer mental anguish in addition to actual damages resulting from reduced income.
Supreme Court sided with the appellate court & lower courts decision The Supreme Court declared that the St. Louis Realtys employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times and it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up but just contended itself with a cavalier rectification. As a result of the mix-up, the private life of complainant was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed causing him to suffer diminution of income and mental anguish. According to the Court, the acts and omissions of St. Louis Realty fall under Article 26.

1. 2.


ART 27 Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals FACTS: RULE: 1. 2. 160 SCRA 449 (1988)

Delmo was elected treasurer of a state college student organization Student Leadership Club She extended loans from the club funds to some students. College President claimed that extending loans was against school rules and informed Delmo that she was being dropped from the membership of the club & would not be a candidate for any award from the school come graduation Delmo appealed to the Bureau of Public Schools Bureau directed the college president not to deprive Delmo of any award if she is entitled to it On Apr 27, 1966 the president received the directors decision. On the same day, he received a telegram airmail records Delmo missent that office Director meant the return of the records ONLY But the president mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back so he returned by mail all the records plus the decision to the director. The next day, the president received a telegram from the Bureau Director telling him to give a copy of the decision to Delmo President sent a telegram to the director saying that he returned the decision & had not retained a copy May 3, graduation day. President received a telegram from the director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due to her. Delmos name can no longer be included in the program as one of the honors students She graduated as a plain student, instead of being awarded the latin honor of Magna Cum Laude

The President of the state college was held liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a student with honors, on account of said officials neglect of duty and callousness. Undoubtedly, Delmo went through a painful ordeal brought about by the presidents neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code are but proper.

ART 30 People vs Bayotas 263 scra 239 FACTS: Extinction of Civil Liability

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of the accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability. Counsel for the accused-appellant on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that death of the accused while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

HELD: 1. 2.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollary, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) Quasi-delicts. Where the civil liability survives, as explained above, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Sec.1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules the court ruled that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, rape. Consequently, the appeal was hereby dismissed.




ART 31 Prudential Bank vs. IAC FACTS: Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a fiveyear deferred payment plan. To effect payment for said machineries, Philippine Rayon Mills opened a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. Against this letter of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho, which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan. Two of these drafts were accepted by Philippine Rayon Mills while the others were not. Petitioner instituted an action for the recovery of the sum of money it paid to Nissho as Philippine Rayon Mills was not able to pay its obligations arising from the letter of credit. Respondent court ruled that with regard to the ten drafts which were not presented and accepted, no valid demand for payment can be made. Petitioner however claims that the drafts were sight drafts which did not require presentment for acceptance to Philippine Rayon.

ISSUE: Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon. RULING: 1. In the case at bar, the drawee was necessarily the herein petitioner. 2. It was to the latter that the drafts were presented for payment. There was in fact no need for acceptance as the issued drafts are sight drafts. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). 3. The said section provides that presentment for acceptance must be made: a. Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any other case, where presentment for acceptance is necessary in order to fix the maturity of the instrument; or b. Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance; or c. Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee. In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in order to render any party to the bill liable. Obviously then, sight drafts do not require presentment for acceptance.

ART 32 Padua vs. Robles 66 SCRA 485 FACTS: The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless imprudence filed to driver Romeo Punzalan and defendants appellees as subsidiary liable, which give rise to two separate liabilities, namely 1. the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and

2. ISSUE: RULE: 1.

the liability arising from civil negligence or so called culpa aquiliana.

Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent liabilities.

The negligent act such committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, a. the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal b. and the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.

These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately

ART 33 Yakult Philippines, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. FACTS: G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990Gancayco, J.

In 1982, 5yr old Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado. The latter was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. In 1984, a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila. A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants Yakult and Salvado to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff sums for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills, attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action RULE: YES. 1. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 2. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. 3. In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. 4. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

ART 36
Meynardo Beltran vs People and Judge Tuazon FACTS:

In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix got married. They had 4 children. After 24 years of marriage, Beltran filed nullity of marriage due to Felixs PI As per Felix, Beltran left their home to live with a certain Milagros. And that she has filed a case of concubinage against Beltran In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: o the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and o the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.


The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.