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Author(s): Pierre Hassner Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul., 1990), pp. 461-475 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2623068 . Accessed: 02/08/2012 12:56
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Europebeyond partition and unity:disintegration or ? reconstitution PIERRE HASSNER writes Thereis a raceon in Europetoday.is already past. borrowed from a verse in a Frenchpoem. it is impossible today to speak of Europe in the presenttense: thebipolar Europe. Hassner. Some of us thoughtwe knew the Europe of tomorrow.In this in between West. Affairs 3 (1990) towards1992. The responsibility the West of in thisregard theshortness timeavailablecannot overemphasized. at any rate. Indeed.between integration the in East and West. based on the divisionbetween two alliances. and backto and in differentiation newfrustrationsEast and West.the road taken by the European Community looks more than ever like the only promisingone forthe whole continent. two superpowers and two Germanies.symbolizedby the about the date of the 1992 magical figureof 1992. we are not headedtowards1914.and they can. Cold War to all-European collaboration then. Thirdly. 'The moment when I speak has alreadyescaped me': No one can writeabout Europe today without acknowledging that thiseternaltruth. whether yesterday's Europe 46I-475 46I 16-2 . Yet the liberationof EasternEurope.two economic organizations. theunitingof Germanyand the decolonizationstruggles the of Soviet Empire have raised in many minds the question whether. But to new uncertainties horizon as Ralf Dahrendorf has said. civil may be confinedto one part of the continent. and be Hassner of traces three phasesin Europeanand Russiandevelopments fromtheending the of withdisillusion. has never been more valid. includingcommon security institutions.disintegration theEast. the goal of 1992 has been reaffirmed reinforced and by the Kohl-Mitterrand declaration of April I990 aiming at the creation of a European political union. Secondly.Balkanizationand disintegration. and rapprochement situation keyto thedecline revivalofEuropeas a wholeis thestrengthening the or and opening Western of Europeto Eastern Europe. the same by date.ratherthan will not be succeededby the Europe of the day beforeyesterday rather thanby that of tomorrow. war and revolution.as peacefulintegration and democraticprosperity become universally accepted goals in the East as well as in the West. but when?' are now added new doubts about its direction.only last for International 66. '1992 will surely come. Of course.
triedto slow down the tide.The timesof troublesmay lead. In the abstract. allies. alliancestructures. to anticipate. processeswere constrained. led to popular impatience.and while each of them has its own result theircombination political of that logic and dynamic. where so many ages of historyand dimensionsof politicsare coexistingin so littlespace. which virtually everybody thoughtwould take decades and could be 'managed' fromabove or fromthe of it outside. an evasion of the necessary and he may not be entirely wrong. Chancellor Kohl acted decisivelyin and Germany's neighboursand using this situationto speed up unification.thrownback to itsown heroic or barbaric past.having unsuccessfully or tryinghastily to adapt old institutions to build new ones in order to accommodate a united Germanyin the middle of Europe.but the time-dimension has become both more decisive and less predictable.it may be WesternEurope which will be 'East Europeanized'.between and across societies.it may be useful to distinguishthree such processes: the of the of interaction strategies (both diplomaticand military). discussion of these processes see Pierre Hassner.expressedby escalatingemigrationand dissent. interdependence and the interpenetration societies (parof interests(particularly economic). on the contrary unless the the meetingof East and West fulfils Hegelian dream of reconcilingunityand virtuewith modernfreedomand peace. aspirations timethat all threeof these processeswork at different paces or on different scales.During the Cold War. 'Modelling while Rome burns?'. The real question is less that of tomorrow than of the day after tomorrow.it is theunpredictable decisions (which are naturallybiased towards immediateproblems and deadlines) and institution-building (which inevitablyworks forthe long run and is slowed down by the need for multilateralconsensus) have to take into account or.and thenthe opening of the Austrianborderlast summerand thenthe Berlin Wall increasedthe interdependence between the two German economies and made the East German one quite unworkable. simply.model-building and have been fundamentally decisionsand institutions more necessary are thanever. For further unpublished paper. First. Yet the interpenetration societiesprecipitated in two successive the twin impact of Westernprosperity and of Soviet liberalization ways. the and ideas.post-revolutionary and even post-nationalist the victory of liberalism and rationality.are runningbehindit. as theydid in WesternEurope. Yet theydo serveto point out thatin a Europe which is moving in so many directions.repressedor channelled by state and. even worse. new prophetsand new Caesars.Pierre Hassner a time.transformed or emptied by contradictory processeswithin. Political institution. 'Third Worldized' or. The reader may findthese speculationsidle and suspectthat they represent task of building a new European architecture.' The point is ticularly affecting movementof people.Or. are today. An example is theprocessof Germanunification.old and new structures being driven. above all. with a post-warlike. complete with new religions and new wars. 462 . Yet theyinterfere with each other. the rulesof the game for transformed. to condition.
or at least towards Central Europe. the end of communistrule in EasternEurope (and hence of the Warsaw Pact) and the unitingof Germany. psychological. by the same token. Going from West to East. whatever WesternEurope mustboth happens. put in a more brutalway. our conclusionwill be that.less active outside and less reliableor dedicated a partnerfor European integration in spite of Chancellor Kohl's determination because of the difficult cultural.the of integration WesternEurope. each case.Europebeyond partition unity and To put it anotherway: There is a race on today between the rapprochement between the two Germanies.theWarsaw Pact rather than Comecon rather NATO. On the other hand. moved eastwards. While for Germanythisstage is likely 463 . on though perhapsin a more seriousway.the Community and severeproblemsin digesting their NATO are encountering victories. It is East Germany which has disintegrated ratherthan West Germany. or. theevolutionof the Soviet Union betweenimperial In power and democraticreform.and with them those of Europe as a whole.Of these.the two Europes and the two superpowers. social and of integrating17 million people whose spiritual and economic problems for materialexperienceshave been different 45 years. i. to give much higherpriority itsrelationwith theEast and clingto itsenterprise of buildingan autonomous centreof power withinthiscontinental framework.whose strength are surprise. and the of of trendto the disengagement the two superpowers. and European mainstream.while is of course the future unknown. respective While in thelong and even medium runit is likelythatthe absorptionof the former GDR will increase Germany's total economic power and political influence. thanthe European Community. has moved On the one hand. the centreof gravityof the respectiveWestern halves of these pairs has. The West: from Cold War victory to all-European cooperation and back to deterrence The root of the problem lies in the double-facedresultof the I989 revolutions. This same problem reverberates the European Community as a whole. in the shorterrun Germanyis likelyto be less stableinside. and in the process Germany. regardingits linkswith the United States)now hang in the balance. we can distinguishthree possible dialectical sequences concerning the relation between Western and pan-European the evolution of Eastern Europe in its attempt to rejoin the institutions.the only clear and speed have taken everybody by and irreversible trends. the disintegration EasternEurope.The fateof the Soviet Union itself (both as a communist regime and as a multinationalempire) and that of a WesternEurope (both regardingits abilityto unite and thusconstitute valid and also counterweightto increasingGerman power and Soviet instability. the centreof gravityof the European continent fromEast to West. just as Eastern Europe and Germanyhave provided the headlinesof the late I98os. It is these the themesthatwill constitute main concernsof the early I99os. the West has won over the East.
of first while less and served' variety?-Though thesepragmaticconsiderations. and Strengthening opening The only way out of this dilemma must be to combine broadening and daring deepening. can Hungary be far behind? If does thisnot necessarily Germany's weight withinthe Community increases. of endowing Europe with structures. particularly countrieswhose levels of development. retaina certaintechnicalvalidity. will theynot be even more insistent than today upon being treatedas fullyfledgedEuropeans. Austria be refusedaccess? If Austria is in. whose president. less psychologicallyand morallydefensible. 2 See his speech to the College of Europe. is the author of the so-called 'Bruges formula' according to which any progressin reunion with the East should lead to a speeding up of in integration the West)2 claim to be aiming for. Bruges. economic traditions and international are Deepeningversus enlarging Yet it is just as unlikelythat the priorityof 'deepening' over 'enlargement' stronglyadvocated by the French government.to make thechallengeof broadeninginto a reasonforgreater and energyin the directionof deepening that is.forthe Community it may lead to basic structural changes. forverylong. of be content with offeringhelp from outside and well-meaning advice on forming union of theirown which would enterinto some kind of association a with the EC? If and when these nations progresstowards democracy and a marketeconomy. politicaland security of the EC governments(not to mention the Commission. 464 . is thereany good reason for the restricting Community to WesternEurope. 1989. This is what the majority common monetary. to orientation qualitativelydifferent.and to some extent by the BrusselsCommissionand by all thoseEuropeanists who are primarily concerned and the creationof a West European with the functioning the institutions of can be maintainedfor very long. If the formerGDR is in. While the Monnet method of combining and economic interdependence common institutions ensurepeacefulpolitical to the integration a striking is success storyand indeed represents only hopeful road forthe less peacefuland prosperouspartsof the continent. is not likely it of extensionto thatthe institutions the Community and stillless theirfuture political union and military security can be successfullycombined with indefinite enlargement.PierreHassner to last no more thana few yearsin its acute form. I7 Oct. otherthan the pragmaticones of based on considerations optimal size and on justifications the 'Firstcome. Jacques Delors. can federation. draw the lattermore towards Central Europe? Can it then turna deaf ear to the unanimousaspirations CentralEuropean nations?Can it. and will theynot have a point? Once the Cold War and the divisionof Germanyare over.
Besides the crumblingof the Warsaw Pact and the decline of the Soviet the military threat.Europebeyond partition unity and Of course thisis easiersaid than done. and a different voluntaryalliance of freenations with origins fundamentally from those of the Warsaw Pact is under no logical compulsion to follow the fateof the instrument the Brezhnev Doctrine and Soviet domination.But. let alone a military organization. I would emphasize that the of of successor failure thiscombinationholds thekey to thedeclineor revivalboth of the Community and of Europe as a whole. as necessarybut discreteinsurancepolicies.Europe 'a la carte' and 'multiple speeds'.witheach countryof theWarsaw Pact having a more independentpolicy.particularly are when applied to the problem of dealing with EasternEurope. which have constitutedthe cornerstoneof NATO. every day. it is hard to imagine futurearms control being handled essentiallyat the alliance level.the uniting 465 . After NATO The problem is even more difficult. and above all. The limelightwill belong to panratherthan to purelyWesternones. the prognosisrather and less sanguine. at best.even if NATO and nuclearweapons do retaina role. if only because the deepeningand the enlargingcannotbe done quite by the same partners quite on thesame timeor scale. valid as of are theyare. and thisrole constitutes hard core of Europe's military the security. the permanentor at least longer-term exception of the Soviet Union. But the directionmust remain clear: that of an ultimateextensionof the Community to the whole of the continent(with. even on arms control. arguments whose missionwould be to negotiatearms controlagreements likelyto be are challengedby theobjectionthat. which we shall discuss later). to bilateral relations or to universalistic organizationsratherthan to alliances. While the Community can easily survivethe demiseof Comecon and even prosperfromit. preceded and guided by a double process of a political strengtheningof the Community and a reorientation its activitiestowards the East. Hence 'variable geometry'.This does not mean that the presence in Europe of American troops and nuclear weapons.at least in its immediateand visibleform.the dissolution the of Warsaw Pact and the decline of the Soviet militarythreat. for transforming NATO into a political organization Secondly. to economics rather European structures than to security. or at least for NATO. all thosesloganswhich at one time or anotherhave been applied to the processof European integration. of course. I believe. Afterall. They will recedeinto the backgroundand appear. rather thanpoliticalrelationstakingplace primarily eitherat the bilateralor at the CSCE level. has outlived its usefulness.pose much more seriousquestionsforthe survival of NATO. a military alliance. primaryreason forthisevolution is.can hardly thrive without a potential adversary. even more valid today.for the Atlanticalliance. Finally. theycan no longer provide the primary structuringframework of West-West and East-West relations. thesearguments not necessarily convincingforthe generalpublic.
I99o-I. This development would in many ways be a welcome and salutaryone.it is certainthatthe waning of the Cold War has opened up a whole seriesof new security problems. how long will the Germanstoleratethe presence of foreigntroops and nuclear weapons.It is likelythat. Mandelbaum.Pierre Hassner of Germany. it should safeto predictthatin a few yearstherewill be no nuclearweapons be relatively and perhaps no foreigntroops on German soil.Without even mentioning dimensionsof security economic. no longer appearsas a threat. Faced with the disintegration the Warsaw Pact and with a Soviet Union of or which. Let us further West German elections and that NATO's presence in Germany remains and operational(ratherthan essentially substantial symbolic. Let us assume that. in While theold problemsof European security termsof theEast-West balance have not reallydisappeared. rather than to an alliance committed to the defenceof the West. demilitarized. 466 .as it would seem of to be in the discussions the SPD).3 arms control ratherthan defence. contraryto theirposition at the time of writing. but also with thatof German attitudes and with its own and priorities going to keep its troops and nuclear budgetary constraints weapons in Europe.contrary thestatedSoviet preferences. or the dissolution of the alliancesthemselves. Reconstructing Europeansecurity the order(New York: Council on Foreign Relations. whetherthroughfriendliness absorptioninto its own internalstrife. but it definitely on is unitedin wantingto eliminatethelimitations Germany'ssovereignty that were linkedwith its defeatin the Second World War and with the Cold War. to Germany But thepricefornot havinga neutralGermanybetween will not be neutralized. social.the Soviets accept thatunitedGermanyshould belong to NATO. 'Critical issues').which may look on satisfactory paper. M. and that those which may remain would justifytheirresidual presencein termsof 'reassurance' rather of than deterrence. How long is thissolution.of contribution the to collectivesecurity advocated by suchdiversevoices as Mr Shevardnadze. with the former GDR remaining or or non-integrated. the two alliances may well be a neutral Europe. system number of German voices coming fromboth Vaclav Havel and an increasing government and opposition. particularly American ones. likely to last in realityunless the Soviet Union again threat? Germanpublic opinion may be lessunited appearsas a crediblemilitary in its commitmentto unification than is sometimesassumed. let alone in a reluctant Germany? A collective security system is To the feebleextentthatany prediction possiblein today's Europe. even hostingsome Soviet assume that Chancellor Kohl wins the December I990 troops. ecological and yet the non-military 3 Cf. on their soil? And how long is Americanpublic opinion equally confronted with the evolution in the East. p. 22.
can based on predictability. for that matter. attempts mediation. The questionthenis whetherto look in the directionof a revivalof the UN and at an extensionof its activities Europe. manage and limit theseproblems. thereis no reason to believe thatany collectivesecurity if in would be more effective. One proposal is common membershipof Germany (and possibly other European states) in both alliances.should be less war-pronethanthe Middle East or yesterday's organization Balkans. to Hence in order to prevent. and from the minorityand border problems of the Balkans. yet no substitutebased on East-West cooperation and on the of reunification Europe is likely to provide the same degree of securityand predictability. even without depressing. The troubleis thatnobody reallyknows what such a systemwould consist at is of. more realistically. Soviet interventionin the Baltic states or conflict between uses Romania and Hungary. are Many currentconceptual efforts directedat solving or mitigatingthis and physicalpresencewith all-European dilemma by combining integration structures. particularly it consists mobilizingall the statesof or theinternational communityto punishan aggressor. military alliances. 467 .solve or. Another. broached by the West in GermanSPD leader Oskar Lafontaine some campaignspeechesalthoughnot is a kind of multiple tous azimuts bilateral part of his officialplatform. factthe lesson of the postwar years In is that boththe classical systems a flexiblemultipolarbalance of power and world peace throughworld law are too unreliable. Given the of identification the Helsinki process both with human rightsand with the of Cold War divisions in Europe.Europebeyond partition unity and so on it is clear that the dangersof violence in the new Europe come more states fromthe riseof nationalismin the East.the experienceof the League of Nations or thatof the United time in postwar Nations is more relevantthan that of NATO.and thattheactual recordof previousattempts collectivesecurity pretty While thereare many reasonswhy today's Europe. All thesepotentialdomesticor inter-state of force have more to do with the problems of prewar Europe or of today's Third of World than with the East-West confrontation the last 45 years. in delegatingtheuse of forceto a standingcommon authority.and thatonly permanent or preventiveintegration. There is littlethat NATO (or.the sendingof observersor international peace forcesmay be the order of the day.the French or British national nuclear deterrents)can do about civil war in Yugoslavia. or to look to the endowmentof to a tegional organization like CSCE with a true security role. bring a new quality of stability and of the Hence the dilemma: The overcoming of the East-West conflict likeitspresent role divisionof Europe makesthesurvivalof NATO in anything unlikely. fromthe decay of multinational like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For the first at Europe (with the exceptionof Cyprus).or entanglementthrough physical presence. it is likely that an overcoming institutionalization CSCE will be the road chosen to give 'Europe fromthe of Atlanticto the Urals' or the 'Common European Home' its collectivesecurity system.
not NATO. possibly including if Germany. at least some Westernstructure mechanismfor military or deterrence and political action. suppose thatthe Easternpart of the continent in the throes of civil conflict and revolution. rather.but also in the perspectiveof the new role in security agenda.afterbipolarityand the Cold War.the idea would be that the European tied Communityshouldbe structurally both to theUnited Statesand to Eastern Europe. In all these cases. It is in this thirdphase.They do not escape the traditional thattheyare plausibleonly if theyare not reallyneeded. theprecisepriority betweenthesetwo directions and whateverthe Whatever precise institutionalarrangements. Multiple reciprocalstationing forces.while the Western one continuesits progress towardspoliticaland economic union. what is needed goes beyond weaknessof collectivesecuritysymbols. of existingFranco-German national or multinational. if European divisions and imbalanceshave alreadybeen overcome. for instance. and But suppose the Soviet Union is becoming again more militaristic Or is threatening. dependingon America's wish to maintain in itspresence Europe and Germany'swish to maintain speciallinksin theWest. and afterthe of euphoria and the disappointment all-European cooperation that the time for a reassertion a West European defenceidentity(which is unlikelyto of a for in constitute priority any country thepresent atmosphere)may come.not only as a framework for discouraging German temptations. European stateson each other'sterritories a 'reassuring' in by or preventivefunction anotherversionof the same idea.being added to the ones. Yet none of themseemsverypractical. the thesisconstituted NATO and the antithesis CSCE. Put after of differently. it is likely that neitherthe CSCE nor any of the various schemes for reciprocal in would prove very effective restoring and balance to entanglement security the continent. its freedom of diplomatic action will need to be protected againstblackmail by its own counter-deterrence. but that under whateverroof it should maintaina distinct identity of its own. with a German-Polish brigade. Or suppose theextremes catastrophic of decline in the East and of revolutionary unityin the West do not materialize.likely that Western Europe.Pierre Hassner integration. as theirhybridor seemingly characterdoes reflect paradoxes of the emergingEuropean the contradictory if situation. 468 . but thelogic of nationalpower reasserts in itself thelong runand. by some kind of European Defence Community may come to representa All synthesis. of Germanyand Russia (or a federation Slavic republicsor a largelypreserved USSR) emerge as the two dominant statesin Europe. the more so since this mightbe conceived as a West European pillareitherof NATO or of CSCE. If WesternEurope is to exerta mediatingor stabilizing EasternEurope. This would be desirablenot only as a counterbalanceagainst a potentially re-emerging Soviet superiority. as in thepast.It is.would tryto reactivateor reconstitute. is A return Western to deterrence None of theseideas shouldbe rejectedout of hand.
On the contrary.thento the inner by tensions between politicaland economic reforms. It is clear that. Liberationobviouslyleads thevariousEast European separation countries a rushtowardsthe West-which impliessimultaneously to claiming their European identity (and hence the recognition of their full rights as of as Europeans and of the incompletecharacter European integration long as it is limited to the Western half of the continent). harmoniousintegration The rushto the West For EasternEurope.this perspectiveis not open to otherEast Europeans.at least in part.the Westernones are tendingto close theirs.But while the Federal Republic.to Westernstandards.Europebeyond partition unity and 2. This-movement from East to West was afterall the main single factor behind German unification. fromEasternEurope and the Soviet Union millionsof would-be immigrants enter into competition with hundreds of millions from Africa and Latin 469 .adopting democraticand parliamentarian institutions. while the East European countriesare Tens of opening up theirborders. Eastern Europe: beyond liberation It is all the more urgent for Western Europe to preservethis latteroption because its relations with Eastern Europe may well become increasingly both complex and unpredictable the only certainty being the improbability of complete separationthrough a new Iron Curtain or Berlin Wall and of freefrominequalitiesand conflicts. but not on the scale theEast Europeans expect. which will involve government consent. Moreover. the EC is reluctantto accept the immediate admissionof all thenewly democraticEast European countries membership.while conditionsin theirown countriesare deteriorating individualEast Europeans are temptedto tryto findforthemselves theWest in the freedom and prosperity that elude them in their own countries. The North-South East-West of For the reasons quoted above.But it is due just as much to the likely West European reaction. This is due first all to the objective difficulties of the transition. which will involve hardships and inequalities. private propertyand the market.in turn. the Cold War represented both the impositionof alien regimesthroughSoviet occupation and a forcedsocial.and then to the lack of appropriatetraditions and the longof lastingeffects the communistsystem. short. however justifiedthe immediate urge and the long-term direction may be. culturaland economic fromtheWest. to the extentthat they realize that West European standardswill be hard to even further attain.and expecting theirstandardof living to rise. legally and politicallyunable to stem the flood of Ubersiedler (from East Germany) and Aussiedler (ethnicGermansfromEasternEurope and the Soviet Union). saw no other solution than a fuiteen avantinto unity.and middle-run expectations are bound to be of disappointed. to It is willing to help.
set East forpoliticalreasonscould be replacedby new barriers up by the West for economic and demographic ones.The case of Poland hangsvery to may well succeedin their much in the balance. Fituancial Times. partlysuperficial unity As in the Third World. for different reasons. More than ever.but within some of its countriesthemselves. who are accused of unfaircompetitionthroughblack marketor cheap labour. David Marsh. but in a much more compressed space. the East Germanswill be a class in themselves. 'Europe through Hungarian eyes'. For theNorth-South divide runsnot only acrosstheEuropean continent and withinits Easternpart. tradeand aid). But of course the self-isolation that evaded totalitarian statesis not a viable option for democraticsocieties. Initernational Affairs.They dictates have to live with thisuncomfortable problem. 28 Apr. and theirown interest active cooperation in improvingconditionsin the home countries. the most seriousof all.see L.a unique basis of political and which moral legitimacythanksto which its population has accepted sacrifices and would be unthinkableamong its neighbours. Romania and Bulgaria encounter no less serious difficulties.with Solidarity. To thatextent(as of withtheproblemof debt and investment. 'Angst ulberalles'. 5 For an excellent analysis of emerging inequalities between East-Central European states. Vol.but its economic structures and rigidity traditions itsdiplomaticstyle(as evidencedby thenervousness and of itsdiplomaticactionsover Germanunityand borderand minority issues)are very serious handicaps. or of relations Hence the dangerthatthe Wall and the Iron Curtainset up by the peripheries. seem to be increasing out of Even betweenEast and West Germans.Slovenia 4 Cf. 2. 66. encounterwith Western Europe will combine with permanentor resurgent as national characteristics promote an increasingdifferentiation.tensions about the amount of help fromthe West and of disruption mutual resentment or competitionfrom the East.Pierre Hassner America foraccess to the prosperousand democraticWest. Lengyel. East-East tensions the And thisonly illustrates second type of tensionsand inequalitiesarisingin of Clearly theresults the Europe: thosebetweentheEast Europeansthemselves. Those of multinationalcountrieslike Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are. return Mitteleuropa. several playingthe role of the region's categoriesare likelyto emerge: some countries 'little dragons'. Apr.4 In turn.investment access even remotely comparable to that provided by unity with the FRG and the enthusiasmof West German business. 470 . East-West relations are losing theirspecific character and are appearingmore and more as a special between the richcentreand the poor case of North-South ones. It enjoys. of course.both partsof Germany are united in irritation or workers(particularly againstPoles or otherimmigrants temporary fromthe Third World). and some being in danger of becoming Europe's Africa. I990. I990.5 compared to to the forcedhomogeneityof the communistpast and to the sentimental but of European reconciliation. Hungary and Czechoslovakia. No. no other as or countryis likelyto finda level of salaries.
Here the relation with the West. like the November I989 Budapest meetingof theSouthernFour (Hungary. Disillusion This would be all the more desirableas relationswith the West are likely to become a major. perhapsthemajor politicalstakein the domesticlifeof former in communistcountries. I990.efficiency and national identity.each East European countrywill undertake hard and long journey to theWest alone. and dictatorships reactedto thefailure that of the formerin the name of moral regeneration.basically. Usefulattempts regrouping at along regionallines are being undertaken. the Baltic statesand Georgia are much more readyto be co-opted into the efficient prosperouscentrethan theirpoorer.not to mentionthe more backward Muslim republics. and particularly with WesternEurope. are added to traditionalnational antagonismsand minorityproblems. more generally.But their prewar historyis made up of alternations between formallydemocraticregimes that were patternedon the French or Britishmodel but weak and corrupt. Already now. can play an important role in steering the in rightor thewrong direction. Italy and Austria) organized by Italian Foreign Ministerde Michelis. more plausibly.or a return a national populism of the left or.Yugoslavia. countries Central and EasternEurope are not devoid of democratic traditions. Austria and Yugoslavia).his balk at theidea of freeentry Poles into Czechoslovakia) as well for countrymen as traditional rivalriesmake it more likely that. the stillprevalentopposition between communistsand nonor communists being supplemented replacedby an articulation is along linesof 6 See 'Un avenir commun pour les "petits" pays d'Europe centrale?'. thiswould only repeat traditional patterns. The question then is likely to be what kind of ungrateful regime will intervenein this third. then. Will it be an to at attempt some kind of social democraticcompromise. or the BratislavaCentral European conference called in April I990 by Vaclav Havel of (with the participation Hungary and Poland and observerstatusfor Italy. sometimes with Western participation. Contraryto common the of Westernbeliefs. Io Apr. to its Communityitself as the United Statesdid with the MarshallPlan.Europebeyond partition unity and and Croatia.of the right? Afterall. Le Monde.in political approach (nothing is more striking than the differences diplomatic conceptionsand stylebetween Poland and in Czechoslovakia) and to some extentin interests (while PresidentHavel is the most active proponent of Central European confederal structures. Economic rivalriesand jealousies. throughcommon institutions.these failureswill tend to be blamed on an and selfishWest.more numerousand and militarily more powerfulorthodox counterparts like Serbia and Russia.Particularly the cases where attemptsat promoting democracy and marketeconomy and. 47' .post-disillusionment phase.unlessthe its undertakes encourage theirunityby channelling help. in Yet differences situation.at 'rejoining Europe' will be perceived as failures.6 or Poland's contacts with the Nordic countries.
provided it has another message beyond 'Leave it to Moscow'.when the Soviet bloc was available. The responsibility the West in thisregard. and liberalism. essentially Both perceptionsmay well correspondto a period which. in the predicting victoryof xenophobic or anti-democratic interwarperiod three models competed for the soul of these peoples: the Western democratic one. a coordinatedpolicy of gradualadmission of the whole region to West European marketsand institutions can make a decisive difference.Afterall.economic and cultural help to theircountries and. which looked energetic and on the rise. Even at the diplomatic and securitylevel. warning or surveillance.in defusing national conflicts. and the communist one. when the glow Community and Western-style democracy may lose their triumphant in and thecrisis theEast may lead to uncontrollable crises and resentments now is the time when political help to pro-Westernforces. Today are dead or discredited. particularly Germany.cannotbe overemphasized. unlike the future.or from the worry thatthesepositive developmentsdepend on the person of Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet Union: beyond perestroika Of course. the fascistone. In other words.seem to proceed either from a complacent view according to which the Soviet Union will satellites towardsdemocracyand the marketand follow the path of its former in become a stableand cooperativepartner a common European order. but still more along Russia). or between the 'blacks' (i.Pierre Hassner economic interests(hence the rise of peasant parties). the articulationemergingin Central and Eastern Europe is one between national or religiousneo-traditionalist populism.should not be interpretedas the forces.This is why it is so vitallyimportant or of thatit should not appear indifferent worse closed to the aspirations its newly won disciplesin the East.and the liberal the fascistand communist models world looks to be not only the only model available but also highly capitalist successful economically and politically. pro-Westerndemocraticor rationalist The pessimistictone of these remarks. above all. 3. as Michel Tatu 472 . which looked tired and declining.so that Western policy should consistin helping him out.e. Most in projectionsof the European future. of the Church) and secularmovementslike the intellectual founders Solidarity in Poland. whose power is under threat. WesternEurope may be highly useful through mediation. inaccessible to Western direct influence.and the shortness the time of of Unlike thepast.reinforcedby the currentrise in national clashes in most of these countries. traditional lines between 'slavophiles' and 'Westernizers' (as in tsarist between urbanists and populists(as in Hungary). as seemed to be the case duringthe Romanian revolutionin December I989 and the Lithuaniancrisisin April/May I990.Moscow is at least as much the problem as it is the solution. which to appearedas a dangerousthreat most and as an inspiring hope to some.
may already be past. nor a threatening empire occupying half of Europe and bidding for continentalor global dominance. brutish and weak.But it is highlyunlikelythat even the most hostileand militaristic Soviet leadershipcould eitherrestorethe Brezhnev Doctrine or reconquerEasternEurope or starta bid for global and on strategic primacyagain. 'The Soviet Union: three scenarios'.seems to be taking the lead in the movement for independence and reform. In particular. See also Z. US News and WorldReport.and to be engaging in direct negotiations with other republics. but the chance may already have been lost.including the Baltic republics. and Gorbachev's current hesitations may well be foundedon a correctawarenessof the limitsof his power over Soviet society in spite of his constant gains in intra-elite struggles. Le Monde. would seem to indicate that the revolutionarydecolonization Gorbachev has so far refusedmay occur in spite of him. a new balance may then be found without the agonies of repressionor civil war. On the other hand. 'Le troisieme Gorbatchev'.It would be rather reminiscent theinterwar of communist period. Perhapsit could become lessforthcoming a German and settlement insiston maintaining troopsin the former its GDR indefinitely. a Brezhnev-likepolicy of military and pressure)once Moscow has expansion overcome itstechnological and lulled theWest into dismantling defences. the fact that the Russian Republic. 473 . whether a political game based on compromise would not be overtaken by the mounting economic and social tensionsand the bloody ethnic clashes at the periphery.only to resumethe attack (in the formof a Third World War. i8 June I990. of NATO and American troops and of East-West relationsin general. althoughit is hard to imaginehow it could undo Germanunification. 46.7Of the various possible for Soviet futures the coming years. I990. from below. Brzezinski. neither the West's friendlyand cooperative neighbour in a 'Common European Home'.as difficulties resistances and againstthepolicy of retreat mounting are as one approachesthehardcore of Soviet power. p. 28 Apr. genuine multi-party democracy and Polish-style economic reformis the best hope on paper.23 Apr. If Russian nationalism evolves in this direction ratherthan in the imperial one.extrapolatingthe last three years does not seem very plausible. Certainly it would tryto keep the inner empire.8 Repression retrenchment and Some of the Western observers who refuse the optimisticscenarios often denounce the whole Gorbachev enterpriseas a plan designed to capture Westerngood will and technology. 8 Michel Tatu. under Boris Yeltsin's new leadership. its lag This interpretation has the advantage of serving to justify the survival of NATO and the attemptsat European defence. though.Europebeyond partition unity and among othershas pointed out. A revolutionary breakthrough in the directionof a Soviet Commonwealth based on independentrepublics. but a hostile yet inner-directed powerwould raisemany unansweredquestionsabout the statusof EasternEurope.the two most positive are not the most likely. as Zinoviev asserts. less extravagantly. The question remains. I990.minustheinternational movement and the threatfromGermany. the formof in or. Such a situation-of a Soviet Union thatwas nasty.and it would have itshandsfullwith trying repress variousnationalist social to the and movementsand to stop the Soviet Union's slide into anarchy.
if it could last very long. and whetherit would not precipitate threatof imperialand social collapse into the anarchyand civil the war which it was meantto prevent. in and perspectives integration whateverislandsof peace may emerge. even more than for the 'repression plus retrenchment' hypothesis. its democratizationand its Europeanization. perhapsa Slavic federation-eventuallyemerged out of the turmoil. Former German Chanceller Kiesinger'sformulaabout Germany-that it has always been eithertoo weak or too strongforthepeace of Europe-may be even more applicable to Russia.are of for not to be excluded.the way in which nationaland social confrontations leading to revolution or secession would combine is impossible to predict. The nucleardimensionwould increaseboth the of need forrestraint theneed forcommunication. afterthe repressionand the anarchyrepresented the two precedingones. to use Enders Wimbush's phrase. Even democratized and 'cut down to size' throughtheloss of itsinnerempire followingtheexternal in one.however.as would seem to be the case in de Gaulle's notion of 'Europe from the Atlanticto the Urals' or in some versionsof Mitterrand's ambiguous proposal for a confederation. it may be too strongto be includedin an institutional structure fromwhich theUnited Stateswould be absent. Russiais likelyto be different size and population. and so. Clearly the latter would do its best to avoid repeating its half-hearted interventions I9I7 to I920. at best. Who would want such an unpredictablepartner. although a voluntary fragmentationthrough 'implosion rather than explosion'. are the consequences for Eastern Europe and the West. One can only assertthat these more likelyafter 'time of troubles' thanthroughgradual a processesare rather reform or radical revolution in the present phase.Of course. by There is no way of predicting when and how Russia would thus complete if.to wait untilone or several politicallyand economically manageable entities-perhaps Russia. in armamentsand in domestic institutions from the rest of Europe.is no longer to be excluded. A stableRussia This last scenariowould probably have a chance. perhapsan independent Ukraine. But theinstitutional inclusionof the Soviet Union or what would be leftof it into an all-Europeansecurity systemor peacefulordersuch as Mitterrand's 'confederation'would have.only in a thirdphase.theproblemof refugees and and the dangersof territorial overflowwould requiredelicatehandlingboth at the diplomaticand at thehumanitarian level. Peace-keepingforces theshortrun.unless this confederation was only another name for CSCE? 474 . then. Unless it is in the throesof anarchyand civil war.Pierre Hassner Collapse One wonders.
We are back. but that of American presence or withdrawal. should also determine degreesof intimacy These degreesof unpredictability and of institutionalization. by contrast. would be foolishto believe thatEurope should cut It priorities the are itself fromthe two superpowers. After SecondWorld a May I990 475 . is The reason formy scepticism about all-Europeanarchitecture thatwe have and War.could be decisivelyinfluenced. The evolution of EasternEurope is rather more unpredictable. the range but of variationsand theirimpact on the restof the continentare stilllimitedby weakness.to where we started. including if and Germany. institutional entertained. then. last but not least. size. economic and socio-culturaldependence.along with European politicalunion. not shaped by theinstitutional economic hand of a powerfuland eager United States. democratic would seem to make a education and.Yet it is clear thatitsfirst off of economic and political union of Western Europe and the establishment structuralties with Eastern Europe leading to its eventual integration. while Western Europe.and military of The real question-mark hangs over the vast stretches an empire which is ill terminally while stilla nuclear superpower.the real question was not that of the precise institutional formula for the League of Nations. The difference today is thatthe first problem-Germany-is happilysolved for the time being. Nuclear weapons. economic interdependence.and the prospectof similarties with the Soviet Union should be keptopen fortheday when Europe and thewhole civilizedworld can celebrate 'the end of Soviet exceptionalism'.isolatedin itsbarbaricrigidity in its domination over Eastern Europe. 25 to the entered periodwhichis closer I9I8 thanto I947.Afterthe FirstWorld War.and above all thatof the domesticevolution and the ultimatefate of Germanyand the Soviet Union.European integration resurgence of German totalitarianismand military expansionism almost unthinkable. and linkswith theUnited Statesshould be maintained Meanwhile. theSoviet Union was a separateworld.and Europebeyond partition unity of The reasonI have given such stress theunpredictabilities Soviet evolution to is thatit seems to me thatthis. holds the key to the evolution of the continent.