This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
ANTI-TRUST LAW Introduction
With the advent of globalization, and the standardization of principles and norms, trade and technology have undergone rapid transformation. What used to be an individual’s vocation has now become the occupation of the country as a whole. The promotion of healthy competition and establishment of the same, has to be, and to a great extent already is, the prerogative of the trade- centric nation. It is only when market etiquette are adhered to, that a country becomes attractive to foreign investors and traders. Moreover, healthy competition ensures consumer welfare, technological novation, and quality assurance. An absence of the same would result in a hodgepodge of a market situation, wherein a situation of ‘might is right’ would prevail, and thereby be detrimental to the consumer. Thus, regulation and distribution of the market is quintessential in ensuring not just consumer welfare, but also in maintaining global standards and reputation. One of the main repercussions accruing out of an unhealthy, rather, unregulated economy, is the situation of concentrated market power. This is also referred to as a monopoly power. Though US courts have aimed to differentiate between the two terms1, economists use both 'market power' and 'monopoly power' to refer to the power of a
++ Authored by Aditi Kamath, Patent Attorney, S. Majumdar & Co. 2010. Submitted on 26.04.2012 1 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Court defined 'market power' as 'the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.' By contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently defined 'monopoly power,' at least for section two cases, in accordance with the definition articulated in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (decision is sometimes referred to as the Cellophane case)--i.e., as 'the power to control prices or exclude competition.'
. the firm's perceptions of the additional revenue the unit of output will create). prices which are not to the benefit of the consumer. although their marginal costs at the level of output they produce is the same as their less efficient competitors.e. In such a situation. its cost of producing an additional unit) equals the market price (i. no incentive for innovation and lastly. Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law Georgetown Law Journal December. guilty of market upturns.. nor were their beginnings 2 ‘In a perfectly competitive market. those with lower marginal costs for particular levels of output) produce more output. and Steven C. mainly due to lack of competition. Salop.2 Monopoly. each firm maximizes its profits by expanding its output until its marginal cost (i. Lande. They earn higher profits because they have lower average costs. They were not.e. In such a market. as price-takers they ignore any effects of their production decisions on the market price. Robert H. lack of variety in products.e. This situation is highly detrimental to the consumer as it brings about a situation of crass misuse of power and resources. Monopolistic markets are frowned upon by advocates of economic stability mainly due to the absence of competition. That is. More efficient firms (i. 1987 Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative . in layman’s terms refers to the situation in a market where a particular firm is at an advantage over the consumer. the terms both refer to the ability to price above competitive levels. as many presume. Hence. these circumstances of market monopoly are adjudged by laws across continents as prohibited and punishable. all firms have the same marginal cost at the levels of output they produce.’ (FN 38) Krattenmaker.. Less technically. and not undergoing any financial fallback. In a perfectly competitive market.single firm or group of firms to price profitably above marginal cost. the firm is capable of deciding the price of its commodities. Birth of Monopolies An astounding revelation which many endure is the fact of monopolistic inception. firms take the market price as given.
complaints against monopolies in Rome and an early imperial prohibition.5 These kinds of monopolies were in practice considered to be trade tactics. Introduced into the realm as a system of easy administration.3 The merger of trade with monopolies accrued by the adoption of the Egyptian system. it was endorsed by the Romans as far back as the 3rd and 4th century B. around the 3rd and 4th centuries. organized his economy by means of the traders. With the conquest of Egypt by the Romans and Greeks. their inductions. Thus. absent from any grant from Emperor or Senate. As a consequence. and reasons for the same. while his ‘able subjects’ ran the economy. Though they did fall into the aforementioned categories consequently. these weren’t in actuality grants than they were delegations of responsibilities. As usual these too sought to take advantage of the system prevailing. improvised by him to suit . This strategy. as they too believed in delegation for efficiency. were never meant to cause harm. 5 Aristotle in his book I of Politics (quoted by Laura Ford.economically malicious.see fn 6) 6 According to Harold Fox. which were paradoxically an ‘art of amassing a fortune’.7 However. wherein shrewd and strategic traders would gain an advantage over others by acquiring monopolies through trade and merchandize. concerned monopolies exercised by individuals or associations through their independent acquisition of control over a particular trade in a particular place. This though was not a means to stimulate any intellectual or knowledge centered growth. the same system of trade regulation was continued by the Romans. 3 It was part and parcel of mankind to expand territories.Laura Ford ‘Monopoly as a Rhetoric: the case of Letters Patent’ 7 Diocletian. This way.C.4 Parallel to the kinds of monopolies granted by the administration. monopolies were shunned for public benefit and welfare. they did emerge. there also existed individualized monopolies. repeatedly in history. they happened to have a huge empire. merchants etc. he could concentrate on the defensive and offensive aspects of running his Empire. only to be constantly eschewed. which was cumbersome to administer from one capital. on the contrary. the Egyptian governors exercised wide ranging regulatory controls over particular trades and these controls sometimes took the form of monopoly grants.6 Even then. it was merely used to regulate the various conquered lands in a convenient manner. to whom he granted the monopolies. Hence they introduced a system of governance. The Roman sovereignty was one of the most engrossed in expansion and border extension. who had to report to the ruler. wherein different areas would be under the control of a particular individual. 4 Simultaneously.
. the 4th and 5th centuries saw the ban on monopolistic endeavors rightfully and instantaneously.The Knight in Shining Armor: Anti. In order to curtail the same. or under an imperial decree or under a rescript signed by our Majesty. 8 Of the many groundbreaking regimes introduced. However. various legislations were put into place. and the Sherman Act 1890 by the USA. The most important of those happens to be antitrust law. nor may any person combine or agree in unlawful meeting that different kinds of merchandize may not be sold at less price than they have agreed upon among themselves”. and finally after much persuasion. On the contrary. In fact it is a law whose primary purpose is the protection of consumer welfare.Trust Law As stated earlier. in the marketplace. the existence of an his needs. may not be the result of anti competitive conduct. monopolies arose constantly and intermittently. or that may hereafter be procured. introduced as a result of growing market tension due to the formation of trusts which restricted competition. Unfortunately though. happens to be the current Anti. “that no one may presume to exercise a monopoly of any kind of clothing or of fish or of any other thing for serving of food of for any use.trust Law followed by nations worldwide. The latter. at times. either on his own authority or under a rescript of an emperor already procured. it may arise out of healthy competition and fair trade practices. As per the definition of market power given earlier. compelled the Emperor Zeno to limit its use. anti-trust law is often misconstrued as a law which prevents monopolies. 8 Technically. whatever its nature may be. However. i.e. history having an inclination of repetition. Monopolies. the practice of monopoly continued to oppress the masses. apparently proved quite disastrous. the ability to raise prices in a market without losing market share is true monopoly. as the Roman Empire collapsed soon after. two of the most successful were the Statute of Monopolies. and came into the hands of the imperial Byzantium. natural monopoly can be presumed to be the presence of such ability but the absence of such raise in price. 1623 by the English.
the EU Regulations14 etc.United States v.13 Anti. foresight and industry. 9 Thomas G. 1987 10 A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors. merely by virtue of his superior skill. Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative Georgetown Law Journal December.trust laws today are incorporated in almost every Constitution. wherein competitors though absent.trust law seeks to prevent monopolies at first sight. Thus. . 430 (2d Cir. the ultimate aim of anti-trust is that of consumer benefit. Salop.competitive practices Prevention of agreements( both horizontal11 as well as vertical12) in restraint of trade • Prevention of mergers and acquisitions. the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly. having been urged to compete. which may lead to market imbalance.9 Thus.’. the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster . Lemley A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust John M. 1945).. keeping the aforementioned in mind. due to their indispensable nature. which arise due to anti. though anti. Judge Hand 11 Agreements between competitors 12 Agreements between buyers and sellers 13 Mark A. although. . In such cases a strong argument can be made that. are free to participate.open market. Lande. 148 F. Aluminum Co. of Am.10 Antitrust law protects competition and the competitive process by preventing certain types of conduct that threaten a free market. must not be turned upon when he wins. by means of the following: • • Prevention of monopolies. 34April 2007 14 Article 81and 82 of the EU Treaty . Steven C.2d 416. Robert H. Olin Program in Law and Economics Stanford Law School Working Paper No. The successful competitor. Krattenmaker. it refrains from penalizing the same when it is obtained as a natural consequence. They are a part of the TRIPS Agreement.
Came into force 2007.blogspot. Rather the former happens to be a no frills personification of monopoly rights. countries such as USA15 and India16 have separate Acts dealing with Antitrust/ Competition law. Though each national approach differs to a great extent.spicyipindia. The ‘evolution’ of IP can actually be referred to as cosmetic surgery by the various governments in order to facilitate significant approval for the system in the minds of the public.start in the market.a situation which competitive law sought to prevent in the first place.1890 (Section 1 and 2 specifically prohibit and penalize monopoly respectively) they also draw a line of demarcation between monopolies arising out of anti. and consumer detriment.see www. devoid of anti competitive practice. let alone company.competitive practice. their common goal is a healthy market. and obviously lead to successful results. which in turn would act to the detriment of the consumer. The constant threat that accrues from granting a particular individual exclusivity in the market place is not only prominent. 2002. 16 Indian Competition Act. that this law would be regarded with much apprehension and distaste.Introduced to meet the demands of Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement. It is but natural then. but also the reason for consternation amongst market participants.com . The Tainted Maiden: Intellectual Property The Intellectual Property regime that exists today is actually the result of several years of polishing and restructuring the devil child of monopolistic practices.Moreover. In the absence of the reward of a head. no selfconcerned individual. This would proportionately lead to a stagnant market place. would attempt to innovate. and monopolies which accrue naturally. Investments in R & D today are phenomenally extravagant. 15 Sherman Act.
generally economists.foolish’. Moreover. thereby reducing their value and substance by manifold. pound. wherein the greater good was disregarded in lieu of presumably preventing an immediate evil.paint the tainted face of intellectual property and attempt to rid the same of the blotchy misconceptions that cause its supposed war with anti. use to refer to intellectual property rights as monopolies.wise. the personified situation of the term ‘penny. This is very far from reality. Their fine link with monopoly has forever caused them to be an analogy to a monopolistic grant. the exclusive power to economically dispose of a certain product vests the author with a modicum of market power which will be inversely proportioned to the number of existing substitutes for such product.17 There are various reasons why public 17 ‘Because commentators. as will be elaborated in the coming section. The aim of the remainder of this essay is to re. As a general principle. and thereby cause undue apprehension in the flexible minds of the public. Patents and copyrights only afford authors a set of exclusive rights which are strictly limited to the fruit of their intellectual labor. as is the psychology of the individual. Intellectual property rights. for both IP paradigms.a-times casting a shadow over their pristine cause. Anti. many. the past of these rights have always been held against them. due to the high risk associated with their use and subsequent misuse.Hence would ensue. have been reproached by many. The smaller the number of competing products. there is a widespread misleading belief that patents and copyrights entitle the author to obtain a monopoly in the economic sense. The tryst between anti. There are many instances where Chinese whispers result in the spread of misconstrued facts.trust and Intellectual property at loggerheads: Illusion or Veracity? A lie told a hundred times.trust law and IP law is an outcome of the same mishap. becomes the truth.trust law. the greater the power the owner will derive from the exclusive .
there would be only two primary reasons highlighted. Intellectual property rights at the crossroad between monopolization and abuse of dominant position: American and European approaches compared. to have a prospective effect based on retrospect and experience. their past actually is linked due to and by. A careful analysis of the two reveals that though monopoly and IP shared an intersecting history. but also attempt to invalidate the notion of them being against each other. • • Misinterpretation Of Intentions Behind IP And Anti-Trust Law Misuse Of Provisions Pertaining To IP The above two grounds seek not only to verify the persisting clash of the two regimes. and though there have been cases where one would override the other. However. vol. John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law. but as is the scope of the essay. 24.’. trade.Emanuela Arezzo. issue 3. 2007 18 It was to stimulate trade that monopoly was introduced into the realm (as discussed earlier).misconception has been harbored over the years. the same ought not to be taken as Gospel truth and views about the relationship of the two cannot be altered on that basis. 18 The very fact that the former has undergone right. it was due to the need to stimulate innovation in trade that monopoly was granted . IP law holds no exception to this much cherished protocol. At the same time. In fact this law is one of the most frequently improvised legislations. Misinterpretation of intentions behind IP and anti-trust law It is the sole aim of every legislative body. its history is often considered to be the same as the history of monopoly. Both laws are in effect complementary to one another.
and thereby benefit the consumer. that Intellectual Property Rights grant a monopoly power in return for the invention disclosure. they confer upon the individual in question the sole right to exclude the rest of the world from commercially benefitting from his invention. […] A patent or a copyright does carve out an area of exclusive rights. They do not provide any sort of power or privilege apart from the aforementioned. Keeping the above in mind. 2005 Taking pharmaceutical products as an example. 332 U.S. v. 20 “The use of the word ‘monopoly’ with regard to IPRs “though common is unfortunate.”). Nye Tool & Mach. v. it was to prevent the misuse of the monopoly. the approval of the Drug Control and Regulatory authorities is required. . it is but common deductive capacity that is required to establish that the intentions behind the formulation of both were strictly to stimulate trade. in every bit of sense. This particular assessment is absolutely incorrect. even by experienced and learned experts. it is often misconstrued. 37 (1923) (referring to “[t]he monopoly thus granted” by the assignment of a patent). but whether the right holder can use his right to obtain a monopoly return depends on whether there are good substitutes for his product […]”. Les Nouvelles. In order to commercially utilize the invention.20 to the inventor. because it confuses an exclusive right with an economic monopoly. United States. March 1.S. Posner. when one considers anti. 395 (1947) (“The appellant’s patent confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward.e. More specifically. Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property. 19 Int’l Salt Co. 19 Patents and copyrights. Moreover.rapid and constant improvisation is proof in itself that it was never intended to prevent or hamper the functioning of the marketplace. 392. and limiting the “monopoly” granted by the patent laws to activities within the scope of the patent. along with all other rights provide market exclusivity i.trust law and IP law. Crown Die & Tool Co. 261 U. Works.See Richard A. that IP law was modified. 24. a patent over the same guarantees just the right to exclude.
21 Thus. However.trust is not the prevention of monopolies. In addition to the above. for the whole period of the grant. rather it is a state of compromise. with no guarantees of success at the end of the . as they both serve a common purpose. The owner has to endure the same procedure of market whiplash and fluctuations applicable to any other commercial product. Antitrust. Conferring such rights does not automatically confer upon individuals the monopoly in the market.22 Ask yourself whether you’d 21 . for the greater good. An assumption of market power cannot be made due to the exclusionary attribute of the right in Intellectual Property. and thus the whole argument against IP goes to dust. A product may not be commercially viable. The primary purpose of the patent system is straightforward. Conducting research and development and bringing an invention to market often are lengthy and expensive processes. Arizona Law Review [Vol. the patent and antitrust laws both endeavor to increase welfare. This instance cannot be called a situation of conflict.Lastly. Many a times. the intention behind the formulation of anti. And Market Power. as mentioned before. stems the issue of definite commercial gain and market power due to an IP grant.competition. Inventors and investors expend substantial resources in creating and developing inventions. Anti-trust law seeks to maintain a free market. 49:837 22 On their broadest level. which is obviously pro. there is no clash between the two legislations. the struggle to launch a new product could be comparatively higher than that concerned with the sale of an established product. there are circumstances when either has to take a backseat compared to the other. Ariel Katz Making Sense Of Nonsense: Intellectual Property. But the paths by which they pursue this objective frequently diverge. It cannot be assumed that every Intellectual creation would garner the expected results.
3university Of Pennsylvania Law Review 23 Mark A. Unraveling The Patent-Antitrust Paradox Vol. The court first held that it would decide questions of preemption and of the relationship between patent and antitrust law as matters of Federal Circuit law. thereby reducing innovation. a right that permits inventors to charge prices higher than their post invention costs. such as Xerox24.” Michael A. 340 April 2007 http://ssrn. Such activity would tend to deter future inventors and investors. At one point. such as the nascent nature of legislation or the presence of numerous loopholes in the law. the patent laws promise inventors a right to exclude for a period of twenty years. The Federal Circuit also refused to examine the patentee’s subjective intent in refusing to deal with a . and Xerox settled the suit by agreeing to suspend its parts policy and by licensing its diagnostic software for a period of time. And on those occasions when success is achieved. There have been cases wherein IP rights have been crassly exploited and misused. Lemley A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust Working Paper No. sold. all) of its lines of copiers to independent service organizations (ISOs) unless they were also end-users of the copiers. situations of abuse do occur in stark quantities in IP cases. who seeks to eradicate competition and maximize profits.com/abstract=980045 24 Xerox manufactured.23 Misuse of IP As is typical of any right or privilege bestowed upon an individual. it has to be remembered tunnel. Kodak25 and Intel26. A class of ISOs filed an antitrust lawsuit. Carrier. “free riders” who did not make any such investments might imitate the hard-earned innovation and appropriate its value for themselves. It instituted a policy of not selling parts for one (and later. The Federal Circuit held that Xerox did not violate Section 2. thereby allowing them to recover profits in excess of the value of their front-end investments. and serviced high-volume photocopiers. At the same time. or the very nature of the market savvy trader. The right to exclude thus is designed to increase appropriability and thereby the level of invention in society. alleging that Xerox violated the antitrust laws by setting the prices on its patented parts higher for ISOs than for end-users in an attempt to force ISOs to raise their prices. Reasons behind this are manifold. 150 January 2002 No.rather pay monopoly price for an iPod or a competitive price for an eight-track tape player. Xerox cut off certain ISOs’ abilities to directly purchase such restricted parts. To prevent this. One ISO opted out of the settlement and filed suit.
3d 1195 (9th Cir. Carlos Correa (refer fn 20). Microsoft Corp. 87 F. the Supreme Court did pronounce the patent holder to be above the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act27.that these cases have been dealt with successfully and in such manner as was dictated by the situation then. Ct.C.C. Although the company had. 253 F.C. in this activity.D. claiming that its restrictive parts policy violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Cir. Refer fn 16 . Because the court concluded that Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts did not exceed the scope of the patent grant and did not fall within any of the three exceptions. v. Eastman Kodak Co. competitor.In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (“Xerox”) 203 F. As a result of the limited access. in subsequent cases. and (3) engaging in sham litigation. In a landmark ruling on the issue of market power. it began to restrict this practice as competition with the ISOs increased. Cir. Kodak also sold and installed replacement parts for its equipment.’* 25 Kodak manufactured high volume photocopiers. 27 It then emphasized the centrality of the right to exclude in the patent system before carving out three limited categories in which a patent holder would not be immune from antitrust liability: (1) tying patented and unpatented products.3d 34 (D. has also listed out various instances which result in the intersection of the two legislations in a negative manner. it concluded that Xerox did not violate the antitrust laws. (2) obtaining a patent through knowing and willful fraud. denied. aff’d in part and rev’d in part. Supp. sold parts for repair service to ISOs. True in cases such as Xerox. (“Kodak II”) 125 F. 122 S. 2000) (en banc). 2d 30 (D. however. the Supreme Court held that one brand of a product could constitute a separate market and that “the relevant market from the Kodak equipment owner’s perspective is composed of only those companies that service Kodak machines. Intel CorpUnited States v.” The Court explained that even a competitive primary market would not forestall a finding of market power in aftermarkets where customers faced “significant information and switching costs. And it confirmed that action “within the scope” of the patent grant could not violate the antitrust laws. 61 (D. Moreover. as well as the post grant situations pertaining to IPRs. Mr. * 26 Intergraph Corp. and so were not able to compete with Kodak in providing multi-year service contracts.D. v. Kodak competed with ISOs. The ISOs sued Kodak.) (conclusions of law).” Image Technical Services. These are based upon the grant situations.3d 1322 (Fed. 2000). at one time. 2d 9. Inc. 350 (2001). Supp. ISOs lacked a reliable supply of parts. 1999) (findings of fact). 84 F. cert. 1997). the same mistakes were avoided.
. the Courts have been almost successful in emancipating the reputation of IP. in an irreversible manner. by defining and limiting the extent of exclusivity power conferred. infrastructure or access to a physical place such as a harbor or an airport.J. denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first. a service. v. Microsoft European Directive 96/9.30 Practices such as the above tend to mar the reputation of the law. 29 The possibility of permitting third party use of IPRs in cases of refusal to deal has been considered in some countries under competition law in the context of the “essential facilities” doctrine. 31 However.absurdpatents.• Refusal to Deal: This is the situation wherein an IPR owner may refuse to license his particular technology.com 31 (“[The] exclusive right of use [granted by a patent] is a true and absolute monopoly . an “essential facility” may be “a product such as a raw material. 1896) . L77/20. an intellectual property right. 77 F. 291 (6th Cir.licensing and patent pools: These situations are rampant among IPR owners today in that they tend to prevent the dissemination of technology and market progress. and this right to monopolize the use of the invention or discovery is the substantial property right conferred by law. which controls an essential facility. contrary to Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Under EC law. This doctrine. Eureka Specialty Co. as defined by a US appellate court. or a part of a telecommunications network. and which the public is under obligation to respect and protect. “imposes liability when one firm. 1996. 28 United States v. Misinterpretation of the laws by courts too has played a tremendous role in stimulating negativity towards IP and thereon causing a supposed friction between the two laws. information.” The European Commission and courts have examined in several cases whether the refusal to give third parties access to an essential facility constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. cross.29 • IP licensing. frivolous claims etc. 288. . or a software interface” 30 Refer site www.”) HeatonPeninsular Button-Fastener Co. with the exception of compulsory licenses in certain exceptional cases. O.. 28 Courts such as those in USA and EU have treated IPRs on par with other property rights. • Ever-greening of patents.
unity becomes our pillar. but rather when such intervention is justified. As we realize that our goal is but similar. unless the situation demands for it. 1995). is the result of a direct misunderstanding as well as wrongful construction of given facts and provisions.CONCLUSION As may be observed and construed from the data presented. Patent protection in the absence of novelty and non obviousness can harm innovation by eliminating the incentives for the patent holder and others to engage in further pursuit of something that is novel and non-obvious” (Azcuenaga. =============================================== 32 Carlos M. the same should be done in a nondiscriminatory and open. the critical point is not whether competition policy may interfere with IPRs. between the two legislations occurs only when they seek to realize their common goal.32 As a conclusion.32 .minded manner. Neither law maybe presumed to interfere with the functioning of the other. Correa — Intellectual Property And Competition Law ICTSD Programme On IPRS And Sustainable Development.the respect of IPRs under competition law:“is premised on the assumption that the intellectual property is properly obtained. Problems arise when particular intellectual property rights have not been obtained in the proper manner or are not deserved. of maintaining a healthy market. We amend our ways. The overlap if any. the long term benefit of the market should be given more emphasis as compared to the immediate issue of slight imbalance in the market.e. The greater good i. As is rightly observed. it can be humbly stated that the much-hyped conflict between the two branches of law. I would like to state that though there are times when it is necessary to hold the two legislations against one another.
oxfordjournals. 5(4). Carlos M. J. Michael A.1093/joclec/nhp024 Advance Access publication 20 November 2009. 1 2. John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law. Gregory Sidak & David J. 340 April 2007 http://ssrn. 21 4. Emanuela Arezzo Intellectual Property Rights At The Crossroad Between Monopolization And Abuse Of Dominant Position: American And European Approaches Compared. issue 3. Downloaded from http://jcle. Ariel Katz Making Sense Of Nonsense: Intellectual Property. 2007 5. Lemley A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust Working Paper No. Correa Intellectual Property and Competition Law Exploring Some Issues of Relevance to Developing Countries ICTSD Issue Paper No. Kieff & Paredes. 2010 6. And Market Power. vol. . 24.BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Mark A. 581–631 doi:10. Carrier. Antitrust Marathon June 2008 European Competition Journal ECJ VOL. The Basics Matter: At The Periphery Of IP Stanford Law School 7.com/abstract=980045 8. Arizona Law Review [Vol. 4 NO.org by on March 15. Antitrust. Teece Dynamic Competition In Antitrust Law Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 49:837] 3.
27 14. Stephen M. Visconte A Bitter Pill To Swallow: Patent Law. L.J. 3university Of Pennsylvania Law Review 9. Martin Natural Monopolies in Antitrust. Abbott Laboratories Barry M. Antitrust Law Issues In Competition Law And Policy 1 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) . Sunny Woan Antitrust In Wonderland: Regulating Markets Of Innovation (Summer 2008) Temple Journal Of Science. and Copyright Law: The Essential Facilities.Unraveling The Patent-Antitrust Paradox Vol.S. 2006 13. Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer Profit Neutrality in Licensing: The Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent Law revised June 26. Michael J. Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents. 75] 12. Technology. Krattenmaker. Salop Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law (76 Geo. Lande. Meurer Vertical Restraints And Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust Minnesota Law Review (March 3. Robert H.And Environmental Law Vol. A True Exception To Antitrust Law University Of Cincinnati Law Review [Vol. Thomas G. The Ideological Origins And Evolution Of U. William H. 241) 15. 2003) 87 11. 2006 10. 150 January 2002 No. and Originality Doctrines as Triggers for a Compulsory Licensing Remedy Intellectual Property and Antitrust Seminar January 27. Steven C. Michael F. Schor V. Patent. Page.
htm . Critical Analysis Reflection of IP in Competition Law of India. Posner Aei The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law. Felipe.blogspot.A history from fire to feud’. Lara Ford: ‘Monopoly as a rhetoric: the Case of Letters Patent’ 21. www.Armesto: ‘Ideas that changed the World’ 19. Vishwas Deviah: ‘A History of Patent Law’ Websites: 1. John R.spicyipindia. 1987 17. William M. Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative Georgetown Law Journal December. Karnika Seth: ‘History & Evolution of Patent Law’ 20. Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently: ‘The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law’ 18. Peter Watson (2005): ‘Ideas. Thomas.16. Harold C. Orion Publishing group 23.blogspot.com/search/label/Competition%20law?updatedmax=2007-09-22T19%3A40%3A00%2B05%3A30&max-results=20) 2.com http://spicyipindia. Randall R. Martin Adelman.Fernandez. Rader. Landes And Richard A. Wegner: ‘Cases and materials on Patent Law’ 1998 22.
com 5. www.ssrn.htm 4.hg. West's Encyclopedia of American Law http://iris.nyit. www.3.edu/wld.org .
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.