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JOHN DOE 49’S OMNIBUS MOTION TO QUASH, ISSUE A PROTECTIVE ORDER, AND/OR SEVER AND DISMISS, AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW Defendant, John Doe 49,1 by and through undersigned counsel, files this Omnibus Motion and moves this Court to: quash the subpoena directed at Comcast Cable Communications (“Comcast”), issue a protective order preventing or limiting the disclosure of John Doe 49’s personally identifying information by Comcast, and/or sever and dismiss John Does 2-252. This Court should grant the relief requested. Defendant requests oral argument to assist this Court in fully considering the matter. In support, the Defendant relies on the following Memorandum of Law: I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Celestial, Inc. is a California corporation and professes to have its principal places of business in California. (Complaint ¶ 7.) Plaintiff neither alleges nor appears to transact business in Florida or have any identifiable connections to Florida. Plaintiff claims to be the copyright holder of the video production titled Blumpkin Blowjobs (the “Work”). (Compl. ¶ 10.)


Identified by the IP address 1

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Plaintiff alleges that each of the 252 John Doe Defendants is liable for the infringement of and contributory infringement of Plaintiff’s copyright in the Work. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff has also issued an unknown number of subpoenas seeking information about the identities of the Defendants, including a Rule 45 subpoena to the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) Comcast seeking information regarding the identity of Doe 49 (the “Subpoena”). (See Exhibit “2” to Declaration of John Doe 49, which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and is incorporated herein at if set forth verbatim herein.) II. ARGUMENT

A. The Subpoena Should Be Quashed and/or Defendant Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction As an initial matter, the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege the Court’s personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. This was recently explained to Plaintiff’s attorneys by this Court in Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-3932, No. 2:11-cv-545-SPC-JES, slip op., 2012 WL 1890829, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2012): Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, its Complaint does need to sufficiently allege personal jurisdiction, although the facts alleged need only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2008); Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214. Vague and conclusory allegations in a complaint are insufficient. Snow, 450 F.3d at 1318. The Complaint alleges a single count of copyright infringement, and premises subject matter jurisdiction on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the copyright laws of the United States (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 1-2.) The Complaint continues that upon “information and belief”, each of the 3,932 defendants may be found in the Middle District of Florida “and/or a substantial part of the acts of infringement” occurred in this District. (Id., ¶ 5.) Upon further “information and belief”, plaintiff alleges that personal jurisdiction in this District is proper because each defendant “distributed and offered to distribute over the Internet copyrighted works” “in every jurisdiction in the United States, including this one.” (Id.) The Court finds that these allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to allege personal jurisdiction over any defendant under the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. … The vague and conclusory allegations related to the internet are insufficient to satisfy a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. E.g.,

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Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 611 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2010); Bond v. Ivy Tech State College, 167 F. App’x 103, 106 (11th Cir. 2006). The participation in a BitTorrent swarm does not provide the necessary minimum contact with the State of Florida. See, e.g., Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Tabora, No. 11-cv651-IEG(JMA), 2012 WL 28788 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012). Defendant Doe 49 does not reside in Florida and lacks any meaningful or continuing contacts with this forum. (See Exhibit “A”, Declaration of John Doe 49, which is incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim herein.)2 Defendant lacks the regular and consistent contacts required to confer jurisdiction pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statue, Fla. Stat. § 48.193. Moreover, Defendant lacks the “minimum contacts” necessary to confer personal jurisdiction as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 316, 316 (1945) and its progeny. “A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Wallack w. Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1365 (M.D. Fla. 2003). “A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274 (citing Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999). A prima facie case is established only if Plaintiff alleges enough facts to withstand a motion for directed verdict. Control. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000); SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th
Evidence may be submitted by an unsworn declaration that is dated and subscribed by the declarant as true under the penalty of perjury in lieu of a notarized affidavit. 28 U.S.C. § 1746; Trammel Real Estate Corp. v. Trammell, 748 F.2d 1516, 1518 (11th Cir. 1984); Carter v. Clark, 616 F.2d 228, 229 (5th Cir. 1980); F.T.C. v. Vacation Travel Club, Inc., No. 89-219-CIV-FTM-21D, 1996 WL 557831, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 1996); PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.Com, Inc., 336 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1217 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 3

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Cir. 1997). It should also be noted that as Plaintiff is not a Florida resident, Florida’s legitimate interests in the dispute are “considerably diminished.” Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to make out a prima facie case that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Doe 49, or any of the Defendants, and therefore the burden-shifting analysis which would otherwise follow (Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)) does not apply. Even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over Doe 49, Defendant’s Declaration in support of this motion shifts the burden back to the Plaintiff. Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002). 1. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute Florida’s long-arm statute provides for both specific and general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction arises when a defendant is “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity” within Florida, whether that activity “is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise” and “whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would demonstrate that Defendant has engaged in any activity, substantial or otherwise, within the state of Florida. As set forth in the Declaration of John Doe 49, Defendant is neither a resident of Florida nor engaged in any activity, substantial or otherwise, within Florida. (Exhibit “A”.) Plaintiff makes only the bare assertion that it has “information and belief, [that] each Defendant may be found in this District and/or a substantial part of the acts of infringement complained of herein occurred in this District.” (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff has not presented this Court with any evidence of this claim.3 What Plaintiff has failed to explain, however, is that

“While jurisdictional discovery is liberally granted, a plaintiff is not entitled to take it solely because she requests it – she still must make the requisite showing of good cause. Thus, a plaintiff must, inter alia, reasonably 4


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simple geolocation tools exist (and are freely available) which allow for the accurate determination of the general location of an IP address. Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F.Supp.2d 34, 40-41 (D.C.C. 2011); see also Third World Media, LLC v. Does 1-1,243, No. 1000090-JPB-JES, [Doc. No. 16], at. 5 n.2 (N.D. W.Va. Dec. 16, 2010) (discussing testimony presented to the court that “the physical location of any I.P. address can be determined from a simple Google search”); Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequence of Modern Gelocation Technologies, 21 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 61, 78-71 (2011) (“Today, leading geolocation technologies are . . . more than 97% accurate at the state level within the United States. . . . [S]erver-side technologies can pinpoint a user’s location within a twenty to thirty mile radius.” (internal citations omitted)); Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 Colum. Sci & Tech. L. Rev. 41, 57-63 (2010) (discussing how geolocation technologies allow for determining jurisdictional boundaries related to Internet activities). In recent years, several courts have taken explicit judicial notice of the increasing accuracy of geolocation technologies, suggesting that these technologies are now accurate enough for legal purposes. See, e.g., Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F.Supp.2d 34, 40-41 (D.C.C. July 29, 2011);4 Third World Media, LLC v. Does 1-1,243, No. 10-00090-JPB-JES,

demonstrate that she can supplement her jurisdictional allegations through discovery.” Bond v. ATSI/Jacksonville Job Corps Ctr., 811 F.Supp.2d 417, 423-24 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Where Plaintiff has made no effort to determine jurisdiction, the administration of justice is not served by requiring out-ofstate recipients of subpoenas to bring challenges to the subpoenas in far-flung jurisdictions. Further, ‘[f]rom a judicial economy perspective, it makes more sense for Plaintiff to bring its case against these [doe defendants] in the court where they have a good faith belief that venue and personal jurisdiction are attainable and the case can actually be prosecuted.’” New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1-1,474, No. C-11-2778 MEJ, slip op., 2011 WL 7460100, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2011) (quoting Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 2011 WL 3240562, at *5 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2011)); also Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-2,590, No. C-2766 MEJ, slip op., 2011 WL 7460101, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2011). 4 Followed by: West Coast Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-1,434, --- F.R.D. ---, Civ. No. 11-55 (JEB/JMF), 2012 WL 336174, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2012); Axel Braun Productions v. Does 1-2,823, Civ. No. 11-56 (EGS/JMF), slip. op., 2012 WL 253399, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2012); Exquisite Multimedia, Inc. v. Does 1-336, Civ. No. 11-1976 (RWR/JMF), slip op., 2012 WL 17785, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Jan 19, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. 5

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[Doc. No. 16], at. 5 n.2 (N.D. W.Va. Dec. 16, 2010); American Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 820 n.13 (E.D. Penn. 2007); Hageseth v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 4th 1399, 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Recently, the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony relating to the geolocation of IP addresses based on an online database or Internet search. U.S. v. Cray, 450 Fed. App’x 923, 934 (11th Cir. 2012). In Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322,5 the court extensively discussed geolocation services and concluded that they were sufficient to establish “a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be [a resident of the court’s jurisdiction] if a geolocation service places his/her IP address within the [jurisdiction], or a city located within 30 miles of the [jurisdiction].” Id. at 41. The court made a point to note that even evidence presented by the Plaintiff to discredit geolocation services stated that “[e]ven when not accurate, though, geolocation can place users in a bordering city, . . . [t]his happens because a common method for geolocating a device is referencing its IP address against similar IP addresses with already known locations.” Id. at 4041 (quoting How accurate is GeoLocation? What Is My IP Address, Here, the use of these geolocation tools demonstrates that Defendant’s IP address is located outside of Florida. (See Exhibit “B” which is incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim herein.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish general jurisdiction over Defendant. As

Does 1-72, Civ. No. 11-58 (RMU/JMF), slip. op., 2012 WL 177864, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan 19. 2012); SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-87, Civ. No. 11-1962 (JDB/JMF), slip op., 2012 WL 177865, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2012); People Pictures, LLC v. Group of Participants in Filesharing Swarm Identified by Hash: 43F4CFD05C115EE5887F680B0-CA73B1BA18B434A, --- F.Supp.2d. ---, Civ. No. 11-1968 (JEB/JMF); 2011 WL 6758462, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2011). An action brought by the present Plaintiff, Nu Image, Inc., which was also then represented by Dunlap, Grubb, and Weaver, PLLC. 6

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such, Defendant should be dismissed from this case and the Subpoena should be quashed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction arises over a non-resident defendant only when a defendant engages in certain enumerated acts. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1). The following acts, inter alia, convey specific personal jurisdiction: “(1) [o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in Florida or having an office or agency in Florida; (2) committing a tortious act in Florida; (3) owning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real property in Florida; (4) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within Florida at the time of contracting; (5) causing injury to persons or property within Florida arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside of Florida, if, at the time of the injury either the defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within Florida or products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within Florida; and (6) breaching a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida.” Id.6 Plaintiff, a California corporation with its principal place of business in California (Compl. ¶ 7), merely asserts that it believes “a substantial part of the acts of infringement complained of herein occurred in this District.” (Compl. ¶ 5.) This bare assertion is insufficient for Plaintiff to satisfy its burden of establishing this Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a non-resident of Florida. Plaintiff appears to be traveling under the theory that Defendants caused economic injury to Plaintiff in the Florida arising from an act or omission outside of Florida. However, economic injury in Florida, without more, is insufficient to establish personal

Additional enumerated acts recognized by Florida’s long-arm statute include acts with respect to proceedings for alimony, child support or division of property in connection with a divorce proceeding (Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(e)), and certain acts relating to paternity actions (Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(f)). Such acts are wholly unrelated to Plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement. 7


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jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 629 (11th Cir. 1996). Additionally, while Plaintiff likely contends that alleged copyright infringement could be a basis for jurisdiction as a tortious act committed in Florida, such application is not warranted here because Plaintiff does not reside in Florida and therefore cannot have experienced injury in this state. See Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 12380, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008). As set forth in John Doe 49’s supporting Declaration, and never contradicted by Plaintiff, the Defendant: does not reside or work in Florida; has never operated, conducted engaged in or carried on a business or business venture in Florida; has never committed a tortious act in Florida; never owned, used, possessed or held a mortgage or other real property lien in Florida; never contracted with any person or property within Florida; never caused injury to persons or property within Florida; nor ever breached a contract in Florida. (See Exhibit “A”.) Accordingly, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute. As such, Defendant should be dismissed from this case and/or the Subpoena should be quashed. 2. Constitutional Standard Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff were to establish jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, there is still an insufficient relationship between Plaintiff’s claim and the Defendant’s contacts (or lack thereof) with Florida to justify this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant. It is a fundamental principal that a defendant should not be forced to have his interests adjudicated in a jurisdiction with which the defendant has no contact. The basic requirement of personal jurisdiction “gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).


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The determination of whether personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports with the due process clause of the federal Constitution is a two-prong inquiry. First, the Court must decide whether the defendant has established “minimum contacts” with Florida. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 392 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting, International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). If the requisite minimum contacts do exist, the Court must then determine if the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendant would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. The minimum contacts analysis “cannot simply be mechanical or quantitative,” but instead must depend on the “quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not reside in Florida and therefore could not have experienced injury in this state as a result of any Defendants’ out of state actions. Furthermore, as illustrated by the Declaration of John Doe 49, any apparent contact that Defendant has with Florida is far from “continuous and systematic.” See Exhibit “A”; cf. Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff argues that the alleged activity took place over the Internet, and therefore, “unlawful distribution occurred in every jurisdiction in the United States, including [Florida].” (Compl. ¶ 5.) In other words, Plaintiff reasons that because the alleged conduct involves Internet use, minimum contacts are essentially established on a national level. However, the rise of the Internet does not destroy fundamental, constitutional requirements. See GTE New Media Servies Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In GTE, the plaintiff asserted that the personal jurisdiction requirement was satisfied because the defendants acted in concert to redirect users in the District of Columbia away from the plaintiff’s


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website to another website owned by them defendant. Id. at 1346. Rejecting the plaintiff’s theory, the Court explained that it was insufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate personal jurisdiction “based solely on the ability of the District resident to access defendants’ websites,” in particular when there was no evidence of financial harm to the plaintiff in the District of Columbia. Id. at 1349. The court further stated: Indeed, under this view, personal jurisdiction in Internet-related cases would almost always be found in any forum in the country. We do not believe that the advent of advanced technology, say, as with the Internet, should vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of federal court jurisdiction. . . . In the context of the Internet, GTE’s expansive theory of personal jurisdiction would shred these constitutional assurances out of practical existence. Our sister courts have not accepted such an approach, and neither shall we. Id. at 1350. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has concluded that the mere act of hosting infringing copyrighted material on an out-of-state ISP was insufficient to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant ISP in a Maryland court. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 787, 713 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F.Supp.2d 128, 133 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that a defendant’s posting of statements to the Internet that could then be downloaded and viewed in the District of Columbia was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction). Accordingly, merely alleging that Doe 49 and the other out of state Defendants used the Internet to upload and download the subject material is insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy the minimal requirements for personal jurisdiction under the Constitution. As such, Defendant should be dismissed and the Subpoena should be quashed.


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Plaintiff’s counsel has been alerted to the impropriety of the Subpoena in so far as it seeks information about a Defendant who the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over. Plaintiff was unable to cite any binding authority to demonstrate that such a subpoena should not be quashed. As such, it is proper for the Court to award John Doe 49 the attorney’s fees incurred in filing this Motion to Quash. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1); Night Hawk Ltd. v. Briarpatch Ltd., L.P., 2003 WL 23018833, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003). Holding otherwise would allow and encourage foreign copyright holders to manipulate this Court in order to compel foreign ISPs to disclose subscriber information about foreign customers. B. Defendant Should Be Dismissed and/or Severed Due to Misjoinder

Plaintiff’s Complaint improperly joined 252 unrelated individuals as Defendants. As such, John Does 2 through 252 should be severed and dismissed from the instant lawsuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Joinder is appropriate under the Federal Rules only if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). However, even if these parameters are met, joinder is not necessarily mandatory. The Court may order separate trials to protect any party against “embarrassment, delay, expense, or other prejudice.” See Fed. R. Civ. 20(b). Where misjoinder occurs, the court may, on just terms, add or drop a party so long as “no substantial right will be prejudiced by severance.” AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-97, No. C-11-3067-CW(DMR), slip op., 2011 WL 2912909, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (quoting Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997)). 1. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Arise Out of “the Same Transaction, Occurrence, or Series of Transactions or Occurrences”

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Plaintiff would like this Court to believe that the mere use of BitTorrent Protocol by the individual Defendants is sufficient to sustain their joinder in this action. However, an individual Defendant’s alleged use of BitTorrent Protocol does not necessitate the inference that he or she had any interaction with any of the other 251 Defendants in this case. Numerous courts handling similar cases have found that alleged copyright infringement through the use of BitTorrent Protocol is insufficient to sustain permissive joinder, both in the Eleventh Circuit7 and beyond.8 As was noted in an analogous case recently decided in the Southern District of Florida: Under the BitTorrent Protocol, it is not necessary that each of the Does … participated in or contributed to the downloading of each other’s copies of the work at issue – or even participated in or contributed to the downloading by any of the [other] Does…. Any “pieces” of the work copied or uploaded by any individual Doe may have gone to any other Doe or to any of the potentially thousands who participated in a given swarm. The bare fact that a Doe clicked on a command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does not mean that they were part of the downloading by unknown hundreds or thousands of individuals across the country or across the world. Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. 672, 675 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (quoting Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d. 1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011)); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. 669, 671 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (same). Similarly noted in an analogous case in the Eastern District of New York: Much of the BitTorrent protocol operates invisibly to the user – after downloading a file, subsequent uploading takes place automatically if the user fails to close the
See Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-16, No. 6:12-cv-477-ACC-KRS, Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 7] (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (severing defendants); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.D.R. 669 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (severing defendants); Raw Films, Inc. v. Does 1-32, No. 1:11-CV-2939, slip op., 2011 WL 6840590 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2011) (order severing defendants); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-35, No. 1:11-CV-02940 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2011) (order severing defendants); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-63, No. 1:11-CV-2941-CAP (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2011) (order severing defendants). See, e.g., In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:11-cv-3995-DRH-GRB, 2012 WL 1570765 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012); Third Degree Films v. Does 1-3577, No. C11-02768 LB, slip op., 2011 WL 5374569 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011); Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-30, No. 2:11-CV-345, slip op., 2011 WL 4915551 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011) (severing defendants); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-78, No. 5:11-CV-05060 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 3, 2011) (order severing defendants). 12
8 7

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program. Exhibit D to the complaints, which allegedly documents the “interactions” between defendants, is a page of machine instructions which clearly demonstrate that the user plays no role in these interactions. Indeed, “[t]he bare fact that Doe clicked on a command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does not mean that they were part of the downloading by unknown hundreds or thousands of individuals across the country or across the world.” Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2011). In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:11-cv-3995-DRH-GRB, 2012 WL 1570765, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012). Many courts, including the Middle District of Florida, have reasoned that John Doe defendants in analogous lawsuits were improperly joined based the large time span between each defendant’s alleged sharing of the file. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-16, No. 6:12-cv-477-ACCKRS, Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 7] (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012) (ordering plaintiff to show cause why defendants should not be severed when “access occurred on different dates”); Raw Films, Inc. v. Does 1-32, No. 1:11-CV-2939-TWT, slip. op., 2011 WL 6840590, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2011) (time span of more than 4 months); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-63, No. 1:11-CV02941-CAP, at 6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2011) (time span of almost 3 months); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC, 277 F.R.D. at 675 (time span of 2 months); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. at 671 (time span of 2 months); Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 809 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1163 (time span of 6 weeks). In Raw Films, Inc., the court found that “[d]ownloading a work as part of a swarm does not constitute ‘acting in concert’ with one another, particularly when the transactions happen over a long period.” 2011 WL 6840590, at *2; see also K-Beech, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-02941-CAP, at 4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2011) (order granting motion to sever). In explanation of that finding, the court reasoned that: [t]he differing dates and times of each Defendant’s alleged sharing do not allow for an inference that the Defendants were acting in concert. While the Defendants

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may have used the same peer-to-peer system, the Complaint does not allege that they were sharing with each other. Id. at *2; see also K-Beech, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-02941-CAP, at 5-6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2011). Plaintiff concedes that in order for one Defendant to have shared a file with another Defendant, both would need to be online simultaneously. (E.g. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Exp. Disc. [Doc. No. 6], at 7 (“Because of the nature of a P2P protocol, any seed peer who has downloaded a file prior to the time a subsequent peer downloads the same file is a possible source for the subsequent peer so long as that first seed peer is online at the time the subsequent peer downloads a file”) (emphasis added).) However, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants were sharing the file simultaneously. In fact, Exhibit A to the Complaint shows that these transactions or occurrences happened throughout a time span of MORE THAN SEVEN (7+) WEEKS. (See Compl. Ex. A.) Severance of the Defendants in this and similar cases is only consistent with the common sense notion that “[i]n this age of instant digital gratification, it is difficult to imagine, let alone believe, that an alleged infringer of the copyrighted work would patiently wait six weeks to collect the bits of the work necessary to watch the work as a whole.” Hard Drive Productions v. Does 1-188, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1163 (quoting Boy Racer v. Does 2-52, No. 11-2834-LHK-PSG, [Doc. No. 12], at *6). Plaintiff’s allegation that all of the Defendants shared a file identified by the same “hash tag” does not warrant the implication that Defendants exchanged any piece of the relevant file with each other or actually acted in concert with one another. See, e.g., MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1149, No. C 11-02331 LB, slip op., 2011 WL 4352110, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (finding misjoinder where the plaintiff failed to show that any of the defendants actually exchanged any piece of the seed file with one another); Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, slip

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op., 2011 WL 3652521, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (finding misjoinder because “Plaintiff [did] not plead facts showing that any particular defendant illegally shared plaintiff’s work with any other particular defendant”). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants committed the same type of violation in the same way simply does not equate to participation in the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transaction or occurrence. See LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL 544992, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008). sufficient to warrant the severance of the Defendants. 2. Joinder Will Prejudice the Defendants Moving Forward and Result in a Lack of Judicial Economy “Among the factors to be considered by the court in exercising its discretion under Rule 21 are whether . . . judicial economy would be facilitated, whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted, and whether different witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims.” Hartley v. Clark, No. 3:09cv559/RV/EMT, 2010 WL 1187880, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2010); see also, 7 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1652, at 396 (3d ed. 2001) (“[T]he court has discretion to deny joinder if it determines that the addition of the party under Rule 20 will not foster the objective of the rule, but will result in prejudice, expense or delay”). While Plaintiff’s litigation tactic of joining unrelated Defendants in this action results in substantial economic benefit to the Plaintiff, it results in an overall lack of judicial economy for the Court and Defendants. In effect, Plaintiff’s improper joinder tactics rob the court of the fees it requires to adjudicate such actions. recognized that: In addition to the procedural improprieties outlined above, the plaintiffs’ tactics deny the federal courts additional revenue from filing fees in the suits that should be filed to obtain the information the plaintiffs desire. CP Prods., 2011 WL

This basis alone is

In a similar case, the Northern District of Illinois

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737761, at *1 (“No predicate has been shown for thus combining 300 separate actions on the cheap – if CP had sued the 300 claimed infringers separately for their discrete infringements, the filing fees along would have aggregated $105,000 rather than $350.”) Pacific Century Int’l, LTD v. Does 1-37, No. 1:12-cv-01057 (consolidated action), 2012 WL
1072312, at *5 n.15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012). This was also recognized and discussed in great

detail in an analogous case in the Eastern District of New York: In multidistrict cases considering severance of cases, courts have noted that the filing fee has: two salutary purposes. First, it is a revenue raising measure… Second, §1914(a) acts as a threshold barrier, albeit a modest one, against the filing of frivolous or otherwise meritless lawsuits. Had each plaintiff initially instituted a separate lawsuit as should have occurred here, a fee would have been collected for each one… Thus, the federal fisc and more particularly the federal courts are being wrongfully deprived of their due. By misjoining claims, a lawyer or party need not balance the payment of the filing fee against the merits of the claim or claims. In re Diet Drugs, 325 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541-42 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see also In re Seroquel Prods. Liability Litig., 2007 WL 737589, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2007) (denying reduction of filing fees, noting the burden on the court and the “gatekeeping feature of a filing fee”). Several courts in similar cases involving BitTorrent protocol have also recognized the effect of a countenancing a single filing fee. One court described the “common arc of the plaintiffs’ litigation tactics” in these cases: …these mass copyright infringement cases have emerged as a strong tool for leveraging settlements – a tool whose efficacy is largely derived from the plaintiffs' success in avoiding the filing fees for multiple suits and gaining early access en masse to the identities of alleged infringers. Pacific Century, 2012 WL 1072312, at *3. Thus, the plaintiffs file a single case, and pay one filing fee, to limit their expenses as against the amount of settlements they are able to negotiate. Postponing a determination on joinder in these cases “results in lost revenue of perhaps millions of dollars (from lost filing fees) and only encourages plaintiffs in copyright actions to join (or misjoin) as many doe defendants as possible.” K-Beech, Inc. v. John Does 1-41, 2012 WL 773683, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2012).

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In the four cases before this Court, plaintiffs have improperly avoided more than $25,000 in filing fees by employing its swarm joinder theory. Considering all the cases filed by just these three plaintiffs in this district, more than $100,000 in filing fees have been evaded. If the reported estimates that hundreds of thousands of such defendants have been sued nationwide, plaintiffs in similar actions may be evading millions of dollars in filing fees annually. Nationwide, these plaintiffs have availed themselves of the resources of the court system on a scale rarely seen. It seems improper that they should profit without paying statutorily required fees. In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 2012 WL 1570765, at *13. In the joint Report & Recommendation in Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-23, No. 1:12-cv159, the Magistrate Judge “inquired of the Clerk’s staff, and has been advised that the alternative scenario of multiple suits described by plaintiff will not burden that office.” Id. at 9 Joinder of 252 unrelated Defendants in this case will result in severe practical problems moving forward. The Defendants, proceeding both pro se and through counsel, will likely assert different legal and factual defenses that apply to them particularly, or only a fraction of the 252 Defendants. Based on an individual Defendant’s circumstances, he or she may be asserting legal defenses based on copyright invalidity, de minimis copying, fair use, grant of permission or a license, copyright misuse, acquiescence, unclean hands, and/or estoppel. Further, the individual Defendants are likely to put forward a variety of factual defenses and will identify different witnesses. As one court noted in a similar case: Comcast subscriber John Doe 1 could be an innocent parent whose internet access was abused by her minor child, while John Doe 2 might share a computer with a roommate who infringed Plaintiffs’ works. . . . Wholesale litigation of these claims is inappropriate, at least with respect to a vast majority (if not all) Defendants. BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. Civ. A 04-650, 2004 WL 953888, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2004). Before naming and serving any Defendant with process, Plaintiff is likely to make further discovery requests against each individual Defendant that will further increase complexity and

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cost. This is the exact situation in which the Northern District of California found itself when it failed to sever the mere 52 defendants in a similar case: [Plaintiff] would require nothing less than an inspection of the subscriber’s electronically stored information and tangible things, including each of the subscriber’s computer and computers of those sharing his internet network. . . . Presumably, every desktop, laptop, smartphone, and tablet in the subscriber’s residence, and perhaps any residence of any neighbor, houseguest or other sharing his internet access, would be fair game. Beyond such an inspection, [Plaintiff] might require still more discovery, including interrogatories, document requests and even depositions. Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-52, No. 11-CV-2329-PSG, at 4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011) (order denying further discovery). The courthouse circus which will likely ensue if the Defendants are not severed will result in inefficiency for the Court and prejudice the Defendants moving forward. See, e.g., Pac. Century Int’l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533-(DMR), slip op., 2011 WL 5117424, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011) (“An internet based copyright infringement case with at least 101 defendants would prove a logistical nightmare.” (emphasis added)). Failure to sever at this stage in the litigation will so severely economically prejudice the nearly four-thousand Defendants in this case that most would be unable to afford pursuing valid defenses and be forced into accepting settlement offers. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 233 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (“If joined in one action, hundreds of Defendants will be subject to an overwhelming onslaught of materials and information unrelated to the specific claims against them – all of which they must pay their attorneys to review.”). To prevent prejudicing the Defendants and maximize judicial economy, this should sever and dismiss the all but the first Defendant from this case. C. The Subpoena Should be Quashed or a Protective Order Issued Because the Information Sought is Irrelevant


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“The foremost fundamental principle regarding subpoenaed discovery is that a subpoena duces tecum to obtain materials in advance of trial should be issued only when the party seeking the materials can show that the materials are evidentiary and relevant.” Straily v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-884-REB-KMT, 2008 WL 5378148, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2008); 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 20. A subpoena may be quashed and/or a protective order may properly be issued when a subpoena seeks irrelevant information. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 169 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The term “relevant” as used in Rule 26 and implied in Rule 45 is broad, but not exhaustive. While matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of its case are relevant, matters without bearing either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence are not within the scope of inquiry. See Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 27 F.Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1939). As the Subpoena here was issued prior to the Rule 26(f) conference, the relevancy of the discovery sought should be even more narrowly tailored to that information which is necessary to definitely and immediately allow Plaintiff to proceed with this lawsuit. Here, the subpoenaed information will not allow Plaintiff to identify the individuals responsible for infringing its copyright and who could properly be named as Defendants in this lawsuit. The discovery requested through Plaintiff’s Subpoena is based on the faulty assumption that the Internet subscribers identified in Exhibit A to the Complaint are the individuals who actually infringed Plaintiff’s copyright. The only individual that can be identified through an IP address is an ISP subscriber. Many courts have recognized that “the ISP subscribers to whom a certain IP address was assigned may not be the same person who used the Internet connection for illicit purposes.” SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-3036, No. 11-4220 SC, 2011 WL 6002620, at *3


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(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011); e.g. In re: Ingenuity 13 LLC, No. 2:11-mc-0084-JAM-DAD, Order [Doc. No. 24], at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012) (“the identities of the subscribers associated with the identified IP addresses … would not reveal who actually downloaded petitioner’s work, since the subscriber’s internet connection could have been used by another person at the subscriber’s location, or by an unknown party who obtained access to the subscriber’s internet connection without authorization”); Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-130, No. C-11-3826-DMR, 2011 WL 553960, at *2 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 16 2011) (“Plaintiff concedes, in some cases the Subscriber and the Doe Defendant will not be the same individual”); Pac. Century Int’l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533-DMR, 2011 WL 5117424, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011). An IP address provides only the location at which one of any number of computer devices may be deployed, especially when used with a wireless router.9 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York noted that: If you only connect one computer to the Internet, that computer can use the address from your ISP. Many homes today, though, use routers to share a single Internet connection between multiple computers. Wireless routers have become especially popular in recent years, avoiding the need to run network cables between rooms. If you use a router to share an Internet connection, the router gets the IP address issued directly from the ISP. Then, it creates and manages a subnet for all the computers connected to that router. In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 2012 WL 1570765, at *3 (quoting “What is an IP address?” available at

Thus, it is even less

likely that an ISP subscriber (e.g. John Doe 49) carried out a particular computer function than that an individual who pays a home telephone bill made a specific call. It is possible that any family member living in that household, or visitor of that household, could have performed the

One study has shown that 61% of all U.S. homes now have wireless access to the Internet. Lardinois, F., “Study: 61% of US Households Now Have WiFi,” available at, 4/5/2012. 20


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complained of infringement. Unless the wireless router had been appropriately secured (and that security had not been compromised), neighbors or a passersby could assess the Internet using the IP address assigned to a particular subscriber and download Plaintiff’s works. Illustrating this fact, the court in VPR International v. Does 1-1017, 2:11-cv-02068-HAB-DGB (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) cited an instance involving a raid by federal agents on a home that was linked to downloaded child pornography: The identity and location of the subscriber were provided by the ISP. The desktop computer, iPhones, and iPads of the homeowner and his wife were seized in the raid. Federal agents returned the equipment after determining that no one at the home had downloaded the illegal material. Agents eventually traced the downloads to a neighbor who had used multiple ISP subscribers’ Wi-Fi connections (including a secure connection form the State University of New York). Id. at 2 (citing Carolyn Thompson, Bizarre Pornography Raid Underscores Wi-Fi Privacy Risks (April 25, 2011),

wireless/). These circumstances create serious doubt as to Plaintiff’s claim that the expedited discovery sought will produce information sufficient to identify the individuals who actually infringed upon Plaintiff’s copyright. As one judge observed: The Court is concerned about the possibility that many of the names and addresses produced in response to Plaintiff’s discovery request will not in fact be those of the individuals who downloaded “My Little Panties # 2.” The risk is not purely speculative; Plaintiff’s counsel estimated that 30% of the names turned over by ISPs are not those of the individuals who actually downloaded or shared copyrighted material. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, --F.R.D.--, 2012 WL 263491, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012) (emphasis added); also SBO Pictures, 2011 WL 6002620, at *3. discovery in a similar case, the Eastern District of California noted: In a denying expedited


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Although the revised Hansmeier declaration clarifies that he observed the coconspirators’ IP addresses engaged in the same downloading and uploading as John Doe, the declaration still does not establish that none of the internet subscribers whose information plaintiff seeks to obtain are innocent internet users. The concern remains that potentially non-offending users’ information is being sought.… Because plaintiff seeks information about the “ISP subscribers who were assigned certain IP addresses, instead of the actual Internet users who allegedly engaged in infringing activity, ‘Plaintiff’s sought-after discovery has the potential to draw numerous innocent internet users into the litigation, placing a burden upon them that weighs against allowing the discovery as designed.’” Id. (quoting Hard Drive Prods., 2011 WL 5573960, at *2). First Time Videos, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:11-cv-3478-GEB-EFB, 2012 WL 423714, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2011). Further, studies have shown that the type of tracking software used by investigators, such as IPP, International, to identify BitTorrent users often produces a large number of false positive IP hits. One study performed by the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Washington determined that “copyright holders utilize inconclusive methods for identifying infringing BitTorrent users. [The Researchers] were able to generate hundreds of DMCA takedown notices for machines under [their] control at the University of Washington that were not downloading or sharing any content.” Michael Piatek et al., Challenges and Directions for Monitoring P2P File Sharing Networks –or– Why My Printer Received a DMCA Takedown Notice, 3rd USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security 2008, (July 29, 2008) article concludes: [W]e find that it is possible for a malicious user (or buggy software) to implicate (frame) seemingly any network endpoint in the sharing of copyrighted materials. We have applied these techniques to frame networked printers, a wireless (nonNAT) access point, and an innocent desktop computer, all of which have since received DMCA takedown notices but none of which actually participated in any P2P networks. Id.



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Additionally, the Subpoena seeks confidential personally identifying information that Comcast has on file about its subscriber John Doe 49. Section 551 of the Cable Communications Act of 1984 requires that IPSs10 notify their subscribers before disclosing any personally identifiable information. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 n.4 (Del. 2005); H.R. Rep. 98-934, at *77 (“Subsection (c) limits the disclosure of personally identifiable information collected by a cable operator to those situations … required by court order, provided that the subscriber has been notified of the disclosure...”). Congress established this requirement because subscribers have a privacy interest in their personally identifying information on record with their ISPs. H.R. Rep. 98-934, at *79 (“The Congress is recognizing a right of privacy in personally identifiable information collected and held by a cable company…”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the confidential information sought by Plaintiff regarding the identity of John Doe 49, in which the Defendant holds a congressionally recognized privacy interest, is irrelevant to this lawsuit based on inaccuracy of the tracking software and the fact that many individuals will often access the Internet through the same ISP account. As such, this Court should quash the subpoena and/or issue a protective order preventing or limiting the disclosure of John Doe 49’s personally identifying information by Comcast. III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has demonstrated that it is far more interested in obtaining Defendants’ contact information for use in extracting large settlements than the formalities of the legal process and privacy interest of the affected individuals. Plaintiff has brought this action in a court that lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. Plaintiff’s joinder of Defendants is improper because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series thereof, and it

Many ISPs, including Comcast, qualify as a “cable operators” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 522(5). 23

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prejudices the Defendants while undermining judicial economy. Plaintiff’s Subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant to the lawsuit and in which the Defendant holds a congressionally recognized privacy interest. WHEREFORE, premises, considered, Doe 49 respectfully requests that this Court: (a) Dismiss Defendant John Doe 49 from this case for lack of personal jurisdiction; (b) Sever and dismiss and sever all Defendants pursuant for lack of personal jurisdiction, and/or misjoiner and to and require Plaintiff to bring individual actions against each Defendant, if it chooses to do so, in a court of appropriate venue with personal jurisdiction of the parties; (c) Quash the Subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45; (d) Issue a protective order prohibiting Comcast from disclosing John Doe 49’s personally identifying information pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26; (e) Award John Doe 49 his attorney’s fees incurred in moving for this Subpoena to be quashed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1); and/or (f) Grant such other and further relief to which Doe 49 may justly be entitled.


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Respectfully submitted, TAMAROFF & TAMAROFF, P.A. The Alfred I. DuPont Building 169 East Flagler Street, Suite 1633 Miami, Florida 33131 Tel: (305) 403-2020 Fax: (305) 403-2021 By: /s/ David F. Tamaroff DAVID F. TAMAROFF Florida Bar No. 92084 DANIEL F. TAMAROFF Florida Bar No. 92083 Attorneys for John Doe 49 .

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH M.D. Fla. Loc. R. 3.01(g) I have conference with counsel for the opposing party in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised in this Motion and we were unable to agree on the resolution of the Motion. By: /s/ David F. Tamaroff DAVID F. TAMAROFF .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of June, 2012, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system and served on all of those parties receiving notification through the CM/ECF system.

By: /s/ David F. Tamaroff DAVID F. TAMAROFF



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