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Melissa Macaya

The Chavez Media Model: Spreading Repression and Control across Latin America

Hoping to revitalize historic dreams of a unified and integrated South America, President Hugo Chavez has introduced and exported a political model throughout Latin America that challenges domination by external powers. Crucial to this model, is the control and manipulation of the media as an outlet of dissidence. Since the inception of his 21-century Bolivarian Revolution, the relationship between the president and the media has deteriorated and escalated to an explosive level. The president has repeatedly addressed the media calling them enemies of the fatherland (IACHR, 2009). As Chavezs revolution has intensified, so has his relationship with the media. Hidden behind a faade of democracy, the presidents tactics against the media have evolved and varied in structure. From creating laws to regulate the media to revoking broadcasting licenses, all of these actions fit into Chavezs goals of utilizing the media as an instrument of propaganda rather than as a platform for free expression. These efforts have successfully expanded to several Latin American nations and have challenged democratic principles in the region. In this paper, I will identify and describe the characteristics of Chavezs model toward the media and outline how these factors have spread throughout certain countries. Before explaining Chavezs model, the media context in Venezuela must first be laid out. After the 2002 coup against the president, the government has had an increasingly adversarial approach to private media. The president has even accused the United States of

leading international media and their Venezuelan counterparts in a media war to smear and destroy his government (Holland, 2008). During the coverage of the coup and an oil strike in 2003, the oppositional media increasingly took a bias tone and abandoned the basic principles of ethical journalism (Alves, 2010). Leading journalists denounced the president in harsh and at times partisan terms. Chavez said in a 2003 interview with Newsweek that most of the members of the Bloque de Prensa are part of these coup plotters, especially the TV networks and TV stations (Brett, 2003). As his presidency continued, Chavez intensified his attacks against the media and threatened to revoke licenses. During his nationally televised programs, the president verbally criminalized journalists and began to move away from democratic-like actions. There are four main characteristics of the Chavez Model of media. Even though each has evolved differently, all factors are interdependent of one another and are part of a tightly knit system built by Chavez. The first characteristic is the creation of government owned media and Cadenas that provide Chavez with a platform for informal discourse with the Venezuelan public. At the start of his presidency in 1999, like Fidel in Cuba, Chavez himself becomes the media by beginning his own radio and TV show Alo Presidente. Government ministers are required to attend the program and they may be questioned by the president about anything, and sometimes policies, even military plans, are made on the show. Since the first broadcast in 1999, over 330 shows have aired (IACHR, 2009). During this show, the president has repeatedly attacked the press. Chavez also created cadenas presidenciales. Public and private broadcast media in Venezuela are obligated to connect to the frequency of the principal state channel, Venezolana de Televisin (VTV), and transmit the declarations of the President whenever he deems it necessary. Through the Organic

Law on Telecommunications, the president is authorized to transmit all his speeches and presentations simultaneously without any time limit. Between February 1999 and July 2009, the Venezuelan communications media transmitted a total of equivalent to 1,252 hours and 41 minutes, or in other words 52 days of uninterrupted broadcasting of presidential messages (IACHR, 2009). In 2005, the government also purchased an international satellite TV called TeleSur that will air programming that the Venezuelan government says will challenge U.S. media (Alves, 2010). His media efforts continually spilled over Venezuelan borders into the Latin American region. The second characteristic of the Chavez model is the creation of constitutional laws and governing boards that regulate the media. An essential part of the success and livelihood of the model is that all actions made against the media by the government be done under the legitimacy of the democratic system. In December 2004, the Law on Social Responsibility in Radio and Television also known as the Ley Resorte, entered into force and declared that the medias obligation was to deliver only the right and truthful information. This legal principle was considered vague and imprecise (Lugo-Ocando, 2008). In order to insure that all of these laws are followed, the government created communicational governing boards that kept a close eye on the media. Conatel is an organ empowered to initiate administrative proceedings for violations of the provisions of the Law on Social Responsibility. Article 35 of the Organic Law on Telecommunications provides for different organs to be responsible for [the] application [of the Law on Social Responsibility]. One of these being (Conatel), with legal capacity, its own budget independent of the National Treasury, and technical, financial, organizational, regulatory, and administrative autonomy. [] (IACHR, 2009). In 2004, Chavez continued to make

sweeping changes to the constitutional framework, and his controlled National Assembly approved a Gag Law that made the private radio and television sectors part of the state. This would open the way for the revocation of licenses. The third characteristic of the model is the nationalization of the media. Through the legal revocation of licenses, Chavez has been able to silence and close various TV stations, radios and other networks. The case of RCTV is the most prominent one. In 2007, the president decided not to renew the broadcast license of RCTV, the most important and oldest network in the nation, because of its editorial line against Chavezs revolution (Alves, 2010). Despite international protest, RCTV was shutdown and all of its equipment was confiscated. This action would lead to harsher operations against the media. As a result of this closing, the government now controlled five national TV networks, a radio station and a wire service. On July 3, 3009, the Minister of Popular Power for Public Works and Housing, Diosdado Cabello, after stating that the government was in the process of democratizing the radio broadcasting spectrum, announced that Conatel would open a process to establish the possible revocation of the concessions granted to 240 radio stations. This announcement was followed by the decision to order the suspension of the transmission of 32 radio stations (IACHR, 2009). Now Conatel is making efforts to close Globovision, the only opposition channel left in the country. The governing body has already made at least six administrative proceedings against the channel. The fourth and final characteristic of the model is disciplinary, administrative, and criminal proceedings made against communications media and journalists. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights observed that in the late months of 2009, there

had been an increase in punitive administrative proceedings against communications media critical of the government. A number of these cases, investigations and administrative proceedings were initiated after the highestranking state authorities called upon public entities, especially Conatel, to act against Globovisin and other independent media that are critical of the government. These disciplinary actions have heightened to violent levels. On August 3, 2009, the headquarters of Globovisin were attacked by a group of individuals identifying themselves as members of the UPV, led by Lina Ron, a person allied with the Chavez government. The armed attackers entered the channels headquarters, threw tear gas bombs inside, and intimidated the workers. A member of the Metropolitan Police and a worker with the security company guarding the location were injured. Although the event was condemned by the government, its connection to this violent event is still unknown. The effects of this model of media can already be felt throughout Latin America. Certain ally countries of the Chavez government such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, have begun to repress and challenge the journalistic systems in their nations. The president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, is farthest along Chavezs media model. Morales is creating a government owned media system spanning from a new TV network to a series of community radio stations. A constitutional assembly also approved a new constitution that Freedom of the Press organizations consider restrictive. Now it will be submitted to popular vote on a referendum (Alves, 2010). Article 108 of this new constitution states that News and opinions expressed in the news media must respect the principles of truthfulness and responsibility. Just like the Law on Social Responsibility in Venezuela, this ambiguous law will open the door for future media closings. Similar to Chavez, Morales

has also called the media the main enemy. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa expanded the state controlled media networks and new legislation to control the press. He has also revised the constitution that permits presidential re-election and has introduced a bill that would allow the government to be the regulator of all media content (Padgett, 2009). On Sept. 18, Correa moved to shut down the TV network Teleamazonas, which he says is conspiring to overthrow him. In Nicaragua, a nation that had enjoyed unprecedented levels of freedom of the press during the 1990s, President Daniel Ortega wants to require all private media to employ only reporters affiliated with the journalism guild controlled by his Sandinista Party. Anyone else found practicing the profession in Nicaragua would be considered illegal and subject to criminal punishment. The presidents wife controls official advertisement and is able to use this as a tool of manipulation. Most alarmingly, in February 2010 Ortegas group purchased with the help of Venezuelan money a TV station that aired an oppositional news show (Padgett, 2009). The Chavez Model of media has faced several criticisms especially from the international community. In February 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights released a 300-page report saying that the Chavez government restricts freedom of expression, rights of its citizens to protest and the ability of opposition politicians to function. It recommended that Venezuela: Make all decisions relating to broadcasting subject to the laws, the Constitution, and the international treaties in force and strictly respect all the guarantees of due process, the principle of good faith, and the interAmerican standards that 151 guarantee the right to freedom of expression of all persons without discrimination. Blogs and social networks have also bloomed throughout the nation and served as a forum for public dissidence. Despite these challenges, the Chavez

media model continues to flourish at an alarming speed in Latin America. Robert Rivard, editor of the San Antonio Express news and chair of the Miami-based Inter American Press Association (IAPA), said in a Time article last year that, President Chvez and his bloc of allies all want to consolidate power, neutralize any opposition and remain in office beyond their elected terms. They probably can't gain the kind of grip on their respective countries without passing laws to legitimize their moves and limit independent media."As long as these nations control the media, they will control the message and therefore control the people.

Bibliography

Alves, Rosental. "Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cuba." Journalism in Latin America. Classroom. Mar.-Apr. 2010. Lecture. Brett, Sebastian, Joanne Mariner, Wilder Tayler, and Joseph Saunders. Venezuela, Caught in the Crossfire: Freedom of Expression in Venezuela. New York, NY.: Human Rights Watch, 2003. Print. "Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela."Inter-American Commission on Human Rigths.30 December 2009. Web.

Holland, ,. Alisha. Venezuela: a Decade under Cha?vez : Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2008. Print. Karlekar, Karin Deutsch. Freedom of the Press 2003: a Global Survey of Media Independence. New York [u.a.: Freedom House [u.a., 2003. Print. Lugo-Ocando, Jairo. The Media in Latin America. Maidenhead: Open UP, 2008. Print. Padgett, Tim. "Chvez and the Latin Left: Muzzling the Media?" Time Magazine. 22 Sept. 2009. Web. 28 Apr. 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/>. Sullivan , Mark. "Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy." CRS Report forCongress . (2008): http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf

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