1CHAPTER 1: SYNOPSIS OF THE ISSUES IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA The dispute has its roots in the early

twentieth century when Chinese auth orities began to assert Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in the Sout h China Sea. This triggered protest by the Vietnamese court at Hue, which had es tablished its control over the islands well before the French conquests of Vietn am. In the 1930s, while China began to publish maps declaring its territorial cl aims in the South China Sea, French authorities in Indochina also began to set u p weather stations on and send garrisons to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The dispute gained prominence in 1978, when the Philippines set out its EE Z (Exclusive Economic Zone), formally including the island Kalayaan in the Sprat lys. An EEZ extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles (370km) beyond a coastal states 12-mile territorial sea, and grants sovereign rights over the natural reso urces and exploitation in the zone, while preserving the freedom of navigation. Several coastal states had claimed EEZs since the 1940s, but it was not until 19 82 that the third UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) codif ied the EEZ. The Philippines made their first claim in the area, which they refer to a s the Kalayaan islands in 1975 and has been developing oil in the region between the Spratlys and the island of Palawan since 1976. The Philippines real history in the region began in May 1956 when a private Philippine expedition surveyed a nd occupied some of the islands. The Philippines were a trusteeship of the Allie d powers at the time and the guarantee of Allied protection kept the Philippines from garrisoning troops on its islands. However, as that guarantee weakened the Philippines decided to beef up its defense. In 1976, it set up a garrison on Pa lawan and in 1978 it established more soldiers on seven of the islands. There ar e currently about 1,000 Marines stationed on the islands. In1979, the Philippine s stated that it only wanted control of the seven islands under its control and administration and not the rest of the archipelago. Malaysia has been involved in the dispute since 1979. It currently has con trol over three of the islands but claims the whole chain. Malaysias case is base d on the fact that the islands are part of its continental shelf. This gives it right to the islands under the Law of the Sea Convention. Brunei s claims to the island also rest on the Law of the Sea. It states that the southern part of the Spratly chain is actually a part of its continenta l shelf and therefore its territory and resources. Taiwan has maintained a garrison on the biggest of the islands since 1956 . Its claims to the island are based on its assertion that Taiwan and its Kuomin tang government are the true China. Both Taiwan and the People s Republic of Chi na say that the islands were discovered by Chinese navigators, used by Chinese f ishermen for centuries, and under the administration of China since the 15th cen tury. Further, the Kuomintang sent a naval expedition to the islands and took fo rmal possession in 1946. It left a garrison on the largest island of Itu Aba. Ho wever, since Taiwan claims to be the true China, it believes the islands belong to it and not to the PRC. Its main concern is that China alone or China and Viet nam will gain control and thus, have a monopoly on the South China Sea. China and Vietnam are the main protagonists in the dispute. Vietnam claims to the islands, which they call the Truong SA islands, are part of the empire o f Annam, Vietnam s ancestor, in the l9th century. In 1815, an expedition sent by king Gia Long to chart sea lanes occupied and settled the islands. The French, who were Vietnamws colonial rulers, annexed the Spratlys in 1933, so Vietnam say s the islands are theirs as the inheritors of the French possessions. In Septemb er 1973, Vietnam declared that the Spratlys were part of the Phuoc Tuy province. It has since stated that the Philippines are occupying part of its territory. Vietnam currently holds three i slands.

China s claims to the island are based on the same history as Taiwan s cla im. The PRC government maintains that it is the legitimate Chinese government an d that, therefore, the islands, which they call the Nansha islands--are their te rritory. They have been the most belligerent in pursuing their claim. The disput e between China and Vietnam picked up in 1988. Chinese naval vessels sailed into the Spratlys in January 1988 and Chinese marines started building defenses on o ne of the largest Islands--the first time China has settled soldiers on the islands. In March, fig hting broke out between Vietnam and China and China sunk two Vietnamese ships. W hile they have moved to more political means of dealing with the dispute, tensio ns remain high in the area. Confrontation surfaced again when China contracted w ith a US firm to begin testing for oil sights, even though the territorial issue remains far from solved. Occasional harassment of fishermen by all sides contin ues as well. Each of the six countries maintains its claim to all the islands. T he protagonists have been discussing the possibility of shelving the sovereignty issue to undertake joint development of its resources and have sent a joint sci entific team to run tests on resource potential. The dispute has not been taken to any official forum as of this date. Indo nesia tried to start talks among the disputants. Jakarta believed that as a noninvolved Asian country, it could be an impartial mediator. No decisions on sover eignty were reached at the meetings but the disputants did agree to send a scien tific team to the islands to assess their resource potential and the environmental condition. So far no measures have been instituted but the territorial dispute has pr oven to be the most effective ban because it has prevented Exploitation of the o il and natural resources completely. The Law of the Sea Convention, an international law/standard agreed to by the countries of the world, is involved in the claims of Malaysia, Brunei, and t he Philippines. These three countries claim that all or parts of the islands are a part of their continental shelf. According to the Law of the Sea, the countri es have legal right over the area of their continental shelf. In 1987 China claimed that the Hainan Island, the closest recognized Chine se territory to the islands was a separate province that would be developed as a special economic zone and declared a new law on its territorial waters in 1992. These laws gave China a greater basis for claiming control over the Spratlys as a "contiguous zones" for territory.1 Today, military forces from Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Phi lippines occupy about 45 of the islands. Brunei has claimed an Exclusive Economi c Zone in the southeastern part of the region without maintaining a military pre sence. The dispute is inevitably linked to Chinas rise and its military ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, the Chinese navy has intensified i ts patrols throughout the area and has shown an increasing readiness and willing ness to confront other nations for control within the contested island chains. The essential problem is simple: the claimants disagree about the distribu tion of the Spratly Islands. While Beijing has repeatedly stated that China owns sovereignty and jurisdiction over the island and adjacent waters, other nations involved in the dispute contradict this claim, basing their responses on histor ical or legal arguments. On May 2009 that China issued an official note concerning the nine-dash li ne, formally bringing the nine-dash line map to global attention. Beijings declar ation of the international significance of this line was a response to Malaysia and Vietnams joint submission to the United Nations that manifests their own clai ms in the South China Sea. In early 2010, Chinese officials appeared to have con

sidered the idea of elevating Chinas claims in the South China Sea to a core nation al interest, which would put it on par with Tibet and Taiwan. Beijing has never publicly confirmed this. Neither, however, has it made a formal denial despite t he apprehension aroused in the region. In April 2011, the Philippines filed a fo rmal protest in the United Nations over Chinas nine-dash line. According to the c ontested map, the Chinese-claimed waters include several oil, natural gas, and c ondensate fields of the Philippines (Malampaya and Camago), Malaysia (fields off shore Sarawak), Indonesia (Natuna Islands) and Vietnam (several blocks off the V ietnamese coast). In April 2011, Chinese President Hu Jintao called on other Asian nations t o forge better cooperation regarding security matters involving territorial clai ms over the Spratly Islands to avoid disagreements. The Taiwanese government ech oed this statement with similar remarks. Foreign Ministry spokesperson James Cha ng said all the countries involved should first shelve their disputes and then se ek to solve the issue peacefully. The idea of a cooperative approach to resolving the territorial dispute is not new and has been floating for some two decades. Including all Southeast Asian states with the exception of Timor Leste, ASEAN ha s been at the forefront of diplomatic initiatives to approach the dispute from a multilateral angle. The ASEAN DOC (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) of 1992, signed by China in 2002, is often praised as a first step toward a peaceful settlement. On paper, the DOC commits the signatories to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means and in a ccordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including UNCLOS. Although the DOC is not binding and dependent upon the goodwill of sign atory states, government officials and scholarly observers alike hope that the a greement will nevertheless oblige the Southeast Asian claimants and China to avo id any activity that would damage or complicate their relations. In an optimisti c scenario, the declaration constructively contributes to the avoidance of armed clashes among the parties over their conflicting claims on the sovereignty of t he Spratly Islands. China has succeeded in prohibiting bilateral discussions with the other cl aimants. However, the dynamics of China-ASEAN interactions changed, when in 2010 the US administration declared for the first time an interest in the dispute an d took up the side of the ASEAN. In July, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clin ton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi attended the ARF (ASEAN Regional Fo rum), which is a security-focused dialogue mechanism of 27 member states. China allegedly exerted pressure to try to keep the South China Sea off the agenda, bu t Clinton addressed the matter at the urging of the host Vietnam and other ASEAN members. She declared the United States national interest in seeing a resolution of the rival claims and its support for a collaborative diplomatic process by a ll claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. Be ijing was outraged by Clintons remarks as it is strategically opposed to a collabo rative settlement with ASEAN members. Yang went so far as to call Clinton s remar ks an attack on China. In January 2011, US State Department Assistant Secretary fo r Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell confirmed the United States strategic interest in the South China Sea and also reemphasised the key role of ASEAN in re solving the dispute. The Obama Administration also clarified that, while it was not taking sides on the claims to sovereignty over the islands in the South Chin a Sea, it did have concerns about claims to territorial waters or any maritime zon es that were not consistent with the Law of the Sea Convention. 2

CHAPTER 2: ISSUES ON SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY In July 2011, Philippine President Benigo Aquino III made it clear in a sp eech that the Spratly Islands belong to the Philippines based on international l aw pertaining to rights given to archipelago nations and continental shelf exten sions, especially in regards to the Spratly Islands. The Philippines refer to th e area as the West Philippine Sea. The most pressing territorial dispute for the Philippines is with China ov er rival claims to parts of the South China Sea, home to some of the worlds most important shipping lanes and believed to hold vast deposits of fossil fuels. The Philippines and Vietnam, which also claims parts of the South China Sea, compla ined repeatedly last year of what they said were increasingly aggressive acts by China in the decades-long rift. The alleged acts, which included a Chinese nava l ship reportedly firing warning shots at Filipino fishermen, fuelled fears amon g some nations in the region about China as its military and political strength grows The Philippines announced plans on Friday to allow a greater US military p resence on its territory, in a move analysts said was directly aimed at trying t o contain a rising China.3 1. Advantages of U.S military presence in the Philippines It is to our definite advantage to be exploring how to maximize our treaty alliance with the United States in ways that would be mutually acceptable and be neficial, this is what Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said in a statement. He said that a greater US military presence in the Philippines would help bolste r regional security and such cooperative efforts would as well result in achievi ng a balance of influence to ensure peace, stability, and economic development i n the region. Del Rosario also added that the increased US military presence cou ld include planning more joint exercises to promote interoperability and a rotati ng and more frequent presence by them. Aside from regular military exercises, the most notable US presence in the Philippines in recent times has been a rotating force of about 600 troops that has been stationed in the southern Philippines for the past decade. The US force s special train local troops in how to combat militants, but are not allowed to have a fighting role. One Political analyst in Manila said the Philippines decisi on to allow a bigger US military presence was a direct reaction to Chinas perceiv ed increased aggressiveness, particularly regarding the South China Sea. The Phi lippines is playing the US card to get more leverage against China. The Philippine Air Force (PAF), the youngest of the three major commands o f the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is not capable of defending the country w ith its almost nil or zero conventional capability, this was the statement of our Commission on Audit (CoA). If there could really be possibility of threats to ou r national interest, as Chinas military have been harassing our patrol men in our territorial land, we have the U.S military aid in our side if they will attack us which is not impossible as we are not as big as China. 2. Disadvantages of U.S military presence in the Philippines The US has always regarded the Philippines as a strategic base in various respects and considers our islands as practically an unsinkable US naval fleet. The Philippines decision 16 years ago to close down a US military base made h istory and marked a significant victory for anti-base campaigners. But backdoor deals have delivered the largest ever US military presence. Philippines illustra

te the latest strategy of US imperialism to create agile, flexible forces to mai ntain dominance. Sixteen years ago, the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to shut down what American analysts once described as probably the most importa nt basing complex in the world -- the US military bases in Subic and Clark, alon g with other smaller support and communications facilities in the country. Taken after long and emotional debates, the Senate vote shook the Philippines relatio ns with its most important ally. That one small and weak country could say no to what by then had become the worlds only remaining superpower reverberated acros s the world.4 We can expect more US military intervention in the Philippines. It has use d for sometime the CIA-created Abu Sayyaf as the pretext for introducing militar y forces via Balikatan/VFA not only in Mindanao but also in the entire country, for meddling in the negotiations between the Manila government and the MILF and for seeking to grab oil and other major natural resources from Moroland. It is a lso using the issue of the Spratlys in order to beef up its military forces in t he Philippines. But the Philippines cannot be too sure about US support because the US has far greater economic and security interests in its relations with Chi na. Its true that the United States wants to expand its presence in the region, which is why they will put up a base in Australia and station ships in Singapor e. But in the Philippines, it involves exercises that will still be in accordanc e with our Visiting Forces Agreement. The US wants to expand its military presen ce in the Southeast Asian region to counter the growing military strength of Chi na which it considers a big threat. The expansion of US military presence in the Philippines is key to achieving these geopolitical goals, The US wants to increase its economic, political and military domination of the region and is decided on using the Philippines for the purpose. And if we do not think again and accept their aid in what we allege of Chinas attack to th e Philippines, which is of course their front reason to be able to enter again t he Philippine territory, then we cant deny the fact that history will repeat itse lf. It is a sad fact that the US controls the Philippines economically, politica lly, culturally and militarily. The Philippines remains a semi colonial and semi feudal country because of the continuing infringement of our national sovereignt y and prevention of economic development by the US. Indeed, the US wants to maint ain a feudal or more precisely a semi feudal mode of production in the Philippines in order to make it a political underling and an easy source of super profits f or the US monopoly banks and firms. Further, the move sends a very dangerous signal that could cause China to misjudge the US intentions, and raise suspicions between the two countries. Inst ead of maintaining diplomatic way of solving the issue, this will lead to height en the tension between the two countries. Lets just presume that the U.S militar y forces in our country is an advantageous to our territorial integrity and sove reignty, however on the part of China, they view this as an alliance to overthro w them or they see this as an alliance as a join forces to fight them in their t erritorial claim. China, on the other hand, will strengthen his military forces to heir territorial claim, and prepare its people to war and this is the last th ing that Philippines and other ASEAN countries want--To push the giant country t o raise in its military power. Obviously, Philippine is just an insect compared to China in terms of everything. With power, money, weapon and others, China can easily swallow us like a lost fish. And this is what were trying to avoid having war because we will be all dead in the sense of government. The U.S military ai d is besides us not because theyre with us but because of their goal for expansio nism in the region. Philippines will be left for nothing and what will happen to our fight for territorial integrity will be turn to ashes. We should condemn the move of P-noy in allowing U.S military presence in t he Philippine because these instruments violate national sovereignty, allow the US military forces to intervene in the Philippines and protect US interests agai nst the interests of the Filipino people. We must condemn and change a government

that acts as a puppet and servant of US imperialism. We must engage in all possi ble and necessary forms of struggle in order to achieve national liberation and democracy and establish a peoples democratic government that can act best to resi st the impositions of imperialism.5

CHAPTER 3: Critiques in the military power of P-noy The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national plicy, adopts th e generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of thae land and adheres to the policy of peace, equity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. --- Article 2, section 2 of the Constitution. Our Constitution grants the Executive the military Power to meet emergency situation. It mentions three extraordinary remedies or measures which the Presi dent is empowered to utilize in meeting emergency situations. They are the power to call the armed forces; the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of hab eas corpus; and to declare martial law. When the President accepted the U.S mili tary presence here in the Philippines regarding the dispute in the West Philippi nes sea territory, he puts the Philippines in a dangerous situation. First and f oremost, the ASEAN countries are trying to do their best to solve the territoria l dispute in a diplomatic manner. And here is the Philippine calling the aid of the U.S arm forces for military assistance to the Philippines. It is true that C hina is strengthening his weapon and military forces in its territory in the Wes t Philippine Sea and this is natural move to a country to protect his own territ ory. What should the President do is to protect also his claim. As the military power is vested upon him, he can call out the armed forces, to protect also our territorial claim in the West Philippine Sea. He must give priority in strengthe ning military forces in the territory. The Presidents moved in seeking the U.S military forces here in the Philipp ines for assistance in case a war broke out between Philippines and China is out of order within his military power. Our Constitution renounces war as an instru ment of national policy except if it is a defensive war. However, what the Presi dent is doing in seeking the aid of the U.S military forces in the Philippines i s an implied aggressive war against China. The mere presence of the U.S forces h ere in the Philippines is challenging and pushing China to rise in war whether C hina is contemplating war or not because the U.S military presence in the Philip pines imposes threat to the territorial claim of China in the West Philippine Se a. Lets go back again to our present situation with China, is there an attack fr om China? None, what happened to the allegedly attacks of Chinese military to ou r patrolmen in our territorial claim in the West Philippine See is not an attack because they didnt harm or do anything violent to them; is there an invasion by China? None. So basically, it is the Philippines contemplating a war by calling and letting the U.S military presence in our country. To be prepared in any aspe ct, like strengthening military forces and weapons in this critical situation is the best move of the Philippines, however, to let military to intervene for all owing their military forces in our country is not a good solution to our lack of power to fight China in case China will rise against us. What the Philippine government only can do is to deal the problem through diplomacy and wait rather than to have the U.S military in our country, which is the real bully between the two giant countries. We must admit that theres nothin g we can do except to deal with it through peaceful manner because if we resort to other way like considering the possibility of China to attack us, it will be

to our disadvantages, we will be the loser at the end and whatever happens, eith er China or United States, we will become their pawn.

1CHAPTER 1: SYNOPSIS OF THE ISSUES IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA The dispute has its roots in the early twentieth century when Chinese auth orities began to assert Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in the Sout h China Sea. This triggered protest by the Vietnamese court at Hue, which had es tablished its control over the islands well before the French conquests of Vietn am. In the 1930s, while China began to publish maps declaring its territorial cl aims in the South China Sea, French authorities in Indochina also began to set u p weather stations on and send garrisons to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The dispute gained prominence in 1978, when the Philippines set out its EE Z (Exclusive Economic Zone), formally including the island Kalayaan in the Sprat lys. An EEZ extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles (370km) beyond a coastal states 12-mile territorial sea, and grants sovereign rights over the natural reso urces and exploitation in the zone, while preserving the freedom of navigation. Several coastal states had claimed EEZs since the 1940s, but it was not until 19 82 that the third UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) codif ied the EEZ. The Philippines made their first claim in the area, which they refer to a s the Kalayaan islands in 1975 and has been developing oil in the region between the Spratlys and the island of Palawan since 1976. The Philippines real history in the region began in May 1956 when a private Philippine expedition surveyed a nd occupied some of the islands. The Philippines were a trusteeship of the Allie d powers at the time and the guarantee of Allied protection kept the Philippines from garrisoning troops on its islands. However, as that guarantee weakened the Philippines decided to beef up its defense. In 1976, it set up a garrison on Pa lawan and in 1978 it established more soldiers on seven of the islands. There ar e currently about 1,000 Marines stationed on the islands. In1979, the Philippine s stated that it only wanted control of the seven islands under its control and administration and not the rest of the archipelago. Malaysia has been involved in the dispute since 1979. It currently has con trol over three of the islands but claims the whole chain. Malaysias case is base d on the fact that the islands are part of its continental shelf. This gives it right to the islands under the Law of the Sea Convention. Brunei s claims to the island also rest on the Law of the Sea. It states that the southern part of the Spratly chain is actually a part of its continenta l shelf and therefore its territory and resources. Taiwan has maintained a garrison on the biggest of the islands since 1956 . Its claims to the island are based on its assertion that Taiwan and its Kuomin tang government are the true China. Both Taiwan and the People s Republic of Chi na say that the islands were discovered by Chinese navigators, used by Chinese f ishermen for centuries, and under the administration of China since the 15th cen tury. Further, the Kuomintang sent a naval expedition to the islands and took fo rmal possession in 1946. It left a garrison on the largest island of Itu Aba. Ho wever, since Taiwan claims to be the true China, it believes the islands belong to it and not to the PRC. Its main concern is that China alone or China and Viet nam will gain control and thus, have a monopoly on the South China Sea. China and Vietnam are the main protagonists in the dispute. Vietnam claims to the islands, which they call the Truong SA islands, are part of the empire o f Annam, Vietnam s ancestor, in the l9th century. In 1815, an expedition sent by

king Gia Long to chart sea lanes occupied and settled the islands. The French, who were Vietnamws colonial rulers, annexed the Spratlys in 1933, so Vietnam say s the islands are theirs as the inheritors of the French possessions. In Septemb er 1973, Vietnam declared that the Spratlys were part of the Phuoc Tuy province. It has since stated that the Philippines are occupying part of its territory. Vietnam currently holds three i slands. China s claims to the island are based on the same history as Taiwan s cla im. The PRC government maintains that it is the legitimate Chinese government an d that, therefore, the islands, which they call the Nansha islands--are their te rritory. They have been the most belligerent in pursuing their claim. The disput e between China and Vietnam picked up in 1988. Chinese naval vessels sailed into the Spratlys in January 1988 and Chinese marines started building defenses on o ne of the largest Islands--the first time China has settled soldiers on the islands. In March, fig hting broke out between Vietnam and China and China sunk two Vietnamese ships. W hile they have moved to more political means of dealing with the dispute, tensio ns remain high in the area. Confrontation surfaced again when China contracted w ith a US firm to begin testing for oil sights, even though the territorial issue remains far from solved. Occasional harassment of fishermen by all sides contin ues as well. Each of the six countries maintains its claim to all the islands. T he protagonists have been discussing the possibility of shelving the sovereignty issue to undertake joint development of its resources and have sent a joint sci entific team to run tests on resource potential. The dispute has not been taken to any official forum as of this date. Indo nesia tried to start talks among the disputants. Jakarta believed that as a noninvolved Asian country, it could be an impartial mediator. No decisions on sover eignty were reached at the meetings but the disputants did agree to send a scien tific team to the islands to assess their resource potential and the environmental condition. So far no measures have been instituted but the territorial dispute has pr oven to be the most effective ban because it has prevented Exploitation of the o il and natural resources completely. The Law of the Sea Convention, an international law/standard agreed to by the countries of the world, is involved in the claims of Malaysia, Brunei, and t he Philippines. These three countries claim that all or parts of the islands are a part of their continental shelf. According to the Law of the Sea, the countri es have legal right over the area of their continental shelf. In 1987 China claimed that the Hainan Island, the closest recognized Chine se territory to the islands was a separate province that would be developed as a special economic zone and declared a new law on its territorial waters in 1992. These laws gave China a greater basis for claiming control over the Spratlys as a "contiguous zones" for territory.1 Today, military forces from Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Phi lippines occupy about 45 of the islands. Brunei has claimed an Exclusive Economi c Zone in the southeastern part of the region without maintaining a military pre sence. The dispute is inevitably linked to Chinas rise and its military ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, the Chinese navy has intensified i ts patrols throughout the area and has shown an increasing readiness and willing ness to confront other nations for control within the contested island chains. The essential problem is simple: the claimants disagree about the distribu tion of the Spratly Islands. While Beijing has repeatedly stated that China owns sovereignty and jurisdiction over the island and adjacent waters, other nations

involved in the dispute contradict this claim, basing their responses on histor ical or legal arguments. On May 2009 that China issued an official note concerning the nine-dash li ne, formally bringing the nine-dash line map to global attention. Beijings declar ation of the international significance of this line was a response to Malaysia and Vietnams joint submission to the United Nations that manifests their own clai ms in the South China Sea. In early 2010, Chinese officials appeared to have con sidered the idea of elevating Chinas claims in the South China Sea to a core nation al interest, which would put it on par with Tibet and Taiwan. Beijing has never publicly confirmed this. Neither, however, has it made a formal denial despite t he apprehension aroused in the region. In April 2011, the Philippines filed a fo rmal protest in the United Nations over Chinas nine-dash line. According to the c ontested map, the Chinese-claimed waters include several oil, natural gas, and c ondensate fields of the Philippines (Malampaya and Camago), Malaysia (fields off shore Sarawak), Indonesia (Natuna Islands) and Vietnam (several blocks off the V ietnamese coast). In April 2011, Chinese President Hu Jintao called on other Asian nations t o forge better cooperation regarding security matters involving territorial clai ms over the Spratly Islands to avoid disagreements. The Taiwanese government ech oed this statement with similar remarks. Foreign Ministry spokesperson James Cha ng said all the countries involved should first shelve their disputes and then se ek to solve the issue peacefully. The idea of a cooperative approach to resolving the territorial dispute is not new and has been floating for some two decades. Including all Southeast Asian states with the exception of Timor Leste, ASEAN ha s been at the forefront of diplomatic initiatives to approach the dispute from a multilateral angle. The ASEAN DOC (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) of 1992, signed by China in 2002, is often praised as a first step toward a peaceful settlement. On paper, the DOC commits the signatories to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means and in a ccordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including UNCLOS. Although the DOC is not binding and dependent upon the goodwill of sign atory states, government officials and scholarly observers alike hope that the a greement will nevertheless oblige the Southeast Asian claimants and China to avo id any activity that would damage or complicate their relations. In an optimisti c scenario, the declaration constructively contributes to the avoidance of armed clashes among the parties over their conflicting claims on the sovereignty of t he Spratly Islands. China has succeeded in prohibiting bilateral discussions with the other cl aimants. However, the dynamics of China-ASEAN interactions changed, when in 2010 the US administration declared for the first time an interest in the dispute an d took up the side of the ASEAN. In July, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clin ton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi attended the ARF (ASEAN Regional Fo rum), which is a security-focused dialogue mechanism of 27 member states. China allegedly exerted pressure to try to keep the South China Sea off the agenda, bu t Clinton addressed the matter at the urging of the host Vietnam and other ASEAN members. She declared the United States national interest in seeing a resolution of the rival claims and its support for a collaborative diplomatic process by a ll claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. Be ijing was outraged by Clintons remarks as it is strategically opposed to a collabo rative settlement with ASEAN members. Yang went so far as to call Clinton s remar ks an attack on China. In January 2011, US State Department Assistant Secretary fo r Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell confirmed the United States strategic interest in the South China Sea and also reemphasised the key role of ASEAN in re solving the dispute. The Obama Administration also clarified that, while it was not taking sides on the claims to sovereignty over the islands in the South Chin a Sea, it did have concerns about claims to territorial waters or any maritime zon es that were not consistent with the Law of the Sea Convention. 2

CHAPTER 2: ISSUES ON SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY In July 2011, Philippine President Benigo Aquino III made it clear in a sp eech that the Spratly Islands belong to the Philippines based on international l aw pertaining to rights given to archipelago nations and continental shelf exten sions, especially in regards to the Spratly Islands. The Philippines refer to th e area as the West Philippine Sea. The most pressing territorial dispute for the Philippines is with China ov er rival claims to parts of the South China Sea, home to some of the worlds most important shipping lanes and believed to hold vast deposits of fossil fuels. The Philippines and Vietnam, which also claims parts of the South China Sea, compla ined repeatedly last year of what they said were increasingly aggressive acts by China in the decades-long rift. The alleged acts, which included a Chinese nava l ship reportedly firing warning shots at Filipino fishermen, fuelled fears amon g some nations in the region about China as its military and political strength grows The Philippines announced plans on Friday to allow a greater US military p resence on its territory, in a move analysts said was directly aimed at trying t o contain a rising China.3 1. Advantages of U.S military presence in the Philippines It is to our definite advantage to be exploring how to maximize our treaty alliance with the United States in ways that would be mutually acceptable and be neficial, this is what Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said in a statement. He said that a greater US military presence in the Philippines would help bolste r regional security and such cooperative efforts would as well result in achievi ng a balance of influence to ensure peace, stability, and economic development i n the region. Del Rosario also added that the increased US military presence cou ld include planning more joint exercises to promote interoperability and a rotati ng and more frequent presence by them. Aside from regular military exercises, the most notable US presence in the Philippines in recent times has been a rotating force of about 600 troops that has been stationed in the southern Philippines for the past decade. The US force s special train local troops in how to combat militants, but are not allowed to have a fighting role. One Political analyst in Manila said the Philippines decisi on to allow a bigger US military presence was a direct reaction to Chinas perceiv ed increased aggressiveness, particularly regarding the South China Sea. The Phi lippines is playing the US card to get more leverage against China. The Philippine Air Force (PAF), the youngest of the three major commands o f the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is not capable of defending the country w ith its almost nil or zero conventional capability, this was the statement of our Commission on Audit (CoA). If there could really be possibility of threats to ou r national interest, as Chinas military have been harassing our patrol men in our territorial land, we have the U.S military aid in our side if they will attack us which is not impossible as we are not as big as China.

2. Disadvantages of U.S military presence in the Philippines The US has always regarded the Philippines as a strategic base in various respects and considers our islands as practically an unsinkable US naval fleet. The Philippines decision 16 years ago to close down a US military base made h istory and marked a significant victory for anti-base campaigners. But backdoor deals have delivered the largest ever US military presence. Philippines illustra te the latest strategy of US imperialism to create agile, flexible forces to mai ntain dominance. Sixteen years ago, the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to shut down what American analysts once described as probably the most importa nt basing complex in the world -- the US military bases in Subic and Clark, alon g with other smaller support and communications facilities in the country. Taken after long and emotional debates, the Senate vote shook the Philippines relatio ns with its most important ally. That one small and weak country could say no to what by then had become the worlds only remaining superpower reverberated acros s the world.4 We can expect more US military intervention in the Philippines. It has use d for sometime the CIA-created Abu Sayyaf as the pretext for introducing militar y forces via Balikatan/VFA not only in Mindanao but also in the entire country, for meddling in the negotiations between the Manila government and the MILF and for seeking to grab oil and other major natural resources from Moroland. It is a lso using the issue of the Spratlys in order to beef up its military forces in t he Philippines. But the Philippines cannot be too sure about US support because the US has far greater economic and security interests in its relations with Chi na. Its true that the United States wants to expand its presence in the region, which is why they will put up a base in Australia and station ships in Singapor e. But in the Philippines, it involves exercises that will still be in accordanc e with our Visiting Forces Agreement. The US wants to expand its military presen ce in the Southeast Asian region to counter the growing military strength of Chi na which it considers a big threat. The expansion of US military presence in the Philippines is key to achieving these geopolitical goals, The US wants to increase its economic, political and military domination of the region and is decided on using the Philippines for the purpose. And if we do not think again and accept their aid in what we allege of Chinas attack to th e Philippines, which is of course their front reason to be able to enter again t he Philippine territory, then we cant deny the fact that history will repeat itse lf. It is a sad fact that the US controls the Philippines economically, politica lly, culturally and militarily. The Philippines remains a semi colonial and semi feudal country because of the continuing infringement of our national sovereignt y and prevention of economic development by the US. Indeed, the US wants to maint ain a feudal or more precisely a semi feudal mode of production in the Philippines in order to make it a political underling and an easy source of super profits f or the US monopoly banks and firms. Further, the move sends a very dangerous signal that could cause China to misjudge the US intentions, and raise suspicions between the two countries. Inst ead of maintaining diplomatic way of solving the issue, this will lead to height en the tension between the two countries. Lets just presume that the U.S militar y forces in our country is an advantageous to our territorial integrity and sove reignty, however on the part of China, they view this as an alliance to overthro w them or they see this as an alliance as a join forces to fight them in their t erritorial claim. China, on the other hand, will strengthen his military forces to heir territorial claim, and prepare its people to war and this is the last th ing that Philippines and other ASEAN countries want--To push the giant country t o raise in its military power. Obviously, Philippine is just an insect compared to China in terms of everything. With power, money, weapon and others, China can easily swallow us like a lost fish. And this is what were trying to avoid having

war d is nism our

because we will be all dead in the sense of government. The U.S military ai besides us not because theyre with us but because of their goal for expansio in the region. Philippines will be left for nothing and what will happen to fight for territorial integrity will be turn to ashes. We should condemn the move of P-noy in allowing U.S military presence in t he Philippine because these instruments violate national sovereignty, allow the US military forces to intervene in the Philippines and protect US interests agai nst the interests of the Filipino people. We must condemn and change a government that acts as a puppet and servant of US imperialism. We must engage in all possi ble and necessary forms of struggle in order to achieve national liberation and democracy and establish a peoples democratic government that can act best to resi st the impositions of imperialism.5

CHAPTER 3: Critiques in the military power of P-noy The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national plicy, adopts th e generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of thae land and adheres to the policy of peace, equity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. --- Article 2, section 2 of the Constitution. Our Constitution grants the Executive the military Power to meet emergency situation. It mentions three extraordinary remedies or measures which the Presi dent is empowered to utilize in meeting emergency situations. They are the power to call the armed forces; the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of hab eas corpus; and to declare martial law. When the President accepted the U.S mili tary presence here in the Philippines regarding the dispute in the West Philippi nes sea territory, he puts the Philippines in a dangerous situation. First and f oremost, the ASEAN countries are trying to do their best to solve the territoria l dispute in a diplomatic manner. And here is the Philippine calling the aid of the U.S arm forces for military assistance to the Philippines. It is true that C hina is strengthening his weapon and military forces in its territory in the Wes t Philippine Sea and this is natural move to a country to protect his own territ ory. What should the President do is to protect also his claim. As the military power is vested upon him, he can call out the armed forces, to protect also our territorial claim in the West Philippine Sea. He must give priority in strengthe ning military forces in the territory. The Presidents moved in seeking the U.S military forces here in the Philipp ines for assistance in case a war broke out between Philippines and China is out of order within his military power. Our Constitution renounces war as an instru ment of national policy except if it is a defensive war. However, what the Presi dent is doing in seeking the aid of the U.S military forces in the Philippines i s an implied aggressive war against China. The mere presence of the U.S forces h ere in the Philippines is challenging and pushing China to rise in war whether C hina is contemplating war or not because the U.S military presence in the Philip pines imposes threat to the territorial claim of China in the West Philippine Se a. Lets go back again to our present situation with China, is there an attack fr om China? None, what happened to the allegedly attacks of Chinese military to ou r patrolmen in our territorial claim in the West Philippine See is not an attack because they didnt harm or do anything violent to them; is there an invasion by China? None. So basically, it is the Philippines contemplating a war by calling and letting the U.S military presence in our country. To be prepared in any aspe ct, like strengthening military forces and weapons in this critical situation is the best move of the Philippines, however, to let military to intervene for all

owing their military forces in our country is not a good solution to our lack of power to fight China in case China will rise against us. What the Philippine government only can do is to deal the problem through diplomacy and wait rather than to have the U.S military in our country, which is the real bully between the two giant countries. We must admit that theres nothin g we can do except to deal with it through peaceful manner because if we resort to other way like considering the possibility of China to attack us, it will be to our disadvantages, we will be the loser at the end and whatever happens, eith er China or United States, we will become their pawn.

1CHAPTER 1: SYNOPSIS OF THE ISSUES IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA The dispute has its roots in the early twentieth century when Chinese auth orities began to assert Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in the Sout h China Sea. This triggered protest by the Vietnamese court at Hue, which had es tablished its control over the islands well before the French conquests of Vietn am. In the 1930s, while China began to publish maps declaring its territorial cl aims in the South China Sea, French authorities in Indochina also began to set u p weather stations on and send garrisons to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The dispute gained prominence in 1978, when the Philippines set out its EE Z (Exclusive Economic Zone), formally including the island Kalayaan in the Sprat lys. An EEZ extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles (370km) beyond a coastal states 12-mile territorial sea, and grants sovereign rights over the natural reso urces and exploitation in the zone, while preserving the freedom of navigation. Several coastal states had claimed EEZs since the 1940s, but it was not until 19 82 that the third UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) codif ied the EEZ. The Philippines made their first claim in the area, which they refer to a s the Kalayaan islands in 1975 and has been developing oil in the region between the Spratlys and the island of Palawan since 1976. The Philippines real history in the region began in May 1956 when a private Philippine expedition surveyed a nd occupied some of the islands. The Philippines were a trusteeship of the Allie d powers at the time and the guarantee of Allied protection kept the Philippines from garrisoning troops on its islands. However, as that guarantee weakened the Philippines decided to beef up its defense. In 1976, it set up a garrison on Pa lawan and in 1978 it established more soldiers on seven of the islands. There ar e currently about 1,000 Marines stationed on the islands. In1979, the Philippine s stated that it only wanted control of the seven islands under its control and administration and not the rest of the archipelago. Malaysia has been involved in the dispute since 1979. It currently has con trol over three of the islands but claims the whole chain. Malaysias case is base d on the fact that the islands are part of its continental shelf. This gives it right to the islands under the Law of the Sea Convention. Brunei s claims to the island also rest on the Law of the Sea. It states that the southern part of the Spratly chain is actually a part of its continenta l shelf and therefore its territory and resources. Taiwan has maintained a garrison on the biggest of the islands since 1956 . Its claims to the island are based on its assertion that Taiwan and its Kuomin

tang government are the true China. Both Taiwan and the People s Republic of Chi na say that the islands were discovered by Chinese navigators, used by Chinese f ishermen for centuries, and under the administration of China since the 15th cen tury. Further, the Kuomintang sent a naval expedition to the islands and took fo rmal possession in 1946. It left a garrison on the largest island of Itu Aba. Ho wever, since Taiwan claims to be the true China, it believes the islands belong to it and not to the PRC. Its main concern is that China alone or China and Viet nam will gain control and thus, have a monopoly on the South China Sea. China and Vietnam are the main protagonists in the dispute. Vietnam claims to the islands, which they call the Truong SA islands, are part of the empire o f Annam, Vietnam s ancestor, in the l9th century. In 1815, an expedition sent by king Gia Long to chart sea lanes occupied and settled the islands. The French, who were Vietnamws colonial rulers, annexed the Spratlys in 1933, so Vietnam say s the islands are theirs as the inheritors of the French possessions. In Septemb er 1973, Vietnam declared that the Spratlys were part of the Phuoc Tuy province. It has since stated that the Philippines are occupying part of its territory. Vietnam currently holds three i slands. China s claims to the island are based on the same history as Taiwan s cla im. The PRC government maintains that it is the legitimate Chinese government an d that, therefore, the islands, which they call the Nansha islands--are their te rritory. They have been the most belligerent in pursuing their claim. The disput e between China and Vietnam picked up in 1988. Chinese naval vessels sailed into the Spratlys in January 1988 and Chinese marines started building defenses on o ne of the largest Islands--the first time China has settled soldiers on the islands. In March, fig hting broke out between Vietnam and China and China sunk two Vietnamese ships. W hile they have moved to more political means of dealing with the dispute, tensio ns remain high in the area. Confrontation surfaced again when China contracted w ith a US firm to begin testing for oil sights, even though the territorial issue remains far from solved. Occasional harassment of fishermen by all sides contin ues as well. Each of the six countries maintains its claim to all the islands. T he protagonists have been discussing the possibility of shelving the sovereignty issue to undertake joint development of its resources and have sent a joint sci entific team to run tests on resource potential. The dispute has not been taken to any official forum as of this date. Indo nesia tried to start talks among the disputants. Jakarta believed that as a noninvolved Asian country, it could be an impartial mediator. No decisions on sover eignty were reached at the meetings but the disputants did agree to send a scien tific team to the islands to assess their resource potential and the environmental condition. So far no measures have been instituted but the territorial dispute has pr oven to be the most effective ban because it has prevented Exploitation of the o il and natural resources completely. The Law of the Sea Convention, an international law/standard agreed to by the countries of the world, is involved in the claims of Malaysia, Brunei, and t he Philippines. These three countries claim that all or parts of the islands are a part of their continental shelf. According to the Law of the Sea, the countri es have legal right over the area of their continental shelf. In 1987 China claimed that the Hainan Island, the closest recognized Chine se territory to the islands was a separate province that would be developed as a special economic zone and declared a new law on its territorial waters in 1992. These laws gave China a greater basis for claiming control over the Spratlys as a "contiguous zones" for territory.1

Today, military forces from Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Phi lippines occupy about 45 of the islands. Brunei has claimed an Exclusive Economi c Zone in the southeastern part of the region without maintaining a military pre sence. The dispute is inevitably linked to Chinas rise and its military ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, the Chinese navy has intensified i ts patrols throughout the area and has shown an increasing readiness and willing ness to confront other nations for control within the contested island chains. The essential problem is simple: the claimants disagree about the distribu tion of the Spratly Islands. While Beijing has repeatedly stated that China owns sovereignty and jurisdiction over the island and adjacent waters, other nations involved in the dispute contradict this claim, basing their responses on histor ical or legal arguments. On May 2009 that China issued an official note concerning the nine-dash li ne, formally bringing the nine-dash line map to global attention. Beijings declar ation of the international significance of this line was a response to Malaysia and Vietnams joint submission to the United Nations that manifests their own clai ms in the South China Sea. In early 2010, Chinese officials appeared to have con sidered the idea of elevating Chinas claims in the South China Sea to a core nation al interest, which would put it on par with Tibet and Taiwan. Beijing has never publicly confirmed this. Neither, however, has it made a formal denial despite t he apprehension aroused in the region. In April 2011, the Philippines filed a fo rmal protest in the United Nations over Chinas nine-dash line. According to the c ontested map, the Chinese-claimed waters include several oil, natural gas, and c ondensate fields of the Philippines (Malampaya and Camago), Malaysia (fields off shore Sarawak), Indonesia (Natuna Islands) and Vietnam (several blocks off the V ietnamese coast). In April 2011, Chinese President Hu Jintao called on other Asian nations t o forge better cooperation regarding security matters involving territorial clai ms over the Spratly Islands to avoid disagreements. The Taiwanese government ech oed this statement with similar remarks. Foreign Ministry spokesperson James Cha ng said all the countries involved should first shelve their disputes and then se ek to solve the issue peacefully. The idea of a cooperative approach to resolving the territorial dispute is not new and has been floating for some two decades. Including all Southeast Asian states with the exception of Timor Leste, ASEAN ha s been at the forefront of diplomatic initiatives to approach the dispute from a multilateral angle. The ASEAN DOC (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) of 1992, signed by China in 2002, is often praised as a first step toward a peaceful settlement. On paper, the DOC commits the signatories to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means and in a ccordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including UNCLOS. Although the DOC is not binding and dependent upon the goodwill of sign atory states, government officials and scholarly observers alike hope that the a greement will nevertheless oblige the Southeast Asian claimants and China to avo id any activity that would damage or complicate their relations. In an optimisti c scenario, the declaration constructively contributes to the avoidance of armed clashes among the parties over their conflicting claims on the sovereignty of t he Spratly Islands. China has succeeded in prohibiting bilateral discussions with the other cl aimants. However, the dynamics of China-ASEAN interactions changed, when in 2010 the US administration declared for the first time an interest in the dispute an d took up the side of the ASEAN. In July, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clin ton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi attended the ARF (ASEAN Regional Fo rum), which is a security-focused dialogue mechanism of 27 member states. China allegedly exerted pressure to try to keep the South China Sea off the agenda, bu t Clinton addressed the matter at the urging of the host Vietnam and other ASEAN

members. She declared the United States national interest in seeing a resolution of the rival claims and its support for a collaborative diplomatic process by a ll claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. Be ijing was outraged by Clintons remarks as it is strategically opposed to a collabo rative settlement with ASEAN members. Yang went so far as to call Clinton s remar ks an attack on China. In January 2011, US State Department Assistant Secretary fo r Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell confirmed the United States strategic interest in the South China Sea and also reemphasised the key role of ASEAN in re solving the dispute. The Obama Administration also clarified that, while it was not taking sides on the claims to sovereignty over the islands in the South Chin a Sea, it did have concerns about claims to territorial waters or any maritime zon es that were not consistent with the Law of the Sea Convention. 2

CHAPTER 2: ISSUES ON SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY In July 2011, Philippine President Benigo Aquino III made it clear in a sp eech that the Spratly Islands belong to the Philippines based on international l aw pertaining to rights given to archipelago nations and continental shelf exten sions, especially in regards to the Spratly Islands. The Philippines refer to th e area as the West Philippine Sea. The most pressing territorial dispute for the Philippines is with China ov er rival claims to parts of the South China Sea, home to some of the worlds most important shipping lanes and believed to hold vast deposits of fossil fuels. The Philippines and Vietnam, which also claims parts of the South China Sea, compla ined repeatedly last year of what they said were increasingly aggressive acts by China in the decades-long rift. The alleged acts, which included a Chinese nava l ship reportedly firing warning shots at Filipino fishermen, fuelled fears amon g some nations in the region about China as its military and political strength grows The Philippines announced plans on Friday to allow a greater US military p resence on its territory, in a move analysts said was directly aimed at trying t o contain a rising China.3 1. Advantages of U.S military presence in the Philippines It is to our definite advantage to be exploring how to maximize our treaty alliance with the United States in ways that would be mutually acceptable and be neficial, this is what Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said in a statement. He said that a greater US military presence in the Philippines would help bolste r regional security and such cooperative efforts would as well result in achievi ng a balance of influence to ensure peace, stability, and economic development i n the region. Del Rosario also added that the increased US military presence cou ld include planning more joint exercises to promote interoperability and a rotati ng and more frequent presence by them. Aside from regular military exercises, the most notable US presence in the Philippines in recent times has been a rotating force of about 600 troops that has been stationed in the southern Philippines for the past decade. The US force s special train local troops in how to combat militants, but are not allowed to have a fighting role. One Political analyst in Manila said the Philippines decisi

on to allow a bigger US military presence was a direct reaction to Chinas perceiv ed increased aggressiveness, particularly regarding the South China Sea. The Phi lippines is playing the US card to get more leverage against China. The Philippine Air Force (PAF), the youngest of the three major commands o f the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is not capable of defending the country w ith its almost nil or zero conventional capability, this was the statement of our Commission on Audit (CoA). If there could really be possibility of threats to ou r national interest, as Chinas military have been harassing our patrol men in our territorial land, we have the U.S military aid in our side if they will attack us which is not impossible as we are not as big as China. 2. Disadvantages of U.S military presence in the Philippines The US has always regarded the Philippines as a strategic base in various respects and considers our islands as practically an unsinkable US naval fleet. The Philippines decision 16 years ago to close down a US military base made h istory and marked a significant victory for anti-base campaigners. But backdoor deals have delivered the largest ever US military presence. Philippines illustra te the latest strategy of US imperialism to create agile, flexible forces to mai ntain dominance. Sixteen years ago, the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to shut down what American analysts once described as probably the most importa nt basing complex in the world -- the US military bases in Subic and Clark, alon g with other smaller support and communications facilities in the country. Taken after long and emotional debates, the Senate vote shook the Philippines relatio ns with its most important ally. That one small and weak country could say no to what by then had become the worlds only remaining superpower reverberated acros s the world.4 We can expect more US military intervention in the Philippines. It has use d for sometime the CIA-created Abu Sayyaf as the pretext for introducing militar y forces via Balikatan/VFA not only in Mindanao but also in the entire country, for meddling in the negotiations between the Manila government and the MILF and for seeking to grab oil and other major natural resources from Moroland. It is a lso using the issue of the Spratlys in order to beef up its military forces in t he Philippines. But the Philippines cannot be too sure about US support because the US has far greater economic and security interests in its relations with Chi na. Its true that the United States wants to expand its presence in the region, which is why they will put up a base in Australia and station ships in Singapor e. But in the Philippines, it involves exercises that will still be in accordanc e with our Visiting Forces Agreement. The US wants to expand its military presen ce in the Southeast Asian region to counter the growing military strength of Chi na which it considers a big threat. The expansion of US military presence in the Philippines is key to achieving these geopolitical goals, The US wants to increase its economic, political and military domination of the region and is decided on using the Philippines for the purpose. And if we do not think again and accept their aid in what we allege of Chinas attack to th e Philippines, which is of course their front reason to be able to enter again t he Philippine territory, then we cant deny the fact that history will repeat itse lf. It is a sad fact that the US controls the Philippines economically, politica lly, culturally and militarily. The Philippines remains a semi colonial and semi feudal country because of the continuing infringement of our national sovereignt y and prevention of economic development by the US. Indeed, the US wants to maint ain a feudal or more precisely a semi feudal mode of production in the Philippines in order to make it a political underling and an easy source of super profits f or the US monopoly banks and firms. Further, the move sends a very dangerous signal that could cause China to

misjudge the US intentions, and raise suspicions between the two countries. Inst ead of maintaining diplomatic way of solving the issue, this will lead to height en the tension between the two countries. Lets just presume that the U.S militar y forces in our country is an advantageous to our territorial integrity and sove reignty, however on the part of China, they view this as an alliance to overthro w them or they see this as an alliance as a join forces to fight them in their t erritorial claim. China, on the other hand, will strengthen his military forces to heir territorial claim, and prepare its people to war and this is the last th ing that Philippines and other ASEAN countries want--To push the giant country t o raise in its military power. Obviously, Philippine is just an insect compared to China in terms of everything. With power, money, weapon and others, China can easily swallow us like a lost fish. And this is what were trying to avoid having war because we will be all dead in the sense of government. The U.S military ai d is besides us not because theyre with us but because of their goal for expansio nism in the region. Philippines will be left for nothing and what will happen to our fight for territorial integrity will be turn to ashes. We should condemn the move of P-noy in allowing U.S military presence in t he Philippine because these instruments violate national sovereignty, allow the US military forces to intervene in the Philippines and protect US interests agai nst the interests of the Filipino people. We must condemn and change a government that acts as a puppet and servant of US imperialism. We must engage in all possi ble and necessary forms of struggle in order to achieve national liberation and democracy and establish a peoples democratic government that can act best to resi st the impositions of imperialism.5

CHAPTER 3: Critiques in the military power of P-noy The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national plicy, adopts th e generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of thae land and adheres to the policy of peace, equity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. --- Article 2, section 2 of the Constitution. Our Constitution grants the Executive the military Power to meet emergency situation. It mentions three extraordinary remedies or measures which the Presi dent is empowered to utilize in meeting emergency situations. They are the power to call the armed forces; the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of hab eas corpus; and to declare martial law. When the President accepted the U.S mili tary presence here in the Philippines regarding the dispute in the West Philippi nes sea territory, he puts the Philippines in a dangerous situation. First and f oremost, the ASEAN countries are trying to do their best to solve the territoria l dispute in a diplomatic manner. And here is the Philippine calling the aid of the U.S arm forces for military assistance to the Philippines. It is true that C hina is strengthening his weapon and military forces in its territory in the Wes t Philippine Sea and this is natural move to a country to protect his own territ ory. What should the President do is to protect also his claim. As the military power is vested upon him, he can call out the armed forces, to protect also our territorial claim in the West Philippine Sea. He must give priority in strengthe ning military forces in the territory. The Presidents moved in seeking the U.S military forces here in the Philipp ines for assistance in case a war broke out between Philippines and China is out of order within his military power. Our Constitution renounces war as an instru ment of national policy except if it is a defensive war. However, what the Presi dent is doing in seeking the aid of the U.S military forces in the Philippines i

s an implied aggressive war against China. The mere presence of the U.S forces h ere in the Philippines is challenging and pushing China to rise in war whether C hina is contemplating war or not because the U.S military presence in the Philip pines imposes threat to the territorial claim of China in the West Philippine Se a. Lets go back again to our present situation with China, is there an attack fr om China? None, what happened to the allegedly attacks of Chinese military to ou r patrolmen in our territorial claim in the West Philippine See is not an attack because they didnt harm or do anything violent to them; is there an invasion by China? None. So basically, it is the Philippines contemplating a war by calling and letting the U.S military presence in our country. To be prepared in any aspe ct, like strengthening military forces and weapons in this critical situation is the best move of the Philippines, however, to let military to intervene for all owing their military forces in our country is not a good solution to our lack of power to fight China in case China will rise against us. What the Philippine government only can do is to deal the problem through diplomacy and wait rather than to have the U.S military in our country, which is the real bully between the two giant countries. We must admit that theres nothin g we can do except to deal with it through peaceful manner because if we resort to other way like considering the possibility of China to attack us, it will be to our disadvantages, we will be the loser at the end and whatever happens, eith er China or United States, we will become their pawn.