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PEOPLE VS. CAYAT [68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO.

45987; 5 MAY 1939] Facts: In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians. “Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes” The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the nonChristian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

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Ceniza vs. Comelec Facts: Sometime December 1999, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 5, providing for local elections on January 30, 1980 The law in questions provides that any city existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than 40M at the time of the approval shall be classified as highly urbanized city and all other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. To implement the law in question, the respondent Comelec enacted Resolution no.1421, which provides the instruction of voting provincial officials from ³highlyurbanized´ and ³component¶ cities. The Resolution provides that registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the officials of the province of which the city is a component, if its charter provides, but in voters in highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located. The effect of the law in question results to inconsistencies with other city. Two of which are; City of Cebu is considered as a highly urbanized city and its charter allows that registered voters can elect provincial officials, but pursuant to the law in question, they cannot. Also the City of Mandaue is classified as component city but cannot vote on provincial officials since their charter prohibits them to do so. Thus, a taxpayer suit was instituted by the petitioners led by Ramon Ceniza, assailing the validity of BP51, on which uses the annual income as basis for classification arbitrary and is not germane to the purposes of the law. Issue: Whether or not annual income as basis reasonable and valid distinction. Whether or not BP 51is not germane to the purposes of the law. Held: Yes. It is a substantial distinction and it is with accordance to the purpose of the law. In the issue of its relativity to the purpose of the law, what the law in question seeks to effectuate is the constitutional provision as prescribed in the Principal and State Policies that the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, specially the barrio tonsure their fullest development as selfreliant communities. By enacting BP 51, it defines a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall independent from the provincial government and officials. By virtue of city classification set by BP 51, then cities, with capability of independence and self-reliance will be detached from the supervisory powers of the provincial government. Because the revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic and political unit. Also, it will show whether or not the city has a sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is located. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. Thus, if a city will have an annual income as set which is 40M, then it would be self-reliant to mange itself and the provincial will no longer lend its assistance, thus corollary to their independence, is equal to the loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs specifically in electing provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any jurisdiction and authority over these highly urbanized cities. Rufino Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts:On 1979, by virtue of the PD1486 as amended byPD1606, RA1379 was passed supplemented by another act, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.The petitioner, Rufino Nunez was convicted by thepublic respondent, Sandiganbayan, of Estafa throughfalsification of public and commercial documents.The petitioner filed a motion to quash inconstitutional and jurisdictional grounds but was denied bythe respondent. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition claiming that PD1486 as amended is violative of his right to equal protection of laws.The petitioner contends that 1) an appeal, as amatter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion, 2) appeal also was shrunk and limited only toquestions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trialevidences and 3) there is only one chance to appealconviction, by certiorari to the SC instead of traditional twochances, CA then SC.He also avers that other Estafa indictess are entitledto appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts andto two appellate courts. Issue: Was the law in question, amending the jurisdictionof Sandiganbayan, violates the right of equal protection? Held: No it is not.The court ruled that the law in question satisfies therequisites laid under the People vs. Vera case, warranting itas a valid and reasonable classification. Base on substantial distinction. Since the institution of the1973 constitution, there isalready an established different procedures for an accused, aprivate citizen or a public official, and it is not necessarily abreach to equal protection of law. Germane to the purposes of the law Sandiganbayan is created to promote a accountableand honest public service since as constitution provides, public office/service is a public trust. Moreover, this specialcourt is created in a purpose of providing remedy to aproblem, which is, dishonesty in public service. 2

That would be adding insult to injury. 1 JUN 2000] Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction. effort and responsibility. NO. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. for short). 128845. salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. its "international character" notwithstanding. under similar conditions. of course. should be paid similar salaries. Held: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. and home leave travel allowance. This rule applies to the School. beside the point. Issue: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. Accordingly. it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. For the same reason. from Philippine or other nationalities. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. 3 . classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. (the School. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732. G. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is. cry discrimination. transportation. We agree. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. the local-hires of private respondent School. taxes.R. Inc. such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreignhires. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires. The employer has discriminated against that employee. skill. Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. mostly Filipinos. These include housing. Private respondent International School. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications. it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure. the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty. shipping costs. except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank.INT'L.

000 for the purpose of effecting a combination of plaintiff in error and certain other companies to restrain competition in the manufacture and sale of such agricultural implements in Missouri. courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. Before the combination the companies combined were competitors of one another and of other corporations. 1997. are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. a fine be imposed upon it in 'punishment of the perversion..000. binders. and particularly the retail dealers and farmers of the state. to do business in Missouri under the name of the Milwaukee Harvester Company. Plff. and the New Jersey company has maintained plaintiff in error as its sole selling agent in Missouri. plaintiff in error has compelled the retail dealers in each county of the state 4 .[234 U. and thereby the said corporations entered into and became members of a pool. and entitled 'Pools. 199. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER v. in lieu thereof. brought in the supreme court of the state. STATE OF MISSOURI. the petition is given due course." "to afford labor full protection. 1914. Wherefore. has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. therefore. or. and partnerships engaged in the same business in the state. 1902." The State.S.S. etc. and on September 18. In that year in such business in the state. 1914. must yield to the common good. MISSOURI. Decided June 8. and all or such portion of its property as the court may deem proper be confiscated. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: Information in the nature of quo warranto. abuse. The combination was designed and made with a view to lessen. and Conspiracies and Discriminations. in Err. and Conspiracies. In this case. and was licensed on the 5th of April. Mr.' and 'Pools. we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts. and agreement. 199. 234 U. Trusts. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy. became licensed to do and engaged in such business in the state.S. mowers. The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10. to exclude plaintiff in error from the corporate rights. The petition is hereby granted in part. received the benefit of competition in the purchase and sale of farm implements.' The facts alleged in the information are these: Plaintiff in error is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of agricultural implements. v. Trusts. 166.The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. and for the purpose of preventing competition in the sale thereof. 203] cised or enjoyed by it under the laws of the state.. trust. usurpation. and misuse of franchises. No. and it tended to lessen. collective bargaining agreements included.' The ground of the action is the alleged violation of the statutes of the state passed respectively in 1899 and 1909. and that thereby the people of the state. 1996 and march 19. Argued April 29. In furtherance thereof. 199 (1914) 234 U. 1892. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. ON THE INFORMATION OF ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL. individuals. free competition in such implements. In that year New Jersey was organized with a capital stock of $120. privileges.S. that they be forfeited. combination. and franchises exer. 204] monopoly of the business of manufacturing and selling agricultural implements in the state. 199 INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF AMERICA. and for the purpose of giving the International Harvester Company of New Jersey a [234 U.

as alleged in the information. wilful. 185. It was. as it is expressed in one of the cases (Brown v. and malicious perversion and abuse of its franchises. and did not consider or decide it. trusts. and it was adjudged that the license be forfeited and canceled and the company ousted from its rights and franchises granted by the state to do business in the state. the prices of which are equally and similarly determined by competition. and deprives it of property rights in respect thereto. or. privileges. trust.S. and it is contended that by not alleging in its answer that those laws violated the Constitution of the United States. prices controlled. 672. It is further contended that because the Federal right was not asserted in the answer. but does not prohibit purchasers from combining to fix or reduce the market price of the commodities or articles to be purchased by them.' and to that end the court retained 'its full and complete jurisdiction over the cause. 'to file its proof of willingness' to comply with the judgment. and plaintiff in error has been able to secure. the supreme court of the state could not have considered. Decisions of the supreme court of Missouri are cited to sustain the contentions. provided that upon payment of the fine on or before the 1st of January. and by reason of the acts and things done by it. 74 S. and by reason of its participation in the pool.S. 199. R. 206] bination with them to lessen and destroy competition in the sale of the enumerated farm implements. as charged in the information. Missouri. (2) Because said statute arbitrarily discriminates between the makers and sellers of products and commodities and the purchasers thereof: It prohibits manufacturers and sellers from making contracts or arrangements intended or tending to increase the market price of the articles they make or sell. and not continuing and maintaining the unlawful agreement and com. By reason thereof competition in such implements has been restrained. or that.[234 U. and licenses granted to it by the state. and plaintiff in error being one of such companies. The company was given until March 1. It was also adjudged that upon a subsequent violation of the statute 'the suspension of the writ of ouster shall be removed' by the court 'and absolute ouster be enforced. there was any purpose to restrain or lessen competition. and giving satisfactory evidence thereof to the court. and thereafter. or that trade had been or was restrained. Judgment was entered upon the report. that the International Harvester Company of New Jersey was a combination of the properties and businesses of formerly competing harvester companies. W. (3) Because said statute. In exceptions to the report of the special commissioner plaintiff in error urged that the statute of Missouri violated the equality clause and due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. W. however. unreasonably and arbitrarily interferes with plaintiff in error's right to make proper and reasonable business contracts. from 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the business. in its transactions.[234 U. had violated the Missouri statutes against pools. K.000 was imposed upon it. 'the protection of the Constitution must be timely and properly invoked in the trial court.' These exceptions were urged and argued in the supreme court upon the filing of the commissioner's report. 199. plaintiff in error has been guilty of an illegal. and may be equally and similarly the subject of combination and conspiracy to the detriment of the public. 973). '(1) because said statute arbitrarily discrim. 1912. He found. and conspiracies. and for several years enjoy. 205] inates between persons making or selling products and commodities and persons selling labor and service of all kinds: In that each section of said statute applies only to articles of merchandise. in which it was adjudged that by reason of the violation of the statutes of the state. plaintiff in error had forfeited the license theretofore granted to it to do business in the state. and immediately ceasing all connection with the International Harvester Company of New Jersey and the corporations and copartnerships with which it had combined.who desire to handle and sell or act as agent for it to refrain from selling implements manufactured or sold by competing companies or persons. and a fine of $50. A motion is made to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff in error in its answer simply denied that it had violated the antitrust laws of the state.' 237 Mo. 175 Mo. Co. 141 S. and not to labor or services and the like. it waived such defense. The answer of plaintiff in error denied that it had become a party to any combination. The decisions declare the proposition that constitutional questions must be raised at the first opportunity. 369. all to the great damage and loss of the people of the state. by selling the New Jersey company's products in Missouri.' 5 . the judgment of ouster should be suspended. and combination. & T. as construed by the commissioner. 1912. The case was referred to a special commissioner to take the evidence and report his conclusions. the quantity of such implements has been fixed and limited.

199. 438. lawful trade. 'shall deal in. sell. of any class or kind whatsoever.. 207] the first door for the question to enter.' are declared to be against public policy. or which tend to increase. manufacture. In Hartzler v. and earmarked as of substance. etc. unlawful and void. having like purpose. or corporations doing business in' the state. . 372. stipulated. or understood that any person. or full and free competition in the importation..301 provides that 'all arrangements. and in our later decisions we have ruled that a question of such gravity must be raised as soon as orderly procedure will allow. and do not include combinations of persons engaged in labor pursuits. the payment of a fine. commodity. or thing. 'whereby or under the terms of which it is proposed. 209] general or natural classification of rights or things. an original proceeding in the supreme court. 1. such is the time and place to raise it. and not mere color. Foreign offending corporations shall forfeit their right to do business in the state.304 of the Revised Statutes of 1909. or commodity. with forfeiture also of property. and those offending 'shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. 370. and any person offending 'shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy to defraud. 145 S.S.S.S. 218 Mo. and not mere color. Section 8. or it will be deemed to have been waived. 117 S.In Dahnke-Walker Mill.966 of the Revised Statutes of 1899 Section 10. and then used to secure a new trial. 242 Mo. agreed. Metropolitan Street R. W. that the court only intended to express the condition of appellate review to be that in the trial court constitutional questions should not be reserved until the case had gone to judgment on other issues. The relevant provisions are contained in 10. such as described in 10. This in order that the trial court may be treated fairly. it is provided that domestic offending corporations shall forfeit their charters and all or any part of their property as shall be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction. or thing bought and sold. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied. Blake. It is. Co. combinations. W. agreements. 208] bought and sold. and punished' as provided. 199. 1124. and have never been so recognized by the common law or by legislative enactments. association of persons. and shall not. or article. 562.' It is manifest.' in the state. In State ex rel. Co. it was held: 'The motion for a new trial was not [234 U. transportation. 218 Mo..' It is true the court has not referred to them in its opinion. the court further said that 'it must be borne in mind that the differentiation between labor and property is so great that they do not belong to the same [234 U. or which tend to lessen. unlawful and void. and the question get into the case under correct safeguards. or be fined in lieu of the forfeiture of charters or of property. it is said: 'The rule of this court is that so grave a question [constitutional question] must be lodged at the first opportunity. or offer for sale' in the state 'any particular or specific article. product. or. or offer for sale. the supreme court held that the anti-trust statutes of the state 'are limited in their scope and operation to persons and corporations dealing in commodities. commodity. or commodity. W. The principle of the rulings is satisfied in the case at bar. as we have seen. [234 U. 199. and 8. during the continuance or existence of any such arrangement .' 6 . the market price of any product.' are declared to be against public policy. .301 of the Revised Statutes of the state of 1909. v. or article.' And. designed or made with a view to lessen. etc.301.' and all such arrangements. justifying the statutes against a charge of illegal discrimination. but we cannot regard its silence as a condemnation of the time or manner at or in which they were raised. product. and thereby be a question lodged in the record proper. 116 S. The assignments of error necessarily involve a consideration of the statutes. or understandings made or entered into between two or more persons.' and that it is too late to raise the question after judgment in a motion for new trial. contracts. sell. provided. 'which are designed or made with a view to increase. we think. 31. and upon the report of the commissioner which brought the case to the court for decision of the issues and questions involved in it the Federal questions were made 'under correct safeguards and earmarked as of substance. and be subject to the penalties' provided. or sale' in the state 'of any product. Standard Oil Co. deal in. in lieu thereof. If it can be appropriately and naturally raised in the pleadings. and all such arrangements. By 10. etc. 'any competing article. 902. Hadley v.966 provides that arrangements. .

supra. Rep. It is too late in the day to assert against statutes which forbid combinations of competing companies that a particular combination was induced by good intentions and has had some good effect. 174 U.S.-the one because the law does not embrace vendors of labor. ed. v.S. 210] of the results which the statute was intended to prevent. 221 U. United States. Ct. saying.S. 31 Sup. Ann. Both. 28 Sup. 57 L. ed. 199 U.) 834. therefore. 734. 164. 663.embracing terms. These contentions may be considered together. 43 S. ed. 141. transportation.S. Co. Ct. 20. Greenwich Ins. ed. 117. but it did find that there was an offending against the statute. 221 U. A. The 7 . American Tobacco Co. Greenwich Ins. as so construed. lawful trade or full and free competition in the importation. [234 U. 909. Rep. United States. We said in Atchison. 'If the legislature of the state of Iowa deems it desirable artificially to prevent.S. v. its prohibition being against combinations 'made with a view to lessen.) 325. Central Lumber Co. 226 U.S. United States. 246. Ct.' And. And such is explicitly the purpose and policy of the Missouri statutes. 525 . after stating that there was a general statute of Iowa which prohibited combinations to fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity. 33 Sup.R. ed.S. a statute of Iowa was considered which made it unlawful for two or more fire insurance companies doing business in the state. 106 . 107.-the unequal struggle of individual effort against the power of combination.S. L. 619. 211] In Carroll v. & S. 428. to make or enter into combinations or agreements in relation to the rates to be charged for in surance. or their officers or agents. The purpose of such statutes is to secure competition and preclude combinations which tend to defeat it. or article. but contesting its legality as thus construed. T. a union of able competitors. And we shall presently see that power has very broad range. this court cannot say that fire insurance may not present so conspicuous an example of what that legislature thinks an evil as to justify special treatment.' Again. so far as it can. the answer is immediate. United States v. whether a combination of wage earners or purchasers of commodities called for repression by law under the conditions in the state was for the legislature of the state to determine. v.S. 33 Sup.' Therefore. Rep. Ct. 157 . if anything. L. 62 . invoke a consideration of the power of classification which may be exerted in the legislation of the state. 199. v. A classification is not invalid because of simple inequality. 9. ed. 55 L. Rep. 19 Sup. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Patten. and (3) between vendors and purchasers of commodities. 44 L. 66. 609.R. 49 .' This is one [234 U. and they have been sustained by the Supreme Court. 1 . 50 L. 681. This court reversed the decision. the substitution of combination for competition. it may be there is restraint of competition in a combination of laborers and in a combination of purchasers. 401 . by Mr.Accepting the construction put upon the statute. Rep. 55 L. 96. To so decide would be stepping backwards. Cas. It is true that the supreme court did not find a definite abuse of its powers by plaintiff in error. 502. but that does not demonstrate that legislation which does not include either combination is illegal. 52 S. it is contended. 226 U.' See Standard Oil Co.A.(N. 57 S. Co. 209 U. or thing bought or sold. 1912D.(N. (2) discriminate between the vendors of commodities and the vendors of labor and services. Whether it would have been better policy to have made such comprehensive classification it is not our province to decide.S. 56. and the court said: 'Some of the smaller concerns that were competitors in the market have ceased their struggle for existence and retired from the field. or doctrinaire requirement that they should be couched in all. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which precludes a state from adopting and enforcing such policy. 26 Sup. 57 L. 226 U. F.S. the Constitution embodies no prohibition of laws confined to the evil. Co. Rep. 106 . Carroll v. Armour Packing Co. Ct. 632. or to limit the quantity of the same produced or sold in the state: 'Therefore. Granting that this is not an overstatement of the opinion. Ct. 913. South Dakota. 199. unreasonably and arbitrarily limit the right of contract. or sale of any commodity. manufacture. The preventing of the engrossment of trade is as definitely the object of the law as is price regulation of commodities. both involving a charge of discrimination. v. ed. Ct. the other because it does not cover purchasers of commodities as well as vendors of them. or which tend to lessen. the act in question does little. (1) The specification under this head is that the supreme court found. In other words. L. (2) and (3). R. 31 Sup. plaintiff in error makes three contentions: (1) The statutes. Rep. Rep. 'If an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business. Matthews. and certain other matters. ed. Co. benefit-not injury-to the public had resulted from the alleged combination. 66. 33 Sup. so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. United States v. 34 L. more than apply and work out the policy of the general law in a particular case. 333. 684.S. The provision was held invalid by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Iowa on the ground of depriving of liberty of contract secured by the 14th Amendment and of the equal protection of the laws. and a cessation of their competition. Cr. Justice Brewer: 'The very idea of classification is that of inequality.

S. ed. 128. plaintiff in error. it may be. Lewis. v.S. are included. 222 U. L. 90 .' and because these are not embraced in the law. fallacious. 218 U. 22 Sup.imposition of a more specific liability upon life and health insurance companies was held valid in Fidelity Mutual Life Asso. as well as others which may be cited. 971. Rep. We repeated the ruling in Heath & M. whatever their degree or effect or purpose. 493. Ct. but the comparisons are not without value in estimating the contentions of plaintiff in error. 219 U. Rep. and the cases we have cited. We held that the omission was not for judicial cognizance. 418 . Martell. and the same omission of prohibition of combinations of vendors of labor and services as in the Missouri law. 219 U. The foundation of our decision is. Admit exceptions. cannot distinguish between ' restraints. of course.[234 U. 89. 31 Sup. and you admit the power of the legislature to select them. is the contention of plaintiff in error. 194 U. 389. 'persons engaged in domestic service' and 'nurses. L. If this power of classification did not exist.S. 338 . 972. 638. v. 30 Sup. L.S. Greenwich Ins.' We might leave the discussion with that and the other cases.S. ed. 32 Sup. 128. in Mutual Loan Co. 185 U. 'the proper basis of classification is obviously neither in commodities nor services. v. Rep. Cas. In the enumeration of those who. Ct. supra. and that because the Missouri statute has not this universal operation it offends against the equality required by the 14th Amendment. and we decided in Ozan Lumber Co. and it is for a broad generalization that plaintiff in error contends. 175. Mfg. therefore. Rep. 236. Co. S. Co. 28 Sup.000. and persons. 990. and able thereby to engross 85 per cent or 90 per cent of the trade in agricultural implements. There was the same distinction. 267. 217 U. 987. Rep. Co. Such contrasts and the considerations they suggest must be pushed aside by government. 662. Ct. it is contended. Under the principle applied a combination of all the great industrial enterprises (and why not railroads as well?) could not be condemned unless the law applied as well to a combination of maidservants or to infants' nurses. which it was said declared the general policy of Iowa. 128 . ed. The distinction and omission were continued when the policy of the state was extended to insurance companies. ed. 114. v. 179 . Carroll v. 1913B. ed. 269 . Classification must be accommodated to the problems of legislation. and there is an enumeration of wage earners in emphasis of the discrimination in which manufacturers and sellers are singled out from all others. But it may be said the comparison of extremes is forensic. This may be granted (Engel v.' Missouri. 58 S. a generalization which includes all the activities and occupations of life. As great as the contrast is. & T. Ct.S. ed.S. in Engel v. among others. ed. Co. Cas.S. O'Malley. and a rigid and universal classification applied. The law was not condemned because it went no farther. 46 L. 195. was a prohibition against a combination of producers and sellers. 173. Ct. K. that it may depend upon degrees of evil without being arbitrary or unreasonable. 199. 199. to what straits legislation would be brought. 922. and that a court could not say that fire insurance might not present so conspicuous an example of what the legislature might think an evil 'as to justify special treatment. 34 Sup. but in restraints. 677. and to this the contention must come. 79. a greater one may be made. is nevertheless beyond the competency of the legislature to prohibit. 54 S. 31 Sup. 644. nor in persons. 8 . L.S. and weak ones of both. 207 U. Ct. it is contended.' A law. and that it cannot be disturbed by the courts 'unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched. is especially opposite. 308 . because it did not prohibit the combination of all trades. 213] 251. 48 S. 'In dealing with restraints of trade. ed.' but must apply to all restraints.-indeed. [234 U. O'Malley. cannot distin. by combination are able to restrain trade. 214] guish between strong and weak offenders. Ct. Williams v. Ct. 52 L. Rep. 55 L. 52 L. 233 U.S. 18 Ann. 673. businesses. 54 S. Rep. Ct. whose humble functions preclude effective combination. 24 Sup. v. Rep. therefore. 55 L. 30 Sup. In the latter case a distinction was sustained against a charge of discrimination between stock fire insurance companies and farmers' mutual insurance companies insuring farm property. ed. is the inflexible deduction. 128 . Rep.S. the power of classification which a legislature may exercise. --. to be valid. Worst. and again in German Alliance Ins. and. to be valid. Ct. Bank. be. 212] tween vendors and purchasers of commodities as in the Missouri statute. Watson v. 225 .' Other cases were also cited in illustration. R. 190. and yet it is earnestly urged in various ways which it would extend this opinion too much to detail. Rep. 865. 28 Sup.000. They decide that we are helped little in determining the legality of a legislative classification by making broad generalizations. Ann.' We have said that it must be palpably arbitrary to authorize a judicial review of it. 207 U. Maryland. The contention in deceptive. It will be observed that the statute.[234 U. demonstrate that some latitude must be allowed to the legislative judgment in selecting the 'basis of community. and that the law. 56 L. Union County Nat. May. that there may be powerful labor combinations as well as powerful industrial combinations. ed. We may illustrate by the examples furnished by plaintiff in error. 74.' it is said. It contains the elements of the case at bar and a decision upon them. 199. This court has decided many times that a legislative classification does not have to possess such comprehensive extent. 190).S. 529. although a combination of companies uniting the power of $120. 612. v. Mettler. Arkansas.

S. In the third. 660 . Rep.S.A. 179 U. Illinois Trust & Sav. cannot be arbitrarily exercised.S. Fears. 642 . Rep. 226 U. prohibiting it to sellers of commodities and permitting it to sellers of services. In the second. 594. 21 Ann. Bank. Chicago. Malone. 290. Rep. Murphy v. ed. 217. for Sav. 270 . ed. 177 U. 22 Sup. 31 Sup.R. 160. ed. supra. ed. 9 . & T. R. 216. v. Ct. of the municipality of Cabanatuan. I. of course. 219 U. The distinction made must have reasonable basis. 179 U. 283 . Ct. plaintiff-appellee. 1037. 666. and sentencing him to pay a fine of P200. 221 U. Ct. 716. Co.R. of course. 679.[234 U.S. ed. 815.S. Rep.(N. 4. 20 Sup. 1912C. It is said that the statute as construed by the supreme court of the state comes within our ruling in Connolly v. Such power.S. 1088. 337. or confined it as the statute does to manufacturers and vendors of articles. O'Malley. K.S. v. ed. Rep. Ct. G. Cas. v. 215] tection of the law. L. 453. Connecticut.S. Rep. Rep. 183 . Co. 170 U. 31 Sup. Ct. 633. 392. 184 U.S. 42 L. (N.) 1129. 31 Sup. Ct. Ct. 21 Sup. 815. Arkansas. Ct. 221 U.S. 55 S. To be able to find fault. Other cases might be cited whose instances illustrate the same principle. 21 Sup. Cas.) 153. 186. Co. Minnesota. and we cannot say that the distinctions made are palpably arbitrary. prohibiting combined action for any purpose and to everybody. L-31265 November 12. we should. Rep. in effect. a difference based on the evidence of qualification of physicians was declared valid. 725. ed. 431. ed. 36 L. Ct. a distinction between bankers was sustained. 43. 89 . 270 . 284. New York. 32 Sup. 540 . Rep. Ann. No. ed. 177 U. Ct. ed. L. Cruz form the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija convicting him of a violation of ordinance No. Co. Whether the Missouri statute should have set its condemnation on restraints generally. And so in the case at bar. 1929 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 1229. ed. 199. ed. & P. 102. is not to establish the invalidity of the law based upon it. v.A.The instances of these cases are instructive. Co. CRUZ. 44 L.S. Missouri. 31 Sup. Rep. Louisiana. 275. vs. MAXIMO N. 176 U. 27. but we do not think so. Coach Co. Rep. 55 L. 59. Rep. 34 L. 678. 623 . 661. 79 . R. 54 L. 709. ed. 1151. and costs. Ct.S. Chicago.) 220. therefore. Williams v. 20 Sup. Griffith v. 899.S. 467 .S. in which this court has refused to accept the higher generalizations urged as necessary to the fulfilment of the constitutional guaranty of the equal pro.(N. 56 L. 45 L. Union Sewer Pipe Co.R. which we have seen is the condition of judicial review. L. In Engel v. Rep. Magoun v. Ct. R.S. --. Cade. 31 Sup. 218 U.R. 218 U. 697. Rep. v. Kansas City. Teleg. 34 Sup. 55 L. 563 .S.S. 45 L. Ct. clared valid. 269. 114 . with such policy. 46 L. California. 233 U. not the policy of the exercise of the power. 44 L. It is to be remembered that the question presented is of the power of the legislature. New York. was a matter of legislative judgment. v. Ct.S. 33 Sup. American Sugar Ref. deposits in savings banks were distinguished from deposits in other banks in the application of the statute of limitations. 128. ed. 296.S. held that it is competent for a legislature to determine upon what differences a distinction may be made for the purpose of statutory classification between objects otherwise having resemblances. 41 L. Ct. 132. Clark v. 369. This is an appeal taken by Maximo N. Petit v. 225 U. Commercial Mill. 164 . 377. If it did. Gundling v. 61. In Western U. ed. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. Rep. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 44 L. In the first there was a difference made between landowners as to liability for permitting certain noxious grasses to go to seed on the lands. Rosenthal v. Ct.S. the statute passed on made a difference between businesses in the solicitation of patronage on railroad trains and at depots. series of 1928. 18 Sup. 20 Sup. 466 . defendant-appellant. and permitting it to purchasers of such articles. and in which we. Lindsley v. a distinction was made between common carriers in the power to limit liability for negligence. 54 L. Fifth Ave. 406 . apply that ruling here. 58 L. 220 U. 55 S. 57 S. and in Provident Inst. ed. Judgment affirmed. Rep.A. 31 Sup.

however. Nueva Ecija. The lower court erred in not declaring unconstitutional the aforesaid ordinance as amended by resolution No. construction and repairs of any potency of "DELCO LIGHTS AND CINEMATOGRAPHS. 2. series of 1928. The lower court erred in not declaring the zoning ordinance No. 3. discriminatory. 10 . The lower court erred in not declaring the machine in question to be out of the zone of machineries. machines and apparatus to be used for the establishment. the Municipal Council of Cabanatuan. 2. or part of the same in conflict with the present. of the municipality of Cabanatuan. as amended by resolution No. and shall repeal all previous ordinances and resolutions. Section 2 of the Ordinance No. 4 of Cabanatuan of 1928 unconstitutional for being unjust." are hereby allowed. 4. 5. Ordinance No. they will be discussed together.In support of his appeal. prohibitive of trade and depriving the accused equal protection of the laws. Any kind of engines are not allowed to be installed within the limit of the MACHINERY ZONE as it is clearly defined by section 1 of the Ordinance No. 1928. above-mentioned: Provided. 4 By virtue of the authority of section 2243 (letter [n]) of the Revised Administrative Code. On account of the close connection between the first and second assignments of error in appellant's brief. unreasonable. or by imprisonment of not less than 30 nor more than 6 months." Sec. is unconstitutional. 4. 327 of the council of said municipality. 23] ORDINANCE AMENDING THE ORDINANCE No. enacts: Section 1. as amended. 4 current series. 4. discriminatory. The appellant contends that said ordinance. upon conviction. That all kind of engines. Any violation of this ordinance will be punished. The lower court erred in not declaring the ordinance in question as beyond the power of the municipal council to enact. 2. and that it deprives the defendant of his right to equal protection of the laws. Sec. is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its judgment. 1928. to wit: 1. Approved with eight affirmative votes on November 16. 3. with a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P1 a day. reads as follows: [No. The lower court erred in trying and condemning the accused without due process of law. This ordinance shall take effect upon the approval of the Council. with a fine not less than P50 nor more than P200. 327 of November 16. unreasonable and prohibitive.

is a just and reasonable classification. whether or not the defendant-appellant has been tried and condemned without due process of law. Moreover. only authorizes municipal councils to regulate the installation of. In banning the installation in said zone of all engines not excepted in the ordinance. the municipal council of Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their installation by means of zonification. said authority must be construed to extend to motor engines. and the progress of mechanical engineering. 59 Law. Within the powers granted to municipal councils in section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code. ed. for there is a great difference between a motor engine for sawing wood. 1awphil. said municipal council exceeded its powers in regulating their installation. Such a classification being just and reasonable. the same is affirmed in too. this question has already been decided in the case of McMicking vs. they may determine the kinds of machinery to be installed therein. we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That municipal councils are empowered to enact zonification ordinances within their jurisdiction in the exercise of their police power. and that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. No. after arraignment and after he had entered the plea of not guilty. So ordered. With regard to the question. enact ordinances or regulations on zonification (43 Corpus Juris. and have the same end. and not motor engines. Considering the activities of modern life. As to the contention that said ordinance discriminates in favor of Delco motor engines for light and cinematograph purposes as against other motor engines. and that the engines in question not being steam but motor engines. General Orders. whereas the second actually furnishes diversion and amusement.net The question to be decided now is whether said ordinance is illegal and unconstitutional. 99.. If the municipal council of Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said zone. namely. since both kinds of engines are dangerous in their handling and operation. S. (2) that within the zones so established. 334). to have at least two days within which to prepare for trial. Schields (238 U. 11 . in the exercise of their police power. 971). is untenable.. the ordinance establishing it does not violate the defendant-appellant's constitutional right to equality before the law.. and light and cinematograph machinery: the first is a nuisance due to the noise of its operation. As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. and to provide for the inspection of steam boilers within the municipality. it will be seen that the ordinance copied above does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. inasmuch as he had not been given time to prepare his defense after having been arraigned. it is also authorized to provide what kind of engines may be installed therein. and the defendant-appellant so admits. (3) that the exception of the Delco Light and Cinematograph motor engine from all other motor engines for industrial purposes. The defendant-appellant contends that said ordinance is illegal because section 2243 (n) of said Revised Administrative Code. it does not appear that the defendant invoked the right granted to him by section 30. 58. published in 41 Phil. 1220. For the foregoing considerations. the development of motive power for industrial purposes. likewise of constitutional right. the municipal council of Cabanatuan was authorized to enact the zonification ordinance with which we are now concerned. such discrimination is not unreasonable nor unjust. that municipal corporation may.It is a matter definitely settled by both Philippine and American cases. with cost against the appellant. and there being no error in the sentence appealed from. Appellant's contention that the municipal council of Cabanatuan is only authorized by section 2243 (n) of the Administrative Code to regulate the installation of steam boilers. By virtue whereof.

It is clear that under the Act in question. It appears from the proof that there was a light burning in the house at the time the accused entered. the owner the house. Marcela San Andres. contesting that it is violative of equal protection clause provided in the constitution. and also imposed upon each a fine of 271 pesos and costs. defendants-appellants. that the accused took and carried away out of the said house toward the fields the said Marcela San Andres and illtreated her. While equal protection of law does not require territorial uniformity. between 8 and 9 o'clock at night. 1903. On the night of the 20th of February. The evidence shows that Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company with his wife. Issue: Does equal protection of law require territorial uniformity? Held: No. since the court said that there is no difference between law that denies equal protection and law that permits such denial. In reaching this conclusion the court took into consideration the 12 . the element of substantial distinctions. armed with deadly weapons. The court below found that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of entering the house of another. one of them wounded. promotes inequality among provinces permits denial of equal protection. it may allow arbitrary decision from local bodies to adapt such. 1904 G. also this act allows the delegation of power to provincial boards to support or not to support the probation system. and was later. Alejo Tiongson. by means of a bolo. from the proof. The petitioners also questions the constitutionality of the RA4221. since discretion is delegated to provincial boards. that Alejo and his wife had retired for the night. if the mode of its implementation may permit unreasonable classification so as to deprive people’s right to equal protection of law. that Marcela was still sitting up sewing. the accused. complainant-appellee. This case came from the Criminal case of PP vs.People vs. that the accused to their own use a certain quantity of money. In a criminal case against Cu. it cannot be applied to all of the members of the same class. there is a limit to allowable territorial lack of uniformity. We find no occasion. which empowered Provincial Boards to appropriate salaries of probation officers for the maintenance of the probation system in respective provinces. against the will of the said Alejo Tiongson. The probation system may be beneficial in its implementation in the Philippines. and his wife's sister. with violence and intimidation. It may be germane to the purpose of the law and that it is not only base on existing condition. however. The defendants were charged with entering the house of one Alejo Tiongson on the night of February 20. 1903.R. by giving an option to provincial boards to either support or not to support the probation system. Act 4221is repugnant to the constitution. The evidence on the part of the defense tended to prove an alibi. which crime is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code. which was immediately put out by one of the accused. that immediately after the accused were in the house. Cu. Hence. 1491 THE UNITED STATES. the trial court under the respondent judge convicted Cu of the crime charged to him.. filed an application for probation. that as soon as Marcela had discovered the accused in the house she awoke Alejo and his wife. then the law should be annulled. to change this finding of fact. 2 requisites will be wanting. which was later approved by the respondent judge. Alejandra San Andres. one of whom was armed with a gun and the other two each with bolo. The defendant. filed a motion for reconsideration. however. Vera Facts: This case involves Act 4221or the Probation Act. March 5. Cu Injeng where the respondent judge of CFI Manila (7th branch) heard the application of probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. entered the house of the said Alejo Tiongson without first obtaining the permission of any person. The court below found that this testimony was not to be believed. and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for the term of three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional. No. an original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondent judge CGADALEJ placing Cu under probation. Subjecting the law in question to the four requisites of reasonable classification. whereas there is a real And not to capricious differences cannot be established and second. vs. since it allows inequalities among different provinces. however. LORENZO ARCEO ET AL.

was the trial court justified in finding that the accused were guilty of the crime of entering the residence of another against his will and with violence or intimidation? We think that it was. p. The privacy of the home � the place of abode. To allow this construction would destroy the very spirit of the law. The king was powerful. We think it relates also to the conduct. p. Therefore. to say that one's home is open for the entrance of all who are not expressly forbidden. His protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in England. as well as in other countries. without consent. but the king may not enter against its owner's will. the place where a man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone. Viada. under the police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to dwelling houses against the will of the owners for sanitary purposes. the wind. except in rare cases � has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to which men are entitled. He who being armed with deadly weapons enters the residence of another in the nighttime. the phrase "against the will of the owner" means that there must have been an express prohibition to enter.250 pesetas. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the privacy of his home. It may be argued that one who enters the dwelling house of another is not liable unless he has been forbidden � i. This is not the rule. with few exceptions. even the king. his will was the law. 6. The government has this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives of all of its people." has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth. the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. No one can enter into the house of another without the consent of its owners or occupants. if one enters the dwelling house of another without the knowledge of the owner he has not entered against his will.aggravating circumstance of nighttime and the extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code. but. A man can not insist upon the privacy of his home when a question of the health and life of himself. 1883. vol. 165. 1892. This construction is certainly not tenable. vol. of him who enters the house of another without his consent. 3. 363. none of his forces dare to cross the threshold of even the humblest tenement without its owner's consent. because entrance is forbidden generally under the spirit of the law unless permission to enter is expressly given. bid defiance to all the powers of the state. In other words. 303. and a fine of from 325 to 3. Gazette of Spain of the 19th of May. and Spain. We are not of the opinion that the statute relates simply to the method by which one may pass the threshold of the residence of another without his consent.259 pesetas. Gazette of Spain of the 28th of March. America. "A man's house is his castle. and immediately commits acts of violence and intimidation.. Under the facts presented in this case. However.) The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. no matter how frail or humble it is. the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten parts. in his cottage. he was clothed with majesty. The statute must not be given 13 . his family. p.e. immediately after entrance. Under the law no one has the right to enter the home of another without the other's express consent. This private right must be subject to the public welfare. Subsection 2 provides that � If the act shall be executed with violence or intimidation the penalty shall be prision correccional in the medium and maximum grade. is guilty of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation and is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code. (See Viada. Article 491 of the Penal Code provides that � He who shall enter the residence (dwelling house) of another against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3. The poorest and most humble citizen or subject may. and that of the community is involved.

" while the object of article 491 is to prevent entrance into the dwelling house of another at any time. with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Valenzuela. maintaining peace and order. and hereby impose the maximum degree of prision correccional. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. We are of the opinion. while under article 491 of the Penal Code entrance against the will. and each to pay a fine of 271 pesos and the costs of this suit or in default thereof to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. It is true that the offense of entering the house of another without the latter's consent and the common-law crime of burglary are both offenses against the habitation of individuals. The sentence of the court below is therefore modified. the privacy of their houses. committed specific violations of 14 . a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters. Valmonte vs. that the extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code should not be considered in favor of these defendants. if it be nighttime. indeed. illegal. No one can enter the dwelling house of another. the military. with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas. Benjamin Parpon. De Villa Facts: On 20 January 1987. that they might even take the life of the unlawful intruder. AFP. of the owner is punishable. We find that the defendants are guilty of the crime of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation. Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures Held: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se. without the consent of the owner. So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy. and each of the said defendants is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for the term of six years of prision correccional. simply. economic and political development of the National Capital Region. quam domus uniuscu jusque civium. for any purpose. without rendering himself liable under the law.that construction. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order. The punishment for burglary is "to prevent the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime for the purpose of committing a felony therein. This was also the sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: "Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius." It may be argued that the offense punishable under article 491 of the Penal Code corresponds to the crime of burglary at the common law. against the will of its owner. was gunned down allegedly in cold bloody the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta. Under the provisions of the Penal Code entrance in the nighttime can only be regarded as an aggravation of the offense of entering. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when. for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela. in there Islands. Bulacan. But these crimes are distinctively different. under all the facts in the case. in the course of their routine checks. either by day or by night. because of the installation of said checkpoints. Petitioners aver that. Metro Manila. and the fine provided for in subsection of 2 article 491 of the Penal Code should be imposed. unless he has the express consent of the owner and unless the one seeking entrance comes within some of the exceptions dictated by the law or by a sound public policy. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. at dawn of 9 July 1988. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that. especially at night or at dawn. In burglary there must have existed an intent to enter for the purpose of committing a felony. considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. unmolested.

Usana and Lopez[GR 129756-58. an M-1 US Carbine. PO3 Bernabe Nonato. the trial court convicted Escaño. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. Their search yielded a . Upon reaching the precinct. which. the other passengers were searched for more weapons. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. People vs. upon order of the police. Branch 64. stopping those they found suspicious.3143 kilograms. Between the inherent rights of testate to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against warrantless search w/c is. admittedly. which they asked Escaño to open. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. from Usana. namely. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. the former should prevail. (CJ): 4 concur Facts: On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. SPO4 Juan de los Santos. P03 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat. PO3 Eduardo P.” but it cannot be denied that. parked along Sen. The checkpoint therein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. Usana and Jerry C. which was promulgated on 17 June 1997. 28 January 2000] First Division. was found positive for hashish weighing 3. When Escaño. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. Lopez. Rosaldos. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape. Escano.45 calibre firearm which they seized from Escaño. reasonably conducted. and imposing merely a running stop on the others. they stopped a Kia Pride. In fact. Held: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. identified as Julian D. were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two.Usana and Escaño. when conducted w/in reasonable limits. as a rule. together with Julian D. But. They noticed a blue bag inside it. and whether the evidence acquired therein would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs. Davide Jr. Escaño. Virgilio T. he requested Escaño to open the trunk. Suba. to open the door. to a certain extent. at the cost of occasional inconvenience. Escaño readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Escaño. said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. For. Lopez. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search. were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Issue: Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal. True. and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search.P03 Suba seized the long firearm. In its Decision of 30 May1997. some law enforcers of the Makati Police. routine checkpoints do intrude. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. these routine checks. on motorists’ right to “free passage without interruption.petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a securit y measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. the checkpoints during these abnormal times. They were checking the cars going to Pasay City. who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. At about past midnight.. are even less intrusive. Gil Puyat Ave. They asked the driver. in the interest of public security.Escaño and Usana were also charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree 1866. Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. when conducted in a fixed area. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle. upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose right shave been infringed. and Inspector Ernesto Guico. however. such as 15 . or threatened to be infringed.

In fact. which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper. the Court cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop. After transmittal of the case. without the presence of Usana and Lopez. or transporting the prohibited drug. distributing. Private respondent. Their having been with Escaño in the latter’s car before the “finding” of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling. Felix Facts: The petitioners. 3. (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms. what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. issue arrest warrant and 2. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge.Thus. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. (4) the car’s trunk was opened. as amended. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño. without personally examining the information (which still in Masbate. 56 of the respondent judge. there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. In the case at bar. The former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECUTOR’S JOB. 16 . and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant ). Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause. distinguished. thereby. the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that ³x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judge x x´. the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest against the accused by virtue of the prosecutor's certification in each submitted information recommending the existence of a probable cause. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry. there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause. it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Held: Yes. Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the car’s trunk. which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release. Lim vs. without opening the car’s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. But by itself. Despite the validity of the search. Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable causeexists. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE. the judge shall either. Lim et al. 2. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. 1. This means that 1. (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station. the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. Alfane was designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor. he must issue warrant or order for an arrest. and in basis thereof. Nemesio Felix. with the permission of Escaño. Moreover. the respondent committed abuse of discretion. he may disregard the prosecutor’s certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Congressman Moises Espinosa. Jr. RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. survived the assassination plot.-Thereafter... Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause. All of these should be before the Judge. VS JUDGE FELIX GR NOS. Felix of Branch 56. although. and for the purpose of preliminary investigation. Florencio Fernandez. Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5. 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19. 1989. Sr. italicized). However. each information is complete in form and substance. the court issued an order dated July 31. Vicente Lim. Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate. Nonilon Bagalihog. Jaime Liwanag. However. Fernandez. JR. Usually.Nonilon A. the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification 17 . Makasiar. Jimmy Cabarles. at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport.LIM. Bagalihog. Jolly Fernandez. . located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate. 9211. . Sr. . Nestor Lim. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin.. Jolly T. and his security escorts. 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. concludes that a probable cause has beenestablished for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint. 1991)GUTTIEREZ. of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing.. 1990. namely. namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion. the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The judge wrote. this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information…” -Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix (statement immediately preceding this paragraph. among others. ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.-An investigation of the incident then followed. RD: As held in Soliven v.It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. Facts: -On March 17. Florencio T. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. Harry O. the designated investigator. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa. and there is no visible defect on its face. Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.. there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare certification.In another manifestation. Ronnie Fernandez. Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof. Sr.Petitioners Vicente Lim. Sr. TSg. “In the instant cases. J.-After conducting the preliminary investigation. Tantiado. SR. at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning. -On July 5. Mayor Nestor C. the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate. Jr. pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. Fernandez.. after all. 1989stating therein that: “. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the existence of guilt. the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Gaspar Amaro. to be sure. the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.” . Sr. Susana Lim. VicenteLim. Antonio Kho. after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers. the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. he himself suffered a gunshot wound. this depends on the circumstances of each case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.

stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense." which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws. However. As mentioned in the facts (stated above). were cured by petitioners' consent. Indubitably.3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers. Although. Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code. balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). financial records. (2) cash money. at the very least. STONEHILL VS. not mentioned in the warrants. ledgers. to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices. typewriters. portfolios. 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. were actually seized. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. and (3) that. namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations. (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them. correspondence. have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases.5 directed to the any peace officer. journals. (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner. and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts. DIOKNO [20 SCRA 383.and investigation report whenever necessary. credit journals. as "the subject of the offense. the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him. Tariff and Customs Laws." or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense. if any. L-19550. and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups. books and things to be seized. to be disposed of in accordance with law — Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law. The documents. papers. the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should. warehouses and/or residences. and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants. (2) that the defects of said warrants. In making the required personal determination. and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts. he issues a warrant of arrest." Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents. Issue: 18 . in any event. and (5) the documents. the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5. the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners. vouchers. receipts. regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. the Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. on different dates. 19 JUN 1967] Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as RespondentsProsecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued.

namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations. Addison. A. papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein. or committed specific omissions." In other words. It would be the legal heresy. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders 19 . None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. vs. A. of the highest order. of Calle Sacristia No.Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally. A. defendants-appellees." — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or G. No. to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision. lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court. I.. in the court of the justice of the peace of Vigan. 70. for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities. Addison and Pastor M. 954. Pastor Gomez. therefore. With respect to the documents. Tariff and Customs Laws. 1962. On the 10th of June. Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.000) Philippine currency: Now. separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners. it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause. charging Walter Schultz with the offense of `malversation of public funds by a public official. the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Ilocos Sur presented a complaint in the justice's court of Vigan. As a consequence. P. 1912.' and he having been admitted to bail in the sum of two thousand pesos (P2. Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. To procure the liberty of the accused pending trial. and A. accusing Walter Schultz of the crime of malversation of public funds in violation of the provisions of Act No. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in favor of the defendants in an action on a bond given in a criminal action to procure the liberty of the accused pending trial. A. plaintiff-appellant. Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof. in effect. the important parts of which are the following: Whereas a complaint has been filed on the 10th of June. restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein. No. 1730. the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. jointly and severally. we. and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. GOMEZ. for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts. 1912. Indeed. of Calle Globo de Oro. violating a given provision of our criminal laws. Tariff and Customs Laws. ADDISON and PASTOR M. Gomez became his sureties upon a bail bond. A. Indeed. Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws. As a matter of fact.R. L-9635 August 26. the aforementioned resolution of June 29. hereby undertake that the above-named Walter Schultz will appear and answer the charge above mentioned in whatever court it may be tried. 1914 THE UNITED STATES. and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. thereby. it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate. no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. Ilocos Sur.

Campbell. as ordered. The accused having renounced his right to a preliminary investigation before the justice of the peace. for the sum of P2. On the 31st of March. 1912. the prosecuting attorney of Ilocos Sur moved the court that the said bondsmen be ordered to present the body of the accused on the 10th day of April. 1913. On the 19th of August G. and that the reason why they were unable to deliver the body of the accused was that the court had refused to issue the order of arrest which they had three times prayed for. the judge declared the bond forfeited. Gomez and A. the bond would be declared forfeited. This order was mailed to the bondsmen on the same day that it was issued. asked for a postponement of the hearing of the motion until the 3d of November. and again prayed that the court issue such order of arrest. attorney for the bondsmen and for the accused. Addison. and praying that upon the allegations made they be relieved of responsibility. although they had made diligent search. in which. The cause was called for trial on the 10th of April. the Court of First Instance received a petition signed by A. On the 7th of October. judgment would be rendered and entered against them for the amount of the obligation. The hearing was finally 20 . was sent to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.000. A. This motion was notified to the bondsmen and their counsel and hearing of the same was set for the 3d of September at 8 o'clock in the morning. basing their application upon the same ground as before. the ground upon which they based this application was that the accused had absented himself from the city of Manila. the trial of the case was set for the 26th of December of the same year. after alleging that they desired to deliver the accused into the custody of the law and to relieve themselves from the obligation imposed by the bond. the bondsmen filed their answer. they prayed that said court issue an order of arrest against said accused for the purpose of his apprehension. A. acting on the petition of the bondsmen above referred to. They further prayed that on the issuance of said order of arrest the bond which they had signed be canceled and that they be relieved from all responsibility thereunder. At the opening of the court on said 30th of November the bondsmen applied to the court for a reconsideration of ifs previous orders denying the application of the bondsmen to be relieved from their responsibility and for an order of arrest against the accused. with the admonition that if they failed or neglected to do so. Addison and Pastor M. This order was served on the sureties on the 7th of April.and process of the court. alleging that they did not appear in Vigan before the Court of First Instance on the 10th of April. At a session of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur held on the 30th of November. for trial. the prosecuting attorney of Ilocos Sur moved the court that judgment be entered against Pastor M. The order of forfeiture gave the sureties thirty days within which to present the body of the accused and admonished them that if they did not do so within that time or show cause satisfactory to the court why they did not. and that the judgment be executed at once. being obe over which the latter had no jurisdiction. sureties for Walter Schultz. 1913. for the reason that they did not have time to reach that place from Manila after they received notice of the order.000) Philippine currency. and the body of the accused not having been presented. alleging as a ground therefor that the peace authorities did not believe that they were authorized to arrest the accused without such order. On the 10th of December the court. or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that we will pay to the United States the sum of two thousand pesos (P2. with an order authorizing said bondsmen to arrest their principal or require his arrest by any policeman or peace officer. 1913. although the Information Division of the Bureau of Constabulary had made diligent search for him. In this application they alleged that the accused could not be found. ordered the clerk to issue to said bondsmen a certified copy of the bail bond. On the 5th of May. 1913. 1913. where he had been for some time. the accused was not served with a copy for the reason that he could not be found within the Philippine Islands. On the 30th of November the court again denied the application. and that the bondsmen were unable to ascertain his whereabouts. E. On the 28th of July. 1912. On the 22d of November the bondsmen again applied to the court for the issuance of an order of arrest against the accused. On the 8th of October the court denied the petition. and if convicted will appear for judgment and render himself to the execution thereof. Gomez. but refused to relieve the bondsmen from their obligation under the bond.

and that. to order the arrest of a principal if it is shown or appears that he is attempting or planning his escape or is in hiding for the purpose of defeating the ends of justice. it does not say that the court may not assist them to release themselves. that they relieved from obligation when the order was issued. admittedly unknown. When the obligation of bail is assumed. until the moment of cancellation or revocation of the bail bond in pursuance of law. We have no doubt about the power of the court. they may arrest him themselves or they may cause his arrest thorough certain channels. should have lent the sureties. in a general way. Their custody of him is the continuance of the original imprisonment. That question is not before us. . the accused was entitled to his liberty. As stated by the attorney for the appellees: From the wording of this section it is clear that there are two methods that may be pursued by the bail in order to surrender the accused. whose whereabouts was. The court to which the application was presented did not consider itself authorized under the showing was that the principal was at liberty under a bond which had not been revoked or withdrawn in the manner prescribed by law. all the aid that it reasonably could in the apprehension of the principal. We do not now decide to what court or other official it is necessary for sureties to present their principal in order to be relieved from responsibility under the bond. or he may surrender himself and the bail be thus executed. Section 75 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: The sureties of the bail bond may surrender the defendant at any time prior to forfeiture. . The court. in their application for the order of the arrest. We do not regard this position as altogether tenable.set for the 26th of December. We are of opinion that the judgment must be reversed. They simply asked the cooperation of certain peace officials for the capture of the principal. absolving them from all responsibility under the bond. cannot be sustained. the 26th of December. or on written authority indorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking may cause him to be arrested by any police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion. An order of exoneration may be made by the court upon proof of surrender and after due notice to the promotor fiscal of the proposed issuance of the order. It is against that judgment that this appeal is taken. In order words. or they mat cause his arrest to be made to any police officer or other person of suitable age and descrition by indorsing the authority to arrest upon a certified copy of the undertaking and delivering it to such officer or person. the bail may arrest the principal and deliver him to the proper authorities. and we think that the court in this case should have assisted them in their endeavor to apprehend and deliver the principal and thereby to relieve themselves from responsibility. they are subrogated to all 21 . therefore. or of procuring his arrest by a peace officer authorized by indorsement upon a certified copy of the undertaking. The bondsmen or the accused not having appeared at the time set. by which the sureties may relieve themselves from responsibility relative to the recognizance. While the Codes of Criminal Procedure Acts out the methods by which the sureties may release themselves from their obligation. they permitted the accused to escape and then sought to induce the court in which the action against the principal was pending to issue an order of arrest that the principal might be apprehended and they absolved. These are the only methods. The bondsmen did not either of these things. Instead of delivering the principal to the court having jurisdiction over him or to the sheriff thereof or his deputy. at the time. under the facts presented. For the purpose of surrendering the defendant the bail may arrest him. the court found in their favor. and though they cannot actually confine him. while the contention of the sureties. refused to issue the order of arrest. the Court of First Instance. the sureties become in law the jailers of their principal. in such manner as the law permits. the sureties never delivered or attempted to deliver the body of their principal to any court or peace officer. with or without the application of the sureties. .

upon the facts before us. U. Bearden vs. Rosseau.. Ryder. S. in the manner prescribed by statute.. If resistance be apprehended.. 729. The judgment absolving the sureties is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. 89 Ala. 109 N. or that the refusal of such an officer. Taintor. therefore.. U. State vs. they may arrest the principal at pleasure and surrender him into the hands of the law. either in person or by agent. 393. The responsibility assumed by the bail. 9 Wall. Lingerfelt. State. People. 13. Read vs.. 127. Even though there were no statute to their effect. State. Cunningham. there is no evidence that any peace officer had an opportunity to arrest the principal after having received notice to do so from the sureties. 775. vs. 56 Fed. 366. very little excuse for their failure to protect themselves. We simply say that. S. either. nor do we hold.. 4 Conn. Rep. the right of the bail to arrest the principal for the purpose of surrendering him is incidental to the engagement. s Ternberg vs. vs. to effect this end. State vs. 57. 16 Wall. they may at all times command the assistance of the peace officers upon complying with the terms of the statue. State. 21. may be terminated by them at any time. 16. 10 La. may seize him at any time of the day or night. they may pursue him. S. and the issuing of process is not necessary to its exercise. It does not appear from the record that the action of the court had any effect on the outcome as it is fairly clear that the sureties permitted the principal to escape before any attempt was made to apprehend him. being purely gratuitous. 43 Ill. had any influence on the result.. Keiver. 22 . State vs.. if any. 9. U. The arrest may be made by the bail. S. 110 U. (Reese vs. we are not prepared to hold that the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur erred in refusing to issue the order of arrest under the showing made — at least no error was made sufficient to relieve the sureties.. Norfolk vs.. Ann. Kellogg vs.. and. that a court may not issue an order of arrest for the accused upon the representation of the bondsmen upon the proper showing. and may enter his house for the purpose.. with instructions to enter judgment against the sureties in accordance with this opinion. Taylor vs.) To the sureties the state gives every facility for the apprehension and surrender of the principal and there is. 499. Hughes vs.the other rights and means which the Government posesses to make their control of him effective. 422. 28 Tex. C.. Case. 43 Miss. App.. 614. State. 42 Ark. while we do not determine whether or not a peace officer has the right to arrest the principal on the request of the sureties if they do not present a certified copy of the bond properly indorsed. 39 Tex.