HOMELESS IN THE

HOUSE OF INTELLECT
Formative
and
Education
Robbie
Justice

as an Academic Study
McClintock
" a stunning demonstration"
Jacques Barzun
Author
From Dawn to Decadence
" an extraordinary analysis "
Arthur Levine
President
Teachers College, Columbia University
" too good to just admire"
David Mathews
President
Ketteri ng Foundation
Laboratory for Liberal Learning
Homeless in the
House of Intellect
Formative Justice
and
Education as an Academic Study
Robbie McClintock
New York
Laboratory for Liberal Learning
2005
Copyright © 2005 by Robbie McClintock
Published by Laboratory for Liberal Learning
322 Thompson Hall (Box 136)
Teachers College. Columbia University
525 West 120th Street
New York. NY 10027
ISBN 0-9763672-0-3
Author grants permission to reproduce this essay in whole
or in part [or non-commercial purposes, provided
it is with proper citation and attribution.
Contents
Preface 5
Putting a question 7
The professional and the academic, 9
The anomaly in education 15
Models of advanced study, 27
Building a case for change, 35
What the university has lost 41
The educational and the political, 57
What the university will gain 65
Concept formation, 66
Formative justice, 72
Some concluding questions, 102
Index 106
Preface
In writing Homeless in the House of Intel/ect, I have three
objectives.
First, I aim to establish the intellectual context for a substan-
tial work of scholarship on the concept of fonnative justice.
The last third of this essay introduces that concept and the first
two-thirds analyze the intellectual context for it.
Second, through a critique of schools of education, I want to
provoke serious discussion of two questions. What lrnowledge,
skills, and understandings should professional educators hold
in common and how can schools of education ensure that they
acquire them? And should the dissertation, putatively an origi-
nal contribution to knowledge but often far less, cease to cul-
minate advanced professional preparation in education, re-
placed by a clinical internship, sustained and comprehensive,
one like that concluding the preparation of medical doctors?
Third, and most importantly. I strive to persuade university
scholars and administrators to add education to the deparbnents
in the arts and sciences, as a field akin to political science, in
order to secure a place for disinterested academic research and
teaching about education at the graduate and lmdergraduate
levels. American culture needs a renewed lmderstanding of
education as a deeply formative experience, one that will serve
each person in a life-long aspiration to fulfillment. The educa-
tional profession, entangled in the status quo, cannot provide
the necessary leadership. The university as a whole might pro-.
ject to the public a moving vision of formative education, a
birthright of all, but to lead with effect it must strengthen its
internal commitment to the study of education. This essay calls
for that action.
These views have ripened slowly over 37 years as a member
6 Preface
of the faculty at Teachers College, Columbia University. I am
deeply indebted to the College and to the University, and to
munerous colleagues, both past and current, for intellectual
stimulus and professional support across my career.
At Teachers College, I have had the opportunity to pal1ici-
pate closely in doctoral programs preparing both scholars for
the academic study of education and practitioners for profes-
sional work in schools. I have become convinced that a sharp-
ening of the distinction between those purposes and the pro-
grams serving them would furtller the interests of students and
the public they aim to serve. I fear that some colleagues may
take affront at this view, and if they do, I apologize, for I intend
no insult. I believe, however, that the blun'ing of academic and
professional purposes causes grave weaknesses in schools of
education, Despite the immense talent, dedication, and eff011
of those working within Teachers College and other graduate
schools of education, these weaknesses arise because the uni-
versity supports the study of education poorly, We cannot im-
prove the situation without speaking honestly about its destruc-
tive effects and calling vigorously for a decisive remedy.
I want to thank explicitly Rene ArcilIa, John B. Black, Ste-
ven Cohen, Lambros Comitas, James Fraser, Seth Halvorson,
Floyd Hammack, Jennifer Hogan-Murphy, Andrew Light,
Susan Lowes, Maxine McClintock, Avi Mintz, Frank A. Mor-
etti, James B. Murphy, Pat Nicholson, Thomas W. Pogge,
Grace Goodyear Roosevelt, Mitchell Stevens, John Waterbury,
and Jonathan Zimmennan for comments on presentations or
drafts that have helped me sharpen points, TIley bear no re-
sponsibility, however, for my continuing lack of clarity or for
the burden of the argument.
For Maxine,
who brooked no discouragement.
Putting a question
On the steps of Low Library in the warmth of a springtime
sun, a friend surveyed the Columbia square and posed a ques-
tion. Has the contemporary university fully developed its intel-
lectual organization? A hundred years ago, Columbia was just
moving here from midtown, with hardly anything yet built.
Columbia was like others, a university in the making. Now it
has fined out physically - and intellectually too. It offers sev-
eral routes to the bachelors - Barnard across Broadway, Engi-
neering back behind Low, General Studies there to the right,
and the College proper over in Hamilton. It has the big profes-
sional schools. and some smaller, each with its special degree,
and the graduate school in the arts and sciences grants the
Ph.D. in most any specialty one can imagine, and all around,
centers and institutes do research on matters of every sort.
Of course, relative to the generic university, the ideal-type
that touches on all the possibilities, Columbia leaves out a few,
like a school of agriculture. But who would go to an ag-school
on the Heights? Surely no single university has all the possi-
bilities. That is not the point. The question is not - Which par-
ticular university is most complete? Rather - Is the model, the
idea of the university, now intellectually complete? In princi-
ple, have the key academic disciplines and the professional
schools, major and minor, developed fully with a rough work-
ing consensus among them about purpose and effort?
Agreed, some developments, despite the buzz, were not so
pertinent. For instance, continuing education is growing, draw-
ing in new participants, and organizational innovations may
emerge from distance learning, but these changes have to do
with the medium more than the message. New means to meet
demands for learning fit within the established fields of study,
8
Putting a question
tilting towards the practical end of the spectrum. The question
has to do with the structure and scope of knowledge itself, not
with techniques for its dissemination. Do the fields of study
within the contemporary university organize its work in a way
that is intellectually sound and complete?
Every school and every field still has much to accomplish.
The question does not call for an inventory of all pending de-
velopments. Rather, is the university rightly organized to sup-
port these efforts? Is the research lUliversity rightly adapted to
acquire, preserve, and disseminate the knowledge, skill, and
Wlderstanding requisite in contemporary life? Taken together,
universities are the novum organum made tangible, for they
organizationally embody the advancement of leanting that has
taken place in the modent era. As they have developed to this
point, do university structures tightly serve the intellectual
functions active in twenty-first-century experience? Does the
division of intellectual labor at work among the arts and sci-
ences and the leanted professions suit the major opportunities?
If not, what reorganization of intellectual work might prove
wise? This is the question.
In putting the question, let us set speculations about the pe-
ripheral emergence of new knowledge or skill to the side. A
slow chum at the margins where research fields intersect will
generate new subspecialties. For instance, nanotechnology is
fast becoming a new applied science, not as a structural im-
provement correcting an evident deficiency in academic or-
ganization, but as an extension of well-established lines of in-
quiry within existing components of the university. Emerging
subspecialties evidence a mature system at work, not a persist-
ing immaturity of it. Rather than looking for novelties, let us
restrict the question to issues with a long history in cultural
experience. Is a core pursuit of the university still imperfectly
institutionalized? Given the spectrum of disciplines in the arts
and sciences, along with the range of human practice addressed
through professional schools, is the study of something impor-
tant still homeless in the house of intellect?
Putting a question 9
The professional and the academic
To start, consider the distinctive differentiation long distin-
guishing university organization. Surely the university has il-
lustrated how "harmony consists of opposing tension," as
Heraclitus long ago claimed. I Almost always, cognate to each
professional school, which prepares skilled practitioners in an
important activity. one or more academic fields treat the do-
main as a subject for disinterested inquiry and teaching. In the
professional schools, the interests of practitioners shape re-
search and training, which are keyed to what those in the craft
need to know. In the arts and sciences, scholarship and instruc-
tion are detached, drawn by curiosity, not driven by the impera-
tives of practice,l All the same, the professional and the aca-
demic address the same realms of experience.
1 Fragment 51, Kathleen Freeman, trans., Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic
Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 28.
1 To be sure, turning from ideal-types to the mundane actualities of
academic life, professionalism bas increasingly pervaded the arts and
sciences at the doctoral level, with the various departments aggregat-
ing into the professional school that prepares the future faculty of the
arts and sciences according to the interests of a largely self-dermed
elite. Such actualities create circumstances under which departments
can slip away from the academic idea and take up some purpose other
than knowledge for its own sake. To deal with such circumstances
well, scholars and lUliversity leaders need to be clear about the integ-
rity of the ideal-type. That Noble Dream: The "Objectivily Question"
and the American Historical Profession by Peter Novick (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988) is very illuminating with respect
to these problems. I think it is important to recognize that objectivity
is a (dubious) epistemology whereas disinterestedness is a disposition
in which the dis- in disinterested is important, a refusal to control
inquiry by external interests, however putatively normative others
may claim those to be. Socrates paradigmatically exemplified disin-
terestedness when he would refuse to accept what "everyone" recog-
nized to be important and would accept as controlling what he and his
to Putting a question
Whoever looks only at one or the other, either the profes-
sional or the academic, will find the concept of interested or
disinterested knowledge difficult to grasp. Thus scholars often
flounder in explaining what they mean by "knowledge for its
own sake." The concept makes sense as one of two contrasting
ideal-types - Irnowledge adapted to the interests of an organ-
ized profession counterbalanced by knowledge derived from
the play of curiosity, the Irnowledge that springs from wonder,
the knowledge motivated by no purpose outside itself. Profes-
sional schools and the academic arts and sciences do not deal
with different human stuff; they overlap, dealing with a com-
mon substance in a distinctive way. The knowledge of most
worth in the professional school is highly instrumental fi'om the
perspective of the skilled practitioner; that of most worth in the
academic department is disinterested, value-free with respect to
practice, which means neither uninterested nor irrelevant, and it
takes the perspective of the inquisitive person, moved by sim-
ple curiosity, not that of the proficient professiona1.
3
interlocutor would hold to be important OIl careful examination ofthe
matter. Socrates characteristically quetied people who possessed
expertise of one sort or another to show the limits of such knowledge.
3 In this essay, I will use as the primary distinction, the ideal-types of
interested knowledge and disinterested Imowledge. I will use as fre-
quent synonyms, the professional and the academic, and for the for-
mer, I will sometimes describe inquiry as partial, meaning disposed
towards the advantage of one or another givett purpose, and for the
latter, I will occasionally speak of detaclnncnt, objective Imowledge,
and value-free, dispassionate, or intpaltial inquiry. Max Weber's
methodological essays and his great discussion of "Science as a Vo-
cation" are important for thinking out the diScipline of disinterested
study, but he was concerned less to define the work of the arts and
sciences vis-a.-vis professional schools than he was to ensure the in-
tegt;ty oftlte arts and sciences against diverse temptations of politici-
zation. See inter alia, Max Weber, The Methodology a/the Social
Sciences, Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, trans., (Glencoe, IL:
TIle Free Press, 1949) and Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in
Putting a question 11
Here is the key. The distinction between the professional
and the academic provides a way to decide whether the univer·
sity has reached its full development. The university structure
will be complete if it provides both professional training and
academic study for all major domains of experience and action.
An opportunity to improve the organizational structure of the
university exists where professional programs lack an academic
correlate, or vice versa.
A harmony of opposing tension in the university between the
professional and the academic is neither a recent accident nor
the happenstance of inefficient management. From its earliest
origin, the university housed both liberal education in the arts
and sciences and specialist preparation in learned professions,
the two sides often locked in creative conflict with one an-
other." The opposing tendencies arose early on, nascent in the
different forms of reasonableness that tradition attributed to the
pre-Socratic sages. The lore about early thinkers celebrated
both their gift for detached reflection with their paradoxes and
obscure definitions and their shrewd acumen as they used their
knowledge to comer markets for olive oil, to layout well-
ordered cities, and to promulgate effective laws. Soon, ancient
centers of learning supported both Socratic and sophistic
schools, the one dedicated to philosophic learning, the other to
practical rhetoric.
H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 1958), pp.
129-156.
" Immanuel Kant saw the principle clearly and distinguished lawful
from unlawful conflicts between the professional faculties and the
arts and sciences. Lawful conflicts proceeded through open, rational
debate and were intellectually fruitful. Unlawful conflicts resorted to
external authorities to impose a resolution to questions by the force of
censorship, suppressing offensive reasoning by the rule of force. See
Immanuel Kant., The Conflict of the Facuilies, Mary 1. Gregor, trans.,
(New York: Abaris Books, 1979), passim, especially pp. 47-53.
12 Putting a question
Such early tensions, maturing into the academic arts and sci-
ences and the major professional schools, became an essential
organizational characteristic of the modem university. Because
of it. the twellty-first-century university includes numerous
overlapping units: a department of economics and a school of
business; a department of sociology and a school of social
work; a department of politics and both a school of public af-
fairs and a law school; a department of biology and a school of
medicine; departments of physics, of chemistry, and of other
sciences of matter and energy and a school of engineering, a
department of religion and a theological seminary; departments
of literature. of music, and of art history and schools of the arts,
architecture, and journalism. 5
Why does the university foster so much overlap in its inteI-
S The differentiation between academic and professional study is re-
lated to the much-discussed tension between pure and applied knowl-
edge, but I do not think it is precisely the same issue. To explore the
difference fully would require an extended reflection inappropriate
within the confines of this essay. Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic Science
and Technological Innovation by the late Donald E. Stokes (Wash-
ington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997, esp. Figure 3-5 and related
discussion, pp. 70-5), a useful discussion, does not really distinguish
betwcen the professional and the academic, for the quadrant applies
to both. It arises from the possibility of responding yes or no to two
questions - Was there a quest for fundamental understanding? Were
there considerations of use? Y csN es; YeslNo; NoNes; NolNo.
With respect to both interested and disinterested inquiries, one can
ask both questions and apply the quadrant to each type of inquiry,
with each producing examples of the [our different resulls. What
distinguishes interested and disinterested inquiry is not how each
situates within the quadrant. but rather who will decide how to an-
swer the questions defining the quadrant and what sorts of reasons
they will give in detemlining their answers. By characterizing in-
quiry as interested or disinterested, one describes neither the process
nor its results, but the motivations driving both the process and its
results.
Putting a question 13
lectual organization between academic departments and profes-
sional schools? We can imagine a corporate apostle of pro duc-
tivity insisting that intellectual institutions use precious re-
sources more efficiently by situating the preparation of profes-
sionals in academic departments or, better yet, by locating dis-
interested scholarship, if needed at a11, in the appropriate pro-
fessional school. We can hear the directives. Have prospective
executives take graduate degrees in economics. Better, close
the economics department and move the faculty to the b-
school. But then, we also hear the complaints. With the one,
the economics courses are too ivory tower, divorced com-
pletely from real-world, managerial imperatives. With the
other, the b-school gives short shrift to high-level researchers,
it won't tenure macroeconomists, and it dumbs down anything
mathematical to what distracted executives would find easy
and relevant. Who knows, relegated to the b-school, research
economists might lobby to move en masse to the school of pub-
lic policy where rational choice theories receive a bit more re-
spect. Corporate restructuring, doing away with inefficient
redundancies between academic departments and professional
schools, would prove ineffective, for the overlap arises from
real differences in the uses of knowledge generated and dis-
seminated by each.
The anomaly in education
Consider whether the opposing tension in the university be-
tween academic disciplines and professional schools character-
istic for economic, political, social, religious, biologic, artistic,
and material experience holds with the study of educational
experience. Does the professional school of education stand
without a clear departmental complement in the arts and sci-
ences? The ostensible, organized study of education is perva-
sively professional. To be sure, sometimes it is situated in the
faculty of the arls and sciences, but it nevertheless specializes
in preparing practitioners. At the undergraduate level, students
can often major in education, but in doing so, they are usually
taking a program of professional preparation leading towards
initial teaching credentials. Thus they study education in an
interested, not a disinterested, manner, seeking status as
fled practitioners.
Occasional exceptions appear to exist - perhaps. For
stance, Stanford's Undergraduate Honors Program in the
School of Education, which "is not a preparation for teaching,"
offers instead an opportunity to do research on educational
ics that honors students could not do within a regular
pline. This program confinns the rule, however, for it
scribes itself as "lmique in the nation," and even at that, most
"educational research" is not uninvolved, instead comprising a
set of inquiries highly responsive to the imperatives of the pro-
fession.
1i
Perhaps more significantly, Brown University has
broadened its undergraduate education offerings to include a
(; Stanford University School of Education. "Undergraduate Honors
Program in the School of Education."
deptfSUSEJhonors/info.htm.
16 The anomaly in education
concentl'ation "designed for students seeking a broad liberal
arts background in the field of education."7 But it is a small
department supporting only an M.A.T. at the graduate level.
At the graduate level, the study of education is almost eu-
tirely contained within the schools of education, where research
and instruction primarily concerns the needs of schools and
those who run them and those who teach and learn within
them. Work there is professional, not academic and overall
sets the tone for the study of education throughout the univer-
sity. One exception arises because graduate schools of the arts
and sciences are paying much more attention to the quality of
teaching in their various fields at both the graduate and under-
graduate level. This is a major positive development in higher
education over the past decade or so backed by major associa-
tions in higher education. It introduces systematic work on
instructional practice into the arts and sciences, significantly
preparing the way for the disinterested study of education
there. 9 The academic study of education might build on these
developments, but it would differ in one significant way fl.·om
them, for it would look outward to education in the world gen-
erally, not inward to the process of teaching and learning on the
local campus. In the end, needed attention to the preparation of
graduate students as prospective college and university instruc-
7 hI addition to an undergraduate teacher education program, the Edu-
cation Department at Brown University offers a concentration in
Education Studies with two emphases, Human Development or His-
tory and Policy. See "About Us," www.bnnVI1.edulDepatt-
mentslEducationlabout.php, and "Concentration Requirement,"
www.brown.eduIDcpartmentslEducationlconcJcqs.php).
8 See, for instance, the Preparing Future Faculty Program,
www.preparing-faculty.org. These developments are not examples of
the academic study of education in the arts and sciences, howcver.
They reflect a salutary effort to bring a higher level of professional
excellence to the teaching and learning that takes place in the arts and
sciences.
The anomaly in education 17
tors is not the same as a field of inquiry devoted to the aca-
demic study of education in the way political science ap-
proaches politics or sociology social life and conditions.
So, my friend observed, if a differentiation between profes-
sional preparation in education and the academic study of it
does not hold, introducing it may be an opportunity for further
developing the intel1ectual organization of the university. But
is the tension between the academic and the professional actu-
a1ly absent in way the university organizes work on education?
Do not departments of psychology in the arts and sciences
stand to schools of education as departments of biology and
related life sciences stand to medical schools? In part, they do,
but imperfectly so, for psychology as an academic correlate to
the professional study of education has two limitations. First, a
weak differentiation of the academic from the professional in
the study of education deeply affected the way the university
institutionalized the study of psychology itself. The upshot:
psychology has been co-opted by the professional school of
education. Universities appoint a high proportion of academic
specialists in psychology as faculty members in the profes-
sional school of education, not in the arts and sciences. Al-
though psychology may partially serve as an academic corre-
late to the professional school of education, in doing so, it
shows how weakJy the university differentiates the academic
and the professional in education. By co-opting major parts of
psychology, the professional school of education has enveloped
parts of the academic field, making the interests of the profes-
sion primary in major sectors of the academic subject. !I
\I Ellen Condliffe Lagemann gives an excellent account in An Elusive
Science: The Troubling His/Dry of Educalion Research (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2000), showing how psychology be-
came a dominant component of educational research as professional
schools of education developed in the United States. In this story,
Lagemann's primary interest is the shaping of educational research,
not the development of psychology as an academic subject (see espe-
18 The anomaly in education
A second, still more imp011ant limitation on psychology as
the academic correlate to the professional study of education
arises because psychology, in its various foons, is mute about
much that is at stake. Education involves more than the psy-
chological, for through it the cultural experience of humanity is
at work. Education comprises cultural processes, immeasur-
able and intricate, vital to all, spawning complex institutions,
guzzling material resources, with experiential consequences for
persons and for publics. The disinterested, academic study of
educational experience as it might be conducted within the arts
and sciences contains much that lies outside the purview of
psychological inquiry. In short, psychology speaks to patt of
the how and to part of the when in education. Does an aca-
demic cOiTelate address well the rest of tIle how and the when,
and also, the what, the who, the where, and the why of educa-
tion?tll
cially Chapters I & 2, pp. 23-70). In The NONon History of the Hu-
man Sciences (New York: W. W. Norton & Co .• 1997), Roger Smith
gives a good general explanation, primarily from the perspective of
the history of psychology, describing how many of the leading psy-
chological researchers fl:om roughly 1880 to 1920 were instrumental
in building up both psychology as a discipline and education as a sub-
ject of professional education (see especially pp. 519-529, 580-599,
and 650-672). Dorothy Ross traces how the social sciences devel-
oped in American higher education from 1865 to 1929 in The Origins
of American Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press.
1991). In contrast to the linkage between psychology and schools of
education, she shows the development of the major social science
disciplines to be primarily all internal matter through which the disci-
plines created an intental professional ethos and discipline for their
practitioners. not a process linked 10 a professional school from which
the discipline might derive its ethos.
to In the analysis that follows. I concentrate on developing the ration-
ale for the academic study of educational matters independent of psy-
chology. I think. however, that a few psychologists who are currently
on the faculty of education schools might argue parallel to the case
The anomaly In education 19
In the nineteenth century, philosophy served as the academic
correlate to the professional study of education, at that time
spanning both the psychological and cultural sides of it. Phi-
losophy had this role. not only in Gennany,l1 but also in the
United States, for German influence in American philosophy,
developed here that their work would be better situated in the arts and
sciences were education recognized there as a significant. non-
professional field. Other psychologists seem satisfied within the pro-
fessional context and call for greater attention to the socio-cultural
setting of professional educational work. David C. Berliner gives an
attractive vision of improved doctoral preparation in educational psy-
chology, making it more effective with respect to the realities ofedu-
cational practice. in "Toward a Future as Rich as Our Past." Carnegie
Essays on the Doctorate (Stanford: The Carnegie FOlUldation for the
Advancement of Teaching. 2003) www.carnegiefoundation.orgiCID/
essayS/CID _ Edu _ Berliner.pdf.
11 Wilhelm Dilthey introduced his substantia] work on historical
pedagogy. asserting that "the blossom and goa] of real philosophy is
pedagogy in its fullest sense. the fonnative theory of man
(Bildungslehre des Menschen}." See Pildagogik: Geschichte und
Grllndlinien des Systems. Gesammeite Schriften, vol. IX, 3rd, edition.
(Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner. 1960). p. 7. I think the concept of his tori-
cal pedagogy. the idea that one learns through philosophy and history
what human beings can and should become, is important for the dis-
interested study of education and regret not having published any-
thing on it other than a fragment in a Spanish journal: Robert
McClintock, "El nacimiento de la historia de la educacion: Los ante-
cedentes alemanes de la pedagogia hist6rica." Revista de Educaci6n.
fa]l 1985. An excellent doctoral dissertation in an academic depart-
ment of education would examine the development of historica]
pedagogy from Hermann Niemeyer (1754-1828) and F. H. C.
Schwarz (1766-1857) through Wilhelm Dilthey ending with the
Weimar Period with Das Pildagogische Problem in der Geistes-
geschichte der Neuzei/ by Hermann Leser (Munich: Druck and
Verlag von R. Oldenbourg. 1925 & 1928).
20 The anomaly in education
from Transcendentalism through Dewey, was significant.
lt
By
World War I, psychology had largely separated from philoso-
phy and, like their peers in England, American philosophers
largely abandoned detached reflection on the cultural aspects of
education. As a fi'cestanding subfield, the philosophy of educa-
tion, Dewey notwithstanding, had migrated to the schools of
education, which co-opted it as the "philosophical and histOli-
cal foundations of education" to serve an explicit role in the
professional preparation of teachers and other educational spe-
cialists. Through most of the twentieth century in the arts and
sciences, philosophers have rarely written about education
overtly. 13
u. William Torrey Harris, of course. was both the first U.S. Commis-
sioner of Education and the fowlder of T1,e Journal of Speculative
Philosophy (1867) a key journal in the history of philosophy in Amer-
ica. See The American HegeUans: An Intellectual Episode in the His-
10lY of Western America edited by William H. Goetzmatm (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). Louis Menand might have paid more
attention to Hams and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in T1,e
Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 200 I), for
they did much to draw together and sustain the community of dis-
course about which Menand "''rotc.
13 Throughout the twentieth century, there has been a paucity of work
on education in leading philosophy journals and the dearth is espe-
cially marked over the past 50 or more years. Mind published one
article with "education" in its title in the twentieth century, in 1953;
Philosophy mld Phenomenological Research published five between
1940 and 1998, the most recent in 1952; The Philosophical Review
published three in the twentieth century, the most recent in 1921; and
Philosophical Quarlerly published none between its start in 1950 and
1998. Relatively speaking, only the Journal of Philosophy has been a
hot bed of pedagogical speculation, between 1904 and 1998 publish-
ing fifteen articles the most recent in 1982. Although academic phi-
losophers do not ostensibly write about education, what many ofthem
write has great relevance to the disinterested study of education and it
The anomaly in education 21
Recognizing the limitations of psychology and philosophy as
academic complements to the professional study of education
implies a definition of education, which deserves to be explicit.
Education occurs through complex interactions under concrete
circumstances as persons or groups perceive, activate, de-
velop, and combine natural capabilities and nurtured possibili-
ties, thereby acquiring and realizing their determinate attrib-
utes. This defmition avoids the verb. 10 be. refraining from
saying what education is, for education does not exist passively
like a stone; it takes place actively. as a result of which persons
or groups achieve significant accomplishments.i.J Educative
would gain in value were there an organizational center for such work
in the arts and sciences.
14 It is important to break away from the lazy equating of education
with schooling, particularly schooling through state--supported sys-
tems. The best educational histories make that break, but the control-
ling defmitions of education in them have not been entirely satisfac-
tory. Paideia: the Ideals of Greek eli/lUre by Werner Jaeger (Gilbert
Highet, trans., 3 vols., 2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press,
1945) is a work of lasting value for the study of ancient Greek educa-
tional thought. But Jaeger reified his ideas about "the Greek mind"
and dehumanized education in his magisterial history by defining it as
a self-subsistent force, "education is the process by which a commu-
nity preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character ...
from one generation to another ... " vol. I, p. xiii. Lawrence A. Cre-
min was more circumspect in his 3 volume American Education in
which he would "view education as the deliberate, systematic, and
sustained effort to transmit or evoke knowledge, attitudes, values,
skills, and sensibilities ... " vol. I, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970),
p. xiii; c£ vol. 2, p. ix; Public Education (New York: Basic Books,
1976), p. 41; and Traditions of American Education (New York: Ba-
sic Books, 1977), pp. viii & 134-5 for variations. This definition con-
centrates attention on the causal processes that one might associate
with education. I think it more appropriate to accentuate the recipro-
cal influences and complicated interactions at work within it. Cremin
wanted to discriminate between the history of education and "history
in genera1," and consequently avoided a truly comprehensive defini-
22 The anomaly in education
agents acquire their characteristics through an interactive proc-
ess that takes place in an actual environment replete with con-
straining and enabling conditions. Education viewed from past
towards future accounts for stabilities of personal character and
the weight of social reproduction; viewed from future to past it
projects the aspirations and hopes, which persons and peoples
work to achieve.
Looking at the interactions through which it takes place, edu-
cation comprises reciprocal determinations between an
autonomous agent. possessing natural and cultural potentials,
and a range of circumstances, all co-existing within an ex-
tended time and place that both limits and enables the actuali-
zation of potential.'s Through education, homo sapiens be-
comes the Lamarckian species capable of developing and pass-
ing on acquired characteristics. Disinterested scholarship on
tion of education. This was a mistake. I believe. Fundamental human
concerns - economics. politics. social action, culture. and education-
touch all of human experience. Scholars in these fields of study
should not exclude anything by definition, but make reasoned judg-
ments according to their understanding of the whole about what they
take to be incidental and what they hold central to a proper under-
standing of the matter in question.
IS A great deal of pedagogical frustration arises because people insist
011 thinking about education using Kant's second analogy of experi·
ence, the principle of temporal succession according to the law of
causality, only to find that all-too-often teachers. curricula. and texts
have little causal command upon the plastic stuff of the pupil. Theo-
lists will find it far more fruitful to consider educational experience,
like so much other human experience, through Kant's third analogy,
the principle of simultaneity according to the law of reciprocity or
community. Persons engaged in education - child and adult, near and
far - inhabit a shared life-world in which all and everything are si-
multaneous and therefore neccssarily "stand in thoroughgoing com-
munity of interaction with each other." See, Immanuel Kant, Cl'itique
of Pure Reason, I. Elements, Pt. n, Div. I, Bk. II, eh. II, A2131B260,
Guyer & Wood, trans.
The anomaly in education 23
education would study, in a variety of ways under diverse con-
ditions, how educational interactions bring natural potentials
and nurtured achievements to fulfillment and affect the quality
of personal and public life.
16
So defined, inquiry into education considers many matters,
some pertinent to professional work and some not, but an sus-
ceptible to detached scrutiny. Universities institutionalize sup-
port for the disinterested study of education as a cultural en-
deavor poorly, however, with no organizational center in the
arts and sciences and an uncertain rationale within schools of
education. To be sure, from time to time, at one or another
university, in this or that academic department, a scholar thinks
deeply about one or another cultural component of education,
but nowhere do such thinkers draw together into an effective
department of education in the arts and sciences where they can
plumb, as a community of peers, the human experience of edu-
cation in an objective manner. With respect to historical, cul-
tural experience, the university has situated dispassionate
scholarship on education in its professional school, and there
academic inquiry has lacked the critical mass and resources to
remain true to its intellectual mission in the face of steady pres-
sure to prove its relevance to the imperatives of preparing prac-
16 Scholars can genuinely respect the complexity of educational prac-
tice by breaking the simple assumption that education is what hap-
pens in schools. What happens in schools mayor may not be educa-
tion and much of education takes place independent of school and
classroom. Disinterested inquiry about education needs to try to see
it whole, understanding how education unfolds, both in school and
out. Deschooling Society by Ivan Illich (New York: Harper & Row,
1971) can still be very helpful, if we take it as an exhortation to con-
centrate on the realities of education, not the fonnalities of schooling.
Wherever education takes place, we need to pay more attention to the
student as a controlling agent, a view I argued long ago in "Towards a
Place for Study in a World ofInstruction," Teachers College Record
(73:2, Dec. 1971, pp. 161-205), www.studyplace.orglstudyplace/
studyspace/mcclintockltwards _a "place Jor _study _1971.html.
24 The anomaly in education
titioners. In short, the disinterested study of education in
American universities has an anomalous organization. Does
this anomaly matter? Does it indicate a potential for further
development in the organizational structure of the university?
By preparing both academic scholars and professional practi·
tioDers, perhaps the schools of education demonstrate how cor·
pOfate rationalization can improve results and lower costs.
Certainly. the peculiar situation in the study of education has
had discemible effects on educational scholarship and the ad-
vanced preparation of professionals. Whether the effects im-
prove results or lower costs is a question.
In most fields, the Ph.D. is the highest academic degree, with
advanced professional degrees given a distinctive identification
- M.D., M.B.A., J.D., etc. In the field of education, universi-
ties have confused the situation, however. Early in the twenti-
eth century, the first major graduate school of education,
Teachers College, used the Columbia University Ph.D. as both
the highest degree for academic work in education and psy-
chology and for the most advanced level of professional prepa-
ration. By the 1930s, Teachers College students were earning
an wlseemly proportion of Columbia's Ph.D. degrees. To cor-
rect that situation, Teachers College and Columbia adopted the
Ed.D., ostensibly a distinctive degree for advanced professional
preparation in education, restricting use of the Ph.D. in educa-
tion to strictly academic programs.
17
By this time, however,
17 See A History a/Teachers College, Columbia University by Law-
rence A. Cremin, David A. Shalmon, and Mary Evelyn Townsend
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 140-1. "For years
there had been discussions in educational circles on the inappropri-
ateness of the research-oriented Ph.D. program for a large variety of
school leadership positions. What was needed instead was a doctoral
program whose foci lay in the advanced knowledge, the specialized
understandings, and the practical skills required for broad profes-
sional competence in the field. Acceptance of such an equivalent
doctorate would accomplish at least two things which seemed very
The anomaly in education 25
many other universities had adopted the early usage at Teach-
ers College for their own schools of education, granting the
Ph.D. indiscriminately to signiIy both advanced academic and
professional preparation. And at Teachers College, a clear dis-
tinction between the academic Ph.D. and the professional
Ed.D. proved hard to uphold, for many students wanted a Ph.D.
on completion of their professional preparation and many fac-
ulty members wanted to give Ed.D. programs a more academic
cast, aiming to gain status as research scholars thereby. 18
Consequently, whether a doctorate in education, be it Ph.D.
or Ed.D., is an academic or a professional degree has long been
ambiguous. A symptom of this ambiguity: official, nation-
wide statistics have counted both degrees in determining the
number of academic doctorates awarded each year by the na-
tion's universities. As indicators of academic attainments, pe-
much in demand. First, it would remove the continuing conflict of
aims and purposes which had for years marked the effort to pursue
both research and professional goals in a single Ph.D. program; and
second, it would allow those advanced students who remained with
the Ph.D. to concentrate more than ever on the cultivation of research
skills and competencies. In so doing, it was felt that a good deal of
the friction between 'research-oriented' and 'field-oriented' members
of the Faculty would be quickly alleviated."
18 Concern to ensure that the Ph.D. would be restricted to academic
programs at Teachers College was evident in reporls by two influen-
tial committees: "Report of Committee on the Ph.D. Degree," submit-
ted by Austin P. Evans, Chainnan, to the Dean of the Graduate Facul-
ties, January 29, 1952. and "On the Relation between the Graduate
Faculties and Teachers College, Colwnbia University: Report to the
Joint Committee on Graduate Instmction by a Special Fact-Finding
Committee," submitted by Uriel Weinreich, Chairman, November 15,
1963 (with revisions to September 11, 1964). This effort at Teachers
College to preserve the academic character of the Ph.D. earned by its
students has been more or less successful, but it has not been baJ-
anced by a similar one to ensure that the Ed.D. remained strictly a
professionaJ degree.
26 The anomaly in education
culiarities resulted. In 2000-0 I, American universities awarded
just under 45,000 doctorates, of which 15%, a bit over 6,700
were in education. The number of doctorates eamed in educa-
tion was 1.7 times greater than all those in the physical sci-
ences, 1.5 times greater than those in the biological and life
sciences, and 1.7 times those in all the social sciences and his-
tory. For every doctorate in economics, 7.9 were awarded in
education, for history, 7.2, for politics 9.8, and for sociology
12.3. Furthermore, these propOltions have been roughly cou-
stant for the past fifty years or more,l9
Consider some implications of these gross numbers. Each
doctorate indicates completion of a dissertation, an original
contnbution to knowledge, and each contribution to knowledge
should have at its generative source a significant question, one
worthy of serious inquiry. Does educational experience, year
after year, generate nearly ten times the number of significant
questions, each meriting an original, consequential study, than
political experience generates? As a field of disinterested in-
quiry, education is neither more nor less protean tIIan politics;
rather, it generates so many more doctorates because both pro-
spective academic researchers and professional practitioners
19 National Center for Educational Statistics. Digest of Educational
Statistics, 2002. Chapter 3, Tables 254. 279, 282-287, 292-293. and
296. http://nces.ed.gov/programsidigestld02/. In addition to educa-
tion. psychology is the othcr field that awards a very high nwnber of
doctorates relative to other fields, 10.4% of all doctorates earned in
2000-01 (4,659). One may hypothesize that students in schools of
education earn a significant proportion of those psychology doctor-
ates. Most of those earned in ed schools, however, probably go to
educational researchers, not field practitioners. The ratio of psychol-
ogy doctorates to all those in the social sciences is 1.2 to 1 as it is for
all those in the physical sciences. The ratio to doctorates in econom-
ics is 5.5 to I, in history 5.0 to I, in political science 6.8 to I, and in
sociology 8.5 to 1. Year after year, at least since 1950, about one
quarter of all doctorates earned in the United States has been in edu-
cation and psychology.
The anomaly in education 27
are seeking the degree, whereas in most other fields, only the
prospective academics seek the doctorate.2° Is this situation
efficient or effective?
Models of advanced study
By separating the academic and the professional, the univer-
sity has developed a model for supporting advanced academic
education that differs significantly from the one sustaining pro-
fessional preparation. Each model includes distinctive ways to
establish and enforce standards of excellence and expectation.
On the professional side, different types of schools imple-
ment the professional model in distinctive ways. Nevertheless,
they share a general pattern. In most fields. the professional
20 Of course, not all doctorates in education are professional degrees.
Educational researchers, not professional practitioners, earn some of
the doctorates in education and they go on to staff schools of educa-
tion and educational research organizations. One can estimate the
proportion with the following reasoning. If no education doctorates
were professional degrees, one would expect the American Educa-
tional Research Association to be on the order of 8 times the size of
the American Historical Association. AERA put its membership at
about 20,000 and AHA at over 14,000. If the ratio between those
membership levels indicates the ratio of research doctorates between
education and history, about 1,330 of the more than 6,716 doctorates
in education in 2000-2001 were earned by research scholars, which
leaves the rest, some 80%, earned by professional practitioners.
Since many AERA members have doctorates, not in education, but in
psychology, this estimate undoubtedly overstates the number of re-
search doctorates in education. Of the research doctorates in educa-
tion earned annually in education, most in tum involve "educational
research," which as a domain is highly interested research producing
instrumental knowledge for the field. Those earning a doctorate in
the disinterested academic study of education would be much the
smaller part. We will see below that the academic study of education
shows signs of a seriously deficient critical mass.
28 The anomaly in education
school primarily provides intensive, formal instruction in the
base of knowledge and stock of skills requisite in the profes-
sion, for which students pay a high tuition and struggle to mas-
ter fully in a limited period of all-out study. In this model,
through an additional period of interning or on-the-job learn-
ing, students recoup somewhat their cost of tuition in knowl-
edge, skill, and understanding, while they master their pre-
scribed learning in actual practice. On the successful comple-
tion of their paid, clinical practice, they are inducted, more or
less fonnally, into full professional statuS.
21
Throughout the
21 The induction is most fonnal ill medicine. substantially so in law
with the system of bar examinations. and rather infonoal in business,
where the recipient of an M.B.A .• after a period of comprehensive
olicntation to a finn. makes it. or does not. onto the fast track to ex-
ecutive power. It would take the discussion too far afield to fuUy
differentiate the patterns of advanced professional preparation in edu-
cation fi'om those in medicine. law, and business. Suffice it here to
contrast two ideal-types. one in education where doctoral preparation
modeled on the academic Ph.D. SClVes to prepare advanced educa-
tional practitioners and the other. variations of which serve in medi-
cine, law. and business. where a period of intense formal instruction
followed by clinical practice, constitutes the training of practitioners.
The history of professional education is a good example of the disag-
gregation of work on education that comes about because the arts and
sciences do not recognize education as a matter of academic study;
the best scholarship on professional education fits into the history of
each separate profession and a good conceptual overview is lacking.
Hence, a serious historical sociology comparing forms of professional
education would be very helpful. The Culture of Professionalism:
The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in Amer-
ica by Burton 1. Bledstein (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976) does not
try to differentiate types of professional schools. "Dissecting Types
of Professional Schools" by Peter M. Blau, 101m B. Cullen, Rebecca
Z. Margulies, and Hilaty Silver. Sociology of Education, 52:1, (Jan.
1979), pp. 7-19, concentrated too much on extrinsic characteristics to
tell much about the typology of educational strategies across the pro-
fessions.
The anomaly in education 29
process, the major bodies of professional self-governance di-
rectly set and legitimate standards of expectation, or indirectly
influence them significantly, ensuring that the interests of the
profession control the program of preparation. Standards are
relatively clear-cut and high; and both professional schools and
professional groups cooperate to enforce them with rigor.
On the academic side, with the doctorate in the arts and sci-
ences, the model of advanced education de-emphasizes formal
instruction in the knowledge of the field and apprentices the
student to an extended process of appropriating the state of the
field and generating new knowledge, involving proposals, re-
search, and publication, with standards throughout set and en-
forced by the dynamics of peer review. The more elite the
university, the more it, not the student, bears the student's costs
and subsistence. With reliance on peer review, expectations
are often unclear and the enforcement of standards can some-
times appear dysfimctional, but the process has deep roots in
the idea of academic freedom and it advances the research mis-
sion of the university well. It stokes the advancement of learn-
ing. High-level academic apprenticeship teaches by doing and
inducts the prospective academic into the advancement of
learning, developing an impassive resistance to the idols
against which Bacon warned.21 By keeping the professional
model and the academic model largely distinct, the modern
university has simultaneously cultivated both advanced profes-
sional preparation and disinterested scholarship in the arts and
sciences.
In education, the professional school primarily uses the aca-
demic model in preparing advanced practitioners in educational
2] See Francis Bacon, The NelV Organon, Books One, XXIII-Lxvm.
However much Bacon's ideas mayor may not have had to do with the
development of modem scientific methods, his vision of the intellec-
rual enterprise and the potential role it could have in a well consti-
ruted society certainly suggest the structure and function that intellec-
tual institutions have developed in the modem world.
30 The anomaly in education
administration, curriculum and teaching, and other specialties,
areas where one might reasonably expect to find the profes-
sional model in use. In individual cases, in which a strong stu-
dent meets up with an effective advisor within a program
where support is sufficient, results exemplify the best of aca-
demic standards. But systemically, tbe academic model works
poorly in professional situations where the knowledge of most
worth is clinical, rooted deeply in the particularities of practice
in this or that place under these Of those conditions. Systemic
reliance on the academic model conflates the trappings of aca-
demic scholarship with substantial professional leaming. As a
result, schools of education too often nurture well neither ex-
cellence in scholarship nor prepossessing competence among
licensed practitioners.
lJ
23 How does this unfortunate result come about? Andrew Abbott, in
his excellent study, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Divi-
sion of Expert Labor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1988), esp. pp. 52-58, gives some helpful clues. Abbott observes that
professions use two bodies of knowledge. One is the profession'S
knowledge nin use," consisting of powers of diagnosis, treatment, and
inference (the ability to make cOimections between diagnosis and
treatment when these are ostensibly obscure). The other is the "aca-
demic knowledge" of the profession, a "fomml knowledge system .••
ordered by abstractions alone" (p. 53). Abbott's "academic knowl-
edge" differs from what I am discussing as disinterested knowledge
appropriate to the arts and sciences; Abbott's is a set of professional
resources that serve to legitimate professional aulhority and to gener-
ate new methods of diagnosis, treatment, and inference. For clarity, I
will use his alternative ternt, (he fomral knowledge system of the pro-
fession. Within the profession of education, the fonnal knowledge
system comprises the great bulk of "educational research" as repre-
sented by the American Educational Research Association. In the
professional model of advanced education described above, the pe-
riod of intense formal instlUction concentrates on the profession's
fonnal knowledge system, followed by the period of interning, link-
ing the fonnal system to the profession's knowledge in use. We can
hypothesize the following dynamic in schools of education. With the
The anomaly in education 31
Although the academic model for advanced work predomi-
nates in schools of education, it does not result in strong disin-
terested scholarship there. Strong norms of originaJ scholar-
ship should prevaiJ, but within the cluttered doctoral instruction
in schools of education, the practices of peer-review become
unusually muddled. Over-academicized professionalism has
spawned a myriad of methodologies as professors in schools of
education have sought ways to enable prospective professionals
to produce passable dissertations, even though their talents,
skills, and interests often have little to do with serious scholar-
ship. In the professional schools of education, academic norms
have controlled recruitment, promotion, and tenure for decades
in areas that one might expect to be grounded in clinical exper-
tise and the scholarly process has churned on eclectically
within a diverse world of practice. A great incoherence has
resulted with too much written about too little, vimmlly none of
it conclusive. With too much written, there has been thereby
too much to teach in an environment riven by overspecializa-
tion.
24
Hence, schools of education communicate little consen-
disinterested study of education, appropriate to the arts and sciences,
relegated to the professional school, energies directed to it combine
with the efforts to develop and transmit a fonnal knowledge system
for the profession of education. Together, these give the fonnal sys-
tem inordinate heft relative to activities nurturing the profession's
knowledge in use. As a reswt, the fonnal knowledge system has be-
come over-developed, a professional peacock-tail rendered ineffec-
tive by its excessive divisions and components, and its absorption of
resources culminates in a stunted commitment to developing the
knowledge in use among practitioners-in-preparation. The hypothe-
sis: by moving the truly academic study of education into the arts and
sciences, the balance between the fonnal system and use system in
the professional school would improve.
24 Virginia Richardson gallantly tries to give a coherent overview of
all this in "The Ph.D. in Education," Carnegie Essays on the Doctor-
ale (Stanford: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching, 2003) www.camegiefoundation.orgiCID/-essayslCID_
32 The anomaly in education
sus about what constitutes the shared Imowledge and set of
skills requisite across the educational profession. Without a
consensus on essentials, programs and courses proliferate in
schools of education and the field has a jumble of professional
standards poorly enforced. Extemal certification procedures
are equally fragmented and multiple accrediting agencies dart
incessantly, here and there, through the schools of education.
15
Having spent my career on the faculty of a major graduate
school of education, I have little desire to perpetuate the long-
standing art of bashing schools of education. The university,
not the school of education, is at fault. The tuliversity has cre-
ated serious problems by mingling the academic with the pro.
fessional in its work on education. This weakens schools of
education, where the fonns of advanced scholarship receive
undue emphasis in the processes of professional preparation,
and it leaves a gap in the arts and sciences, which accord no
place to the disinterested study of education.
With a weak differentiation between academic and profes·
sional work, the university inadequately institutionalizes the
study of education. Noble exceptions may exist within an im·
educ_Richardson.pdf. The result, however, provides a befuddling
complexity of fonnal categories singularly lacking in concrete sub-
stance.
15 The Harvard Graduate School of Education has started the arduous
process of developing a core curriculum to address this incoherence,
so far introducing one core course, "Thinking Like an Educator:
Modeling an Integrative Approach." This is a major act of institu-
tionalleadership, intended eventually to reshape professional prepara-
tion for educators both at Batvard and elsewhere. It shows, however,
how far schools of education have to go before they can effectively
impart a common base of knowledge, skilI, and understanding
tlU'Oughout the field, fOl'it is currently one course out of many, sig-
nificantly still an elective - an important start down a long path of
innovation. See "Getting to the core at BGSE" by Beth Potier, Har-
vard University Gazette. Oct. 7, 2004, www.news.hatval'd.-
edulgazettelZ004/1 0.07/0 l-gsecore.html.
The anomaly in education 33
perfect system but university authorities should not point to
these and insist that they can and should become the norm
without any change in the flawed system. Over time, heroic
effort cannot substitute for good organization. As the univer-
sity squeezes everything into the professional school, irrelevant
norms exert excessive influence in developing practical exper-
tise. Academic procedures dominate advanced professional
preparation; most students engaged in the time-consuming, re-
source-intensive process of writing dissertations have no real
reason to do so. Would-be practitioners spend their time, ef-
fort, and money seeking to satisfy inappropriate standards of
research scholarship, which gives them little opportunity for
paid, on-the-job learning through interning and clinical prac-
tice. This situation raises the costs that students must bear
while straining the resources for the support of students en-
gaged in genuine academic inquiry through the schools of edu-
cation.
Like most other professional schools, schools of education
are tuition-dependent.
26
Schools of education need lots of stu-
dents paying for lots of courses, and they have relatively few
resources to support detached scholarship. In the current situa-
tion, they must spread those scant resources thinly across an
inflated number of doctoral candidates, each of whom must try
26 Medical schools would seem to be the exception, for they derive
substantial resources from funded research. But if one concentrates
within medical schools on the professional preparation of the M.D.,
they combine a relatively short period of intensive formal instruction
with a subsequent period of income-producing interning and clinical
residency. An original contribution to the research program of medi-
cal schools does not culminate the professional preparation of the
newly minted M.D. See Kenneth M. Ludmerer's two books. Learn-
ing to Heal: The Development of American Medical Education (Bal-
timore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, 1996) and Time to
Heal: American Medical Education from the Turn of the Cenhlty to
the Era of Managed Care (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999).
34 The anomaly in education
to do good research on a shoe-string. With too many poorly
supported doctoral students struggling to make "an original
contribution to knowledge," it proves hard to insist on exacting
standards. Pseudo-scholarship comes to pervade the prepara-
tion of professionals in education even though the world of
practice continually calls for leaders endowed with less aca-
demic paraphernalia and with a fuller repertoire of effective
skills. Excessive academic accoutemlents distort professional
preparation, while a demand for direct relevance to the needs of
professional educators chronically challenges academic in-
quiryP
With all its effort concentrated in the schools of education,
the university serves the field of education less effectively than
it does in areas where a potent academic organization in the
27 Schools of education are beginning to face a powerful financial
reason to shift the advanced preparation of professionals from the
academic model to the professional. With a relatively large number
of doctoral students, a financial time bomb ticks away in the current
situation: schools of education cannot afford to meet what are becom-
ing the prevailing norms for the support of doctoral candidates in
research universities. Graduate schools of education have an inilated
number of doctoral students and fewer resources than the more afflu-
ent parts ofuniversilies. Hence they lack the endowment per student,
the research income per student, and the teaching opportunities (on-
campus or on-line) per student to compete according to the emerging
academic model for supporting advanced education - a five-year
package covering full tuition and providing a substantial stipend for
all students admitted to doctoral programs, which rigorously limit
their size. Schools of education will find it hard to offer competitive
packages to that portion of their doctoral students genuinely engaged
in academic doctoral study. If they do not differentiate the pedagogi-
cal process characterizing the academic doctorate from the profes-
sional doctorate, all doctoral students will increasingly expect full
support through the course oftheir studies. With 15% of the nation's
doctoral students, schools of education would drive themselves to
bankruptcy meeting such demands for assistance.
The anomaly in education 35
arts and sciences stands in creative tension with a strong sepa-
rate school dedicated to the task of professional preparation.
The anomaly in the study of education matters enough to merit
change.
Building a case for change
As an obvious solution, the university could do what it did in
other fields: institute academic departments of education in
their undergraduate and graduate schools of the arts and sci-
ences to complement the professional school of education. In
the arts and sciences, students and scholars would address edu-
cation in an impartial, comprehensive way with no presupposi-
tions about professional practice. Disinterested, academic
scholarship about education would improve. Pressure to use an
academic model in professional preparation would diminish.
Schools of education might restructure to be more like medical
schools, developing a program of professional education com-
bining rigorous fonnal instruction with clinical practice and
overlaying that with an ancillary program of externally funded
educational research responding to clearly defined needs for
improved professional knowledge. This fix is easy to state, but
hard to effect.
Critics have published a steady din calling for an improved
study of edllcation.
29
Some hostile, some sympathetic, they all
assess professional education and appraise research in the field.
Overwhelmingly, the needs of professionals dominate the
analyses. What are and are not professionals doing? How are
28 Most critiques of the situation view it as a problem ofthe education
schools, not the university as a whole. For instance, in The Trouble
with Ed Schools (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), David F.
Labaree analyzes well the problems of status encountered by schools
of education, pointing out how the knowledge needed by the profes-
sion has unusual characteristics.
36 The anomaly in education
they recruited and trained? And how do they generate the
knowledge of potential use in practice serving students and
society? The critiques are high-minded; whether harsh or sup-
portive, they seek ways by which the educational system and
those who labor through it can better serve society and its
progeny.19 All this is important, but it is not what is here in
question. It does not tackle the basic refOlm that the university
must make in the way it organizes the study of education. The
basic reforol does not have to do with success or failure within
the professional school, but with the absence of the study of
education in the arts and sciences. That absence weakens dis-
interested inquiry and distorts professional preparation.
19 The most useful study is An Elusive Science by Ellen Condliffe
Lagemann (op. cit., note 8), a thorough histolical examination of the
investigation of education in research universities. Lagemann ex-
plains why during the period of rapid development before and after
the tum of the twentieth century, research universities did not did not
incorporate the study of education into the arts and sciences, the rea-
sons having to do with gender, as all male faculties feared that de-
partments of education would bring wnvanted co-education in their
wake (Chapters 2 & 3, pp. 41-97). Also as a major step in improving
knowledge about education, she calls for diminishing the institutional
distance between educational research and academic research in the
social sciences and humanities (pp. 231-247). I am in full accord. In
order to anchor such connections and give them real staying power,
however, it is necessat)' for the university to add academic depart-
ments of education in the arts and sciences. Dedicated to disinter-
ested inquiry and teaching, scholars could develop a body of Imowl-
edge about education and engage students in it as an academic study,
thereby complementing the professional schools of education and
their extensive production of "educational research," that kaleido-
scopic effort to equip the educating professions with what they need
to know. An academic department of education would not constitute
a discipline in the mid-twentieth-century sense, but an intellectual
concentration in which scholars use diverse strategies, as they do in
departments of politics. to develop a better understanding of educa-
tional experience.
The anomaly In education 37
By itself, no amOWlt of reform in the professional schools
will bring about a sound demarcation between the academic
and the professional in the Wliversity study of education. The
trouble with ed schools does not cause the weak differentiation;
the trouble is its symptoms. The cause is that the academic arts
and sciences never made a formal place for the objective study
of education within their precincts. And the current difficulty
will not be easy to correct, for universities are unlikely to cre-
ate academic departments of education simply because their
schools of education are burdened with a confusion of func-
tions. To bring such a step about, scholars and lmiversity lead-
ers need to perceive how they can strengthen the arts and sci-
ences themselves, and the university as a whole, by making a
place for detached, academic work on education independent of
the professional school. They naturally ask, Why should we
change the given situation?
A good answer is not easy. Historically, the arts and sci-
ences have denigrated educational scholarship and resisted in-
cluding a department of education in their midst.
30
The arts
30 The Evans Report (op. cit., note 18, p. 6) gives a good example,
circa 1952. It reported a check of the opinions about Ph.D. work at
Teachers College then held by professors in Colwnbia's Graduate
Faculties. Respondents thought the top candidates in education to be
on a par with those in the arts and sciences, but they also held that the
overall spectrum of quality was lower, with many suggesting that "the
poorest candidates from Teachers College. as judged by the disserta-
tion presented and its defense, are inferior to the poorest appearing in
most other departments; that the dissertation of these weaker candi-
dates too frequently are dubious in clarity of definition, adequacy of
content, mastery of research techniques. and effectiveness of presen-
tation; that guidance during the planning and development of the dis-
sertation sometimes appears to have been inadequate; that when their
research leads them into subject-matter fields represented by depart-
ments under the Graduate Faculties. the weaker candidates often
show lack of essential infonnation in such fields; and that final ex-
aminations upon the dissertation are not always sufficiently search-
38 The anomaly In education
and sciences are now unlikely to welcome the disinterested
study of education spontaneously, for they have a well-
ingrained habit of rejection and the field comes freighted with
the peculiar pathologies of a stunted history. 31 The university
ing.n Presently. a similar check of opinion. across many different
campuses, might uncover similar views. Fifty years after the Evans
Report, the Trustees of Teachers College heard a not dissimilar brief
from the outgoing Columbia President, George Rupp, in his envoi to
them. But it was a bum rap, in mid century or now, for the university
needs to let schools of education be professional schools, like other
professional schools, and provide for the academic study of education
in the arts and sciences. as it does for other great sectors of hwnan
experience.
31 Thc decision in the late 1990's by the University of Chicago to
close its Department of Education is a powerful recent example of
that habit of rejection. The Department of Education at Chicago was
a small, high quality professional school with a tradition of academic
strength, which had contracted and needed renewal. It could perhaps
have become an academic department devoted to the disinterested
study of education. Put under review. the Chicago department wa·
vered in its "Self·Study," and made neither a strong case for its auton·
omy as a field among others in the social sciences nor for a clear mis·
sion as a professional school. It claimed to be a bit of both: "as a
multidisciplinary field of inquiry. education gains its coherence
across disciplines by addressing a set of questions derived from prob·
lems of practice." It did not achieve intemal consensus about devel-
oping a non·professional undergraduate major. Its most prominent
proposed area of potential strength was methodology, hardly a raison
d'eh'e for a field, followed second by policy studies, which the Uni·
versity could easily incorporate into its larger and more dynamic Har·
ris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies. See, University of Chi·
cago, Depat1ment of Education, "Self-Study" (January 1996) and
"Report" (November 1996), www.uchicago.edulu.scholarly/educa-
tionlstudy.html and www.uchicago.edulu.scholarly/educationlreport.
hunl. The moral of that sad tale is clear: the case that must be made
is a case for change, not continuity, and it must be a case compelling
enough to overcome strong prejudgment against it. I do not think,
however, that the University of Chicago's action indicates that univer·
The anomaly in education 39
will adopt the strategy of differentiating the academic and the
professional for its work in education, if the advantages are
clear within the context of the arts and sciences themselves.
We shall see that the arts and sciences can reap many a d v a n ~
tages as we pursue answers to two questions. First, does the
absence of the characteristic differentiation in the study of edu-
cation have adverse consequences within faculties of the arts
and sciences that might motivate a change? And second, more
positively. would academic scholars in the arts and sciences
reap benefits were they to add a department of education within
their schools?
Effective answers, that is answers that do cbange the situa-
tion, however, must cross a threshold of resistance. It is not
hard to win tepid assent, followed sotto voce, "Is it worth the
trouble?" Academics of influence need to reflect and come to
strong assent, after which they know what to do and act to do
it. Let us not, therefore, minimize the issue. The university
should adopt differentiation not simply to shift a few scholars
and their programs from one school to another in order to make
arrangements in education more consistent with those in other
fields. That is a mere argwnent of symmetry, which mathema-
ticians may take as grolmds for strong assent, but not most aca-
demicians and certainly not university administrators. The mo-
tive needs to be stronger: making a proper place for the study
of education in the arts and sciences will set the conditions for
a further, important advancement of learning. Organizational
change is worth the trouble when it leads to intellectual results
of vital consequence. Might the disinterested study of educa-
tion do so? Can adding the study of education to the arts and
sciences appreciably advance the work of impartial scholar-
ship, its power and substance, not merely in a new specialized
niche, but across the full scope of academic work as a whole?
sities will necessarily reject a strong case for inclusion of the aca-
demic study of education in the arts and sciences.
40 The anomaly in education
Consider a two-fold response. It will explain why the arts
and sciences could become more productive by making a place
for disinterested work on education. One part, the positive,
will show that through the academic study of education impor-
tant advances in the work of the arts and sciences are feasible.
The other part, the negative, will show that the cun'cnt organi-
zation for the study of education holds back good academic
work, on both education and other important matters. Let us
take the negative up first: conditions in the arts and sciences
and the plight of academic scholars in schools of education
both cun'eotly inhibit the academic enterprise. Let us then lum
to the positive, more important pat1: envisioning what the aca-
demic study of education might become on achieving fuller
development. Together, the reasoning will make evident, not
only that the disinterested study of education would develop
more fully as part of the arts and sciences, but other fields, and
their combination as a whole, would benefit from this advance
and the results would have significant value in the conduct of
life. both individual and collective.
What the university has lost
We start with the negative, weaknesses in the arts and sci-
ences and the disinterested study of education induced by the
current situation. Insofar as it exists in the arts and sciences,
the academic study of education is dispersed as a subsidiary
interest in many different departments. Insofar as it exists in the
schools of education, disinterested inquiry is subject to strong
professional imperatives. Both conditions narrow the scope
and diminish the quality of the resulting scholarship and detract
from the arts and sciences as a whole.
In the arts and sciences, scholars in a variety of departments
publish work of high quality that bears significantly on educa-
tional experience. For instance, within economics, Arnartya
Sen's work concentrates on how subtle incentives tmder condi-
tions of autonomy can significantly change the informational
base from which people make choices, and with that, whole
patterns of human capital fonnation change, deeply altering,
for better and for worse, patterns of economic development.
31
Or within political thought, in recent years theorists have con-
31 The power of the informational base to inform choice is fundamen-
tal and is laid out well in the parable opening Chapter 3 of Amartya
Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), pp.
54-6. The hopeful dynamics that Sen perceives in welfare economics
function because the infonnational base upon which people ground
their choices is not fIxed and impervious to change. In his Nobel
Lecntre, "The Possibility of Social Choice," published in Amartya
Sen, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002), pp. 65-118, Sen explains the role of "infonnational broaden-
ing," a wonderful stealth tenn for education, which can be activated
in many ways to combat the source of poverty and sociopolitical
stagnation in "capability deprivation."
42 What the university has lost
templated declining rates of citizen participation in democratic
polities and resuscitated interest in civic republicanism as a
potential ethos more effective at forming engaged citizens.
33
Likewise, significant contemporary philosophers, among them,
1. Peter Euben, Alexander Nehamas, and Charles Taylor, have
concentrated on the fomlation of the self as a culturally en-
dowed source of action in an historical world.
34
Such studies,
and much, much more, illuminate the embedded role of educa-
tional experience in core activities interpreted through the arts
and sciences.
Not infrequently, a problem of context weakens work perti-
nent to education dispersed in the arts and sciences. Good in-
terpretation arises from the tension between text and context.
Often scholars in the arts and sciences seem to write about edu-
cation by stealth, perhaps not wanting to appear too interested
in a suspect subject. A risk for stealthy scholarship on educa-
tion is not simply.1ike alI scholarship, that someone wiII take it
out of context; rather critics can too easily put it in the wrong
context and as a result evaluate it poorly. If education had a
more visible, legitimate place in the arts and sciences. much
work. now shunted into a context fruitless for interpretation,
might be taken up in a more enlightening way.
33 See, among others, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Lib-
eral Democracy by Eamonn Callan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997),
Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism by
Richard Dagger (New York: Oxford University Press. 1997). Repub-
licanism in the Modem World by John W. Maynor (Malden, MA:
Polity, 2003). and The Greek Tmdition in Republican Thought by
Eric Nelson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
34 See J. Peter Eubcn, Cornlpting Youth: Political Education. Democ-
ratic Culture, and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1997); Alexander Nehamas. The Art of Living: Socratic Reflec-
tions /i'OfIl Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: Universily of California
Press, 1998); and Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of
the Modem Identify (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1989).
What the university has lost 43
Take the philosopher, Stanley Cavell, as a case in point.
Education is a central theme throughout his work, finally made
explicit in his recent book, Cities of Words, which his subtitle
describes as "pedagogical letters."
35
With this book, as with
most of his writing, it is sometimes hard to say exactly what
Cavell is writing abollt, in part because he always writes "as
educator," not stating conclusions and giving, ex post jacto, his
neatly edited reasons for them, but engendering ideas, exempli-
fying the power of conversation to induce them, by setting be-
fore his readers his inner conversations, his internal dialogues,
parenthetical jwnp within parenthetical jump, so that they will
see for themselves how the exchange of words and the associa-
tion of images will enrich their thought. Caven has written
extensively about the importance of an Emersonian perfection-
ism for current philosophy and he objects when critics question
his ideas about Emerson, and with them about Nietzsche, as a
form of anti-democratic The critics, pre-eminent
among them, John Rawls, interpreted perfectionism as a politi-
cal philosophy, the wrong context.
J7
Caven's ideas, along with
J5 Stanley Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Lellers on a Register
of/he Moral Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
J6 See Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The
ConsJi/ulion of Emersonian Peifeclionism (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1990), especially pp. 3-4, 48-53. Cavell reiterated
his discomfort with the criticism in Cities of Words, pp. 211-2, 248.
More broadly, Cavell communicates in undertones his feeling that his
interests do not fit in well with the dominant interests in current phi-
losophical scholarship. I wonder to what degree this uneasiness
arises because he is really an educational theorist, who feels himself,
like others, homeless in the house of intellect.
37 Rawls' critique of perfectionism, a critique of Nietzsche taken at
second-hand, at which Rawls is not at his best, is Section 50 in A
Theory of Jus/ice, Revised edition, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1971, 1999), especially pp. 286. It is bizarre to accuse
Nietzsche of propounding a pernicious political philosophy on the
basis of a quotation from SchopenJiauer as Educator, a meditation on
44 What the university has lost
most perfectionist thought, should be interpreted as educational
philosophy, with perfectionist prescriptions baving less to do
with the presumed prerogatives of elites and more to do with
the self-educative opportunities facing each and every individ-
ual and the struggle to fulfill them.
38
Problems of context go beyond the proper interpretation of
certain ideas and works about them. Without a formal place in
the arts and sciences for the disinterested study of education, it
is sometimes difficult to find the proper context for whole ca-
reers that are life-long efforts in education in a broad and fun-
damental sense - that of Jacques Barzun, for example.
Through a full, productive life, he has won note in many ways,
as historian, stylist, critic, academic leader, and educator. In
each domain, however, he shares the spotlight with others, also
of substantial note. To recognize the full force and stature of
his accomplishments, the central commitment informing them
education in which Nietzsche was most apolitical, rejecting the influ-
ence of the state in any sound education. To be sure, Nietzsche
opened the relatively long and passionate sixth section of ScllOpen-
hailer als Erzieher by meditating on the proposition that the sole task
of humanity is "to engender individual great men," but he immedi-
ately dismisses any sociopolitical meaning to such an assertion as a
crass deterrent to the "intrepid self-knowledge" that allows each per-
son to engage in the lonely pursuit of a higher self. He goes on to
rebuke commerce, the state, good taste, and scholarship as selfish
fonns of vacuous privilege that suck dry the creative energies avail-
able for individual self-fonnation in destructive cultural deflections.
It was the antithesis of elitism, a rousing complaint against the tyr-
anny of barren elites.
3& As an aside, one must wonder whether the use of the term "perfec-
tionism" in philosophy over the past fifty years or so, a rather forbid-
ding teon derived from Methodism, docs not belie the reluctance of
good academics in the arts and sciences to speak directly about edu-
cation. It is remarkable how, in a wide-ranging study such as Perfec-
tionism by Thomas Hurka (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), nothing is said explicitly about education.
What the university has lost 45
all needs to be seen as that of the educator deploying scholar-
ship and criticism, persuasion and action, exhortation and ad-
vice to engender awareness, rigor, precision, discrimination,
and thought. In the twentieth century. few can match his pre-
eminence as a many-sided educator, but in the professional
schools he is unlikely to be remembered as anything but a hete
noir and in the arts and sciences there is not an arena of study
within which to appreciate his central In
39 Nwnerous aspects ofBarzun's work reflect a many-sided pedagogic
intent. Throughout his career, Barzun has reached out as a scholar
beyond a specialist audience, writing sometimes to debunk dangerous
ideas, as in Race, A Study in Superstition (Revised Edition, New
York; Harper & Row, 1937. 1965). Numerous works of criticism
reach out broadly to inform and to enable and then to provoke readers
to push back, to question their assumptions, and either to assent criti-
cally or to assert independently an alternative view. BarzlUl'S most
recent study, From Dawn 10 Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cul-
luraJ Life, J500 10 the Presenl (New York: HarperCollins, 2000)
shows such a pedagogy at work. Most of the work is remarkably
informative, building up an attentive reader's capacity to think about
cultural experience, adducing detail in the service of carefully stated.
large ideas. Then in the final part Barzun advances the thesis of
decadence. cutting into common complacencies, pushing the reader to
form his or her view. Further development of Bamm's work as edu-
cator would need to look closely at his commitment to language us-
age as a tool of clear thinking, for instance, Simple and Direct. (4
th
edition, New York: HarperCollins, 2001) and A Word or Two Before
You Go . .. (rvIiddletown. CT: Wesleyan University Press. 1986); and
to research practices as an element in educating the general public
through The Modern Researcher by Jacques Bamm and Henry F.
Graff, (6
th
edition. Belmont. CA; Thompson. Wadsworth, 2003).
Bamm's criticism has called out for the maintenance of conditions
promoting high-quality achievements and their reach to a discerning
public across a wide range of domains - music. art, literature. and
intellect - through works such as The Energies of Art: Studies of Au-
thors, Classic and Modern (New York; Random House. 1956); Criti-
cal Questions on Music and Lellers, Cultllre and Biography (Chi-
46 What the university has lost
this way. the arts and sciences lack the context for doing full
justice to some of their greatest exemplars.
In addition to problems of context, educational inquiry
witltin the arts and sciences suffers from dispersal and the iso·
lation of parts. Within diverse fields, scholars thinking about
education often have to snuggle for the recognition for their
ideas, which may appear peripheral to their colleagues. Thus
preoccupied, they do not draw potential connections with re-
lated work in other fields. Without a standing discow"se about
the disinterested study of education, the connections between
diverse contributions to it are more likely to go unnoticed. To
be sure, to evidence the absence of something is difficult, but
we can note opportunities for exchange that have failed to de-
velop. For instance, there seems to be a paucity of exchange
between students of human capital fonnation and students of
citizenship education even though the educational dynamics
cago: Chicago University Press, 1982); The Culture We Deserve
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989); and many
more. Barzun worked constructively to advance the conditions of
intellectual achievement in the university as Provost of Columbia and
spoke out forthrightly about improving conditions in higher education
in works such as The House of Intellect (New York: Harper & Broth-
ers, 1959), Science: The Glorious Entertainment (New York: Harper
& Row, 1964), and The American University: How It Runs, Where It
Is Going (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). He has long defended
active intelligence on the fundamentals in education and teaching
through books and essays such as Teachers in America (Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown, 1945); Begin Here: The Forgotten Conditions ofTeach-
ing and Learning (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991);
up to his recent pamphlet, What Is a School and Trim the College!
(Washington: Hudson Institute. 2002). Such is hut a sampling, skip-
ping over much of his formal scholarship and his work in publishing,
all of which nurtures the intellect of the general reader. Where in the
arts and sciences can one celebrate Barzun as educator?
what the university has lost 47
studied by both may be closely related.
40
Likewise, literary
critics writing about the Bildungsroman seem to interact little
with philosophers concerned with the cultural fannation of the
active self.
41
40 Early in my career, in Man and His Circumstances: Ortega as
Educator by Robert McClintock (New York: Teachers College Press,
1971), I tried to develop an idea of civic pedagogy as a concept by
which diverse activities structuring public life might be examined in
relation to each other. Lawrence A. Cremin had a much better tenn
for a similar concept - "the education of the public" - in Public Edt/-
cation (New York: Basic Books, 1976) pp. 57-80. But neither has
had any traction as a concept drawing diverse strands of research into
relation with each other. Rather than seeking basic unifYing con-
cepts, indigenous to education, so to speak, the professional interests
dominant in the study of education lead scholars to use concepts de-
rived from one or another field in the arts and sciences in order to
frame solutions to specific issues encountered in institutions of fonnal
instruction. Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg provide an ex-
ample in their introduction to their fine collection of essays, Educa-
tion and Citizenship in Libera/-Democratic Societies: Teaching for
Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), p. 8, where they observe "the chapters in this
book address the requirements of citizenship in liberal-democratic
political theory as it has evolved in recent years, in order to take into
account claims from cultural recognition through education." The
movement of thought is not to generate a fimdamental view from the
experience of education, but to clarifY a specific problem in the ex-
perience of education by bringing more generaJ, external ideas to bear
upon it.
41 It should not be surprising, as a sub-concern within literary criti-
cism, that studies of the Bi/dungsroman put the novel at the center of
discussion, as the matter to be illuminated, with Bildung at the pe-
riphery, as that which will be discussed in order to illuminate the
novel. It is a symptom, however, indicating the lack of a coherent
concern for education in the arts and sciences, that there is no sus-
tained effort to examine what one can learn about education and
Bi/dung from the novel and how one might test that knowledge and
48 What the university has lost
Conceptually, we can see what happens. Educational work
within the arts and sciences is largely encapsulated within each
originating discipline, there being no group to draw different
inquiries together, concentrating a sustaining attention on what
is common among them. Scholars such as Cbarles Taylor in
The Sources of the Self, Alexander Nehamas in The Art o/Liv-
ing, and J. Peter Buben in Con'upting Youth separately work
from a distinctive background and interest, with its unique in-
tegrity, and that is as it should be. In addition to the integral
value each achieves, however, their separate works potentially
infonn a common discourse about education, and it is the ab-
sence of a systematic centering of that discourse in the arts and
sciences that we must lament. To begin, a department of edu-
cation need not be large and it could start usefully by drawing a
few initial faculty members from schools of education and a
few from existing departments of the arts and sciences. But by
starting to work, beginning to prepare advanced students in the
disinterested study of education, it would strengthen currently
disaggregated contributions fi-om within the arts and sciences
by providing them with a coherent context and by educing pro-
ductive connections among them.
More is at stake. To put ideas and careers in their proper
context is important. To draw fruitful connections between
separate strands of work is too. Beyond all that, detacbed in-
quuy about education has importance for the fundamental mis-
sion of the arts and sciences themselves. Intellect leavens ex-
perience in three ways - with scholarship, research, and criti-
cism. In lived experience, scholarship, research, and criticism
connect it to other ideas about education. See The Way of the World:
The Bildungsroman in European Culture by Franco Moretti, New
edition, (New York: Verso, 2000), Season of Youth: The Bildungsro-
man from Dickens 10 Golding by Jerome Hamilton Buckley (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Reflection and Action:
Essays on the Bildungsroman edited by James Hardin (Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina Press, 1991).
What the university has lost 49
overlap and in the person they combine to make the complete
academic, yet conceptually they have significant differences,
which become clearer if we think about them as ideal-types.
Scholarship begins from the cmnulative state of a field, the
broader the better, and integrates findings, new and old, ad-
dressing a fundamental concern by crafting a coherent under-
standing of the whole. Research starts with a well-defined,
specific question, to which the researcher seeks a clear and
definite ffilswer using peer-sanctioned methods and techniques.
Criticism addresses a spectrum of aims and accomplishments
and iofoTIns selection among them, strengthening assent, deep-
ening appreciation, provoking doubt, channeling attention and
energy.
In practice, research is taking on a role, central yet problem-
atic. Research is an important means in the conduct of scholar-
ship and criticism, for scholars and critics alike must answer
numerous particular questions in the exercise of their craft. In
addition, research is also an important purpose, one that is ever
more central in academe: not a means, but an end, the dominant
purpose defining eHte effort - the essential character of the re-
search university itself. Leading universities have become re-
search universities because they depend financially on funded
research and their faculty members rely on the publication of
peer-reviewed research for promotion and tenure. Such activ-
ity is a great source of intel1ectual energy in the arts and sci-
ences. As researchers bring their specific results together as
the basis for theoretical abstraction, they energize scholarship,
and as they uncover Imexpected specifics they empower criti-
cism. In addition, research powers much professional work, as
distinct from the academic, for good research tends to be use-
driven, conducive to interested, not disinterested, results, and it
accentuates findings with instrumental value directly applicable
to a specific form of activity. In contrast, scholarship and criti-
cism, even when energized by significant research programs,
often have less direct instrumental value. Instead, they leaven
experience substantial1y through their capacity to have lasting
50 What the university has lost
educative effects as a student uses them to define her values,
standards, and skills. The pay off is neither direct nor immedi-
ate, and consequently the arts and sciences need recurrently to
explain the educative value of reflective scholarship and criti-
cal discourse with care, which disinterested scholarship on
education can help to do.
With respect to the educative power of the arts and sciences,
the ascendance of research in academic culture presents impor-
tant, but subtle difficulties. The prestige of research conduces
to instructional practices that differ in important ways fTOm
those that would pertain with scholarship, research, and criti-
cism in a proper balance. Pedagogically, the distinction be-
tween the professional and the academic relates closely to a
distinction between the applicable lessons and the fomlative
education. In her studies, a student seeks both applicable
knowledge and formative experience, one problem being that
the fomler is relatively easy to identify and assess while the
latter can be obscure and hard to measure. Fonnative educa-
tion is all that which a student builds up over time by way of
characteristic interests, proclivities, hopes, skills, considered
purposes, attachments, and a unique, dynamic mix of knowl-
edge, lore, information, and experience. ~ 1
4! In Gennan there is a literature, both extensive and deep, on fonna-
tive education, Hi/dung, but it is largely ignored in English. It is im-
portant to reinvigorate the ability to think well about the fOlmative
effects of education as they develop over the full period of a person's
fonnative experience. Schooling, and the study of education as
schooling, pigeonholes educational experience into grades and sub-
jects and assesses the fragmental)' results as these are evident in co-
horts, not the integral development achieved by the person. Educa-
tional scholarship needs to regain contact with ideas about Hildtmg,
and a good place to start is "BildsamkeitIBildung" by Dieuich Benner
and FriedheIm Briiggen, which surveys it well in liistorisches
W6rterbuch del' Piidagogik edited by Dietrich BeMer and JUrgen
Oelkers (Weinheim: Beltz Verlag, 2004), pp. 174-215.
What the university has lost 51
A subtle problem is now building because it arises, not di-
rectly. but as a side effect. All three - scholarship, research,
and criticism - offer students significant formative experience.
Whenever a student is learning by doing, the process is deeply
formative, and as a student learns to be a researcher, as all stu-
dents should, she does so by doing research. a deeply formative
engagement. In this sense, the formative induction into the
activities of scholarship, research, and criticism are all of one
piece. The difference arises with the way the results of re-
search enter into education in comparison to those of scholar-
ship and criticism.
Whatever the field, the accomplished contributor deploys all
three - scholarship, research, and criticism - in a well-unified
effort. Maintaining the balance becomes more difficult. how-
ever. Within the arts and sciences, the prestige of research as
an end product grows and that of scholarship and criticism
shrinks, for research produces the coin of tangible worth, appli-
cable answers to evident questions. Education as accumulating
applicable knowledge gains prestige at the expense of educa-
tion as formative experience. This makes the formative tasks
of scholarship and criticism much harder and detracts from the
education of researchers as well. Doctoral students perceive
the instnunental value of research work and readily plunge into
it, accepting unreflectively the constraints of one or another
formal methodology that they find at hand, eager to produce
some results. In this process, moreover, they are often impa-
tient with the scholarly effort required to base that research on
a well-developed theoretical grounding and to extract its full,
critical implications for theory and practice. In this way, re-
search itself as a formative educational experience suffers from
the prestige of its results. With such influences steadily shap-
ing educational practice at every level, the measurement of
recollected information, research findings at one or another
remove, and some superficial skills, increasingly mark educa-
tional attainment.
52 What the university has lost
An education in the results of research alone does not suffice;
the disinterested mission of the arts and sciences thrives
through formative engagement in scholarship, research, and
criticism, the power of which is more enlightening than instru-
mental. How does this formative enlightening take place? By
sustained engagement in scholarship, a student develops a large
conceptual framework with which she can judge the impor-
tance and plausibility of diverse ideas and assertions. By ac-
tively doing research, a student famls habits of testing how
well different claims are grounded and perceives the strengths
and weaknesses in assertions of validity. By producing rea-
soned criticism, a student acquires a considered stmcture of
priorities to draw upon in the endless process of making
choices in response to alI the claims upon her attention and
commitment. The arts and sciences populate a thoughtful pub-
lic as a steady stream of university students form their intellec-
tual standards by engaging in the work of scholarship, research,
and criticism for substantial periods. And the arts and sciences
nourish that thoughtful public through a continuing flow of
publication, renewing and extending the scholarship, research,
and criticism active in the different realms of public discussion.
Traditionally, the fom13tive role of scholarship, research, and
criticism seemed self-evident or relatively easy to uphold. As
professionalism has spread into the arts and sciences, the ra-
tionale for more and more work appears to be instrumental. if
not to high public purpose, at least to the interests of academics
themselves. Under such circumstances, the mission of the arts
and sciences. exercised through the formative uses of scholar-
ship, research, and criticism, becomes less self-evident. More
and more, academics have difficulty showing employment con-
scious students, tlleir parents, and the public how study in the
arts and sciences should differ from gaining marketable skills
through professional preparation. And ironically, the univer-
sity reinforces this instLUmental bias by treating the subject of
education itself as strictly an instrumental subject. Currently,
the university proclaims through its actions with respect to the
What the university has lost 53
study of education that only professional preparation is of
value. As the arts and sciences face an insistently market-
conscious clientele, they give short shrift to the disinterested
study of education. Yet it should be serving as a valuable re-
source in developing a more compe1ling rationale for a fonna-
tive education throughout the arts and sciences. Thus, it may
prove deeply imprudent to ignore the study of education in the
arts and sciences at a time when the claim that scholarship and
criticism have self-evident value as formative educators carries
ever less weight.
43
Experience in schools of education shows that belief in self-
evident values poorly supports impartial scholarship and doubt-
provoking criticism. Academic work on pedagogical themes
scattered through the arts and sciences has little resonance in
schools of education. As we have seen, conditions in those
schools pressure academic scholars to make their work instru-
mental in the professional preparation of teachers and other
practitioners. Mid-twentieth-century efforts to resist this pres-
4J Weakened convictions about the educative mission of the arts and
sciences may have deep and fateful historical consequences. Much
historical initiative seems to have moved away from those working
within the Enlightenment tradition, as suggested most recently by
Garry Wills in "The Day the Enlightenment Went Out," The New
York times, November 4, 2002, op ed page, www.nytimes.
coml2004/11l04/0pinionl04wills.html. In many ways the carriers of
the Enlightenment tradition, historically public intellectuals whose
organizational base is the arts and sciences, have been suffering a
failure of nerve, in large part because they have lost confidence that
enlightenment has any educative potency. The critique of enlighten-
ment has gone too far and to care well for the arts and sciences, it is
important to go back and study again works like the Dialectic of
Enlightenment: Philosophic Fragments by Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno (Edmund Jephcott, trans. Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1947,2002) in order to see that the critique of instru-
mental reason is not an unconditional critique, but one voiced in de-
fense of the fonnative. educational power of enlightened reasoning.
S4 What the university has lost
sure had hopeful beginnings but proved unsustainable. In the
late 19505, critics attacked schools of education as hotbeds of
anti-intelIectualism.
44
The attack stung scholars in schools of
education and they responded by trying to connect more
closely to key departments in the arts and sciences, inspired by
Bernard Bailyn's analysis, Education in the Forming of Ameri-
can Society. Bailyn showed how historians of education had
failed to ask productive questions because they were preoccu-
pied with the interests of the profession, working to build the
morale of prospective teachers. They had neglected to pursue
disinterested topics of research and thereby missed the oppor-
tunity to clarify the role of education in the fonning of Ameri-
can society.4S
Academics in schools of education de-emphasized the needs
of the profeSSion and took their cues about what to study and
how to study it from cognate disciplines in the humanities and
social sciences. They became professors of a discipline "and
education" - anthropology and education, or history and educa-
44 Educational Wastelands: The Retreatfi'om Leaming in Our Public
Schools by Arthur Bestor (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953)
was the most distinguished source of this critique. The Miseducation
of American Teachers by James Koerner (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1963) was a good summation, discounting rhetorical exaggerations.
45 Whcn I was a graduatc student in history and cducatiOli in the early
1960s at Teachers College, Education in the Forming of American
Society: Needs and Opportunities for Study (New York: W. W. Nor-
ton & Co., 1960, 1972) was thc defining manifcsto, followed up with
Lawrence A. Cremin's The Wondelful World of Ellwood Patterson
Cubberley: An Essay on the Historiography of American Education
(New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers Collegc, Columbia
University, 1965). Crcmin worked with pcrsonal dedication as a
scholarly historian to fill out the vision. which he complcted with
great succcss before his wltimcly death in 1990. Only a few years
later. his substantive work is out of print., and the agenda dominant in
the histOlY of education is oncc again more exclusively focused on
the interests of the profession.
what the university has lost 55
tion, or sociology and education, and so on. In this role, they
taught with a rigor characteristic of the arts and sciences. 4 ~
They prized recognition by peers there and paid less attention
to the relevance of their courses in the preparation of practitio-
ners. Good doctoral programs spread and disinterested schol-
arship about education strengthened. The effects of the move-
ment persist to the present, but ever more faintly.
Fortuitously, the cultivation of the disciplines and education
had initially taken hold in a period of academic expansion.
While resources were flush, the effort succeeded. It did not,
however, come to grips with the fiscal organization of profes-
sional schools, which differ significantly from schools of the
arts and sciences, a reality that became inescapab1e as contrac-
46 See The Discipline of Education edited by John Walton and James
L. Kuethe (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963) for a
movement related to the disciplines and education - a less successful
effort to define a discipline of education. Within that movement, it
was probably a tactical error to speak about a discipline mther than a
deparbnent or a field, for the effort died quickly as participants ar-
gued with one another over whether a unique methodology was the
hallmark of a discipline, and if so, whether education, which has been
methodologically eclectic, to say the least, could possibly be a disci-
pline. It might have been a better initiative to describe the academic
study of education as a field of study, one sllch as political science
with its multiple vectors of inquiry pursued with a mix of methodolo-
gies. That, in effect is what is being called for in this essay. The dis-
cipline of education never got started. The disciplines and education
did, successfully spreading, but the effort had a tendency to over-
expand staffmg needs inherent in it. Each discipline that was to be
included - say, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, politi-
cal science, and sociology - wanted at least a diminutive critical
mass, often three faculty members, which put severe demands on
resources, particularly relative to the tuition dollars such groupings
could generate in the professional schools.
56 What the university has lost
tion beset universities in the 19705:" Schools of education are
tuition-dependent, that is, dependent on tuition paid by students
who do not seek knowledge for its own sake, but for its profes-
sional relevance. Despite a concerted effort by those appointed
to a discipline and education, tuition-dependency progressively
eviscerated the academic study of education in the professional
school. The discipJinary study of education has often persisted
nominally. but in a tuition-dependent professional school it
cannot be genuinely robust and detached. The cumulative deg-
radation has been marked.
47 In 1977. on behalf of the Teachers College Faculty Executive
Committee, I prepared a 36 page study of the College budget chroni-
cling contraction and tuition-dependency, Thinking about the Budget:
An Informal Report to the Teachers College Faculty. In addition, I
circulated a memo "Possible Strategy for Developing the Depart-
ment," analyzing the fiscal difficu1ties that we faced in the home of
the disciplines and education, the Department of Philosophy and the
Social Sciences. My argument was not obscure: to tlllive in a tuition-
dependent, financially strapped professional school, we needed to add
to our commitment to academic Ph.D. instruction other sorts of pro-
grams that would generatc more tuition and research income. Imple-
menting a response to the argument was not easy, however. My col-
leagues deemed (I think rightly from this vantage point) my strategy
unrealistic in the particulars 1 advanced. Wc stood pat, and in 1994
Teachers College disbanded the Department of Philosophy and the
Social Sciences, spreading its programs into other units where they
might be more responsive to the core concerns of the professional
school. Adherents to the disciplinary idea have not yet found a way
to replace such a department with a better means for remaining closc
to the acadcmic strengths of the university. It is time, however, for
the tmivcrsity to look at the question as its problem, not a problem
encapsulated in the schools of education, which cannot solve it con-
veniently for the tmiversity without wider changes in the prevailing
academic organization.
What the university has lost
The educational and the pOlitical
57
To gauge how marked, compare scholarship on the heritage
of politicaJ thought, securely situated in the arts and sciences,
with research on the legacy of educational ideas, conducted
almost exclusively by specialists in schools of education. Stu-
dents of political thought and of educational thought deal with
essentially the same resources and often themes of politics and
education intertwine in the very same historical texts. Conse-
quently, one might expect scholarship in the two fields to be
similar in scope, intensity, and quality of results. In actuality,
scholarship on political themes in the historical record differs
astonishingly from that on educational themes, with work on
political thought dynamic and deep and that on educational
thought static and thin.
Let us survey some evidence. In English, educational
thought lacks a distinguished series like the Cambridge TexIs in
the History of Political Thought. As the study of education in
Germany has increasingly come under the influence of Ameri-
can professional practices, the excellent collection, SchiJninghs
Sammlung Piidagogischer Schriften, has been significantly cut
back.
43
And the contrast reaches further than the publication of
sources. A startling disjlmction in the range and depth of stud-
48 The Cambridge Texts in the His/ory of Political Thought currently
provide editions of over 125 works from the early Greeks to recent
times, for most in both hardbound and paperbound versions. Each
edition is edited to high standards and includes an authoritative intro-
duction and scholarly apparatus. See the current list,
www.cup.org/titles/subjecUsbns_vista.asp?code=SS3&legend=Texts
%20in%20 Political%20Thought. Schiininghs Sammiung Piida-
gogischer Schriflen was a similar collection published by Verlag Fer-
dinand SchOningh, Paderborn, Germany (www.schoeningh.de). In
the mid-1980s in comprised editions of educational writings by some
80 figures in the Western tradition, each volume well-edited and in-
troduced. Judging from the current online catalogue the list in print is
substantially reduced.
58 What the university has lost
ies separates the two bodies of scholarship. Political theorists
substantively engage their past; educational theorists do not.
For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a seminal thinker
generating important concepts about both politics and educa-
tion and one would expect thCOl;sts in both areas to produce
studies about his ideas. In accordance with that expectation,
students of political theory have published a steady stream of
thoughtful studies about Rousseau's work, while scholars in
schools of education have produced virtually Ilotlling since the
early twentieth century.49 Such a dispatity holds, not only for
Rousseau, but for nearly all the historical record.
Important work in political philosophy sustains creative dia-
logue with the historical sources, which John Rawls exempli-
fies in A Theory of Justice. Rawls constructed his theory start-
ing with concerns initially defined by Aristotle; he drew heav-
ily on Kant; and he worked out his ideas by improving step by
step on utilitarian theory.50 The basic commitment to democ-
49 Full citations on this point would be tedious. Consider that the two
chapters on Rousseau and education in The Cambridge Companion to
Rousseau edited by Patrick Riley (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 200 I) are written by a professor of government and a professor
of political science. Peruse the list of "Works on Rous-
seau (a highly selective list)," pp. 446-449, which includes many re-
cent studies of Rousseau's political thought and none ofltis education
ideas. Compare two contemporaneous early studies, one good and
the other better - The Educational Theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau
by William Boyd (New York: Russell & Russell, 1911, 1963) and
The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau by C. E. Vaughan,
(2 vots., New York: Burt Franklin, 1915, n.d.{circa 1965]). Note that
Boyd's work, the good, still circulates through citations (as in the
above Companion, p. 268, n2), while Vaughan's work, the better. has
been thoroughly superseded in the available literature.
50 See Rawls' discussion of the Aristotelian Principle in Section 65 of
A TheolY of Justice, his discussion of the "Kantian Interpretation" in
section 40, and his use of utilitarianism as the major alternative
throughout the construction of his theory of justice as fairness. Fur-
What the university has lost 59
ratic participation running through Benjamin R. Barber's work
derives in significant part from a life-long dialogue with Jean-
Jacques Rousseau.
51
Likewise, C. B. Macpherson shaped his
basic views through reflection on contract theory from Hobbes
to Locke and the influence of Aristotle in the thought of Alas-
dair MacIntyre is fimdamental.
31
Isaiah Berlin pioneered writ-
ing the history of political thought as a way to contribute sub-
stantively to present-day political thinking. and J. G. A. Pocock
and Quentin Skinner have extended those beginnings into a
major way of developing the field.
53
ther evidence of Rawls' respect for the intellectual value to be found
in the historical tradition of political and moral thought is to be found
in his Lectures on Ihe History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2000).
51 Evident in Barber's Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a
New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and An
Aristocracy of Everyone: The Politics of Education and the Future of
America (New York: Oxford University Press. 1992). It derived from
Barber's early work, reflected in part ("an invisible presence through-
out our study") in The Dealh of Communal Liberty: A History of
Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sityPress, 1974),p. 16.
52 For C. B. Macpherson, see The Political Theory of Possessive Indi-
vidualism: Hobbes to Locke (New York: Oxford University Press,
1962), and Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1973), especially, Part three: "Seventeenth-
Century Roots of the Twentieth-Century Predicament," pp. 207-250.
For Alasdair MacIntyre. see After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), especially pp.
137-153.
SJ The key work for each is: Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating 'Four Es-
says on Liberty,' (200 edition. New York: Oxford University Press,
1969. 2002), Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Politi-
cal Thought and the At/antic Republican Tradition, (Revised Edition,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.2003). and Skinner, The
60 What the university has lost
In contrast, insofar as philosophers of education work in dia-
logue with past tltinkers, they generally look back little further
than John Dewey and write obsessive commentaries on his
educational ideas.
54
In political thought, the depth and variety
of scholarship in tum leads to a far more vibrant set of instruc-
tional resources. A steady flow of quality textbooks and an-
thologies, up to date with the academic scholarship, equips the
field to serve as an important component ill general education.
In education, fewer texts and anthologies, too often backed by
static, older scholarship, cycle through successive editions to
serve staple courses that have been required, largely un-
changed, since teacher education programs took fonn early in
the twentieth century. In short, the study of educational
Foundations of Modern Political Thought. (2 vols., New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1978).
S4 For instance. a search of the title index from 1995 to 2000 for Edu-
cational Theory, the leading journal in philosophy and education,
(www .ed.uiuc.edulEPS/educational-titeorylIndexes/index _95-
OO_title.asp) shows 12 contributions about Dewey; Plato, Rousseau,
and Marx 1 each; and none on Aristotle, Erasmus. Locke, Hegel,
Pestalozzi, Herbart, Matthew Arnold, or Maria Montessori. The His-
tory of Education Quarterly shows a similar clumping spread over a
longer period, (1961-1998 - it emphasizes the institutional history of
education over the intellectual history): Dewey 13, Plato 4, Aristotle
3. Rousseau 3, Herbart 2. and none on Erasmus, Locke, Pestalozzi.
Hegel, Marx. or Montessori. In contrast, Political n,eory shows a
much more well-distributed interest in the tradition between 1973 and
2000. with 18 articles about Socrates, Plato 11. Aristotle 24,
Augustine 3, Marsiglio of Padua 2, Machiavelli 17, Hobbes 18,
Locke 16. Hume 3, Montesquieu 4. Rousseau 18, the Federalist pa-
pers 4. Wollstonecraft 1, Tocqueville 5, Bentham 8. 101m Stuart Mill
16, Burke 8, Hegel 25. Marx 28, Nietzsche 15. Oakeshott 10, Haber-
mas 8, Rawls 12, and Foucault 15. The discrepancy in results be-
tween the two fields is not the fault of individual scholars. With the
current organization of effort, the study of education radically lacks
the critical mass to take effective account of its historical roots in
educational theory.
What the university has lost 61
thought is a declining service component in professional educa-
tion, whi1e the study of political thought is a dynamic research
and teaching field in the arts and sciences,53
55 The best text on the history of West em education is still A History
o/Western Education. by James Bowen, 3 vois., (New York: St. Mar-
tin's Press, 1972, 1975, & 1981). Taylor & Francis recently repub-
lished it at $390, no campus bestseller. The best text in the philoso-
phy of education is Philosophy of Education by Nel Noddings (Boul-
der, CO: Westview Press, 1995), It dispenses with "Philosophy of
Education before the Twentieth Century" in an IS-page chapter, fol-
lowed with a J6-page chapter on JOM Dewey and then, preliminaries
complete. it goes on to its the main concerns, the different strands of
post-Deweyian educational philosophy. Noddings' text is good, other
texts less so, with perhaps Hislorical and Philosophical Foundalions
of Education: A Biographical Introduction by Gerald L. Gutek, 4th
edition, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005)
typifying the lot. It is carefully engineered for a standard course in
teacher education and its prose, at once simplistic yet obscure, does
not suggest that a well-heeled, cost-conscious publisher respects the
sophistication of those entering the profession highly. Political
thought has a variety of quality textbooks and anthologies. Oxford
University Press has recently issued one of each, reflecting the excel-
lence of the resources - Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Pre-
sent, a collection of thoughtful essays on contributors to the canon of
political thought by scholars, mostly in mid-career, edited by David
Boucher and Paul Kelly (New York: 2003). and Classics of Political
and Moral Philosophy, edited by Steven M. Cahn (New York: 2002),
which gives well-introduced, substantial selections for major figures
in the tradition, filling 1200 well-packed pages. Compare it to Phi-
losophical Documents in Education edited by Ronald F. Reed and
Tony W. Jolmson, 2"" edition, (New York: Longman, 2000), which
totals 286 pages of poorly introduced texts, of which 85 concern
thinkers prior to Dewey. Philosophers on Education: New Historical
Perspectives edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (New York:
Routledge, 1998) would seem to be an exception, for it provides a
solid parallel for educational theory for what Boucher and Kelly offer
in political theory. Contributors to it. however, are almost all aca-
demics from the arts and sciences willing to write on education. It
62 What the university has lost
As human experience, educational experience is on a par
with political experience: both are pervasive, complex, and im-
perative. Nothing intrinsic to the subject explains why scholar-
ship about educational theory should so lag the study of politi-
cal theory. In the nineteenth century, German academics pro-
duced extensive, deep work on education and Bildung, as did
American intellectuals from the Transcendentalists through
Dewey. In potential, the field of education can match that of
politics, but the results do not. The differences stem primarily
fi'om dispatities in supporting institutional arrangements and
constraining purposes. There is no lack of support, but a poor
organization of it.
In total, the university recruits and trains many more educa-
tional researchers than political researchers. Those who study
education include people fully as capable as those who study
politics. Nevertheless, scholarship in education lags because
reliance in the university solely on the professional school
overwhelmingly turns intellectual attention to the pursuit of
interested, instrumental knowledge, serviceable in the organ-
ized work of the profession. Far too much is thus ignored. 56
Good educational scholarship should have roots in the daily
work of education. Surely that work, in school and out, pro-
vides the empirical data to be considered in thinking about
education. This means that scholarship in education faces the
hints at what the university might gain by providing a better place for
the academic study of education.
56 Highly committed, well-educated teachers will often scorn in-
service programs run from schools of education, for they perceive the
professional view, no matter what particulars it propounds, as hope-
lessly Procrustean. Meira Levinson, in the Demands of Liberal Edu-
cation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), is beginning to
show how disinterested scholarship, anchored with engagement and
respect for the complex actualities of educational activity, can grasp
with a fuller comprehension of the entailments inheting in professed
principles.
What the university has lost 63
challenge of understanding it as a full, formative experience
lived by each person, who finds herself plunged into a cultural
system of global scope, historical depth, and intricate rigor,
having to acquire from it the personal resources with which she
will seek fulfillment. In actuality, this educational cbaUenge is
far ful1er, more difficult, and more many-sided than the con-
cerns the educating profession takes as its ends in view. A full-
blooded scholarship about education must speak, with depth,
with intellectual substance, and with hwnane purpose, to every
dimension of the educational chal1enge. It is not the subject,
but the institutional arrangements supporting its study that ac-
count for the differences in the scholarship about education and
other great concerns of human life.
Scholars trying to consider education in a detached manner
have found themselves pressured by the institutional realities of
the professional school to concentrate, not on knowledge for its
own sake, but to confect syntheses satisfYing to recmits for the
profession. Interested knowledge about education is important
and necessary, but not sufficient. Seeing its insufficiency,
peers in the arts and sciences, haughty from accidental superi-
ority, treat education as a matter unworthy of organized study.
That prejudice ought to be brought to the bar of critical exami-
nation. Poor conditions for educational scholarship have
weakened development of the field. In what might that devel-
opment consist? Is the disinterested study of education actually
unworthy of inclusion in the arts and sciences? Do the poten-
tials of education as an academic study merit serious effort to
include it within the arts and sciences? These questions con-
front, not the schools of education, but the Wliversity as a
whole.
What the university will gain
Note that we are moving here to the positive from the nega·
tive part of our two-fold response to the question whether the
arts and sciences should make a place for impartial inquiry
about education. The positive task is to show that education as
an academic study, properly developed, can substantially con-
tribute to the work of the arts and sciences, and through that, to
the work of the university as a whole.
To begin, let us consider further the differentiation between
interested and disinterested scholarship. A subtle shift, I think,
differentiates professional from academic investigation, namely
whether the upshot of the work, its pragmatic cash value, will
be a thing or action on the one hand or a concept or theory on
the other. Interested inquiry, even when it addresses a great
matter with Olympian scope, starts by examining chosen
strumentalities or actions. It becomes interested at its origin
because it defines a domain of objects or actions and receives
the interest, which will guide the inquiry, as it takes on the
poses that give rise to the objects or activities in question,
ing as its justification its capacity to further those purposes.
Professional knowledge usually becomes highly interested
knowledge because it generally starts out from what members
of the profession and their clients do, internalizing their
poses as the purposes to be served by the inquiry.
With the professional, definitions of the professional activity,
or components of it, defme the interest that controls the
quiry. Education is schooling; education is formal instruction,
the work of teachers; education is construction of the common
school, the public school, education promotes equity, driver
safety, social mobility, the national defense. With each such
defmition delimiting the sphere of action as the subject of
66 What the university will gain
study, the inquiry takes on tbe purpose of its subject, aiming to
enhance the action in question - to strengthen schooling, to
improve fannal instruction, to perfect the skill and alt of teach-
ers, to refonn the public school, to promote all manner of goals
that people may seek through the work of education. Of
course, these arc worthy ends and the knowledge achieved as a
result can be highly instrumental, but the instrumental results
differ from the results that disinterested inquiry into education
would achieve. The two enterprises are not the same.
Concept formation
Disinterested inquiry starts, not with what people do, or even
with what the stuff of nature does, but with concept fomlation,
Begriffsbildung, the postulation of an idea, an abstract proposi-
tion, from which the scholar can build a conceptual framework
with which to interpret or explain an element of experience.
As with interested inquiry, disinterested scholars generally start
concept formation with a definition, but the object of the defi-
nition is not some concrete thing or set of actions, but a con-
cept, an idea, an intellectual proposition, something that exists
in thought and words. Concepts are intellectual objects and
detached inquiry concerns ideas, not things or activities. The
ideas may be about things or activities, but the inquiry is about
the ideas, which must not be confused with the things or activi-
ties to which tbey might refer. And frequently, perhaps always
rigorously speaking, the objects to which they refer are imagi-
nary, conceptual, ideal, not the tangible actualities themselves.
Consequently, as a noun, the term "gravity" refers to a theoreti-
cal concept accounting for countless phenomenal behaviors,
not to an objective force, but to a conceptual explanation ..
To find excellent examples, consult Galileo's 1\vo New Sci-
ences. In that work, Galileo gave many powerful, conceptual
definitions. One started the "fourth day's dialogue," investigat-
ing the motion of projectiles: "imagine any particle projected
What the university will gain 67
along a horizontal plane without friction; then we know, from
what has been more fully explained in the preceding pages, that
this particle will move along this same plane with a motion
which is unifonn and perpetual. provided the plane has no lim-
its." This particle is thoroughly conceptual, patently counter-
factual with respect to the world of experience, with proofs in
thought, explained in prior pages, accounting for the imagined
behavior of the postulated objects.57 The word "any" here is
deeply significant, and earlier, at the start of the "third day's
dialogue" on lmiform motion, Galileo significantly called atten-
tion to its importance as he explicitly inserted it into the tradi-
tional definition of unifonn motion - motion in which equal
distances are traversed in equal times becoming motion in
which equal distances are traversed "during any equal intervals
of time." Any here drives the definition out of the realm of par-
ticular instances and locks it securely in the conceptuaJ realm,
with the proposition applying, not to this or that perceived mo-
tion, apparently unifonn, but to any conceivable motion, any
thinkable one.
59
Whether it touches on moving objects or cul-
tural events, detachment works to generate in thought a con-
ceptual tmderstanding or explanation that will hold as an intel-
lectual proposition about any conceivable instance.
59
57 Galileo Galilei, Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, Henry
Crew and Alfonso de Salvio, trans., (New York: Dover Publications,
n.d.l, p. 244.
53 Two New Sciences, p. 154.
59 Historians and others, apparently dealing with unique particulars,
have sometimes suggested that discourse applicable to "any" instance
is characteristic of natural science, as distinct from the Geisteswissen-
schaften or human sciences. As Max Weber showed in his critique of
Eduard Meyer in The Methodology of the SociaJ Sciences, (Edward
A. SWIs and Henry A. Finch, trans., New York: Free Press, 1949), pp.
127ff., the problem of the unique can be exaggerated, for the ftrst act
of conceptualization in any science is to abstract from particulars a set
of ideal categories about which to think, even if the thinking is to
68 What the university will gain
Intellectual, not material, action is at stake in concept fanna-
tion. A well-fanned idea mayor may not serve a concrete,
tangible interest; it does not exist, however, for that purpose.
With instrumental inquiry so widespread. people become far
too crass in the way they understand the pragmatic cash value
of ideas; their payoff is properly, not material, but intellectual
in disinterested thought. With well-fanned concepts, thought
grasps meaning and explains causalities intelligible in actual
experience. Concepts serve in thinking, in reflecting on ex-
perience, not in experience itself.
Good concept fannation is disinterested because what is at
stake in thinking effectively is of a different order, an ideal or-
der, than the tangible interests at stake in the actual experience.
intet]lret the uniqueness of the patticular. Natural science. like the
human, starts in a primitive sense with unique particulars - this tree
or that rock or the night sky as it appears now. Nature has yielded
instances of its homogeneous elements only after its was subjected to
much post·theoretical refining. Hence all sciences, the natural and
the human, touch upon particulars and develop through the fonnatioll
of concepts in the realm of thought; they construct the realm of
thought by inventing concepts elaborating its contents. Within that
realm, students of the hwnan sciences often want to preserve the par·
ticularity of what they study, and even in such an effort, an "any"
remains, for they cannot abstract themselves out of the intellectual
construct that they create and consequently the "any" for them ap-
plies, not to the unique object of interpretation or explanation, but to
the interpreter or explainer - "any interpretation will need to take this
construction of the matter into account." Were the discourse to insist
on the unique patticuJarity of the interpreter, it would be without
meaning or value as a communication. And interpretation becomes
partial, partisan, and dangerous when voiced as if only a special
group of intet]lreters, those who share an identity defined by external
characteristics, can make the intet]lretation and partake in the values
it nurtures. In contrast, disinterested study of the particular results is
an ideal construction in thought, one pertinent to any intellectual con-
sideration of it, which creates an open discourse in which any and all
can participate.
What the university will gain 69
Whether or not the interpretations or explanations achieved
through good concept fannation further the interests of a privi-
leged group is immaterial - in both senses of the word, irrele-
vant and ideal, not material. Concept fannation has powerful
uses, however, in that it empowers people to query experience,
to ask how and why and with what significance the actual dif-
fers from the ideal - the ideal, not in the sense of the perfect or
most desirable, but in the sense of the conceptual, the theoreti-
cal, what thought leads us to expect.
As the Stoics realized, conceptual thinking is a great locus of
freedom and control because it allows an actor to bring COD-
cepts and experience together, disclosing munerous options.
The discrepancies between idea and actuality pennit one to
improve the concepts, or to change concrete actualities, or to
do both. Interested inquiry is unidirectional, defmed by the
vector of interest. Disinterested inquiry is omnidirectional,
responsive to the play of concept formation, which allows for
the critique of established ideas and the unexpected construc-
tion of improved conceptual frameworks for thinking about
experience anew. Thus, detached inquiry tends to be less in-
strumental in its results and more critical. We may say that
theory is critical, not by the intention of the theorist, but by the
character of theory itself. Theory becomes uncritical only
when people hypostatize it, taking it out of the conceptual
reahn and putting it there in the world as a self-subsisting en-
tity, like other actors, acting and being acted on. Keeping to
the realm of the ideal, of thought, disinterested inquiry pro-
ceeds through concept fonnation to create coherent ideas, with
reference to which people can ask questions about the source
and significance of their concrete experience.
Standing back from the rough and tumble of political action,
political thinkers have engaged in dispassionate, detached re-
flection and formed numerous, powerful concepts - justice,
equality and equity, legitimacy, obligation, freedom, liberty,
property. rights, the state, democracy, representation, power,
and on. Present-day thinkers in the field engage productively
70 What the university will gain
with past thinkers as they try to further develop, expand, and
eOlTeet key concepts fonned by their predecessors in it. The
concepts take on great significance for human life, not as they
are used mechanically to shape behavior to their putative speci-
fications, but as they are used critically to understand why be-
havior, in its divergent particularity, is the way it is. and to dis-
close creatively what it can become, what perhaps it should
become.
Likewise, significant educational concepts have been faroled
within the historical record, but these have not been as fully
developed in modem scholarship. Hence, there are fewer pow-
erful concepts for thinking about education and much writing
on education is therefore descriptive, not conceptual. This rela-
tive paucity of significant concepts generated through the disin-
terested study of education may have much to do with two sali-
ent absences in CUlTent discussions of education. One is the
degree to which educational leaders have surprisingly little to
say about the educative work of the wliversity.6Il The other is
the degree to which academic leaders fail to take part in the
public discussion of educational issues.
fil
Universities have a
6Il The Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987) and the culture wars following from it is
in large part a complaint that universities have abandoned their edu-
cative mission and left the young to flounder for themselves. Bloom
nostalgically prescribes a Great Books pedagogy, the workings of
which he takes for granted. While William G. Bowen and Derek Bok
have provided a distinguished examination of the role of higher edu-
cation in furthering racial equality in The Shape of the River: Long-
Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University
Admissions (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), their
analysis turns far more on econometric projection than on insight into
educational experience.
61 Compare the role of academic students of education [if such can be
found] in public discussion leading to the setting of educational pol-
icy with the role of academic economists in discussions leading to
What the university will gain 71
weak voice in matters concerning education because too few
within them engage in disinterested concept formation about it,
and those who do are too dispersed. At its source, this situation
has probably arisen because scholars in the arts and sciences
have generally believed that there is nothing of substance about
education worthy of study outside of its professional concerns
for the work of schools. Are there opportunities for concept
formation in reflecting on education of a value similar to those
arising from reflections on politics or economics or social ac-
tion? Would more robust concept formation with respect to
education be worth the trouble? That is the question we are
now addressing.
Were it to come into being as a field of academic study, edu-
cation would be somewhat similar to political science, for it
would include distinct component areas - for starters, let us
say, educational theory, American education, comparative edu-
cation, and cultural change, with each area seeking to provide a
general public with conceptual interpretation and impartial ex-
planation pertaining to its core concerns. Powerful concept
formation should go on through al1 its components in the same
way that each of the various components of political science
generate important concepts with which to explain and inter-
pret political experience.
Here, we can merely sample what might result through the
academic study of education, were it organized in this way. To
do so, let us engage in some concept formation to assay intel-
lectual possibilities in the component concentrating on educa-
tional theory. We can sample what education as an academic
study might become by going back into the historical record to
look at the formation of one powerful educational concept and
to sketch significant ways in which later thinkers have used it
to put to themselves and to others important questions about
concrete hmnan experience. In doing so, we will see that the
economic policy, or students of international relations in deliberations
about national security.
72 What the university will gain
concept has had powerful historical uses, ones which have
fallen into abeyance. We will also see that although in abey-
ance, if revived, it will have important implications for con-
temporary educational concerns. Hence, let us reflect on one
example, seeing what it offers. From it, each must extrapolate
to a sense of the possibilities for the field, sensing them to be
somewhere between the jejlUle and the seminal. Here is an ex-
ample, an invitation, to those who will, to develop and expand
a much fuller agenda, not a prescription for the whole under-
taking.
Formative justice
Ancient texts have unusual significance for scholars engaged
in concept fonnation, for in those texts many powerful ideas
have their initial formulations. We go back to them to engage
the ideas themselves in the foml in which they were first set
out, not through later descriptions of them. As we do so, we
find that the fonnation of many key concepts precedes the ad-
jectives describing them as belonging to one or another domain
of thought, be it biological, geological, social, historical, politi-
cal, or educational. Thinkers simply fomled concepts, con-
Stiucting illuminating bodies of thought and critiquing experi-
ence with them. Labeling came later as commentators drew
ideas together and described them as part of one domain or an-
other. Retrospectively, some ideas became political, and others
educational.
In Western intellectual history, educational concepts were
initially fonned in essentially the same texts as major political
ideas, the difference being that political thought, having devel-
oped more fully as an academic subject, has labeled the key
texts as primarily political. Hence in engaging in educational
concept formation, we need to appropriate resources claimed as
parts of other fields, not to take them away from those other
fields, but to find the educational concepts that may be latent
What the university will gain 73
there. Further, we need to be ready to make such excursions,
not only into historical texts, but into current contributions as
well. A passing difficulty in a prominent work of political phi-
losophy may indicate a lacuna arising because educational COD-
cept formation has been weak, allowing readers to gloss over
an important idea.
A careful reader will encoWlter such a passing difficulty in
John Rawls' Theory of Justice. His work is a marvelous exer-
cise in concept formation and it awakened political thought
from a long analytic slwnber by taking the principle of dis-
tributive justice to be the generative principle of political econ-
omy and setting forth a tight reconstruction of that principle -
justice as fairness - as a more coherent construction of it.
To set up his theory of distributive justice, Rawls used a dis-
tinction between formal justice and substantive justice. In
Rawls' view, fonnal justice describes the situation in a polity
whenever a set of principles, good or bad, is in force, whenever
"impartial and consistent administration of laws and institu-
tions, whatever their substantive principles," are in actual op-
eration.
61
Rawls put questions of formal justice to the side and
restricted his inquiry to the problem of substantive justice, to a
search for those principles that would provide substantive, real
justice to the members of a polity. He then restricted the prob-
lem of substantive justice to questions of distributive justice,
fmding those principles for the distribution of public goods
among members of a polity that would lead to a substantively
good distribution. The important issue, the substantive issue,
was for him, not whether or not a principle was adhered to, but
whether or not, if adhered to, the principle of distributive jus-
tice would be substantively correct, the sound and true princi-
ple of justice, the one that rational persons ought to accept.
Rawls sought to think out which principles would best
achieve substantive justice, at least in the domain of distribu-
tive justice, and he left the matter of fonnal justice - whether
62 See A Theory of Justice, Section 10, especially pp. 50-2.
74 What the university will gain
there was "adherence to principle," "obedience to system" -
largely to the side, even a bit mystified.
63
Within Rawls' the-
ory. formal justice either exists in a polity or they does not, for
reasons that he left unexamined. There is adherence to princi-
ple or there is not, and Rawls did not seek to construct concepts
for thinking about the process by which adhering to principle
might or might not come about in the experience of a person or
a polity.
A lacuna arises here because "formal justice" is not really a
satisfactory concept, but merely a descriptive term. The theo-
retical principle of interest is not faroml justice, a mere descrip-
tion of the condition of one or another polity. but rather forma-
tive justice, a concept that enables thinking about how people
come to adhere to principle, to accept and to expect "the impar-
tial and consistent administration of laws and institutions" or
other restrictions on possible behaviors, and even further, to
shape the world and their conduct within it by reference to this
system of thought. Fonnative justice is an important educa-
tional concept, one still insufficiently developed.
64
Fonnative
63 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls touched further on fonnal justice by
way of making some observations about the rule of law (pp. 207-210)
and the adherence to system (pp. 441-2), but not to develop the con-
cept as such any further.
64 Rawls, of cours.e, alludes to education as a public good to be dis-
tributed disproportionately to the least advantaged in a polity gov-
erned by justice as fairness, but he does not consider the role that an
educational justice might have in bringing justice as fairness into
force within a polity. His whole method, however, presupposes the
effective working of a highly Platonic commitment to formative jus-
tice to bring about the primacy of rational choice (see especially Sec-
tion 4, pp. 15-19, and Section 25, pp. 123-130). Rawls and the read-
ers for whom he writes have educated themselves to accept the pri-
macy of rational constraints on their convictions and behavior. The
"fonnal constraints of the concept of right," which Rawls lays doWil
in Section 23. pp. 112-118, are not simply "fOlma! conditions," they
are the outcome of a particular fonnative education, as a result of
What the university will gain 7S
justice - like distributive justice and retributive justice - is an
important part of justice, which deserves far fuller attention
than it receives.
A concept of fonnative justice stands to the disinterested
study of education as that of distributive justice stands to the
dispassionate study of politics. As Aristotle provided the first
full conception of distributive justice, so Plato initiated and
gave a first full conception of formative justice.
63
Present·day
which people learn to expect principles to be general, universru in
application, public, productive of ordered processing, and conclusive
or final. For justice to pertain, it is not enough for education to be
justly distributed as a good among others; it is necessary that there be
a formative justice, an educative process through which people ad-
here to the constraints they will accept on their various possibilities
for behavior. Thomas W. Pogge gives a careful explication of the
role education has in Rawls' second principle of justice in his study,
Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) pp. 161-181.
Pogge shows that Rawls' ideas about education need to be emended
to recognize that each person has a right to an education appropriate
to his capacities, essentially the issue of formative justice.
H See The Republic, especially Books 3 & 4, with the development of
the concept culminating at 444d·e, where Plato resolved the interplay
between justice in the hypothetical city and the person in favor of the
latter: "But the truth is that although justice apparently was something
of this kind, it was not concerned with the external performance of a
manls own function, but with the internal perfonnance of it, with his
true self and his own tme function, forbidding each of the elements
within him to perform tasks other than its own, and not allowing the
classes of things within his soul to interfere with one another. He has,
quite literally, to put his own house in order. being himself his own
mlef, mentor and friend, and tuning the three elements just like three
fixed points in a musical scale - top, bottom, and intermediate. And
if there turn out to be any intervening elements, he must combine
them all, and emerge as a perfect unity of diverse elements, self-
disciplined and in harmony with himself. Only then does he act,
whether it is a question of making money, or taking care of his body,
or some political action, or contractual agreements with private indio
76 What the university will gain
students of education, however, are not developing his idea
very well, for they too often cram his idea into the wrong con-
ceptual context. We immediately encOlUlter here another in-
stance of the contextual problem arising fi-om the absence of an
academic discourse about education. Commentary on Plato's
Republic Dotmally lacks sympathy because commentators take
it to be a work primarily about politics, not education. To be
sure, the city, the polis, from which our term "politics" derives,
was a central concem in the work. But consider what Plato
held to be the primary meaning or significance of the polis in
human experience. In describing his city of words in the Re-
public, Plato conceptualized educational relationships and ac-
tions not political arrangements, and elsewhere, as in the C,.ito,
Socrates based his respect for the nooos of the city, neither on
the realities of power nor on legislated legitimacies, but rather
on the educative, formative ethos those nonus had provided.
66
If taken as a set of socio-political restrictions prescribed for
objective polities, Plato's division of his postulated city into
three functional castes, sharply differentiated from each other,
strikes present-day readers as profolllldly reprehensible. 67 But
Plato was not prescribing political arrangements; he was ex-
plaining an educational concept. And few would dispense with
the educational concept that he was there forming. The castes
were a conceptual fiction, like Galileo's pat1icle, counter fac-
tual and confined to thought. The thought constructed an edu-
cational concept: the idea that human potential has multiple
components, each overflowing with possibilities, with each
viduals. In all these situations he believes and declares that a just and
good action is one \vhieh preserves or brings about this state of mind
~ wisdom being the knowledge which directs the action ...• n (Tom
Griffith, trans., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
6fi See Socrates dialogue with the Athenian nomoi at Crito. 50c-54d.
67 Perhaps the most egregious example having been The Open Society
and Its Enemies by Karl R. Popper, Revised edition. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1946. 1950), Part I, pp. 11-195.
What the university will gain 77
needing to be developed and brought into an appropriate bal-
ance and order, one lUlique to each person, which it is the per-
son's vital challenge to sustain and fulfill. Is this a reprehensi-
ble concept? Is this not the concept that Howard Gardner has
been elaborating, to considerable acclaim, through his theory of
multiple intel1igences?63
Issues of justice arise when a need or desire for something
exceeds its supply. forcing deliberation about what each recipi-
ent is due. Issues of distributive justice stem from having to
allocate a finite supply of public goods among a larger multi-
plicity of claimants. Issues of formative justice have to do, not
with public goods, but with hwnan potentials. In education,
possibilities exceed feasible achievement, forcing choices. A
person cannot actualize all her possibilities; nor can a group.
Which ones will receive what effort? By exercising formative
justice, a person selects among her possibilities and allocates a
finite supply of talent and energy, of motivation and discern-
ment, in pursuing these chosen goals. Fonnative justice
68 See Howard Gardner's, Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple
Intelligences, Tenth-anniversary edition, (New York; Basic Books,
1983, 1993) and Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice (New
York: Basic Books, 1993). Plato, of course, put greater stress on tbe
problem of cultural philosophy that confronts each person than on
that of developmental psychology. Considering potentialities in a
Platonic manner, I must think concretely about both myself and my
circwnstances, understanding and evaluating the possibilities for me
inhering in those circwnstances, the cultural conditions in the midst
of which I live. In view of the world in which I fmd myself, what
nurturing resources can I take from the world in order to develop,
integrate, and deploy my particular mix of capacities and powers? To
live is to respond constantly to this question in order to achieve to my
fulfillment within the world, those unique circumstances of my life.
Concepts of fonnative justice help people address that question
through a life-long series ofself-fonnative efforts.
78 What the university will gain
thereby detetmines the mix of potentials that a person or group
will effectively act to achieve.
69
Guided, well Of poorly, by fonnative justice, each person ex-
erts educational effort to bring his or her mix of aptitudes to
their full employment in pursuit of sustainable fulfillment. "Be
all you can be": this is the problem of fonnative justice that
each youth must ultimately solve for herself.
70
What do you
fi9 The dramatic tcnsion in Homer's Iliad unfolds from the tension
between distlihutive and fornmtive justice. Superficially, issues of
distribution were at stake. The quarrel between Agamemnon and
Achilles broke out over an issue of distributive justice, nominally as
Agamemnon appropriated Briseis, part of Achilles' share of the
spoils, which affected the more basic distribution of honor within the
community of Greek warnors. But neither further redistribution of
spoils nor professions of honor, however, could end the quanel. for
the affront to distributive justice was really merely the occasion
through which Achilles came to grapple with his inward problem of
fonnative justice, deciding (to put it in present-day language) what
definition of self would be primal}' for him. Thus, the real drama of
the Iliad recoWlted how Achilles wavered over and then resolved the
so-called choice of Achilles, whether to lead a long life of obscure but
comfottable satisfaction or to achieve through dangerous deeds a
ShOlt life of enduring renoWll.
70 It is disconcerting, to say the least, that about the only place in
American public life that celebrates such a principle of formative
justice is in recruiting publicity for the U.S. military. The tenns of
discussion aroWld fonnal schooling are about how to teach a set body
of knowledge and how to assess whether or not it has been learned.
Schools are ciphers with respect to fonnative justice and schools of
education do nothing to prepare teachers to speak effectively to the
problems of fonnative justice yOWlg people encomlter growing up
under diverse personal circmnstances. Popular images showing edu-
cation taking place effectively across a wide range of circumstances -
as in movies such as Stand and Deliver, Finding For,.ester, Dead
Poets Society, and the like - suggest that the effective educator must
speak to the problems of fonnative justice his or her students experi-
ence in the choices they must make. Katherine Boo shows what a
What the university will gain 79
want to become? What should you become? What can you
become? How will you integrate the imperatives of desire,
upbringing, and reason into a secure and fulfilling self? There
is one life to live and a multiplicity of possibilities in it. Which
merit realization, how, when, where, and why? This is the
question of formative justice and good educational concepts,
sound pedagogical principles, enable people to think. about and
act on such fateful choices.
Twentieth-century public discourse, obsessed with materia1
externalities, has obfuscated issues of formative justice by de-
grading them into concerns of distributive justice. Education
collapses into schooling, so much seat-time devoted to this or
that, with the only issue of justice being one of access to formal
opportunities, which get counted up among the cornucopia of
public goods. Who will get so much of what kind? In the
course of developing his conception of formative justice, Plato
spun his myth of the metals to explain why a person would ac-
cept the idea that her potential was not some fated absolute, but
a complex whole made of many parts that she had to develop
and form. 71 Sober literalists among us condemn this myth and
school can do, despite all the extrinsic disadvantages. when it ad-
dresses issues of formative justice in "Letter from Boston: The Fac-
tory." The New Yorker, October 18. 2004. pp. 162-176. At the other
extreme of willful degradation, partisan politics exemplifies fonna-
tive injustice at a lavish scale. educational malfeasance as campaign-
ers indulge in competitive perjury and character assassination. The
young watch what putative leaders do, and let be done in their names,
and the examples they are setting amount to an ever-more miseduca-
tive politics. However effective in gaining power, it will in due
course destroy the body politic.
11 Republic. 414c-e. where Plato made it clear the characteristics in
question are in fact the result of upbringing and education. not innate
differences. Through the myth of the metals, Plato was addressing
the problem of ensuring that the parts in a complex whole remain
effectively subordinated in the service of the whole. The problem of
effectively subordinating the parts to the whole is a pre-eminently
80 What the university will gain
its ironies - which Plato at least labeled as myth and spun in
discourse for purposes explicitly not to be put into practice.
Yet those same literalists collaborate now in our endless test-
ing. with the Educational Testing Service and other authorities
propotUlding our myths of metals, only for us not as myth, but
as objectivities legitimated by statistical arcana and an obliging
quest for bias-fi'ce phrasing.1Z TIle Republic propounded an
early theory of fOlmative justice, a conceptual construct, and a
major activity in the disinterested study of education should be
the continuous development of that construction, as well as
educational problem, onc central to fonnativc justice. It has a signifi-
cant political dimension as well, however. For instance, the separa-
tion of powers and the system of ehecks and balances operate as prin-
ciples of fonnative justice within modern constitutional theory. In
order to think about different fonns ofpotcntiality. we need to think
about them as relatively fixed. not in scope but in character, for they
are not transmutable into one anolher. That way, we do not try to
have one potentiality do the work of another. TItus. we do not try to
draw reasoned conclusions through the exercise of appetitive desire
or to bond emotionally through closely reasoned argument. The Pla-
tonic myth of the metals does not deserve rebuke if it is taken to de-
scribe the character of potentialities. By perceiving the inherent dif-
ferences selting distinct capacities apart from one another, a person
will deploy those capacities, each for its appropliatc purpose, and
integrate her activities into a sustainable life-project. How to allocate
both faith and reason to their proper domains and to be able to draw
appropriately on both within the hwnan enterprise is by no means a
dead issue. existing only as history.
71 Despite decades of critique from The Tyranny of Testing by Banesh
Hoffinann (New York: Dover Publications, 1964.2003) to The Big
Test: n,e Secret Histmy of the American Meritocracy by Nicholas
Lemann (New York: Farrar. Straus and Giroux, 2000), reliance on
mass testing has become ever more widespread as the arbiter of edu-
cationalopportunity. What may be of use as a diagnostic in helping
each person achieve fOlmative justice in their education has no proper
business cloaking distributive injustices with a false legitimacy.
What the university will gain 81
others, and their use in asking difficult questions about educa-
tional experience.
We can return to Plato. Let us first sharpen the distinction
between fonnative and distributive justice. Remembering
Galileo's caution about the importance of "any," let us meditate
briefly about how we might use the two concepts to think about
a trivial, but widely documented matter - the doings of profes-
sional sport. Take your favorite football team, it does not mat-
ter whether it plays the global or the American game, for me
the Jets or Giants will do. The front office deals with distribu-
tive justice, at least within the tiny universe of the team, in ne-
gotiating salaries and other terms of player contracts. The issue
of distributive justice here - we will not dwell on your salary or
mine - is to justify differentials in compensation, working with
players and their agents to achieve agreement through judg-
ments about the market and putative skill and drawing power
and other measures of worth, whereby some players will make
millions for showing up and others will labor at a base pay of
several hundred thousand. If the front office mismanages the
valuation of worth and the distribution of resources, with too
much here leaving too little there, jealousies and resentments
can wrack the team and the stable of players will fall short on
talent, leading fans to rail at the front office. If the distribution
is astute, the team can thrive. But will it?
This question raises the issue of fonnative justice. By itself,
a great collection of talent, richly remunerated, may achieve
consistent success - damn those Yankees - but it does not
guarantee it, as at last the Red Sox showed. A coaching staff
must use principles of fonnative justice to bring each player up
to his full potential and to integrate them all into a resourceful,
winning team. The issue here is to get each player into opti-
mum condition for the roles he has to play, to build the deter-
mination and elan of the group so that each plays with full in-
tensity, and to develop and communicate to each player an as-
tute game plan that takes into account the unique capacities of
key personnel and the vulnerabilities of opponents. Finally,
82 What the university will gain
formative justice here consists in putting all these activities
together, each in its proper measure, so that on the day of the
crucial game, the whole team is strong, intense, and shrewd
together, winning in a commanding perfonnance.
73
As in SPOlt, so in the great game of life - the challenge of
formative justice abounds. Football is a microcosm of passing
import, personal or historic, but even with more complex, fate-
ful situations, fonnative justice perfects the unique excellences
of diverse components and integrates them into an optimal per-
fonnance, on pain of suffering the consequences. V.lhatever the
domain of experience, the theory of formative justice enables a
person to think about how to bring a diversity of potential ca-
pacities to a combined fulfillment. For distributive justice, tIle
conceptual fe/os is equality in one sense or another. Or per-
haps, as Rawls reasons, fairness is the goal, equality being too
simplistic. For fonnative justice, fulfillment is the controlling
goal. Fonnal justice, as Rawls understood it, describes the end
state of the process of fonnative justice and it consists in laws
and institutions, "whatever their substantive principles," that
people have brought to fulfillment in practice, effectively insti-
tuting diverse efforts motivated by a suitable integration of in-
terest, pride, and principie.
74
73 This and the previous paragraph are a revision of material in ~ 1 1 9 -
112 of Robbie McClintock. The Educator's Manifesto (New York:
Institute for Learning Tec1mologies. 1999), available online at
www.studyplace.orglstudyplace/studyspacc/mcclintocklmani-
festo_work_in"-progress.html. There I used the tenn "regulative jus-
tice" rather than "fonnative justice." but the concept in question is the
same although I have come to prefer the lattcr tenn.
74 We might here note in passing that it is only with respect to a
measure of fulfillment, of each person's realization of his or her po-
tentialities, that thc Rawlsian can judge who is least advantaged, how
and why. and the only real "veil of ignorance" (A Theory of Justice,
Section 24, pp. 118-123) that people systematically experience is the
ignorance at any time and any situation of what their best potentials
What the university will gain 83
Ful:fillment is a goal that excites powerful human sympathy.
We want our own fulfillment and thus exercise effort to de-
velop and use our natural capacities, and we want the fulfill-
ment of others, taking care to educate others. We feel sponta-
neous admiration for exemplary achievement by others and
regret when circumstances force someone to desist from sig-
nificant effort. Thus fans will acknowledge with respectful
applause an opposing star, suddenly injured and forced out of a
game, for the potential of the game itself became less fulfilling
when injury forced his withdrawal. The goal of fulfillment
even translates into a powerful directive nonn for political
economy. Not growth, stoking the ever-insatiable few, but fun
employment is the goal, the right of each person to creative
work and, further, to the full employment of his or her unique
mix of potentialities for the benefit of self and others. Full em-
ployment in its fullest sense is a truly challenging, and worth-
while goal of public policy. Aristotle defmed a city as the
shared pursuit of the good life.
7s
In this view, human fulfill-
ment becomes the fimdamental purpose of a polity. With ful-
fillment as the purpose the polity, the test of legitimacy comes
through the educative work of its ethos, nonns, and principles.
With respect to fonnative justice, the legitimacy of a regimen
- something we educators will not confuse with the regime of a
state - turns on judgments of whether or not it rightly brings
are. Justice as fairness may make even better sense as a theory of
formative justice, than it does as a theory of distributive justice.
7S Aristotle, Polilics, I, I. and passim. "Every state is a community of
some kind, and every community is established with a view to some
good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they
think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or
political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces
all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other. and at the
highest good." (Benjamin Jowett, trans.) Any full discussion of for-
mative justice would require more attention to Aristotle, in addition to
that given here to Plato, as well as many others.
84 What the university will gain
potentials to full realization, whether or not it respects and n u r ~
tures the conditions of fulfillment. Were this 110t an essay, but
a full study of fomlative justice, we would need to develop
here the concept of authenticity in dialogue with Rousseau and
others;'6 and likewise, the concept of autonomy with Kant, and
that of its fiuition in spirit, Geist, or culture with Hegel." In
76 Education is more deeply personal than politics and concepts perti-
nent to it orient from the inside, so to speak, with the person inter-
nally as actor both affecting and being affected by the surrounding
world. This makes conceptual frameworks enabling people to think
well about the self in interaction with the world very important in
education. In that context, Rousseau's fundamental distinction be-
tween amour de soi, a healthy, affirmative sense of self, and amow'
pro pre, an other-regarding self-possessive, proprietary, and prideful
- very impOitant. See especially, Rousseau's Discourse an the Origin
of Inequality, Note 0, and Emile, Or Education, Book 3. The inter-
pretation of Rousseau would be clearer, and dangers that some find in
his thinking less ominous, if the distinction between formative justice
and distributive justice were more firmly in mind. Rousseau based
his critique of his sociocultuml circumstances, not on grounds of dis-
tributive justice, but on those of formative justice - as formative in-
fluences they were profoundly distorting. Under the heading of "po-
litical education," theorists usually consider what kind of education
will lead to good political outcomes. Rousseau, even in the Social
Contract, thought about "educational politics
n
by asking, What kind
of politics would have good, or bad, educative outcomes? Can dis-
cord, sown by exploitative political conduct, undercut the shared po-
tential for fulfillment by wedging many to despair and others to smug
complaccncy?
77 There is immense potential in interpreting Gennan idealism as a
major exercise in concept fOlmation dedicated to understanding the
educational experience of humanity. From Kant's Critiques, setting
forth the legislative powers of reason, to Hegel's study of the human
spirit's Bildungsgeschichte, the historical process of human self-
formation, the primary concern is educational. The challenge to pre-
sent-day interpreters, and it is no small challenge, is to find a way to
make the conceptual achievements of that era far more widely acces-
What the university will gain 85
doing so, we would see that many issues of political theory can
be clearer and easier to manage when the educational concepts
embedded in them are adequately differentiated and kept dis-
tinct, yet related, in thought. Moving complaints about the de-
ficiency of substantive justice show how the fonnative influ-
ence of a political or moral order distorts the character and ex-
pectations of those subject to it. Both the right of rebellion and
judgments that a given order is basically legitimate turn in
large part on whether one feels that formative justice is attain-
able under the conditions that prevail.'s
Where the justice at issue is primarily formative, relation-
ships of subordination, coordination, and control may have va-
lences different from what they would have if principles of po-
litical power and authority were directly at work. What may be
highly repressive in politics may be liberating in education,
particuJarly as the person sets herself a regulative regimen for
bringing a favored potential to fruition.
79
A regimen may be
demanding in ways that a regime may not. Things that are
negative and destructive when done to us as passive objects by
sible to a general public than were the very difficult philosophical and
literary sources of them.
73 Martin Luther King, Jr., eloquently exemplified such connections
in his "Letter from Binningham Jail" (April 1963. especially section
IV). Franz Kafka's Leller to his Father (November 1919) examined
deeply how a distorting paternal authority culminated in a fearful
rejection of filial duty and continuity between generations. The ways
in which misrule evokes counteraction can be understood only by
reference to the ability people have to control the formative education
by which they shape themselves in interaction with their circum-
stances.
7 ~ As Walter L. Adamson has shown well in Hegemony and Revolu-
tion: Antonio Gramsd's Political and Cultural Theory (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980). Antonio Gramsci recom-
mended a highly disciplinary education for proletarians and peasants,
not so that they could co-opt themselves into more favored classes,
but to master the skills to gain and exercise real political power.
86 What the university will gain
an external agent can be positive and fulfilling when we do
them actively by and for ourselves.
so
The marathon runner
pushes herself through a discipline of painful training to
achieve her goal. Were such a discipline imposed by an exter-
nal power, it would stultify and suppress the spirit, but self-set,
it is part or the path to fulfilhnent.
Ironically. students of education too often read Plato as if he
is talking politics, not education, proposing external authorities.
Not liking what they thus hear, they tum away. 11ms, by mis-
taking the context, educational thinkers have impoverished
their resources. Plato described in speech a highly fonnative,
but authoritarian city, a hypothetical city that he did not seek to
found in fact, in order to illustrate an educative discipline by
which persons could put fonnative justice into practice in the
living of their Iives.
91
By seeing politics where education
should be found, interpreters diminish the developmental po·
tentialities of the person. And they compound this weakening
by attributing pedagogical initiative, efficacy, and responsibil-
ity, not to the person acquiring her education, but to her exter-
nal teachers. Confined to the extemals, to the apparent sur-
tiO The interpretation of present-day conditions would be more effec·
tive, I think, were we to keep the things we do for ourselves more
clearly differentiated from the things that get done to us. We need a
dose ofEpictetus. For instance, students will often misread The Con·
trol Revolution: Teclmological and Economic Origins oltlle lnlorma·
tion Society by James R. Bcnigcr (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1990) because they invert the real control problem that Beniger
had in mind - How do we cope with the flux of circumstances? - and
see the question of control as a conspiracy by hypostatized forces out
there to control the outer and inner life of the meager self.
91 Plato was not looking for real world versions of his polis, as a key
passage showed: "our hypothetical city, since I don't think it exists
anywhere on earth. . .. A pattern or model laid up in heaven some-
where, for anyone who chooses to see it - and seeing it, chooses to
found a city within himself." Tile Republic (Tom Griffith. trans.),
592b. cf. 47Ia·473b.
What the university will gain 87
faces, education becomes superficial and lax. Beneath the sur-
faces, the unexpected, difficult achievements arise from self-
discipline, willed subordination to a goal, and extraordinary
effort.
Within his effort at concept formation, Plato used three ideal-
typical concepts in constructing his concept of formative jus-
tice. These described in thought how people adhered to a sys-
tem of law and even more generally how they willingly con-
strained their behavior. In Plato's view, people voluntarily ob-
ligated themselves and adhered to purposes in response to mo-
tivating capacities, which he conceptualized as being of three
types - responses to appetite, to honor or spiritedness, or to
reason. People want, believe. and think, and in so doing
choose their ends in view. Fonnative justice, or simply justice
as he put it, constituted a fourth ideal-typical concept, which
consisted in bringing the other three into an appropriate relation
with one another such that each separately, and a11 together,
would be fully employed performing their proper functions in a
way optimal for the whole person. For Plato, this optimality
meant achieving a stable, self-sustaining hannony, that is, ful-
filbnent, in the conduct of a person's life within the flux of his
or her actual circumstances.
It is not appropriate here, within the scope of this essay, to
try to construct a full theory of fonnative justice, either through
an extended commentary on Plato or by taking the concept up
and constructing a new theory of it, as Rawls did for distribu-
tive justice. Here, we seek to indicate what the academic study
of education might become in the arts and sciences and can do
so by following a few further hints from Plato to see how those
might lead us further into subsequent work, most of which mer-
its being interpreted as educational, among other things. Plato
advanced concepts, under a heading which we are calling for-
mative justice, that grasped in thought, in discourse, the way
people constrained their actions and adhered to a purpose or
principle, and he gave that, as theorists often do, a normative
dimension enabling him to interpret both human fulfillment
88
What the university will gain
and human degradation. Plato achieved a theoretical account
of how people adhere to principles in the course of living their
lives, and with it, he illuminated significant consequences for
conduct as people under differing conditions adhered to par-
ticular principles in different ways. He used it to put quite
clearly two very important questions that should be major COll-
cems in the academic study of education.
Consider first Plato's wonderful passage at the conclusion of
the allegory of the cave. "Education is not what some people
proclaim it to be, ... that they are able to put knowledge into
souls where none was before. Like putting sight into eyes
which were blind." People learned by exercising their capacity
to find and lrnow their own good, their own fulfilbnent, a ca-
pacity that was their human dignity, one that Plato asserted to
be a universal - "this capacity in every soul." He then gave a
powerful statement of the educative function of fonnative jus-
tice: "Education ... would be the art of directing this instru-
ment, ... not the art of putting the power of sight into it, but
the art which assumes it possesses this power ... and contrives
to make it look in the right direction. ,,81
This passage culminated Plato's critique of the sophists,
which had stretched through several of his dialogues, for they
were the teachers who professed to put sight into blind souls.
The sophists had begun to offer instruction in the rhetorical and
related arts that promised to give power to those who would
live by the exercise of persuasion and leadership. Conditions
had put conventions and circumstances in flux, and with an
insouciance that some thought disruptive and others unwise,
the sophists prepared young men on the make to gain an edge
in pursuing pleasure and power. And immediately both cul-
tural conservatives and philosophic critics then queried whether
the proffered instruction could deliver the promised results:
truly knowledge is power, which will mean that "a little learn-
ing is a dangerous thing," as Alexander Pope many centuries
81 Republic, SISc. (Griffith, trans.)
What the university will gain 89
later restated a Socratic ploy. If power is mistaken, it wreaks
hann, not good. Thus the paradigmatic culture war began
around a great question, one that still echoes into our time and
times to come. As the classical Greeks put it - Can arele be
taught? Or the Romans - Can vir/lis be taught? Or as the
modems, from the Renaissance to now, have been putting it,
Can virnle, can excellence, can power be taught?
This question persisted, recurrently demanding answers. The
cultural conservative answered then, and answers now, that
arete, virtus, virtue, excellence, power need not be taught, for it
was given by tradition and convention, ascribed to the young as
a matter of course in a well-ordered community. The sophistic
pedagogue answered then, and answers now, that indeed they
teach it, for they have devised a program of instruction that
leads to "soWld deliberation, both in domestic matters - how
best to manage one's household, and in public affairs - how to
realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate
and action."SJ The philosophic critic demurred then, and de-
murs now, questioning the strong claim that "every day, day
after day, you will get better and better,,84 and suggesting that
with sustained effort one might develop the rational skill to
figure out in the flux of circwnstance what principles and skills
may prove best suited to the situation, that is, as Plato put it,
being able, as occasion required, to "look in the right direc-
tion."
Let us take a conceptual risk and agree that in contemporary
parlance the best way to translate arete is not its common trans-
lation. "virhle," or even the better but less common, "excel-
lence," but the one insinuated here, "power" - Can power be
taught? Power, like arete, has a range of component capacities
- strength, skill, courage, knowledge, wisdom, compassion.
Like arete, we can speak of the power of persons and of collec-
:!I3 Pro/agoras, 319a, (Lombardo & Bell, trans.)
84 Pro/agoras, 318b.
90 What the university will gain
tivities, and we see it as a concept for thinking both about the
special capacities of some and simultaneously about qualities
universally possessed in some measure by each and every per-
son. Furthennore, like Qf'ete and v;,1us were in their original
contexts, power as a concept applies not to an abstract attribute
inhering separately in the person, but to a complex quality per-
ceived to arise at the juncture where the active person interacts
with his or her conditioning circumstances. One cannot speak
about the power of a person without taking into account the
context in which the power is manifest.
Can power be taught? People hope that education will cul-
minate in power - for tIle conservative, reproducing it through
ascription, for the sophistic, disbursing it through instmction,
for the Socratic, mastering it through learning and study. If the
hope is that education will culminate in power, the imp0l1ance
of formative justice becomes inescapable and a major debate
running historically through consequential sources emerges
into clarity as an examination of education. In the Platonic
construct, by definition, the good was the object of power, the
ability to act with effect, and in this sense, the Socratic position
- that no person Imowingly, intentionally did evil - made nec-
essary sense, for every act aimed to accomplish the good. But
it meant that the problem of fomlative justice was pervasive
and ominous, posing a difficult question: given the complexity
of power and the many goods that were its object! how should
one order these so that each, and their resultant combination,
could all work rightly, consistent with fit goals?
In the face of this question, many people make, as they
should, very difficult demands on themselves. And they easily
over-reach. The autonomous acceptance of difficult expecta-
tions must not serve to legitimate dehumanizing authority over
others, be it religious, economic, political, emotional, or educa-
tional. Formative justice works through the self-formation of
each person. 111at is the source of the fundamental dignity of
each, shared by all humans. It is what Plato celebrated in the
greatest of all his myths, the coda at the end of the Republic in
What the university will gain 91
which the human souls chose their lives, in which there were
numerous possibilities for each. "Responsibility lies with the
one who makes the choice. . .. There is a satisfactory life
rather than a bad one available even for the one who comes
last, provided that he chooses it rationally and lives it seriously.
Therefore, let not the first be careless in his choice nor the last
discouraged,lt85 Here is the inalienable humanistic condition,
celebrated by Socrates and Plato, and many after them.
Many past thinkers wrote for people engaged in pondering
the question of fonnative justice, the question of their regimen
ofself-fonnation. What should be the purposes OfYOllI power
and how should you direct your power to pursue them? An-
cient ethical writers, as Pierre Hadot and Martha Nussbaum
have been reminding present-day readers, tried less to desider-
ate on the substantive question of what the good is, but spoke
more to themselves and others pursuing the formative question,
trying to develop a rational self-discipline for selecting pur-
poses and shaping their capacities to achieve them. S6 They
were students, less of substantive justice, more of formative
justice. Their work is one major strand in a literature the aims
of which are essentially educative.
85 Republic, 617e & 619b (Grube & Reeve, trans.)
85 For Hadot, see Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises
from Socrates to Foucault (Michael Chase, trans., Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell, 1987, 1995), What Is Ancient Philosophy? (Michael
Chase, trans., Cambridge: Hruvard University Press, 1995, 2002), and
The Inner Citadel; The 'Meditations' of Marcus Aurelius (Nlichael
Chase, trans., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, 1998).
For NussbalUn, see The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Elhics in
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Updated Edition, New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1986,2001) stressing how Plato and Aris-
totle saw the problem of fonnation in view of the vicissitudes of ex-
perience; and The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Helle-
nistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
92 What the university will gain
Another strand filled out an emerging gap in the Platonic
agenda. In view of subsequent history, Plato's tripartite schema
of the human constitution took the role of belief in the fanna·
tion of power too much for granted. He had assumed that ac-
culttu'alian in one or another city-state would provide each per-
son's spirited element with a set of honored attachments more
elevating than the appetites but less open to doubt than the ob-
jects of reason. Imperial hegemonies, especially the Roman,
soon created a syncretism of different beliefs as Rome became
intensely multi-cultural. A diversity of accultm'ating condi-
tions confounded the unselfconscious honoring of belief, for
with so much diversity it was impossible to not question con-
ventionallocal nomlS. People found themselves with few un-
questioned convictions, and pained by that deficiency, a grow-
ing number of sensitive, self-aware persons felt that the rational
disciplines of the Stoic, Epicurean, and skeptic, did not suffice
for their fOlmative needs. Increasingly, they concentrated on
achieving conscious acts of faith as the basis for their fonning
their purposes and powers. We might say that the challenge of
fonnative justice shifted from the plane of reason to that of be-
lief. People no longer found their chief problem to be their
rational understanding of the good, but their ability to honor
truly, to revere something with unquestioned faith.87
Let us leave, for this essay, the discussion of how to shape
one's power to live rightly and well in the face of unlmown cir-
87 To me, this shift in what people put primary in Rome as it Christi-
anized. is well exemplified by Augustine in his Confessions, which
showed the inadequacy for him of his philosophical education. a good
one, and the deep need he felt for achieving the conviction of faith.
Augustine's City of God sketched a new regimen for formative jus-
tice, and Dante's Divine Comedy set it forth in a magnificent vision,
full in detail and cxtraordinaty in scope, depicting the fonnative force
- for one who felt it, not as a threat or a lure, but as an existential
state - of damnation, repentance, and salvation, energies at best
weakly sensed by Plato.
What the university will gain 93
cmnstance, which caught reflective attention from the ancients
to the present. It is a matter that merits greater attention in the
study of education than it is now receiving. Recognition that
power is an educational concept, as much as a political one, is
essential to making sense of many important developments in
current public life. Nation-states came into being as much
through the conscious pursuit of an educational ideal as
through the constitution of political institutions, and as that as-
piration fragments into numerous movements of group identity
and assertion, from Black Power in the 60's to the many vari-
ants now in action in the national and global arenas, it is wrong
to view these solely, even primarily, as political movements. If
seen as strictly political, they feed into the Hobbsian war of all
against all. These movements pursue power as the construction
of identities and the vision of fulfillment through them. Thus
these movements are in large part educational, feeding not the
war of all against all, but the many-sided affirmation of human
potential. Without the study of education, and the place of
power within it, fully developed, we hear many assertive dis-
cussions of power without discernment and react with repres-
sive incomprehension, tragically exacerbating the tensions of
our world.
Our aim here is simply to see what the academic study of
education might involve, and around problems of power, it
might enable us to convert more political conflict into peda-
gogical effort. Hence, we should realize that the fITst question
- How can the person best master his or her power to seek ful-
fillment? - has been a question of seminal importance in our
cultural history and one that continues to be at the heart of con-
temporary dilemmas. Reflection on it should lead to the con-
ceptual critique of educational effort, not to ever more astute
answers to the how of education, but to the reflective examina-
tion of the what and the why of education, on the who, and the
where, and the when. On these issues, public discourse is ap-
pallingly inert. To what degree do our immense educational
efforts further the hlUnan fulfillment of those involved? Why,
94 What the university will gain
in a world so full of resources, do so many find themselves in a
state of deprivation, depression, and doubt, disposed to rancor
and resentment? What are the discrepancies between contem-
porary practices and the ideas of fomlative justice and what
might educators do to diminish those discrepancies? We have
probed far enough to recognize that education as an academic
study must address these questions, but there are others as well.
Let us sample them by looking at the other fundamental educa-
tive problem that Plato grasped with his concept of fonnative
justice.
In Books 8 and 9 of the Republic, where Plato traced the cy-
cle of transformation from the rule of the best to that of the
worst, subtly charting the interplay of formative influences on
the character of the polity and the person, he anchored the sec-
ond educative question of continuing importance.
88
Two di-
mensions of it are critical in a disinterested study of education.
One accounts for the formative influences that differentiate one
person or polity, one regimen 01' regime, from another; the
other concerns the sources of historic stability and change
working upon the unique person or polity, the question about
the contingency of personality and community in time. Both
inquiries intertwine through the historical resources and spread
out into different domains of modern scholarship. The aca-
demic study of education could do much to give them better
unity and focus.
Events, as events do, had raised these issues. For long,
Homer's listeners had learned to think about themselves
through the contrast between the Greek and the other. Greek
cities constituted a cauldron of political experimentation, each
coping with its internal conflicts, each engaged in external
competition and conflicts among them, and many sending citi-
zens forth in a practice of founding new cities according to a
plan. The relative merits of different formative principles in
the organization of a polis were significantly contested and de-
IrS Republic, 545b-580b.
What the university will gain 95
bated. People experienced the question. Caught in contingent
times, they began to write history, seeking to understand
whether and how knowledge and culture detennined the power
of persons and of polities.
Over centuries, successive thinkers have sought to fonn ideas
and principles with which they could account for the relative
success of one power system vis-a.-vis another. Herodotus be-
gan the inquiry, suggesting that the principle of participation
among Greek citizens enabled them to withstand Persian sub-
jects, who were governed by a principle of subordination that
neutralized their superior material strength.
SQ
Thucydides
pulled back from the contrast between the Greek and the other
and contrasted the two poles within the Greek ethos, the plod-
ding power of Sparta versus the Odyssean sea-wit of Athens,
concentrating on the genius and self-destructive volatility of
the latter, thereby greatly deepening insight into the interplay
between character and command.
9o
Plato and then Aristotle
89 Present-day concern for nurturing the vitruity of civil society and
for maintaining channels of civic participation is a distant descendant
of Herodotean history. Bowling Alone: The ColJapse and Revival of
American Community by Robert D. Putnam (New York: Touchstone
Books, 2001) and Diminished Democracy: From Membership to
Management in American Civic Life by Theda Skocpol (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2003) have much more to do with
problems of formative justice in civic life than with issues ofdistribu-
tive justice.
90 A very revealing study, perhaps it has been done and I am lmaware
of it, would look at the Cold War in a neo-Thucydidian manner as the
playing out of two frameworks for large-scrue formative justice. At
least the presentation of self by the leading powers on the "Free
World" side was largely framed by reference to deep-seated ideas
about the formative justice of democratic regimes. celebrating the
capacities for self-development exercised by people under a regime of
freedom. The actual conduct oftbe Cold War, at least in its denoue-
ment, seems to have come about as the Communist regimes were
pushed to the point at which they collapsed as distributive systems. If
96 What the university will gain
turned further inward to reflect on how internal conflicts within
Athens and other cities led to a change in governing constitu·
tion, and such inquiries have matured into more modem ideas
about checks and balances and the separation of powers. One
can lUlderstand these constitutional principles as principles de·
signed to ensure that each of the different forms of political
power keeps to its proper business so that the whole can func-
tion in effective hamlOny. which is precisely the fundamental
concept of formative justice. As political theorists have often
explored "political education," in which they reflect on the kind
of education that will best lead to good political outcomes, so a
full consideration of formative justice would lead to ideas
about "educational politics," constructing concepts about how
political anangements force educational, fonnative results, for
better and for worse.
How [onnative influences shape the members ofa polity. and
hence collectively its power and stability, is a large question,
dangerous yet imperative. With respect to the influences shap-
ing people in a polity. there is, rn-st, what we might call the
pedagogy of events. Henry Adams pointed to the awful costs
of this pedagogy, early in his Education, as he looked back on
the outbreak of the Civil War.91 Adams' autobiography and its
that was the case, the tension was not settled on fonnative groWlds.
Hence, one can imagine at some point a revisionist argument that
contends on fonnative grounds that a democratic socialism is prefer-
able to an ever-more bloated regime equating freedom with the un-
trammeled pursuit of material wealth.
91 ''Not a man there !mew what his task was to be, or was fitted for it;
every one without exception, Northern or Southern, was to learn his
business at the cost of the public. Lincoln, Seward, SUllmer, and the
rest, could give no help to the young man seeking education; they
knew less than he; within six weeks they were all to be taught their
duties by the uprising of such as he, and their education was to cost a
million lives and ten thousand million dollars, more or less, North and
South, before the country could recover its balance and movement."
What the university will gain 97
companion reflection on Mont-Saini-Michel and Chartres were
great literature. Unfortunately, they were too indirect to pro-
vide well-formed, effective concepts for interpreting the peda-
gogy of events.
92
Ear1ier Machiavelli had come closer in his
Discourses to creating a conceptual framework for interpreting
the pedagogy of events as he reflected on how the Romans pre-
served. tluough diverse vicissitudes, their capacity to extend
and maintain their governing principles.
9
] Later students of
Rome took Machiavelli's question rather for granted and COD-
centrated more on its sequel, the decline and fall, without as
much educative insight. Hence, the pedagogy of events is still
a matter in great need of clarification, especially as it is going
on all about us, rampantly since 9/11. We have virtually no
good concepts with which to ana1yze or explain what is hap-
pening as public leaders and their followers become willing to
compromise their governing principles in angst at apparent life
dangers.
A second type of influence fonning political character arises
through the ethos of a given polity, through its historical or po-
litical character. Which types of regimes educate the best and
which regimes can best draw strength from the education of
their members? What educational arrangements wil1 best ac-
cord with the character of a given regime and what educational
strategies will best strengthen and enhance the regime? Some
modern responses have probed how education has shaped and
been shaped by the principle of nationa1ity, with Lawrence
Cremin's American Education perhaps the pre-eminent exam-
Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, end of Chapter VII: "Trea-
son."
9:! Henry Adams. Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres (New York: Pen-
guin Books, 1986).
g] Machiavelli, The Discourses (Bernard Crick, ed., New York: Pen-
guin Books, 1985).
98 What the university will gain
ple.
94
Emerging debates about multiculturalism ill education
may be the harbinger of an historic dissociation between educa-
tion and nationality, which could have significant effects on
whether people identifY with and recognize the nation-state as
the dominant center of political authority. Instead of concen-
trating on the concept of nationality. other modern responses
have examined the interactions between democracy and educa-
tion, with John Dewey's work, and more recently Amy Gut-
mann's, pre-eminent.
95
Finally. a third modem response broadens out in the manner
originated by Herodotus, comparing the fonnative ethos of
civilizations, exemplified by Max Weber's incessant investiga-
tion and by ntunerous post-Weberians trying to understand ''the
great divergence" as Kenneth Pomeranz has recently put it.
96
94 Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education (3 vols., New York:
Harper & Row, 1970, 1980, 1988).
95 In Democracy and Education (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1916, 1997), Dewcy engaged in important educational concept for-
mation, especially with the concept of growth and the reconstruction
of experience and used both concepts to forge an integral link be-
tween the politics of democracy and the practice of education. Amy
Gutmann's Democratic Education (princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987, 1999) is an excellent example of the way students of
politics often look at education, asking how educational activities and
services should be provided consistent with democratic political
nonns.
% Weber's life work was an effort to understand the cultural sources
of capitalistic rationalization, and why it developed in Europe. as dis-
tinct from other civilized spaces, and why, within Europe, in the
modem period, as distinct from the ancient or medieval. The most
accessible example is The Protestant Ethic and tile Spirit a/Capital-
ism (Peter Baehr and Gordon C. Wells, trans., New York: Penguin
Books, 2002) along with other translations and editions. Perhaps the
most essential instantiation of this concern, which was a life-long
work-in-progress, is his posthumous Economy and Society: An Out-
line of Interpretive Sociology (2 vols., Guenther Roth and Claus Wit-
What the university will gain 99
Such comparative inquiry into the formative power of an inter-
acting cultural system is fraught with dangers, for many people
misconstrue ideas developing conceptual differences and take
the thought to signifY objective inferiorities and superiorities.
Here are the roots of genocide, a terrible twentieth-century deg-
radation. It threatens to be a twenty-first-century scourge as
well, as globalism intersects with terrorism, as high technology
and Midas wealth mingle with massive poverty in a world
where the supply of resources shrinks rapidly relative to the
demand. Arrogant power meshes with the belief that one's own
civilization beneficently imparts fuB humanity to its members,
while that of one's enemies molds depraved beings, less than
human. The interplay of self-aggrandizement and the degrada-
tion of the other makes it imperative to achieve a dispassionate,
value-free understanding of how different systems of formative
justice work in the present-day world.
97
tich, eds., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), especially
the very long second part (pp. 311-1374), which drew together all the
strands of his historical sociology. I refer to The Greal Divergence:
China, Europe, and Ihe Making of the Modern World Economy by
Kenneth Pomeranz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), not
because cultural factors are primary in his explanatory efforts. but to
show how the question of the relative power of different historic civi-
lizations remains an open, unsolved question. A fuller account of
these aspects of fonnative justice would look at the ways in which
culhlrai resources and technological innovations interact in the fonna-
tion of historical power -- questions into which Ihe Weallh ofNalions:
Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor by David S. Landes (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1998) and The Lever of Riches: Techno-
logical Creativity and Economic Progress by Joel Moykr (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990) are useful entry points.
97 The late Edward Said pointed out the deep proclivities to dehwnan-
ize others by unconsciously aggrandizing the truth of one's own prin-
ciples in OrientaJism (New York: Vintage, 1979). Comprehending
how the world appears to someone other than oneself is a fundrunen-
tal educational skill that is terribly strained as all the world's people
100 What the university will gain
Enough. Were this essay intended to present fully the oppor-
tunities for concept formation in education, it would need to
deal with much more than the discussion of formative justice
touched on here. The historical record is rich in educational
concepts, but their current development and use are sparse.
Disinterested fOlmation of educational concepts deserves seri-
ous academic study. Within the arts and sciences, the study of
educational concepts, such as fOImative justice, would be a fit
enterprise, oue worth exerting significant effort to introduce.
Looking back on the historical record, we see that it provides
a profuse heritage of concept formation, offering influential
ideas for thinking critically about educational experience. The
claim is not that inquiry about such concepts should become,
within the arts and sciences, exclusively an educational inquiry,
or even primarily educational, but that, in addition to the eco-
nomic, social, political, religious, ethical, even literary dimen-
sions of the inquiry, it should consistently have an educational
dimension. The educational dimension of concepts like fonna-
tive justice has been of peripheral impOlt in schools of educa-
tion, although it would be of central import were education a
disinterested study in the ruts and sciences. Further, the claim
goes beyond recognizing the value in developing the educa-
tional import of concepts such as fommtive justice in itself.
The educational dimension of such ideas often constitutes the
are being brought together in a Hegelian life-and-death struggle for
mutual recognition. The most difficult of all books about education,
the Bi/dung of tIle human mettle - Hegel's Phenomenology o/Spirit-
is, alas, among the timeliest. "Hegel on Education" by Allen W.
Wood is an excellent summation, although it leaves the topic still
very esoteric. See, Rorty, cd., Philosophers on Education, op. cit.
(note 43), pp. 300·17. Making the heritage of reflection about
Bi/dung in Gennan available in English would be a significant task
for the academic study of education. It is a valuable heritage, but one
of minor importance to the work of professional educators.
What the university will gain lOl
nexus relating all their other dimensions to each other. With
the nexus absent in the arts and sciences, their ability to do jus-
tice to the theme, however productive their separate contribu-
tions may be, is significantly reduced. The need for the aca-
demic study of education is real.
Clearly, the contemporary university has not developed its
intellectual organization fully. To complete development of it,
the university needs to provide the differentiation characteristic
in other fields for the study of education. The university needs
to recognize education as a field of academic study, as a body
of autonomous inquiry in the arts and sciences.
In doing so, there is no need to make education into a tightly
unified discipline, whatever that would be. Basic forms of hu-
man activity generate broad, diversified fields of study. The
study of politics provides the closest analogue to the study of
education. As a field, political science includes significant
subdivisions - political theory, American politics, comparative
politics, international relations. The academic study of educa-
tion would as wen - educational theory, American education,
comparative education, cultural change. Each area itself would
be substantial, welcoming methodologically diverse contribu-
tions to the conceptual explanation and understanding of edu-
cational experience in its fullness. To be sure, contributions to
such work take place in schools of education and the object
would not be to empty it out of those institutions, but, in a
small yet significant way, to fill out and complete the arts and
sciences with a group of scholars dedicated primarily to disin-
terested concept formation about education.
A department of education in the arts and sciences would
strengthen and focus university scholarship on education. That
step would relieve distorting pressures on schools of education.
It would help them, and the educational research establishment,
to concentrate more effectively on the instrumental goals es-
sential to the work of professional education. By including a
department of education in the arts and sciences, dedicated to
disinterested scholarship and teaching, the university can take a
102 What the university will gain
concrete step to develop its intellectual organization ruther.
111at step would strengthen the university and enhance its hu-
man wOlth.
Some concluding questions
All this, the negative and the positive responses building the
case for education as an academic study. might persuade aca-
demic leaders inside the university. But what about the aca-
demic pail'ons and the public? Here the university must lead.
Someone, somewhere must take a risk, staking resources to
change the given situation. That risk devolves upon the univer-
sity. for ideas precede their payoff. And this brings us to the
close, finally, with one last point - the payoff will be real. In
fostering the disinterested study of education culminating in the
formation of concepts such as formative justice, the university
would not be turning away from human experience and flesh
and blood needs. The arts and sciences, properly pursued and
practiced, are no ivory tower. Too the contrary: the absence in
the university of education as an academic study contributes to
the woes of our world.
An absence of education as an academic study is not simply
an intramural problem within the university. With education in
the university confined to the professional school, in public
discourse education has become synonymous with the work of
schools. This creates a profound irresponsibility as prominent
people ill other walks, who should be caring for their educative
effects, blithely act as if they have none. The young, indeed
everyone, need strong, fonnative examples across the full spec-
trum of action - effort, honesty, wisdom, self-sacrifice, recog-
nition of complexity, generosity, confident humility, intelligent
purpose, courage, and on. Instead, they get heedless leaders in
politics, commerce, and the media who shirk the responsibility
to cultivate public principles through the fonnative effects of
their actions. The principles through which we live are not
What the university will gain 103
given, dependable realities, etched in history; our principles are
not transcendent necessities that need no fonnative care. They
are contingent. They exist only to the degree that we exem-
plifY them for each other and enable ourselves, ever anew, to
fonn and fulfill them.
Dishonest corporate executives profoundly miseducate the
public, as do the rapaciously overpaid. So do political leaders
who lie and deceive in the pursuit of power; they destroy the
bonds of community, mutual trust among people, each of
whom is unique and different. Politics is not corrupt; our poli-
ticians are corrupting. A putative leader cannot excuse decep-
tion on his behalf by saying that his guy must twist truth be-
cause the other guy's guy is worse, and then follow it up, dis-
missing the complex temptations the young experience with the
complacent cliche, ''just say no." Greed and the lust for power
are such strong motivations that even if we recover a public
understanding of education, such destructive drives will not
disappear. Nevertheless, were educational discussion to aS
8
sume again its proper scope, those b1ind to their duties would
fmd it harder to pass as persons of probity.
Close readers of Plato know that the concept of formative
justice will not be toothless with respect to the important con
8
cerns of social justice. In thinking about formative justice,
scholars can put critical questions that they are unable at pre-
sent to put with effect. To some the questions will seem
merely rhetorical - "but of course." In that case, one has al
8
ready persuaded oneself of the point. But to others, concepts of
fonnative justice and the questions put through them may pr08
voke searching inward inquiry. empowering reflections that
lead to ahered action. That is how detached, impartial inquiry
makes a difference in the world and that is why we need educa-
tion as an academic study. -
• Do parents commit a grave formative injustice when they
bequeath to their children resources of wealth and power
of such scope that life appears to present the chi1dren
with no element of circumstantial risk or challenge?
104 What the university will gain
• Do proponents of a belief system commit a grave forma-
tive injustice when they set its adherents apalt from other
people in such a way that they can no longer recognize
the full humanity of those others?
• Does a society characterized by extremes of inequality,
such that the least favored cannot possibly aspire to real-
ize tJle capacities that the most favored can easily de-
velop, conunit a grave formative injustice, hurting not
only the least favored, but also the most, and those be-
tween, diminishing the sum of accomplishments to be
enjoyed by all?
• Do principles of formative justice peltain on the level of
global interactions, the environment, and intergenera-
tiona! time and how should they operate to prevent the
excessive development of a geographic, environment. or
generational component to oodermine the harmony and
stability of the whole?
• Can principles of formative justice show whether the cur-
ricula, the delivery of instruction, and the methods of as-
sessing aptitudes and achievements in use in the provi-
sion of formal education are most likely to enable stu-
dents to develop their powers and purposes to achieve
fulfillment in an uncertain world?
• When teachers and schools fail to speak with conviction
and meaning to the fonnative choices that each and every
student must uniquely make, do they do justice in their
work?
• Respecting education and formative justice, should peo-
ple reassert a politics of humane full employment?
And so, we end. Let us do so by returning full-circle to the
question with which my friend began, now restated in a lan-
guage newly learned.
• Has the university. considering the powers and purposes
of its parts, brought each to its full potential and put them
all in relation to each other so that each serves its proper
What the university will gain 105
business, fonning the whole to the fullness of its possi-
bility? Is the university an exemplar of the fonnative
justice for which it should stand?
Index
Abbott, Andrew, 30
academic, the, 9-12,16-9,
25,27-9,31-2,34,37-
41,49-50,55-6,60,62,
71,87,93,100-2
Achilles, 78
Adams, Henry, 96-7
Adorno, Theodor, 53
Agamemnon, 78
American Educational
Research Association
(AERA), 27, 30
American Historical
Association (AHA), 27
amour de soi, amour
propre, 84
applied knowledge, 12
arete, 89
Aristotelian Principle, 58
Aristotle, 58, 60, 75, 83,
91,95
arts and sciences, 7-12, 15-
8, 20, 23, 28-9, 30, 32,
34-7,39-42,44,46-53,
55,57,61,63,65,71,
87,100-2
Athens, Athenian, 76. 95
Augustine of Hippo, Saint,
60,92
Bacon, Francis, 29
Bailyn, Bernard, 54
Barber, Benjamin R., 59
Barzun, Jacques, 44-6
Beniger, James R., 86
Berlin, Isaiah, 59
Berliner, David C., 19
Bestor, Arthur, 54
Bi/dung, Bildungsroman,
47,50,62, 100
Blau, Peter, 28
Bledstein, Burton J., 28
Bloom, Allan, 70
Bok, Dereck, 70
Boo. Katherine, 78
Boucher, David, 61
Bowen, James, 61
Bowen, William G., 70
Boyd, William, 58
Brown University,
Educational Studies, 15-
6
Callan, Eamonn, 42
Cambridge Texts in the
History of Political
Thought, 57
Cavell, Stanley, 43
Chicago, University of,
Department of
Education, 38
clinical practice, 5, 28, 30-
!O8
[,33,35
Cold War, 95
Columbia University. 7,
24-25,37,46
concept fonnation,
Begriffsbildung, 66, 68·
9,71-3,84,87,98,100-[
continuing education, 7
Cremin, Lawrence A., 21,
24,47,54,97-8
criticism, 43, 45, 47-53
Crito, 76
Dante Alighieri, 92
Dewey, Jo[m, [9,60-62,98
DHthey, Wilhelm, 19
discipline, to, 15, 18,36,
48,54-6,86,9[,1O[
disinterested knowledge, 9-
13, [5-6, [8-20,23,26-
7,29-32,35-4[,44,46,
48-9,52-3,55-6,62-3,
65-6,68-70,75,80,94,
99, [00-2
distance learning. 7
distributive justice, 73, 75,
77-9,8[-4,87,95
doctorate, the, 24-7, 29. 34
economics, 15,41,71,90,
[00
Ed.D. Degree, 24-5
education, definition of,
20-[
educational research, 15,
[7,26-7,30,35-6,62,
lQ[
Educational Testing
Index
Service, ETS, 80
Educational Theory. 58, 60
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 43
Emile, 84
Enlightenment. 53
Epictetus, 86
Epicurean, 92
Euhen, J. Peter, 42, 48
Evans, Austin P., 25. 37
Feinberg, Walter, 47
fonnal justice, 73-4
fonnativejustice, 74-5, 77-
88, 90-2, 94-6, 99-100,
102-5
fulfillment, 5, 23, 63, 77-8,
82-4, 86-8, 93, 104
full employment, 78, 83,
104
Galileo, 66-7. 76, 81
Gardner, Howard, 77
Geist, Geisteswissen-
schaften, 67, 84
Goetzmann, William H., 20
Gramsci, Antonio, 85
Gutek, Gera[d L., 6 [
Gutmann, Amy, 98
Hadot, Pierre, 91
Harris, William Torrey, 19
Harvard Graduate School
of Education, 32
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich, 60, 84, 100
Heraclitus, 9
Herodotus, 95, 98
History of Education
Quarterly,1?,60
Hobbes, Thomas, 59-60
Hoffinann, Banesh, 80
Homer, 78, 94
homo sapiens, 22
Horkheimer, Max, 53
Hurka, Thomas, 44
ideal-type, 7, 9-10, 28, 49,
87
Iliad, The, 78
11lich, Ivan, 23
intellect, 8, 43, 46
interested knowledge, 10,
12,15,27,42,49,62,
65-6
interning, 28, 30, 33
J.D. Degree, 24
Jaeger, Werner, 21
Journal of Philosophy, 20
Kafka, Franz, 85
Kant, Immanuel, II, 22,
58,84
Kelly, Paul, 61
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 85
Koerner, James, 54
Kuethe, James L., 55
Labaree, David F., 35
Lagemann, Ellen
Condliffe. 17,36
Landes, David S., 99
Lemann, Nicholas, 80
Leser, Hennann, 19
Levinson, Meira, 62
Locke, John, 59-60
Ludmerer, Kenneth M., 33
M.B.A. Degree, 24, 28
M.D. Degree, 24, 33
Index 109
Machiavel1i, Niccolb, 60,
97
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 59
Macpherson, C. B., 59
McClintock, Robbie, 19,
23,47,56,82
McDonough, Kevin, 47
medical school, 17, 33, 35
Menand, Louis, 20
Mind,20
Moykr, Joel, 99
nanotechnology, 8
National Center for
Educational Statistics, 26
Nehamas, Alexander, 42,
48
Niemeyer, Hermann, 19
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 43, 60
Noddings, Nel, 61
Novick, Peter, 9
novum organum, 8
Nussbaum, Martha, 91
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 47
overspecialization, 31
perfectionism, 43-4
Ph.D. Degree, 7, 24, 25,
28,31,37,56
Philosophical Quarterly,
20
Philosophical Review, 20
philosophy, 19-20,43-4,
55,58,60-1,73,77
Philosophy and
Phenomenological
Research, 20
Plato, 42,60,74-77,79,
110
81,83,86-92,94-5,103
Pocock, J. G. A., 59
Pogge, Thomas W., 75
Political Theory. 42, 59, 60
political thought, 41, 57-
61,72-3
Pomeranz, Kenneth, 98-9
Pope, Alexander, 88
Popper, Karl R., 76
power. 28, 36, 39, 41, 43,
50,52-3,69,76,79,81,
85,88-93,95-6,99,103
Preparing Future Faculty
Program, 16
pre-Socratics, 11
productivity, 13
professional school, 7-10,
12-3, 15, 17,23,27-29,
31-3,35-8,45,55-6,62-
3,102
professional, the, 7, 9-12,
15,17-20,25,27,29-37,
39,45,47, 50, 53, 55-6,
62-3,65, 102
professionalism, 9, 31, 52
Protagoras, 89
pseudo-scholarship,S
pure Irnowledge, 12
Putnam, Robert D., 95
Rawls, John, 43, 58, 60,
73-4,82,87
Republic, The, 75-6, 79-80,
86, 88, 90-1, 94
research,7-9, 13, 15, 17,
24-5,27,29-30,33-7,
45,47-52,54,56-7,61,
Index
101
Richardson, Virginia, 31
Riley, Pa1rick, 58
Rome, 92, 97
Rarty, Amelie Oksenberg,
61,100
Ross, Dorothy, 18
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques,
58-60,84
Rupp, George, 38
Said, Edward, 99
scholarship, 9, 13,2224,
28-33,35,37,39,41-6,
48-53, 55, 57-8, 60, 62-
3,65, 70, 94, 101
Schoninghs Sammlung
Piidagogischer Schriften,
57
school of business, 13
school of education, 15,
17-8,20,23-4,26-7,30-
8,40-1,48,53-4,56-58,
62-3,78,100-1
school of public policy, 13
Schwarz, F. H. C., 19
Sen, Amartya, 41
skeptic, 92
SkilUler, Quentin, 59
Skocpol, Theda, 95
Smith, Roger, 17
Socrates, 9, 60, 61, 76, 91
Stanford University, 15
Stoics, Stoicism, 69, 92
Stokes, Donald E., 12
Taylor, Charies, 42, 48, 61
Teachers College,
Columbia University,
23-5,37,47,54,56
Thucydides,95
undergraduate, 5, 15-6,35,
38
university,7-9, 11-2, 15-7,
23,27,29,32,34-9,41,
46,49, 52, 56, 62-3, 65,
Index
70, 101-2, 104
Vaughan, C. C., 58
virtue, 89
Walton, John, 55
Weber, Max, 10, 67, 98
Weinreich, Uriel, 25
Wills, Garry, 53
Wood, Allen W., 100
111
Homeless in the House oflntetlect invites creation of an academic
department of education in the arts and science faculties of Ameri-
can universities. It explains the rationale for disinterested study of
education, independent of professional concerns.
From long experience, Robbie McClintock speaks to·all engaged
in educative effort. In this book, be asks a simple question about
universities and identifies a flaw in their pursuit of knowledge about
education. He shows how intellectual losses result and suggests what
universities can do to correct the failing. He exemplifies the correc-
tive through the concept of formative justice, whichtdeals "not with
public goods, but with human potentials." Universities can streng-
then their leaderspip in education by providing opportunities at the
graduate and undergraduate levels for the academic study of educa-
tion through departments with important subfields, similar to those
in political science.
McClintock considers how the currently deficient arrangements for
the study of education lead to serious weaknesses in civic leadership.
"In public discourse, education has become synonymous with the
work of schools. This creates a profound irresponsibility as promi-
nent people in other walks, who should be caring for their educative
effects, blithely act as if they have none." He concludes, with elo-
quent concern, putting questions that we ought not to shirk.
Robbie McClintock, a historian of educational and political thought,
has worked extensively to integrate technology into education. In
1967 be joined the faculty at Teachers College, Columbia University,
where he is now the John L. and Sue Ann Weinberg Professor in the
Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Education.
The Laboratory for Liberal Learning supports disinterested scholar-
ship, research, and criticism about bow educational interactions bring
natural potentials and nurtured achievements to fulfillment and thereby
shape the quality of personal and public life.
Laboratory jor Liberal Leorning
322 Thompson Hall (136)
Teachers College, Coilimbia University
525 West 120th Street
New York, NY 10027_6696
ISBN 0-9763672-0-3
9

Homeless in the House of Intellect
Formative Justice and Education as an Academic Study

Robbie McClintock

New York
Laboratory for Liberal Learning

2005

Copyright © 2005 by Robbie McClintock

Published by Laboratory for Liberal Learning 322 Thompson Hall (Box 136) Teachers College. Columbia University 525 West 120th Street New York. NY 10027

ISBN 0-9763672-0-3

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57 41 What the university will gain Concept formation. 9 5 7 The anomaly in education Models of advanced study.Contents Preface Putting a question The professional and the academic. 27 35 15 What the university has lost The educational and the political. 66 72 65 Some concluding questions. Building a case for change. Formative justice. 102 Index 106 .

a birthright of all. but to lead with effect it must strengthen its internal commitment to the study of education. in order to secure a place for disinterested academic research and teaching about education at the graduate and lmdergraduate levels. The educational profession. replaced by a clinical internship. Second. one like that concluding the preparation of medical doctors? Third. The university as a whole might pro-. These views have ripened slowly over 37 years as a member . skills. ject to the public a moving vision of formative education. entangled in the status quo. cannot provide the necessary leadership. and most importantly. one that will serve each person in a life-long aspiration to fulfillment. This essay calls for that action. I aim to establish the intellectual context for a substan- tial work of scholarship on the concept of fonnative justice. sustained and comprehensive. First. I want to provoke serious discussion of two questions. The last third of this essay introduces that concept and the first two-thirds analyze the intellectual context for it. cease to culminate advanced professional preparation in education.Preface In writing Homeless in the House of Intel/ect. through a critique of schools of education. I have three objectives. as a field akin to political science. What lrnowledge. and understandings should professional educators hold in common and how can schools of education ensure that they acquire them? And should the dissertation. I strive to persuade university scholars and administrators to add education to the deparbnents in the arts and sciences. putatively an origi- nal contribution to knowledge but often far less. American culture needs a renewed lmderstanding of education as a deeply formative experience.

however.6 Preface of the faculty at Teachers College. both past and current. I believe. At Teachers College. and eff011 of those working within Teachers College and other graduate schools of education. Floyd Hammack. We cannot improve the situation without speaking honestly about its destructive effects and calling vigorously for a decisive remedy. John Waterbury. Mitchell Stevens. Moretti. Murphy. Maxine McClintock. Grace Goodyear Roosevelt. John B. I want to thank explicitly Rene ArcilIa. Columbia University. James B. I am deeply indebted to the College and to the University. I fear that some colleagues may take affront at this view. Thomas W. Seth Halvorson. TIley bear no responsibility. Frank A. I have become convinced that a sharpening of the distinction between those purposes and the programs serving them would furtller the interests of students and the public they aim to serve. that the blun'ing of academic and professional purposes causes grave weaknesses in schools of education. and to munerous colleagues. Steven Cohen. Lambros Comitas. Susan Lowes. Pat Nicholson. Despite the immense talent. these weaknesses arise because the university supports the study of education poorly. Avi Mintz. who brooked no discouragement. for my continuing lack of clarity or for the burden of the argument. For Maxine. Black. I have had the opportunity to pal1icipate closely in doctoral programs preparing both scholars for the academic study of education and practitioners for professional work in schools. Jennifer Hogan-Murphy. Andrew Light. for intellectual stimulus and professional support across my career. I apologize. James Fraser. . and if they do. and Jonathan Zimmennan for comments on presentations or drafts that have helped me sharpen points. however. dedication. for I intend no insult. Pogge.

Is the model. General Studies there to the right.and intellectually too. major and minor. have the key academic disciplines and the professional schools. were not so pertinent. Engineering back behind Low. and the College proper over in Hamilton. and all around. with hardly anything yet built. developed fully with a rough working consensus among them about purpose and effort? Agreed. . Now it has fined out physically . a friend surveyed the Columbia square and posed a question. Columbia leaves out a few. centers and institutes do research on matters of every sort. each with its special degree. continuing education is growing. Of course.D.Which particular university is most complete? Rather . some developments. New means to meet demands for learning fit within the established fields of study. but these changes have to do with the medium more than the message. like a school of agriculture. the idea of the university. It has the big professional schools. Columbia was like others. now intellectually complete? In principle. the ideal-type that touches on all the possibilities. relative to the generic university. Columbia was just moving here from midtown.Barnard across Broadway.Putting a question On the steps of Low Library in the warmth of a springtime sun. Has the contemporary university fully developed its intellectual organization? A hundred years ago. and the graduate school in the arts and sciences grants the Ph. It offers sev- eral routes to the bachelors . despite the buzz. a university in the making. in most any specialty one can imagine. That is not the point. drawing in new participants. The question is not . and some smaller. and organizational innovations may emerge from distance learning. But who would go to an ag-school on the Heights? Surely no single university has all the possibilities. For instance.

The question does not call for an inventory of all pending developments. and disseminate the knowledge. As they have developed to this point. For instance. Do the fields of study within the contemporary university organize its work in a way that is intellectually sound and complete? Every school and every field still has much to accomplish. not as a structural improvement correcting an evident deficiency in academic organization. along with the range of human practice addressed through professional schools. Is a core pursuit of the university still imperfectly institutionalized? Given the spectrum of disciplines in the arts and sciences. universities are the novum organum made tangible. for they organizationally embody the advancement of leanting that has taken place in the modent era. is the university rightly organized to support these efforts? Is the research lUliversity rightly adapted to acquire. let us set speculations about the peripheral emergence of new knowledge or skill to the side. skill. nanotechnology is fast becoming a new applied science. In putting the question. Rather than looking for novelties. The question has to do with the structure and scope of knowledge itself. but as an extension of well-established lines of inquiry within existing components of the university. let us restrict the question to issues with a long history in cultural experience. what reorganization of intellectual work might prove wise? This is the question. A slow chum at the margins where research fields intersect will generate new subspecialties.8 Putting a question tilting towards the practical end of the spectrum. do university structures tightly serve the intellectual functions active in twenty-first-century experience? Does the division of intellectual labor at work among the arts and sciences and the leanted professions suit the major opportunities? If not. is the study of something important still homeless in the house of intellect? . preserve. not with techniques for its dissemination. Rather. and Wlderstanding requisite in contemporary life? Taken together. not a persisting immaturity of it. Emerging subspecialties evidence a mature system at work.

in disinterested is important. scholars and lUliversity leaders need to be clear about the integrity of the ideal-type.Putting a question 9 The professional and the academic To start. Kathleen Freeman. I think it is important to recognize that objectivity is a (dubious) epistemology whereas disinterestedness is a disposition in which the dis. Socrates paradigmatically exemplified disinterestedness when he would refuse to accept what "everyone" recognized to be important and would accept as controlling what he and his . I Almost always. which are keyed to what those in the craft need to know. In the arts and sciences. 28." as Heraclitus long ago claimed. 1988) is very illuminating with respect to these problems. the professional and the aca- demic address the same realms of experience. That Noble Dream: The "Objectivily Question" and the American Historical Profession by Peter Novick (New York: Cambridge University Press. cognate to each professional school. not driven by the imperatives of practice.l All the same. scholarship and instruction are detached. drawn by curiosity. which prepares skilled practitioners in an important activity.. however putatively normative others may claim those to be. the interests of practitioners shape research and training. professionalism bas increasingly pervaded the arts and sciences at the doctoral level. with the various departments aggregating into the professional school that prepares the future faculty of the arts and sciences according to the interests of a largely self-dermed elite. Such actualities create circumstances under which departments can slip away from the academic idea and take up some purpose other than knowledge for its own sake. trans. In the professional schools. p. Surely the university has il- lustrated how "harmony consists of opposing tension. Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1 To be sure. 1956). consider the distinctive differentiation long distinguishing university organization. 1 Fragment 51. a refusal to control inquiry by external interests. To deal with such circumstances well. turning from ideal-types to the mundane actualities of academic life. one or more academic fields treat the domain as a subject for disinterested inquiry and teaching.

to

Putting a question

Whoever looks only at one or the other, either the professional or the academic, will find the concept of interested or disinterested knowledge difficult to grasp. Thus scholars often flounder in explaining what they mean by "knowledge for its own sake." The concept makes sense as one of two contrasting ideal-types - Irnowledge adapted to the interests of an organized profession counterbalanced by knowledge derived from the play of curiosity, the Irnowledge that springs from wonder, the knowledge motivated by no purpose outside itself. Professional schools and the academic arts and sciences do not deal with different human stuff; they overlap, dealing with a common substance in a distinctive way. The knowledge of most worth in the professional school is highly instrumental fi'om the perspective of the skilled practitioner; that of most worth in the academic department is disinterested, value-free with respect to practice, which means neither uninterested nor irrelevant, and it takes the perspective of the inquisitive person, moved by simple curiosity, not that of the proficient professiona1.3
interlocutor would hold to be important OIl careful examination ofthe matter. Socrates characteristically quetied people who possessed expertise of one sort or another to show the limits of such knowledge. 3 In this essay, I will use as the primary distinction, the ideal-types of interested knowledge and disinterested Imowledge. I will use as frequent synonyms, the professional and the academic, and for the former, I will sometimes describe inquiry as partial, meaning disposed towards the advantage of one or another givett purpose, and for the latter, I will occasionally speak of detaclnncnt, objective Imowledge, and value-free, dispassionate, or intpaltial inquiry. Max Weber's methodological essays and his great discussion of "Science as a Vocation" are important for thinking out the diScipline of disinterested study, but he was concerned less to define the work of the arts and sciences vis-a.-vis professional schools than he was to ensure the integt;ty oftlte arts and sciences against diverse temptations of politicization. See inter alia, Max Weber, The Methodology a/the Social Sciences, Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, trans., (Glencoe, IL: TIle Free Press, 1949) and Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in

Putting a question

11

Here is the key. The distinction between the professional and the academic provides a way to decide whether the univer· sity has reached its full development. The university structure will be complete if it provides both professional training and academic study for all major domains of experience and action. An opportunity to improve the organizational structure of the university exists where professional programs lack an academic correlate, or vice versa. A harmony of opposing tension in the university between the professional and the academic is neither a recent accident nor the happenstance of inefficient management. From its earliest origin, the university housed both liberal education in the arts and sciences and specialist preparation in learned professions, the two sides often locked in creative conflict with one another." The opposing tendencies arose early on, nascent in the different forms of reasonableness that tradition attributed to the pre-Socratic sages. The lore about early thinkers celebrated both their gift for detached reflection with their paradoxes and obscure definitions and their shrewd acumen as they used their knowledge to comer markets for olive oil, to layout wellordered cities, and to promulgate effective laws. Soon, ancient centers of learning supported both Socratic and sophistic schools, the one dedicated to philosophic learning, the other to practical rhetoric.

H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 1958), pp. 129-156. " Immanuel Kant saw the principle clearly and distinguished lawful from unlawful conflicts between the professional faculties and the arts and sciences. Lawful conflicts proceeded through open, rational debate and were intellectually fruitful. Unlawful conflicts resorted to external authorities to impose a resolution to questions by the force of censorship, suppressing offensive reasoning by the rule of force. See Immanuel Kant., The Conflict of the Facuilies, Mary 1. Gregor, trans., (New York: Abaris Books, 1979), passim, especially pp. 47-53.

12

Putting a question

Such early tensions, maturing into the academic arts and sciences and the major professional schools, became an essential organizational characteristic of the modem university. Because of it. the twellty-first-century university includes numerous overlapping units: a department of economics and a school of

business; a department of sociology and a school of social
work; a department of politics and both a school of public affairs and a law school; a department of biology and a school of medicine; departments of physics, of chemistry, and of other sciences of matter and energy and a school of engineering, a department of religion and a theological seminary; departments of literature. of music, and of art history and schools of the arts, architecture, and journalism. 5 Why does the university foster so much overlap in its inteI-

The differentiation between academic and professional study is related to the much-discussed tension between pure and applied knowledge, but I do not think it is precisely the same issue. To explore the difference fully would require an extended reflection inappropriate within the confines of this essay. Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation by the late Donald E. Stokes (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997, esp. Figure 3-5 and related discussion, pp. 70-5), a useful discussion, does not really distinguish betwcen the professional and the academic, for the quadrant applies to both. It arises from the possibility of responding yes or no to two questions - Was there a quest for fundamental understanding? Were there considerations of use? YcsNes; YeslNo; NoNes; NolNo. With respect to both interested and disinterested inquiries, one can ask both questions and apply the quadrant to each type of inquiry, with each producing examples of the [our different resulls. What distinguishes interested and disinterested inquiry is not how each situates within the quadrant. but rather who will decide how to answer the questions defining the quadrant and what sorts of reasons they will give in detemlining their answers. By characterizing inquiry as interested or disinterested, one describes neither the process nor its results, but the motivations driving both the process and its results.
S

managerial imperatives. research economists might lobby to move en masse to the school of public policy where rational choice theories receive a bit more respect. Better. Corporate restructuring. for the overlap arises from real differences in the uses of knowledge generated and disseminated by each. would prove ineffective. and it dumbs down anything mathematical to what distracted executives would find easy and relevant. by locating disinterested scholarship. We can hear the directives. relegated to the b-school. Who knows. it won't tenure macroeconomists. doing away with inefficient redundancies between academic departments and professional schools. Have prospective executives take graduate degrees in economics. divorced completely from real-world. But then. if needed at a11. . close the economics department and move the faculty to the bschool. the economics courses are too ivory tower. better yet. in the appropriate professional school. the b-school gives short shrift to high-level researchers.Putting a question 13 lectual organization between academic departments and professional schools? We can imagine a corporate apostle of pro ductivity insisting that intellectual institutions use precious resources more efficiently by situating the preparation of professionals in academic departments or. we also hear the complaints. With the other. With the one.

seeking status as certi~ fled practitioners.stanford. which "is not a preparation for teaching. 1i Perhaps more significantly. however. Occasional exceptions appear to exist . Does the professional school of education stand without a clear departmental complement in the arts and sciences? The ostensible.htm. but in doing so.edul~ deptfSUSEJhonors/info.The anomaly in education Consider whether the opposing tension in the university be- tween academic disciplines and professional schools characteristic for economic. Stanford University School of Education. organized study of education is pervasively professional. To be sure. sometimes it is situated in the faculty of the arls and sciences." www. for it de~ scribes itself as "lmique in the nation. . artistic. and material experience holds with the study of educational experience. Thus they study education in an interested. instead comprising a set of inquiries highly responsive to the imperatives of the profession. For in~ stance. biologic. religious. social. This program confinns the rule. manner. students can often major in education." and even at that. Stanford's Undergraduate Honors Program in the School of Education. they are usually taking a program of professional preparation leading towards initial teaching credentials. but it nevertheless specializes in preparing practitioners.perhaps." offers instead an opportunity to do research on educational top~ ics that honors students could not do within a regular disci~ pline. "Undergraduate Honors Program in the School of Education. most "educational research" is not uninvolved. political. Brown University has broadened its undergraduate education offerings to include a (. At the undergraduate level. not a disinterested.

the study of education is almost eutirely contained within the schools of education." www. This is a major positive development in higher education over the past decade or so backed by major associations in higher education. needed attention to the preparation of graduate students as prospective college and university instruc- 7 hI addition to an undergraduate teacher education program.brown. where research and instruction primarily concerns the needs of schools and those who run them and those who teach and learn within them. It introduces systematic work on instructional practice into the arts and sciences.A. Work there is professional. 9 The academic study of education might build on these developments. not academic and overall sets the tone for the study of education throughout the university." www. and "Concentration Requirement. They reflect a salutary effort to bring a higher level of professional excellence to the teaching and learning that takes place in the arts and sciences. the Education Department at Brown University offers a concentration in Education Studies with two emphases. but it would differ in one significant way fl. At the graduate level. One exception arises because graduate schools of the arts and sciences are paying much more attention to the quality of teaching in their various fields at both the graduate and undergraduate level. See "About Us. for it would look outward to education in the world generally. www. at the graduate level.16 The anomaly in education concentl'ation "designed for students seeking a broad liberal arts background in the field of education.eduIDcpartmentslEducationlconcJcqs.bnnVI1. 8 See. In the end.·om them. significantly preparing the way for the disinterested study of education there.php. Human Development or History and Policy. howcver.preparing-faculty. . for instance.org. the Preparing Future Faculty Program. These developments are not examples of the academic study of education in the arts and sciences.T.php)."7 But it is a small department supporting only an M. not inward to the process of teaching and learning on the local campus.edulDepattmentslEducationlabout.

a weak differentiation of the academic from the professional in the study of education deeply affected the way the university institutionalized the study of psychology itself.The anomaly in education 17 tors is not the same as a field of inquiry devoted to the academic study of education in the way political science approaches politics or sociology social life and conditions. showing how psychology became a dominant component of educational research as professional schools of education developed in the United States. they do. if a differentiation between professional preparation in education and the academic study of it does not hold. Universities appoint a high proportion of academic specialists in psychology as faculty members in the professional school of education. introducing it may be an opportunity for further developing the intel1ectual organization of the university. it shows how weakJy the university differentiates the academic and the professional in education. Although psychology may partially serve as an academic correlate to the professional school of education. for psychology as an academic correlate to the professional study of education has two limitations. First. So. making the interests of the profession primary in major sectors of the academic subject. But is the tension between the academic and the professional actu- a1ly absent in way the university organizes work on education? Do not departments of psychology in the arts and sciences stand to schools of education as departments of biology and related life sciences stand to medical schools? In part. The upshot: psychology has been co-opted by the professional school of education. not the development of psychology as an academic subject (see espe- . not in the arts and sciences. By co-opting major parts of psychology. In this story. but imperfectly so. 2000). !I \I Ellen Condliffe Lagemann gives an excellent account in An Elusive Science: The Troubling His/Dry ofEducalion Research (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lagemann's primary interest is the shaping of educational research. in doing so. the professional school of education has enveloped parts of the academic field. my friend observed.

18

The anomaly in education

A second, still more imp011ant limitation on psychology as the academic correlate to the professional study of education arises because psychology, in its various foons, is mute about much that is at stake. Education involves more than the psychological, for through it the cultural experience of humanity is at work. Education comprises cultural processes, immeasurable and intricate, vital to all, spawning complex institutions, guzzling material resources, with experiential consequences for persons and for publics. The disinterested, academic study of educational experience as it might be conducted within the arts and sciences contains much that lies outside the purview of psychological inquiry. In short, psychology speaks to patt of the how and to part of the when in education. Does an academic cOiTelate address well the rest of tIle how and the when, and also, the what, the who, the where, and the why of education?tll

cially Chapters I & 2, pp. 23-70). In The NONon History of the Human Sciences (New York: W. W. Norton & Co .• 1997), Roger Smith gives a good general explanation, primarily from the perspective of the history of psychology, describing how many of the leading psychological researchers fl:om roughly 1880 to 1920 were instrumental in building up both psychology as a discipline and education as a subject of professional education (see especially pp. 519-529, 580-599, and 650-672). Dorothy Ross traces how the social sciences developed in American higher education from 1865 to 1929 in The Origins of American Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991). In contrast to the linkage between psychology and schools of education, she shows the development of the major social science disciplines to be primarily all internal matter through which the disciplines created an intental professional ethos and discipline for their practitioners. not a process linked 10 a professional school from which the discipline might derive its ethos. to In the analysis that follows. I concentrate on developing the rationale for the academic study of educational matters independent of psychology. I think. however, that a few psychologists who are currently on the faculty of education schools might argue parallel to the case

The anomaly In education

19

In the nineteenth century, philosophy served as the academic

correlate to the professional study of education, at that time
spanning both the psychological and cultural sides of it. Phi-

losophy had this role. not only in Gennany,l1 but also in the
United States, for German influence in American philosophy,

developed here that their work would be better situated in the arts and sciences were education recognized there as a significant. nonprofessional field. Other psychologists seem satisfied within the professional context and call for greater attention to the socio-cultural setting of professional educational work. David C. Berliner gives an attractive vision of improved doctoral preparation in educational psychology, making it more effective with respect to the realities ofeducational practice. in "Toward a Future as Rich as Our Past." Carnegie Essays on the Doctorate (Stanford: The Carnegie FOlUldation for the Advancement of Teaching. 2003) www.carnegiefoundation.orgiCID/ essayS/CID_Edu_Berliner.pdf. 11 Wilhelm Dilthey introduced his substantia] work on historical pedagogy. asserting that "the blossom and goa] of real philosophy is pedagogy in its fullest sense. the fonnative theory of man (Bildungslehre des Menschen}." See Pildagogik: Geschichte und Grllndlinien des Systems. Gesammeite Schriften, vol. IX, 3rd, edition. (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner. 1960). p. 7. I think the concept of his torical pedagogy. the idea that one learns through philosophy and history what human beings can and should become, is important for the disinterested study of education and regret not having published anything on it other than a fragment in a Spanish journal: Robert McClintock, "El nacimiento de la historia de la educacion: Los antecedentes alemanes de la pedagogia hist6rica." Revista de Educaci6n. fa]l 1985. An excellent doctoral dissertation in an academic department of education would examine the development of historica] pedagogy from Hermann Niemeyer (1754-1828) and F. H. C. Schwarz (1766-1857) through Wilhelm Dilthey ending with the Weimar Period with Das Pildagogische Problem in der Geistesgeschichte der Neuzei/ by Hermann Leser (Munich: Druck and Verlag von R. Oldenbourg. 1925 & 1928).

20

The anomaly in education

from Transcendentalism through Dewey, was significant. lt By World War I, psychology had largely separated from philosophy and, like their peers in England, American philosophers largely abandoned detached reflection on the cultural aspects of education. As a fi'cestanding subfield, the philosophy of education, Dewey notwithstanding, had migrated to the schools of education, which co-opted it as the "philosophical and histOlical foundations of education" to serve an explicit role in the professional preparation of teachers and other educational specialists. Through most of the twentieth century in the arts and sciences, philosophers have rarely written about education overtly. 13

u. William Torrey Harris, of course. was both the first U.S. Commissioner of Education and the fowlder of T1,e Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867) a key journal in the history of philosophy in America. See The American HegeUans: An Intellectual Episode in the His10lY of Western America edited by William H. Goetzmatm (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). Louis Menand might have paid more attention to Hams and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in T1,e Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 200 I), for they did much to draw together and sustain the community of discourse about which Menand "''rotc. 13 Throughout the twentieth century, there has been a paucity of work on education in leading philosophy journals and the dearth is especially marked over the past 50 or more years. Mind published one article with "education" in its title in the twentieth century, in 1953; Philosophy mld Phenomenological Research published five between 1940 and 1998, the most recent in 1952; The Philosophical Review published three in the twentieth century, the most recent in 1921; and Philosophical Quarlerly published none between its start in 1950 and 1998. Relatively speaking, only the Journal of Philosophy has been a hot bed of pedagogical speculation, between 1904 and 1998 publishing fifteen articles the most recent in 1982. Although academic philosophers do not ostensibly write about education, what many ofthem write has great relevance to the disinterested study of education and it

" vol. 1976). skills.." and consequently avoided a truly comprehensive defini- .. viii & 134-5 for variations. as a result of which persons or groups achieve significant accomplishments. c£ vol... 2nd ed. This defmition avoids the verb. Public Education (New York: Basic Books. and Traditions of American Education (New York: Basic Books. Education occurs through complex interactions under concrete circumstances as persons or groups perceive. " vol. I. 3 vols. trans.. particularly schooling through state--supported systems. it takes place actively.. p. "education is the process by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character .i. ix. I think it more appropriate to accentuate the reciprocal influences and complicated interactions at work within it.J Educative would gain in value were there an organizational center for such work in the arts and sciences.The anomaly in education 21 Recognizing the limitations of psychology and philosophy as academic complements to the professional study of education implies a definition of education. The best educational histories make that break. This definition concentrates attention on the causal processes that one might associate with education. 1977). 41. Cremin wanted to discriminate between the history of education and "history in genera1. p.. xiii. activate. p. for education does not exist passively like a stone. which deserves to be explicit. refraining from saying what education is. Lawrence A. develop. 14 It is important to break away from the lazy equating of education with schooling. and sensibilities . and sustained effort to transmit or evoke knowledge. 10 be. from one generation to another. New York: Oxford University Press. attitudes. p. (New York: Harper & Row.. values. 1945) is a work of lasting value for the study of ancient Greek educational thought. thereby acquiring and realizing their determinate attributes. pp.. But Jaeger reified his ideas about "the Greek mind" and dehumanized education in his magisterial history by defining it as a self-subsistent force. but the controlling defmitions of education in them have not been entirely satisfactory. xiii. Paideia: the Ideals of Greek eli/lUre by Werner Jaeger (Gilbert Highet. 2. systematic. I. Cremin was more circumspect in his 3 volume American Education in which he would "view education as the deliberate. 1970). and combine natural capabilities and nurtured possibilities.

which persons and peoples work to achieve. . like so much other human experience.child and adult. only to find that all-too-often teachers. This was a mistake. Guyer & Wood. trans. the principle of temporal succession according to the law of causality. Pt. social action. Scholars in these fields of study should not exclude anything by definition. Div. the principle of simultaneity according to the law of reciprocity or community. Elements.economics. viewed from future to past it projects the aspirations and hopes. culture.inhabit a shared life-world in which all and everything are simultaneous and therefore neccssarily "stand in thoroughgoing community of interaction with each other. n. possessing natural and cultural potentials. Fundamental human concerns . all co-existing within an extended time and place that both limits and enables the actualization of potential. I believe. through Kant's third analogy. A2131B260. IS A great deal of pedagogical frustration arises because people insist 011 thinking about education using Kant's second analogy of experi· ence. II. and educationtouch all of human experience. and texts have little causal command upon the plastic stuff of the pupil. II. Immanuel Kant. but make reasoned judgments according to their understanding of the whole about what they take to be incidental and what they hold central to a proper understanding of the matter in question. Disinterested scholarship on tion of education. politics. homo sapiens becomes the Lamarckian species capable of developing and passing on acquired characteristics. curricula. I. edu- cation comprises reciprocal determinations between an autonomous agent. Persons engaged in education . Cl'itique of Pure Reason. Education viewed from past towards future accounts for stabilities of personal character and the weight of social reproduction. Looking at the interactions through which it takes place. and a range of circumstances. Bk." See.22 The anomaly in education agents acquire their characteristics through an interactive process that takes place in an actual environment replete with constraining and enabling conditions. near and far . I.'s Through education. eh. Theolists will find it far more fruitful to consider educational experience.

1971) can still be very helpful. as a community of peers. at one or another university. with no organizational center in the arts and sciences and an uncertain rationale within schools of education. a view I argued long ago in "Towards a Place for Study in a World ofInstruction. not the fonnalities of schooling. however. some pertinent to professional work and some not. 1971. Deschooling Society by Ivan Illich (New York: Harper & Row. but an susceptible to detached scrutiny. a scholar thinks deeply about one or another cultural component of education. understanding how education unfolds. and there academic inquiry has lacked the critical mass and resources to remain true to its intellectual mission in the face of steady pressure to prove its relevance to the imperatives of preparing prac16 Scholars can genuinely respect the complexity of educational practice by breaking the simple assumption that education is what happens in schools. cultural experience. in a variety of ways under diverse conditions.html. . if we take it as an exhortation to concentrate on the realities of education. we need to pay more attention to the student as a controlling agent. the human experience of education in an objective manner. inquiry into education considers many matters.The anomaly in education 23 education would study." Teachers College Record (73:2. in this or that academic department.orglstudyplace/ studyspace/mcclintockltwards_a"placeJor_study_1971. 161-205). Disinterested inquiry about education needs to try to see it whole. What happens in schools mayor may not be education and much of education takes place independent of school and classroom. Wherever education takes place. both in school and out. but nowhere do such thinkers draw together into an effective department of education in the arts and sciences where they can plumb.studyplace. the university has situated dispassionate scholarship on education in its professional school. from time to time. Universities institutionalize support for the disinterested study of education as a cultural endeavor poorly. To be sure. pp. With respect to historical. www. how educational interactions bring natural potentials and nurtured achievements to fulfillment and affect the quality of personal and public life. Dec. 16 So defined.

D. and the practical skills required for broad professional competence in the field. in education to strictly academic programs.D. with advanced professional degrees given a distinctive identification . ostensibly a distinctive degree for advanced professional preparation in education. the specialized understandings. 140-1. What was needed instead was a doctoral program whose foci lay in the advanced knowledge. degrees. Teachers College and Columbia adopted the Ed. however. Early in the twentieth century. 1954). restricting use of the Ph. In short. "For years there had been discussions in educational circles on the inappropriateness of the research-oriented Ph. used the Columbia University Ph. Certainly.D. 17 See A History a/Teachers College.. program for a large variety of school leadership positions. In the field of education.D. the Ph. Whether the effects improve results or lower costs is a question. the first major graduate school of education. 17 By this time. Shalmon. To correct that situation. Columbia University by Lawrence A. the disinterested study of education in American universities has an anomalous organization.D. as both the highest degree for academic work in education and psychology and for the most advanced level of professional preparation. In most fields. etc. Does this anomaly matter? Does it indicate a potential for further development in the organizational structure of the university? By preparing both academic scholars and professional practi· tioDers.. Teachers College. M. J. David A. however. and Mary Evelyn Townsend (New York: Columbia University Press..D. the peculiar situation in the study of education has had discemible effects on educational scholarship and the advanced preparation of professionals. Teachers College students were earning an wlseemly proportion of Columbia's Ph. Cremin.D.M. universities have confused the situation.D.24 The anomaly in education titioners. pp.B. is the highest academic degree. perhaps the schools of education demonstrate how cor· pOfate rationalization can improve results and lower costs.. Acceptance of such an equivalent doctorate would accomplish at least two things which seemed very . By the 1930s.A.

The anomaly in education 25 many other universities had adopted the early usage at Teachers College for their own schools of education. remained strictly a professionaJ degree.D.D. and second. November 15.D.D. for many students wanted a Ph. granting the Ph. would be restricted to academic programs at Teachers College was evident in reporls by two influential committees: "Report of Committee on the Ph. Evans. proved hard to uphold. 1963 (with revisions to September 11.D.D. earned by its students has been more or less successful.D. to the Dean of the Graduate Faculties. 1952. but it has not been baJanced by a similar one to ensure that the Ed.." 18 Concern to ensure that the Ph.D. and the professional Ed. is an academic or a professional degree has long been ambiguous. program.D. Degree. whether a doctorate in education. and "On the Relation between the Graduate Faculties and Teachers College. on completion of their professional preparation and many faculty members wanted to give Ed. 18 Consequently. In so doing. Colwnbia University: Report to the Joint Committee on Graduate Instmction by a Special Fact-Finding Committee. a clear distinction between the academic Ph. be it Ph." submitted by Uriel Weinreich.D.D. programs a more academic cast. to concentrate more than ever on the cultivation of research skills and competencies. . 1964). it was felt that a good deal of the friction between 'research-oriented' and 'field-oriented' members of the Faculty would be quickly alleviated. Chainnan. aiming to gain status as research scholars thereby. it would allow those advanced students who remained with the Ph. indiscriminately to signiIy both advanced academic and professional preparation. it would remove the continuing conflict of aims and purposes which had for years marked the effort to pursue both research and professional goals in a single Ph.D. This effort at Teachers College to preserve the academic character of the Ph. As indicators of academic attainments." submitted by Austin P.D. A symptom of this ambiguity: official. or Ed. nationwide statistics have counted both degrees in determining the number of academic doctorates awarded each year by the nation's universities. pemuch in demand. January 29. Chairman. And at Teachers College. First.

7 times those in all the social sciences and history. one worthy of serious inquiry. for history. 7. and 1. and each contribution to knowledge should have at its generative source a significant question. and in sociology 8. For every doctorate in economics. 10. One may hypothesize that students in schools of education earn a significant proportion of those psychology doctorates.000 doctorates. Furthermore.700 were in education. Each doctorate indicates completion of a dissertation. American universities awarded just under 45.ed. in political science 6. at least since 1950. 282-287. and 296. The ratio to doctorates in economics is 5. rather. Chapter 3. each meriting an original.4% of all doctorates earned in 2000-01 (4.9 were awarded in education. In 2000-0 I. consequential study. 292-293. Tables 254. not field practitioners.5 times greater than those in the biological and life sciences. these propOltions have been roughly coustant for the past fifty years or more. 7.2 to 1 as it is for all those in the physical sciences.2. an original contnbution to knowledge.l9 Consider some implications of these gross numbers.26 The anomaly in education culiarities resulted. The number of doctorates eamed in educa- tion was 1. in history 5. Most of those earned in ed schools. however.5 to 1. it generates so many more doctorates because both prospective academic researchers and professional practitioners 19 National Center for Educational Statistics.gov/programsidigestld02/.8 to I. than political experience generates? As a field of disinterested inquiry. about one quarter of all doctorates earned in the United States has been in education and psychology.0 to I. psychology is the othcr field that awards a very high nwnber of doctorates relative to other fields. Does educational experience. Digest of Educational Statistics. and for sociology 12. 279. education is neither more nor less protean tIIan politics.8. http://nces.659). probably go to educational researchers. a bit over 6.7 times greater than all those in the physical sciences.3. year after year. 1. generate nearly ten times the number of significant questions.5 to I. Year after year. The ratio of psychology doctorates to all those in the social sciences is 1. . for politics 9. of which 15%. 2002. In addition to education.

they share a general pattern. Nevertheless. which leaves the rest. If no education doctorates were professional degrees.716 doctorates in education in 2000-2001 were earned by research scholars. On the professional side.The anomaly in education 27 are seeking the degree. We will see below that the academic study of education shows signs of a seriously deficient critical mass. . most in tum involve "educational research. not in education. AERA put its membership at about 20. one would expect the American Educational Research Association to be on the order of 8 times the size of the American Historical Association. earned by professional practitioners. One can estimate the proportion with the following reasoning.000. Those earning a doctorate in the disinterested academic study of education would be much the smaller part. the professional 20 Of course. whereas in most other fields. Of the research doctorates in education earned annually in education.330 of the more than 6. the university has developed a model for supporting advanced academic education that differs significantly from the one sustaining professional preparation. this estimate undoubtedly overstates the number of research doctorates in education. Since many AERA members have doctorates." which as a domain is highly interested research producing instrumental knowledge for the field. Educational researchers. not all doctorates in education are professional degrees. about 1. some 80%. If the ratio between those membership levels indicates the ratio of research doctorates between education and history. but in psychology. not professional practitioners.2° Is this situation efficient or effective? Models of advanced study By separating the academic and the professional. Each model includes distinctive ways to establish and enforce standards of excellence and expectation.000 and AHA at over 14. In most fields. only the prospective academics seek the doctorate. different types of schools implement the professional model in distinctive ways. earn some of the doctorates in education and they go on to staff schools of education and educational research organizations.

for which students pay a high tuition and struggle to mas- ter fully in a limited period of all-out study. 7-19. Bledstein (New York: W. students recoup somewhat their cost of tuition in knowledge.28 The anomaly in education school primarily provides intensive.A. and business. Blau. Sociology of Education. Suffice it here to contrast two ideal-types. more or less fonnally. a serious historical sociology comparing forms of professional education would be very helpful. or does not. and rather infonoal in business. 52:1. . clinical practice. pp. constitutes the training of practitioners. and Hilaty Silver. It would take the discussion too far afield to fuUy differentiate the patterns of advanced professional preparation in education fi'om those in medicine. "Dissecting Types of Professional Schools" by Peter M. concentrated too much on extrinsic characteristics to tell much about the typology of educational strategies across the professions.D.B. Margulies. substantially so in law with the system of bar examinations. (Jan. In this model. SClVes to prepare advanced educational practitioners and the other. law. Rebecca Z. law. they are inducted. skill. formal instruction in the base of knowledge and stock of skills requisite in the profession. the best scholarship on professional education fits into the history of each separate profession and a good conceptual overview is lacking. The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development ofHigher Education in America by Burton 1. 1976) does not try to differentiate types of professional schools. makes it. onto the fast track to executive power. 1979). On the successful completion of their paid. 101m B. Hence. The history of professional education is a good example of the disaggregation of work on education that comes about because the arts and sciences do not recognize education as a matter of academic study. and understanding. while they master their prescribed learning in actual practice. where the recipient of an M. Cullen. W. variations of which serve in medicine.• after a period of comprehensive olicntation to a finn. and business. Norton. into full professional statuS.21 Throughout the 21 The induction is most fonnal ill medicine. where a period of intense formal instruction followed by clinical practice. through an additional period of interning or on-the-job learning. one in education where doctoral preparation modeled on the academic Ph.

The NelV Organon. his vision of the intellecrual enterprise and the potential role it could have in a well constiruted society certainly suggest the structure and function that intellectual institutions have developed in the modem world. XXIII-Lxvm. with standards throughout set and enforced by the dynamics of peer review. the more it. ensuring that the interests of the profession control the program of preparation.21 By keeping the professional model and the academic model largely distinct. with the doctorate in the arts and sciences. involving proposals. the model of advanced education de-emphasizes formal instruction in the knowledge of the field and apprentices the student to an extended process of appropriating the state of the field and generating new knowledge. With reliance on peer review. On the academic side. and publication. and both professional schools and professional groups cooperate to enforce them with rigor. but the process has deep roots in the idea of academic freedom and it advances the research mission of the university well. Standards are relatively clear-cut and high. the major bodies of professional self-governance directly set and legitimate standards of expectation. the professional school primarily uses the academic model in preparing advanced practitioners in educational 2] See Francis Bacon. or indirectly influence them significantly. Books One. . developing an impassive resistance to the idols against which Bacon warned. not the student. The more elite the university. research. It stokes the advancement of learning.The anomaly in education 29 process. bears the student's costs and subsistence. In education. the modern university has simultaneously cultivated both advanced professional preparation and disinterested scholarship in the arts and sciences. expectations are often unclear and the enforcement of standards can sometimes appear dysfimctional. However much Bacon's ideas mayor may not have had to do with the development of modem scientific methods. High-level academic apprenticeship teaches by doing and inducts the prospective academic into the advancement of learning.

As a result. Abbott's is a set of professional resources that serve to legitimate professional aulhority and to generate new methods of diagnosis. 53). the period of intense formal instlUction concentrates on the profession's fonnal knowledge system.30 The anomaly in education administration. Systemic reliance on the academic model conflates the trappings of academic scholarship with substantial professional leaming. areas where one might reasonably expect to find the professional model in use. a "fomml knowledge system . followed by the period of interning. In individual cases. the fonnal knowledge system comprises the great bulk of "educational research" as represented by the American Educational Research Association. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. rooted deeply in the particularities of practice in this or that place under these Of those conditions. treatment. Abbott's "academic knowledge" differs from what I am discussing as disinterested knowledge appropriate to the arts and sciences. tbe academic model works poorly in professional situations where the knowledge of most worth is clinical. Within the profession of education. We can hypothesize the following dynamic in schools of education. and inference (the ability to make cOimections between diagnosis and treatment when these are ostensibly obscure). curriculum and teaching. gives some helpful clues. and inference. schools of education too often nurture well neither excellence in scholarship nor prepossessing competence among licensed practitioners." consisting of powers of diagnosis.•• ordered by abstractions alone" (p. For clarity. One is the profession'S knowledge nin use. In the professional model of advanced education described above. But systemically. linking the fonnal system to the profession's knowledge in use. lJ How does this unfortunate result come about? Andrew Abbott. treatment. 1988). esp. and other specialties. results exemplify the best of academic standards. I will use his alternative ternt. 52-58. in his excellent study. (he fomral knowledge system of the profession. With the 23 . The other is the "academic knowledge" of the profession. in which a strong stu- dent meets up with an effective advisor within a program where support is sufficient. Abbott observes that professions use two bodies of knowledge.

a professional peacock-tail rendered ineffective by its excessive divisions and components. the fonnal knowledge system has become over-developed. promotion. but within the cluttered doctoral instruction in schools of education. and tenure for decades in areas that one might expect to be grounded in clinical expertise and the scholarly process has churned on eclectically within a diverse world of practice. Over-academicized professionalism has spawned a myriad of methodologies as professors in schools of education have sought ways to enable prospective professionals to produce passable dissertations. schools of education communicate little consendisinterested study of education.camegiefoundation." Carnegie Essays on the Doctorale (Stanford: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. skills. The hypothesis: by moving the truly academic study of education into the arts and sciences. these give the fonnal system inordinate heft relative to activities nurturing the profession's knowledge in use. there has been thereby too much to teach in an environment riven by overspecialization. and interests often have little to do with serious scholarship. 24 Hence. even though their talents.orgiCID/-essayslCID_ . With too much written. in Education. Together. and its absorption of resources culminates in a stunted commitment to developing the knowledge in use among practitioners-in-preparation. A great incoherence has resulted with too much written about too little. In the professional schools of education.The anomaly in education 31 Although the academic model for advanced work predominates in schools of education. appropriate to the arts and sciences. the balance between the fonnal system and use system in the professional school would improve. vimmlly none of it conclusive. 2003) www. energies directed to it combine with the efforts to develop and transmit a fonnal knowledge system for the profession of education. As a reswt. the practices of peer-review become unusually muddled. relegated to the professional school. 24 Virginia Richardson gallantly tries to give a coherent overview of all this in "The Ph. academic norms have controlled recruitment. it does not result in strong disinterested scholarship there. Strong norms of originaJ scholarship should prevaiJ.D.

The result. intended eventually to reshape professional preparation for educators both at Batvard and elsewhere.edulgazettelZ004/1 0. Harvard University Gazette. Without a consensus on essentials. I have little desire to perpetuate the longstanding art of bashing schools of education. 15 Having spent my career on the faculty of a major graduate school of education. The university. With a weak differentiation between academic and profes· sional work. It shows. significantly still an elective . and it leaves a gap in the arts and sciences. which accord no place to the disinterested study of education. . provides a befuddling complexity of fonnal categories singularly lacking in concrete substance. www.news. skilI.pdf. fOl'it is currently one course out of many. Oct.html. and understanding tlU'Oughout the field. however.32 The anomaly in education sus about what constitutes the shared Imowledge and set of skills requisite across the educational profession. the university inadequately institutionalizes the study of education." This is a major act of institutionalleadership.an important start down a long path of innovation. however. here and there. "Thinking Like an Educator: Modeling an Integrative Approach. Extemal certification procedures are equally fragmented and multiple accrediting agencies dart incessantly.07/0 l-gsecore. 2004. 7. This weakens schools of education. how far schools of education have to go before they can effectively impart a common base of knowledge. is at fault. See "Getting to the core at BGSE" by Beth Potier. through the schools of education.hatval'd. so far introducing one core course. programs and courses proliferate in schools of education and the field has a jumble of professional standards poorly enforced. 15 The Harvard Graduate School of Education has started the arduous process of developing a core curriculum to address this incoherence. fessional in its work on education. Noble exceptions may exist within an im· educ_Richardson. where the fonns of advanced scholarship receive undue emphasis in the processes of professional preparation. not the school of education. The tuliversity has created serious problems by mingling the academic with the pro.

Would-be practitioners spend their time. Over time. Like most other professional schools. An original contribution to the research program of medical schools does not culminate the professional preparation of the newly minted M. on-the-job learning through interning and clinical practice. they must spread those scant resources thinly across an inflated number of doctoral candidates. for they derive substantial resources from funded research. 1996) and Time to Heal: American Medical Education from the Turn of the Cenhlty to the Era of Managed Care (New York: Oxford University Press. most students engaged in the time-consuming. 1985. 26 Schools of education need lots of students paying for lots of courses.D. heroic effort cannot substitute for good organization. schools of education are tuition-dependent. they combine a relatively short period of intensive formal instruction with a subsequent period of income-producing interning and clinical residency. See Kenneth M. In the current situation. each of whom must try 26 Medical schools would seem to be the exception.D. . Learning to Heal: The Development of American Medical Education (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1999). Academic procedures dominate advanced professional preparation. Ludmerer's two books. But if one concentrates within medical schools on the professional preparation of the M.The anomaly in education 33 perfect system but university authorities should not point to these and insist that they can and should become the norm without any change in the flawed system. and money seeking to satisfy inappropriate standards of research scholarship. which gives them little opportunity for paid. and they have relatively few resources to support detached scholarship. This situation raises the costs that students must bear while straining the resources for the support of students engaged in genuine academic inquiry through the schools of education. irrelevant norms exert excessive influence in developing practical expertise. As the university squeezes everything into the professional school. effort.. resource-intensive process of writing dissertations have no real reason to do so.

while a demand for direct relevance to the needs of professional educators chronically challenges academic inquiryP With all its effort concentrated in the schools of education. With too many poorly supported doctoral students struggling to make "an original contribution to knowledge. Pseudo-scholarship comes to pervade the preparation of professionals in education even though the world of practice continually calls for leaders endowed with less academic paraphernalia and with a fuller repertoire of effective skills.34 The anomaly in education to do good research on a shoe-string. With a relatively large number of doctoral students. Graduate schools of education have an inilated number of doctoral students and fewer resources than the more affluent parts ofuniversilies. a financial time bomb ticks away in the current situation: schools of education cannot afford to meet what are becoming the prevailing norms for the support of doctoral candidates in research universities. Excessive academic accoutemlents distort professional preparation. the research income per student. Hence they lack the endowment per student. 27 . Schools of education will find it hard to offer competitive packages to that portion of their doctoral students genuinely engaged in academic doctoral study. which rigorously limit their size. all doctoral students will increasingly expect full support through the course oftheir studies." it proves hard to insist on exacting standards. If they do not differentiate the pedagogical process characterizing the academic doctorate from the professional doctorate. and the teaching opportunities (oncampus or on-line) per student to compete according to the emerging academic model for supporting advanced education . schools of education would drive themselves to bankruptcy meeting such demands for assistance. With 15% of the nation's doctoral students.a five-year package covering full tuition and providing a substantial stipend for all students admitted to doctoral programs. the university serves the field of education less effectively than it does in areas where a potent academic organization in the Schools of education are beginning to face a powerful financial reason to shift the advanced preparation of professionals from the academic model to the professional.

. but hard to effect. students and scholars would address education in an impartial. David F. The anomaly in the study of education matters enough to merit change. the needs of professionals dominate the analyses. Building a case for change As an obvious solution. pointing out how the knowledge needed by the profession has unusual characteristics. Overwhelmingly.The anomaly in education 35 arts and sciences stands in creative tension with a strong separate school dedicated to the task of professional preparation. in The Trouble with Ed Schools (New Haven: Yale University Press.29 Some hostile. In the arts and sciences. Critics have published a steady din calling for an improved study of edllcation. some sympathetic. 2004). comprehensive way with no presuppositions about professional practice. Disinterested. they all assess professional education and appraise research in the field. developing a program of professional education combining rigorous fonnal instruction with clinical practice and overlaying that with an ancillary program of externally funded educational research responding to clearly defined needs for improved professional knowledge. Pressure to use an academic model in professional preparation would diminish. For instance. the university could do what it did in other fields: institute academic departments of education in their undergraduate and graduate schools of the arts and sciences to complement the professional school of education. academic scholarship about education would improve. Schools of education might restructure to be more like medical schools. This fix is easy to state. What are and are not professionals doing? How are 28 Most critiques of the situation view it as a problem ofthe education schools. Labaree analyzes well the problems of status encountered by schools of education. not the university as a whole.

it is necessat)' for the university to add academic departments of education in the arts and sciences. 231-247). research universities did not did not incorporate the study of education into the arts and sciences. Lagemann explains why during the period of rapid development before and after the tum of the twentieth century. but with the absence of the study of education in the arts and sciences. It does not tackle the basic refOlm that the university must make in the way it organizes the study of education. as they do in departments of politics. they seek ways by which the educational system and those who labor through it can better serve society and its progeny.. . note 8). she calls for diminishing the institutional distance between educational research and academic research in the social sciences and humanities (pp. the reasons having to do with gender. I am in full accord. as all male faculties feared that departments of education would bring wnvanted co-education in their wake (Chapters 2 & 3. a thorough histolical examination of the investigation of education in research universities. but an intellectual concentration in which scholars use diverse strategies. The basic reforol does not have to do with success or failure within the professional school. but it is not what is here in question. scholars could develop a body of Imowledge about education and engage students in it as an academic study. 41-97). cit. That absence weakens disinterested inquiry and distorts professional preparation. to develop a better understanding of educational experience. 19 The most useful study is An Elusive Science by Ellen Condliffe Lagemann (op. Dedicated to disinterested inquiry and teaching. pp. however.36 The anomaly in education they recruited and trained? And how do they generate the knowledge of potential use in practice serving students and society? The critiques are high-minded. An academic department of education would not constitute a discipline in the mid-twentieth-century sense. In order to anchor such connections and give them real staying power." that kaleidoscopic effort to equip the educating professions with what they need to know. Also as a major step in improving knowledge about education. whether harsh or supportive.19 All this is important. thereby complementing the professional schools of education and their extensive production of "educational research.

that the dissertation of these weaker candidates too frequently are dubious in clarity of definition. The trouble with ed schools does not cause the weak differentiation. It reported a check of the opinions about Ph. but they also held that the overall spectrum of quality was lower. adequacy of content. note 18. the weaker candidates often show lack of essential infonnation in such fields. The cause is that the academic arts and sciences never made a formal place for the objective study of education within their precincts. Why should we change the given situation? A good answer is not easy. no amOWlt of reform in the professional schools will bring about a sound demarcation between the academic and the professional in the Wliversity study of education. that guidance during the planning and development of the dissertation sometimes appears to have been inadequate. for universities are unlikely to create academic departments of education simply because their schools of education are burdened with a confusion of functions. as judged by the dissertation presented and its defense. work at Teachers College then held by professors in Colwnbia's Graduate Faculties.. mastery of research techniques. by making a place for detached. 6) gives a good example. To bring such a step about. are inferior to the poorest appearing in most other departments. cit. academic work on education independent of the professional school.D.The anomaly In education 37 By itself. the arts and sciences have denigrated educational scholarship and resisted including a department of education in their midst. with many suggesting that "the poorest candidates from Teachers College. 30 The arts 30 The Evans Report (op. Respondents thought the top candidates in education to be on a par with those in the arts and sciences. and the university as a whole. They naturally ask. Historically. and that final examinations upon the dissertation are not always sufficiently search- . p. and effectiveness of presentation. And the current difficulty will not be easy to correct. circa 1952. scholars and lmiversity leaders need to perceive how they can strengthen the arts and sciences themselves. the trouble is its symptoms. that when their research leads them into subject-matter fields represented by departments under the Graduate Faculties.

and it must be a case compelling enough to overcome strong prejudgment against it.uchicago. the Trustees of Teachers College heard a not dissimilar brief from the outgoing Columbia President. across many different campuses. which the Uni· versity could easily incorporate into its larger and more dynamic Har· ris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies. that the University of Chicago's action indicates that univer· . hardly a raison d'eh'e for a field." and made neither a strong case for its auton· omy as a field among others in the social sciences nor for a clear mis· sion as a professional school. and provide for the academic study of education in the arts and sciences. like other professional schools. which had contracted and needed renewal. high quality professional school with a tradition of academic strength. in mid century or now.n Presently.38 The anomaly In education and sciences are now unlikely to welcome the disinterested study of education spontaneously. for the university needs to let schools of education be professional schools. the Chicago department wa· vered in its "Self·Study. Its most prominent proposed area of potential strength was methodology. hunl. George Rupp." It did not achieve intemal consensus about developing a non·professional undergraduate major. "Self-Study" (January 1996) and "Report" (November 1996).scholarly/educationlstudy. The moral of that sad tale is clear: the case that must be made is a case for change. www. Depat1ment of Education. for they have a wellingrained habit of rejection and the field comes freighted with the peculiar pathologies of a stunted history. education gains its coherence across disciplines by addressing a set of questions derived from prob· lems of practice. It could perhaps have become an academic department devoted to the disinterested study of education. I do not think. in his envoi to them. as it does for other great sectors of hwnan experience. not continuity. however.edulu. See. a similar check of opinion. 31 The university ing.scholarly/educationlreport. might uncover similar views. followed second by policy studies.edulu. Put under review. 31 Thc decision in the late 1990's by the University of Chicago to close its Department of Education is a powerful recent example of that habit of rejection. But it was a bum rap. University of Chi· cago.html and www.uchicago. It claimed to be a bit of both: "as a multidisciplinary field of inquiry. Fifty years after the Evans Report. The Department of Education at Chicago was a small.

its power and substance. The motive needs to be stronger: making a proper place for the study of education in the arts and sciences will set the conditions for a further. does the absence of the characteristic differentiation in the study of education have adverse consequences within faculties of the arts and sciences that might motivate a change? And second. however. would academic scholars in the arts and sciences reap benefits were they to add a department of education within their schools? Effective answers. We shall see that the arts and sciences can reap many advan~ tages as we pursue answers to two questions. The university should adopt differentiation not simply to shift a few scholars and their programs from one school to another in order to make arrangements in education more consistent with those in other fields. followed sotto voce. but not most academicians and certainly not university administrators. more positively. minimize the issue. therefore. after which they know what to do and act to do it. Might the disinterested study of education do so? Can adding the study of education to the arts and sciences appreciably advance the work of impartial scholarship. Organizational change is worth the trouble when it leads to intellectual results of vital consequence. if the advantages are clear within the context of the arts and sciences themselves. that is answers that do cbange the situation. . Let us not.The anomaly in education 39 will adopt the strategy of differentiating the academic and the professional for its work in education. must cross a threshold of resistance. "Is it worth the trouble?" Academics of influence need to reflect and come to strong assent. That is a mere argwnent of symmetry. important advancement of learning. not merely in a new specialized niche. First. but across the full scope of academic work as a whole? sities will necessarily reject a strong case for inclusion of the academic study of education in the arts and sciences. which mathematicians may take as grolmds for strong assent. It is not hard to win tepid assent.

40 The anomaly in education Consider a two-fold response. would benefit from this advance and the results would have significant value in the conduct of life. will show that the cun'cnt organization for the study of education holds back good academic work. but other fields. The other part. more important pat1: envisioning what the academic study of education might become on achieving fuller development. Let us take the negative up first: conditions in the arts and sciences and the plight of academic scholars in schools of education both cun'eotly inhibit the academic enterprise. . and their combination as a whole. Let us then lum to the positive. on both education and other important matters. both individual and collective. the reasoning will make evident. the negative. will show that through the academic study of education important advances in the work of the arts and sciences are feasible. not only that the disinterested study of education would develop more fully as part of the arts and sciences. the positive. Together. One part. It will explain why the arts and sciences could become more productive by making a place for disinterested work on education.

disinterested inquiry is subject to strong professional imperatives. Sen explains the role of "infonnational broadening. Insofar as it exists in the schools of education. In his Nobel Lecntre. Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books. Both conditions narrow the scope and diminish the quality of the resulting scholarship and detract from the arts and sciences as a whole. 31 Or within political thought. in recent years theorists have conThe power of the informational base to inform choice is fundamental and is laid out well in the parable opening Chapter 3 of Amartya Sen. whole patterns of human capital fonnation change. In the arts and sciences. and with that. "The Possibility of Social Choice. within economics. Insofar as it exists in the arts and sciences. deeply altering. The hopeful dynamics that Sen perceives in welfare economics function because the infonnational base upon which people ground their choices is not fIxed and impervious to change. Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. for better and for worse. 2000). For instance. 2002). patterns of economic development. pp. the academic study of education is dispersed as a subsidiary interest in many different departments.What the university has lost We start with the negative." 31 ." published in Amartya Sen. which can be activated in many ways to combat the source of poverty and sociopolitical stagnation in "capability deprivation. Arnartya Sen's work concentrates on how subtle incentives tmder conditions of autonomy can significantly change the informational base from which people make choices. 65-118. scholars in a variety of departments publish work of high quality that bears significantly on educational experience. pp. weaknesses in the arts and sciences and the disinterested study of education induced by the current situation. 54-6." a wonderful stealth tenn for education.

and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press. MA: Polity. Civic Virtues: Rights. Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy by Eamonn Callan (Oxford: Clarendon Press. and Republican Liberalism by Richard Dagger (New York: Oxford University Press. 1989). significant contemporary philosophers.42 What the university has lost templated declining rates of citizen participation in democratic polities and resuscitated interest in civic republicanism as a potential ethos more effective at forming engaged citizens. a problem of context weakens work pertinent to education dispersed in the arts and sciences. perhaps not wanting to appear too interested in a suspect subject. Maynor (Malden. illuminate the embedded role of educational experience in core activities interpreted through the arts and sciences. among others. among them. 34 Such studies. Republicanism in the Modem World by John W. Cornlpting Youth: Political Education. 1997). legitimate place in the arts and sciences. 1998). might be taken up in a more enlightening way. Peter Eubcn. Peter Euben. Good interpretation arises from the tension between text and context. The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections /i'OfIl Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: Universily of California Press. that someone wiII take it out of context. rather critics can too easily put it in the wrong context and as a result evaluate it poorly. 33 See. If education had a more visible. and The Greek Tmdition in Republican Thought by Eric Nelson (New York: Cambridge University Press. 34 See J. Alexander Nehamas. 33 Likewise.1ike alI scholarship. and Charles Taylor. Often scholars in the arts and sciences seem to write about education by stealth. . and much. 2004). 1997). 2003). Citizenship. Democratic Culture. and Charles Taylor. A risk for stealthy scholarship on education is not simply. Alexander Nehamas. 1. have concentrated on the fomlation of the self as a culturally endowed source of action in an historical world. now shunted into a context fruitless for interpretation. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modem Identify (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Not infrequently. much work. 1997). much more.

especially pp. his internal dialogues. More broadly. Cavell reiterated his discomfort with the criticism in Cities of Words. exemplifying the power of conversation to induce them. a critique of Nietzsche taken at second-hand. especially pp. Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The ConsJi/ulion of Emersonian Peifeclionism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Cities of Words: Pedagogical Lellers on a Register of/he Moral Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ex post jacto."35 With this book. Education is a central theme throughout his work. 248. the wrong context.J~ The critics. who feels himself.J7 Caven's ideas. 1971. pp. 3-4. Revised edition. interpreted perfectionism as a political philosophy. like others. in part because he always writes "as educator. Caven has written extensively about the importance of an Emersonian perfectionism for current philosophy and he objects when critics question his ideas about Emerson. Cavell communicates in undertones his feeling that his interests do not fit in well with the dominant interests in current philosophical scholarship. pre-eminent among them. and with them about Nietzsche. as a case in point. J6 See Stanley Cavell. but engendering ideas. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. I wonder to what degree this uneasiness arises because he is really an educational theorist. 2004). so that they will see for themselves how the exchange of words and the association of images will enrich their thought. parenthetical jwnp within parenthetical jump. 37 Rawls' critique of perfectionism. a meditation on J5 . at which Rawls is not at his best. 1999). It is bizarre to accuse Nietzsche of propounding a pernicious political philosophy on the basis of a quotation from SchopenJiauer as Educator. 1990). 211-2." not stating conclusions and giving. which his subtitle describes as "pedagogical letters.What the university has lost 43 Take the philosopher. Cities of Words. by setting before his readers his inner conversations. John Rawls. as a form of anti-democratic elitism. his neatly edited reasons for them. finally made explicit in his recent book. 286. Stanley Cavell. along with Stanley Cavell. as with most of his writing. homeless in the house of intellect. is Section 50 in A Theory of Jus/ice. it is sometimes hard to say exactly what Cavell is writing abollt. 48-53.

1993). a rather forbidding teon derived from Methodism. To recognize the full force and stature of his accomplishments. however. in a wide-ranging study such as Perfectionism by Thomas Hurka (New York: Oxford University Press. .44 What the university has lost most perfectionist thought. the state. also of substantial note. he shares the spotlight with others. It is remarkable how. It was the antithesis of elitism. docs not belie the reluctance of good academics in the arts and sciences to speak directly about education. 38 Problems of context go beyond the proper interpretation of certain ideas and works about them.that of Jacques Barzun. should be interpreted as educational philosophy. for example. the central commitment informing them education in which Nietzsche was most apolitical. Without a formal place in the arts and sciences for the disinterested study of education. stylist." but he immediately dismisses any sociopolitical meaning to such an assertion as a crass deterrent to the "intrepid self-knowledge" that allows each person to engage in the lonely pursuit of a higher self. and scholarship as selfish fonns of vacuous privilege that suck dry the creative energies available for individual self-fonnation in destructive cultural deflections. In each domain. one must wonder whether the use of the term "perfectionism" in philosophy over the past fifty years or so. he has won note in many ways. nothing is said explicitly about education. and educator. To be sure. academic leader. with perfectionist prescriptions baving less to do with the presumed prerogatives of elites and more to do with the self-educative opportunities facing each and every individual and the struggle to fulfill them. 3& As an aside. rejecting the influence of the state in any sound education. critic. Through a full. good taste. Nietzsche opened the relatively long and passionate sixth section of ScllOpenhailer als Erzieher by meditating on the proposition that the sole task of humanity is "to engender individual great men. He goes on to rebuke commerce. it is sometimes difficult to find the proper context for whole careers that are life-long efforts in education in a broad and fun- damental sense . a rousing complaint against the tyranny of barren elites. productive life. as historian.

(4 th edition.What the university has lost 45 all needs to be seen as that of the educator deploying scholarship and criticism. 1937. art. writing sometimes to debunk dangerous ideas. and to research practices as an element in educating the general public through The Modern Researcher by Jacques Bamm and Henry F. CT: Wesleyan University Press. CA. and intellect . precision. Then in the final part Barzun advances the thesis of decadence.through works such as The Energies ofArt: Studies of Authors. Simple and Direct. as in Race. Throughout his career. Numerous works of criticism reach out broadly to inform and to enable and then to provoke readers to push back. Graff. (6th edition. Further development of Bamm's work as educator would need to look closely at his commitment to language usage as a tool of clear thinking. and either to assent critically or to assert independently an alternative view. Thompson. Bamm's criticism has called out for the maintenance of conditions promoting high-quality achievements and their reach to a discerning public across a wide range of domains . Harper & Row.music. building up an attentive reader's capacity to think about cultural experience. adducing detail in the service of carefully stated. rigor.3~ In 39 Nwnerous aspects ofBarzun's work reflect a many-sided pedagogic intent. J500 10 the Presenl (New York: HarperCollins. literature. to question their assumptions. New York. Critical Questions on Music and Lellers. 1965). (rvIiddletown. BarzlUl'S most recent study. Random House. 1986). for instance. few can match his preeminence as a many-sided educator. In the twentieth century. Most of the work is remarkably informative. 2001) and A Word or Two Before You Go . Barzun has reached out as a scholar beyond a specialist audience. and thought. cutting into common complacencies.. pushing the reader to form his or her view. Belmont. Classic and Modern (New York. From Dawn 10 Decadence: 500 Years of Western CulluraJ Life. . Wadsworth. but in the professional schools he is unlikely to be remembered as anything but a hete noir and in the arts and sciences there is not an arena of study within which to appreciate his central accomplishment. exhortation and advice to engender awareness. persuasion and action. Cultllre and Biography (Chi- . 2000) shows such a pedagogy at work. New York: HarperCollins. A Study in Superstition (Revised Edition. large ideas. discrimination. 2003). 1956).

skipping over much of his formal scholarship and his work in publishing. the connections between diverse contributions to it are more likely to go unnoticed. 1964). Barzun worked constructively to advance the conditions of intellectual achievement in the university as Provost of Columbia and spoke out forthrightly about improving conditions in higher education in works such as The House of Intellect (New York: Harper & Brothers. 2002). 1991). the arts and sciences lack the context for doing full justice to some of their greatest exemplars. 1982). What Is a School and Trim the College! (Washington: Hudson Institute. Where It Is Going (New York: Harper & Row. they do not draw potential connections with related work in other fields. to evidence the absence of something is difficult. Within diverse fields. up to his recent pamphlet. Begin Here: The Forgotten Conditions ofTeaching and Learning (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Without a standing discow"se about the disinterested study of education. He has long defended active intelligence on the fundamentals in education and teaching through books and essays such as Teachers in America (Boston: Little.46 What the university has lost this way. 1989). and The American University: How It Runs. all of which nurtures the intellect of the general reader. 1945). 1959). Such is hut a sampling. For instance. In addition to problems of context. Brown. Science: The Glorious Entertainment (New York: Harper & Row. educational inquiry witltin the arts and sciences suffers from dispersal and the iso· lation of parts. but we can note opportunities for exchange that have failed to develop. scholars thinking about education often have to snuggle for the recognition for their ideas. which may appear peripheral to their colleagues. there seems to be a paucity of exchange between students of human capital fonnation and students of citizenship education even though the educational dynamics cago: Chicago University Press. 1967). The Culture We Deserve (Middletown. CT: Wesleyan University Press. Thus preoccupied. and many more. Where in the arts and sciences can one celebrate Barzun as educator? . To be sure.

as a sub-concern within literary criticism. in order to take into account claims from cultural recognition through education. indicating the lack of a coherent concern for education in the arts and sciences.in Public Edt/cation (New York: Basic Books. indigenous to education. 2003). Lawrence A. where they observe "the chapters in this book address the requirements of citizenship in liberal-democratic political theory as it has evolved in recent years. in Man and His Circumstances: Ortega as Educator by Robert McClintock (New York: Teachers College Press. but to clarifY a specific problem in the experience of education by bringing more generaJ. It is a symptom. p. 8. I tried to develop an idea of civic pedagogy as a concept by which diverse activities structuring public life might be examined in relation to each other."the education of the public" . however. that studies of the Bi/dungsroman put the novel at the center of discussion.what the university has lost 47 studied by both may be closely related. as that which will be discussed in order to illuminate the novel. But neither has had any traction as a concept drawing diverse strands of research into relation with each other. 41 It should not be surprising. the professional interests dominant in the study of education lead scholars to use concepts derived from one or another field in the arts and sciences in order to frame solutions to specific issues encountered in institutions of fonnal instruction. 1971). with Bildung at the periphery. external ideas to bear upon it. Rather than seeking basic unifYing concepts. Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg provide an example in their introduction to their fine collection of essays. that there is no sustained effort to examine what one can learn about education and Bi/dung from the novel and how one might test that knowledge and . Cremin had a much better tenn for a similar concept . 57-80." The movement of thought is not to generate a fimdamental view from the experience of education. literary critics writing about the Bildungsroman seem to interact little with philosophers concerned with the cultural fannation of the active self. as the matter to be illuminated. 1976) pp. Education and Citizenship in Libera/-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities (New York: Oxford University Press. 40 Likewise.41 40 Early in my career. so to speak.

1974). there being no group to draw different inquiries together. we can see what happens. Scholars such as Cbarles Taylor in The Sources of the Self. detacbed inquuy about education has importance for the fundamental mission of the arts and sciences themselves. and it is the absence of a systematic centering of that discourse in the arts and sciences that we must lament. Beyond all that. and criticism. Season of Youth: The Bildungsroman from Dickens 10 Golding by Jerome Hamilton Buckley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Alexander Nehamas in The Art o/Living. and J. their separate works potentially infonn a common discourse about education. and that is as it should be. with its unique integrity. SC: University of South Carolina Press. To put ideas and careers in their proper context is important. But by starting to work.48 What the university has lost Conceptually. To begin. research. 2000). . concentrating a sustaining attention on what is common among them. and criticism connect it to other ideas about education. scholarship. See The Way ofthe World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture by Franco Moretti. Intellect leavens experience in three ways . beginning to prepare advanced students in the disinterested study of education. it would strengthen currently disaggregated contributions fi-om within the arts and sciences by providing them with a coherent context and by educing productive connections among them. To draw fruitful connections between separate strands of work is too. Peter Buben in Con'upting Youth separately work from a distinctive background and interest. 1991). In lived experience. however. research. (New York: Verso. New edition. In addition to the integral value each achieves.with scholarship. More is at stake. Educational work within the arts and sciences is largely encapsulated within each originating discipline. a department of education need not be large and it could start usefully by drawing a few initial faculty members from schools of education and a few from existing departments of the arts and sciences. and Reflection and Action: Essays on the Bildungsroman edited by James Hardin (Columbia.

Criticism addresses a spectrum of aims and accomplishments and iofoTIns selection among them. even when energized by significant research programs. one that is ever more central in academe: not a means. often have less direct instrumental value. they energize scholarship. research powers much professional work. In practice. for scholars and critics alike must answer numerous particular questions in the exercise of their craft. the broader the better. research is also an important purpose. channeling attention and energy. Research starts with a well-defined. and integrates findings. for good research tends to be usedriven. but an end. which become clearer if we think about them as ideal-types. yet conceptually they have significant differences. as distinct from the academic. specific question. central yet problematic. deepening appreciation. the dominant purpose defining eHte effort . and as they uncover Imexpected specifics they empower criticism. Instead. research is taking on a role. new and old.What the university has lost 49 overlap and in the person they combine to make the complete academic. to which the researcher seeks a clear and definite ffilswer using peer-sanctioned methods and techniques. Scholarship begins from the cmnulative state of a field. and it accentuates findings with instrumental value directly applicable to a specific form of activity. Such activity is a great source of intel1ectual energy in the arts and sciences. addressing a fundamental concern by crafting a coherent understanding of the whole. Research is an important means in the conduct of scholarship and criticism. they leaven experience substantial1y through their capacity to have lasting . In contrast. As researchers bring their specific results together as the basis for theoretical abstraction. results. not disinterested. In addition. In addition.the essential character of the research university itself. scholarship and criticism. conducive to interested. provoking doubt. strengthening assent. Leading universities have become research universities because they depend financially on funded research and their faculty members rely on the publication of peer-reviewed research for promotion and tenure.

skills. considered purposes. Fonnative education is all that which a student builds up over time by way of characteristic interests. pp. and skills. 174-215. but subtle difficulties. ~1 4! In Gennan there is a literature. dynamic mix of knowledge. but it is largely ignored in English. proclivities. In her studies. With respect to the educative power of the arts and sciences. the distinction between the professional and the academic relates closely to a distinction between the applicable lessons and the fomlative education. The pay off is neither direct nor immediate. pigeonholes educational experience into grades and subjects and assesses the fragmental)' results as these are evident in cohorts. and consequently the arts and sciences need recurrently to explain the educative value of reflective scholarship and critical discourse with care. and a unique. Educational scholarship needs to regain contact with ideas about Hildtmg. hopes. The prestige of research conduces to instructional practices that differ in important ways fTOm those that would pertain with scholarship. which surveys it well in liistorisches W6rterbuch del' Piidagogik edited by Dietrich BeMer and JUrgen Oelkers (Weinheim: Beltz Verlag. one problem being that the fomler is relatively easy to identify and assess while the latter can be obscure and hard to measure. It is important to reinvigorate the ability to think well about the fOlmative effects of education as they develop over the full period of a person's fonnative experience. lore. information. and a good place to start is "BildsamkeitIBildung" by Dieuich Benner and FriedheIm Briiggen. Hi/dung. the ascendance of research in academic culture presents important. on fonnative education. and criticism in a proper balance. both extensive and deep. Pedagogically. 2004). and experience. and the study of education as schooling. . Schooling. research. standards. not the integral development achieved by the person. attachments.50 What the university has lost educative effects as a student uses them to define her values. which disinterested scholarship on education can help to do. a student seeks both applicable knowledge and formative experience.

Whenever a student is learning by doing. eager to produce some results. and criticism .offer students significant formative experience. research. In this way. the measurement of recollected information. the process is deeply formative. but as a side effect. critical implications for theory and practice.in a well-unified effort. moreover. Within the arts and sciences. Doctoral students perceive the instnunental value of research work and readily plunge into it. however. and criticism . Education as accumulating applicable knowledge gains prestige at the expense of education as formative experience. the prestige of research as an end product grows and that of scholarship and criticism shrinks. increasingly mark educational attainment. applicable answers to evident questions. With such influences steadily shaping educational practice at every level. the accomplished contributor deploys all three .What the university has lost 51 A subtle problem is now building because it arises. and criticism are all of one piece. research. All three .scholarship. Whatever the field. . This makes the formative tasks of scholarship and criticism much harder and detracts from the education of researchers as well. In this sense. accepting unreflectively the constraints of one or another formal methodology that they find at hand. she does so by doing research. Maintaining the balance becomes more difficult. The difference arises with the way the results of research enter into education in comparison to those of scholarship and criticism. a deeply formative engagement. they are often impatient with the scholarly effort required to base that research on a well-developed theoretical grounding and to extract its full. and some superficial skills. research itself as a formative educational experience suffers from the prestige of its results. and as a student learns to be a researcher. research findings at one or another remove.scholarship. for research produces the coin of tangible worth. not directly. the formative induction into the activities of scholarship. as all students should. In this process. research.

research. exercised through the formative uses of scholarship. and criticism. a student develops a large conceptual framework with which she can judge the importance and plausibility of diverse ideas and assertions. As professionalism has spread into the arts and sciences. the rationale for more and more work appears to be instrumental. tlleir parents. Traditionally. How does this formative enlightening take place? By sustained engagement in scholarship. The arts and sciences populate a thoughtful public as a steady stream of university students form their intellectual standards by engaging in the work of scholarship. research. More and more. academics have difficulty showing employment conscious students. and criticism active in the different realms of public discussion. the university reinforces this instLUmental bias by treating the subject of education itself as strictly an instrumental subject. research. a student acquires a considered stmcture of priorities to draw upon in the endless process of making choices in response to alI the claims upon her attention and commitment. becomes less self-evident. And the arts and sciences nourish that thoughtful public through a continuing flow of publication. the mission of the arts and sciences. the fom13tive role of scholarship. the university proclaims through its actions with respect to the . the power of which is more enlightening than instrumental. and criticism seemed self-evident or relatively easy to uphold. research. if not to high public purpose. the disinterested mission of the arts and sciences thrives through formative engagement in scholarship. Under such circumstances. and criticism.52 What the university has lost An education in the results of research alone does not suffice. And ironically. a student famls habits of testing how well different claims are grounded and perceives the strengths and weaknesses in assertions of validity. Currently. By actively doing research. research. By producing reasoned criticism. at least to the interests of academics themselves. and criticism for substantial periods. renewing and extending the scholarship. and the public how study in the arts and sciences should differ from gaining marketable skills through professional preparation.

November 4. Mid-twentieth-century efforts to resist this pres4J Weakened convictions about the educative mission of the arts and sciences may have deep and fateful historical consequences. As the arts and sciences face an insistently marketconscious clientele. it may prove deeply imprudent to ignore the study of education in the arts and sciences at a time when the claim that scholarship and criticism have self-evident value as formative educators carries ever less weight. 2002. op ed page. as suggested most recently by Garry Wills in "The Day the Enlightenment Went Out. As we have seen. trans. conditions in those schools pressure academic scholars to make their work instrumental in the professional preparation of teachers and other practitioners. The critique of enlightenment has gone too far and to care well for the arts and sciences. 43 Experience in schools of education shows that belief in selfevident values poorly supports impartial scholarship and doubtprovoking criticism.html. Much historical initiative seems to have moved away from those working within the Enlightenment tradition.2002) in order to see that the critique of instrumental reason is not an unconditional critique. In many ways the carriers of the Enlightenment tradition. but one voiced in defense of the fonnative. historically public intellectuals whose organizational base is the arts and sciences." The New York times. Academic work on pedagogical themes scattered through the arts and sciences has little resonance in schools of education. 1947. have been suffering a failure of nerve.nytimes.What the university has lost 53 study of education that only professional preparation is of value. educational power of enlightened reasoning. coml2004/11l04/0pinionl04wills. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Yet it should be serving as a valuable resource in developing a more compe1ling rationale for a fonnative education throughout the arts and sciences. in large part because they have lost confidence that enlightenment has any educative potency. Thus. they give short shrift to the disinterested study of education. it is important to go back and study again works like the Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophic Fragments by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (Edmund Jephcott. . www.

1972) was thc defining manifcsto. Education in the Forming of American Society: Needs and Opportunities for Study (New York: W. Norton & Co. his substantive work is out of print. 44 The attack stung scholars in schools of education and they responded by trying to connect more closely to key departments in the arts and sciences.S4 What the university has lost sure had hopeful beginnings but proved unsustainable. . discounting rhetorical exaggerations.4S Academics in schools of education de-emphasized the needs of the profeSSion and took their cues about what to study and how to study it from cognate disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Teachers Collegc. 1953) was the most distinguished source of this critique. They became professors of a discipline "and education" .anthropology and education. Bailyn showed how historians of education had failed to ask productive questions because they were preoccupied with the interests of the profession. or history and educa44 Educational Wastelands: The Retreatfi'om Leaming in Our Public Schools by Arthur Bestor (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Columbia University. 1960. and the agenda dominant in the histOlY of education is oncc again more exclusively focused on the interests of the profession. critics attacked schools of education as hotbeds of anti-intelIectualism. 1965). W. inspired by Bernard Bailyn's analysis. which he complcted with great succcss before his wltimcly death in 1990.. The Miseducation of American Teachers by James Koerner (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Only a few years later. Crcmin worked with pcrsonal dedication as a scholarly historian to fill out the vision. followed up with Lawrence A. In the late 19505. 45 Whcn I was a graduatc student in history and cducatiOli in the early 1960s at Teachers College. 1963) was a good summation. working to build the morale of prospective teachers. Education in the Forming of American Society. Cremin's The Wondelful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley: An Essay on the Historiography of American Education (New York: Bureau of Publications.. They had neglected to pursue disinterested topics of research and thereby missed the opportunity to clarify the role of education in the fonning of American society.

to say the least. and sociology . The disciplines and education did. which differ significantly from schools of the arts and sciences. which has been methodologically eclectic. or sociology and education. Kuethe (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. it was probably a tactical error to speak about a discipline mther than a deparbnent or a field. philosophy. 1963) for a movement related to the disciplines and education . particularly relative to the tuition dollars such groupings could generate in the professional schools. a reality that became inescapab1e as contrac- 46 See The Discipline of Education edited by John Walton and James L. Good doctoral programs spread and disinterested scholarship about education strengthened. history. could possibly be a discipline. It might have been a better initiative to describe the academic study of education as a field of study. 4~ They prized recognition by peers there and paid less attention to the relevance of their courses in the preparation of practitioners. the effort succeeded. It did not. The discipline of education never got started. and so on. While resources were flush. they taught with a rigor characteristic of the arts and sciences. Within that movement. often three faculty members. whether education. The effects of the movement persist to the present. come to grips with the fiscal organization of professional schools. however. political science. which put severe demands on resources.what the university has lost 55 tion. . in effect is what is being called for in this essay. anthropology. economics. but ever more faintly. That.say.wanted at least a diminutive critical mass. the cultivation of the disciplines and education had initially taken hold in a period of academic expansion. for the effort died quickly as participants argued with one another over whether a unique methodology was the hallmark of a discipline. one sllch as political science with its multiple vectors of inquiry pursued with a mix of methodologies. successfully spreading. Each discipline that was to be included . In this role. but the effort had a tendency to overexpand staffmg needs inherent in it. and if so. Fortuitously.a less successful effort to define a discipline of education.

the Department of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Thinking about the Budget: An Informal Report to the Teachers College Faculty. we needed to add to our commitment to academic Ph. dependent on tuition paid by students who do not seek knowledge for its own sake. . Despite a concerted effort by those appointed to a discipline and education. Implementing a response to the argument was not easy. My argument was not obscure: to tlllive in a tuitiondependent. for the tmivcrsity to look at the question as its problem. My colleagues deemed (I think rightly from this vantage point) my strategy unrealistic in the particulars 1 advanced. 47 In 1977. Wc stood pat. but in a tuition-dependent professional school it cannot be genuinely robust and detached. on behalf of the Teachers College Faculty Executive Committee. and in 1994 Teachers College disbanded the Department of Philosophy and the Social Sciences." analyzing the fiscal difficu1ties that we faced in the home of the disciplines and education. financially strapped professional school.D. not a problem encapsulated in the schools of education. spreading its programs into other units where they might be more responsive to the core concerns of the professional school. but for its professional relevance. The cumulative degradation has been marked. Adherents to the disciplinary idea have not yet found a way to replace such a department with a better means for remaining closc to the acadcmic strengths of the university. I prepared a 36 page study of the College budget chronicling contraction and tuition-dependency. The discipJinary study of education has often persisted nominally. that is. In addition.56 What the university has lost tion beset universities in the 19705:" Schools of education are tuition-dependent. instruction other sorts of programs that would generatc more tuition and research income. I circulated a memo "Possible Strategy for Developing the Department. tuition-dependency progressively eviscerated the academic study of education in the professional school. It is time. however. however. which cannot solve it conveniently for the tmiversity without wider changes in the prevailing academic organization.

with research on the legacy of educational ideas. See the current list. each volume well-edited and introduced. compare scholarship on the heritage of politicaJ thought. with work on political thought dynamic and deep and that on educational thought static and thin. Students of political thought and of educational thought deal with essentially the same resources and often themes of politics and education intertwine in the very same historical texts. Germany (www.What the university has lost 57 The educational and the pOlitical To gauge how marked. one might expect scholarship in the two fields to be similar in scope.cup.asp?code=SS3&legend=Texts %20in%20 Political%20Thought. the excellent collection. Schiininghs Sammiung Piidagogischer Schriflen was a similar collection published by Verlag Ferdinand SchOningh. In English. Consequently. scholarship on political themes in the historical record differs astonishingly from that on educational themes. www. A startling disjlmction in the range and depth of stud48 The Cambridge Texts in the His/ory of Political Thought currently provide editions of over 125 works from the early Greeks to recent times. In the mid-1980s in comprised editions of educational writings by some 80 figures in the Western tradition.schoeningh. for most in both hardbound and paperbound versions. As the study of education in Germany has increasingly come under the influence of American professional practices. and quality of results. Let us survey some evidence. In actuality. Each edition is edited to high standards and includes an authoritative introduction and scholarly apparatus. securely situated in the arts and sciences. has been significantly cut back. SchiJninghs Sammlung Piidagogischer Schriften. . educational thought lacks a distinguished series like the Cambridge TexIs in the History of Political Thought.org/titles/subjecUsbns_vista.de). conducted almost exclusively by specialists in schools of education. intensity. Judging from the current online catalogue the list in print is substantially reduced. Paderborn. 43 And the contrast reaches further than the publication of sources.

Peruse the Companion~ list of "Works on Rousseau (a highly selective list).58 What the university has lost ies separates the two bodies of scholarship.50 The basic commitment to democ49 Full citations on this point would be tedious. while Vaughan's work. but for nearly all the historical record. E. students of political theory have published a steady stream of thoughtful studies about Rousseau's work.{circa 1965]). New York: Burt Franklin. 1963) and The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau by C. 446-449. his discussion of the "Kantian Interpretation" in section 40. Fur- . which includes many recent studies of Rousseau's political thought and none ofltis education ideas. Note that Boyd's work. (2 vots. Rawls constructed his theory starting with concerns initially defined by Aristotle. 268. In accordance with that expectation.sts in both areas to produce studies about his ideas. and he worked out his ideas by improving step by step on utilitarian theory. while scholars in schools of education have produced virtually Ilotlling since the early twentieth century. Important work in political philosophy sustains creative dialogue with the historical sources. and his use of utilitarianism as the major alternative throughout the construction of his theory of justice as fairness. Compare two contemporaneous early studies. n2). 50 See Rawls' discussion of the Aristotelian Principle in Section 65 of A TheolY of Justice. 1915. 200 I) are written by a professor of government and a professor of political science. educational theorists do not. one good and the other better . the good. he drew heavily on Kant. n. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a seminal thinker generating important concepts about both politics and education and one would expect thCOl." pp. Political theorists substantively engage their past. 1911. the better.. p. which John Rawls exemplifies in A Theory ofJustice.49 Such a dispatity holds. not only for Rousseau. has been thoroughly superseded in the available literature.The Educational Theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau by William Boyd (New York: Russell & Russell. Consider that the two chapters on Rousseau and education in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau edited by Patrick Riley (New York: Cambridge University Press. Vaughan. still circulates through citations (as in the above Companion. For instance.d.

16. 1962). Pocock. see The Political Theory ofPossessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (New York: Oxford University Press. and Skinner. reflected in part ("an invisible presence throughout our study") in The Dealh of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress. 51 Evident in Barber's Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1975. 1992). Pocock and Quentin Skinner have extended those beginnings into a major way of developing the field. For Alasdair MacIntyre. 53 ther evidence of Rawls' respect for the intellectual value to be found in the historical tradition of political and moral thought is to be found in his Lectures on Ihe History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press." pp. 31 Isaiah Berlin pioneered writing the history of political thought as a way to contribute substantively to present-day political thinking. New York: Oxford University Press. and J. 51 Likewise. 1981). 1969. and Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (New York: Oxford University Press. (Revised Edition. Barber's work derives in significant part from a life-long dialogue with JeanJacques Rousseau. Part three: "SeventeenthCentury Roots of the Twentieth-Century Predicament. B. G. 2000). 137-153. 52 For C. B. A. especially pp. 1974).What the university has lost 59 ratic participation running through Benjamin R.' (200 edition. 1984) and An Aristocracy ofEveryone: The Politics of Education and the Future of America (New York: Oxford University Press. C. especially. see After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. SJ The key work for each is: Berlin. Macpherson shaped his basic views through reflection on contract theory from Hobbes to Locke and the influence of Aristotle in the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre is fimdamental.p. It derived from Barber's early work. 207-250. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the At/antic Republican Tradition. The .2003). Macpherson. 2002). 1973). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Liberty: Incorporating 'Four Essays on Liberty.

Rousseau 3. The History of Education Quarterly shows a similar clumping spread over a longer period.. Wollstonecraft 1. Marsiglio of Padua 2. Erasmus. and none on Aristotle. Marx 28. largely unchanged. Herbart 2. Aristotle 3. Rousseau. Pestalozzi. Plato. since teacher education programs took fonn early in the twentieth century. and Foucault 15. Bentham 8. Hegel. with 18 articles about Socrates. the Federalist papers 4. Machiavelli 17.60 What the university has lost In contrast. equips the field to serve as an important component ill general education. (www. Aristotle 24.edulEPS/educational-titeorylIndexes/index_95OO_title. Nietzsche 15. A steady flow of quality textbooks and anthologies. Pestalozzi. older scholarship. Political n. Locke. Habermas 8. Herbart.eory shows a much more well-distributed interest in the tradition between 1973 and 2000. Hegel 25. or Maria Montessori. the study of educational Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Plato 11. (1961-1998 . In education. and none on Erasmus. Montesquieu 4. Oakeshott 10. up to date with the academic scholarship. Rawls 12. the leading journal in philosophy and education. too often backed by static. 54 In political thought.uiuc. In contrast. Tocqueville 5. 101m Stuart Mill 16. or Montessori.ed.asp) shows 12 contributions about Dewey. Hegel. the depth and variety of scholarship in tum leads to a far more vibrant set of instruc- tional resources. S4 For instance. The discrepancy in results between the two fields is not the fault of individual scholars. In short. cycle through successive editions to serve staple courses that have been required. Rousseau 18. they generally look back little further than John Dewey and write obsessive commentaries on his educational ideas. fewer texts and anthologies. With the current organization of effort. 1978). the study of education radically lacks the critical mass to take effective account of its historical roots in educational theory. Plato 4. insofar as philosophers of education work in dialogue with past tltinkers. . Locke 16. Marx. Burke 8. Augustine 3. Hobbes 18. (2 vols. Hume 3. New York: Cambridge University Press. a search of the title index from 1995 to 2000 for Educational Theory.it emphasizes the institutional history of education over the intellectual history): Dewey 13. and Marx 1 each. Matthew Arnold. Locke.

Cahn (New York: 2002). other texts less so.Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present. reflecting the excellence of the resources . cost-conscious publisher respects the sophistication of those entering the profession highly. Inc. 1975. which gives well-introduced. it goes on to its the main concerns. a collection of thoughtful essays on contributors to the canon of political thought by scholars. 4th edition. Oxford University Press has recently issued one of each. the different strands of post-Deweyian educational philosophy. Jolmson. Taylor & Francis recently republished it at $390. Noddings' text is good. (Upper Saddle River.. however. It dispenses with "Philosophy of Education before the Twentieth Century" in an IS-page chapter. Compare it to Philosophical Documents in Education edited by Ronald F. fol55 lowed with a J6-page chapter on JOM Dewey and then. by James Bowen. 1995).53 The best text on the history of Westem education is still A History o/Western Education. for it provides a solid parallel for educational theory for what Boucher and Kelly offer in political theory. 1998) would seem to be an exception. Gutek. (New York: Longman. whi1e the study of political thought is a dynamic research and teaching field in the arts and sciences. of which 85 concern thinkers prior to Dewey. does not suggest that a well-heeled. It is carefully engineered for a standard course in teacher education and its prose. and Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy. Martin's Press. 1972. NJ: Pearson Education. at once simplistic yet obscure.What the university has lost 61 thought is a declining service component in professional education. 3 vois. (New York: St. substantial selections for major figures in the tradition. Contributors to it. CO: Westview Press. 2000). no campus bestseller.. are almost all academics from the arts and sciences willing to write on education. preliminaries complete. 2"" edition. edited by Steven M. filling 1200 well-packed pages. The best text in the philosophy of education is Philosophy of Education by Nel Noddings (Boulder. with perhaps Hislorical and Philosophical Foundalions of Education: A Biographical Introduction by Gerald L. It . which totals 286 pages of poorly introduced texts. Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (New York: Routledge. mostly in mid-career. Reed and Tony W. 2005) typifying the lot. & 1981). Political thought has a variety of quality textbooks and anthologies. edited by David Boucher and Paul Kelly (New York: 2003).

instrumental knowledge. Surely that work. for they perceive the professional view. scholarship in education lags because reliance in the university solely on the professional school overwhelmingly turns intellectual attention to the pursuit of interested. . Nevertheless. 56 Highly committed. Far too much is thus ignored. can grasp with a fuller comprehension of the entailments inheting in professed principles. but a poor organization of it.62 What the university has lost As human experience. anchored with engagement and respect for the complex actualities of educational activity. educational experience is on a par with political experience: both are pervasive. This means that scholarship in education faces the hints at what the university might gain by providing a better place for the academic study of education. in the Demands of Liberal Education (New York: Oxford University Press. in school and out. In the nineteenth century. 56 Good educational scholarship should have roots in the daily work of education. deep work on education and Bildung. the university recruits and trains many more educational researchers than political researchers. the field of education can match that of politics. 1999). as did American intellectuals from the Transcendentalists through Dewey. German academics produced extensive. complex. serviceable in the organized work of the profession. no matter what particulars it propounds. Those who study education include people fully as capable as those who study politics. but the results do not. In potential. provides the empirical data to be considered in thinking about education. and imperative. is beginning to show how disinterested scholarship. as hopelessly Procrustean. well-educated teachers will often scorn inservice programs run from schools of education. Nothing intrinsic to the subject explains why scholarship about educational theory should so lag the study of political theory. There is no lack of support. Meira Levinson. The differences stem primarily fi'om dispatities in supporting institutional arrangements and constraining purposes. In total.

peers in the arts and sciences. to every dimension of the educational chal1enge. haughty from accidental superiority. who finds herself plunged into a cultural system of global scope. In actuality. having to acquire from it the personal resources with which she will seek fulfillment. Seeing its insufficiency. . and more many-sided than the concerns the educating profession takes as its ends in view. A fullblooded scholarship about education must speak. this educational cbaUenge is far ful1er. not the schools of education. treat education as a matter unworthy of organized study. but the institutional arrangements supporting its study that account for the differences in the scholarship about education and other great concerns of human life. not on knowledge for its own sake. It is not the subject.What the university has lost 63 challenge of understanding it as a full. with intellectual substance. Poor conditions for educational scholarship have weakened development of the field. In what might that development consist? Is the disinterested study of education actually unworthy of inclusion in the arts and sciences? Do the potentials of education as an academic study merit serious effort to include it within the arts and sciences? These questions confront. but the Wliversity as a whole. and with hwnane purpose. but not sufficient. historical depth. more difficult. Scholars trying to consider education in a detached manner have found themselves pressured by the institutional realities of the professional school to concentrate. Interested knowledge about education is important and necessary. but to confect syntheses satisfYing to recmits for the profession. That prejudice ought to be brought to the bar of critical examination. and intricate rigor. with depth. formative experience lived by each person.

Interested inquiry. education is formal instruction. will be a thing or action on the one hand or a concept or theory on the other. properly developed. as it takes on the pur~ poses that give rise to the objects or activities in question. or components of it. It becomes interested at its origin because it defines a domain of objects or actions and receives the interest. education is construction of the common school. tak~ ing as its justification its capacity to further those purposes. let us consider further the differentiation between interested and disinterested scholarship. definitions of the professional activity. I think. which will guide the inquiry. The positive task is to show that education as an academic study.What the university will gain Note that we are moving here to the positive from the nega· tive part of our two-fold response to the question whether the arts and sciences should make a place for impartial inquiry about education. the national defense. internalizing their pur~ poses as the purposes to be served by the inquiry. differentiates professional from academic investigation. starts by examining chosen in~ strumentalities or actions. even when it addresses a great matter with Olympian scope. driver safety. To begin. Professional knowledge usually becomes highly interested knowledge because it generally starts out from what members of the profession and their clients do. defme the interest that controls the in~ quiry. With the professional. can substantially contribute to the work of the arts and sciences. the public school. namely whether the upshot of the work. the work of teachers. A subtle shift. education promotes equity. Education is schooling. to the work of the university as a whole. With each such defmition delimiting the sphere of action as the subject of . and through that. social mobility. its pragmatic cash value.

consult Galileo's 1\vo New Sciences. to promote all manner of goals that people may seek through the work of education. The ideas may be about things or activities. Concept formation Disinterested inquiry starts. To find excellent examples. Of course. but the instrumental results differ from the results that disinterested inquiry into education would achieve. disinterested scholars generally start concept formation with a definition. but to a conceptual explanation. an abstract proposition. but with concept fomlation. perhaps always rigorously speaking. but a concept. Consequently. In that work. not the tangible actualities themselves. these arc worthy ends and the knowledge achieved as a result can be highly instrumental. something that exists in thought and words. to perfect the skill and alt of teachers. Galileo gave many powerful. but the object of the definition is not some concrete thing or set of actions. And frequently. not things or activities. from which the scholar can build a conceptual framework with which to interpret or explain an element of experience. the inquiry takes on tbe purpose of its subject. conceptual. As with interested inquiry. not with what people do.66 What the university will gain study. One started the "fourth day's dialogue. or even with what the stuff of nature does. as a noun. which must not be confused with the things or activities to which tbey might refer. aiming to enhance the action in question . not to an objective force. ideal. to improve fannal instruction. the term "gravity" refers to a theoretical concept accounting for countless phenomenal behaviors.." investigating the motion of projectiles: "imagine any particle projected . The two enterprises are not the same. conceptual definitions. the postulation of an idea. to refonn the public school. an intellectual proposition.to strengthen schooling. Concepts are intellectual objects and detached inquiry concerns ideas. but the inquiry is about the ideas. Begriffsbildung. the objects to which they refer are imaginary. an idea.

pp. 127ff. not to this or that perceived motion. n. then we know. New York: Free Press. apparently dealing with unique particulars. as distinct from the Geisteswissenschaften or human sciences. have sometimes suggested that discourse applicable to "any" instance is characteristic of natural science. As Max Weber showed in his critique of Eduard Meyer in The Methodology of the SociaJ Sciences. with proofs in thought. at the start of the "third day's dialogue" on lmiform motion. for the ftrst act of conceptualization in any science is to abstract from particulars a set of ideal categories about which to think.motion in which equal distances are traversed in equal times becoming motion in which equal distances are traversed "during any equal intervals of time.What the university will gain 67 along a horizontal plane without friction.. p.. but to any conceivable motion. Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. that this particle will move along this same plane with a motion which is unifonn and perpetual. accounting for the imagined behavior of the postulated objects. Finch.d. from what has been more fully explained in the preceding pages. 154. SWIs and Henry A." This particle is thoroughly conceptual. 1949). Galileo significantly called attention to its importance as he explicitly inserted it into the traditional definition of unifonn motion . trans.l." Any here drives the definition out of the realm of particular instances and locks it securely in the conceptuaJ realm.. explained in prior pages. any thinkable one. Henry 57 Crew and Alfonso de Salvio. trans. (Edward A. detachment works to generate in thought a conceptual tmderstanding or explanation that will hold as an intellectual proposition about any conceivable instance.59 Galileo Galilei. even if the thinking is to 59 .57 The word "any" here is deeply significant. and earlier. the problem of the unique can be exaggerated. apparently unifonn. p. provided the plane has no limits. patently counterfactual with respect to the world of experience. (New York: Dover Publications. 53 Two New Sciences. with the proposition applying.59 Whether it touches on moving objects or cultural events. Historians and others. 244.

intet]lret the uniqueness of the patticular. those who share an identity defined by external characteristics."any interpretation will need to take this construction of the matter into account. Nature has yielded instances of its homogeneous elements only after its was subjected to much post·theoretical refining.68 What the university will gain Intellectual. the natural and the human. partisan. like the human. action is at stake in concept fanna- tion. it would be without meaning or value as a communication. Good concept fannation is disinterested because what is at stake in thinking effectively is of a different order." Were the discourse to insist on the unique patticuJarity of the interpreter. not material. And interpretation becomes partial. starts in a primitive sense with unique particulars . not material. and even in such an effort. for that purpose. tangible interest. students of the hwnan sciences often want to preserve the par· ticularity of what they study. not in experience itself. . touch upon particulars and develop through the fonnatioll of concepts in the realm of thought. one pertinent to any intellectual consideration of it. Natural science. Concepts serve in thinking. but to the interpreter or explainer . thought grasps meaning and explains causalities intelligible in actual experience. than the tangible interests at stake in the actual experience. for they cannot abstract themselves out of the intellectual construct that they create and consequently the "any" for them applies. and dangerous when voiced as if only a special group of intet]lreters. people become far too crass in the way they understand the pragmatic cash value of ideas. which creates an open discourse in which any and all can participate. Hence all sciences. With well-fanned concepts. A well-fanned idea mayor may not serve a concrete. an "any" remains. their payoff is properly. it does not exist. an ideal order. not to the unique object of interpretation or explanation. can make the intet]lretation and partake in the values it nurtures. In contrast. disinterested study of the particular results is an ideal construction in thought.this tree or that rock or the night sky as it appears now. With instrumental inquiry so widespread. but intellectual in disinterested thought. Within that realm. however. in reflecting on experience. they construct the realm of thought by inventing concepts elaborating its contents.

disclosing munerous options.justice. with reference to which people can ask questions about the source and significance of their concrete experience. disinterested inquiry proceeds through concept fonnation to create coherent ideas. Keeping to the realm of the ideal. irrele- vant and ideal. however. which allows for the critique of established ideas and the unexpected construction of improved conceptual frameworks for thinking about experience anew. not by the intention of the theorist. The discrepancies between idea and actuality pennit one to improve the concepts. responsive to the play of concept formation. not in the sense of the perfect or most desirable. Standing back from the rough and tumble of political action. legitimacy. powerful concepts . political thinkers have engaged in dispassionate. in that it empowers people to query experience. the state.What the university will gain 69 Whether or not the interpretations or explanations achieved through good concept fannation further the interests of a privileged group is immaterial . but in the sense of the conceptual. representation. detached reflection and formed numerous. like other actors. or to do both. As the Stoics realized. Thus. to ask how and why and with what significance the actual dif- fers from the ideal . defmed by the vector of interest. We may say that theory is critical. detached inquiry tends to be less instrumental in its results and more critical. property. obligation. taking it out of the conceptual reahn and putting it there in the world as a self-subsisting entity. Concept fannation has powerful uses. Interested inquiry is unidirectional. what thought leads us to expect. or to change concrete actualities. freedom. equality and equity. and on. democracy. Disinterested inquiry is omnidirectional. power. Present-day thinkers in the field engage productively . Theory becomes uncritical only when people hypostatize it. liberty. rights. not material. acting and being acted on.in both senses of the word.the ideal. of thought. the theoretical. conceptual thinking is a great locus of freedom and control because it allows an actor to bring CODcepts and experience together. but by the character of theory itself.

Likewise. fil Universities have a 6Il The Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom (New York: Simon and Schuster. what perhaps it should become. Hence. there are fewer powerful concepts for thinking about education and much writing on education is therefore descriptive. but these have not been as fully developed in modem scholarship. The concepts take on great significance for human life. 1998). expand. Bloom nostalgically prescribes a Great Books pedagogy. and eOlTeet key concepts fonned by their predecessors in it. 1987) and the culture wars following from it is in large part a complaint that universities have abandoned their educative mission and left the young to flounder for themselves. significant educational concepts have been faroled within the historical record. 61 Compare the role of academic students of education [if such can be found] in public discussion leading to the setting of educational policy with the role of academic economists in discussions leading to . but as they are used critically to understand why behavior. While William G. is the way it is. in its divergent particularity.70 What the university will gain with past thinkers as they try to further develop. their analysis turns far more on econometric projection than on insight into educational experience. One is the degree to which educational leaders have surprisingly little to say about the educative work of the wliversity.6Il The other is the degree to which academic leaders fail to take part in the public discussion of educational issues. Bowen and Derek Bok have provided a distinguished examination of the role of higher education in furthering racial equality in The Shape of the River: LongTerm Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (princeton: Princeton University Press. not as they are used mechanically to shape behavior to their putative specifications. and to disclose creatively what it can become. the workings of which he takes for granted. This relative paucity of significant concepts generated through the disinterested study of education may have much to do with two salient absences in CUlTent discussions of education. not conceptual.

. In doing so. comparative education. were it organized in this way. let us engage in some concept formation to assay intellectual possibilities in the component concentrating on educational theory. At its source. Powerful concept formation should go on through al1 its components in the same way that each of the various components of political science generate important concepts with which to explain and interpret political experience. and those who do are too dispersed. Are there opportunities for concept formation in reflecting on education of a value similar to those arising from reflections on politics or economics or social action? Would more robust concept formation with respect to education be worth the trouble? That is the question we are now addressing.What the university will gain 71 weak voice in matters concerning education because too few within them engage in disinterested concept formation about it. educational theory.for starters. American education. we will see that the economic policy. with each area seeking to provide a general public with conceptual interpretation and impartial explanation pertaining to its core concerns. Were it to come into being as a field of academic study. for it would include distinct component areas . let us say. education would be somewhat similar to political science. We can sample what education as an academic study might become by going back into the historical record to look at the formation of one powerful educational concept and to sketch significant ways in which later thinkers have used it to put to themselves and to others important questions about concrete hmnan experience. To do so. and cultural change. this situation has probably arisen because scholars in the arts and sciences have generally believed that there is nothing of substance about education worthy of study outside of its professional concerns for the work of schools. we can merely sample what might result through the academic study of education. Here. or students of international relations in deliberations about national security.

an invitation. conStiucting illuminating bodies of thought and critiquing experience with them. Thinkers simply fomled concepts. sensing them to be somewhere between the jejlUle and the seminal. but to find the educational concepts that may be latent . some ideas became political. let us reflect on one example. Hence. it will have important implications for contemporary educational concerns. From it. not a prescription for the whole undertaking. and others educational. As we do so. educational concepts were initially fonned in essentially the same texts as major political ideas. each must extrapolate to a sense of the possibilities for the field. we find that the fonnation of many key concepts precedes the adjectives describing them as belonging to one or another domain of thought. seeing what it offers. Labeling came later as commentators drew ideas together and described them as part of one domain or another. not to take them away from those other fields. social. not through later descriptions of them. for in those texts many powerful ideas have their initial formulations. ones which have fallen into abeyance. We will also see that although in abeyance. Hence in engaging in educational concept formation. In Western intellectual history. Here is an example. Retrospectively. to those who will. the difference being that political thought. having developed more fully as an academic subject.72 What the university will gain concept has had powerful historical uses. if revived. Formative justice Ancient texts have unusual significance for scholars engaged in concept fonnation. has labeled the key texts as primarily political. We go back to them to engage the ideas themselves in the foml in which they were first set out. geological. political. historical. or educational. we need to appropriate resources claimed as parts of other fields. to develop and expand a much fuller agenda. be it biological.

especially pp. and he left the matter of fonnal justice . Further.61 Rawls put questions of formal justice to the side and restricted his inquiry to the problem of substantive justice. the sound and true principle of justice. at least in the domain of distributive justice. fmding those principles for the distribution of public goods among members of a polity that would lead to a substantively good distribution. He then restricted the problem of substantive justice to questions of distributive justice. if adhered to. was for him. whenever "impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions." are in actual operation.as a more coherent construction of it. His work is a marvelous exercise in concept formation and it awakened political thought from a long analytic slwnber by taking the principle of distributive justice to be the generative principle of political economy and setting forth a tight reconstruction of that principle justice as fairness . In Rawls' view. To set up his theory of distributive justice. not whether or not a principle was adhered to. 50-2. to a search for those principles that would provide substantive. the one that rational persons ought to accept. the principle of distributive justice would be substantively correct.whether 62 See A Theory ofJustice. The important issue. whatever their substantive principles. . Section 10. but into current contributions as well. but whether or not. real justice to the members of a polity. A passing difficulty in a prominent work of political philosophy may indicate a lacuna arising because educational CODcept formation has been weak. we need to be ready to make such excursions. Rawls used a distinction between formal justice and substantive justice. Rawls sought to think out which principles would best achieve substantive justice. not only into historical texts. A careful reader will encoWlter such a passing difficulty in John Rawls' Theory of Justice. fonnal justice describes the situation in a polity whenever a set of principles. good or bad. the substantive issue. allowing readers to gloss over an important idea.What the university will gain 73 there. is in force.

for reasons that he left unexamined. but he does not consider the role that an educational justice might have in bringing justice as fairness into force within a polity. His whole method. as a result of . 63 Within Rawls' theory. a concept that enables thinking about how people come to adhere to principle. of cours. The theoretical principle of interest is not faroml justice. alludes to education as a public good to be distributed disproportionately to the least advantaged in a polity governed by justice as fairness. The "fonnal constraints of the concept of right. A lacuna arises here because "formal justice" is not really a satisfactory concept. presupposes the effective working of a highly Platonic commitment to formative justice to bring about the primacy of rational choice (see especially Section 4. 64 Fonnative 63 In A Theory of Justice. pp." which Rawls lays doWil in Section 23. formal justice either exists in a polity or they does not. Rawls and the readers for whom he writes have educated themselves to accept the primacy of rational constraints on their convictions and behavior.e. but rather formative justice. to accept and to expect "the impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions" or other restrictions on possible behaviors. 207-210) and the adherence to system (pp. a mere description of the condition of one or another polity. and even further. pp. to shape the world and their conduct within it by reference to this system of thought. 64 Rawls. 112-118. 123-130). Rawls touched further on fonnal justice by way of making some observations about the rule of law (pp. but not to develop the concept as such any further. and Rawls did not seek to construct concepts for thinking about the process by which adhering to principle might or might not come about in the experience of a person or a polity. are not simply "fOlma! conditions. Fonnative justice is an important educational concept. even a bit mystified.74 What the university will gain there was "adherence to principle. and Section 25. There is adherence to principle or there is not. 15-19. 441-2). one still insufficiently developed." they are the outcome of a particular fonnative education. however." "obedience to system" largely to the side. pp. but merely a descriptive term.

so Plato initiated and gave a first full conception of formative justice. 63 Present·day which people learn to expect principles to be general. public. mentor and friend. especially Books 3 & 4. an educative process through which people adhere to the constraints they will accept on their various possibilities for behavior. As Aristotle provided the first full conception of distributive justice. quite literally. and conclusive or final. essentially the issue of formative justice. 161-181. whether it is a question of making money. Only then does he act. which deserves far fuller attention than it receives. productive of ordered processing. being himself his own mlef. but with the internal perfonnance of it. or contractual agreements with private indio . and emerge as a perfect unity of diverse elements.What the university will gain 7S justice . or some political action. bottom. Pogge gives a careful explication of the role education has in Rawls' second principle of justice in his study. with his true self and his own tme function. it was not concerned with the external performance of a manls own function. Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. universru in application. And if there turn out to be any intervening elements.like distributive justice and retributive justice . it is necessary that there be a formative justice. where Plato resolved the interplay between justice in the hypothetical city and the person in favor of the latter: "But the truth is that although justice apparently was something of this kind. forbidding each of the elements within him to perform tasks other than its own. it is not enough for education to be justly distributed as a good among others. A concept of fonnative justice stands to the disinterested study of education as that of distributive justice stands to the dispassionate study of politics. with the development of the concept culminating at 444d·e. Pogge shows that Rawls' ideas about education need to be emended to recognize that each person has a right to an education appropriate to his capacities. selfdisciplined and in harmony with himself.is an important part of justice. to put his own house in order. or taking care of his body. he must combine them all. Thomas W.top. and intermediate. H See The Republic. 1990) pp. and tuning the three elements just like three fixed points in a musical scale . and not allowing the classes of things within his soul to interfere with one another. He has. For justice to pertain.

trans. Part I. 11-195.ito. neither on the realities of power nor on legislated legitimacies. but rather on the educative. Socrates based his respect for the nooos of the city. 67 But Plato was not prescribing political arrangements. 2000). from which our term "politics" derives. Commentary on Plato's Republic Dotmally lacks sympathy because commentators take it to be a work primarily about politics. and elsewhere. And few would dispense with the educational concept that he was there forming. In describing his city of words in the Republic. however. sharply differentiated from each other. . with each viduals. he was explaining an educational concept. 50c-54d. the polis. New York: Cambridge University Press.66 If taken as a set of socio-political restrictions prescribed for objective polities. The thought constructed an educational concept: the idea that human potential has multiple components.. pp. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. as in the C. 67 Perhaps the most egregious example having been The Open Society and Its Enemies by Karl R. the city. In all these situations he believes and declares that a just and good action is one \vhieh preserves or brings about this state of mind ~ wisdom being the knowledge which directs the action. like Galileo's pat1icle. not education. counter factual and confined to thought. are not developing his idea very well. The castes were a conceptual fiction. 6fi See Socrates dialogue with the Athenian nomoi at Crito.•n (Tom Griffith. But consider what Plato held to be the primary meaning or significance of the polis in human experience. 1950). formative ethos those nonus had provided. strikes present-day readers as profolllldly reprehensible. To be sure.. 1946. Plato's division of his postulated city into three functional castes. We immediately encOlUlter here another instance of the contextual problem arising fi-om the absence of an academic discourse about education.. Revised edition. was a central concem in the work.. Plato conceptualized educational relationships and actions not political arrangements. each overflowing with possibilities. for they too often cram his idea into the wrong con- ceptual context. Popper.76 What the university will gain students of education.

. A person cannot actualize all her possibilities. Plato. (New York. one lUlique to each person. Fonnative justice 68 See Howard Gardner's. I must think concretely about both myself and my circwnstances. in pursuing these chosen goals. 1983. put greater stress on tbe problem of cultural philosophy that confronts each person than on that of developmental psychology. those unique circumstances of my life. integrate. but with hwnan potentials. not with public goods. the cultural conditions in the midst of which I live. Basic Books. 1993). Is this a reprehensible concept? Is this not the concept that Howard Gardner has been elaborating. Issues of distributive justice stem from having to allocate a finite supply of public goods among a larger multiplicity of claimants. Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences. 1993) and Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice (New York: Basic Books. Which ones will receive what effort? By exercising formative justice. forcing choices. of motivation and discernment. forcing deliberation about what each recipient is due.What the university will gain 77 needing to be developed and brought into an appropriate balance and order. Considering potentialities in a Platonic manner. In education. possibilities exceed feasible achievement. a person selects among her possibilities and allocates a finite supply of talent and energy. In view of the world in which I fmd myself. of course. which it is the person's vital challenge to sustain and fulfill. what nurturing resources can I take from the world in order to develop. understanding and evaluating the possibilities for me inhering in those circwnstances. through his theory of multiple intel1igences?63 Issues of justice arise when a need or desire for something exceeds its supply. Concepts of fonnative justice help people address that question through a life-long series ofself-fonnative efforts. nor can a group. and deploy my particular mix of capacities and powers? To live is to respond constantly to this question in order to achieve to my fulfillment within the world. Issues of formative justice have to do. to considerable acclaim. Tenth-anniversary edition.

part of Achilles' share of the spoils. 70 What do you The dramatic tcnsion in Homer's Iliad unfolds from the tension between distlihutive and fornmtive justice..S. "Be all you can be": this is the problem of fonnative justice that each youth must ultimately solve for herself.78 What the university will gain thereby detetmines the mix of potentials that a person or group will effectively act to achieve. Schools are ciphers with respect to fonnative justice and schools of education do nothing to prepare teachers to speak effectively to the problems of fonnative justice yOWlg people encomlter growing up under diverse personal circmnstances. military.suggest that the effective educator must speak to the problems of fonnative justice his or her students experience in the choices they must make. which affected the more basic distribution of honor within the community of Greek warnors. whether to lead a long life of obscure but comfottable satisfaction or to achieve through dangerous deeds a ShOlt life of enduring renoWll. and the like . 70 It is disconcerting.ester. nominally as fi9 Agamemnon appropriated Briseis. The quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles broke out over an issue of distributive justice. Superficially. Popular images showing education taking place effectively across a wide range of circumstances as in movies such as Stand and Deliver. deciding (to put it in present-day language) what definition of self would be primal}' for him. Dead Poets Society. The tenns of discussion aroWld fonnal schooling are about how to teach a set body of knowledge and how to assess whether or not it has been learned. 69 Guided. that about the only place in American public life that celebrates such a principle of formative justice is in recruiting publicity for the U. Finding For. the real drama of the Iliad recoWlted how Achilles wavered over and then resolved the so-called choice of Achilles. for the affront to distributive justice was really merely the occasion through which Achilles came to grapple with his inward problem of fonnative justice. each person exerts educational effort to bring his or her mix of aptitudes to their full employment in pursuit of sustainable fulfillment. Thus. could end the quanel. to say the least. by fonnative justice. issues of distribution were at stake. Katherine Boo shows what a . But neither further redistribution of spoils nor professions of honor. well Of poorly. however.

it will in due course destroy the body politic. enable people to think.What the university will gain 79 want to become? What should you become? What can you become? How will you integrate the imperatives of desire. Which merit realization. has obfuscated issues of formative justice by de- grading them into concerns of distributive justice. At the other extreme of willful degradation. despite all the extrinsic disadvantages. 11 Republic. with the only issue of justice being one of access to formal opportunities. not innate differences. obsessed with materia1 externalities. upbringing. Plato was addressing the problem of ensuring that the parts in a complex whole remain effectively subordinated in the service of the whole. but a complex whole made of many parts that she had to develop and form. Through the myth of the metals. and let be done in their names. 162-176. which get counted up among the cornucopia of public goods. pp. where Plato made it clear the characteristics in question are in fact the result of upbringing and education. partisan politics exemplifies fonnative injustice at a lavish scale. and reason into a secure and fulfilling self? There is one life to live and a multiplicity of possibilities in it. Who will get so much of what kind? In the course of developing his conception of formative justice. The problem of effectively subordinating the parts to the whole is a pre-eminently . and why? This is the question of formative justice and good educational concepts. 414c-e. October 18. how. 71 Sober literalists among us condemn this myth and school can do. Education collapses into schooling." The New Yorker. when. and the examples they are setting amount to an ever-more miseducative politics. Twentieth-century public discourse. Plato spun his myth of the metals to explain why a person would accept the idea that her potential was not some fated absolute. when it addresses issues of formative justice in "Letter from Boston: The Factory. about and act on such fateful choices. where. so much seat-time devoted to this or that. sound pedagogical principles. educational malfeasance as campaigners indulge in competitive perjury and character assassination. However effective in gaining power. The young watch what putative leaders do. 2004.

For instance. Straus and Giroux. a conceptual construct.which Plato at least labeled as myth and spun in discourse for purposes explicitly not to be put into practice.2003) to The Big Test: Secret Histmy of the American Meritocracy by Nicholas Lemann (New York: Farrar. 1964. The Platonic myth of the metals does not deserve rebuke if it is taken to describe the character of potentialities. we do not try to have one potentiality do the work of another. with the Educational Testing Service and other authorities propotUlding our myths of metals. How to allocate both faith and reason to their proper domains and to be able to draw appropriately on both within the hwnan enterprise is by no means a dead issue. the separation of powers and the system of ehecks and balances operate as principles of fonnative justice within modern constitutional theory. Yet those same literalists collaborate now in our endless testing. as well as educational problem. we need to think about them as relatively fixed. In order to think about different fonns ofpotcntiality. not in scope but in character.1Z TIle Republic propounded an early theory of fOlmative justice. reliance on mass testing has become ever more widespread as the arbiter of educationalopportunity. for they are not transmutable into one anolher.80 What the university will gain its ironies . existing only as history. and integrate her activities into a sustainable life-project.e . however. a person will deploy those capacities. What may be of use as a diagnostic in helping each person achieve fOlmative justice in their education has no proper business cloaking distributive injustices with a false legitimacy. onc central to fonnativc justice. n. but as objectivities legitimated by statistical arcana and an obliging quest for bias-fi'ce phrasing. By perceiving the inherent differences selting distinct capacities apart from one another. It has a significant political dimension as well. That way. we do not try to draw reasoned conclusions through the exercise of appetitive desire or to bond emotionally through closely reasoned argument. 71 Despite decades of critique from The Tyranny of Testing by Banesh Hoffinann (New York: Dover Publications. only for us not as myth. TItus. each for its appropliatc purpose. 2000). and a major activity in the disinterested study of education should be the continuous development of that construction.

working with players and their agents to achieve agreement through judgments about the market and putative skill and drawing power and other measures of worth. By itself.What the university will gain 81 others. may achieve consistent success ." let us meditate briefly about how we might use the two concepts to think about a trivial. at least within the tiny universe of the team.is to justify differentials in compensation. the team can thrive. to build the determination and elan of the group so that each plays with full intensity. and to develop and communicate to each player an astute game plan that takes into account the unique capacities of key personnel and the vulnerabilities of opponents. for me the Jets or Giants will do. If the front office mismanages the valuation of worth and the distribution of resources. jealousies and resentments can wrack the team and the stable of players will fall short on talent.damn those Yankees . The front office deals with distributive justice. a great collection of talent. We can return to Plato.we will not dwell on your salary or mine . The issue of distributive justice here . Let us first sharpen the distinction between fonnative and distributive justice. The issue here is to get each player into optimum condition for the roles he has to play. . winning team. whereby some players will make millions for showing up and others will labor at a base pay of several hundred thousand.the doings of profes- sional sport. with too much here leaving too little there. Finally. it does not matter whether it plays the global or the American game. Take your favorite football team. and their use in asking difficult questions about educational experience.but it does not guarantee it. Remembering Galileo's caution about the importance of "any. but widely documented matter . as at last the Red Sox showed. in negotiating salaries and other terms of player contracts. But will it? This question raises the issue of fonnative justice. If the distribution is astute. A coaching staff must use principles of fonnative justice to bring each player up to his full potential and to integrate them all into a resourceful. leading fans to rail at the front office. richly remunerated.

Section 24. fonnative justice perfects the unique excellences of diverse components and integrates them into an optimal perfonnance. Fonnal justice.82 What the university will gain formative justice here consists in putting all these activities together. and the only real "veil of ignorance" (A Theory of Justice. of each person's realization of his or her potentialities. the theory of formative justice enables a person to think about how to bring a diversity of potential capacities to a combined fulfillment. as Rawls reasons. winning in a commanding perfonnance. available online at www. 118-123) that people systematically experience is the ignorance at any time and any situation of what their best potentials . describes the end state of the process of fonnative justice and it consists in laws and institutions.html. so in the great game of life . tIle conceptual fe/os is equality in one sense or another. "whatever their substantive principles. equality being too simplistic. 73 As in SPOlt. For fonnative justice. so that on the day of the crucial game. fairness is the goal. effectively instituting diverse efforts motivated by a suitable integration of interest. the whole team is strong." but the concept in question is the same although I have come to prefer the lattcr tenn. fulfillment is the controlling goal. The Educator's Manifesto (New York: Institute for Learning Tec1mologies. 74 We might here note in passing that it is only with respect to a measure of fulfillment. how and why.the challenge of formative justice abounds. intense.studyplace. pride. personal or historic.lhatever the domain of experience. each in its proper measure. and principie. fateful situations. pp. Football is a microcosm of passing import. and shrewd together. as Rawls understood it.orglstudyplace/studyspacc/mcclintocklmanifesto_work_in"-progress. V. 1999). that thc Rawlsian can judge who is least advantaged. but even with more complex. For distributive justice.74 73 This and the previous paragraph are a revision of material in ~119112 of Robbie McClintock. There I used the tenn "regulative justice" rather than "fonnative justice. Or perhaps. on pain of suffering the consequences." that people have brought to fulfillment in practice.

and at the highest good. human fulfillment becomes the fimdamental purpose of a polity. and principles. and which embraces all the rest.7s In this view. Aristotle defmed a city as the shared pursuit of the good life. . Full employment in its fullest sense is a truly challenging. and every community is established with a view to some good. further. Justice as fairness may make even better sense as a theory of formative justice. if all communities aim at some good. the state or political community. taking care to educate others. But." (Benjamin Jowett. the test of legitimacy comes through the educative work of its ethos.) Any full discussion of formative justice would require more attention to Aristotle. I. than it does as a theory of distributive justice. for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. and passim. nonns. to the full employment of his or her unique mix of potentialities for the benefit of self and others. With respect to fonnative justice. for the potential of the game itself became less fulfilling when injury forced his withdrawal. as well as many others. We want our own fulfillment and thus exercise effort to develop and use our natural capacities. "Every state is a community of some kind. which is the highest of all. The goal of fulfillment even translates into a powerful directive nonn for political economy. the legitimacy of a regimen . trans. in addition to that given here to Plato. aims at good in a greater degree than any other. stoking the ever-insatiable few.What the university will gain 83 Ful:fillment is a goal that excites powerful human sympathy. We feel spontaneous admiration for exemplary achievement by others and regret when circumstances force someone to desist from significant effort. and worthwhile goal of public policy. Thus fans will acknowledge with respectful applause an opposing star.turns on judgments of whether or not it rightly brings are. the right of each person to creative work and. Polilics. and we want the fulfillment of others. but fun employment is the goal.something we educators will not confuse with the regime of a state . suddenly injured and forced out of a game. I. 7S Aristotle. Not growth. With fulfillment as the purpose the polity.

" In Education is more deeply personal than politics and concepts pertinent to it orient from the inside. or culture with Hegel. to Hegel's study of the human spirit's Bildungsgeschichte. In that context. and dangers that some find in his thinking less ominous. educative outcomes? Can discord. What kind of politics would have good.84 What the university will gain potentials to full realization. the concept of autonomy with Kant. is to find a way to make the conceptual achievements of that era far more widely acces76 . so to speak. and prideful . an other-regarding self-possessive. and Emile. Were this 110t an essay.as formative influences they were profoundly distorting. Book 3. Rousseau. sown by exploitative political conduct. not on grounds of distributive justice. Geist. Under the heading of "political education. affirmative sense of self. setting forth the legislative powers of reason. See especially. From Kant's Critiques.very impOitant. if the distinction between formative justice and distributive justice were more firmly in mind. and that of its fiuition in spirit. but a full study of fomlative justice. but on those of formative justice . Rousseau's Discourse an the Origin of Inequality. This makes conceptual frameworks enabling people to think well about the self in interaction with the world very important in education. thought about "educational politics n by asking. undercut the shared potential for fulfillment by wedging many to despair and others to smug complaccncy? 77 There is immense potential in interpreting Gennan idealism as a major exercise in concept fOlmation dedicated to understanding the educational experience of humanity. or bad. even in the Social Contract. whether or not it respects and nur~ tures the conditions of fulfillment. and amow' propre. The interpretation of Rousseau would be clearer. The challenge to present-day interpreters. Note 0. we would need to develop here the concept of authenticity in dialogue with Rousseau and others. the primary concern is educational.'6 and likewise. and it is no small challenge. proprietary. Or Education." theorists usually consider what kind of education will lead to good political outcomes. the historical process of human selfformation. a healthy. Rousseau based his critique of his sociocultuml circumstances. Rousseau's fundamental distinction between amour de soi. with the person internally as actor both affecting and being affected by the surrounding world.

What the university will gain 85 doing so. but to master the skills to gain and exercise real political power. Adamson has shown well in Hegemony and Revolution: Antonio Gramsd's Political and Cultural Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press. 73 Martin Luther King. in thought. coordination. The ways in which misrule evokes counteraction can be understood only by reference to the ability people have to control the formative education by which they shape themselves in interaction with their circumstances.'s Where the justice at issue is primarily formative. and control may have valences different from what they would have if principles of political power and authority were directly at work. especially section IV). Moving complaints about the de- ficiency of substantive justice show how the fonnative influence of a political or moral order distorts the character and expectations of those subject to it. 79 A regimen may be demanding in ways that a regime may not. Jr. yet related. Things that are negative and destructive when done to us as passive objects by sible to a general public than were the very difficult philosophical and literary sources of them.. relationships of subordination. eloquently exemplified such connections in his "Letter from Binningham Jail" (April 1963. Both the right of rebellion and judgments that a given order is basically legitimate turn in large part on whether one feels that formative justice is attainable under the conditions that prevail. we would see that many issues of political theory can be clearer and easier to manage when the educational concepts embedded in them are adequately differentiated and kept distinct. Franz Kafka's Leller to his Father (November 1919) examined deeply how a distorting paternal authority culminated in a fearful rejection of filial duty and continuity between generations. What may be highly repressive in politics may be liberating in education. not so that they could co-opt themselves into more favored classes. . 1980). 7~ As Walter L. Antonio Gramsci recommended a highly disciplinary education for proletarians and peasants. particuJarly as the person sets herself a regulative regimen for bringing a favored potential to fruition.

For instance. cf. a hypothetical city that he did not seek to found in fact. not to the person acquiring her education.and see the question of control as a conspiracy by hypostatized forces out there to control the outer and inner life of the meager self." Tile Republic (Tom Griffith. . and responsibility. Ironically.How do we cope with the flux of circumstances? . 1990) because they invert the real control problem that Beniger had in mind . they tum away. Not liking what they thus hear. Confined to the extemals. students will often misread The Con· trol Revolution: Teclmological and Economic Origins oltlle lnlorma· tion Society by James R. chooses to found a city within himself. educational thinkers have impoverished their resources. as a key passage showed: "our hypothetical city. proposing external authorities. by mistaking the context. . it is part or the path to fulfilhnent. . in order to illustrate an educative discipline by which persons could put fonnative justice into practice in the living of their Iives. since I don't think it exists anywhere on earth. And they compound this weakening by attributing pedagogical initiative.. interpreters diminish the developmental po· tentialities of the person. 11ms. trans. Bcnigcr (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.86 What the university will gain an external agent can be positive and fulfilling when we do them actively by and for ourselves. not education. students of education too often read Plato as if he is talking politics. but self-set. it would stultify and suppress the spirit. 47Ia·473b. so The marathon runner pushes herself through a discipline of painful training to achieve her goal. I think. 91 Plato was not looking for real world versions of his polis.and seeing it. but authoritarian city. Plato described in speech a highly fonnative. 592b. We need a dose ofEpictetus. for anyone who chooses to see it . were we to keep the things we do for ourselves more clearly differentiated from the things that get done to us. to the apparent surtiO The interpretation of present-day conditions would be more effec· tive. efficacy. Were such a discipline imposed by an external power. A pattern or model laid up in heaven somewhere.). but to her external teachers.91 By seeing politics where education should be found.

constituted a fourth ideal-typical concept. and a11 together. as Rawls did for distributive justice. under a heading which we are calling formative justice. Here. People want. Plato used three idealtypical concepts in constructing his concept of formative justice. For Plato. These described in thought how people adhered to a system of law and even more generally how they willingly constrained their behavior. which he conceptualized as being of three types . that is. education becomes superficial and lax. that grasped in thought. we seek to indicate what the academic study of education might become in the arts and sciences and can do so by following a few further hints from Plato to see how those might lead us further into subsequent work. and extraordinary effort. In Plato's view.What the university will gain 87 faces. which consisted in bringing the other three into an appropriate relation with one another such that each separately. to honor or spiritedness. in discourse. It is not appropriate here. Plato advanced concepts. and think. Within his effort at concept formation. in the conduct of a person's life within the flux of his or her actual circumstances. the way people constrained their actions and adhered to a purpose or principle. fulfilbnent. the unexpected. this optimality meant achieving a stable. within the scope of this essay. or simply justice as he put it. most of which merits being interpreted as educational. willed subordination to a goal. people voluntarily obligated themselves and adhered to purposes in response to motivating capacities. among other things. to try to construct a full theory of fonnative justice. would be fully employed performing their proper functions in a way optimal for the whole person. and in so doing choose their ends in view. Beneath the surfaces. a normative dimension enabling him to interpret both human fulfillment . believe. either through an extended commentary on Plato or by taking the concept up and constructing a new theory of it. as theorists often do. and he gave that. difficult achievements arise from selfdiscipline. self-sustaining hannony. or to reason. Fonnative justice.responses to appetite.

." He then gave a powerful statement of the educative function of fonnative justice: "Education . their own fulfilbnent. Conditions had put conventions and circumstances in flux. not the art of putting the power of sight into it. SISc." as Alexander Pope many centuries 81 Republic. for they were the teachers who professed to put sight into blind souls. . . but the art which assumes it possesses this power . which had stretched through several of his dialogues. Like putting sight into eyes which were blind. would be the art of directing this instrument. one that Plato asserted to be a universal . a capacity that was their human dignity." People learned by exercising their capacity to find and lrnow their own good.81 This passage culminated Plato's critique of the sophists.. which will mean that "a little learning is a dangerous thing. "Education is not what some people proclaim it to be. Plato achieved a theoretical account of how people adhere to principles in the course of living their lives. The sophists had begun to offer instruction in the rhetorical and related arts that promised to give power to those who would live by the exercise of persuasion and leadership... And immediately both cultural conservatives and philosophic critics then queried whether the proffered instruction could deliver the promised results: truly knowledge is power. trans..) ..88 What the university will gain and human degradation.. . and with an insouciance that some thought disruptive and others unwise. (Griffith.. that they are able to put knowledge into souls where none was before. He used it to put quite clearly two very important questions that should be major COllcems in the academic study of education.."this capacity in every soul. he illuminated significant consequences for conduct as people under differing conditions adhered to particular principles in different ways. and contrives to make it look in the right direction. the sophists prepared young men on the make to gain an edge in pursuing pleasure and power. Consider first Plato's wonderful passage at the conclusion of the allegory of the cave. and with it.

and demurs now. 89 later restated a Socratic ploy. skill. recurrently demanding answers. 318b. questioning the strong claim that "every day. virtus. we can speak of the power of persons and of collec- :!I3 Pro/agoras. from the Renaissance to now. being able."SJ The philosophic critic demurred then. compassion. to "look in the right direction. virtue. Like arete." Let us take a conceptual risk and agree that in contemporary parlance the best way to translate arete is not its common translation.how best to manage one's household. 319a. power need not be taught. that arete. day after day. for they have devised a program of instruction that leads to "soWld deliberation. trans. . like arete. If power is mistaken. not good. and answers now. Can virnle.how to realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate and action. as occasion required.84 and suggesting that with sustained effort one might develop the rational skill to figure out in the flux of circwnstance what principles and skills may prove best suited to the situation.strength. has a range of component capacities . "excellence. as Plato put it." but the one insinuated here. and answers now. both in domestic matters . The cultural conservative answered then. knowledge. The sophistic pedagogue answered then.. it wreaks Thus the paradigmatic culture war began around a great question. "virhle.What the university will gain hann. for it was given by tradition and convention. one that still echoes into our time and times to come.) 84 Pro/agoras. that is.Can arele be taught? Or the Romans . wisdom." or even the better but less common. can power be taught? This question persisted. As the classical Greeks put it . courage. and in public affairs . you will get better and better. that indeed they teach it. "power" . ascribed to the young as a matter of course in a well-ordered community. (Lombardo & Bell. have been putting it. can excellence. excellence.Can power be taught? Power.Can vir/lis be taught? Or as the modems.

economic. the coda at the end of the Republic in . and in this sense.for tIle conservative. reproducing it through ascription. the good was the object of power. but to a complex quality perceived to arise at the juncture where the active person interacts with his or her conditioning circumstances. like Qf'ete and v. Can power be taught? People hope that education will culminate in power . the imp0l1ance of formative justice becomes inescapable and a major debate running historically through consequential sources emerges into clarity as an examination of education.1us were in their original contexts. But it meant that the problem of fomlative justice was pervasive and ominous. the ability to act with effect. for the sophistic. for every act aimed to accomplish the good. And they easily over-reach. for the Socratic. could all work rightly. as they should. shared by all humans.that no person Imowingly. mastering it through learning and study. posing a difficult question: given the complexity of power and the many goods that were its object! how should one order these so that each. or educational. disbursing it through instmction.made necessary sense. by definition. power as a concept applies not to an abstract attribute inhering separately in the person. If the hope is that education will culminate in power. consistent with fit goals? In the face of this question. many people make. It is what Plato celebrated in the greatest of all his myths. 111at is the source of the fundamental dignity of each. emotional. political. One cannot speak about the power of a person without taking into account the context in which the power is manifest. and their resultant combination. intentionally did evil . very difficult demands on themselves. the Socratic position .. The autonomous acceptance of difficult expectations must not serve to legitimate dehumanizing authority over others. Furthennore. be it religious. Formative justice works through the self-formation of each person.90 What the university will gain tivities. and we see it as a concept for thinking both about the special capacities of some and simultaneously about qualities universally possessed in some measure by each and every person. In the Platonic construct.

in which there were numerous possibilities for each. tried less to desiderate on the substantive question of what the good is.) For Hadot. New York: Cambridge University Press. trying to develop a rational self-discipline for selecting purposes and shaping their capacities to achieve them. The 'Meditations' of Marcus Aurelius (Nlichael Chase. trans. Therefore. 1995. . trans. and The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press.2001) stressing how Plato and Aristotle saw the problem of fonnation in view of the vicissitudes of experience. see The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Elhics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Updated Edition. Their work is one major strand in a literature the aims of which are essentially educative. 2002).. MA: Blackwell. Cambridge. For NussbalUn. What Is Ancient Philosophy? (Michael Chase. Many past thinkers wrote for people engaged in pondering the question of fonnative justice. S6 They were students. 1986. Cambridge: Hruvard University Press. and many after them. let not the first be careless in his choice nor the last discouraged. 1992. trans.lt85 Here is the inalienable humanistic condition. less of substantive justice.. 85 85 . celebrated by Socrates and Plato. provided that he chooses it rationally and lives it seriously. There is a satisfactory life rather than a bad one available even for the one who comes last. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. and The Inner Citadel. 1987. but spoke more to themselves and others pursuing the formative question.. more of formative justice. "Responsibility lies with the one who makes the choice. 617e & 619b (Grube & Reeve. What should be the purposes OfYOllI power and how should you direct your power to pursue them? Ancient ethical writers. see Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Michael Chase. 1998).What the university will gain 91 which the human souls chose their lives. the question of their regimen ofself-fonnation. Republic. 1994).. as Pierre Hadot and Martha Nussbaum have been reminding present-day readers. 1995). . trans.

not as a threat or a lure.87 Let us leave. and the deep need he felt for achieving the conviction of faith. Plato's tripartite schema of the human constitution took the role of belief in the fanna· tion of power too much for granted. and Dante's Divine Comedy set it forth in a magnificent vision. We might say that the challenge of fonnative justice shifted from the plane of reason to that of belief. is well exemplified by Augustine in his Confessions. but their ability to honor truly. In view of subsequent history. and skeptic. self-aware persons felt that the rational disciplines of the Stoic. for with so much diversity it was impossible to not question conventionallocal nomlS. this shift in what people put primary in Rome as it Christianized. He had assumed that acculttu'alian in one or another city-state would provide each person's spirited element with a set of honored attachments more elevating than the appetites but less open to doubt than the objects of reason. for this essay. . did not suffice for their fOlmative needs. People no longer found their chief problem to be their rational understanding of the good. soon created a syncretism of different beliefs as Rome became intensely multi-cultural. and salvation. which showed the inadequacy for him of his philosophical education. Epicurean. depicting the fonnative force . they concentrated on achieving conscious acts of faith as the basis for their fonning their purposes and powers.of damnation. energies at best weakly sensed by Plato. to revere something with unquestioned faith.for one who felt it. Augustine's City of God sketched a new regimen for formative justice. and pained by that deficiency. especially the Roman.92 What the university will gain Another strand filled out an emerging gap in the Platonic agenda. a growing number of sensitive. a good one. People found themselves with few unquestioned convictions. Increasingly. A diversity of accultm'ating conditions confounded the unselfconscious honoring of belief. repentance. Imperial hegemonies. but as an existential state . the discussion of how to shape one's power to live rightly and well in the face of unlmown cir- 87 To me. full in detail and cxtraordinaty in scope.

they feed into the Hobbsian war of all against all. on the who. as political movements. and the where. It is a matter that merits greater attention in the study of education than it is now receiving. and as that aspiration fragments into numerous movements of group identity and assertion. we should realize that the fITst question . and the place of power within it. from Black Power in the 60's to the many vari- ants now in action in the national and global arenas. Nation-states came into being as much through the conscious pursuit of an educational ideal as through the constitution of political institutions.What the university will gain 93 cmnstance. it is wrong to view these solely. Recognition that power is an educational concept. public discourse is appallingly inert. Our aim here is simply to see what the academic study of education might involve. Reflection on it should lead to the conceptual critique of educational effort. not to ever more astute answers to the how of education.has been a question of seminal importance in our cultural history and one that continues to be at the heart of contemporary dilemmas. which caught reflective attention from the ancients to the present. but the many-sided affirmation of human potential. Without the study of education. If seen as strictly political. we hear many assertive discussions of power without discernment and react with repressive incomprehension. tragically exacerbating the tensions of our world. To what degree do our immense educational efforts further the hlUnan fulfillment of those involved? Why. is essential to making sense of many important developments in current public life. and around problems of power. . These movements pursue power as the construction of identities and the vision of fulfillment through them. as much as a political one. feeding not the war of all against all. On these issues. and the when. it might enable us to convert more political conflict into pedagogical effort.How can the person best master his or her power to seek fulfillment? . Thus these movements are in large part educational. fully developed. even primarily. but to the reflective examination of the what and the why of education. Hence.

but there are others as well. .94 What the university will gain in a world so full of resources. One accounts for the formative influences that differentiate one person or polity. Both inquiries intertwine through the historical resources and spread out into different domains of modern scholarship. 545b-580b. the other concerns the sources of historic stability and change working upon the unique person or polity. Homer's listeners had learned to think about themselves through the contrast between the Greek and the other. disposed to rancor and resentment? What are the discrepancies between contemporary practices and the ideas of fomlative justice and what might educators do to diminish those discrepancies? We have probed far enough to recognize that education as an academic study must address these questions. and doubt. subtly charting the interplay of formative influences on the character of the polity and the person.88 Two dimensions of it are critical in a disinterested study of education. In Books 8 and 9 of the Republic. The academic study of education could do much to give them better unity and focus. do so many find themselves in a state of deprivation. Let us sample them by looking at the other fundamental educative problem that Plato grasped with his concept of fonnative justice. had raised these issues. each engaged in external competition and conflicts among them. one regimen 01' regime. the question about the contingency of personality and community in time. he anchored the second educative question of continuing importance. where Plato traced the cy- cle of transformation from the rule of the best to that of the worst. from another. Greek cities constituted a cauldron of political experimentation. The relative merits of different formative principles in the organization of a polis were significantly contested and deIrS Republic. depression. For long. Events. each coping with its internal conflicts. and many sending citizens forth in a practice of founding new cities according to a plan. as events do.

seems to have come about as the Communist regimes were pushed to the point at which they collapsed as distributive systems. suggesting that the principle of participation among Greek citizens enabled them to withstand Persian subjects. People experienced the question. seeking to understand whether and how knowledge and culture detennined the power of persons and of polities.9o Plato and then Aristotle Present-day concern for nurturing the vitruity of civil society and for maintaining channels of civic participation is a distant descendant of Herodotean history. 90 A very revealing study. the plod- ding power of Sparta versus the Odyssean sea-wit of Athens. The actual conduct oftbe Cold War.-vis another. Putnam (New York: Touchstone Books. concentrating on the genius and self-destructive volatility of the latter. they began to write history. Bowling Alone: The ColJapse and Revival of American Community by Robert D. celebrating the capacities for self-development exercised by people under a regime of freedom. perhaps it has been done and I am lmaware of it.What the university will gain 95 bated. If 89 . 2003) have much more to do with problems of formative justice in civic life than with issues ofdistributive justice. who were governed by a principle of subordination that neutralized their superior material strength. Over centuries.SQ Thucydides pulled back from the contrast between the Greek and the other and contrasted the two poles within the Greek ethos. At least the presentation of self by the leading powers on the "Free World" side was largely framed by reference to deep-seated ideas about the formative justice of democratic regimes. at least in its denouement. successive thinkers have sought to fonn ideas and principles with which they could account for the relative success of one power system vis-a. thereby greatly deepening insight into the interplay between character and command. 2001) and Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life by Theda Skocpol (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Caught in contingent times. Herodotus began the inquiry. would look at the Cold War in a neo-Thucydidian manner as the playing out of two frameworks for large-scrue formative justice.

or was fitted for it. and their education was to cost a million lives and ten thousand million dollars. fonnative results. early in his Education. is a large question. Henry Adams pointed to the awful costs of this pedagogy. As political theorists have often explored "political education. Northern or Southern. and hence collectively its power and stability. With respect to the influences shaping people in a polity. there is." in which they reflect on the kind of education that will best lead to good political outcomes. was to learn his business at the cost of the public.96 What the university will gain turned further inward to reflect on how internal conflicts within Athens and other cities led to a change in governing constitu· tion. dangerous yet imperative. rn-st. 91 ''Not a man there !mew what his task was to be." constructing concepts about how political anangements force educational. more or less. Hence. North and South. which is precisely the fundamental concept of formative justice. How [onnative influences shape the members ofa polity. what we might call the pedagogy of events. they knew less than he. and such inquiries have matured into more modem ideas about checks and balances and the separation of powers. SUllmer. Seward. one can imagine at some point a revisionist argument that contends on fonnative grounds that a democratic socialism is preferable to an ever-more bloated regime equating freedom with the untrammeled pursuit of material wealth. before the country could recover its balance and movement.91 Adams' autobiography and its that was the case. and the rest." . as he looked back on the outbreak of the Civil War. within six weeks they were all to be taught their duties by the uprising of such as he. the tension was not settled on fonnative groWlds. One can lUlderstand these constitutional principles as principles de· signed to ensure that each of the different forms of political power keeps to its proper business so that the whole can function in effective hamlOny. Lincoln. could give no help to the young man seeking education. every one without exception. so a full consideration of formative justice would lead to ideas about "educational politics. for better and for worse.

with Lawrence Cremin's American Education perhaps the pre-eminent exam- Adams.. A second type of influence fonning political character arises through the ethos of a given polity. The Education of Henry Adams. We have virtually no good concepts with which to ana1yze or explain what is happening as public leaders and their followers become willing to compromise their governing principles in angst at apparent life dangers. without as much educative insight.9] Later students of Rome took Machiavelli's question rather for granted and CODcentrated more on its sequel. rampantly since 9/11. Hence. Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres (New York: Penguin Books. New York: Penguin Books. especially as it is going on all about us. g] Machiavelli. 1986). end of Chapter VII: "Treason. effective concepts for interpreting the pedagogy of events. 1985). tluough diverse vicissitudes. ed. 92 Ear1ier Machiavelli had come closer in his Discourses to creating a conceptual framework for interpreting the pedagogy of events as he reflected on how the Romans preserved. they were too indirect to pro- vide well-formed. Which types of regimes educate the best and which regimes can best draw strength from the education of their members? What educational arrangements wil1 best accord with the character of a given regime and what educational strategies will best strengthen and enhance the regime? Some modern responses have probed how education has shaped and been shaped by the principle of nationa1ity. The Discourses (Bernard Crick. through its historical or political character. their capacity to extend and maintain their governing principles. ." 9:! Henry Adams. the decline and fall. Unfortunately. the pedagogy of events is still a matter in great need of clarification.What the university will gain 97 companion reflection on Mont-Saini-Michel and Chartres were great literature.

and more recently Amy Gut- mann's. 1987. comparing the fonnative ethos of civilizations.. as distinct from other civilized spaces. 2002) along with other translations and editions.94 Emerging debates about multiculturalism education may be the harbinger of an historic dissociation between education and nationality. which was a life-long work-in-progress. and why it developed in Europe. Dewcy engaged in important educational concept formation. other modern responses have examined the interactions between democracy and education. 1997). New York: Penguin Books. 95 In Democracy and Education (New York: Simon & Schuster. a third modem response broadens out in the manner originated by Herodotus. New York: Harper & Row. pre-eminent. asking how educational activities and services should be provided consistent with democratic political nonns. % Weber's life work was an effort to understand the cultural sources of capitalistic rationalization. especially with the concept of growth and the reconstruction of experience and used both concepts to forge an integral link between the politics of democracy and the practice of education. 1980. with John Dewey's work. American Education (3 vols.95 Finally. Cremin. is his posthumous Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (2 vols. within Europe. The most accessible example is The Protestant Ethic and tile Spirit a/Capitalism (Peter Baehr and Gordon C.96 Lawrence A. Instead of concentrating on the concept of nationality. as distinct from the ancient or medieval.98 What the university will gain ill ple. 1988). exemplified by Max Weber's incessant investigation and by ntunerous post-Weberians trying to understand ''the great divergence" as Kenneth Pomeranz has recently put it. which could have significant effects on whether people identifY with and recognize the nation-state as the dominant center of political authority. 1999) is an excellent example of the way students of politics often look at education. and why.. Amy Gutmann's Democratic Education (princeton: Princeton University Press. Wells. 1970.. Guenther Roth and Claus Wit94 . 1916. in the modem period. Perhaps the most essential instantiation of this concern. trans.

1978). 97 tich.. a terrible twentieth-century degradation. W. and Ihe Making of the Modern World Economy by Kenneth Pomeranz (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990) are useful entry points. 1998) and The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress by Joel Moykr (New York: Oxford University Press. Norton & Co. A fuller account of these aspects of fonnative justice would look at the ways in which culhlrai resources and technological innovations interact in the fonnation of historical power -. as high technology and Midas wealth mingle with massive poverty in a world where the supply of resources shrinks rapidly relative to the demand. especially the very long second part (pp. not because cultural factors are primary in his explanatory efforts. unsolved question. The interplay of self-aggrandizement and the degradation of the other makes it imperative to achieve a dispassionate. eds.. 2000). which drew together all the strands of his historical sociology. Comprehending how the world appears to someone other than oneself is a fundrunental educational skill that is terribly strained as all the world's people . 97 The late Edward Said pointed out the deep proclivities to dehwnanize others by unconsciously aggrandizing the truth of one's own principles in OrientaJism (New York: Vintage. Berkeley: University of California Press. for many people misconstrue ideas developing conceptual differences and take the thought to signifY objective inferiorities and superiorities. Landes (New York: W. while that of one's enemies molds depraved beings. less than human. value-free understanding of how different systems of formative justice work in the present-day world. Arrogant power meshes with the belief that one's own civilization beneficently imparts fuB humanity to its members. Here are the roots of genocide. as globalism intersects with terrorism.What the university will gain 99 Such comparative inquiry into the formative power of an interacting cultural system is fraught with dangers.questions into which Ihe Weallh ofNalions: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor by David S. but to show how the question of the relative power of different historic civilizations remains an open. I refer to The Greal Divergence: China. 1979). It threatens to be a twenty-first-century scourge as well. Europe. 311-1374).

Making the heritage of reflection about Bi/dung in Gennan available in English would be a significant task for the academic study of education.100 What the university will gain Enough. Within the arts and sciences. cit. Philosophers on Education. it would need to deal with much more than the discussion of formative justice touched on here. 300·17. cd. but their current development and use are sparse. alas. although it leaves the topic still very esoteric.. but that. would be a fit enterprise. The historical record is rich in educational concepts. within the arts and sciences. (note 43). or even primarily educational. the claim goes beyond recognizing the value in developing the educational import of concepts such as fommtive justice in itself. op. Looking back on the historical record. we see that it provides a profuse heritage of concept formation. oue worth exerting significant effort to introduce. political. The educational dimension of concepts like fonnative justice has been of peripheral impOlt in schools of education. Wood is an excellent summation. pp. religious. ethical. Further. Disinterested fOlmation of educational concepts deserves serious academic study. The most difficult of all books about education. . among the timeliest. Rorty. See. the Bi/dung of tIle human mettle . Were this essay intended to present fully the opportunities for concept formation in education. the study of educational concepts. "Hegel on Education" by Allen W. social. in addition to the economic. The claim is not that inquiry about such concepts should become. even literary dimensions of the inquiry. but one of minor importance to the work of professional educators.Hegel's Phenomenology o/Spiritis. it should consistently have an educational dimension. It is a valuable heritage. such as fOImative justice. offering influential ideas for thinking critically about educational experience. The educational dimension of such ideas often constitutes the are being brought together in a Hegelian life-and-death struggle for mutual recognition. although it would be of central import were education a disinterested study in the ruts and sciences. exclusively an educational inquiry.

political theory. The university needs to recognize education as a field of academic study. It would help them. That step would relieve distorting pressures on schools of education. Each area itself would be substantial. in a small yet significant way. Clearly. whatever that would be. international relations. the contemporary university has not developed its intellectual organization fully. In doing so. to fill out and complete the arts and sciences with a group of scholars dedicated primarily to disinterested concept formation about education. as a body of autonomous inquiry in the arts and sciences.educational theory. the university needs to provide the differentiation characteristic in other fields for the study of education. is significantly reduced. diversified fields of study. American education. A department of education in the arts and sciences would strengthen and focus university scholarship on education. the university can take a . political science includes significant subdivisions . The academic study of education would as wen . To be sure. to concentrate more effectively on the instrumental goals essential to the work of professional education. there is no need to make education into a tightly unified discipline. contributions to such work take place in schools of education and the object would not be to empty it out of those institutions. however productive their separate contributions may be. comparative education. Basic forms of human activity generate broad. By including a department of education in the arts and sciences. The study of politics provides the closest analogue to the study of education. and the educational research establishment.What the university will gain lOl nexus relating all their other dimensions to each other. their ability to do justice to the theme. As a field. The need for the academic study of education is real. American politics. comparative politics. To complete development of it. dedicated to disinterested scholarship and teaching. With the nexus absent in the arts and sciences. cultural change. welcoming methodologically diverse contributions to the conceptual explanation and understanding of educational experience in its fullness. but.

honesty. recognition of complexity. are no ivory tower. might persuade academic leaders inside the university. 111at step would strengthen the university and enhance its hu- man wOlth. need strong. finally. Too the contrary: the absence in the university of education as an academic study contributes to the woes of our world.102 What the university will gain concrete step to develop its intellectual organization ruther. And this brings us to the close. With education in the university confined to the professional school. This creates a profound irresponsibility as prominent people ill other walks. Someone. and the media who shirk the responsibility to cultivate public principles through the fonnative effects of their actions. intelligent purpose. indeed everyone. generosity. somewhere must take a risk. and on. In fostering the disinterested study of education culminating in the formation of concepts such as formative justice. properly pursued and practiced. the negative and the positive responses building the case for education as an academic study. staking resources to change the given situation. The principles through which we live are not . commerce. blithely act as if they have none. The young. An absence of education as an academic study is not simply an intramural problem within the university. who should be caring for their educative effects. That risk devolves upon the university.the payoff will be real. with one last point .effort. fonnative examples across the full spectrum of action . confident humility. But what about the academic pail'ons and the public? Here the university must lead. the university would not be turning away from human experience and flesh and blood needs. in public discourse education has become synonymous with the work of schools. self-sacrifice. Instead. they get heedless leaders in politics. wisdom. The arts and sciences. Some concluding questions All this. courage. for ideas precede their payoff.

those b1ind to their duties would fmd it harder to pass as persons of probity. dismissing the complex temptations the young experience with the complacent cliche. That is how detached. as do the rapaciously overpaid. But to others. They exist only to the degree that we exemplifY them for each other and enable ourselves. So do political leaders who lie and deceive in the pursuit of power. Nevertheless. ''just say no. dependable realities. Close readers of Plato know that the concept of formative justice will not be toothless with respect to the important con8 cerns of social justice. each of whom is unique and different. were educational discussion to aS8 sume again its proper scope. impartial inquiry makes a difference in the world and that is why we need education as an academic study. our principles are not transcendent necessities that need no fonnative care. such destructive drives will not disappear." In that case. • Do parents commit a grave formative injustice when they bequeath to their children resources of wealth and power of such scope that life appears to present the chi1dren with no element of circumstantial risk or challenge? . Politics is not corrupt. empowering reflections that lead to ahered action. one has al8 ready persuaded oneself of the point. A putative leader cannot excuse deception on his behalf by saying that his guy must twist truth because the other guy's guy is worse. To some the questions will seem merely rhetorical . and then follow it up. scholars can put critical questions that they are unable at present to put with effect. concepts of fonnative justice and the questions put through them may pr08 voke searching inward inquiry.What the university will gain 103 given. to fonn and fulfill them. Dishonest corporate executives profoundly miseducate the public. our politicians are corrupting. they destroy the bonds of community. In thinking about formative justice."but of course. They are contingent. ever anew. etched in history." Greed and the lust for power are such strong motivations that even if we recover a public understanding of education. mutual trust among people.

now restated in a language newly learned. Let us do so by returning full-circle to the question with which my friend began. brought each to its full potential and put them all in relation to each other so that each serves its proper . and the methods of assessing aptitudes and achievements in use in the provision of formal education are most likely to enable students to develop their powers and purposes to achieve fulfillment in an uncertain world? • When teachers and schools fail to speak with conviction and meaning to the fonnative choices that each and every student must uniquely make. • Has the university. such that the least favored cannot possibly aspire to realize tJle capacities that the most favored can easily de- • velop. do they do justice in their work? • Respecting education and formative justice. should people reassert a politics of humane full employment? And so. and intergenerationa! time and how should they operate to prevent the excessive development of a geographic. the environment. diminishing the sum of accomplishments to be enjoyed by all? • Do principles of formative justice peltain on the level of global interactions. conunit a grave formative injustice. we end. hurting not only the least favored. and those between. but also the most. or generational component to oodermine the harmony and stability of the whole? • Can principles of formative justice show whether the curricula. the delivery of instruction.104 • What the university will gain Do proponents of a belief system commit a grave formative injustice when they set its adherents apalt from other people in such a way that they can no longer recognize the full humanity of those others? Does a society characterized by extremes of inequality. considering the powers and purposes of its parts. environment.

What the university will gain 105 business. fonning the whole to the fullness of its possibility? Is the university an exemplar of the fonnative justice for which it should stand? .

William G.. 91. 5. Dereck.27-9. 54 Bi/dung. 58 Aristotle. Bildungsroman. Saint. 86 25. 78 Adams. 57 Cavell. 83. 89 Aristotelian Principle. 59 Berliner. 75. 12 arete. Henry. 28.. 43 Chicago. 78 American Educational Research Association Berlin. Peter. 71. 42 Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought.44.92 Bacon. Theodor. Isaiah. Andrew. David C.87. Bailyn.50.16-9. 55. 61 Bowen. 32. Educational Studies.62. 87.61.100-2 Achilles.93. amour propre.65. Department of Education. 84 applied knowledge. 59 Barzun. 30 American Historical Association (AHA). 44-6 Beniger. 27 amour de soi. 27. 58. Arthur.55-6.57. 19 Bestor.62. Allan.46-53.31-2. Bernard. 78 Boucher. Athenian. 20. Katherine. 53 Agamemnon.3741. 30 academic. 23. 70 Boyd.71. 15- 8. 47. David.49-50. James. 95 Augustine of Hippo. 70 Boo. Francis. 156 Callan. 96-7 Adorno. Eamonn. 60.. 70 Bok.100-2 Athens. University of.. 76. James R.63. 58 Brown University. 30- (AERA). 61 Bowen. 54 Barber.34. 60. William.. 30. 34-7. Stanley. 38 clinical practice.60.39-42. Burton J. Benjamin R. 28 Bledstein.95 arts and sciences.Index Abbott. Jacques. 28 Bloom. 28-9. 7-12. 9-12. the. 100 Blau. 29 .

77-9.75. 5.100-[ continuing education. Degree.. 84 Goetzmann. 84.97-8 criticism. 19 discipline.52-3.86.30. 15.44. 104 Galileo. 60. [7. ETS. 75. 98 History ofEducation Quarterly.267. 99-100. 76. Geisteswissenschaften. 86 Epicurean.26-7.35 Cold War. 100 Heraclitus. 77- Dante Alighieri.94. 47 fonnal justice. 81 Gardner. 63. 98 Hadot. 45.98 DHthey.1?. Ralph Waldo.84. [00 Ed. 104 full employment. 20-[ educational research.47. J. 68· 9.8[-4. 18. 95 Columbia University.60-62. 43 Emile. lQ[ 88. the. 7 distributive justice. William Torrey. 73. [8-20.37. 15. 66.87.1O[ disinterested knowledge. 80 Educational Theory. 47-53 Crito.. Peter. 95. 86-8. 24.98. 48-9.95 doctorate. Jo[m. 913. 19 Harvard Graduate School of Education. 25.41. 83. Wilhelm. 74-5. 21. 77 Geist. Antonio. 24-25.68-70. 48. 7. 58. 6 [ Gutmann. 99.90. 20 Gramsci.33. 32 Hegel.62-3.54. 73-4 fonnativejustice.35-6. 84 Enlightenment.55-6. 66-7. 93. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 102-5 fulfillment. 23. Walter. 78.54-6. 76 Index Service. 60 Emerson. 9 Herodotus. 29..46 concept fonnation.80.60 Educational Testing . definition of. Begriffsbildung. 15. 42.23. 24-5 education. William H.9[.29-32. 92 Dewey. 94-6.D. 82-4. 91 Harris. 24-7. 77-8.71-3. 90-2.!O8 [. Gera[d L. 67. Pierre. 7 Cremin.. to. 92 Euhen. 53 Epictetus. 85 Gutek. 34 economics.62.71. 65-6. [9. Lawrence A. 37 Feinberg. 43.87. [00-2 distance learning.35-4[. Amy. [5-6. 48 Evans. Austin P. Howard.36.46.

35 Menand.49. 22. Kenneth M. 62 28. 17. 28. 46 interested knowledge. James L. 19 Levinson. 24. Hermann.79.. 33 M. 10. 60 Noddings. 80 Leser. 94 homo sapiens. 30. Paul.20 87 Iliad.58. 8 Nussbaum.B.36 Landes. Martha. 42.. Ivan.31. C. 61 King.84 Kelly. 31 perfectionism. John..A.82 McDonough. 33. Max. Degree. 54 Kuethe. 9-10. 7. 19-20. 47 overspecialization.60-1. . 33 J.. Jr. 48 Niemeyer. 26 Nehamas. 85 Kant. Degree. 20 Locke. 59 Macpherson. 109 Machiavel1i. Robbie. Kevin. Degree. Franz. 12. 8 National Center for Educational Statistics. Niccolb. 55. Hennann. 60. 28 M. David F. 44 ideal-type. 8. 42. 59-60 Hoffinann. 20 Kafka. B. Alexander. David S.42.Index Hobbes. Moykr. 49. Banesh. 61 Novick. Ellen Condliffe.56.D. James. 19 Nietzsche. 21 Journal of Philosophy. 19. Friedrich.62. Nicholas.47. 23 intellect. 17. Joel. Jose. 20 philosophy. 24 Jaeger.D.37. 20 Mind. Nel. Martin Luther. 25. Meira. 53 Hurka.77 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 97 MacIntyre. Werner..73. 23. 24.74-77.15.D. Louis.60. 78. 80 Homer. Thomas. 99 Lemann. Peter. 55 Labaree. The. 28. 59 McClintock. 22 Horkheimer. II. 43.27.43-4. Thomas. Immanuel. 85 Koerner. 58. 99 nanotechnology. Degree.56 Philosophical Quarterly. Alasdair. 20 Philosophical Review. 47 medical school. 65-6 interning. 91 Ortega y Gasset. 59-60 Ludmerer. 43. 7. 35 Lagemann. 78 11lich. 33 Plato.. 9 novum organum. 24. 43-4 Ph.

41-6. 61.52-3. 45.54. 53.81. H. 42. 99 scholarship.94-5.47-52. 19 Sen. 92. Karl R. 9-12.86-92. Roger. The.20. 13. 16 pre-Socratics.56-7. 92 pseudo-scholarship. 15. 58-60. 31-3. Pa1rick. 12 Putnam.7-9.35-8. Theda. 15.82. 15 Stoics. 9. 17. 17 Socrates.83. 7-10. 58 Rome..27-29. John. 41 skeptic.23.37. 94 research.76. 48. 88 Popper. 59 Skocpol. SkilUler. 95 Smith. 31 Riley. 24-5. . 60.69. 97 Rarty. 102 professionalism.29-30..110 Index 101 Richardson.72-3 Pomeranz. Amartya. Stoicism.25. 36. 91 Stanford University. Charies.48. 88.100-1 school of public policy. 623. Jean-Jacques. 28-33.56-58.78. F.29-37. 13 professional school. Kenneth. 86.2224.53-4. 76. 70. 9.103 Pocock.102 professional. 50. 58. Donald E. 18 Rousseau.45. 92 Stokes. 50. Virginia. 55-6.65.40-1..79. 5761. 60. J. 41. 55. 73-4. the. 15. 31. 7. 15. 59 Pogge. 42.17-20. 38 Said. 101 81.33-7. 28. A. G.35.84 Rupp. Quentin.87 Republic. 69. 12-3.95-6. 79-80. Robert D. Thomas W.47.26-7..55-6.61. 39. George. 9. 12 Taylor. 43. 75 Political Theory. Amelie Oksenberg.. 98-9 Pope. 57 school of business. 11 productivity. 95 Rawls. 43. 60 political thought. 62-3. 13 school of education. 85. 17. 41.88-93.. Alexander. 60. 90-1. 94. 75-6. 48-53.100 Ross.23-4.39.S pure Irnowledge.99. Dorothy. 57-8. C.103 Preparing Future Faculty Program.45. 39. 62-3. 13.623. 61 Teachers College. 13 Schwarz. Edward. 52 Protagoras. 59. 89 Schoninghs Sammlung Piidagogischer Schriften.308.65.27. 76 power.27. 61. 17-8.

52. Uriel.56 Thucydides. 38 university. 53 Wood. Allen W. 62-3. 25 Wills. C. 89 Walton. 23.49.Index Columbia University.. Garry. 11-2.27. C. 5. 15-6.47. 65.29. 56.7-9. 100 . 101-2. 104 Vaughan. 67. 55 Weber.41. 111 23-5. 70.37. 10.32.. 46.34-9. 15-7. John. 98 Weinreich. Max.54. 58 virtue.35.95 undergraduate.

a historian of educational and political thought. It explains the rationale for disinterested study of education. education has become synonymous with the work of schools. similar to those in political science. has worked extensively to integrate technology into education. "In public discourse. research. In this book. whichtdeals "not with public goods. independent of professional concerns. blithely act as if they have none. He shows how intellectual losses result and suggests what universities can do to correct the failing." He concludes. This creates a profound irresponsibility as prominent people in other walks. and Sue Ann Weinberg Professor in the Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Education." Universities can strengthen their leaderspip in education by providing opportunities at the graduate and undergraduate levels for the academic study of education through departments with important subfields. NY 10027_6696 9 . who should be caring for their educative effects. From long experience. He exemplifies the corrective through the concept of formative justice. ISBN 0-9763672-0-3 Laboratory jor Liberal Leorning 322 Thompson Hall (136) Teachers College. McClintock considers how the currently deficient arrangements for the study of education lead to serious weaknesses in civic leadership. Robbie McClintock. with eloquent concern. The Laboratory for Liberal Learning supports disinterested scholarship. and criticism about bow educational interactions bring natural potentials and nurtured achievements to fulfillment and thereby shape the quality of personal and public life. be asks a simple question about universities and identifies a flaw in their pursuit of knowledge about education. but with human potentials. Coilimbia University 525 West 120th Street New York.Homeless in the House oflntetlect invites creation of an academic department of education in the arts and science faculties of American universities. where he is now the John L. putting questions that we ought not to shirk. Columbia University. Robbie McClintock speaks to ·all engaged in educative effort. In 1967 be joined the faculty at Teachers College.

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