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APRIL 1942-MARCH 1945
25 November 1942
Colonel F. Barrows, Field Artillery
Editor, Review
Command and General Staff School
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Dear Barrows:
The courses of instruction now given by this School
have materiaU;;" enlarged its original mission. Today it
is the academic training school in the Army and
C0vers subjects which in time of peace were included in
the stUdies of the fonner Artny War College and the Arrrry
Industrial College. The foregoing, together with the in
creasingly large number of graduates returning to duty in
the Ground Forces, the Air Forces and the Services of Sup
ply both at home and overseas, make it necessary that the
scope of the MILITARY REVIEW reflect the changed mission
of the School and endeavor to serve all its graduates.
In keeping with the sources from which our students
are drawn, subject matter should be appropriately bal
anced to their re'luirements, particularly as regards
the Air Forces "nd the curront operation of the Services
of SUPi,ly in its sUP;Jort of the field forces - groun:i and
The articles and l'1at",rial presented in the MILlTl,HY
should be such as "ould assist prvspective stu:ients
as well as serve them after graduation. should
be placed on that materi"l which reflects our current stra
tegic operations, anticipatinJ such in tactical
and logistical aspects.
The high literary standard and r,uality of the
RLVLSW, toeether with its professional reputation, must be
maintained - regardless of cost.
Major General, U.S. Artny
Volume XXII Number 87
COLD>lEL F. 1\1 [lAUUU\\S, FirM .Irtillery _ EdItor
CAPTAIN ,JO-'I'.PIl Infantry Assistant Editor
LU:UTLXANT Dos E. (iHlBllLL, Field Assistant Edit or
January, 1943
THE CO).Ul.\.i\D ,\:\'D GE:":EHAL ST.\FF :\lII.l'L\RY RE\'IEW- Pubhshed quarterly by the Cd'rnmand and General Staff School at
Fort Leav(>ll\\orth. Kam,as Entl'red as s{'('onu-ci.lss matter .\ugust 3i. 1934. at the Post Office at Fort Kansas. under the Act of March

The editors Jeslre to cxpreos theIr thanks and apprecIation to those persons who have valuably aSSIsted in
the preparation of matenal for this issue. The work of contributors has been done in addition to their regular
dulles and gratUItously on theIr own [H'le, We are very grateful to the followipg officers for their generous
, .. ___________ TheAl'lI/o,'ed FOl'ce
MAJOR GE'lERAL JAMES A. JLIO _ __ _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ Srow of the Adillta1lt Gel/ernl'., Dcpctl'tmr1lt
BRIGAIlIER GENERAL C. W. WICKERSHAM ____ . __________ Th" School (It Milltn,'y Gor("'I/IlIC1It
COLONEL CHARLES R. BATHURST ____________ The "i1lfanll'y PlOl1ee/'''-Pmwcea o,'.Faliacy?
_" ___ _ Training Problems
___________ The Serr;ce" of SlIjlply Stuff' COIl1'8<'
__________________ O/Jicel'S(flld theSold{('/"., Me.",
LTEUTE:-';A::-';T COLONEL G. H. PALMER __ Jlilltrn'// ('nutl'o{ 01 ,Voll-Afilitu1'lj Siglin! COI11t1llfll1cotioll\
LIEUTENANT COLONEL IJllBERT E. THORNBER ___ . _____ Thr Tonk DestI'U]/l'IK oud Thcl1' {:KI
_______ Combat 111tclli!1f'lIc/:-' T1'I1loiJl!l ill Nell' Di1'isiolls
__ Tilt Plochenl Suic of lOllrf-.Hm"fw! Trials
_ Thl' Im}Jortuner of Rccot'l'1'Y (l}UZ Salvage)
CAPTAIN F. 0, (Czechoslovakian Army) __________ ,_ What Really is A,,'-COOllf1'((t;ou?
__ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _______________ _________ _
-- - -- - -- --
__________________ _
__________________________________ _
____________ _
\VHAT REALLY IS AIR-COOPERATIOr.-? ____________ _______ _
THE JAP }<'IGHTING MAN ______ . _______ _
GUt-MAl" DEt"ENSE IN THC E,\,"T ____ _
-fItAINING PROBLEMS ____ ____ . ________ ______ _

NIGHT OPERATIONS ________ __ _______ _ __________ _
THE BRITISII 25-POUNDER ____________________________ . _.
OFFICERS AND THE SOLDlE,R'S MESS __________________ _
_ _______________________ 67
S/I}Jply S(>ll'lce nil the TII1Idill Alollg thc Aleru: Oce{ln ______________________ 'i0
The rall/elflble AIlCJ(I/t CfIJrl(>1 _. ____________ __ ______ _ _________ .... _________ ________ .-0
Duftell! Tele/lhone 0111/ GCllna/( F,ollt _________________________ ___ .... _________ . __________ 71
H01f' thc City of }"/lhhllrlf' 11'({s Cfl/lfuled ____________________ ._______ __. _________ ________ '12
( 1 fish Tf'f'illIIQI((' _ ___ __ ___ ___ _ ____________________________ . ______ .... _________ .
Talll. Att(fcl. fill OC(,"I//{''' l',llngCf{ ________ _ __________________ _ ;4
Dn't/O}1l1IcJlt lit tIl(' Gill! _____________ . ________________ _
"lJ"""rr/ GI/'II{ld"'",, __________ _
. nll"t __________________ _
Till' FliRt Battl(' H'dh RUSSlUlI He01'Y T-J4 Tflllks _________________ _
{J'("J/I{lj/ [h/tlfS( /II !::1I('!Jt'll'Jl/Cld ______________________ _
A I',(/ctlcal J/"tllOd tnl T,OJIS/IUJII1iU ['ltell/lfntl{' !lnfts __________ _
Esfabllt'lhlllcuf 01 (I Dllflgchead ________________ L ________________ _
_De"itlltcfIHII pf Enem!} F,t/lit LiJ/(' by .-11111t101l _______________
Tank Aied ____________________ _
/.eade, Shill ut }'/O/I('('IS _______________________________ -- - - -
011 Whnt D(JcsSIf('('CRSDf1J('1I(1hi RUMdat __________________ _
A }'ollsh Snl'/H'I' lIlul .HIII!'1 Cowpony 111 ilctlO>I ____ _
['{II('tJlltIOli ____________________________________________ _
/'J,lt('(fln)J A!Jn11/s/ AI,-GO,II(, Tlno/ls _____________ _
{;('IOIUII DCJCIJ'HI'(' Rt'lJltol C('IIIf' II tR
}'lallIJlI/lj An Attllcl. Ag(/!J/si a 1'11lflUf> ________ _
O"(',COlIIlllg ,11111(' Ob!'ltacle,<? _________ ___ _ ____________ _
D( i( fIt of a Grllllfl1l ("'life, "f
Till L,tf of ,11 hIlI"!J }'/{'('(''<;
FfJlU'fllrl fill !lila//:' Off thr .lIaill R""f!' "f th, A, 111//
Tb,' ..1111'11 ('/1/11"lf'<I((lIf DCjI"t 11/ TIll" 11"u)
("III]lf J (11111/1 "/ 1/, U'(f/ _____
."01'1('( ".110" .1/"tlll Sjl(fiU'flrrffl ___
EI'I'I /<'1I,u'fll'(l _________ _
I', 11f{ lIlIes of .lIndf>' II __
-DI Aga!ll<?t .\'lyM All ROI'II-.
___ :::::_:::::----r::----:::::::::::::


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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - -
____ ._________
THE SECOND WORLD WAR _______________ _
nOOK REVIEWS ____ - - -
LIBRARY RULLETIt\ . _________________ .... __________________ _____ -
DIRhrTOR"i 01' PERIODIC ALS _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________________ _
CATALOG OF SELECTED PERIODlrAL ARTICLES __ ____ __ _ __ - - - - - - -- - -- - - -- - -- - - --- - - - - -
__ ____________________ '/5
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. ___ . _____________________ 94
: ___________________ 110
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__ Moll!}
_____________ liD
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_______ 125 -::.
_ ___________ UX
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Command and General Staff School
_ ___________ Commandant
('OLONEL C. SHALLENBERGER, III/lintI'll _____________________ Assistant Commandant
_ _ _ _ _ _ _: ___ Director, General Staff Course
COLONEL J. H.'VAN VLIET, l"jalltJy __ _ _______ Director, New Divisions Course
COLONEL W. A. PASHLEY, QI/{n teril/flNtl'I' Cm'IIN __ Director, Services of Supply Staff Course
LIEI'TENANT COLONEl. F. R. SWEENEY, C.A,C. _ _ ___ Director, Army Orientation Course
COLONEL D. C. SCHMAHL, Field Arlillfl'lI ____________ Secretary
Chiefs of Sections
COLONEL F. DEL. COMFORT, Cavalr!! ______________________________________ Administrative Section
LIEl!TENANT COLONEL F. E. GILLETTE, Infantry __________________________ G-l Section, Personnel
('OLO:-;EL B. M. LE!'WON, In/alltlY _______________________________ G-2 Section, Military Intelligence
COLONEL L. Il, COOK, In/,,"tl'Y ___________________________ G-3 Section, Operations and Training
COLONEL 'D. S. ELLERTHORPE, ('oast AItillNY Corps __ _____ ___ _ __ G-4 Section, Supply and Evacuation
COLO:-;EL S. T. SUTTON,lnfantl'll __________________________ Command Section, Infantry, Group "A"
COLONEL H. E. KELLY, In/antry _________________________ Command Section, Infantry, Group "B"
COLONEL W. L. ROBERTR, In/antry ____________________________ Command Section, Armored Forces
COLONEL J. M, DAVIES, Air CO>I'8 ____________________________ Command Section, Army Air Forces
COLONEL C. R. BATHURST, Corps of Enginee"s __________________________ Services of Supply Section
. ,
The Armored Force
By . I
Commanding General, Armored Forces
Contrary to common belief the American Armored
After World War I Tank Corps became inac
Force antedates the formation in 1940 of our present
tive; its units-separate !tank companies, battalions,
Armored Force. In World War I we had an Amer
and regiments-were made part of the infantry.
ican Tank Corps, consisting of tank battalions and
Later two cavalry regiments were formed into a
Figure 1. THE M4 TANK.
tank brigades equipped with French Renault tanks. mechanized brigade to which was attached a bat
This corps, formed in the infancy of tank warfare, talion of truck-drawn 75-mm field artillery howit
performed the duties well and covered itself with. zers. This brigade, together with the infantry tank
glory, but it no more resembled our modern well units and another infantry regiment, formed in 1940
balanced armored division than did its Renault tanks the nucleus of our present Armored Force.
resemble our fast, hard hitting, heavily gunned M4 The Armored Force combat units are organized
medium tanks, (See Figure 1.) into armored corps, armored divisions, tank groups.
and separate tank battalions. Tables of organization
are based upon simplidty, the American fighting
instinct and a careful study of the organization of
foreign armored units.
Tank groups consisting of a group headquarters
and three light or medium tank battalions are organ
ized for direct support of infantry, motorized and
FIgure 2.
ca\'alry divisions, They may be used to reinforce
armored divisions. Their misRion, however, is to
furnIsh a powerful armored reinforcement for other
troops. They are used by group or battalion but
must not be split into smaller units as the funda
mental of mass employment will be violated and in
effectual action may result.
The armored corps may consist of two or more
armored divisions and one or more motorized divi
sions, together with corps troops. It may act alone
01' in conjunction with other arms in highly mobile
warfare. It" greatest strategic use is employment
in enemy real' areas.
The armored division is the smallest armored unit
of the combined arms. It is tactically and adminis
tratively self contained. The division consists of
armored and infantry regiments; 105-mm Howitzer,
reconnaissance and armored engineer battalions;
service troops-medical, ordnance and supply; sig
nal personnel; attached observation aviation and
tank destroyers. It should have antiaircraft auto
matic weapons attached.
A rigid tactical organization has been found to be
defective in this war. Any organization must pro
vide flexibility to meet varying conditions of t.:>..rain
and the enemy situation, To provide for this f1.:>xi
bility, the division h.:>adquarters has two combat com
mand detachments, each commanded by " brigadier
general. Using thes.:> detachments for command pur
poses, task forces varying in strength and compo
sition to meet the particular situation are form.:>d.
Each such task force will normally contain recon
naissance, tank, infantry, artillery, and engineer
elements and will be supported by appropriate
maintenance and medical personnel. '
The armored division is organized for offensive.
warfare. Even on defense it must be used offensively
as a reserve for counterattacks. Its tanks ar.:> not
used as pill boxes, Such use fails to take advantage
of the characteristics of mobility.
The armored division operates by surprise, in
mass, against derisive objectives It must not be
split up into numerous small task forces as by such
action its full strength cannot be utilized against a
0 0
1i!::::!;"J lJ:Q]
Figure 3.
decisive objective. The division organization is bal
anced as to tanks, reconnaissance, artillery, infantry
and engineers. The detachment of any of these units
hy higher commanders may seriously interfer.. with
the division's operation.
Armored tactics consist of finding the enemy, lo
cating his weak spots, fixing him, and then hitting
with a mass of tanks supported by all available
weapons. We do not try to hit the enemy where he
is strong. Launching a tank attack alj'Qinst an enemy
strong in antitank defense is fatal. We find the weak
spot or we create the weak spot by use of infantry,
artillery, and air bombardment. The tanks then
~ T K C O
Figure 4.
rush through and complete the enemy's destruction.
Aftpl' closing \vith the enemy. tanks operate as do
infantry and cavalry. by tire and maneuver.
Combat commands usually attack in three echelons
each in a serieR of waves.
The first echelon consisting of tanks supported by
artillery and bombardment adation, has the mission
of destroying the enemy antitank guns and artillery.
It continues on and destroys communication centers
and supply installations.
Figure 5.
The second echelon consisting of tanks has the
mission of destroying hostile small caliber automatic
weapons, hoStile personnel, and antitank guns passed
over by the first echelon. This echelon is prepared
to protect the first echelon from a fiank attack and
to take over the mission of that echelon shonld it be
Fig-ure 6
come so deployed as to be unable to continue effective
The third echelon of attack consists of infantry
,and tanks. It completes the enemy's destruction,
Reizes ground, and protects flanks and rear.
The armored infantry supported by artillery, air
bOlDbardment. and engineers may attack first to re
move obstacles, as mine fields, or seize ground
[rom which the tanks may attack. After completion
of this mission it is passed through by the first and
.cond echelons of attack and joinR the third echelon.
(See Figllre 2.)
The form of attack favored by armored units is
the envelopment, either single Or double. The in
falltry supported by tanks and artillery makes the
frontal attack to fix the enemy while tank units
supported by artillery and bombardment aviation
el1yelop one or both flanks. Reconnaissance units
may keep contact with the enemy's front while the
,.:ntire combat command maluC's an envelopment._
Again the entire infantry regiment may make a
frontal attack while tank units attack from the
flank. The particular combination to use will vary
with the terrain, the enemy situation, and the
mission. (See Figure 3.)
When hostile flanks are not open, a soft spot is
sought and struck with a mass of tanks. Flanks
created are rolled up and objectives in rear taken.
(See Figures 4 and 5.)
In defense as part of a larger unit, the armored
division is held intact as a reserve. It should not be
divided into numerous small task forces but should
be used as a highly mobile striking force to counter
attack, either to eject an enemy who has succeeded in
penetrating our position or to attack while the enemy
is forming for an attack. It may be used, if the en
emy has made faulty dispositions, for a wide counter
attack deep into the enemy rear.
When acting alone on defense the armored division
defends with its infantry occupying the main line
of resistance and its tanks used as a mobile reserve.
In defense, the armored division may be used to
strike the enemy while he is forming for an attack.
(See Figure 6,)
The di vision may be used to eject the enemy from
our position. (See Figure 6.)
What Really Is Air-Cooperation
CAPTAIN F. O. 1I11KscHE, Czechoslovak Army
(A uthor of A ttflck)
After the fif5t world war the great impetus to the
organizational development of air fleets was gIven
by the Italian general. Douhet. In his own gener
ation his influence was everywhere marked. and in
Germany the' Supreme Commander of the Air Force,
Goering. was among his most enthusiastic followers.
If we look at Douhet's ideas through the spectacles
of the present and dig deeply into their true content
we cannot but see that his forecasts belong to the
future as he saw it and not the future as we see it
no\\. lie based his opinions on the experiences of
the first World War without taking into proper ac
count the future development of the ground forces
of the army. "FIre power makes every maneuver
on land impossible. But since the military decision
in a combat is impossible without there
fore it will be the ail' arm which will take over the
offenSIve role in modern war, leaving to the land arm
the defense of the national terl'ltory." Douhet fur
ther believed that the modern air arm could itself
force a decision. He did not see that it was only the
means whereby with its support the land arm could
force such a decision'. Seversky's book. boasted up
by propagandists, is really nothing else but a new
edition of Douhet's ideas and thus represents a very
extreme tendency: to underestimate any weapon is
as dangerous as to over-estimate it.
In many countries right down to the present day
people have been wedded to the Douhet idea to a
greater or less extent. In Germany, however, it re
sulted in bitter disputes. Goering's conceptions lost
ground more and more. Step by step his air fleets
were absorbed by the army. He himself was left only
with the title of "Field Marshal of the Luftwaffe,"
as a result of which today he holds the office of a
control organ, the National Socialist German Work
er's Party (:-';.S.D.A.P.), in the Luftwaffe and air
craft industry rather than the role of chief field
officer of the air.
One of the first opponents of Goering waS the
former Cbmmander in Chief, General Baron von
Fritsch. who during the first world war served as
General Staff Officer in the Flying Corps, and there
fore was not lacking in experience. "The functions
of the Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe become
more and more fictitious ... the Luftwaffe does
not constitute a separate formation, but comes di
rectiy under the army with which it constitutes a
compact whole" said Fritsch; and Ludendorff in his
Total War adds the following: "No general should
imagine that the bombarding of towns brings vic
tory ... war is a reality and no theory. Victory
will be gained by armies assisted by the'air arm."
(1935). 0 I
In these years of development both Fritsch and
Ludendorff contemplated an air fleet which was in
deed under the High Command but nevertheless
WB\'ked in two parts: "the great operational air fleets
which were to be the strategic striking arm in the air
battle and the cooperating air forces which were to
constitute a tactical unity with the ground forces. A
new stage of development III the Luftwaffe ensued in
the years 1936 to 1938. "The German air arm collect
ed from Spain a very rich harvest of experience
which profoundly influenced their future develop
ment" said the inspector of the Germl;ln Luftwaffe,
General Milch, in the Essene,. Nationakeitunu of 21.
V. 1941. The three commanders of the Condor Le
gion, Generals Sperrle, Volkmann and Ritchofell,
came back with new ideas. They had seen with their
own eyes the enormous influence of the air arm on the
land battle and recognized in it the most potent in
strument for a war of movement: one of the two ele
ments (the other being the armored vehicle) which
could unfreeze the stationary battle fronts of 1914
1918. In the new reorganization the idea of a sepa
rate cooperating air force receded more and more
into the background. There was now only one goal:
to organize everything for the support of the army.
In this sense Generals Sperrle and Kesselring co
operated in May 1940 with Army Group A of Field
Marshal von Rundstedt at Sedan and again with
Army Group B of Field Marshal von Bock in Holland
and Belgium. But this did not hinder Sperrle from
organizing in the winter months of 1940-1941 the
drastic bombardment of Coventry and London with
this same air fleet, as we in our persons felt it."'
In the tactical sphere, by reason of the air arm, the
modern battle is no longer confined to a line or zone.
The air ann ha. added a thi"d dimension, so that the
battle nou' must be jouyht in a cubic spoce. Only a
c01nmnudpl' who can think and act thtee-dimel1sional
Iy calf s"eceed ;" tillS battle. In strategic air hattles
as well as in tactical air fights the air force must de
pend entirely on itself. Irrespective of whether the
task of an aIrcraft is defensive or offensive, it can
act only in movement. This movement results in a
constant swinging of air battles through vast air.
spaces. Another feature is the shortness of the air
tight itself. Over the battlefield bombers become
useless as soon as they have discharged their load of
bombs. Fighter engagements last only a few minutes
and their action is restricted further by their limited
fighting range. Reconnaissance 4ircraft, however,
are operating as long as they are actually in the ail'
above the area of the battlefield. For these reasons
the air battle consists of innumerable individual en
gagements. This must be emphasized because the
tactical consequences of single air fights. though each
by itself appears insignificant, may be of the utmost
importance within the framework of a major oper
ation. It is therefore only possible to understand the
significance of single engagements when they are
viewed as part of the total performance of a large
air force unit, perhaps a division. The immediate
bearing of this on the matter in hand is that the snp
port air fleet involved in a land battle must be put
into action in successive waves; and before their
task is finished, the number of aircraft may be in
creased to thousands. Thus the number of aircraft
put into the battle of Crete may be estimated at about
1,600. It is mathematically demonstrable that a sup
port air fleet of 1,500 machines cannot mllintain over
the battle field more than about 150 machines, and
*\Vhat a bitter l'efiectlOll It IS for us today, after three
yeals of war, to read from the pen of :Flight-General Quade
in the 1941 yembook of the German Luftwaffe the follow
ing: "The enemy might have seen from the campaigns of the
past the pregnant results of full cooperatIOn het\wE'n the
army and the all' force In a tnQdpl'n war, But he has not done
50 because he neither ('auld nor would"; or agam to read in
the same publIcatIon another quotation from Colonel Claes.
a specIahst In signalling: "the aircraft of the >nemy fly about
over the field of battle, when they should be
with the ground forces. Our opponents often have no Idea
where theIr ail' formatlons are located, and when they get
mformation, It is already too late. Everywhere they arrive
too late."
this does not take into account losses in air fighting
or the repair of damaged aircraft.
It goes without saying that the high demands made
on the ail' arm in a ground operation are only within
the capacity of a support air fleet which in organiza
tion and tactical employment is most carefully co
ordinated with the ground forces. It must therefore
be conceded that an air arm constructed purely for
long-range bombing is hardly in a position to cooper
ate successfully in a major operation. The bombard
ment of towns such as Essen and Cologne (as also.
in their turn, London and Coventry) requires from
the air staff, flying personnel and signalling service,
in respect to organization and training, other de
side/'ata which are in principle simpler than those re
quired in close cooperative action with ground forces.
One might say. mdeed. that for the latter type of
work a higher grade of tactical required;
and if this be so. 11 will l1e a rJ.ifficult molter tn ad
ranee {1'om a iOlCt'l to a hiuhel' /unctwn. For. while
a watchmaker (if he has the strength) can easily
wield a sledge-hammer. it is impossible for a black
smith to execute the delicate work of a watchmaker.
Beyond this is the danger of "putting all our eggs in
one basket"-of staking all our prospects of success
on one chance: that the bombing of cities will prove
decisive. .
I may develop my central POInt in general terms
thus :--The effectiye use of weapons in the battle is
conditional upon their combination in a correct or
ganization. This organization must pay regard
above all things to the techlllcal characteristics of
the armament in quef.tion: this means to their in
fluence on the battle itself and to the way in which
the different parts of the total armament can, during
the actual fighting, mutually supplement and com
plete each other. IThis is the basis of all true tactical
handling. Consequently, the form of organization
must be flexible enough to be adapted to the changing
p h a ~ e s of the battle, now to attack and now to de
fense. The secret of an effective tactical "set-up"
lies In the orderly combination of different weapon
capacities. An armored dh'ision comprises different
types of tanks whose functions supplement and com
plete not only each other but the other arms as well.
and the same principle applies to the organization of
the air force. Only that air force which is composed
uf mixed units \\bose organizational structure runs
parallel with that of the army is suited for coopera
tion with ground forces. Only so in the battle can the
armament and other characteristics of different
types of aircraft be exploited to the full, as between
themselves and as between them and the ground
forces. Hence my conclusion that an air force in
which a sharp division is drawn between fighter and
bomber commands can never lend to the ground
forces that total dynamic support which is necessary
to victory in a model'll battle. Moreover such an or
ganization is a hindrance to proper cooperation be
tween the main component elements of the_air force
The successful conduct of the combined operation
is contingent upon accnrate timing and meticulous
attention to detail and on the preliminary prepara
tion. In view of the great speed of modern war
machines on the ground and in the air, thought and
execution are all but simultaneous. Information,
decision and action have become units in time. Tac
tical and operational decisions have to be made fre
qnently and quickly, often in a matter of minutes.
\\Thoever is in command of a combined ground oper
ation will need to be conversant both with ground
and aerial warfare. lie in tum must rely on the
experts of the support air fleet as far as their own
very specialized work goes, share with them the re
sponsibility: that is. that the air force must be subor
dinated to the land force. the more as the faster ele
ments in the air have to adapt themselves to the
slower ones on land. Given all these qualities the
performance of an operation will resemble that of
an orchestra. The conductor is the commander of
the ground forces. and all the instruments come in at
the right moment and with the right strength so as
to produce a real halmony.
True coordination is conditional upon a unified
control which implies subordination. In this country
(England-Ed.) the problem of coordination has
been approached differently. The three branches of
the figQting forces enjoy an apparently large meas
ure of autonomy. and they stand in reciprocal rela
tions which are better expressed by "association"
than by "subordmation." Sound logic fights shy of
any such solution. Such forms of organization make
it very difficult to demarcate clearly powers and re
oponsibilities. This further may lead to unsound
compromises between the different branches of the
fighting forces which will have unfavorable repercus
sions during the operation. The battle itself presents
the leadership with a great variety of situations
which cannot all be foreseen in detail. Hence the
necessity of a unified command which at the crucial
moment will have at its disposal all hranches of the
fighting forces and handle them as the situation
For the purposes of this article I have in mind the
organization of an air army corps which typically
may be taken to be composed thus:
'1. Flukier Divimol1.
One Fighter Gronp. Second Fighter Group.
One Reconn'lissance Wing.
II. Bombe1' Divisiun.
One Bomber Group. Second Bomber Gronp.
Third Bomber Group.
One Reconnaissance Wing.
II I. Bombe>' Divis1On.
One Bomber Group. Second Bomber Group.
Third Bomber Group.
One Reconnaissance Wing.
IV. Bomber Division.
One Bomber Group. Second Bomber Group.
Third Bomber Group.
On(' Reconnaissance Wing.
Group, 3 Wings. Wing, 36 Machines. (3 Squadrons).
Composition of Army Corps.
Fighters: MO Bombers: 972
Reconnaissance Planes: 144
TOTAL: 1,656
In offensive operations the task of such an air
army corps is the creation of a "Luftschwerpunkt"
(air-thrust point) in the air space of the region
where the ground operation takes place. But even
the largest air support fleet will only be able to inter
vene successfully in the ground fighting if its units
are systematically put into action at the right mo
ment against the right targets In a highly concen
trated strength. In discussing the tactical employ
ment of such an air corps it is necessary to distin
guish between its three main parts:
1. distant support air forces
2. close support air forces
3. reserve air forces
Let us suppose that the distant support air forces
consist of one fighter and one bomber division. Nor
mally it may happen that several land army corps are
supported by one common distant support air fleet.
But when the Army Air Corps has only to cooperate
with one Land Army Air Corps put into action in the
"focus" of the land battle, the 3rd (Bomber) Divi
,i-ln would form the close support air force, and the
4th (Bomber) Division would be kept as a reserve
to reinforce either the distant support or tbe close
support forces in accordance with requirements as
the action develops.
Deep tbrusts cannot be launched successfully
against the enemy's rear unless tbe attacker through
out the operation can rely fully on support from tbe
air arm. If this condition is not fulfilled any initial
advantage that they gain mny be turned quickly into
decisive failure. Hence: air supremacy is the key to
the modern battle and must be gained not only to
hamper or prevent enemy movements in the air but
ground movements also, since these cannot be con
ducted successfully until mastery of the air has been
achieved. Ai1' supremacy i.<; gained either in the ail'
by lillhtinll 01 by dc,11 oymg enemy (Ii>'emft on the
"round (/l1d usually by a comb11ll1tio11 of both these
lIlethods. The fighter dwision of the distant suppod
units t>,ps to rieteot the fighter defense of the enemy
and thus C}""ote thp necessary for bombinu
of g1'Ound targets.
The bomber division of the distant support air
force in particular tries to gain supremacy by de
stroying enemy AA batteries and aircraft on the
ground. It bombs aerodromes in order to pin down a
large part of the enemy's air forces. The distant
support bombers too turn their attention to ground
force reserves and other important targets such as
traffic installations, bridges. crossroads, railway
stations, etc. In this way they try to disorganize the
defensive measures of the enemy. < All these actions
tend to delay for as long as possible a clash between
the attacker's and the ground reserves or
air forces and thus enable the former,to execute his
tbrust easily.
In ',eneral the air force will act against two kinds
of targets:
a. against targets located by air and ground re
connaissance or other reconnaissance services
-prior to the launching of the action.
b. against unforeseen targets: viz" those whicb
are only discovered during tbe course of tbe
This is why i long-range reconnaissance has the
task of keeping a constant check on enemy move
ments, of drawing the attention of the distant sup
port bombers to these movements or to the otber
targets and of warning their own ground forces of
any special It goes without saying that
there must be a highly developed and well-timed
cooperation between reconnaissance, bomber units
and army units.
The distant support air forces .. which I have dis
cussed, influence indirectly the action of the army.
Theil' movements must be directed by the air force
staff stationed at one of the departure aerodromes
(at the main base), but they must furtber establish
contact with advanced report centers of the land
army corps and divisions. In this way the activities
of the distant support all' forces will be coordinated
not only with the main headquarters of the ground
forces but also with the units of the close support air
The second part of the ail' forces working with tbe
army is the close Sll]J]JO)t air forces. These cooperate
directly witb the troops on the ground and their ac
tion must' form an intimate unity with that of the
army. The close suppm't ail' farce consists mainly of
dIN' bomber and reconnaissance units which inter
\ ene in the development of the ground fighting by
bombing with HE or smoke bombs, machine-gun fire,
The close support air force bombers for their part
will further bomb both foreseen and unforeseen
targets. By careful reconnaissance before tbe ac
tion, fortifications, gun positions, reserve positions at
the landing head, etc., wiII be known in advance. But
many of the targets will only appear during tbe com
bat ltself, and to deal with these unforeseen target.;
it is necessary to have a number of bombers available
over the operational area.
During the whole, combat troops will be accom
panied hy close support bombers which assist them
in tbeir fighting. To fulfill their tasks efficiently
they must keep in constant touch with the ground
forces by means of air force liaison detachments at
tached to the latter. Tbey will then be able imme
diately to pass on recent information gathered by air
observation concerning the defender's position 'lnd
his movements. Of course close support bomberS.
to avoid endangering their own troops, must observ.,
a proper safety margin.
In contrast with the long-range reconnaissance of
tbe distant support air forces that of the close ,up
port units is conducted mainly over the area of actual
ground fighting. They will watch the enemy's ac
tivity as well as the fighting action of theIr ,IWll
troops and will pass on all observations to the report
centers of the ground forces. In this way they wiII
help in the coordination of the individual efforts.
They will inform the troops of details regarding the
enemy's positIOn and in addition maintain contact
with ground forces which have lost touch with neigh
boring units or are fighting in complete isolation. In
ouch cases they call establish communications he
tween the fighting units and the brigade or divisional
headquarters and thuo replace or supplement techni
cal communications (wireless) in cases where
are entirely lacking or not in full working ordel. The
Germans use for this purpose special aircraft termel'l
"report aircraft."
In principle, wireless communication between'air
and ground forces goes to division or brigade. Small
er tactical units such as battalions and companies
maintain contact with their supporting air force
units by ground strips and flash signals. When
ground strips are paid out in different patterns it is
possible thus to transmit brief messages. Such mes
sages will relate principally to the following:
((. the location of the different command posts.
U. information a' to the situation as for example
"we are surrounded," "we hold a line here," and so
t. request for news about the position of the
d. request for air support, while giving at the same
time to the air forces the enemy's position.
e. request for munitions, food and such-like.
Summary news of a limited nature can also be
given by light signals using different combinations
of colors. Visual contact from aircraft to ground is,
however. a more difficult matter. Here only colored
rockets can be employed, but alternatively pilots may
drop from the aircraft written instructions packed
in small containers.
Ohviously effective cooperation between air and
land is only possible when the flying personnel thinks
not only in terms of air fighting but also in terms of
land force tactics. This demands a double IrainiIw.
Yet only so can the pilots put themselves in the PObI
tion of the land force and thus draw from their air
observation the necessary to correct and
speedy action. A nd, vice versa, the soldier on land
must understand fully the air arm so that he may
know how and when the air arm can render its in
dispensable help.
To sum up: everything must work like clockwork.
The movements of the flying units must be synchro
nized with those of the ground units as far down as
battalion headquarters. This inter alia necessitates
a finely adjusted signalling service, which must main
tain communication with the air bases in order to
organize contact between all ground forces con
cerned. This organization is entirely different from
the one required for long-range bombing: that is, it
needs a higher degree of flexibility. Only when these
conditions are fulfilled does it become possible to ex
ploit successfully on land a position prepared by the
air force or to exploit in the air a situation developed
by the forces on land. By complementary action of
this type conducted according to plan, by going thus
into action at the right moment in sufficient strength
against the right objective, the two efforts, that of
the air and that of the ground, will achieve their de
CIsive effect.
There is no such thing as a good regiment and a bad regiment, but
there is such a thing as a good colonel and a bad colonel.
Very Simple--But You
Have to Have the Idea!
What does the German do. when
he hits a swamp during the march?
Step by step they go over tougb, sltcky swampland.
The's\\amp-walker" keeps them from ever smkmg
do\'vn. and man by man they reach solid ground on the
other side as ordered The woven shoE'S are fastened
hke skis. except that the fast('fimg IS slmphfied by using
wire. gtl'addle-Iegged. the pioneers conquer marshy
terrain "Ith the "-From SlgnaL
If rOY Go to Fort LeaveJlworth
. .
The General Staff Course
The miSSion of the Command and General Staff
School is to prepare selected officers of all compo
nents of the Army of the United States for command,
general staff, and executive duties. The School serves
the Ground and Ai!Forces, the Services of Supply,
and, as directed, th defense commands and theaters
~ f operations.
The opportunity to ttend the Command and Gen
eral Staff School therefore marks a turning point in
your military career. It is a priYilege nnt to be ac
cepted lightly, as it may well shape your future iu
the military service. '
The initial training objective is to ground all stu
dents in the general aspects of the United States at
war and its military organization as correlated in the
national war effort; the operation of field forces
ground and air-and the problems of supply and
administration are depicted to the extent necessary
to constitute a foundation for specific instruction.
Current operations will be presented as a matter of
general mtel'Cst.
Tbe ultimate training objective is attained by fur
nishing in&truction in basic staff pnnciples
Ized training in the work of each of the foul' general
staff sections, and applicator;, group work, depending
UPOll the source or destl11atioll of each student, ill
exerci:sE's involving armored. motorized. airborne. or
mfantry diVisions. or all' force fighter. hamuer, sup
port and service commands, and antiaircraft defenst'.
all as parts of task forces 111 combined operations.
The doctrines taught are based on the orders,
training regulations, and manuals isslled by the War
Department. ''file influence of the development of
new instruments of war Is emphasized to the extent
warranted by established facts.
The pace of the COllrse is fast; lIlstruction IS neces
sarily concentrated. In nim' \\eeks you will cover
a lot of ground However. you will find It not too
difficult if YOll come prepared to apply yourself ener
The School makes no aHfmmptions as to your mili
tary background; the course is complete. Howe\'er,
many students find it difficult to do their best work
because they are struggling in a welter of unfamiliar
terms, working with unfamiliar units. using un
familiar tools.
If :;'ou want to do your best at Leavenworth, make
certain that you won't be slo\\Od down by unfamil
iarity with your tools. For instance:
Leal''' to Read a Map.-Almost every problem at
the School is based on a map. Until you are thor
oughly familiar with reading a map, until you' can
itlance at one and picture the terrain, the streams and
the ridges, the roads and railroads, and the distances,
you will be working under a handicap. It is not
enough to be able to interpret conventional symbols
one by one; the whole map must stand ont as a com
plete picture of the ground. Many of the school
problems are based on foreign maps. For instance,
you will have problems in the tactical operation of
troops of all arms, both ground and air, in locations
not anI,) in many parts of this country but in Eng
land, Ireland, France, Africa, and the S.W. Pacific.
KilOII' the Conl'elltiollal iI1ilztm'y Symbols.-FM
21-30, CO'lrentional SIgns, Militm-y Symbols, and
Allbl'evatw11s, contains a list of the basic military
symbols. They should be as familiar to you as the
alphahet. In particular learn the method of desig
nating various echelons (platoon, company, bat
talion, regiment, division, etc.) and the basic arms
and services (infantry, engineers, cavalry, etc.).
These are tools you will use constantly.
KIIOII' tht Milltal'Y Abbl'n'iations.-Mllitnry ab
breviations listed in FM 21-30 are specified for all
field orders, and no other abbrevations are author
Ized. Leal'l1 to write the specified abbreviations ac
curately and with facility, sO that your work will not
be slowed by the mechanics of using them. In par
ticular, learn the abbreviations for the various arms
and service:-o and thE' various echelons of command.
.1[,,/'-c " Preli11linury Study of BoslC Texts.-Only
approved War Department doctrine is taught at
Cea\enworth This doctrille is set forth in the vari
OUq field' manuals. Familiarity with these texts will
pay rich di\'idends during your stay at the Command
and General Staff School. As a minimum you should
review or study FM toO-5, Field Se"v;ce Regulatio" .. ,
,hapters 1, 2, and 4, and preferably the first eight
chapters. Agam as a minimum. you should be fa
milial' with the content of FM 101-5, The Staff and
C011l1)((t O,riOS, to which you will have occasion to
refer constantly throughout the course. Familiarity
With the FM's in the 30 series is desirable.
K11011' the P, IIlC1J11es of 0I'ganizntion.-Most units
are similar in organization regardless of branch, A
clear conception of the framework of organization is
a necessity; the relative strength of companies, bat
talions, regiments, divisions, corps, and armies and
their relation to each other must be thoroughly nn
den,tood. Details of organization will be covered in
the course, but a conception of the general natnre of
the varIOUS type units is necessary to intelligent ab
sorption of other instruction.
You will find that the' preliminary preparation
suggested above will ease your burden as a student,
and will enable you to devote your best thought to the
solution of the problems presented, withput getting
bogged down by the mechanics. '
So much for your mental tools. As to the physical
tools, everything necessary may be procured at the
Command and General Staff School Book Depart
ment except a study lamp, which should be brought
by the student. You can save expense by bringing
your own colored pencils, map measurers, scales, and
notebooks. You will require exercise; so bring such
athletic paraphernalia and appropriate clothing as
you desire. A golf course is available during clement
But above all, bring with you an alert mind and a
desire to learn. If you come thus equipped, you will
leave equipped for bigger .Jobs and greater responsi
The Services, of Supply Staff Course
Elsewhere in this issue of the Military Review
there is an articlp explaining the and extent
of the Services of Supply Staff Course at the Com
mand and General Staff School. For the prospective
student assigned to the SOSS Course, this article
should be protltable reading. It will giw him a fairly
complete estimate of the situation he will encounter
when he comes to Leavenworth.
The mission of the Services of Supply Staff Course
is the training of officers for duty on supply and
administrative staffs of the Services of Supply,
service commands. and for similar duties within the
theaters of operation.
The subject matter of the course, as will be seen
readily, is comprehenSIve and tbe presentation moves
in high gear. During the initial weeks of the course,
when organization is under scrutiny, the student
must grasp and retain information on many separate
and, at the presented, unrelated subjects whose
application will not become apparent until later.
Consequently, the student must strip his mental
equipment of all unnecessary impedimenta and leave
it free to absorb and keep in orderly accessibility all
the principles which are being given to him for fu
ture use. Worries should not be brought along.
Clear thinkmg heads the list of requirements for
success in the SOSS Course.
Time and space factors are paramount consider
ations. There is a vast amount of work to be covered
in nine weeks. Into that period is crowded a total of
hours of conferences, exercises. map exercises
and map maneuvers. Study assignments will require
an average of three hours of work nightly. The stu
dent should come to Leavenworth determined to
budget his time to obtain the maximum results from
each minute spent in class or study.
On the side of physical fitness, the prospective stu
dent should assure himself in advance that he is able
to "take it." If his eyes need attention, they should in advance. If glasses are indicated, they
should be acquired. A spare pair is good insurance
against accident. An adequate desk reading lamp
should be procured and brought' along: A green eye
shade is a big help. Foresight may save eyesight.
In order that prospective students may derive the
most benefit from the course, it IS suggested that
familiarize themselves with the following as a mini
mum of fundamentals. In fact, no officer should at
tend this School without that much background:
FM 100-10 Field SCI' nee RegulatlOns-Adminis
tration. Be familiar with its organization and where
to look in it for pertinent materiaL
FM 100-5 Field Service Rellulations-Operations.
Review the fundamental doctrines of combat oper
ations and the organization and characteristics of
the various arms.
FM 101-5 Staff Officers Field Mallua/,-The Staff'.
Get acquainted with the staff sections and their
Service Command Staff O"lIanizatioll and Func
tions. Know what the staff divisions do and what
means they use. A chart of your own Service Com
mand headquarters will help;
FM f!1-25 Elementary Map and Ae"ial Photo Read
inll. Be sure you know how to read a map and can
interpret an aerial pboto. Along with this study,
familiarize yourself with basic military symbols.
They are contained in FM 21-30 Conventional Silins,
Military Symbols and Abb,eriations. You will have
constant need for this knowledge and this prepara
tion should take high priority.
Thus armed and equipped-with a clear head,
with a realization of the value of budgeted time, with
his mind refreshed by review of the fundamentals of
the subjects he faces and with the physical aids he
requires-the student may approach his nine weeks'
main effort in the SOSS tourse wjthout fear, and
when it is all over, without reproach.
Scope of Adjutant General's Department
The Adjutant General of the Army
The tntssion of the Adjutant General
has been very llttle altered SInce the office
was created by the Contine-utal Congress
in June, 1775. He is the AdJtunistI'ative
ExecutIve of the War Department
('harged WIth writing orde,'s, keepmg
records. conductmg correspondence and
perfornung sueh othn tasks as may be
necessary to supervise the Army's ad
But In the miscellaneous variety of
those "other task:.;;," close re-sE'lllblance'
fades between ('unent actiVIties and what
must have been the comparatively un
troubled existence of HoratIO Gates, who
first held the title. Long ago the Adju
tant General became a multJple person
ality WIth a department called m hIS
name. The Adjutant General's Office
known to every officer and enlIsted man
as "the AGO"-now supervises a vast
numbf'1' of operatlOns, many undeveloped
even as recently as the first World War
Some of these ale new actIVIties, such
as the AdJutant General's Schools Some
are extenSIOns 1)f already estabhshed
functIOns such as the sy::.tem of Clac;sl
fi('utlOn, whIch dates from 1917 but has
been greatly I('fined durmg the last t\.. o
years to sort accurately the &pecial skIlls
reqUlrf'd by modern war. SUll othel' ac
tivities represent notable advances In
efficiency such as the adoptIOn of
machmes to post the Army's records and
tabulate Its strength.
The of the Army
Postal Sf'rIlICe, tne mcreaSIng' Use of
miciofilm for conserVIng space devoted to
l'Pcords, thp admmistratIOn of the Allow
ance and Allotment Act, the round-the
clock operatIOn of the Reproduction
Branch-these are other duties un
urenmpd of III Horatio Gates' philosophy.
Their demand::., almost as much as the
simple multIplicatIOn of actIOns reqUIred
by the Increase of our Army from fewf'r
than 200,000 to spveral millIon men In
less than two years, have rt"qUlred a vast
enlargement in thl? scope and volume of
work which the Adjutant General's Office
Because the very {'omplexity of today's
operatIOns calls for the highest degree of
efficiency, the whole structure of the AGO
was recrntIy restudied and lcvlseu_ Al
though the details of thIS streamlining
process are of httle mterest beyond the
personnel of the department itself, theIr
effects have already made themselves felt
throughout the Army. Thpre have even
been hopeful whispers that we are bent
on a VIgorous reductiOn III army paper
work and that in the futule we shall pro
Vide fewer bundles of records to be tied
up With the G L red tape which Adju
tants General are accused of weaving
mto Intricate puzzlps for the Army to
1 can assure the Army solemnly that
reduction is mdeed the intent. 1 can go
fUl ther and state that the bct will be
come mcreasmgly apparent as succeed
Ing ref01 ms of method and functIOnIng
ale put mto effect But I can also assure
mIlItary personnel thAt no matter how
much It may be slmphfied, administration
will always seem arduous and
ally complex without a clear
untier'>tandmg of Its nature and purpose.
In the Army, administratIOn is a func
tIOn of command It has two objectives.
ThE' primary one IS success in battle; the
concel'ns matters not directly
I"plated to eombaL UnIty of command
anti henc(> UnIty and unifornuty in ad
nllmshation fl0m the War Department
to the squad, cannot be destroyed Without
Ilskmg- the destructIOn of the army
It IS an utter misconception of the
whole pLlrpose of admmistration to con
sldel It as &ynonymous With "paper
\.. ork," though tradItIonal prejudice and
lack of undel'standmg .frequently If'ad to
thiS confusIOn_ Actually, administration i"
executIve and operative. It consists of
managell1>nt, personnel manage
ment and management of records. So
sucrps,>ful has the Almy been. indeed,
III ('<;tablishmg methods of command and
adminIstrative control that large indus
tries have found it profit&blp to copy the
Army qy.stem_
The pJlmalY functlOns of admInistra
tive officers are those of coordmatlOn and
controL Those duties must be performed
in all echelons If the Army is to operate
('ffiClently Adjutants General exerCise no
personnel command but, as business man
agel'S, act as admimstrative expcutives
for the commander, performing functions
whleh are VItal to the mIlitary effort.
Servmg their commander, they are re
sponSible for coordmation. uniformity
and effiCIency In admmistration through
the command channel from the War De
partment to the lowest echelon_
It must be apparent, therefol'e, that to
study the work of this department which
touches the Army sa Importantly and at
so many points is a useful pursuit not
only for Adjutants. All officers, whatever
theiI duties, will find profit in discovering
how the Adjutant General carries out
hiS mIssion.
To begin with, there is the Adjutant
General's Department and there is the
Adjutant General's Office. The first is a
branch of the Army. Officers assigned to
this .branch wear as insignia the I'ed,
wh1te and blue shield. No enlisted men
are assigned to the AGD.
The Adjutant Genel'al's Office is the
operatmg center of the AGD within the
War Department. Orders for the Army
1ssue from the AGO by authority of the
Secretary ofr War or the Chief of Staff
and are certified as official by the Adju
tant General. In the AGO are kept the
central records and files of the Army, and
from here the administrative business of
the A rmy is directed. The office functions
in a Similar capaCIty for the separate ad
nllnIstl'ation of the Services of Supply.
Under its revised set-up, the work of
the AGO IS dIstributed among four prm
clpal dlvisions-Personnel, Operations
and Trainmg, MIscellaneous and Control
-each composed of a number of branches
whlCh perform speCific and limited oper
atIng functIOns. Outside this structure
there are the ExpcutIve Officer, the Ad.
mmistratlve Assistant and the separate
Executive Branch, reporting directly to
the Adjutant GeneraL There is the DI
rector of Records, whose duties I shall
presently descrtbe, and thpre is the Army
Postal Service, WhICh It was thought wise
to set up as a separate entity without
dIVIsional status_ Both of these also re
port directly to the Adjutant General.
Of these dlffel'ent divisions, branches
and agencIes, the Control Division is the
newest and, in a very real sense so far as
the rest of the AI'my IS concerned, the
most slgnificent_ To it is delegated respon
sIbihty for the operatmg efficiency of the
At the tIme 'Of the reorgamzation of the
War Department (WD Cir. 59, March 2,
1942), the Adjutant General's Office be
came a part of the Services of Supply.
Shortly after the reorganiZation was an
nounced, there was established in each
of the serVIces a Control Division with
broad powers and the general mission of
establishing and maintaining a high de
gree of operating efficiency.lnformal con
throughout the SOS was authorized
for Control Divisions, to avoid the
delay 4f channeling. In the Hedquarters,
Services of Supply, a central Control
Division was established.
The work of these Control Divisions is
a continuing function, and its purpose is
to make certain that no unnecessary
ations become "frozen" ang remam to
plague the Army long after their useful
npss is finished. Certain officers of thE"
Control Division in the AGO are at all
times on roving assignments. Their mis
sion is to simplify forms and procedures
in a realistic manner and to coordinate
all such activities between AGO and other
It should be emphasized that they are
not "looking for trouble," though it is
fair to describe them as
ers." Their approach is one of construc
tIVe criticism. In fact, their example
should induce a spirit of self-analysIs in
all branch chiefs, for the Control DivIsion
has littls patience with operations WhICh
are carried on in a certain groove only
because they have always been done that
way. On the other hand, there is no desire
to make changes in useful methods for
the sake of change alone. Nor is speed of
operation the single objective. The prime
requirement of the Adjutant General's
Office is accuracy. The Control DivisIOn
attempts to establish methods which m
crease output as much as possible, consis
tent with accuracy.
Theirs is a staff function with no di
rect operational responsibility except as
regards their own division. A clue to their
method is that most of the liaison is con
ducted hy telephone or personal inter
view. Memoranda ate resorted to only
when resistance to suggested change is
so strong that it is feJt wise to commit
discussion and recommendations to paper.
Where pOSSible, revised procedures are
mstalled as simply as this: The Director
of the Control DiviSion telephones his
eonsidered proposal to the appropriate au
thority-the chief of a branch or the di
rector of another division in the Adjutant
General's Office or to the control officpr of
another service. If no objection lS enw
countered, the change IS put into oper
ation. When it has been accomplished,
that fact is transmitted to the Director
of the Control Divh.ion by telephonp, and
the inCIdent IS closed. Notes and informal
memoranda prepared within the Control
Division are destroyed. No correspon
dence need be filed, SInce the operatlOnal
change has been accomplished entirely
within the affectpd agency.
In the revised set-up of the AGO. the
entire objective has been organization
along functional lmes with as much de
centralization as possJble. As much as
possible. each branch IS devoted to a
single activity with specified limits,
broken down. where necessary, into sec
tions and sub-sectIons. The Personnel
Division, for example, includes branches
which provide all the vital statistics
of individuals in the Army. But it does
not touch their training, which is prop
erly another field_
An examination of the Personnel Divi
sion will indicate the functional approach
of the modern AGO. There is first of alI,
the matter of procurement, and so
is a Procurement Branch. Within Jt is
the Recruiting and InductIOn Section,
whIch administers recrmting, produces
recruiting posters and literature (thpre
is a vast prmting plant on Governors
Island, New York, which is operatpd
twenty-four hours a day by the Recruit
ing Publicity Bureau), and considers
other matters in connection with the pro
CUrement of voluntary enlIstments for
the Army and lately for the W'lnlPU's
Army AuxilIary Corps.
Wlthin tbis branch also is a section to
deal with officer procurement daect from
civilIan life. There is a vast need for IPen
who possess various types of experience.
and in 35 key industrial cihes, offices have
been set up under the jUl'1sdiction of the
Service Commands to consider men for
these commissions. Although these offices
are not operated dIrectly by the Procure
ment Branch, applicatIOns and commis
sions are eventually processed m this
branch and appointments made through
It. Appomtments to the United States
Military Academy are also handled by
There must be files for officers and en
men. as thpre have always been,
where the detaJb of their army lives are
bUilt up as mIlitary bIOg
raphy_ The two agencIes which have al
ways dealt with these matteI'S 31 e now
assigned for gl eater funetIOna1ism to the
Personnel DIVision as the Officers Branch
and the Enlisted Branch. The Officers
Btanch IS the operatmg agency on all
matters relatmg to l'eqUisItlOTImg. dassI
ficatlOn, allotments. promotion. aSSIgn
ment and reaSSIgnment. separatIOn and
1 ecords of mdividual officers. warrant of
ficers, nurses and members of the Army
SpecIali<;t Corps and the Wom<>n's Army
AuxIhary Corps. The Enhsted Branch
performs similar functIOns except Cia'3Slw
ficatlOn and aSSIgnments for enlu-,ted per
t:.onnel The "201 file&" of both officers
and enlisted men. formerly a l"f'spOnSl
llliity of the Executive, have been trans
ferred to these two branches
ThiS IS war. and there \<.,,%11 bE' casual
tI(>s Therefore. a Casualty Branch has
been establIshed to admini5ter this status
separately. A grateful natIOn, however,
wlll not fall to recognize the valol of Its
heroes, and a separate DecoratIOns and
Awards Branch has been created to cany
out thIS functIOn.
ProductIOn of all the records of Indi
viduals. umts, statIons, posts-indeed, of
the entire Army-is now charged to the
Machme Records Branch, which IS a
proper part of the Personnel Division.
This IS a comparatively new development
of the AGO. for it was hardly two years
ago that the replacement of hand and
typewrItten records with bUsines"S ma
chines began. In the AGO the machmes
now are constantly clicking, twenty-four
hours a day, recording and producing on
call the VItal statistics of the Army.
Young John Smith. who reported at a
ReceptIOn Center thIS morning. will pres
ently have two cards on file in the Ma
chine Records Branch, coded with those
cryptIc punches which, when decoded, ten
the arm, most of the facts about Pvt.
John Smith. The first of these is his En
lIstment Card, made out at the time of
hiS enhstment or mdu('tIOn through Se
lectIve Service, which contains basic in- '
formation-his name, serial number,
place of birth, race, permanent address,
next of kID, education and other data
which will not alter by reason of
thmg which he does III the Army. This
card will remain as the current record
untt! it IS Ieplaced by a Separatton Card
at the tIme John Smith Jeaves the
There IS also John Smith's status card
WhICh always contains the latest
matlan about him. It IS made out when
John Smith r'CPIves hiS first assignment
to duty at a Replacement Traming Cen
ter or Unit. At that tIme it shows where
John Sntith is (post. company, battalion.
regIment, etc.); 1t shows that John Smith
IS on active duty and that (let us say)
he i':l a "basic soldIer" WIthout special
Presently. however, John Smith is as
:,lgned to a trammg course. He acqU1res
a sInH. Back to the Machine Records
Branch in the AGO comes a Report of
Change Card. recording this development
in his army career. Hereafter, John Smith
IS to be considered by the Army as a man
With speeml usefulness. So his old Status
Card In the Machine RecOl'ds Branch IS
replaced by a neW one on whIch thlR fact
has heen added. Thereafter. every altera_
tIOn m the status of John Smith will be
sent to the Machine Records Branch on a
Report of Change ('ard, so that he may
h(> counted conectly in any tabulation of
the Army.
For example, if John Smith breaks a
leg and goes to the hOSPital for six
weeks. he can no longer be counted on
actlVe duty In the figures.
"Duty to hospital," says the Report of
(:hange rard which ('arries this mforma
t1On, and the Machme Records Branch
WIll show John Snuth's hospitahzation on
hiS St&tus Card until another Report of
Change arrives with "Hospital to duty."
Incidentally, all of these Report of
Change Cards. after "their mformation
has been coded, are sent to the Enlisted
Branch. where they will become a perma_
nent part of John Smith's military record
in hIS 201 file.
Officers' re('ords are kept similarly on
punch cards In the Machine Reeords
Branch of the A GO there are three prin
cipal cards for each offi<!er. His Statisti
cal Card IS Similar to the enlisted man's
EnlIstment Card, and contains perma
nent data only, His QualIfication Card
is a record of hIS experIence and SkIlls,
both cIvilian and nllhtary. which will
prove valuable when the Army IS search
Ing for special qualifications among its
officer personnel If, for example. an of
ficer was wanted who could speak Polish,
hnew all about DIesel engines. was an e1l.
pert photographer and had a III
law, It would he a ('omparatively Simple
mattel to find hIm by 1unnIng Qualifica
tIOn Card",
Each officer has Statm. tard, too,
almost exactly like the enltsted man'S-. It
j" pI'ocessf'd in the same fUl'ohlOn from Re
port of Change CartIs sent from the umts
to which he a!'.5lgned, and, aft!?T hIS
has been brought up to date In
the Machml' Record", HI anch, tht> Report
of Change Cartls arc sent to the Officel s
Bl'anch a,,> I ecol'ds for hlv !:!Ot file,
There arE' othel cnrd5 In the !'.lachme
Reeol ds Branch whIch ,-'ataIog useful m!
fOll11atlOn about mdlvulual", and thele
are new under cOni>UlelatlOn. In
urlrhtion, the :YIachme Blanch Ie
celves flom enit Pelsonnel SectlOns in
the field a of Strength Return
Summay C;:lni<>, \\-hlch ..,how thE' number
of officer", nUl their dhtl'ib1..ttlOn by
component, and the numher of mdl
ft om othel organtzatIOns tel1l
attached There I" a
Stlength Rptul'n Sumnl,ll'Y {'art! fol'
tl'OOPS and thel(' 15 another which
stl'ength by glatlt'. All of these me used
III neatmg the ma<.,tel lepOi ts WhICh
i>ho\V 111 detml the stll'l1g'th of the ArlHY_
Each month a mastl..'l I" run from
lards of "ort whIch the
strength and locatlnn 101 thp entue
BefOle lIIachll1es were It
! eqUll ed 45 days to pl'epa! e such a re
port, meal1l11g that the A Imy'::- 1..110'\0 ledg(
of )t5 {lwn strength was at hc':>t a month
and a half behlnt\ The machll1C's pl'epal'e
thiS same report In Onc(' a
month, the Allny Imo..."\'s exactly hl)\v
many men are under arms and thel!' loca
tIOn throughout the Fmted States as well
as in the th('aters of operatIOns_
Of cOU! SP, l1Iachme I CC{l1 d" I11U-"t bl'
lIeated Ul the field a<., w(>11 <-1" III the
Adjutant Genelal'" Office In
PpI'sonnel units nt lm,tnllatlOn.., Hnd at
lwadquartel <; of the Service Coml1l,md-.
\".lmtlarly ('oUlppe({ to tliln out and
mamtam files of these cardf-, fOl' each
mans' lecolo must be \\ Ith hlf. Ul11t
as '.,'ell In the AGO'" ('('ntral file!';
The}'e HI I' even mohlle unit::.. neatly fitted
mto truch5. which tl uHI anywhere the
AllllY may go, In the nllddle of a tloplcal
Jungle you may hear the unfanllliar
clIchmg of vne of the"e mobilf' units, ca
pable of turnIng out the St.J.tll'- Card"> of
100,000 troops In t\\entyfouJ
Personnel attached to speCial l\Iachll1e
Record::. UIlIt::. of the Adjutant General's
Department are charged \Vlth full re
sponsibility for maintaining these rec
ords and eqUIpment- This means swifter
processmg of records under battle con
dItIOns, Also. It be observed. it
means a simplification of paper work in
company. battahon and regimental head
Personnel Division has procured milI
tary personnel, mducted them and ar
Tanged to keep records of theIr mdivIdual
and group mihtary careers the
OperatIons and Trammg DiVision picks
up the thread, to supervise training and
admmister Important functIons inCIdent
to the busmess of both the AGD and the
AGO, The work of thIS division is di
vIried mto three Branches-Operatlons.
Classificatlon and Enhsted Replacement,
and Training.
The Operations Branch carnes on all
the work not ::.pecifically charged to any
othel' umt of the Adjutant General's Of
fice. It mamtains station hsts. SupE'l"..rtses
fiscal affairs for the AGO, has custody of
:,,('cret and confidentJal conespondence
and files, Issues general directIves, ad
ll1mstel s the Army ExtenSIOn Courses,
I uns the Travel Bureau Much of thIS IS
10utme, but It IS hIghly Impol'tant
l"Outme, On Its smooth functlOnmg de
much of 'the coordInatIOn of Army
Into thiS (Hanch, also, comes all the
nll<;cellaneous (o1'l'eSpOndellce WIth the
puhlIc, which IS an histOriC functIOn of
the Adjutant GenPI a1. TWIce, mdeed, III
hi\-. hitOI), the Adjutant General has
ileen I enamed the Mihtal'Y Secretary.
dud Vt'I'y oftefl m his 1ecent history It
ha:" seemed the public's desire to
\\ IltC to the Wal Department on
even conceivable subject would threaten
to engulf hIll!. :\lany of these al'e useful
mqtlll'les Often they are frIvolous, But
dlv.. aY5 they'are interest mg. Illdicative
(,f currents of thought which flow
through the country. Every :"el'ious lettel
Iecelves a responsive answer from the
Adjutant GeneraL
The C1a81:>lficatlOn anti EnlIsted Re
placement Branch admmlstel's the pro
g'ram of rla<:;slfymg enlisted men accord
lllg' to thell aptlturles and skills Most
lIuiltnl pelsonnel a1'(' fanllhar WIth the
opel at !On of and Its VItal
nece<;slty If the complex demands of mocl
(lIn wal' al'e to be filled, But thosc who
It III oppratlOn may not realize the
vast amount of planning that was neces
:-al:' Lefore the Army developed It<:
of rh:"rovellllg that, say. John
Smith, whose CivilIan expel'lence appeal
ed to point hon toward no partIcular
.\rl11Y occupatIon, should do well m the
Slgnal Corps.
There were tests to be created which
would give unfailing clue! to aptitudes.
There a QuahficatJOn CartI to be de
\ eloped-the large orange form which
l"e('ords the skills and aptItudes
and which follows him throughout his
army career. Instructors had to be train
ed in the new techniques, and these men,
m turn. had to train interviewers in the
selence of classification. The business ma
chmes were caned in, too. for the Quali .
fication Card is coded for swift handling
by mechanical means. The heart of the
classification system is the ability not
only to assign men shrewdly but to find
them quickly when their skills are wanted.
ClaSSIfication. it Will be remembered.
nas used to some extent III the first
World War when the Army Alpha and
Beta tests provided a screen for sifting
",kills and aptitUdes, But although classi
fication was not dropped at the end of
the war, very httle further was done with
It untIl May 1940. when it became appa
rent that the mechanized needs of modern
warfare would call for claSSification tests
far more effiCient than any yet devised.
The suprplsingly accurate system
whlC'h the Army now employs to de
ternllne the skIlls of Its men was or
gamzed by functions wlthtn the Adjutant
General's Department. The GHQ of this
service IS In the AGO. Here the tests are
deVIsed, procedUies developed. directions
Constantly this branch of the
OperatIOns and Traming DiVISIOn is
results, comidenng new tests.
figunng ot!: new methods whereby the
prlll(,Iple-", of ClaSSificatIon may provide
the Al'my with an even finer screening
of the skills and aptItudes of Its men.
The mitial sorting of the Army's man
!luwer comes at the InuuctlOn Station
\vhere phY5ically or mentally un
able to cope With any of some 645 army
occupatlOm, are weeded out Those pass
Ing thiS sCleen alP ne,t lIlterviewerl at
ReceptIon Crntel':l where their occupa
tIOnal categury detcrl1l1ned by a staff
of enh\-.ted men, tlmned to thiS work.
Each mductee ll" taken lIlrlividually.
Small I are JH'ovltletl for privacy.
and a 00-ll1mute pellOfllt. allotted for the
mtel VIPW. DUling thiS tune a vast
amount of mformatlOn about the men has
heen entered on Quahnr-utlOll !-ard,
to he UP-eli a"i one of the base<; for hi:;

Inculentally, It '" thl"i ('ai'll which ple
eludes the pOl'oslbillt) that a skIlled man
Will be "lost" m the Army, Frequent de
mantb fOI' eel tam al'e mGt hy I'un
mng the Quahl"jcutlOn Cards, which SOl't
out the men deMl'f'd, Although a man's
potf'DtJaittles might havp been origmal1y
overlooked mIlls as."ignmcnt rlue to a
lacl{ of demanu for his speCIal skIll at
that tHne, later needs are almost bound
to catch up With hIm and result in his
tl ansfer. In addItIOn, the acqUIsition Qf
new SkIlls in the Army often leads to re
claSSIficatIon, If. fol' example. a "basic
soldIer" hecomer, an e"pert automobIle
mechamc. that fact IS added to his Quali
ficatIon Card-and to hIS Status Card as
that all assignments will take
this mto consideration.
At the Reception Center. too, the Gen
eral Classification Test is administered. to
secure an index of aptItuue in every new
soldier. This test is one of the first ex
perience:;; which the mductf' undergoes
We have had time now to check its accu
racy through comparison of the actual
performance of soldiers with the scores
they made when they entered the Army.
It IS interesting-and comforting--to
know that the General Classification Test
has completely justified its mission. Inci
dentally, those ingenious machinf's-for
WhICh the Army is finding increasingly
varied use-are put to work in the Gen
eral Classification Test to do the actual
scormg. The test form IS "0
that the indentatIOn III the papers made
by the pencil of the soldIer creates a
scorlllg haslS.
ThIS branch 15 charged with the a::;Slgn
ment of men from ReceptIOn Center to
Replacement Training and units.
It supervIses the of enlisted
replacements from Replacement Train.
Ing Centers to units and mstallatlOns,
and IS responSIble for mamtammg thp
strength figures of all such units and In
stallatIOns receIving enhsted replace
ments. In other words, mdividual super
VIsion does not end with classification or
even reclassification. This branch keeps a
finger on the men It aSSigns.
One Important mIssion of the Trammg
Branch is the supervi"iion of the Adjutant
General'!;, School and of others operatmg
under directIOn of the Adjutant General.
There are now ",i'IL of these The parent
school. SInce January 1942 has been lo
cated at Fort 'Vashington, Maryland, an
historIC army post WhICh had been aban
doned m 1939 and was rf'Claimed from
the Depattment of the InterIor to house
the first Adjutant General's School.
The school condllcts fOUl prIncipal
courseS-In AdminIstratlOn, Classifica
tIon, ;\lachIne Records, and Army Postal
SerVice AdmmistratlOn. Ongmally the
school was for officers only. temporal'1ly
assigned there from other branche:; of
the Army and returned to their UnIts at
the completIOn of the course La':>t Janu
ary, however, an Officer Candidate Course
wa:; established to meet the grOWIng need
for speCIalists. The Adjutant General's
School has become one of the very im
portant adJ uncts of the Depal tment, not
alone for the prorluctlOn and training of
officers, but also as an operating labora
tory fot' research and ImprOVen1f'nt of
forms and procedure_
Late thIS summer audltlonal officer
candldate schools were establIshed at
Fargo, North Dakota; Grinnell College,
Iowa; StarkevI1le. MIssissipPI; and
Gaine::.ville, 'Florida Enlisted Men's
Schools have 1 ecently been actIvated at
Oxford. Mississippi, and Hattiesburg,
I'll issisSIPPl. In additlOn. the Traming
Branch maintains superviSIon over the
Army Music School now conducted by the
Army Band at Fort Meyer. VIrglma
Another function is planmng
and superviSIOn of the work of speCIal
traming umts for enlisted men through
out the Army who are slow If'arners.
IllIterates or non-English speakmg. The
fact that thls trammg salvages for full
or liunted service about 95
{ of the un
fit sent to training Illu">trates Its
valuf' to the set'VIce at large
The programs conSIst of academIC In
structIOn. carf'ful phYSical traInmg. and
instruction in military subjf'cts A special
sectIOn prepares teachmg matel'lals In
readIng. Wl'Itmg and arIthmetic. mclud
lUg baSIC readers and film StllPS It also
l'onducts a teach-tramlllg program to
aId the 650 enlIsted men. warrant officers
and officer5 who ale conducting these
classes throughout the Army. Testing
matel'lals have been prepared to claSSIfy
the men accoI'dmg to their academic
needs, measure theI1' prog-ret',s and de
tel'mme their 1 eadIness for regular
A Tl amIng' Doctrme SectIOn stllUlf'S.
analyzes and proJf'ctf'd training
materials including text-books and man
uals; reviews training pragiams and
schedules submItted by A G and AA
8chool Commandants. studies local proh
If'm.., of schools and collates eXlstmg
tramIng pnnclples and piactices. It pre
pare::. teacher-training- manuals. studies
and detf'l'mmes propel' teaching pro
cedmC'!:> and formulates time schedule.s
for tYPIcal ::'ItuatlOns and reqUlrements.
Into the !\1lscellaneous DlvlslOn have
gone five 'lUlte SPpat ate functions of the
Adjutant General's Office. set up as dIS
tmct branches. Three of need httle
Illscusslon here. The Old Records
Branch IS charged with the Admimstra
tlOn and mamtenance of all mIlitary and
",emI.milItary records from the f'stabhsh
ment of thf' Governmeilt to October 31.
1912. The DemobilizatIOn Records Branch
admmisters records from November I,
1912 of dIsbanded orgamzatlOns and,of in
diVIduals who have been dl&charged 01
sepalated from the ':>enlcc smce that
date_ The CIVIlIan Con"ervatlOn COl p"
Blanch IS concelned at present with
wllldmg up the affall s of that orgalllZ!l
The othel' two Rlanches leqUIre mOle
e:..tended treatment. Thele 1&. fin.t. thc
l{epI0oUeilOn Branch. a new actIVIty of
the Adjutant General's Office. Reproduc
tIon units of the Services of Supply were
:.t::l.rted WIth a few machlllf'S
to take care of thf' I epi oduct1On neerls of
the peace-time Al'my and a<;; that Armj
grew to war-tIme proportIOns, eqU1pment
was added to carry the lllcreaRed load.
Production suffered flom crowded condl
t10ns and separated opE'l"aOng umt::..
Since each separatE' unit was unable
properly and adequatel), to the In
t.:reaf':ed demands of Its own serVICes, pe
production facilities of the Se-rvicei of
Supply are being centralized in one
branch of the office of the Adjutant Gen
eraL The aSSIgned mission of this new
Reproduction Branch is the rapid and
accurate reproduction of directional mat
tel'S and orders. Although the branch
functIOns prImarily for the Services of
(which includes the AGO. of
course). It also produces materIal on re
quest for other agenCIes.
mfl'f'quently. of course, thIS branch
cla&sifierl material The
ClaSSified Section is a complete repro
ductIOn plant III itself. Only authorized
personnel are permitted to enter. Only
matteI tn sealed contamers IS received
and all wor]{ is delivered under
guard in sealed contaIners. Thus, mili
tary mformatIOn IS completely safe
The remaming branch of the MIscel
laneous DIVISIon 1<; the Publication
Branch. WIth whOl;e \Vork everyone who
has ever read a field manual IS familiar.
It is the agency through WhICh War De
partment polICIes. instructIOns and or
ders are tl'ansmittetl to the Army. In
conjUnctIOn WIth the Government Pdnt
mg Office It prOVIdes the Army with the
technical. tactIcal, and auministrative
reference and WIthout which it
would be ImpOSSIble to carry out the vast
Army traInIng' program
Like the Army Itself. the PUbltcatlOns
Blanch has, WIthin the past three years.
e::-..panded over and Ovel' agam. Prom a
':'mall group of 38 CIvil SerVIce employees
III W:W the UnIt has been developed Into
an orgamzatton employmg 660 men and
\vomen Three years ago the branch OC
cupled a few rooms in the
BUIldmg In Washington Today It utIhzes
almost half a mIllIon squarf' feet of floor
... pace WIth storage and supply depots
sItuated 10 foul' geographI
cal centers of the country 11s dIstrIbut
Ing' agenCIes are In every major port of
Durlllg the past two Yf'ar,,> the Pubh
catIOns Branch has handled the pubhca
tIon of almost 550 techmcal manuals and
field manuals, varyIng m SIze from
."mall of pages to volumes
of 800 pages In sOIne Instances. as In
the case of FM 21-100, the Soldler's
Hanrlbook. smgle edItIOns have run mto
nulhons of copies_
A very Important new function of the
AGO if handling the allotments and a1
10wamC''3, In connection with Public Laws
625 and 490 The latter provides benefits
for dependents of officers, enlIsted men,
warrant officelS. IJ.Ill:.5es'and civilian em
ployees who are mternee; missing in ac
tion or captured. ,The former is, of course,
the Sf'l'VIcemen'l' Dependents Allowance
Act of 1942, wh ch permIts per
to allot a certam portion of their
pay to relattves 'and provides additlonal
t;ums by which the Govel'nmpnt 5uppll}.
tnenl::> these alh.llnwnls, '
It is estrmatE.>u that at Ie-ast five- mil
han applicatIOns, plus millIon
change-of-:;tatus nt,JltlcPs, will have to be
processed hy the Office of Dependency
Beneflts, \VhlCh operates under direction
of the Adjutant General and which is
alrearly runmng both day and mght
shifts About apphcatIOm, are now
11l'OCessed each day, and It IS (>\'pe('ted
that at ppak thp pE'l"sonnf'1 \\Ill bp able
to hanrlle 1110re than 10,000 applications
III each eight hour pel IOU
But III spite of thiS enOl'mous amount
of dE'tall, the officE' furetlOns smoothly.
techmque receive.:; applica
tions at a mpEosagt" centel. from WhICh
thC'y go to Re('ordmg-,
HccOl c.l Seal chmg-, RelatlOm;;hlp Determ
ination. De-pt'ndency Detel mmatlOn, Au
thonzatlOn, and thence to the payment
S('CtlOh of the lme wherf' checks
al e issued and lllaIled out.
the Im{' handlt;> other
t'olg"mncant details
While the need., of 0111 aug-mented
A llll)- call for p"'panSlon (i'Vf"1 )"\vhel'E',
even und'l' the 11g'ld of
mn\'{' effiCient operation, It Illay h(' com
fnl tmg to know that mane dll'ectlOn, at
lea.;t, It has heen possible to ('ontlatt
The \Val Df'paltl11ent IS both redUCing
alld comple"'"mg' It:" In IH41 a pia
gl[lm \Va" ollgmuted callm:r fOl' thE' Ill;,
pO"Htwn of recoltis whl('h had become
It al'-.o pllHHied fOi the han...
fpl' of othe!" flIes, rarely consulted, to
1l1iCIofilm at a 'va!:>t ..,aVIng of "'pace.
On Decembel 5, the oflicf' of Dj
Il'CtOI of Re('ol'o::' \\H'-. e...tahh<,hed. and
Itumerimtely the pmn... taldng- :;Ul"vey of
aJ my lecol'd:-. he-)!;an to take It
WOllin be to cite chapter anll ver"e
011 w11at been done- But It II-> com
fOltmg to 1\ now, fOi (' ... ample, that la:.t
year In one blanch of thp ;\Li1utant GeB.
el aI'" Oflke aprl oXll11ately
Jlound" of It'collis wele db
po... etl of, \\11h the sanctHm of
1l1OH' thun Ilo,non tilaWel''> of
filing eqUIpment
SinCE' JUllual y, 1U-.12, ilst-:- have heen
puhh"hed 111 \Val' Department CIl'l'ulat"
of I'COl'ti"- Juti).. !:ed rll'>po">uhle. Theil eu,,
an' 31.1tl10112," to g"E't 1111 of them
WIthout formality. One office
that It ha':> l.i1:-po"-l:'d of 81.000 pound..:;, of
papPI S o('rupvlllg' 2,.1 i5 cubiC feet of
:o.pace, No exact tabulatIOn e... i:-.b of the
total sa... mg, :;mce (In dupo"al
31 p not reqUIred ann the opel'<Itwn 1<>' a
contmuwg" one, But It Illay be at'>
'3.UIl1l'd that the ne\\ iy freed space If,
The incI"easerl use of 11llcl'ofilm for the
pleSel'VatlOn of nece-:.salY 1ecords like
means an enormOlh savlllg III space
and equipment. By thIS time microfilm
IS fall"ly fanlilial. EssentIally, It IS
simply the photographing, by special
camera. of records on rolls of 8mm film.
Llbt'arles have re,<wrted to this method
fot f;ome !.rears not only to save space,
but to preserve records WhlCh were be
COll1mg brittle With age. To the War De
partment it means that thousands of feet
of nOOI' space and thousands of preCIOUS
&teel cabmets are made avmlable for
more current use.
In one case, two ordmary SIze file cabI
nets now hold the rpcords which formerly
oc('upied 4.000 square feet of floor spacE'.
fn another, 100 tons of mIcrofilm records
l'pleased approximately 1,000 steel flUng
cabmets and salvaged about three tons of
tmned metal file fasteners. This micro
filnung actIvity has only just begun and
WIll be extended as fast as opportunity
offers. It is an eminently practical sys
tem, and thp rpcords so preserved are as
avaIlable- for e}(.amination as they were in
their ol'lgmal state. The rolls of films at e
called for by file number and taken to a
small viewing booth where equipment
magnifies the tillY type image to normal
Microfilm has also been used to great
advantage by the Army Postal Service,
fo)' It IS the baSIS of Vmall The one great
bottlen('ck in the overseas mail operatIon
IS space, both on planes and ships,
Last June tremendous strIdes were made
to overcome thiS block by the simple pro
cess of sending letter", on fllm.
V mall prOVIdes for overseas shIpment
of letters on rolh of film. each roll
containmj!" 1,500 letters SpeCial forms,
available at all post offices and atf,o in
...tatlOnery stores, are used for writing the
1Ilf'... EqUIpmf'nt at ports of embarka
tlOn photogi aphs these letters, and at
thell each one is developed
separately on sensitized paper for indI
VIdual dispatch to the addressee.
So great IS the savmg in cargo space
pfi'l:'cteJ by V-maIl that 150,000 V-mall
lettel'''; may b(> dispatched m a smgl":! V
mail sack whIch is about half the SIze of
an 01 rima ry mall sa('k. Th{'se same 150.
000 letters, had they been Wl'ltten on
01 dmal y paper and enclosed in ordimll y
t'nvelop-". would fill 31 full sacks of mall
ThiS quantIty of V-mall weighs only 45
pound", whIlp th{' same number of ordI
nellY If'ttel's WIll weigh 2.515 pounds.
In addltlOn to cons(,l'ving urgently
n('cded cargo space, V-mall has reuuced
th(' tlanslt t1lne of overseas mall by days
and oftent.nnes weeks. An absolute prI
olity IS gIven Vmail by the 'Val' De
partnwnt over all other classes of person
al mall. Undf'1' thIS pohcy, All' Transport
Command and cargo planes carryall V
mall waiting dispatch at the respective
embarkatIOn pomts where V-mail is
Incldpntal1y, the Army Postal Service
is aho responsible for the Expeditionary
Force& M{''';sage Systpm, by which fixed
text personal cables may be sent at nom
inal rate to overseas areas. The service is
effeeted in with the comml}r
cial telegraph and cable companies, and
these EFM cables mark the first time that
such a service has been available to
American overseas forces.
But V-mail and EFM cables are only
a small part of the far-fiung activities of
the Army Postal Service, which is one of
the opel'ating agencies of the Adjutant
General's Office, In peace time, the work
of thIS service is limited in scope, con
sistmg for the most part of long-range
planmng and providing proper postal fa
cilities for the Army while on fleld
In war, however, the Army Postal
SerVIce immediately becomes a. vital a.nd
necessary unit of the War Department,
providing direct contact with military
personnel wherever they may be sta
tIOned This calls for officers and men
experienced in postal problems, and so
the Army Postal Service is staffed, for
the most part, WIth men drawn from
expert personnel in the Post Office de
partment. Through the- Postal Officer
CandIdate School, already noted as one of
the fune1lOns of the Adjutant General's
School, and by the selection of enlisted
men WIth a Postal background, the Serv
ice IS manned everywhere by qualified
officers and enlisted men experienced in
the operation of the mails.
In addition to the officers on duty with
the Army Postal Service in the Adjutant
General's Office in Washington, each
Army, Army Corps, Army Division. and
each post, camp or station with a person
nel m excess of 5,000 has its own Army
Postal Officer. Postal mspectors and
techniCians recommpnd{'d by the Post
Office Department are serving both in
mIlitary and civilIan capaCIty WIth troops
In all overs{'as theaters of operation.
There IS now efficient mall service to
every area where United States forces
arc stationed,
Only one other unit of the AGO re
mams to b{' mentIonpd-the Executive
Branch This acts as the coordinating
agency for all contacts with the Adjutant
General. It sup{'rvises the work of civilIan
personnel wlthm the AGO, furni'lhes esti
mates of offiee supplies, furnitnre and
eqUIpment, supervises the handling of
mail and central files, al'ranges space as
"Ignments of the Headquarters, Services
of Supply, and operates the enlisted
courier detachment assigned to the Adju
tant General's Office. Its miSSIon, in short,
15 to serve as the personal representative
of the Adjutant General In those mat
ters which dIrectly concern the AGO as
a busme-ss establishment.
Throughout thIS diSCUSSIOn of the or
ganIzation of the AGO it has been ap_.
parent that, decentralization was the
guiding force,l ,This motive had been ex
tended even further during the past few
months so that' certain duties formerly
assigned to the Adjutant General have
now been transferred to the Service Com I think it IS faIr to assume that this clency and dispatch. The war operatIOn
'mands. These are functions which policy of decentrahzatlon will continue is so huge that It should be the l"'sponsi
concern specifically military establish and extend to every operation whIch may bility of every commander to reduce or
ments located within their geographical be usefully performed outside the AGO. streamhne his functions and to maintain
boundaries and which the ServIce Com I can assure the Army that the Adjutant a constant scrutiny with thiS mission in
mands can perform with closer super General is not jealous of preserving any mmd. I feel that the AGO may take a
vision than the Adjutant General in duty. now assigned to him, which can be certain amount of pride in its own ac
Washington. carried out elsewhere with more effi- complIshment.
The Tank Destroyers and Their Use
Instructor, Command and General Staff School
The tank destroyers are the grown-up antitank
battalions formed in the fall of 1940. They have ex
panded many times in number and the armament
has changed from towed to self-propelled weapons.
The use of armored forces in the early days of
World War II proved that more maneuverability
and greater fire was needed to combat them. To
stop enemy tanks and other mechanized vehicles was
the biggest job confronting our Army during the
summer and fall of 1941. The problem had two
aspects, the first of using what was immediately
available, and secondly of developing weapons and
antitank means to go beyond any foreign develop
ment. This meant that the organizations would de
velop as the ideas and weapons were tried out in
the field and suggestions for improvements were
As a starting basis, an experimental battalion was
selected. That battalion was equipped with various
combinations of existing weapons and transporta
tion. It was field tested in the Carolina maneuvers
ln 1941.
Thoughts were crystalizing on the needs for an
offensive weapon and the organization to combat
the armored attacks. The objective then waS desig
nated for the tank destroyer battalions. They were
to have high mobility, great fire power and light
armor. For protection in combat they must rely
upon cover, concealment, rapid movement and skill
ful use of terrain to compensate for the lack of
armor. To do this the fact was brought out that
proper means were beyond the capabilities of any
one arm and would require the use of a special force
of combined arms capable of movement as fast as
the tanks on any terrain and with the ability to in
tercept armored thrusts. They would be made lighter,
faster and cheaper than the tanks. Our tank de
stroyer weapons are now being perfected so that
the goal is being reached and the armored units
successfully stopped.
The enemy armored units will coordinate their
a ~ t i o n s with motorized infantry units aud aviation
to overrun and destroy any units encountered on the
way to their objective. They will use every means
at their disposal to conceal their attacking mass and
the direction it will take in the attack. Once launched
lt will strike with surprise and speed while being
protected on both flank and rear. Preceding this
armored mass will be reconnaissance elements con
sisting of aviation, armored vehicles, . motorcycles
and reconnaissance vehicles. all seeking information
to guide the direction of the armored attack. To
smooth the way, combat engineer" and motorized
infantry will always be available to take out the
mine fields and repair the demolitions. These re
connaissance elements may precede the main body
by hours and many miles. They will endeavor to
locate not only our dispositions but also dominating
terrain. vital communications and supply installa
tions. Special attention will be given to our anti
mechanized means such as mined areas, obstacles,
antitank weapons. artillery and tank destroyer as
sembly areas. Having obtained the information.
the tank attack is launched against weak spots. It
will probably be preceded by combat aviation and
artillery concentrations against located antitank,
artillery and tank destroyer weapons. The informa
tion obtained may cause the enemy to lead with in
f antry and engineers in order to break through the
barriers and make openings in the mine fields. After
these have been surmounted by the armored mass.
the armored security elements will protect the flanks
and rear and prevent any counter-action or closing
of the gap. At this point the tank destroyer units
take up the fight.
The employment of the tank destroyer battalions
must be in accordance with the powers and Iimita
tions of the materiel with which they are equipped.
They are designed primarily for offensive action
against armored forces and are capable of semi-in
dependent action but preferably will operate in close
cooperation with other friendly units. The necessity
for that was very evident in the earliest self-pro
pelled 37-mm mounts. Now the armament has been
developed to the extent that their use is not so re
What is a mi"ion for a tank destroyer battalion?
Any mission \vhich reqUIres offensive action against
hostile armored forces is appropriate fOI' tank de
stroyer battalions. Tank destroyer umts are pri
marily intended for offensive operation against hos
tile armored units.
Tank destroyer battalions may also be employed to
n. canalize and stop an armored attack,
l>. block envelopment or encirclement by hostile
armored forces,
c. provide security agaimit hostile armored action
for friendly armored forces in any type of action
or while in an assembly position.
Employment of the tank dest"oyer units as IUde
pendent de/ens11'e elements and their distribution
,,,,ith a VIew to co\ering every possible avenue of
tank approach or to afford immediate protection to
all echelons of the forces leads to uncoordinated ac
tIOn and a dispersion of the means of antitank cte
fense \vith subsequent loss of effectiveness.
Instead of Yielding the initiative to the enemy,
offensive action is deSIrable. Offensive action allows
the entire strength of the unit to be employed against
the enemy. Details of tactical employment of de
stroyer units will yary according to the materiel
with which they are provided. Offensive action of
destroyers equipped with the present materiel con
sists of movement to advantageous positions from
which to attack tanks by fire.
The fire missions are direct 'fire from close range
against point targets for short periods of time. Tank
destroyer ghns do not fire to harass or to interdict
enemy targets. This type of mission is the job of
the supporting artillery already in that zone of ac
tion. :\!o\'ement is employed by the tank destroyers
to bring fire to bear on the tanks at closer and more
effective range Surprise is a prerequisite to suc
cess in the des ruction of tanks. l
The tank destroyer guns secure surprise by the
followiflg means:
o. Careful movement by concealed routes into posi
tion and strict attention to camouflage to avoid de
tection before fire is opened.
h. Frequent lateral displacement to deceive the
enemy as to the location from which the fire is be
ing delivered.
c. Accurate fire placed at the proper time when
the targets arrive in effective range.
d. Rapidity of fire until the tank is destroyed.
Only materiel which in every type of terrain has
mobility equal, or superior, to that of tanks can ad
vantageously act offensively throl'ghout all stages
of action. Materiel which has inferior battlefield
mobility must compensate by superior observation,
better use of cover, and a stable firing platform
coupled with skillful maneuvers to engage the tanks.
Only under exremely favorable conditions (gen
erally open terrain with few obstacles to movement)
does such materiel voluntarily engage in melees with
hostile tanks. Occasional departure from this may
achieve surprise, habitual engagement in melees
with tanks by materiel of inferior cross-country mo
bility is likely to prove disastrous. Employment
should be by battalions in close coordination with
other troops, particularly with infantry and aircraft.
Infantry or reconnaissance company eJe
ments are used to deal with hostile foot troops so
as to allow the tank destroyers to attack tanks.
The employment of tank destroyer units must be
included in the general plan of a.ction for the entire
force. When supporting a unit which is on the de
fensive, tank destroyer battalions are used to
counterattack hostile armored forces. The defense
of a position against an enemy force, including
aI'mored units comprises two main el('ments, viz:
a. Tactical localities organized and garrisoned for
the defense of the main line of resistance including
the organic antitank elements of the front line regi
ments (reinforced when necessary) and passive
antitank means such as mines and obstacles.
b. Reserves of large units are held out for counter
attack including motorized or foot infantry, armored
units and tank destroyer units. When organized
localities do not succeed in stopping the attack, these
reserves disrupt, retard and canalize the attacking
armored units and thus create conditions favorable
for counterattack by intact reserves. Reserve units
occupy pOSItions in such a manner as to afford pro
tection against hostile tanks, and to further disrupt
and canalize the tanks into zones where they may
be effectively dealt with by counterattacking forces.
Destroyer units constitute the principal elements of
these counterattacking forces..
In assigning a mission it must be remembered
that tank destroyer battalions are not suited to close
combat against strong forces of hostile infantry;
they require reinforcement if such missions are as
signed. Tank destroyer battalions operate in close
cooperation with observation and combat aviation,
either independently or with other units of ground
- forces. Maximum combat aviation support is par
ticularly essential in fast moving situations where
time for reconnaissance is limited. Destroyer com
manders meet their responsibilities by intelligent
anticipation, timely decisions and plans to meet all
Haste in execution cannot make up
for time lost through lack of planning. The neces
sary preparations for combat include reconnais
sance, formulation and issuance of orders; move
ment of troops into assembly areas or positions in
readiness and arrangements for supply and com
munication, which are carried on concurrently as far
as possible. Warning orders permit subordinates
to make timely preparations. The results of recon
naissance, the size and location of the hostile
armored force and the character of the terrain will
determine the scheme of employment of tank de
stroyer units. The direction in whieh they are en
gaged must be based on a careful study of the
ground. The terrain selected should afford ample
maneuver room to permit full advantage to be taken
of the inherent mobility of these vehicles.
Tank destroyer battalions are initially held back
III concealed poqitions far enough to the rear to per
mit employment anywhere over a wide zone of ac
tion. From these positions they arc moved up,
preferably under cover of darkness. as the situation
develops. Such movement may be for a distance of
a few miles up to 40 or 50 miles to meet the armored
thrust. When more than one likely avenue of tank
approach exists, it may be necessary to hold a tank
destroyer unit in a position of readiness in a forward
area prepared to move rapidly to a threatened area.
An advance in the presence of the enemy is con
ducted so as to avoid encollntering the enemy while
in unsuitable disT,ositions and in unfavorable ter
rain. An advance by bounds is effective. Early de
velopment is initiated ill daylight movements
whenever the road net permits. As the march
progresses toward the enemy and attack by hostile
aviation increaseg in intensity, cross country move
ment becomes necessary and advance is made on a
broad front whenever terrain permits. Continuous
reconnaissance far in front gives tImely warning of
the location of the tanks' approach.
The estabhshing of a warning net III each zone of
action to covel' any movemerlt of enemy mechaniza
tion is imperative, The tank destroyer radios are
tuned in this net as soon as they arrive in that area.
This enables the tank destroyer commander to have
plans always ready to mlet the thrust
wherever and whenever it is made.
Destroyer units attain surprise by concealment of
the time and place of theil' action, ocreening- of dis
positions. rapidity of maneuver, deception and oc
casional adoption of unorthodox pr0cedure. Tank
destroyer units find and fix the enemy. in his
forces and then launch a decisive attack to destroy
them. Security elements of destroyer units precede
gun elements in order to drive off or destroy any
foot troops protecting hostile tanks The action of
friendly supporting infantry will be required if the
hostile foot troops are in force, in foot
infantrycannot be compensated for by engagement
of additional destroyer vehicles.
The most effective action of tank destroyer units
against hostile tanks is to attack initially by fire
from previously reconnoitered ambush positions
prior to the deployment off the roads by the hostilcl
armored force. After the hostilll deployment. ag-"
gressive action by fire and movement will be normal.
It is most desirable to effect surprise attacks on
tanks when they are in bivouac or assembly posi
tions. This is best accomplished late in the day or
in early morning, and will be performed by the
tank destroyer personnel, who have special
training for this particular type of attack.
Action of destroyer units is characterized by mis
sion tactics and decentralization.. together with
frequent alterations of original missions, or assign
ment of entirely new tasks. Despite the high degree
of control permitted by abundant radio equipment _
of destroyer units, the rapid development of mech- .
ani zed combat requires maximum initiative and re
sourcefulness on the part of all destroyer personnel.
When the position occupied by destroyers is by
passed by hostile tanks, and no target is visible in
the area originally assigned, destroyers move to
seek out and destroy tanks which have passed them.
Necessity for instant action will usually preclude the
obtaining of permission for such movement; loss of
touch with immediate superiors is promptly reme
died. The extent of such movements varies with
the terrain and the size of the unit concerned. Pla
toon leaders may move thei r units several hundred
yards on their own initiative, squad leaders normally
make only short moves to 8upplementary positions
without orders from their superiors. In the absence
of other orders. companies. platoons and sections
which are sent into areas where tanks do not appear,
will assist adjacent units which are engaged, or seek
tanks reported in nearby areas. In such cases they
leave a minimum force to accomplish the 'original
mISSIOn. Changes in position as indicated are
promptly reported.
The frontage covered or the size of the area as
signed destroyer units for operation depends on
many considerations including the strength and mis
sion of units, the terrain, the enemy to be en
countered and the support of other troops. Large
areas of operation, assigned through neeessity, are
covered by holding a unit under control in a central
location 01' by leaving gaps between subordinate ele
ments. Mobility of destroyers allows them to shift
rapidly from one position to another, except against
a powerful'force developed over a broad front. A
destroyer unit can operate effectively in an area
considerably larger than that which it actually oc
Emplacement of self-propelled mounts in a static
defense is sometimes necessitated by the situation.
This is not the type of combat for which tank de
stroyers are intended and as soon as practicable,
destroyers in static defense positions are relieved by
towed guns.
In conclusion, the action of the tank destroyer ness, resourcefulness, and fighting spirit of the sub
battalion is based upon a mission type order, and ordinate leaders. They must act on the situation
they are committed at the proper time by the tank existing in the area where they are fighting. They
destroyer hattalion commander; but for execution, must be determined to hunt tanks and to destroy
reliance must be made on the initiative, aggressive them whenever found.
The Services of Supply Staff Course
COLONEL WALTER A. PASHLEY, Quartermasiel' Corps
Director. Services of Supply Staff Course
During World War I, some ribald wag with a flair
for odious comparisons, com{lOsed a martial ditty,
the theme of which was: "Mother, Mother, take
down that service flag, your son's in the SOS !"
Whether the chant represented an opinion univer
sally held by "ank and file is a moot question. How
ever, it must he remembered that in 1917, there
was little or no appreciatlon of the vast supply job
at hand, and no conception of the importance of the
Services of Supply in ,the picture. There were no
Corps Areas, no Service Commands, but there were
a number of supply services, ea-ch one competing for
the resources of the country, in order to get a job
done. Neither the War Department. the Services,
the Governmcnt, nor the country at lar!!e was pre
pared for the vast supply Job at hand. Yet, on the
day the ArmIstice was signed, the ratio of SOS
men behmd the man behind the gun stood at 7 to 1.
TodaJ', thp entire world is supply conscious. The
Services of Supply is acknowledged to be in the
fight as much as anybody else. Frequently, supply
troops must precede combat units overseas to pave
the way. They are subject to attacks by air and
mechanized forces. Occasions have arisen when
there has been' as much fighting and action in the
rear installations as in the front lines. The SOS
has come into its rightful heritage.
But III the present war, as our rapid expansion
bpgan to take form, virtually all of our experienced
officers were dispersed to field forces and installa
tions throughout the world. Servke Command
organizations and ma.lor supply installations were
seriously affected. It became apparent that instruc
tion and training would have to be introduced to
produce staff officers for such jobs.
To meet this need, under the leadership of Major
General Karl Truesdell, the Commandant of the
Command and General Staff School, a Services of
Supply Staff Course was started on July 11, 1942 at
Fort Leavenworth-a course which had no parallel
in the history of the Army.
Already gra'1!uates of the and Second SOSS
Classes are filling important jobs in seve"ai con
tinents. Many have found themselves overseas as
quickly as officers of tactical units. The demand for
graduates of the SOSS Course for staff jobs out
side the United States has increased by leaps and
The SOSS Course operates for nine weeks con
currently with the General Staff Course, and its
mission is to train selected officers for duty on the
staffs of Service Commands, Zone of Interior and
Communications Zone installations. The curriculum
emphasizes the organization and functions of the
Services of Supply. the operation of civilian agen
cies engaged in the war effort and the supply sys
tem of the Army, but it also includes common and
basic subjects which should be known to all staff
Consisting of approximately 365 hours of work,
the SOS Staff Course is set up for instructional
purposes into five divisions-operating, personnel,
intellIgence and public relations, transportation, and
supply. Conferences occupy 101 hours and applica'
tory exercises 264 hours.
Some of the reneral and baSIC subjects are taught
jointly with the General Staff Course. These in
Organization of the Army, the ground forces,
air forces and Services of Supply, and their func
Organization and characteristics of infantry,
motorized, armored and cavalry divisions and their
capabilities and limitations.
Duties and functions of division staff officers
including instruction in keeping staff records and
reports, map and aerial photo reading, mainte
nance of situation maps, use of orders and opera
tions maps, evaluation and dissemination of mili
tary information, counter-intelligence methods
relations with the civil government.
Planning and execution of offensive and defen
sive operations, with staff cooperation and coordi
nation, in river crossings, desert operations, over
seas task forces, defense against air, antimechan
ized combat and coastal frontier defense.
Movement of troops by rail, motor and air, with.
preparation of march tables and graphs and traffic
control plans and problems. Included are instruc
tion in motor maintenance and combat recovery,
and exercises in formation of plans for training
and administration in motor maintenance.
Planning for and direction of training.
The SOS Staff Class attends conferences which
consider the current world situation, and exercises
which study the organization and characteristics of
German and Japanese Divisions, and methods of
psychological warfare, jungle, desert, mountain and
night operations. \ .
In its own field of specializatt?n, the SOS Staff
Course stresses the organization. and function of
the principal SOS installations and governmental
agencies, supply, transportation, personnel, internal
security and public relations. Conferences and exer
cises given only to the SOS Staff Class focus atten
tion on the national organization for war, and the
missions and relationships to the Army of federal
and state departments, boards, commissions and
independent agencies particularly in matters of sup
ply, personnel and internal security. The application
of principles of industrial organization and manage
ment to the military establishment is also considered.
Detailed study is given to all the Services of the
Army. Conferences treat of the organization of the
Supply Services, the Administrative Services, the
Control Officer Group, the Service Command and the
Service Command Units at posts, camps and stations.
Emphasis, likewise, is placed on matters of supply
including planning, utilization and exploitation of
resources, raw materials, conservation. recovery and
salvage. Procurement and distribution are con
sidered under the topics of priorities, organization
and operation of depots, classification, distribution
and issue, dehydration and refrigeration, and stor
age, including certain aspects of the problems of Air
Force supply.
Transportation subjects range from the Office of
Defense Transportation to operation of regulating
,tations in the Zone of Interior and the Communica
t ions Zone, with attention being directed enroute to
the transportation situation in the United States,
transportation facilities in our territories and selec
ted foreign nations, control of freight and person
nel movements, ocean shipping, ports of embarkation
and debarkation, and the Maritime Commission.
Conferences and applicatory exercises deal with
internaJ.. security plans and operations 'in disasters,
disorders and subversive 'Evacuation of
civilians and prisoners of war, and the War Reloca
tion Authority are included. Matters of construc
tion, real estate and utilities, and relationships of
SOS installations with division, district and post
engineers are covered.
Full consideration is given to suBjects concerning
personnel, with problems of selective service and
induction being coupled with a visit to the Fort
Leavenworth Reception Center, and stress being ap
plied to assignment and classification, replacements,
morale, procurement of officers and civilian person
nel and civilian personnel management and adminis
tration. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, the
War time labor situation, and the War Manpower
Commission are included. The Army Postal Serv
ice also receives consideration.
Numerous opportunities are afforded in the curri
culum for the practical application, by the students,
of the principles presented to them in conferences
and exercises. Among others are exercises in the
preparation of a general supply plan for an expedi
tionary force, a map maneuver' in which a port of
embarkation and elements of Communications Zone
and an Air Service Command are played and a com
bined tactical ride and map exercise involving prep
aration of plans for internal security, disaster relief
and counter fifth column measures.
The specialized work of the course is presented in
a building prepared especially for the SOS Staff
Classes. A century-old, block-long building, Stot
senburg Hall, south of the Command and General
Staff School's academic building has been modernized
and remodeled to contain the SOS Staff Course
Students' assembly rooms, faculty members' offices,
and a large lecture hall. The building was named
long since in honor of Captain John Stotsenburg, 6th
Cavalry, class of 1897, Infantry and Cavalry School,
who was killed in action April 23. 1899 at Quinqua,
Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Like the storied little red schoolhouse on the hill,
which ably played its role in the nation's history,
Stotsenburg Hall, and the facilities it houses, may be
destined to occupy an increasingly important part
of the Army's educational picture as the expanding
war program requires more and more officers effi
ciently trained for duty in Services of Supply spe
cialized fields.
The Officer and His Men
[Reprinted from Au CosantOlr (Dublin) JUly 1942.]
The /il'st l'esponstbihty of the
eel lS not ntel ely to tram and to lead
Jus men, but to know them.
The obJect of all training- IS to turn a
man IOta a soldler. The observatIOns that
follow on the subJect of the "care of
men" a1 e not offered out of particular
sohcltude for the man's f'.Qul. feet or
stomach; nor are they with
the vague Intention of "helpIng an offi
cer wlth hIs work" They arc Wrttten
solely and specIfically to enable an officer
to see that his men are fit and competent
to play thelr pmt on a modern battle
field. There is her' no questIOn of "pam
pering the soldier" For the officer the
only question at issue is "How do I ill
sur' that my men shall gIve of then' best
In No officer can afford to OVE'T
look the stark fact that at the end 'of all
trammg IS the battlefield. The final test
of hIs work IS only to be discovered on
the battlefield.
Care of Men
"Care of Men" IS a neceSl'oary founda
tIOn of all 5uccessful trammg The man
who IS discontented and unwillmg to
learn takes longer to tram, and can never
reach a satisfactory standard of
A rea50nable deg"Iee of Teceptw1ty c.n
the part of the pupIl 15 mdlspensable to
every This receptivity on the
part of the man must be largely influ
enced by the personal factors affectmg
his prtvate hfe_ These personal factors
thus become oft basIc Importance III his
mliltary career; and an officer's responsI
bIlity begins at thiS foundatIOnal point.
At no hour of the day or mght IS he
absolved from thIS re-sponslblhty; thE"
Army does not put l1p the shutters or
close the office door at half-past five. In
ClVl! Hfe a managE'I' or foreman "is Te
::.ponslble for his staff or his "gang" for
some seven or eight hours of the day.
The officer is responsible for hIS men for
twenty-four hours each amI every day.
Two thousand five hundred years ago
one of the great commandeI of hIstory
told his junIOr officers that their first
duty was to see that their men were
"happy"; the rest would follow. The
dler of today may have been invested
with weapons the ancients never knew;
hut he rpmams a man-and not merruy
an automaton rlgged out ill battle dress.
Mental Background
The first responsibIhty of the officer is
not merely to train and to lead his men,
but to know them Although he may know
every trallllOg manual by heart, If he
cannot claIm to know his men he fails
as an officer. He mustel:ucIdate for hIm
self theIr mental background. He must
find out what they are and what
are theIr worries. The officer who VIsits
hIS men at meal times and ca11s out "any
complaints?" IS merely asking for the al
most mevitable response-a response as
meanmgless and automatic as the
tion ltself_
An officer who is really domg his job
WIll &ee for himself and check up. Men
will show a queer loyalty even to an un
satisfactory they Will rarely COm
plam over hIS head to a senior officer
The mtelligf'nt officer will ask, "Are the
dmners good today,!--Are the potatoes
better than they were yesterday?" and
rIng the OhVlOUS variatIOns. 1 he puts
parrot questIOns, he must expect parrot
If a complamt should be forthcommg
on any topic whatsoever I he should neve-r
regard It as frivolous - unless It happens
to be nothing more than
grousmg_ No complaint can be entlrely
frivolous If It is put forward In all sen
[f there IS nothing III the com
plumt itself, the indicatlOn 1<;> that the
man's mental background IS at fauh
and thIS IS hIS officer's responsibility. It
is perfectly well reahzed that an officer
can -only hope to penetrate thiS mental
background through imaginative
pathy and an understandmg' of human
nature and that these qualities of the
mind cannot be acqUlred as a result of
some external injunction.
they are likely to be developed unconscI
ously If the officer continually addresses
hIS milld to the simple questIOn, "What
httle thing more can I do for my men?"
There IS no surer way for an officer to
get to know hiS men than to take part III
their games and to aSSIst in their organi
ZatIOn. His platoon or his company, lll
stead of taking on the complexIOn of a
sohd wad of raw humanity, will become
a collection of mdlViduals, a knowledge
of whose character will stand hIm in
good stead under the supreme test of bat
tIe. It may further be noted that one un
questIOned lesson of war is that regular
healthy recreation for all men III camp
and, when possible, in the field IS as
sential a part of the soldier's profession
as his routine training.
The Officer's Military Background
The complement to the man's "mental
background" must be the officer's
tary background. It is a quality of the
mind he can never hope to until
he stops thinking of himself as a civilian.
Both on and off duty he must remember
that the uniform he wears indicates an
assumptIon of responslb111ty far in ex
cess of his former civilIan responsibilities
-whatever their nature. In war he is
re'3ponsible not only for the welfare but
for thf' lives of his men. He must get to
"know the Army" and to think in terms
of the Anny_
To "know the Army" is a conditIon of
spIritual awareness of a great comrade_
f'ohip that can only come as a result of
mtlmacy and experience. but to "think
in terms of the Army" is largely a mat
ter of takmg thought_ In civilian life in
an mdustrIalIzed country the CIvilian is
asked to do less and less thInkmg for
himself; he is rarely flung back on hIS
own qualItIes and initiative and resource
fulness; the convenience and luxuries of
life are "laid on"; one turns a tap or
puts the money on the counter. Life in
the Army, under actIve service condi
tIOns, repre'3ents something in the nature
of a reverSlOn to a past age. The indi.
Vidual is largely thrown back upon his
own and although these
sources may bE" forth('ommg from the
milllstrative services, it is still the re
spon::-lbihty of the mdividual to see that
they are used to best advantage.
The rations may be the same along the
length of the line, but the dinners will
1'aJ y accol'(fl1lU to the trouble that has
b.;:en taken over them, and the wise offi
cer WIll recollect that, In war, a hot meal
before gomg into actIOn represents a
mforcement of morale out of all pro
pbrtIOn to the trouble and ingenuity its
preparatIOn demands.
In ciVilIan hfe the art'of improvisation
15 rarely Imposed on the mdividual; in
the Army the officer must regard it as a
matter of course.
If hiS men are wet through and the
billets destItute of any form of heating
and Jf there 15 coal or wood anywhere
within transportable distance, he wiII not
settle down to his own dinner until the
men's clothes are being dried and the
blUets warmed; nor, if their stay in them
is to be prolonged, will he be satisfied
WIth these biUets until he has contrived
t(l introduce as many smal1 comforts as
The art of improvisatIOn needs to be
exercIsed to the full under really difficult
conditions; and in these days of air war
fare. when commUnIcatIOns and supplies
are likely to be Interrupted to a degree
never experienced in the last war. the of
fheer can never be certain that he will
not suddenly be thrown back upon hIS
own resources of ingenuity and determin
It WIll be apparent from these observa
tions that an officer who moves about his
work WIth thIS military background to
hIS day by day actIVIties IS asked to as
sume a habit of thought that must be
rome second nature to hml.
Cooperation With Civilians
When an officer IS called upon to Im
prOVIse the essential comforts of hfe for
hI:. men, he Will almo">t certnmly find it
necessary to secure clvlltan cooperatIOn.
He need not doubt that thiS ciVIlIan co
operation will be readIly avaIlable If he
:.hows tact and conslderatlOn m hIS reo
He must not walt for his men to show
the necessary ImttatIve. It IS unquestion
ab1e that the average soldier displays a
cllilOUS dIffidence about approaching 10
mhabltants for such aSSIstance as
they might easily render. His uniform
puts hInI In a race apart from the gen
eral run of CIVIlian hfe. and If he be
longs to some isolated detachment he will
prefer to go WIthout some
small thlllg rather than knoL'k at some
cIvIlIan door.
The officer must mtervene on hlh be
half. An officer's umfollu should not be
necessary to !;ecure such obvIOUS ameni
ties for his troops, bllt the fact remams
that It works lIke a cha'rm, and the offi
eel" should not heSitate to flxerClse It on
behalf of hIS men.
In all such dealmgs WIth local inhabi
tants the officer must remembE'r that hIS
own attItude, and the behaVIOI' of hIS
tl'OOPS, will dIrectly mfluence the recep
tIOn accorded hIS successors. ThiS wal n
Ing has special reference to the conditwn
ill which the houses are left. It should
be a pOint of honol' and d(>cency to leave
them clean.
Finally, "\vhen tImeh are bad and It IS
h'yond the powers of improvisatlon of
officer to reheve them-If, for ex
lLmple. a detachm'nt Ih stranded durmg a
move through some vagary of the weath
(>I'-It must be understood that the offi
t e1" sticks It out WIth hIS men
Health of Troops
If hiS men keep going SIck tt l-S the
of the to find O1d why. More
often than not a man who goes SIck rep
I esents a bad mark against his own ad
l1unistratIOn. If there appears to be some
thmg fundamentally wrong WIth a man's
health he should see that the M. O.
(Medical Officer) takes appropriate acw
tIOn. A persistently sick man is merely
a drag on the work of the battalion and a
waste of his instructors' time. Even in
an age of motorIzed and mechanized war
farc a soldier must be prepared to use
his feet; he must have teeth that wilJ
stand up to hard fare, and a body proof
against hardship and spells of privation.
If hiS men fail to take the strain. the
trouble will have dated back to a perIOd
when the officer fal1ed to look to the fu
On the other hand, if the officer
watches the men's feet, the v,ater they
drink, the food they eat, the clothes they
wear, and If there are any lIttle luxurIes
to be obtained WIthin 50 mIles of the Bat
talion Headquarters. the Quartermaster
chases after them, the men of the. Bat
taIton will never let the officers down.
They wIll go into actIOn III the SpirIt of
"We have the finest lot of officers In the
world and nothing is going to stop us ..
Brains On the Job
If a man IS fit and contented, an officer
should have lIttle difficulty With the prob_
lem5 of tratning; but behmd all the
regular routme of traming he should re
member that he has the general duty of
seemg that hIS men brmg their braIns
to bear on the wor\{ to which he put
them It is not enough that they shOUld
not be bored- and the first yawn shOUld
be regarded by the officer as a
Ing CrIticism of his powers of expositIOn.
Be must train them to use then eyes by
constantly questioning them on any
pOInts of detail WIth which they should
have become acquainted during the exerw
Clses; he must crack down on those who
dawdle on a skyline; he must deliver
fearful warnmgs to those who meander
across an Imaginary battleground. He
WIll do well to remember that In the last
war the constant cry of "Get down, get
down!" was in itself an mdictment of the
officers who utteterl It; and if any of hiS
men show a reluctance to move on their
be1hes durmg traming he should make
them realize that theIr chances of sur
VIval on a mOdern battlefield WIll be so
slight that theIr presence will merely
serve to encumber the work of the medI
cal and bUrial serVICe
He should also remind hImself that in
thIS Wal' every soldier is likely to be
called upon to acqUire somethmg of the
deftness and the adaptability of a mght
bird. and that a townsman WIll find hIm
self at a serious disadvantage If hIS
traIning IS not modified accordingly.
A n officer should Insure that his men
al"e gIven all possible information to take
an intelligent Interest In the general
SItuatIon-whether on an Imaginary bat
tlefield or under actual war condItions
The man who, in war, is utterly taken
by surprise and rendered Incapable of in
stant action is subject to the worst of all
fears-fear of the unknown. A man who
recognizes a bomb attack before the bemb
bursts has already half mastered the
Thus it may be said that It is an offi
eel's responsibility during training not
merely to fit his men for their work on
the bAttlefield but to insure that th{
shaH stand a chanee of survival, and liv
to fight another day. In the average ba
tIe W1th imperfectly trained troops only
small proportion of the casualtles can be
dhectly credited to the enemy. '1
Discipline and Punishments
"Care of men" must not be confused
with loving kindness. The officer must dis
cover for himself the border line between
considerate treatment and iron dIscipline.
Without dIscipline a collectIon of indi
viduals remains nothing more than a
collection of individuals and useless in
war as a fightIng weapon. No man can
succeed as an officer unless his men jump
to hIS least word of command It must
be admitted that such power of command
IS largely a matter of personalIty. Never
theless. any officer who endeavors to put
mto practice the precepts contained in
the foregoing paragraphs WIll have es
tablished between hImself and his men a
subtle bond that will hold even under the
strain of battle; he will be able to count
upon them to respond to his will.
Will power IS a quality of the mind
that an officer can cultivate only by a
stern resolve to do his job and to keep
hiS head In an emergency, b1,Jt the test
WIll be immeasurably less severe If he IS
conscious that hIS men are all out to help
It should be further noted that dis
CIpline WhICh depends for its maIn
tenance on punishments IS not' disciplIne
--:-that IS, the trainIng the m,ental,
moral and phYSical powers by mstruction
and exercIse-but a cowed state of sub
mIssion III authority. Spch "diSCIpline"
will assuredly crack under the test of
battle. The first rate officer will have but
little recourse to punishments. The cause
of any pUnIshment must mevltably be a
symptom of somethmg wrong III the body
of troops under hiS command; and if he
i':> ceaslessly mveStIgatIng the
"mental background," no symptom is like
ly to take him unawares. In particular
th' first-rate officer will avoid petty
pUnIshments. If he has to punish. he
should punish hard-after fair warning.
He should hImself conform to the high
standard of disciplIne he sets his men.
When he returns a salute he should use
hIS hand and not hIS sttck, and if he has
a cigarette III his mouth he should first
remove it.
Every pomt of conduct dIscussed in
the preceding paragraphs IS ultimately
directed to the question of morale. Good
morale 18 the first of the soldierly quali
ties-as it has always proved to be the
final arbitrament in war.
To the extent that the pomts dis
cussed can be reduced to a simple Every
day routme on the part of the officer and
the constant and patient exercise of quite
ordmary virtues, morale can be instilled
mto fighting troops: and any officer
whose work helps to sustam morale
makes a dIrect contribution to fighting
Alternatively, any lack 01' failure of
morale 15 equally hIS responsibIlity. The
essentIal chal aeterishes of the IrIsh race
have suffered neIther dimmutIon. nor
change during the past twenty years;
and every officer may take it that. if
thmgs go wrong, whether, it be a platoon
or In some hIgh formation, the fault is
with the officers of that platoon or forma
tlOll, and not with the men.
The officer has all the' advantages of
educatIon and enVIronment; even in the
heart of a campaign he IS pnabled to en
JOY more than a few of the amenities of
civilized hfe; by comparison. the private
soldier has to rough it and just stick It
out. whatever thp mmor amenitIes his of
fit-ers have been able to secure for him . .
The officer who is worthy of his rank will
nev:er blame his men for any deficiencies
In his command.
Finally, it may be observed that local
inadequacy of equipment provides no
excuse for any to implement the
adVice urgently offered in these para
graphs to those Juntor officers who today
find themselves Immediately responsible
for the well-being, the training, and the
fortunes In war of the Army.
Extrication from Combat: Retreat
The fol/owing artIcle comp,.;ses P"ob/em 17 of
General Rommel's book Aufgaben fur Zug und
Kompanie published in Berlin 111 19W. The book
cuncerned with planning and direction of comr
bat problems, /iring in action and map maneu
vcrs; and the object 0/ this pa,tieula,. exercise
is extrication /1'0111 combat, ,.et,.mt.-THE
Troop 11nit8.-1 rifle company, 1 heavy machine
gun platoon, 1 antitank gun, 1 group of messenger
Situatiol1.-(Given out onlIill H: see Sketch) A
Blue attack from the west against an enemy defend
ing himself on the line A-B has had little success up
to the afternoon of 12 June after many efforts. The
casualties are heavy.
The 1st Company of the 1st Infantry Regiment,
reinforced by 1machine-gun platoon and 1 antitank
gun, which has penetrated about 2000 yards into
the enemy's defensive zone, is in an extremely diffi
cult position by 7 PM. See Sketch!
The 1st platoon, 1 heavy machine-gun section and
the antitank gun are engaged in very heavy defensive
combat against strong enemy infantry with tanks,
who are attacking from the north and whose forward


u (, +



Isf Plat

/n/ of'J'" .>

"00 800Vd:.
elements have already approached within 400 yards.
The enemy troops opposite the 2d platoon are holding
Y IVoDd and have hitherto confined themselves to a
very active fire. The enemy 600 yards distant in
front of the 3d platoon which is also accompanied by
the 2d heavy machine-gun section, does not make
himself very conspicuous.
The adjacent units on the right and left are sepa
rated from the 3d platoon by a gap. They were still
in touch with one another an hour before in D Wood.
The open terrain between the company and D
Wood is being swept by the fire of the enemy machine
gun farther north.
At 6 :30 PM, the company coinmandeIt had re
ported the capture of JIIII H to the battalion and had
urgently requested support from the other elements
of the latter as well as a supply of ammunition and
material for use in close combat.
The following written order from the battalion has
just been delivered by a messenger dbg :
Battahon Command Post" Hunting Lodge,
D Wood I
6:50 PM, June
To the reinforced 1st Compa.ny:
The 1st Battalion is holding Hl11s 178 and 170 D
Wood against strong enemy from! the
north and northeast. It cannot be sUp'ported by the 1st
Company at present. The company wdl withdraw to the
southern slope of Hill 178.
The company hears a loud noise Iof battle (shell
and mine explosions, continuous machine-gun fire)
coming from a northwesterly direction.
Many enemy planes are circling about in the air.
Our own aviators cannot be seen at the time.
Condition of t,oops.-The troops are in a deter
mined, reliable mood in spite of great deprivationSJ
and hard fighting. Casualties so far are 25 percent.
The men had their food 16 hours pre
viously. - I
Ammunition situation.-There are still 40 rounds
per rifle, 2,000 rounds per light machine gun, 2,750
rounds per heavy machine gun, and 140 rounds for
the antitank gun. There are 50 hand grenades, 25
smoke hand-grenades, and 120 grenades for light
trench mortars.
Part /.-The troops are disposed in accordance
with the situation.
The exercise begins; the enemy in the north con
tinues his attack and the 1st Company acts on the
defensive. Before the company commander gives
an order, loud noise of battle is heard from the direc
tion of the 3d platoon. Soon afterward the following
message ani"es: "Enemy to the south is attacking;
reinforced 3d platoon will hold the height south of
Probable decision of company commande!': The
reinforced company will bold Hill H and the height
to the south until dusk, and will then retire as ordered
by the battalion. A message concerning this matter
will be sent to the battalion by messenger dog.
The enemy in the north and south is constantly
renewing his attacks. The former is reaching a
point 200 yards from the company, and the latter
a point 400 yards distalll
Umpires.-Indicate heavy enemy fire, announce
casualties, keep track of the consumption of ammu
Part II.-The supply of rifte ammunition melts
away mpidly owing to the violent fire of the de
fenders. At 7 :20 PM the umpires report the ammu
nition situation at the time: "20 rounds of ammuni
tion per rifle, 500 rounds per light machine gun, and
750 rounds per heavy machine gun are still on hand.
The casualties have increased to 30 percent." The
commanding officer makes it clear to the company
commander by describing the impressions of the
combat and the ammunition situation that the com
pany can no longer hold out until dusk.
I .. !
t1J .\
Company commander's decision.-Attack and
drive back the enemy in the north, then withdraw
from combat and retire to. the battalion. Deceive the
enemy in the east and south with regard to your in
tentions by means of a smoke screen and your fire.
At 7 :40 PM, the company commander gives the as
sembled platoon commanders the following orders:
1. The enemy has nearly enClreled us. A strong enemy
force IS attacking from the north In D Wood, the bat
talion. WhICh IS holding Hills 178 and 170.
2. Under these circumstances, the battalion can give
no support. The company has orders to withdraw to the
battalion on Hill 178.
3. It is possible to discontmue .combat immediately and
wlhdraw across the area between here and D Wood,
beaten by the enemy's fire. only by suffering heavy casual
tiP5. We can no longer hold out untIl du:::k. because the
company's ammunitIon supply is too low.
4. The company will make a surprIse attack upon the
enemy in the north at 8:05 PM, and drive him back; if
It succeeds. it WIll extricate Itself from combat and WIth
draw to the battalion in D Wood under the protection of
a smoke screen.
The followmg UllIts will attaC'k m the fl'ont line: 2d
platoon on the right, 1st platoon on the left, central
The platoons win tire while advancing dUl'ing the at
The attack will be discontinued at my order as soon as
the enemy has been thrown back.
Both platoons will then WIthdraw across that open area
behind D lVood by the shortest route, under the protection
of a smoke screen (each platoon has 8 smoke candles).
5. The heavy mach11le-gun platoon, together with the
light trench-mortar section of the 1st and 2d platoons,
which have been assigned to It. wIll support the attack
toward the north from this hill. It wlll open tire at a
signal from me.

, :s 5"''' Dk
--------- ----"
As soon as the attacking troops are endangered, the
platoon wIll shIft Its til e to the east and south and will
neutralize the enemy troops there until both platoons
attacking toward the north Withdraw from combat. The
reinforced heavy machine-gun platoon WIll retire to D
Wood with these platoons.
The antitank gun will protect the troops from enemy
tanks whIle they are attacking anfl withdrawing from
combat. It, also, will retire with the 1st and 2.d platoons.
6. The Jd platoon wlll neutralize the enemy forces in
the east and south during the attack and will deceive
them by smoke and fire with regard to an eastward-di
rected attack of its own. The severely wounded will be
carried back to D Wood with elements of the 3d platoon
when the troops begin to Withdraw froin combat. The
other platoon will cover the withdrawal of the heavy
machine-gun platoon and antItank gun, and will then
also retire under the protection of a smoke screen.
7. I shall advance between the 1st and 2d platoon dur
mg the attack. Countersign: Victory or death!
Time for watches: It is now 7:45 PM; repeat mis
The platoon commanders order their platoons to
prepare for the attack. The enemy is delivering a
rapid fire in the north, but little fire in the east and
south. Obse1'1'eJ' with the enemy: Can anything be
seen of the preparations for the attack?
Po"t IfI.-E.l'ecutlOll of attaek: c.rtrication jl'Oln
combat, and withdrawal.
The enemy: Part of the enemy forces in the north
are out of action and part have withdrawn, They
are delivering a rapid fire in the east and south!
Obse1'1'el' with the enemy: Does the attack come as
a surprise? How long does It take the Blue platoons
to get out of range of the fire aimed at them 011 with
drawing from combat through the smoke screen?
Umpil'('s.-De.8ignate several riflemen in each pla
toon as severely wounded during the attack. Watch
and see whether the sewrely wounded men are car
ried back during the withdrawal! Indicate enem:,
fire, especially when the troops are extricating them
selves from combat I
Wd'h'l ftn< -,
The Jap Fighting Man
Thp follo/I"luq (lJ tide i.-: {JUsed Oil I1IfnrmatwlI
contUlued l1l (( lecture d(ll'l'f'J cd tit till' Command
und G( fletal Staff Schuol by LieuteNant ('alnud
WIIlI'ell .J (,["(I)', G.S C.-THE EDITOR.
"The Japanese Army b a powerful, tough, well
organized force that has demonstrated ueyond any
doubt its ability to keep the field undel' the most ad
verse conditions. Its common soldiers have endured
privations, starvations and hardshIps that would
emasculate the resiRtance of a
army in SlX months. They have a well-nigh phe
nominal skill III fighting ,n mountain and Jungle
coulltry. TH;,y have a mastery of offensive fighting
that can be acqllirerl only with the expenditure of
"It is an army of veterans, hardened and blooded
by ten ),'ears of intermittent warfare in China. It
kno\vs the of war, the smaIl of SUl'
vh'aI, the cunning. the hard 'York. and the pIp-asurp:.,
of victory."
ThIS statement by Colonel rlear bring. liP the
qUCRtions of what lype of man makes up this super
army, how is he trhined, and what is his balxground.
The little yellow man is small, averaging 11w feet
three inche, tall and weighing about 118 pounds.
He can live 6n a handful of rice and a little dried fIsh
a day. He is one hundred percent literate and a
tough soldier in the bargain
From the first day that he toddles off to school, the
efforts of the military factions in Japan are seen in
the start of his education III Bushido ideology.' Un
til he is twelye, the Jap boy is infused with this
ideology. He struts about the schoolyard in imita
tion of soldiers, sings military songs, and carries his
schoolbooks in a minature military pack. Upon
reaching the age of twelve he wears a uniform re
plete with all the accessories and carries a light rifle,
At this age, also, he participates in his first army ma
neu,'ers under direction of army officers who teach
hIm, among other campaign practices, to handle light
field-guns and hurl dummy grenades. By the time he
is fifteen, the Japanese learns to charge viciously
with the bayonet, to throw live grenades and drive
plywood tanks. "At eighteen he has already marched
twentyfi"e mIles III One day with hlS school battalion,
rifte, pack, and all; dug trenches, filled in lall'ines;
strung barbed wire; acquired some degree of pro
fiCIency in mapPJng and a basic knowledge of soldier
ing." Thus when a young Jap reports for duty with
the army, his commanding officer knows that the ma
terial is quite weli broken in,
ConscrIpts reporting for duty at the age of nine
teen are treated with great respect by the people of
their town who turn out en masse in a solemn
, mony to honor them before their departure for army
d;,ty. Solemnly charged by the mayor of the town
and an army officer, the recruits spend the last night
at home in making obeisances to the emperor and to
*Bushido. "The way of the warrior," was the ('ode of the
SamuraI .. rt was thE' growth of centurIes of clan warfare
and finally ueveloped into a catalog of statutes of mihtary
conduct. . The hIgh standard of loyalty It demanded HI
the service of the feudal lord often Impf'lIed the warrior of
old Japan to SE'E'k voluntary death (hara-kIri) that required
a power of self-command and phYSIcal courage equal to any
ordeals faced by men in the most herOIC actlOns in European
hIstory and Colonel Clear states.
their ancestors and in contemplating the glorious
position of a soldier in Japan's army.
A most important part of the Japanese soldier's
indoctrination is that of his devotion to the emperor,
who is to him the incarnate Supreme Being or God
himself. The whole of this part of his education is
pointed to the unimportance of the individual and
the great importance of cooperative action of the
whole in the service of the emperor. Death is "lighter
than a feather," in fact to be desired if for the sake
of the emperor. This fact coupled with the careful
training, mental and physical, in preparation for the
savagery of battle takes care of the morale condition
of the Jap soldier.
Throughout the Japanese Army there is an at
tempt to play up the attitude of paternalism. This
reaches its highest exemplification in the spirit of
paternalism expressed between the emperor and each
one of his subjects, who feels that he is sprung from
the Son of Heaven. The fatherly attitude is carried
right through the army where the colonel of the
regiment constantly impresses on his men his pa
ternal attachment for each individual. Filial defer
ence, or piety, is carefully kept at its highest peak
by daily devotions to the emporor, to spirits of de
parted ancestors, and to the respective parents of the
Upon taking up his duty with the m'iny, a Jap
soldier is faced with rigorous training. His day is
long, the military duties and maneuvers so hard as to
be almost unbelievable to a western mind. He has a
garrison ration on which most western soldiers could
not exist: a bowl of soya-bean curd suffices for break
fast; rice, with perhaps a few scraps of pickled fish,
constitutes lunch; and dinner ordinarily is made up
of raw fish, sake (the Japanese wine) and some rice
and sugared beans. The field ration, which makes
the garrison ration look like "sumptuous fare," con
sists of a small tin of canned beef a11'd some hard
As for the rigors of field training, an instance is
described by Colonel Clear of a forced march during
maneuvers in which an infantry regiment marched
one hundred twenty-two miles in seventy-two hours
under rifle, one hundred fifty rounds of ammunition
and a forty-five pound pack with only four hours
sleep taken at the half-way mark after digging 600
yards of trenches. And to cap it all, during the last
mile the commander gave the command to double
time the march into the regimental area. When it
was brought out that the action was only a maneuver,
the Jap CO replied, "Maneuvers are war as far as I
am concerned."
In another instance when the technique of pene
trating wired-in positions was stressed, "the leading
echelons would throw themselves, face down, their
arms folded over their eyes, into the belts of barbed
wire; and succeeding echelons would leap on and
over the human bridge of their prostrate comrades."
It has been noted by observers that no matter how
hard and long the march or how exhausting the field
maneuvers or trench-digging, all the soldiers will
manage to find water and soap with which to scrub
themselves vigorously when the day is over. Follow
ing this, all weapons, including the bayonet, which
is o ~ e of the Jap soldier's favorite weapons, receive
a careful and scrutinous cleaning. Testimony of this
fact may be noted in that no weapons captured in t4e
Far East contained any rust, and all were in excel
lent and clean condition.
You have no enemies you say?
Alas, my friend! The boast is poor!
He who hath mingled in the fray of duty which the brave endure,
Must have made foes.
If you have none-small is the work that you have done.
You've smitten no traitor on the hip,
You've dashed no cup from perjured lip,
You've turned no wrong into a right,
You've been a coward in the fight!
( Anonymou..)
-0-0- Shropn.
Anftlank mine barncade.
Passage through mines for
) (
listeningpO.5/s ~ scou/iflg froops
IA Dressing slallon.
This drawing shows a diagrammatical section of a German
dIvIsion's defense position. It is typical of defense posltions
In the cenhal and northern fronts in the U.S.S.R. A heavy
German Defense Position
black line denotes the main line of resistance which is rein
forced by all manner of obstacles such as shrapnel-mine bar
In the East
rIcades. antitank mine barricades. "Spanish ridf .5," other
types of wire entanglements, bunkers. listening posts and
scouting troops. The battalion command post is located not far
from the main line of defense; further to the rear are found
l he command posts of the dIVIsIOns and the army
:orps. The broken lines to the right and left show the bound
,Hies of the divisional sector (in this drawmg it is an infantry
livision.) Near the main line of resistance and also farther
to the Tear are roads, entrances to villages, etc., defended by
antItank guns. Infantry guns stand in firing positions
trained on enemy targets. Medium artillery is in firing po
;itIon at some httle distance from the main line of combat.
Antiaircraft artillery protects the air ahove the division
",ector. There are no tanks to be seen due to the fact that
we are dealIng here with a purely defensive position, and
the tank is an offensive weapon. The straight lines between
the command posts and headquarters denote telephone lines
or radio connections.
-From Die W.hrmacht
Training Problems
Tul(!f( fllJln a platform talk given to ne'wly urrtve'd mstructors at the
Command and General Staff School "
Instl'u('tOl', Command and General Staff Sehool
Each time our country decide" it ha" become nece"
sary to "whip up an army" one of the fir"t pre'8ing
problems is training, and ,,,hen you. speak of training
the problem is instructors.
Expan::llon of our peace time army to a force forty
or fifty times its size is a difficult and vital problem
if we are to have a real army.
A soldIer learne best by (/oill<l; the Army has al
way:-o followed the ((]Jpllcntm'lI system with the stu
dent actually carrying out the uperations arising
from instruction under the guidance of an instructor.
The logic of employing the applicatory system to
troop training- in time of v:ar is obvious. However,
it does prpsent a major problem. Where can we ob
tain sufficient qualified instructors:)
After all, the art of soldiering requires the devel
opment of numerOUR skills, each of which involves
af'tual practice. How can we break our masses of
rE'Cl'UitR into small enough groupR to permit adequate
supervision of their practical work by qualified in
Too many men under a SIngle instructor
handicaps supervision of recruit efforts and conse
quently adversely affects progreRS. On the other
hand to decentralizp instruction to numerous
qualIfied instructors handicaps reRUltR both as to
Htandard and standardIzation. Let us consider a
'. compromise to ,vhich, for purposes of reference. we
will tie the llamp tag "Centralized-Decentralized
I nstructioll."
Gnder thIS system one Instructor handles large
numbers of partially trained aSSIstants. each in turn
handling a'small group of a squad or less. The setup
.' should permit detailed direction of the efforts of the
assi:::.tants either by loud or by frequent. rap
Id as;embly of the assistants around the instructor.
The subject is then broken down into a series of short
each il1ltiaten by detailed instructions gIven the
as:-.istants to inslire uniform and Rtandard super
vision of i\ldividual practice within the small groups.
lnstruction in a procedure requiring the development
of practical skill that the Il1structor no the
I. Set the standard.
(Explanation and demonstration of the pro
2. Mirror the fault.
(Physical demonstration to the student of
his mistakes)
:1. Suggest the cure.
(Analyze the reason for the failure and open
to the student a new and effective approach).
Note that the method outlined permits centralized
control of step 1, complete decentralization of prac
tice (including step 2), with at least partial control
of the last and most important step.
We are all familiar with the use of this method in
"coach and pupil" pairing for marksmanship as well
.. as in the four-man groups used in weapon mechanical
training but its application is sometimes neglected in
such subjects as scouting and patrolling, use of
ground and cover, tactical principles of small units
and other subjects not definitely l'Outined but which
still require the development of practical individual
While both the need and application of the "appli
catory" method are obvious in the troop training of
small units, the fact that it is equally essential in our
problem is usually overlooked. Mass production of
large groups of general staff officers by short courses
requires maximum effort to make all
stick-i.e., "applicatory instmction."
During the latter part of the course the problem is
SImple. ;\1ap exerCIses, terrain rides and map maneu
vers all force Lhe student to apply what he knows
specifically and practically, prOVIded, of course, the
problem is well drawn and the "tudent actually lives
his part. Rut before he can apply he must have some
thing to apply and it is in "grounding" him in the
necessary fundamentals or basic techniques of the
staff officer that we run 111to difficulties, often the
result of our large classes.
A compromise between a conference or exercise
conducted a" a lecture on the one hand, and the
plunging of the student into water beyond his depth
on the other muet be worked out.
In listening to a lecture the student gets
dIgested food." Since he makes little effort, he re
members very little. It's a case of easy come easy go.
A few days later he can recall little of what was said
and less of how to apply the few facts he does recall.
If we use the analogy of swimming instruction it is
comparable to watching the instructor swim. On the
other hand if the student is at once confronted with a
stiuation completely beyond his ability to solve and
left on his own to sink 01' swim, it cannot be said that
he is being given instruction any more than is the
youngster who is beaved off the boat into deep water
and told to "swim or else."
Therefore we must take our subjects, analyze them
and break each into steps-to permit a sort of "by
the numbers" execution. Each such step must re
quire of the student his oWn solution but one within
his abilities.
The sum of several of these partial solutions should
"open the door" to the answer which the student
would have been unable to reach alone and unguided.
Let us consider a concrete case. In an early prob
lem you will recall that the elllss, each as a G-3 of a
flank (main attack) division. was required to decide
what to include in a C-3 estimate to be presented to
the division commander.
This is a pretty large order to be worked out un
guided at this stage of the course. You will recall
the estimate was divided into steps or subdivisions.
One of these subdivisions dealt with the attack for
matinn to be recommended. At this time even this
is too difficult a (jroblem to be worked out unaided.
Let us. therefore, hreak down this problem of "for
mation" into a series of questions each within the
ability of the student to answer, the total of these
answers to hold the solution.
1. Consider first, do we have definite Information
of the enemy and little space for enveloping ma
neuver or are we located on a flank with incomplete
information of the enemy but ample room for mao
Since the situation pictures an open flank beyond
the limit of the organized position. with ample room
for maneuver the situation should obviously indicate
the latter alternative.
2. Which formation will give greater flexibility to
maneuver to meet the developments of an indefinite
situation; a formation of "line of regiments" with all
three regiments initially assigned missions and zones,
or a formation of "column of regiments" where only
one regiment is employed leaving two in reserve
ready to meet any situation which may develop?
Again the question is ,uch that the student should
be able to arrive at the correct answer: Column.
3. If we decide to attack in column of regiment,.
on how wide a front could we make a strong attack
(considering 1000 yards as the yardstick of maxi
mum battalion front for a strong attack) ?
Here the desired answer is 2000 yards since a regi
ment should rarely, if ever. attack employing all three
of its battalions initially. By developing this figure
after a show of hands on the alternatives of 2000 or
3000 yards. thi' fact may be driven home.
4. In this instance, on how wide a front do we de
sire to attack initially?
The situation indicates a front of about 3000 yards
if we include the flank of the organized hosti!e posi
tion and the approach.
Students should measure and determine this front
age individually. They will remember the procedure
because they have done the Job.
5. Since we must attack on a front of 3000 yards.
and since a battalion cannot develop a strong attack
on a front of more than 2000 yards, how can we at
tack in columns of regiments?
This requires a little consideration, but given time,
a volunteer will usually answer that if we place two
battalions in assault with the Iirattalion which is to
make the mam effort using the approach on a front
of 1000 yards, the other battalion can attack on the
interior 2000 yards, and we will still have one bat
talion of the leading regiment in reserve.
6. Since we are on an open flank, exposed both to
the north and west, what in our column
of regiments should be re ommended to offset the
The desired answer is to echelon the column forma
tion toward the north and thus have all regiments
ready to meet a sudden development from either west
or north with minimum loss of time. From this we
suggest as a thought to be considered always by a
flank umt: Echelnn tOleold dange,.!
7. Suppose ill this situation it is necessry to de
velop a strong attack on the entire 3000 yards? If
so, how must we modify our formation?
After allowing a little time for consideration and
again using volunteers. it can usually be developed
that th,s will involve using two regiments in
the main attack regiment disposed 'in column of
battalions on a narrow front and the interior (hold
ing attack) regiment employing two battalions in
line. Of course, this involves echeloning only one
regIment. in re,en'e, toward the right rear (north
east ).
8. Which of these two formations 'do you recom
mend in this instance?
This answer should be written and turned in to
maintain maximum interest. Thus we guide the class
to a choice between two formations 'where the balance
is very close. l'naided they would not, In many in
stances, have been able to reason through the entire
Yet finch of the "by the numbers"
tions involvpd tllrirprnrient thought within the
dent's ability. Further he finally builds up a mass of
knowledge from which to solve the question. He has
lrn1'11ed by dOIl1{/.
9. Does a division order usually indicate how many
battalions a regimental commander will engage? If
not, how will we indicate the formations we desire.
This question is usually a puzzler. The class should
be given enough time to realize that they do not
know the answer; that it is information they need.
The instructor can then develop that the mission as
signed. in combination with the terrain and frontage,
indicates the formation. For example. a regimental
commander given a front of 8000 yards on which to
launch a main attack would inevitably use two bat
talions, locating his main attack battalion on a nar
row front on fa"orable ten-am and giving the other
battalion the remainder of the zone. Similarly, if
two regiments were used on this front the one given
the wider frontage would use two battalions, the one
given the main attack on a '!arrow front should cer
tainly employ a column of battalions.
If time permits, the idea can be stressed that a
column formation is suitable in a vague situation or
one requiring maneuver, while a formation of
ments abreast develops early power to the front
against known resistance. This can be further
driven home by stepping outside the problem for a
moment. We could transfer our front of 3000 yards
to a situation where an interior division is making
a main attack by penetration against strong and
known resistance .. Here. with all three regiments
abreast, the main attack will be by one regiment with
three battalion. in column, while the other regiments.
each less a battalion (in diVision reserve), would
develop maximum power to their immediate fronts,
since all regimental headquarters and regimental
weapons should be employed to srtjiJport the assault
Furthermore a relief involving a passage of lines
could be executed without the confusion and inter
mingling which would be inevitable if one battalion
of the leading regiment had to be passed through by
a battalion of another regiment. .
I can hear you say "But all this takes time, some
thing we do not have." This brings up another vital
point for the instructor. When time is limited do not
reduce the time spent on individual important points.
Rather reduce the number of basic points you at
tempt to cover. Usually, it is Impossible to cover
adequately more than 4 01' 5 points in an hour. One
of the most important and agonizing duties of an
instructor is to pick those points. There are always
so many one would like to cover. Still, it is better to
deal adequately with five. rather than to give ten
points a quick "once over" which will confuse rather
than help the student. When you have made your
decision, stick. to it. Don't ramble! Those green
pasture8 that pop up as you are talking are men
aces; a void them.
In a short course, such as ours, the fundamentals
must be understood. Time is saved during the ad
vanced stages of the course by reducing the number
of times the student is required to apply the funda
mentals so as to "groove them in." No good can re
sult from starting him off on wobbly funrlal1ll'ntals.
Rear III mind also that we can conserve that vital
essential time by the efficient use of student home
study. The student's efforts must be pointed directly
along the desired lines of thought by pertinent study
A perfunctory "shotgun" reference to paragraphs
of the FSR may be an easy "out" but it will not
achieve results. Often the student will waste hours
on such an assignment working at a tangent to the
desired line. Use either study outlines, specific prob
lems or questions which develop the desired approach.
Frequently these may be the very questions discussed
during class. For example, the questions we have
just discussed might well have been used in addition
to others, as a study assignment for the map exercise
in question. What would have been the result in
your opinion? Would his study have been directed
along worthwhile lines?
Each stUdent would either have had an answer to
each question, in which case he would be on the alert
to see if he had "hit it on the nose," or else, realizing
that he could not answer the question, he would have
been alert to get it.
I wonder if we realize how, as instructors, we all
compete for the student's available interest or ability
to concentrate. Exposed as he is to information for
seven or eight hours a day. nature rapidly builds up
an immunity to information. This immunity be
comes progressively stronger as both the day and the
course grow older. Work must be presented so each
student has difficulty in evading it. It is not what
you say but what the "customer" takes away that
counts. Remember that. He gets out of a given
period just what he puts into it. Your prohlem is
not to present a polished address but rather to direct
his energies so he will get the maximum out of his
own efforts.
You will note we have said nothing of personal
appearance, voke or mannerism!;; of the instructor.
Each of Y0'1 should have someone check your voice
and mannerisms. however. Often one fails to realize
his own peculiarities. Many a or
"weight-shifter" is perfectly innocent. By now you
are all aware that an in.tructor should be careful
to avoid distracting attention from his subject to
In closing. bear in mind one last point. When you
are on the platform before a class of a thousand,
to how many persons are you talking? One and only
OI1P! Rut that aile must be each individual man in
the class. Each should feel that your words apply
particularly to him. Talk naturally, your mind jump
ing from idea to idea-not from word to word.
Remember, you talk to people .. not at them!
The School of Military Government
Commandant, School of Military Government
The military occupation of enemy territory sus
pends the operation of the eneMY's government in
the territory occupied. Under the Hague conven
tions, the occupant is then responsible for restoring
public order and safety. This is done by the military
forces under the command of the commanding gen
eral of the theater of operations, who is the military
governor. The exercise of military government is a
command responsibility, and the assistants to the
military governor are known as civil affairs officers.
They are the administrators of military government.
In none of our former experiences was the Army
prepared for this task. Military government was
established in the Coblenz area at the end of the last
war, and the officers detailed to the work, numbering
qbout 230, were compelled to learn their work as
they went along. It is a monument to their ingenuity
and resourcefulness that they accomplished as much
as they did. The lessons learned from that experi
ence were embodied in a report prepared by Colonel
I. L. Hunt, the officel' in charge of civil affairs of the
Third Army and American Forces in Germany. Col
onel Hunt expressed the hope that never again would
our Army be called upon for similar duties without
adequate preparation and training.
The Hunt Report was used as the principal basis
for the Army Field Manual, 27-5. Military Govern
ment, which lays down the policies and outline of
organization of military government, and postulates
the necessity of adequate training of officers for the
Unless we were to be as badly prepared as in all of
our past experiences. it was clear that intensive
training was required to prepare civil affairs officers
for their difficult and important task in many parts
of the world in this global war. The School of Mili
t ~ r y Government was accordingly established by the
War Department at Charlottesville, Virginia, for the
(raining of officers for subsequent detail in connec
tion with military government and liaison under the
<upervision of the Provost Marshal General. Facili
ties were furnished by the University of Virginia.
The first class commenced on May 9, 1942, and grad
uated on Augu"t 29, 1942. The second class followed
and will be succeeded by subsequent classes. The
graduates are available to commander" of thpaters
of operation, departments, task forces and others.
for military government, civil affairs and liaison
duties. A large portion of the first class are npw en
gaged in the performance of their duties in vari
ous parts of the world.
The School's system of instruction is analogous to
that used in the War College in past yeaTS. Lectures
are given by members of the faculty "nd by many
others drawn from colleges and universities and
various branches of the government. The class is
divided into committees to whom problems are issued
periodically for solution. These usually include an
estimate of the situation as existing in the particular
area under consideration, definite recommendations
for the organization, establishment and functioning
of military government in the area, a recommended
decision and a detailed plan. Solutions must be
based on the known facts which are set forth in a
survey made by the committee, and the committee
report is presented at a meeting of the class for dis
cussion and review. Lectures, reading and seminars
are geared up to current problems.. In this way a
student combines the acquisition of knowledge with
the application of what he learns to' existing circum
stances, and at the same time becomes familiar with
necessary staff procedure. The object is to train
him to be of practical use to his cOInmander in the
The curriculum includes courses on Army organi
zation and staff functioning. the international law of
military government, the American regulations,
American experiences in military government, the
experience of other countries, public administration,
politico-military backgrounds and liaison. The
principal enemy countries. as well as various special
areas, are given intensive study, including their sys
tem of government, political history, economics,
social psychology, geography and legal systems.
Problems require surveys of designated cities, states,
provinces, or countries, the data for whiCh are ob
tained from various sources, through the War De
partment and elsewhere. from libraries all over the
country and from visiting lecturers having special
knowledge of the areas under discussion.
A great amount of effort is included in the four
months' course, and the Sch60l has developed a defi
nite procedure for the organization and operation of
the civil affairs work in foreign territory. When oui
troops are invading hostile or semi-hostile territory
the first contacts with the civilian population are
made by the military police. It is usually impractical
to establish organized military government in the
combat zone. The immediate problems of tbe mainte
nance of law and order and the control of the civilian
population ahead of the zone of communications can
be handled by the military police and by civil affairs
. ~ .
officers sent forward for the purpose in accordance
with plans prepared by the civil affairs section at
General Headquarters and approved by the theater
commander. As the combat zone moves forward,
formal and organized military government may be
established in the zone of communications. The
over-all planning and supervision will be handled by
the civil affairs section on the staff of the theater
commander. Smaller sections on subordinate staffs
will engage in similar work for their units. Il}1ffiiny
cases, the organization, however, may be territorial
rather than tactical. If the invaded area is divided
into appropriate subdivisions, an officer in charge of
civil affairs may be appointed for each subdivision
and an appropriate staff assigned to him. Where
larger cities or countries are included, there may be
an officer in charge of civil affairs for each city or
country within the area.
It has to be borne in mind that the civil affairs sec
tion on the staff of the theater commander, once
organized, has no responsibility for the military
functions of other sections of the staff, and they have
none for the conduct of civil affairs, although they
will of course consult together and concert their
measures when necessary_ For this reason, the civil
affairs section at headquarters of large theaters of
operations should have its own coordinating group
under the officer in charge of civil affairs. The sec
tion differs in this respect from other staff sections.
Some idea of the functions of the civil affairs sec
tion may be conveyed by the statement that they in
clude all fiscal matters affecting the civil population,
such as currency, banks, and taxation; public works
and utilities, public safety, the judicial system, in
cluding both military comrrussions and provost courts
for the enforcement of the proclamations and ordi
nances of the theater commande'. as well as the su
pervision of the judicial system of the country; pub
lic education, including schools and colleges; public
welfare; p\lblic health and sanitation; and communi
cations. An extremely important function is that of
economics, which includes supervision of the agricul
ture, manufactures. and trade of the occupied terri
tory; its mined and oil wells; exports and imports,
food, fuel and other necessities, the supply of l"bor,
strikes, lock-outs, and disputes. and like matters.
Tbe functions of liaison officers are not so well
known, but they are of great importance in many
situations which are not conventional military gov
ernment or not military government in any sense.
Where' we have troops in friendly countries, the re
lationship between the commander and our troops on
the one hand and the civil population on the other
requires a staff officer or section to handle for the
commander the many questions and problems arising
that affect the troops. A knowledge of the country,
its people. government, habits, customs and eco
nomics is vitally necessary in order to prevent mis
takes, assure smooth cooperation and obtain the best
results. With this knowledge must be coupled an
<understanding of technique and of methods most
likely to secure desired results. Training and in
struction in these subjects is an essential part of the
training program.
Many intermediate situations may arise, and the
trained civil affairs officer must be prepared with
proper solutions for them. For this reason instruc
tion and training must be pointed towards intelligent
thinking rather than rigid or routine solutions.
The School of Military Government is engaged in
the training of those who will be the administrators
of civil affairs in the field during the period of mili
tary necessity and until a civil government is set up
and recognized. It is not engaged in training pro
consuls. A large staff will be needed for the conduct
of civil affairs in occupied territory, and the grad
uates will be available to take their places in the ap
propriate sub-sections and divisions of the civil af
fairs section. Their work will be essentially admin
istrative. For this reason the school is not engaged
in technical training in the particular departments
of running railroads, water works, or telegraph lines,
hospitals, schools, bank, or business houses. The
training is designed to assist officers in preparation
for the administration of the various functions, and
many students already possess background qualifi
cations which will be of great value to them.
The policy laid down by the manual is to endeavor
to prevail upon local officials, engineers, doctors, and
others in occupied territory to continue their work.
However, it is recognized that American tecbnicians
may be required in various parts of the world and
that assistance will be needed from other depart
ments of the government. For this reason, the
School of Military Government is only a part of a
larger program which is in charge of the Military
Government Division in the Office of the Provost
Marshal General. In addition to the training of civil
affairs officers at the School, steps are being taken for
the training of junior assistants at the Military
Police schools, and of occupational military police,
and the selection and ultimate training of the neces
sary technicians. Moreover, the Division is engaged
in broad planning for military government with esti
mates prepared by the School.
The School of Military Government is both a train
ing institution and a laboratory for plans, estimates,
and doctrines that will be of assistance to our armies
in the field. A small graduate cadre concentrates on
this work with the assistance of the faculty.
The staff and faculty of the school have been drawn
both from the Army and from civil life. They in
clude men of wide experience in the subjects that are
dealt with.
The students are now selected both from the Army
and from civil life. Exceptionally qualified civilians
may be commissioned for the purpose. It is, of
course, important that only those of the highest
qualifications for the work should be chosen. F o ~
that reason, the final selection of recommendations
submitted by army and service command command
ers, chiefs of administrative services, and others, are
made by the School subject to the approval of the
Provost Marshal General.
While the civil affairs officer is not engaged in com
bat duty, the success of his efforts will have a direct
bearing on the success of the campaign. If he does
his work well the communications of the army will
be unhampered; food, ammunition, reinforcements
and replacements will arrive on time and the com
manding general will be able to employ his combat
troops without loss by large detachments for the pro
tection of his rear areas. On the other hand, if the
civil affairs work is done badly, revolt and sabotage
will occur in the rear areas. This will not only pre. ,
vent the steady flow of supplies to the combat 'zone
and seriously interfere with close cooperation be
tween that zone and the zone of communication, but
will also compel the use of tactical units to maintain
law and order, to control the civilian population and
to protect roads, railroads, telephone and telegraph
lines and other vital installations.
If the administration of civil affairs is marked by
harshness, injustice and oppression the civil popula
tion may be driven in desperation to the formation
of suicide squads of guerrillas on a scale sufficient to
require the use of large numbers of troops to sup
press them. We have seen this happen in countries
dealt with by t h ~ Nazis, with their harsh and inhu
man methods--the worst since Attila the Hun. On
the other hand, if the conduct of civil affairs is
marked by such an extremity of softness as to en
courage a hostile population to disobedience of neces
sary ordinances and provisions for the safety of our
troops, equally poor results will be obtained. Be
tween these extremes the theater commander and his
civil affairs section must steer their course.
History teaches, and the manual states, that mili
tary government should be mild rather than harsh.
"As military government is executed by force, it is
incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly
guided by the principles of justice, honor and hu
manity--virtues adorning a soldier even more than
other men for the very reason that he possesses the
power of his arms against the unarmed.
A military occupation marked by harshness, in
justice or' oppression leaves lasting resentment
against the occupying power in the hearts of the
people of the occupied territory and sows the seeds
of future war by tl:\em against the occupying power
when circumstances shall make this possible; where
as just, considerate and mild treatment of the gov
erned by the occupying army will convert enemies
into friends."
This doctrine emphatically does not mean that
military government must be lacking in firmness. On
the contrary no worthwhile results will be obtained,
particularly in the countries of our principal ene
mies, without firm and just enforcement of the rules
that are necessary for the maintenance of law and
order, for the protection of our troops and for the
safeguarding of the military government. This task
will be rendered easier by the American policy, and
by the provisions that will be made for the relief of
the civil population.
The mission of the School of Military Government
is clear. It is to train an increasing number of offi
cers in the principles, technique and application of
military government and liaison so that wherever
our troops go there will be trained personnel to as
sist the commanding general in his relations with the
civil popUlation, and in the vitally important task of
the military government of occupied territory so
long as military necessity e>lists.
The Practical Side of Court-Martial Trials
MAJOR ALLAN R. BROWNE, Judge Advocate General's Department
Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Every eligible officer in the Army will some day
run through the day's debris on his desk and dis
cover himself to be a "Judge, Trial Judge Advocate
or Defense Counsel" for trial on a court-martial.
Many have already had this experience.
When you are appointed you may immediately
suffer the reaction of chagrin, fear, dismay, interest
or boredom. Only that of interest is justified. As
suming that you are a tyro, you will have to learn
much. It is your duty to prepare yourself thoroughly
because you are charged with the responsibility of
decisions which can ruin the lives and disgrace the
families and relatives of and officers as well.
You should review your Manual /01' Co'u,'/s-Martial
at once. It is well to ascertain beforehand the gen
eral nature of the case to be heard and review the
elements of proof required by the Manual.
AssuJPe that you are appointed as a member of the
Court. '4lhe novelty of the judicial robe will soon
wear a\vay, but service on the court should never be
allowed to become routine. The subject matter is
not theoretical but involves the rights of flesh-and
blood human beings, Always remember this is a big
moment and a tremendously vital one to the accused.
Thercfvre. solemnity, fairness, decorum and dignity
are the ABC's of a court-martial hearing. This is
not the movies, a jack-rabbit or kangeroo court, but
a court-martial. of ancient and honorable lineage,
with a reputation to maintain. Examination of
nesses, no matter by whom, must ahvays he
plished with these thoughts in mind. Third degree
methods, badgering and brow-beating of witnesses,
no matter by what interrogator, must never be
countenanced. This does not mean that a strong
and, if necessary, severe and even lengthy cross-ex
amination should not be permitted in a proper case.
But extreme good Judgment and balance must be
observed at all times to the end that the hearing re
mains that of a judicial oody and not one of the
nature of a "sweat box." If the accused is found
guilty, the sentence should be announced without
omission of any ceremony and with full attention by
all persennel of the court. There is often a tendency
among busy officers to commence gathering up
papers, books, equipment and the like while the ac
cused is hearing the fateful words which usually
mean everything to his future. Thus an impression
is created of "slaughter house justice"-knock him
on the head and bring in the next victim. Such cas
ualness has no part in a hearing which to most of
those on trial is more to be dreaded than bUllets,
It will not be disputed that discipline cannot be
maintained unless prompt and suitable punishments
are meted out for infractions of regulations. A regu
lation is nothing but sounding brass, "full of sound
and fury, signifying nothing," unless it is enforced.
Its enforcement is ultimately in the hands of each
officer called to serve on a court-martial.
Prompt and certain justice is the greatest deter
rent to dereliction. It must be remembered along
this line that inadequate sentences and excessive
ones stand in the same shoes as destroyers of morale.
Therefore it would seem wise to determine upon a
sentence for the run of the mill offense of a given
type and using that figure as a yardstick, to vary the
sentence only as the facts show the particular case
to contain aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
This is particularly the case in sentences where the
maximum punishment is unlimited, notably in deser
tion cases (by far the majority of cases which courts
martial hear). It avails nothing to adjudge a violent
sentence, for example, when you know that the re
viewing authority has established a policy of sus
taining only a much lighter sentence in such a case.
Thus, in a certain Command, for instance, a sen
tence in an ordinary type desertion case will-under
the present policy-be held to one and one-half year's
confinement where the desertion is terminated by
apprehension and to one year when terminated by
surrender. A sentence greatly in excess of this
mean will not, in an average case, dignify the court
in the eyes of the soldiers, because the fact that it is
sawed down is bound to be discussed to the disad
vantage of ,the reputation of the "judiciary."
On the other hand, clemency is always for the re
viewing authority. A fail' sentence should be re
turned according to the facts. Thereafter, if it is
appropriate. it is perfectly proper to join in a request
for clemency addressed to the reviewing authority.
But sentence should not be tempered by consider
ations of sympathy and clemency. Those are mat
ters without the sphere of the court-martial hearing.
"Tears are not for the court." I f clemency is indi
cated. never fear, there will be plenty of opportunity
for it to be exercised later, and it will be.
Diflerent questions may arise in trials, several ex
amples of which follow:
a. When is the acewled a dese"ler and when
A WOL only? Prepare yourself for this by carefully
your MCM, pages 142, 143 and 144. De
sertion is not a question of time but of intention; the
latter may be determined by circumstances; AWOL
with intent to avoid hazardous duty or shirk i'l'por
taut service may be desertion. One day's absence
may involve a desertion. The idea. prevalent in
some places that there must be an AWOL for a cer
tain number of days before desertion is evidenced is
a fallacy.
b. What deductions are made in case of for
feitul'es of pay before the two-thil'ds per month maxi
mum may be figured? Remember first that forfei
have attempted to keep the court on the beam.. Or
dinarily your efforts will be successful if you have the
provisions of the Manual in mind and apply them.
Along this line, avoid blurting out unconsidered re
marks or objections, but think your offering through
before you deliver it. Among the more frequent
objectionable remarks are references to a soldier ac
cused of desertion as the "deserter" and to one ac
cused of escape as the "escaped soldier." Where "de-
tures must be stated in dollars and cents, not months
and days. Then with that in mind, if the forfeiture is
% of pay per month for a given period, deduct the
compulsory allotments (wife and or children), then
take % of the balance and subtract lOr for Soldiers'
Home deduction where such appears. Do not ad
judge confinement for over 30 days without forfei
tures nor confinements at all without hard labor. If
the sentence reduces the soldier's grade, figure the
forfeiture on his reduced grade. Sentence of a non
commissioned officer to confinement should always
carry with it a reduction to the grade of private.
c. Must you as a member of a cow'l-martial remain
silent "when hearsay, co,uclusion..c;, argument, imma
terial malter, secondary evidence and prejudicial
statements appear in the evidence 01' emanate from
the mouths of counsel. or e"en of the courl? No. As
a member of the court, you are privileged, in fact
duty bound, to object to anything improper that ap
pears in the trial. To be sure, your objection is ruled
on by the law member or the president, as the case
may be (See MCM pages 39, 40 and A. W. 31), but
in any event you have placed yourself on record and
sertion" or ueseape" appear in morning reports or
similar records, the court should always be specifical
ly advised they are not in and of themselves any proof
whatever of "desertion" or "escape" respectively.
Watch like hawks so that evidence, no matter how
back-handed, of other offenses by accused is not ad
mitted where such evidence appears before a finding
of guilty. Nothing more prejudicial can well be
imagined. The error may be cured by a prompt ob
Jection and a ruling that the objectionable reference
be stricken out. If it does not clearly appear that a
party desires to waive his objection, failure by either
side to object does not waive the objection (except
as to genuineness in case of admission of documents).
This is quite different from the civilian rule.
d. When is an accused "drunk" so as to "S11bject
himself 10 the pair ... and pelwlties of the "Articles
of War? In "soldier talk," a soldier i not drunk if
he is still able slightly to twitch le.ast finger. In
the poet's thoughts:
"He is not drunk, who from the floor
May rise agam and drink once more
But drunk is he who prostrate lies
And cannot either drink or rise."
Not so in the view of the Articles. If you are the
accused and you suffer "any intoxication which is
sufficient sensibly to impair the rational and full
exercise of the mental and physical faculties," why
then, "You're drunk, Sir." Read that again and study
it-not that the shoe has ever been your size, but that
you may be prepared to judge the evidence properly
in an appropriate case.
fI! e. Maya Court-Martial find the accused guilty of
another offense shown by the evidence but not
charged? In a certain class of cases, yes. Where a
"lesser included offense" appears, accused may be
found guilty of that offense by exceptions and sub
stitutions. Most officers are very familiar with the
fact that a finding of guilty of violation of A W 61
(AWOL) vice AW 58 (Desertion) falls under this
heading. One less often occurring is a finding of
"wrongfully taking" under AW. 96 instead of "felon
iously taking, stealing and carrying away" under A W
93, in the case of a joyrider, warmed with spiritus.
frumenti, who simply "borrows" a stranger's car for
the pleasures of the moment with no intent perman
ently to deprive the owner of the vehicle. Generally
speaking, a lesser included offense must include no
more or different elements than are contained in the
original charge but need not contain all those ele
ments. The distinction between lesser included and
those not included is often difficult to draw. For ex
ample, the offense of loitering on post (AW 96) is
not a lesser included offense of sleeping on post (AW
86). Nor is leaving post before being relieved. In case
of grave doubt, there are at least two courses open
to the court: Find the accused guilty of the offense
you believe the evidence establishes, or suspend the
trial and request directions from the appointing au
thority as to the applicable law (see MCM par 74).
The former course should be followed in most cases
inasmuch as the appointing authority may always
correct errbrs, except where a finding of not guilty
is made or an inadequate sentence imposed, and time
may be wasted by the other method.
f. May the CfYUri; request additional evidence?
Yes, and the case may be continued for that purpose.
Ordinarily, however, if the evidence is purely: cumu
lative the case should not be delayed. The rijrhts of
the accused must be fully protected; so m,/-st those
of the government. Nevertheless, it must ah'i'ays be
remembered that "Justice delayed is j u s t i c ~ denied"
and that speedy justice is SUre justice.
The principles stated herein are applicable both to
special and general court-martial trials in appropri
ate cases. Summary courts-martial must follow them
broadly, likewise, lest they degenerate into decisions
like those of Judge Bean, the "law west of the Pecos,"
where the finding and sentence was first placed under
an empty stein and the judge thereafter heard the
evidence, then meted out his predetermined justice.
In conclusion. it is well to remember that in Gen
eral Court-Martial trials, the Trial Judge Advocate
has the benefit, before the trial, of the considered ad
vice of the appointing authority and his staff judge
advocate; that the evidence presented has been thor
oughly investigated and in all likelihood hilS been
examined in advance by those officers; that tliey have
concluded that at least a prima facie case ill estab
lished. The anticipated evidence, of course, may not
develop at the trial as indicated, so that even though
the above thought is borne in mind, the guilt of the
accused must in no event be presumed from the mere
fact that he is being tried. In the Army, as in civilian
life, the accused is always enfolded and upheld by the
presumption of innocence; and this presumption at
tends him until the very moment that the court, by a
lawful finding. declares him to be guilty. This is a'
vital rule of procedure, and it must be observed in
spirit as in letter.
The general rules of Courts-Martial are the rules
of good judgment and common sense. If you follow
them, you cannot be far wrong.
Combat Intelligence Training in New
MAJOR JAMES W. BELLAH, General Staff Corps
In all combat intelligence training, be guided by
three basic ideas. Fix them firmly in your own mind
at the start-fix them in the minds of your S-2's,
and see that they get to the men.
They are to train
1. So that your men learn to see and to hear
all enemy activity within their horizon of action
- -and interpret its military significance within
the light of their experience.
2. So that they can do this lightfootedly,
cagily, cleverly-so that they don't die while
doing it-so that they get away at the right
moment with their information.
S. So that they learn always to orient them
selves by maps and terrain-and position what
they see or hear by map and terrain, that they
may plot their information accurately and get it
into the channels of intelligence communication
For G-2, fix firmly in your own mind
that you are merely the coordinating focal point of
this information-that you are not a clairvoyant
superman, nor are you expected to be. Your job will
be well done only insofar as the training of your
division is well planned and supervised and the en
emy information that results from it is well co
Get the information and that information is your
stock in trade. Sometimes it will give you a perfectly
logical conclusion for your estimate of the
situation. Nine times out of ten, in the confusion of
combat, it will give you nothing-be nothing but
heterogeneous fragments of enemy information.
Don't ever strain for conclusions; don't ever guess;
don't ever wishfully hope. When it ,is just a con
fusing potpourri of enemy information that means
nothing to you-rest with it; wait it out; don't try
to be a bright boy-always remember that it is bet
ter to keep your mouth shut and let people think you
are a jackass, than to open it and remove all doubt.
And in combat, opening it on a guess or a hasty
piece of chain-thinking may put the blood of a di
vision on your hands. Teach that thought to all
your men.
Now, in your early stages at Leavenworth (where
you will be taught all of the bookkeeping involved)
m the New Division Course, you will begin to coiled
fragments of directives that refer to your job. These
will be from the Army or the Corps you will be
activated as a part of. Something like this, which is
paragraph 34, FM 30-5, will crop up among them
"Training in military intelligence will not be re
stricted to personnel assigned to the military
intelligence sections of various headquarters. Ap
propriate instruction in this subject will be given to
all OffiC81'S and enlisted men because every officer and
enlisted man has a part to play in military intelli
gence. All officers should be impressed with the fact
that collection of intelligence is an important func
tion of command."-because, at last, the thought is
becoming prevalent that the function of intelligence
must be a continual function of all members of a
command (as it is in the German Army) rather than
a specialized function of those individuals set up
within a command as intelligence personnel by the
tables of organization.
This immediately gives you about fifteen thousand
men to train instead of a hundred or so. Don't let
it frighten you, because it can be done efficiently and
fairly easily by intelligent planning, ingenuity and
a rational application of the method of strict decen
tralizati on.
Your first step is to have the officers
of units that do not have S-2's on the table of organi
zation appoint officers for additional duties as S-2's
and keep them in the S-2 job: the commanding offi
cers of the medical battalion, the quartermaster bat
talion, the reconnaissance troop, the signal company
and the headquarters company. All of these S-2's
must attend all of your S-2 schools and conferences.
In a sense all must be, eventually, combat S-2's. So
get these unofficial S-2's tp.inking that way from the
Regimental and lower unit intelligence schools
start at about D plus 45. They should be limiteli
to the afternoons with one or two night periods
and dm'k night ppriods-a week, and if the training
is practical, progressive and full of hard punch,
thirty days should turn out highly competent sec
tions and platoons-but never stop the training until
the armistice!
The tendency with new and inexperienced G-2's
will be to hold the instructors' school long before the
regimental and lower unit schools start. This must
not be done for two reasons
1. The longer you hold off on the instructors'
school, the more time you give to lower unit
comrpanders to appoint battalion S-2's and ad
ditjonal noncommissioned afficers, and therefore
the more people you reach with your instructors'
school. J
2, The nearer school is held to
the time lower uni : schools start, the fresher
the lpssons are in t e instructors' minds.
But prior (0 D-day a d at stated periods there
after until the instructors' school starts, you must
hold several S-2 conferences and have (he cadre in
telligence noncommissioned officers attend the:se
ferences, These conferences are for three purposes:
1, To have all S-2's know each other, know
Sou and to become acquainted with the methods
of Instructor-training and intelligence-training
you wish to standarize on,
i!, To provide all S-2's with material to study
that they may increase their own professional
knowledge by progressive work prior to the
start of their schools, (This includes your own
private clipping library of lil1S war, which one
hopes you started on 7 December 1941 or
3, To alert S-2's to the necessity of picking
filler replacements carefully to fill the regi
mental platoons and battalion sectIOns. (Young
high school graduates and athletes are sug
gested as the basis. Individualists!)
In these conferences stress the point that one of
the most important tools of an S-2's Job is a thorough
knowledge of his own dlyision's organizational and
tactical setup. Have him total up in his own mllld
\vhat he knows and what he doesn't kno\v-and in
spire him to get out and fill up his military gaps
prior to D plus 45. Ha\'e him study the reconnais
sance tl'ooP. Its functions and tactIcs. If he is a
Dough, get him to learn something of the artlllery
and vice If you have an observation squadron
handy, take your S-2's over and get them to know
the pilots and observers (a social contact with Air
is a great aid in close cooperation between Air and
Ground. Always know your observation squadrons
personally.) Fly your S-2's if possible prIOr to D
plus cl5. At least ha\'e them talked to by air officers
on the limitations and capabilities of Air-get them
from the start-ha\e them know Air
as an integral part of their work.
Show training films to your S-2's in this prelim
inary pel'lod so that may pick those they wish
to use. later in their own schools. Suggest training
aids, simplified methods of approach, dramatic and
competltiw mcthods of teaching. Have your S-2's
make up their cwn school schedules and submit them
to you for cl'ltidsm. Emphasize demonstration and
pI'actice rather than lectures.
Then, at about D plus 30, run a five-day in
structors'school (afternoon only) for a final tie-up
of teacher-methods before you turn your S-2's loose
on their own schools. But that doe,n't pnd your job.
Be a\'ailable, on S-2's call, to appear and assist at
those schools. Inspect those schools eternally, Put
your personal fire into them. Watch them like a
hawk but, never violate the principles of decentrali
In the infantry regiments and in the engineer,
battalion, the keynote of the schools should be a .
return to Indian fighting methods. (We haven't so
, far to go back to them in this country,) Go back!
Use the principles of commando training-never
failing to impress it upon intelligence personnel,
however, that they are not Captain Wermuths
that there will come a time on all their missions
whm they must cut and' run from it no matter how
tempting the target-to accomplish their primary
mission of getting back with Information. Teach
them to crawl soundlessly and slowly and endlessly.
Teach them to walk on board flooring noiselessly_to
open and climb into windows without a sound-to
open doors without a squeak- to wade through
water WIthout a splash-to cut wire. Encourage
them to buy spring knives (which can be opened
with one hand) with at least a three-inch blade.
Teach them the elements of knife killing. Post
sentries and let your men try to crawl to them and
overpower them without heing seen by the sentries.
Suggest the piano wire garrote-make one and ex
hIbIt Its use. Teach men to catch the bodies of
\'ictims as they fall so that they make no thud.
Run night problems on the detection 'of noises, the
Judging of the distance of these nOIses, the judging
of the direction. The snick of a rifle bolt, the clink
of a mess kit; footsteps on soIl, gravel, concrete,
boards; a dIstant concrete mixer, the starting and
sound of \'arious motors. Acquaint them v... ith the
sounds of rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire at
\'arying distances during your range seasons. Let
them Judge distances and directions by day and the
same dIstances and directions by rdght. End night
class problems hy having an armed patrol surprise
the class by creeping up on it and disclosing its
:.-.oundless arrival with a flare. Always work ele
ments of the command against other elements in
this way to interlock training and save your preci
ous trainIng time.
And use e\'ery trick method you can think of to
teach the men continual alertness, 110t on their front,
lIot on their rear, but on all sides and overhead-at
all times. (In this G-2's division, two days ago, a
class of distance Judging was warned twice in 20
mInutes to keep alert for air. Ten minutes after the
second warning. a squadron came in low over the
trees behind them, by careful prearrangement, and
bombed them with flour at ten feet, But half an
hour afterwarcs when a plane passed overhead, no
one looked up. Gentlemen, it won't do! You must
alert them to the enemy air arm. continually and
from the start, for planes will hit them first, long
before they have reached the terrain where they
will be committed to ground combat. Don't let them
die uselessly-for want of your foresight!)
See the Chemical Warfare Officer and the Division
Engineer and coordinate their training with regi
mental intelligence training, so that smoke and
demolitions can be used to the fullest. Above all,
harden your men eternally and steel them for a
sparing use of tobacco (one cigarette an hour should
be ample for any man). Show them what lighting
a cigarette at a thousand yards looks like at night.
(It will surprise you.)
Alert their minds in every way you can by con
tinually questioning on what they see about them
and the significance of what they see. Teach them
to observe at 20 miles an hour from trucks. (Use
driver training trucks if transportation is scarce.)
iIIake athletes, cat burglars and silent killers of
these men In the regimental platoons and battalion
section<; and in the engineers. and it will repay you a
hundred fold-Just as the training will repay them
by saving their lives in combat many, many times.
But when you are done, you have trained only a
small portion of the command. So, at the very
start, double the number trained, by having an alter
nate designated for each intelligence noncommis
sioned officer and man in the regimental table of
organization. Triple the number, if possible, by
having two alternates designated. (Some day this
highly trained, highly specialized, highly expendable
intelligence personnel will be organized in its OWn
regimental set-ups, probably under Corps, for con
tinual training, for combat attachment to infantry
during action and to protect it from the hundred
other jobs commanders find for it when there is
1I0 immediate need for its vital sneak and peek func
tion.) Train these alternates in the intelligence
schools if you can. If you can't, assign one or two
alternates to each intelligence man and encourage
his preliminary training by individual tutoring.
These alternates are your combat replacements
vital to your system.
This altel"llate system can be sold readily to any
far-seeing regimental commander. So, sell it per
sonally, G-2. And keep up the alternate's enthusiasm
uy the knowledge that he will fill the first vacancy
that occurs in the regular intelligence set-up. Have
alternates designated in advance also for your bat
talion S-2's and your regimental S-2's if you possibly
can-a young inexperienced second lieutenant will
do-if you train him.
We are now spreading intelligence training
through the regiment. Spread it further. Every
vehicle driver in a regiment should be a potential
observer. He has a wider horizon in combat than
the man on foot. He gets around. Require your
S-2's to give him a school in the fundamentals of
observing and in map and terrain work--and in the
means of communicating information to the regi
mental or battalion S-2's.
Spread it further. Have your S-2's prepare a
series of combat intelligence talks to all the officers
in regiment. Talk to the officers of the three regi
ments yourself on the functipn.
And finally have all regi mental and battalion
s and nOllcommissioned officers alerted con
tinually to help in instructing all units in scouting
and patrolling, and map and terrain work, by put
tIng on demonstrations with highly trained details.
Train your own G-2 section for this demonstra
tion work and use it to help regiment. Let its cleri
cal function always by secondary. You are at war!
You have now gone far toward aierting every
man in your three regiments and in the engineer
battalion to the intelligence function, and you have
decentralized the training to reach most of them.
The final tie-up is to mark in SOme unofficial way
the actual intelligence personnel, officers and men,
set up in the table of organization-so that anyone
else in the command who has spot information can
look for the marked man in combat, get it to him,
so he can put it in the ehannels of intelligence com
This, -:-,-'-, in red crayon on the rear of tin
helmets and in red India ink on a sewn-on right
shoulder patch, is suggested to distinguish intelli
gence personnel. It will start as a distinguishing
mark, but very shortly it will become a mark of dis
tinction and a help in morale and training and esprit
de COtpS of the platoons and sections if you have done
your job well.
Now, a lot of space has been filled by this discus
sion of intelligence training in your three regiments
and in the Engineer Battalion-but this is the back
bone of your system and too much emphasis cannot
be placed on it. Air will fail you at times in deep
reconnaissance due to weather, materiel failure and
the action of enemy aircraft. The activity of the
reconnaissance troop will at times be limited se
verely by terrain and counter-reconnaissance. But
there will never be a time in combat when the scout
on foot cannot function to some extent-if you have
trained him well and kept him alive. He is the ulti
mate eyes and ears of your division-the man you
can always count on. Train him, protect him, imbue
him with the sacredness of his mission always-the
safeguarding by reconnaissance and observation of
fifteen thousand men-and remember that it is in
the realm of possibility that he alone-one indi
vidual-On some dark night, may save the entire
command by his alertness, his cleverness and the
knowledge of the military scheme of things that you
have pounded into him.
It is a very good plan at the start to have a
thorough understanding with your division artillery
S-2. There will be, in each of your four artillery
battalions, an S-2 also but the T10 sets up no fur
ther artillery intelligence personnel as such. The
battery details with their i11strument, survey and
communications men have the mission of intelli
gence, and it is a good principle at the start to de
centralize their training directly to the division ar
tillery S-2. He will not scotch the Job, as too much
depends on the efficiency in combat of his battery
details, and the attainment of that efficiency assures
you of adequate artillery intelligence coverage.
Consider artillery intelligence as a s,'stem within
a system. It puts in its own observation posts and
has its own net of communications. Know this sys
tem as well as you know the back of your own hand,
but do not try to combine its training with your in
fantry intelligence training. Have your artillery
S-2's attend your instructors' schools and see to it
that each artillery battalion S-2 knows the infantry
regimental S-2 that he will habItually coordinate
with in combat team. Run joint problems deSIgned
so that the artillery S-2's and the infantry 8-2's
will have a thorough, interlocking grasp of each
other's needs for cooperation. But do not, 1m joint_
schools /0" personnel.
Hat-cQl'd consciousness is a thing of the past when
you are training for combat. Endeavor to have all
branches know the jobs of alJ other branches and
to be able to do some of them pas"ably well, but re
member that the artillery intelligence function is
an adequate and highly dependable bll-pl"Oduct of
other artillery functions, and gi ve free rein to your
artillery S-2 in training for those fundamental
functions. If you do, you satisfy your Gwn mlRsion.
Artillery observatlOn details are trained and or
ganized primarily to locate targets. Howe"er, they
are often in positions for general battle
and if trained to do so, can contribute greatly to the
gathering of enemy information. This communica
tion net is so well organized and so complete that
often they are in a position to get this information
through other means of communication
fail or do nbt exist.
This is definitely your baby, and as a general rule
in new divisions you will find the troop commander
young, keen, but inexperienced and eager for help
and suggestions. Ground yourself thoroughly be
fore you start in the tactical principles of vehicular
reconnaissance. (Captain, probably now Lt. Col.,
Brainard S. Cook of the 8th Reconnaissance Troop,
has done a 23-page monogl'aph on the subject which
cannot be topped for clear and incisive thinking and
excellent presentation.)
Again preach Indian tactics, ingenuity, alertness,
caginess. Work him in his training, against your
infantry intelligence personnel in two-sided prob
lems. Never let him train on a dry run against
simulation. Nothing dries up the reconnaissance
mind faster.
Have him Or his S-2 representative attend your
S-2 conferences and your instructors' school. Be
sure your infantry and artillery S-2's know the
troop commander's job. Let infantry intelligence
personnel ride with him on problems and have him
and his men walk with the infantry enough so that
they become thoroughly acquainted with infantry
1leeds and are able to cooperate closely.
Get him to know Air. Fly him and his sergeants
over his own problems when you can so that he may
see them f!"Om a box seat and be better able to
Gorrect and criticize his troop's further training.
Above all, give him opportunity for air-ground com
munication problems. Take his radio vehicles to
the air field. Let his operators talk to and know
the air observers and operators. Impress upon the
ground operators that it is their job to tool the air
in once it takes off, due to slight frequency changes
incident to the take-off.
(Your signal company training can very well
cover this same air.ground coordination).
Here you have drh'ers-88 of them to be exact
with a nOl'mal expectancy of a b!"Oad horizon of
combat. After their qualification as drivers, they
must go through the same intelligence school you
'have planned for your other drivers. Run the school
yourself, if possible, with the cooperation of the
quartermaster battalion's 8-2 representative. These
'schools, being specialized schools, deserve your per
sonal direction. They can all be five-day schools,
afternoon only, on a schedule somewhat as follows:
1st Day.-Present the intelligence function
and the divisions intelligence agencies. Stress
alertness by dramatic means which show up
general tendency of human beings not to see
or hear what goes on about them.
2nd Day.--Map and terraiu work-on the
3rd Day.-Orientation and map and terrain
work from moving vehicles.
4th Day.-Distance judging, troop-group
judging, vehicle-group judging, etc.
5th Day.-General tie-up. Examination (not
written, but on terrain verbally).
Forget the specialized work of this command; and
in your school, which will probably have to be run
piecemeal, treat the personnel as you would treat
personnel of a rille company-instruct it as you
would lllstruct ordinary infantry intelligence per
sonnel al.hough the school need not and cannot be
as extensive in scope.
The headquarters company should be especially
well trained in camouflage discipline and in general
counterintelligence discipline. The MP's who will
handle prisoners-of-war should have their training
pointed towal'd keen observation of these prisoners
and simple deductions from their appearance and
actions-not, however, their actual interrogation.
Preach simplicity in all your schools-stamp out
the mystery of G-2-ism, the eyewash. Sell three
things and three things only
1, Look-and see
2. Scram-and cagily
3. Report-accurately
And if you have sold them well-and continually
-you have done all you can to prepare for that dark
night that lies ahead of all G-2's and all S-2's.
So don't have elahorate methods; have simple
ones-and the simplest of all lies in disseminating
intelligence training-in words of one syllable-to
every officer and man in your division. Anything
short of that is not doing the job. And if you have
done the job, you can rest assured that you have
done all that It is possible for you to do to accom
plish your prime mission of safeguarding the lives
of fifteen thousand men from enemy surprise action.
The Importance of Recovery and Salvage
MAJOR WILLIAM H. VAN DINE, Quartennaste,' Corps
Instructor. Command and General Staff School
The contents of this article should be made known to every member of the Army.-TIfE EDITOR.
"Everything has a value in modern warfare ,
nothing should be wasted , , , nothing should be
wilfully destroyed unless it is in danger of falling
into enemy hands,"
With this slogan in mind, we have organized
during the past few months the most comprehensive
salvage and conservation effort in our national his
tory. Every day it is more apparent that this pro
gram will affect all Americans, civilians as well as
the military, in our all-out effort to win the war.
n has been an accepted military fact for centuries
that salvage activities save many millions of dollars
in the cost of war. Every great commander in his
tory attempted to organize an efficient battlefield
recovery service. In the present conflict, economic
circumstances as well as enemy action have had a
direct effect on our acfivities. The supply of some
vital raw materials sudh as tin and rubber has been
cut off almost completely through military action by
our enemies. The supply of others is definitely lim
ited with the result that we must conserve them,
ration them for civilian use, pick up every piece of
scrap and turn it into proper channels for military
use, and supplement them by finding suitable sub
Under present conditions; the financial savings
made possible by salvage and conservation activities
are of secondary importance. More important are
the savings in materials and production require
ments, the relief afforded to procurement, storage
and distribution, and the economy effected in over
seas tonnage and shipping space of other transpor
tation facilities.
While this article will cover only the salvage ac
tivities in the theater of operations and the type
organizations designated to function there, similar
activities throughout the Zone of the Interior are
equally important. Actually, the great preponder
ance of our manpower and equipment is now located
within the continental limits of the United States and
our efforts here at home must be well directed, effi
cient and constant. We in the Army should be par
ticularly careful to set the example for all to follow.
We cannot expect the present civilian conservation
programs to be successful unless we lead the way.
We cannot be careless in our effortg and expect the
average civilian to be efficient. He will follow our
To understand the functions of the salvage service,
one must be familiar with the meaning of the word.
Salvage includes everything that is abandoned or no
longer fit for use for its original purpose throughout
the entire Theater of War. The fact that items have
been discarded rather than their actual condition
places them in the salvage category. For example:
a new overcoat or a serviceable machine gun, if either
has been abandoned, is classed as salvage. In the
Theater of Operations, items discarded by enemy as
well as friendly troops corne within this category.
They are classified as salvage until they have been
made ready to be reissued.
There are two main channels of recovery on the
I. The maintenance channel may be described as
recovery made by maintenance personnel, mainly of
combat units. They handle damaged or disabled
vehicles and other heavy equipment requiring special
tools or equipment. Every effort is being made to
furnish the using arm or service with the necessary
tools with which to effect this recovery.
The immediate return of damaged vehicles and
tanks to their normal battle functions is imperative.
Therefore, repair is made on the actual field of battle,
if possible; otherwise, as close to the field of battle as
possible. This will be accomplished by the second
echelon personnel of the using arm or service if they
are equal to the job to be done. If they can't do the
job, they will at least assist in the evacuation of dam
aged vehicles by placing them near the evacuation
axis. There, medium maintenance units of the divi
SlOn ordnance take over and move the equipment
either to their bivouac or other collecting points near
the rear boundary of the division. In case it is im
possible to perform the necessary repairs at this
point, the responsibility for evacuation is transferred
to the ordnance service of the Army or the Theater of
Operations. As a general rule: the item is 110t evacu
ated allY further tn the rem' than ;8 absolutely neees
Efhese damaged items are located by report, rather
than by search. Oftentimes, the driver or another
member of the crew is able to the location of
the disabled vehicle or equipment. If the crew is
entirely wiped out, some other member of the using.
, arm or service should make the report. The various
echelons of maintenance in turn attempt to repair
and reissue the item. If they are unable to do so they
either evacuate it to the next higher echelon or report
. it to such echelon.
II. The sal!'age chanllel involves recovery by all
troops other than those assigned to maintenance
units. It is accomplished by a continuous search of
all areas under the supervision of the type quarter.
master organizations.
There arE' six possible operations in normal salvage
procedure. Recovery is the actual locating and tak
ing possession of abandoned material. You ha;'e to
find it before you can salvage it. EZYlCnation is the
process of removing salvage to the proper coBecting
points and lator to organized salvage installations.
In these days of fluid warfare it is essential that the
greatest speed be exercised in removing
abandoned material from battle field. Otherwise,
if the battle flows in the wrong direction your salvage
may shortly be in the hands of the enemy. Repair is
the actual preparation of abandoned materials for
reissue to the using troops, Salvaged articles are put
into sprviceable condItion as soon aR possible and as
close to the front as possible. Repairs on the spot
are often made by special operator or weapon crews.
Of such repairs, limited as they are by the
time and the tools available only attempt to put the
equipment in usable condition for immediate action.
Reclanwtioll is the proress of reclaiming any possible
serviceable parts f!"Om an article that may be dam
aged beyond repair. Actual Destrllctioll is some
times necessary-this is normally resorted to only in
the event that there is danger of the enemy capturing
the material. However, if destruction is ordered it
must be thorough and complete. Both the Germans
and the Japs have proved themselves adept at im
ptovising repairs on material which has not been"
completely destroyed. Cannibalization, i.e., the
strIpping of component parts from any disabled or
salvaged vehicles or equipment, is a relatively new
practice in the field. It may be practiced by all eche
lons. Non-repairable equipment will habitually be
strJpped before evacuation to the rear providing com
ponent parts are needed by the recovering unit. Even
repairable vehicles may be stripped if there is a
critical shortage of component parts in the echelon
through which they pass.
Let us keep in mind that salvage will be classified
and that its rearward flow will be directed as quickly
>IS possible to the closest installations of the appro
priate services.
Now, let's survey the type organizations of the
salvage service itself. These units will be found,
normally, throughout the Theater of Operations.
They really begin to function at the main salvage
collecting point or salvage dump.
There are three of these type units:
I. The Qllartermaster Sal rage Collection Com
pallY (T. 010-187) is charged with receipt and basic
classification of all classes of salvage. This classifi
cation is done at salvage collecting points or dumps.
1t evacuates all quartermaster salvage to repair
shops and depots. It evacuates salvage of other sup
ply services to the proper installations maintained
by the appropriate service.
The company is designed to handle the salvage
expectancy for approxImately 75,000 men. It is or
ganized into a headquarters and three platoons. The
platoon is the basic operating unit-one platoon will
normally serve a division.
Transportation assigned to the company is suffi
cient ollly for its administrative, supply and mess
requirements. Tactical units must utilize organic
vehicles to haul salvage unless additional transpor
tation is provided.
Specialists f"om the ordnance, chemical war
fare and signal sel vices are attached to the company.
These men inspect and supervise the disposition of
'salvage of their respective supply services which has
been turned in at the collecting points.
II. The Qllartel'ma"te>' Salvage Repair Battalion
SemlMoi,ile (T 0 10-236) is designed to sterilize,
launder and repair quartermaster items. It has an
operating capacity of about 50,000 troops and will be
located as far forward as possible. It will normally
be in the intermediate or advance section of the Com
munications Zone. It is composed of a headquarters,
a sterilization company, a laundry company and a
salvage repair company. Its equipment is carried in
semi-trailers bnt it must depend on securing sufficient
vehicles to move its assigned personnel. The bat
talion is so organized that it can be split into two op
erating units, each of which can serve 25,000 troops.
III. The Salvage Depot(TiO 10-250) has as its mis
sion the reclamation of all quartermaster property
not reclaimed by salvage services further to the
front. It is normally located in the base section of
the Communications Zone and is a more permanent
installation. If existing facilities permit, the depot
should have about a dozen buildings. Whene\'er pos
sible, shop operations will be supplemented by uti
lizing any local repair facilities. Thi8 may he done
on contract by civilian shops or even by hand repair
in workers' homes if conditions make this necessary.
Regardless of the method of operation, local civilian
labor will be employed to the fullest extent. The
number of troops used in the depot will be kept to
the minimum.
All salvage personnel must be prepared to destroy
materiel in their possession upon receipt of proper
orders to do so. As a general rule enemy equipment
will be destroyed before our own. Fuel, motor trans
port, and other supplies which might be of immediate
value to the enemy are given first priority in destruc
tion. All troops should be thoroughly instructed in
the proper method of destroying equipment which
they are handling. If destruction is ordered, it must
be thorough so that our enemies cannot repair and
turn our equipment against us.
Chemically contaminated items woich are found
should be decontaminated by the recovering troops
if they have necessary means. Otherwise, recover
ing troops will tag or mark these items and report
their location to the Chemical Warfare Service for
The utmost speed is imperative as soon as enemy
materiel of new design has been found in order that
, military intelligence can be brought into play at once.
It is vitally important to utilize any new designs, any
technical advances, or any inventions of the enemy;
this is also important from a strategical and tactical
viewpoint. New counterweapons might be, needed,
tactical plans might have to be changed or revised
and provisions made for the eventuality of the cap
ture of large amounts of similar materiel. Certain
Items will also enable us to make deductions as to the
present state of the enemy's economic resources and
,. his future economic potential.
As in the caRe of other salvage, these items are
directed to the rear through their proper channels:
e,g.. Signal Corps items through Signal Corps Serv
ice establishments. It is the duty of all
cooperate in guiding the movement in the appropri
ate direction.
Special efforts should be made to secure )icces
,ories, spare parts, ammunition and any essential
information available and extreme care applied to
prevent any damage. This rearward movement of
the materiel should be paralleled by intelligence re
ports through command channels.
On its move to the rear the enemy materiel wiII
pass through personnel of supply arms and services
who should be on the lookout for any new types. As
soon as any new type items are recognized as such,
it will be delivered direct to the Special Staff Officer
of the appropriate arm or service on the staff of the
commander in the theater. ltere again the move
ment will be paralleled by a report to the G-2 of the
command (See Chart No. I).

Sen I('e troops
combat zone
Theater SpE;'clal
staft" officer
appropriate service
Chte-f of approprlnte
servlee, U So
I Combat troops
8-2 or

A. C. of S"

A C of S,

'Var Department
FJow of mut{>rlpl )
Flo", of '('portb ---------4
(Repu)duced Fl'om TV.D.T.C. No. 81)
Chart !';o. 1.
After it reaches the Special Staff Officer, the item
comes to its first definite stop. Here it will have to
run the gauntlet of modern science and. technology.
Chemical and technical analysis are only the prelimi
nary steps necessary for the compilation of all perti
nent data. As soon as all data are assembled, pre
liminary manuals on operation and maintenance are
made available. These manuals will contain all in .
fOlmation to make the use of enemy equipment
against its former owner possible. They will also list
all Gnited Nations parts, tools, fuels .and other ac
cessories to be used in its service and give detailed
instructions on how to synchronize and coordinate
its operation with the operation of our own equip
The Special Staff Officer who is charged with sup
ervision and is responsible for all these activities will
send a complete report to the G-2 on the theater staff.
By this time the item, or at least a representative
sample, is on its way again and comes to its final stop
at the chief of the appropriate arm of the service in
the Zone of Interior. This movement is again paral
leled by a report of the Special Staff Officer contain
ing results of all preliminary investigations.
It is here that final conclusions from an economic,
strategical and technical viewpoint will be drawn and
final manuals on operations and maintenance issued.
In the meantime, the timesaving device of prelimi
nary investigations controlled by the Special Staff
Officer has made possible dissemination of essential
information to our combat units.
All salvage activities in the field are performed
under the supervision of officers detailed as Salvage
Officers and functioning under the unit Quartermas
fRom t:rN[.
Ad" Sa'v pump

.'x 1








- ZONl or lHTER10R 0
- - - - Flaw ot
____Flow of Rrnoy",tid
Chart No.2.
FLOW OF SALVAGE (not to scale).
ter. The responsibility of salvage activities of sub
ordinate units is vested in supply officers. It should
be emphasized that collection of salvage is not a job
limited exclusively to salvage units. Rather, it is the
duty of aU military personnel.
Administrative orders will designate collecting
points, but every officer and man is expected to co
operate fully. By its very nature of organization,
the organized units of the service cannot function
efficiently without this assistance. .In order to assure
this wholehearted cooperation, it is necessary to ex
plain the vital importance of salvage to every man
who is or might become a member of a combat unit.
He should also be indoctrinated with the necessity
of detection, speedy salvage and examination of ene
my materiel. Of course, it is also essential to instruct
combat troops in the precautionary measures to be
taken against booby traps and chemical contamina
tion mentioned above.
Commanders of all echelons are responsible for
proper utilization of available transportation for
evacuation of salvage to designated collecting points.
They are charged with the duty of collecting all
abandoned property. They should see to it that every
able man or prisoner returning from the front car
ries what salvage he can to the announced collecting
Speed in collection is essential. The quicker salv
age items are recovered and turned in, the sooner
they may be inspected, repaired if necessary, and re
issued to our troops.
In order to illustrate the actual flow of salvage
from the front lines rearward, we will assume that
troops of an American infantry division have found
a number of shoes, shirts, and rifles, which had been
abandoned on the battlefield. The troops immediately
turn these articles in at the salvage collecting point
which has been designated in the Administrative
Order. (See Chart No.2)
As soon as possible, these items are sent on back
to the main salvage dump. Normally, this dump
would be operated by a platoon of a salvage collect
ing company with specialists from the ordnance,
chemical warfare, and signal services attached. The
shirts and shoes are sorted by regular personnel of
the platoon and the ordnance specialists take pos
session of the rifles.
The salvage personnel carefully search all clothing
turned in. Oftentimes valuable information may be
found in clothing which has been abandoned by ene
my troops. Care is taken to see that no ammunition
remains in any pockets.
The ordnance specialists are responsible that the
rifles are to either an ordnance supply point
or to an ordnance repair shop, depending upon their
It should be noted, however, that any of this ma
terial may be utilized for current needs at any point
during its evacuation. For example, if the supply
officer of the division needs any serviceable items
which are turned into the salvage dump, they would
be issued to him at once. No items of salvage are
sent any further to the rear than is necessary.
The main salvage dump is cleared of collected items
as quickly as possible. Any transportation going
toward the rear may be utilized for this purpose.
The shoes and shirts mentioned in this example
would be routed to the semi-mobile salvage repair
battalion as shown on Chart No.2. Here they are
,sorted according to their routes through the repair
processes (See Chart No.3).
The shirts are first sterilized in the sterilization
section and then processed through the laundry
section. After laundering they go to the clothing re
pair section. Those that are suitable for reissue are
sent to the advance quartermaster depot. Any that
are unfit for repair wre baled together as rags and
evacuated to a salvage depot.
The shoes are sent to the sterilizing section and
then to the shoe repair section. Again. those fit for
reissue are sent forward to the advance depot and
the remainder are returned to a salvage depot.
Salvage depots have more extensive repair facili
ties than are to be found in semi-mobile battalions.
They make every effort to renovate all articles sent
in for repair and then return them to the nearest
issuing depot.
Articles which cannot be repaired by the depot are
processed for remanufacture by iudustries in the vi
cinity or if none exist. are returned to the Zone of
Interior for use there if of any value.
It is common know e that both the Germans
and Japanese have place great stress on capture of
equipment of the Allied Nations. They have repeat
edly had their salvage parties on the battlefield even
before evacuation of prisoners of war had been com
pleted. They are equally thorough in their measures to
prevent their own materiel from falling into enemy
hands. They have many efficient devices to insure
quick destruction of materiel which is likely to be
captured. They have often claimed that the efficient
operation of their salvage activities has been one of
the'major factors in past successful campaigns.
There is no reason why our salvage activities
should not be equally successful provided we real
ize that our type organizations cannot carry the
burden alone. To function efficiently. our salvage
Chart No.3.
service requires and demands the full cooperation of
every member of our armed forces. It is vital that
we use every means at our command to save every
thing of val ue and to return it to use as soon as pos
Armament also figures largely among conditions of success. The bravo
est soldiers with lances and swords could effect little against breech loaders
and rifled cannon,
-NatlOn8 in Arms, !'on der Goltz, 1898.
Engineers in Cooperation with Infantry
Translated from the May 1942 Edition of Bellona, official publication of the
Polish Army Headquarters, London, England.
A discussion and answer to this article ap
pears on the opposite page.-THE EDITOR.
Extensive employment of technical equipment (ex
plosive agents, armored vehicles, etc.) in combat has
brought it about that every unit commander. from
the squad upwards. is constantly confronted with the
necessity of performing engineer tasks.
During the march, tasks of this kind may consist
in removal of obstacles caused by the debris of night
aerial bombardment; during offensive action it may
manifest itself in the forcing of natural or artificial
obstacles. removal of mine fields or capture of indi
vidual pill boxes. During defensive action the num
ber of such tasks is multiplied to an even greater
extent. In order that such tasks may be performed
there is need for technicians more or less specialized.
who cooperate closely and constantly with units in
combat. It must be emphasized here that the ele
ment of time during which the tasks must be per
formed is fudamentally important due to the speed
with which action develops. the need for erecting
defenses against enemy armored weapons or, as the
case may be, for clearing the way for our own mobile
The development of the organization of infantry
units. which keeps pace with technical progress. pro
vides them with the even more numerous and power
ful means of combat. However. the number of
engineer-specialists within such units who would be
prepared to make useful employment of technical
equipment and to counteract measures employed by
the enemy is not increasing.
At this tfme the organization of mfantr,. units is
such that for each individual action. engineers or
pioneers must be assigned to them as technical per
sonnel. This system has a number of faults. It
causes loss of time due to the need for t'le infantry
to become familiar with equipment. d'ength and
state of morale of the assigned engineer ietachment.
while the latter must become acquainted with the
situation and mission it is to perform. Besides. it
is difficult to anticipate what the needs may be for
employment of engineer personnel and materiel. This
system is not economical due to the fact that the need
for constant transfer of engineer detachments for
performing various missions decreases the effective
ness of their work because of additional marching,
etc. The effort of engineer detachments is dispersed
because they are unable to work entirely for one cer
tain large unit or any of its parts. Likewise. this
system is costly due to loss of highly qualified special
ists who are frequently used on missions which may
be equally well performed by non-engineer groups
after the latter are given additional technical train
These difficulties increase if tables of organization
of large units and any of their parts provide for only
small detachments of engineers or pioneers.
In this connection, infantry units, from the squad
to and including the battalion should be made inde
pendent through addition of technical equipment and
personnel. Enlisted men who have been given addi
tional technical training could be called "infantry
pioneers" or "technical infantrymen." Their num
ber (at least 25 \C of the total infantry strength)
must be wisely distributed, and such factors as
difficulty of selection of suitable personnel. numerous
missions to be performed, and losses must be taken
into account. The pioneer platoon existing hereto
fore within the T;O of the infantry battalion should
be reorganized into a stronger specialist platoon.
equipped with special tools, anti-armored mines and
explosives. Such a platoon should be capable of
performing any special technical work.
In summing uP. it is deemed advisable that
(1) each infantry squad should have one tech-
nically-trained man;
(2) in each platoon. in addition to the organic
infantry squads, there should be a detachment of six
technical infantrymen;
(3) in each infantry company there should be one
squad composed of two six-man detachments of tech
nical infantrymen;
(4) in each infantry battalion there should be a
technical specialist platoon similar in strength and
engagement to the engineer platoon.
Having technically-trained infantrymen not only
will not reduce the combat value of infantry. but. on
: the contrary, will multiply it. for while performing
the normal infantry mission, this personnel will also
, be used for special missions for which engineers or
pioneers have to be assigned today.
Insofar as extent of technical tasks is concerned.
, these men should be prepared for
(1) planting mines and clearing mine fields;
(2) the use of explosives and flame throwers;
(3) facilitate overcoming smuller natural and
: artificial obstacles for the infantry, and
(4) the building of defensive works.
In connection with the above tasks there arises the
: need for supplying infantry platoons and companies
with appropriate technical tools and equipment such
: as mine locators. explosive and incendiary agents
, and antitank mines.
The "Infantry Pioneer" -- Panacea or Fallacy?
Instructor. Command and General Staff School
This aItide is a discussion of and an answer
to the article "Engineers in Cooperation with
Infantry" which appears on the preceding page.
Such articles as "Engineers in Cooperation with
Infantry" and .similar ones by various military
writers usually emphasize the need for more pioneer
or engineer training for the infantryman and then
proceed to enumerate such elementary tasks as plac
ing and clearing mine fields, overcoming small na
tural and artificial obstacles, and the building of
defensive works. The article by the Polish author,
however, goes one step further and advocates the
inclusion of specially-trained technicians in infantry
units from the squad to the battalion for that pur
I t is believed that modern war demands that all
soldiers, not just a specially-trained few, should be
trained in the placing and removal of anti-tank
mines, that all soldiers must have the pioneer spirit
to overcome obstacles, and that knowledge of the
construction of the simpler forms of defensive works
should come under the head of basic training. There
is no better way to start an argument than, for ex
ample, to tell an artilleryman that he cannot place
his guns in a given position.
However, when it Comes to the extensive use of
high explosives-and the current war is one of high
explosives-or the extensive use of other more tech
nical means, it is hardly practicable to train such a
high proportion of the infantry for such duties. If
the percentage envisioned by the author is now in
cluded in the infantry strength, a little arithmetic
will show an undue decrease in infantry combat
strength and a disproportionate increase in equip
ment. If the percentage is added to the present
infantry strength we would have a return to an un
wieldy large unit cluttered up with special equip
ment. Furthermore, a uniform distribution of pio
neer or engineer specialists is undesirable. The bulk
of such forces must be kept free to mOve to meet the
varying demands of battle.
Articles of this type do emphasize the need for
combat engineers employed as th0ir name implies
and for the close association of engineers and sup
ported troops throughout their training and service.
The current practice of attaching an engineer pIa
toon to a combat team is sound. But it should be a
constant attachment and thus each component of the
team knows the others, their capabilities and their
limitations. The situation is known and no time is
lost in sizing up the situation. Then, if additional
engineer strength is needed in a given situation, the
additional combat engineers merely reinforce the
engineers already on the job. The time element in
reinforcing the engineer effort can be reduced by
proper anticipation of the need and by the mobility
of combat engineers who, in our army, are motorized.
The need for close cooperation between engineers
and infantry reaches its zenith in the assault of
fortified localities. Such an operation requires the
best infantryman and the best engineer, not a jack.
of-all-trades. And both must work as cogs in the
assault team that includes artillery, tanks, chemical
troops, and combat aviation. Such teams require
highlytrained technicians, but each to his own spe
ciality. Here again is the need for close association
and combined training.
The Polish author is .correct in speaking of the
needs for aggressive pioneer training for all soldiers,
but it must be remembered that we are in an age of
specialization and that the system he proposes for
engineer operations is impractical. Without a doubt
combined training of all arms is essential if our
armies are to have the support of modern engineer
Advance and Attack
Methods of German Armored Vnits In Libya, 1941-42
COLONEL H. B. LATHAM, British Army
(Reprinted from The Journa.l of the Royal Artdlery October 1942)
In connection with the handling of his armored COMPOSITION OF THE "Box"
units there are four principles from which the Boche
The "Box" is the part of his column which is in
rarely departs:
side the dotted line in diagram "B." It varies in size,
but if a battalion of tanks is moving with it, it might
contain the following fighting troops in addition to
1. The primary role of the tank is to kill infantry.
2. The main weapon of the tank is thus the ma
chine gun.
the tank "ground crews," reserve petrol, etc.:
d. The tank can only be successful if used in con 1 battalion lorried infantry usually carried iu semi
junction with all arms. tracked, semi-armored vehicles.
4. Tanks must be used enma,sse. 1 battery 50-mm Antitank guns.
, -
\ t>
t,; " d- I
, !...'
BRIT,SH Rcc tlN,r
As a result of these views-
a He will not fight a tank vs tank battle if he can
b The order so constantly given to our armored
formations "to seek out and destroy the enemy's ar
mor" has led to almost tragic results.
r His tactics are based on his armor always mov
ing with other arms in close support in the form of a
"Box" or moving "defended locality."
P05,TIOlV 'B'
1 battery 88-mm AA guns.
1 troop 150-mm close support guns sometimes on
SP mountings.
1 battery field guns.
On the move or in the attack the artillery with the
"Box" is disposed of as shown, i.e., the antitank and
.}A guns guard the flanks and front faces while the
infantry guns and field guns are usually only inside
the "Box" when it takes up a defensive position, In
size it is approximately two miles deep on a frontage
of 800 yards. The 88-mm though it has proved a very
effective antitank gun is primarily included in the
"Box" to protect the "soft skinned" vehicles from air
The method of advance is shown in diagram A.
On dead flat country the distances between the vari
ous portions of his column are approximate.
Between the reconnaissance unit
and the leading echelon of tanks __ 5-10 miles
Between 1st and 2nd Echelons of
tanks ._. _______ .___ 1 mile
Between the 2nd Echelon of tanks
and the "Box" _______ . ________ 2 miles
The whole is directed towards some tactical fea
ture which if seized will force us to fight and so en
gage on ground of his choosing.
In normal terrain each portion of his column moves
from high ground to high ground and the more rear
ward echelons of the column step up rather like the
old cavalry advanced guard. Each echelon of tanks is
supported by field artillery which moves in rear of
As soon as our tanks are reported to be advancing,
the "Box" halts and takes up position for all round
defense. This can be done very quickly owing to its
formation on the move. As our tanks advance the
Boche reconnaissance unit falls back and their two
echelons of tanks deploy on a wide front with the
flanks thrown forward as in position A, diagram
A (ii).
If we continue to advance they continue the re
tirement to position B and force us to attempt to
break through one flank..
If we imagine that decide to attack the Boche
left flank, this falls back to position C and our tanks
If they pursue are not only engaged frontally by his
}1k. IV tanks but are caught in flank by the antitank
and AA guns of the left face of his "Box." Finally
'he tanks of the Boche right flank ,swing round and
engage our attack in real'.
The artillery which moves with the tanks in the
tdvance may either remain supporting them or cn
'cr the "Box" to stiffen its antitank layout.
In general the Boche accepts our reconnaissance
'f the ground and aims at taking one of our local
,ties. He realizes that it is usually impossible for
,n attack in depth to pass between two localities
,'r to cross the front of one locality to attack an
,ther. His attack is launched therefore approxi
-nately "Head on."
Such an attack might thus be carried out in the
following way:
Phase I. He will reinforce his reconnaissance
unit with tanks deployed on a wide front and
drive in our covering force, until he is approxi
mately 2,500 yards from our "Crust.'; .
Phase 2. A most careful reconnaissance of our
localities will then be carried out by a senior
commander in a tank to decide which locality
to attack. In Libya last winter when our lo
calities were not necessarly sited on high ground
a great deal depended on whether the Boche
could get a position about 2,000 yards from our
front face on which to deploy his covering
force. In diagram "B" it is assumed that he
has found this and is going to attack locality
T,o:s 3b_s



14",,, I!I
#rMt$ 0
Phase 3. His covering force now deploys as fol
Mk. IV tanks take up a hull-down position on the
ridge and with the fire of their machine guns at
tempt to pin the defense, They may engage
visible antitank guns with their 75-mm.
Under cover of their fire 50-mm antitank guns,
heavy machine guns and close support 150-mm
infantry guns are also deployed in an attempt
to knock out the antitank guns of the defense
or to kill their detachments.
It should be noted that in the British army since
the Vickers machine gun has been withdrawn
there is no means of engaging the heavy ma
chine guns opposed to us except by the 'fire of
field artillery. The majority of the weapons de
ployed by the Boche in his covering force are
dependent on open-sight laying and so can be
blinded by smoke. Under cover of the fire of
his own covering force the attack forms in rear
1. Three rows of tanks about 50 yards apart and
each row approximately 150 yards in rear of
the one in front.
2. When the tanks are in position the "Box" forms
. up in rear as shown, tbe infantry all riding in
their trucks.
Phase 4. At zero hour the whole moves forward
at about 15 mph depending on the ground. As
they pass through their covering force the
tanks begin to fire not so much with a view to .
hitting anything but simply to have a psycholog
ical effect.
On arrival at locality "B" some tanks drive
straight through to the rear face; others assist
their infantry to mop up.
The latter do not usually dismount till they arrive
III the locality when they fa'n out, using Tommy
. guns extensvely.
Phase 5. When the attack is successful the cover
ing force moves forward into the captured lo
cality to stiffen the defense and the tanks are
usually withdrawn and serviced near what has
now become the Teal' face of his locality.
(a) It takes 2 or 3 hours to prepare and
such an attack.
, (b) If successful no minor counterattack is likely
to drive him out, for his defense is very rapidly or
ganized since all the weapons he requires are im
mediately available.
(c) As a result of such tactics our localities have
iliad to be sited on higher ground to avoid ground
lrom which they can be overlooked.
(d) Such attacks are now being beaten off and it
is apparent that in future they will not succeed with
out much more artillery support.
(e) The whole form of the attack has been re
duced by the Boche to a "Battle Drill."
Check List on Instructional Methods
Is the time of day suitable for the type of instruction?
Is theoretical in::>truction augmented by practical demon
Are practica1 e'XamJnatwltB ghen whel"{,vpr possible?
15 the ..ion effective?
Is the area or dassroom for two or morE' groups, re
sulting In mutual distraction?
Is the instruction being conducted near other di!:>tracting
If Instruction is held outside. are the students seated to the
best advantage to the sun, closp enough together
to hear the instructor, no treps or other obstacles to pre
"Emt the students from seeing the instructor, the in
structor standing up-wind. etc.)?
If inside, is the ventilation satisfactory?
Is the lighting adequate?
Are suitable writing surfaces available for in!!otructlon re
quiring writing, plotting, arithmetic, etc.?
Are blackboards available to the instructor for explanations?
Are blackboards wen-painted and clean?
Blackboards, charts, diagrams, etc., should be placed agaInst
a blank wall. If this is not practical, the windows ad
jacent to the blackboard should be COHfed to prevent
light shining toward the students. Is this principle

Are there proper fadlities for all students and are
they arranged for all to face the Instructor?
Are the eha'rl'_. diagrams, etc., large enough to be seen by
the students in rear of the room without effort?
(s the instructor properly prepared for his period of in
i ::.truction?
Does he make the instruction too academic?
Does the instructor digress from the scheduled subject?
Charts, diagrams, pictures, etc., which are used to emphasize
or clarify a point phase of instruction should be re
mOHd as soon as have served their purpose. Is this
Ooe!!o the instructor speak firmly and loud enough to be heard
in the rear of the room without conscious effort on the
part of the
DoE'S the instructor write or draw on the blackboard large
enough to be read by all s.tudents in the class?
Doe1't the Instructor know his !'>ub-ject or does he read from a
Remember that men lparn by all five of the senses, and by
actually doing. The real test is, how wen can they do it?
If you are to conduet a demonstration, practice several times
prior to the class period.
[{now what you aTt" to teach and how you are going to teach
It before coming to dass.
A\- oid profanitJ'.
use obscene language.
SeH'r talk down to the
Never decide that the student is stupid.
Do not try to bluff. If a question is asked and you do not
know the answer. tell the students that you will find out
out the correct answer and teB them later.
Remembpr that the instruction given has but one ultimate
purpose-Victory on the Field of Battle.
Are the students attentive?
Do they sleep or doze during instruction?
Do they smoke during instruction?
-From The Field Artillery Jou.rnal
Military Control of Non-Military Signal
Communications .
Instructor, Command and General Staff School
Durmg peacetime it IS generany suf
fiC'ient for the Army and !'oJ'avy to concern
themselves only With commel'cwl com
munications in addition to their own
mihtary faCilities, but III war time they
mm,t concern them5elves WIth control and
use of all forms of Signal communica
Under the term "Signal Communica
tIOns" only agenCIes which trans
mit intellIgence by an electrICal means
are conSIdered here. In Its more general
milItary use thIS term also includes mes
sengers and VIsual means of communi
Non-mlhtary communications include
agencies which serve the genel al public
and private communication systems
WhICh serve only particular activities.
Systems ill the latter group are operated
by civIlian agencies of the various eche
lons of government, by nongovernmental
profitmakmg agencies, and by amateurs
who are in the game for pleasure and who
frequently serve the public WIthout cost.
All these types of commulllcatlOn agen
cIes may under certain condlhons be of
military Importance and subjected tC"
Itary control. For what purposes should
Wf' want to control all or any of these
many agencies of Signal commullication?
Tn peacetime, government policy and
the interest and conv(>mence of the publIc
reqUlre that pubhc utilItIes be subject to
economIC control by the civil government
to msure competItIOn, reasonable rateS,
and the availability of adequate facilitIes
m wartIme. In the case of radIO stations
thele must also be technical control to
prevent their mterfermg with each other
or WIth foreign and military communi
catIOns In both peace and wartime. Con
trol of commUnIcations IS also necessary
to msure then best use in the preserva
tlOn of lIfe at sea and m other peacetIme
The extent of economic control exer
cised is determined by domestIc pohcy
alone III the case of internal communica
tlOns. InternatIOnal communications, al
so, could be controlled economically to
bome extent: but up to the present time,
busmess relations between AmerlcaD
owned communicatIOn companies and
foreign agencies with which they
municate have been left to mutual agree
ment without government mterference.
Techmcal control of radio, on the other
hand. is exercised in such a way as to
conform to mternational agreements.
These agreements concerning radio are,
strictly speaking, applicable only under
peacetIme conditIOns or bet\veen natIOns
whlC'h have peaceful relations. Consid
el atIOn of expediency alone will ordi
narily govern wartIme use of radIO.
In peacetIme our national policy per
mits unrestrIcted use of all the agencies
of communication which have been men
tlOned within the particular field for
which each IS licensed. In peacetime only
limited consideration is gIven to certain
factors WhICh ill time of war become
paramount. In war-time these communi
catIOns agenCIes must be subject to the
same control as In peacetime and also to
certain additional measures
In 'Wartime every agency must operate
III such a way as to render maximum
service to the nation's war effort and a
minimum of aid to the enemy. Communi
catlOns agenCIes can greatly aid by giv
Important messages relating to the
war precedence over routine messages,
and there must be assurance that com
mUllication channels will not be inter
rupted by stl'lkes, subverSIve activities, or
any other aVOIdable means. Unauthor
ized radiO stations are sought out and
erac.licated III tIme of peace, but in war
time efforts along this Ime must be re
doubled to prevent commUnIcation With
the enemy There must be assurance that
war message traffic does not become
known to the enemy and that he does: not
mtl'ude false messages into our communi.
cation system Radio statIOns may serve
as beacons to KUide enemy planes to their
objectives III our territory unless there IS
authority to SIlence all Iadio stations at
:::uch times AU these things demand that
there be much close, government super
VISIOn of nonmilitary commUnICatIOn
agenCies in time of war as to operatmg
personnel, message traffic handled, and
periods of operation and of SIlence.
RadIO broadcasting stations must, of
course, be closed in time of enemy raids
just as are other radio statlOns, but at
other time::: they should be used in such a
way as to further the national interest.
We frequently read items in the news
papers concerning the efforts of dictator
governments to prevent their peoples
from listening to foreign broadcasts. We
will be much wiser if we take advantage
of radio broadcasts in a positive way, to
transmit special announcements of public
interest and to raise the country's morale
rather than trying to hal'! listening to
broadcast stations o;f any nationality.
Control of broadcast material must be
e:>..erclsed in such a way as to make the
listener have more confidence in the re
liability and completeness of informa
tIOn broadcast in the United States and
allIed countries than in broadcasts origi
natmg m enemy states. Unless this pub
lic confidence IS maintained, the value of
the broadcasting system will be seriously
reduced and public morale unfavorably
affected by listening to and believing
statements broadcast by the enemy.
The first World War showed that a
natIon can be vanqUished without any
important invasion of its territory and
WIth its army still active in the field. The
first break of the Central Powers came
in national morale; not on the field of
battle. Radio broadeasting gives us a
means of influencing quite directly the
morale of enemy natlOns. and by so domg,
shortening the war.
Such positive control of broadcasts,
\v hether to bolster our own national
morale or to that of the enemy,
a ciVil functIOn in the Zone of the In
tenor; but III a foreIgn theater of oper
ation it WIll be a milItary job.
Negative control of radio stations of
all kmds to prevent their serving as navi
gational aids to the enemy is a military
function, both III the theater of operations
and m the Zone of the Interior.
All the foregomg types of control meas
ures may be necessary even though the
county IS not a theater of actual surface
combat operations. Should surface com
bat actually come to our territory,
whether from the air or from the water,
more strIngent measures of control will
be necessary to insure the security of our
own internal commUnICatIons related to
the war as a whole and to secure such
serVIce as these agencies can provide for
mIhtary purposes.
At corps, army, and higher headquar
ters and in rear areas, it is absolutely
nece5sary to have telegraphic and tele
phonic communication with subordinate,
neIghboring, and higher headquarters
and activities. Distances are usually too
great to be covered efficiently by mes
sengers and haiston officers, and field wire
wIll not give the required electrical com
municatton. Even temporary pole-line
will not always be satisfactory. There
\ .
must be substantial, well constructed,
pole-Imes, To build such Imes takes time,
material and manpower that can ill be
sparE.'d durmg active operatIOns. Fullest
advantage must be taken of eXIsting fa
cilities. and mflasures of control must pro
vide for full use of avaIlable non-mllItary
commUnICatIOn agencIes.
Control can be exercised III a variety ()f
ways and degrees indlrated by the words
supel VISIOn, inspectIOn, control. use and
closure, which are frequently used in
vallOUS plans and dil ectlVes deahng with
thiS 5ubject We may take as the neces
sary mmmlUm the economic and technical
superVISIon exercised m peacetime by the
Federal CommulllcatlOns CommIssion.
ThIS Involves only the prescription of
regulatlOns and the necessary supervision
and inspect10n to msure theIr ohsenance.
!\lormal management, whether commer
eml, private or govel nmental.
complptp oppratlOnal ('ontrol withm the
legally prescrIbed hmlts.
In tlUW of war It may be necessary to
take opel at10nal control, replacing normal
ciVIlian management by a military or
speCIally approved clvIlIan management,
actual operatIOns continumg to be per
formed by 1egular civiltan personnel of
the agency. A further step, to be taken
m case of neceSSIty, would be for the
Army to make complete use of facIhtles
by actually takmg pos'>ession and oper
atmg them, usmg mIlItary personnel. The
fOI mel method-management control-
WIll usually be satIsfactory In the Zone
of the InterlOl' to ltmit th> >fi'ect of do
mestlC distUI bancE's and subversl\rp ac
tiVIties. The latter methot!, complt:'te
111111tal y operatIOn and use of communi
catIOns, may be m actual the
atel s of operatIOns, esp<>cwlly m enemy
In the first World War the only special
degl ee of control e'Xcrcised wIthm the
UnIted StateS; by CIVIl 01' mIlitary arms of
the goveJllment dUllng the first year of
our partICIpatIOn In the war \Va"'; aS5U1l1p
tlOn by the Navy, m Apnl H117, of can
trol of all radio stations, Thls was par
ticularly necessary at that tIme as the
cOl1lmel'clal radIO furlhtlcs for overseas
commUnIcatwn werc much scarcer than
they are now, and thel e was reason to
fear mterruptlOn of cables conneetmg the
UnIted States and Europe. In June 1918,
Congress gave the President authority
to take over telephone, telegraph and
('able ('ompame"i Pnclcl' e'X8('utlve m'der
possession was taken of land wi re sys
ten)s In July 19J8, and cabl(> systpms In
November of the same YPal'.
ment of systerns was In sOllie cases chang
ed to hake It more responSIVe to govern
ment contl01, operatIOn in othel' respects
being cal"l'led on by the normal personnel.
All these commercial communications
facilities were returned to private con
trol at the end of the war and have since
been much lmproved and expanded, To
day there are many more radio channels
to foreign countries and overseas posses
sions than there were in 1917 and 1918,
and there are more submarine cables.
All these channels can be operated at a
speed five times that w:hich could be real
Ized durIng the last war. At the time of
the last war there were almost no en
tirely cables, but now
there are several; so the SItuation as
regards adequacy of international com
munications responsIve to United States
poliCies is not liable to enter into any
decision as to the need for government
control Under the polIcy of limited eco
nomic control by the government there
has abo been a continuous growth of
mte1"nal commUnICatIOn faClhtles since
tbe last war so that at present there is
no fear as to adequacy of either domestic
or mternational commUnicatiOns faCilities
for wartime purposes.
The many amateur radlO stations and
broadcastmg stahons \\ hlch oid not exist
at the tIme of the first World War now
mtroduce new problems in communica
ttons contIoI.
Durmg the last war we also had ex
perIence In mlhtal y ('anti 01 of nonmlll
tary communications In enemy terntory
-in Germany aftel' the armIstICE' It
was found necessary to have lllllttary
on duty at all m
phone officE'S. an officer beIng' stationed m
each of the large centrals Local German
pmployces WE're contmued on both outside
and Inside telephone and telegraph dulles.
Thl<:' German telephone personnel was fQr
hldrkn to Inake changes in the MVltchIng'
faCIlities m at tel nunals WIthout pennI':!
RlOn from the SIgnal officer. Tn one case,
In spIte of normal warning, changes \vere
made on the telephone mam frame at
Coblenz. The l'Psponsiblc party was given
thH'p months in JU11 fOI chang-In!! the::.e
cirCUIts without permiSSIon, and making
of unauthorized changes stopped.
A board set up. and
alllongdistance CirCUIts were contmuous
ly superVIsed by able Img'uists as'3Igned
to thIS boal d. It was reqUIred that loral
inhabitants obtam to make
long-distance calls. In each case they
\\'ere told the restrIctIOns on conversa
t10ns befol e they were allowed to make
a call. If they VIOlated these restrictIOns
dUIlIlg the converbatlOn, they were
diately cut off.
The CIVIlIan populat1On was allowed to
make commercial and social telephone
calls. but they were eautIOnf>ri and wal
ed that their calls ,.ere hemg cem,ored
at the sWltchhoan1. In suspicious
telephone Cll cuits weI e eheched eon
tmuously untll SuspICIOn .va') Iemoved
All teleg'raph messages wel cn::.oreci.
All censorshIp duties ,,,"pre performed
der the mtelligence sectIon of the Gen
eral Staff,
Control of communications in enemy
territory in time of war is exercised in
accordance with the laws of war and
certam international agreements related
to the Hague Convention. Under that
convention. communication facilities in
ocrupled terr1tory may be seized even if
they belong to private individuals, but
they must be restored and compensation
fixed when peace is made. Submarine
cables connecting an occupied territory
WIth a neutral terntory may be :\eized or
destroyed in case of necessity, Hut they
must be restored and compensation made
at th end of hostilities, The primary
governIng consideratlon at all timeJ is
nllhtary neceSSIty.
Congress mal\es laws for control of
tel'state and foreign commumcatlOns in
the Umted States, while control ()f com
mUnlcaUon between pomts withm each
seperate state IS left to that state. RadIO
communicatIOn falls under state juris
diction only so long as SIgnals emItted by
stations do not affect m any way radio
communications outSide of that state. In
VIew of the nature of radIO signals. this
means that there are no radio operations
of any map.-nltude at the present time
winch tlo not come under the jurisdiction
of the federal government.
Federal laws governmg SIgnal com
municatlOns agencles are contained m
thC' Communications Act of 1934 and
anlPndments to that act. Under that act
the Fedcral CommulllcatlOns CommiSSIOn
IS the pi mcipal organ for the executIOn
of federal laws and regulations concern
mg' electrical commUnIcations withm thC'
Unitecl States. The duties of this Com
l111s<,ion have to do prmclpally with
nomIc and terhl1lcall egulatlOn and super
viSlOn of the industry, functions WhICh
must bp performed In both peace and
In addItIon to establishing the Federal
CommUnICatIOns CommiSSIOn and the
1m.,\,., f01 Its the Communica
tIons Act of 1936, as amended, also dele
gate:" to the PI esulent certam powers for
use dUJ ing' war emergency, If he finds
It necessmy. the President may prescribe
prefel ence 01' pl'lOl'ity for communica
t10ns e.ssentlal to the national defense
and secUilty, He may employ the armed
fOl r('''i to prevent any obbtl'Uctlon or re
tardatIOn of communication, interstate or
forclgn, by 1 alho ()l' WIre. He may sus
pend the peacetime rule:'> and regulations
governmg commUnIcatIons and cause the
c10smg of any WIre 01' radIO facility or
MatlOn or authorize use 01 rontrol of
a fUClhty by any department of the
go, ernment With just compensation to its
Censorship of communicatIOns or sig
nab transmittecl by radio fltations is
specifically omitted from the powers of
the Federal Communications Commission,
but by a separate act ()f December 18,
1941, Congress authorized the President
to establish a censorship of communica
tions sent by cable, radio, or other means
of transmission between the United
States and any foreign country. This
power of the President is exercised
through an office of censorship under a
director of censorship advised by a cen
sorship policy board which includes in its
the Secretarlf'S of the Navy
and War Departments. Since censorship
IS not conSIdered as a signal commUnIca
tIOns matter, it will not be dIscussed
further here.
By an Executive Order dated Septm
Ler 24. 1940, thE' Pre-sldent establIshed the
Defense CommunIcations Board to pre
pare plans for military and civilian use
and control of radio, WIre, and cable com
mUnIcation faCIlities. The board was
speCIfically directed not to consider
Smce December 7, 1941. the President
has changed the fune-uon of the Defense
Communications Board from simply plan
nIng to ae-tual exerdse of his wartime
powels as defined Il1 the CommunIcatIOns
Act of 1934, and the title of the board
has been changed to "Board of War Com
mUllicatlOns." In ('xelclsmg the PreSI
dent's powers the board is governed by
consIdcl atlOn of national defense and se
cunty. WIth mInimum Interference with
needs of civIlian government
industry, and civilian morale and with
prOVISion for compensatIOn to the owners
of facilities affected. Unless otherWIse
specifically prOVided by the board, the
nOl'mal management and ale
to contInue in the operation of these fa
CIlities in the nOllnal way The boa1 d
consists of the ChaIrman of the Federal
CommullicatlOm, Commission. the Chief
SIgnal Officpr of the Army, the Director
of Naval CornmulllcatlOns and thp
J.nt Secretary of State 111 charge of the
diviSIOn of lllterntltlOnal communications.
Up to date the Board of War Com
mumceltions has taken the following
Bv an 01 del' dated December 26.
H14i. It gave the' Navy autholity to u<,c.
contl'ol, superVIse. Inspect or dose
radIO on vessels, domestIc and
fOi'elgn. wlthm the JUlI<..rlietIOn of the
Umte>d States. This authority IS neces
sary III connectlOn With the
control of all shippIng In and near thIS
Orders of the FCC issued in December
1941 and February 1942 requll'e rauIO
stations to cease tlan'SmlsSlOns tempo
ral'Ily during Ilnpendmg all' raids on notI
fication by the Fighter Command '\vhlch IS
responsible fol' defense ag-ainst elir at
tacks. ThIS prevents radIO statIOns se1'V
ing as guiuepm.ts to the I aiding planes.
AuthorIty given by this order to fighter
commands was later passed to the defense
commanders under whom fighter com
mands operate.
Under the scheme promulgated in
this order radio broadcast &tations are
groupe-d into radio control areas within
elir defense regions. The or
filter center of the Fighter Command
sends warnings of approaching enemy
raids to certam key stations in the vari
ous groups. Each key station then trans
mit':. a prearranged Signal, and all stel
tIons cease operations until released by
the Fighter Command, In order to carry
out this scheme, key stations are required
to operate 24 hours a day. These orders
zndicate that contI oJ of non-military radIO
<.tutlOns not speCIfically allocated to other
government agencies for control or use
continues to be exerCIsed through the
Federal CommunicatIOns Commission un
riel' pohe-Ies presenbed by the Board of
War CommunIcations,
The latter board in March of this year
authorized the Secretary of War and the I
Se{'retal'Y 9f the Navy to take measures
to safeguard all mIlItary and naval mes
sages handled by radio and wire facili
ties under the JUl'ISdiction of the United
States In order to insure their speedy and
secure handhng and to insure that no
messages of spurious origm will be trans
mItted by these agencIes Under thIS
Older the Army or the Navy may, if
necesselry, reqUire that persons suspected
of subversive activltIe5 be removed from
employment and be forbIdden access to
commUlllcatIOn facilItws In exerCising
this authority, the Army has assumed
JurIsdIctIon over commercial WIre faCIli
tIes, including cables; and the Navy has
assumed JUIISdlction over commercial
radIO-telegraph facilIties, both domestIc
and international
So much for conttol of communications
In the L'lllted States, where the Communi
catIOns Act of 1934 applies and normal
civil agenC'ies are functIOning. What of
theaters of active combat operattons
partIcularly forClgn theaters? How shall
'\ve e-ontrol communIcations there? To
economize materiel and effort, eXlstmg
cOhlmel'cial wIre lmes and milItary WIl'e
systems mm,t be utIlized to ma),.llnum
capacity In enemy territory all wire and
l'adIO farllities come under nlllitary con
trol for use as needed. In fnendly tel-
1'1tOl'Y faclhttes are l'eqUI::'ltioned or oper
ated by normal clvIhan agencies under
filmy superVISIOn.
The degree of milltal y control neces
<;U1'y In any fnendly theater of operation
depends largely on the degree to which
CIVIl activltie-s have been dIsrupted and
thp Il1llitm y requit'ements fol' the use of
nonmilit31 y facilities. In an actual com
bat area, operation by military personnel
would be necessary regardless of whether
the population was frIendly 01' hostIle;
howevpl', in the cOhlmunication zone,
operatlOn by friendly civilian personnel
under milItary supervlslOn would be satis
factory for most purposes. In the Zone
of the InterIOr, except in time of domes
tic disturbance, the present scheme of
control through close cooperation between
m)litary authorities and civU manage
ment will ordinarily suffice. In time of
domestic disturbance it may be necessary
for military authorities to stoep in and
actually take over and operate some or
all communication facilities until tran
quility is restored and reversion to nor
mal civil management is feasible.
The manner and degree of control is
likely to be different in each theater.
In North Africa there are not enough
non-military communications to offer any
problem in theIr control. On the lsland
of Viti Levu in the Fiji Islands the popu
latIOn IS frlendly; so control of non-mih
tary commUnICatIOns there should not
offer any serious problems except that
the number of wire circuits existing there
now, accol'dmg to available information,
1& so small as to make them of practically
no value to any task force called upon to
opc>rate thel"e. In New Zealand would be
found an equally-or more-friendly
populatlOn as well as some facilities, prob
ably, aVaIlable and useful to a force
whIch might operate there. Under such
conditions control would probably be
gamed by cooperatIon WIth normal CIvil
agencies controlling them except in areas
actually occupied by the Army or Navy
for mIlItary purposes, If France is in
vaded by the AllIes in the ffl,ce of German
OPPOSItion, they will undoubtedly find
the populatIOn friendly: but by the time .,
fighting has moved back fat enough to
let them thmk about use of non
mIlitary facllIties, they will :find that
such facilities no longer exist, thereby
ellminatmg the problem of their control.
Perhaps mstead \\<e shall have to thmk
of how to use mIlItary faCIlIties for non
mIlItary purposes,
CondItIOns in FI'ance during the last
w<J,r may be a guide to what can be ex
pee-ted now_ In August 1914, as the Ger
mans advanced rapIdly through Belgium
and northern France confidently ex
pectmg to use existmg'" non-mIlitary fa
cilItIes of Belgium and France much as
they had used those theIr own country
rlm'ing mobiliza' on, they found that
BelgIan and French facilitIes had been \
thoroughly destroy . As troops and "'-.........
hetldquarters adv ced they soon outran
the ability of m ltary or impressed ci
vihan agencies to construct new lines.
Practically no radio had been provided;
so the armies on the north flank of the
German advance soon found themselves
out of touch WIth each other and with
GUQ. ThiS reSUlted in a very serious lack
of cool'dmatlOn m operations and con
tributed m no small degree to their fail
ure to accomplIsh their objective. The
Germans learned their lesson from that
and changed their Chief Signal Officer
and theIr scheme of signal communica
tions. The Allies should not expect the
enemy to leave any facilities as he is
pushed back
When American troops arrived 1n
France in 1917 fresh from a country
where they had all the telephone and tele
graph serviee that they wanted, they
found that facilitIes aV'allable for long
distance communlcatlons, eithe-r telephone
or telegraph, were scarce. While French
Posts and Telegraphs cool'erated as fully
as their facilities allowed, it was neces
!3ary for the Americ,an Army to construct
own lonp; distance wire system extend
ing from GHQ at Chaumount to all the'
varwUS bases in France as well as to
The Slgnal Corps erected over 1,700
miles of permanent pole Ime:? In France
and strung over 22,000 miles of WIre.
The system mrluded nearly 155,000 tele
phones connected to 400 central offices.
At the end of the war the system was
turneu over to the French Government.
Suppose American troops were to make
.a Iandmg III Japan. They might find a
useful communication bystem there if
they landed and advanced fast enough,
but they could not depend on the civil
popnJatJon to operate }t in a way favor
able to us, and It would undoubtedly be
necessary to take it over zn toto and op
erate It by usmg mIlitary personnel
pprhaps some of the WJ.J.\.AC's-that al'e
now In training,
In Hawati there arise still different
conditIOns. Martml law was declared on
the afternoon of December 7; on Decem
bE'r 9 a general order was Issued by the
mIlItary governor placing all
of the Mutual Telephone Company under
contIol of the signal officer of the Ha
wallan Department, ThiS was for the
purpose of insuring max.Imum use of
facilities and stocks of supplies available.
ThE' Navy supervises transpacIfic radIO
while the Army supervises communica
tions between islands.
Employees of communication <:om
paI,lies are prepared to instruct patrons
on what can and cannot be telephoned.
A person rleSITlng to call from Hawaii to
the mamiand must identify the person to
be caned and give a fun account of the
conversation to be held. If any names
are to be mentioned, they must be given
to the censors beforehand; and if any
are ml:'ntwned that have not been sub
mItten, the connection IS broken imme
diately. Other phases of conversation
are dealt WIth slmllarly. and there are
cettam standard subjects that cannot be
mentIOned at all. The Army maintains
practIcally the same of control
O'ver the inter-Island radio-telephone
Night Operations
MAJOR COLLINS-POWELL, Military College. Curragh, Eire
[Reprinted from An Cosantoil' 1942.]
F>.en the orthnary nund untramed m
methods of Wal and limIted In Its l.nowl
edge of thE> rhanH'tel'll'-tl(::-' of modem
weapons and engwE'S at \\al' !UUbt leallzc
the follo\\I111g of fact:
I The tanh is all-powerful Jf prop
('rlv used m dayllght hours, Lut It 15
cUIH}lcrSOl1le to use and blInd at nIght.
1 The all plaT,!.' Ii' a menace to
ground troops dunng daylight hours,
It can dehver')j'lleclMon bombmg from
E'ven high altItudes; It can effectively
machme-gun and dIve-bomb glound
forces durmg dayllght; It can spot
movements of troOps III open country;
but It IS relatIvp}y useless for thls
type of work when darkness falls
.J The machme gun and artIllery
finu theil- best use In daylight when
observatIon is po<:,slble, These
weapons are of little value at mght m
anythIng but operatIOns.
It may he tl uly stated that "m the
night all cats are grey," and in the night,
modern weapons of war lose a great deal
of thelr value. Everything depends on
the man: hh traimng, hIS tenaci.ty. hIS
courage and InItiative, In view of the
foregomg, OUI' Army and L D.F_ (Local
Defense Force) umts must place night
trainmg high III the list of essential
work, and by constant practice and at
tention to detaIl fit all ranks to under
take this difficult work.
Advantages of Ntgkt Operations.
These may be l'ead11y s),lmmal'ized under
foUl' heudmgt-:
a. Introduction of surpnse-an iln
pOl'tant prmclple of war.
b. AVOidant'' of observatIOn.
c AVOidance of hostIle alll1ed 1he
ftom :,upenOl g-l'ound weapons anu
d AvOldance of shoch actIOn of
mechanized arillored
1\18n naturally looks to darl.ness clUJ'
lllg' whlch the bull... of his forces can lest.
Hp }'ehes on SeCUl'lty by, vanous means
groups, patrols, hstenmg posts.
etc., and If these secul'ily meaSUles fall.
he IS open to annihIlatIOn from the mght
raiders whose numbpl's he finds difficult
to ('stm1ute and \vhQse attact IS so swift
and une'l.pected that he has lIttle tHne in
WhICh to arrange anytbmg but an Im
provI:-.ed dE'fense.
The eyes of the defender's force ale
blmdeJ by the darkness of mght. and
use of fires or any illunlinatlOn WIll ren
der mght bIvouacs an easy t<lrget; con
sequently, prOVIded adequate preeuutlOns
taken to msure a stealthy approach
by the attackers, It should be feaSIble to
effect SurprIse.
It is posslhle to place a band of small
arms fire around rest, areas at mght,
but success depends on careful arrange
ments made in ad... ance: and also on suc
eessful operation of an alarm scheme.
The armored fightIng vehIcle is no
tOl'lOusly vulnerable at night. Its crews
are small, and operatlOns of the ma
('hinE's during the day make severe calls
on the &tamlDa of Its pel'$onnel; Cl'OSS
country movement over unknown country
dlfficult and dangerous for tank crews;
their armor prOVides comp-Iete protec
tIOn only agam&t bullets, and glven the
sheltenng cloak of darkness it is com
paratlvely easy to destroy them by spe
cwl deVIce::. (Molotoff "CocktaIls" etc,)
prov](led mght raiders are sufficiently
trained to enable them to get to close
The Disadvantages of Night Opera
tlO)IS."--Nlght operatwns are dIfficult and
dangerous unless troops are trained to
such piteh that they have implicit con
firient'e III their abilIty to maintain di
rectIOn and approach objectives cau
tiously and as a result of experience in
tramJng, have implicit faith in their
leaders. Only first-rate troops have any
hope of success; inexperienced men are
habIe- to pantc and confUSIon. Plans for
all mght operations must be simple
Maneuver is difficult, control is limited
and there IS constant danger of confu
!:lIOn, apart altogether from the difficulty
of distingubhmg between friend and foe.
The Ploblem of Training.-There is
no short-cut to proficiency in training
for night operations. Success or failure
of these operatIOns depends entirely on
the skill of the individual, and one badly
trained man can upset the most careful
plans and cause mOl'e confusion and
panic in the ranks of the raIders than
In those of the attacked.
Elementary training should cover
Training of vision.
Training of hearmg.
Direction find mg.
Movement in darkness individually
and in groups.
Efficient employment of short range
and special weapons-Thompson
gun, pistol, revolver, Molotoff
"Cocktails," grenades, knives, wire
cuttel s, bayonets, etc.
Pa<,smg of messages and orden.
.11cthods of TlUnl1IIg.-The foregomg
presents problems all of which must be
solved. The ObVIOUS questIOn presented
IS: How IS this traming to be canied
out? In the case of Visual trammg, in
structlOn can only be gIven aftn the
mdividual soldier is proficient in the
ject by day. It IS adVIsable to start
mentary trammg on wellknown ground
when the soldier can easily understand
the dIfferencE' in appearance. shape. and
size of objects m the darkness. DUl'mg
theIr .trammg it Will be noted that all
objects appear larger. Outlines af:,sume
unaccustomed shapes because detaIls dis
appeal. It IS deSIrable to observe with
the moon shming from the rear and also
to locate thE:'- ousener In As
progress IS made, trammg of hearmg
can be combmed WIth VIsual training. In
thiS phasE' of Instruction the soldier can
be taught that the silence of mght makes
sound audible for a long distance;
sequently, the dIstance of sound is under
E'stimat.ed. Furthermore, it should be
demonf:,tl ated that a scout can see better
from the prone pOSItIOn and hear better
with an ear close to the ground.
Trainmg for movement can first be
considered m tWlltght near barracks.
EmphaSIS should be placed on methods
of movement and selectIon of ground for
SIlent movement. In thiS phase the sol
dier is taught that on hard ground he
should advance the foot gently, place the
toe on the ground first and then lower
the heel, and in soft ground or grass,
etc., he raises the foot clear of the grass
and puts heels down first, then lowers
the foot gently.
Training in direction finding should
follow the elementary periods, and in
thIS phase all lessons taught previously
can be practiced. DirectIon finding
should he carried out with and Without
compass, and here again it is llJOst de
sirable that easy ground, well known to
the soldier. should be chosen. In this
way confidence will develop, and the
trainee is systematIcally prepared for
movement over difficult and unknown
The good instructor wil1 keep in mind
that the sole purpose of night training
IS to enable the soldier to find hIS way
over unknown terrain m darknebs, to
move silently, to avoid observation by
the enemy. and to close With his enemy,
destroy him and return to his rallying
point. In addition, therefore, to the
points already mentioned, emphasis
should be placed on the following:
a, AVOId use of lights-they disclose
pOSItion and may result in loss of sur

b. AVOId noise-fasten artIcles of
equipment or any item that I attles.
f' Aim at SIlent, swift movement
even when not on I'oads or paths.
d. A VOId movement on hard roads
and use grass mal gi ns,
c. Collective movement; observe the
man to the front-conform to Ius
movements. ThiS eliminates necessity
for orders.
f. Pass information back qUickly
and silently.
g. Wear Identification
strIpe on back or around both al'ms
h. Practtce rapid and slow crawling.
1 Practice crossing obstacles. wire,
wooded ground, etc.
l PractIce falhng.
k. Use speCIal footwear where neces
nary-gym shoes, socks over boots;
dispense WIth unnecessary eqUipment.
There IS no short-cut to proficu?llcy In
thiS pha<;e of military traming. Prepara.
tlOn of a syllabus t'equil'es careful
thought and propel' know ledge by the
traintng officer of the requirements of
men III learnIng fundamentab. Individ.
ual tramlllg of the soldIer must first
I {'celve conSideration. and success Or
failure depends primarily on the care
and forethought exercIsed In prepara
tton and superVISIOn of thiS traInmg
ProfiCIency can be obtained qUickly and
Interest sustained If competltlOns are
carried out In scoutIng, obsel vmg,
trollIng, dIrectIOn findIng, etc. :\105t in.
structIOn should be carded out at mght.
and herem hes the great advantage
mIlitary trammg can be combined with
that of the L D.F. With the result that
Army UnIts and L.D.F. UllitS are afford
ed opportunity for cooperatIOn WIth
consequent beneficial results to both.
Night training has other advantages.
It breaks the routine of ('onstant daIly
parades; its novelty appeals to the sol
dier; It develops illltiative and powers
of leadershIp; it makes for phYSIcal fit
ness and finally, it insures that If time
comes for action we will have units
capable of deriving maximum benefits
from and using that darkness
as a ally and not as a dangerous
Before makIng a deCision in reg'ard to
night attacks, a commander must give
careful consideration to the folIowing:
Wealher.-Dark and rainy nights are
best. They make movements and control
very dIfficult but are most favorable for
surprise. Bright nights with wind blow
ing towards objectives are least suitable.
Glotmd.-A study of details of night
attacks indicates that in most cases of
faIlure the fault lay 1ll operations over
difficult. broken country which had the
effect of imposing great strain on the
attackers and causing confusion by in
terminglIng of troops and columns;
wheleas in open country, attacks have
been mOI"e frequently successful. In
other words, nIght attacks dIffer front
those carried out lfl daylight because
they depend on the power of darkness
fot concE'aIment and Pl'otE'ctlOn rather
than upon terrain features.
Tl'((/IIllIg.-Troops must be thoroughly
tramed and discIplmed. J
Ob)ccil1'cS of Night A ttacks.-The fol
lowmg considerations are of primary im
portance m selection of objectives:
I. A limIted objective should be
2 The objective must be well de
finE'd and easIly recognized.
J. Approach to the obJectlve and the
objective Itself must be carefully re
connOItered m dayltght.
4. The route should provide an area
near the ObjectIve at WhICh attackers
can assemble prIOr to the assault.
5. Roads. fences. hedges, etc. lead
Ing' toward the objectIves aI evaluable
as a means of maintaining direction.
6. The objectIve selected shouJd, if
attmned. as!'.l!'.t future operatIOns.
TJllle ot Attack.- The selectIOn of time
for attack depends entn'ely"on the situa
tIOn If the objectlve IS to be attacked
and consolidated. the IS launched
In sulficlent tinle to cou{plete capture and
consolIdatIOn before daylight. ThIS in
volves careful preparatIOn and accurate
calculatIon of the tIme taken to march
to the objectIve plus estimatIOn of the
tIme taken for capture and consolida
tIOn. In a raiding attack wherein the
attackers may have to get back under
darkness, the time taken will have to be
consulE'l'ed before any deCIsion regarding
time IS made. The basic consideration
which governs a decision of this nature
hinges on whether a.ayhght Of' darkness
IS desired Immediately after the objective
has fallen,
Selecting Fo'rward Assembly Areas.
This is the position where the attacking
umt halts and takes up the formation
to be used in the final advance. It
corresponds closely to any assembly area
ordered for a daylight" attack except
that. owing to darkness. cover is not an
essentwl. The important point to remem
ber IS that this assembly area is selected
as close to the objectIve as possible con
sistent with safety. as the further away
It is from the objective the less chance
there will be of preserving order in the
last stages.
Composltion and Stlength of the At
tacking FOI as.-Foot troops or cavalry
(cyclists) are be::.t suited of all arms to
QVeT('ome dIfficultU's of night attacks.
Armored or motorIZed ('avalry or In
fantry can be effectwely use1. In opera
tIOns H.qUlrmg movement over long
rhstauces. It should. however be remem
bered that ::.urprise liable to be lost
by the us.e of any mechanical vehicles
<In I that In any ev<,nt rln,m')lmted actIOn
Will. have to he takE'n In final ::.tag-ec; of
the> assault
The problems to lw solved, therefoH',
(l How large ':Ihonld thI,", mfantt y
f01C(> hp'>
b. \\'hat ,>uppo\t c<w hl' glVPH by
othel arms?
StlPllgth of tlw fOI ce employed de
rends on thC' sanK> cOnS1f!t>1 atlOn ap
plIcable to daylight attacko;;. excppt that
the elemcnt of sm plIse. the likelihood of
h'cttlng' do"e to the en(;'my ,\o"lthout loss..
cCliI (!lfficultH'S 111 conti 01 all pomt the
ies'>on that a ltlJI'IJ1tl{lH fOICC conslbtent
WIth 1equtrelnenb ::'.hould hp bclected
Actual of the force wIll
31<"0 r/epl'nd on t,l(' "nuatl<ln Speclalt",ts
WIll be '3c\ectl'II fOI <:>pertali::.t Johs. If
thl' SItUJtlOil 1:. 0 l(' whIch dE'll1anri"" tlw
(;'mploymcnt (,f 1'('1110I1tlOn pal hoop"
tl"JJrwl In u(,ll1u/ltion WOI k mu:oC be in
dulled The mlpmt3.nt fnctOl's to oh
1. Incllloe "'t:fiI!'lE'nt men and mao
tel wI to th<, ta<;], efficH?ntly
.!. only mcn who all'
cally fit and tr.1Jne-J m l1Ight '\\'orh.
J Appowt tl'l commandCl' a mall
'\\ho hd::' ::,pL'Claliflt knowlf'dg<.' of th"
partlrular ta..,1-. 11"\ hclnt! UUlt '\"ho has
(''\.lJeI Hmce In ieaclmg men at mght
Ordl'IS -In Vll'W of the neceSSIty for
cUleful plepat1atIOn In advance. wmnmg
ordcrs ...,lIouid be gIven as speedily as
pOSSible to subordmat(;' 0111t<.. aftcl the
JCCI1'il'Jl1 has been made
Apalt flom detmb 1l00mally mclufleli
In a dayilght attacl, 01 del. the followmg
pomt-" I eqlllre to 1)(> ('1)\,('1 (' I fo], an at
tack m (lal kne"s
u A d(;'nmte lout\;' f\H l' column
to the assl'mbly area 01' hne hom Which
the m;::.ault Will Hal t
b :\.leans of ul(mtlfieatlO')
c. of and USS1:-tll1g'
the command In l11ulI'tenanc of dll'PC
tlon and contact.
d. A definIte OhJ('('tlve otltlmed In
cIeal' language fOl' ea('h element of thp
c. Action to he tal,en by othel' troop-;
nf}t pal tlcIpatmg m the d'll ('ct attack
but leqU1l'ed to give as"I;.'ltance.
f Procedure to be adapted in case
of success by attackerh.
g. A rallying pomt in the event of
h. A detail regarding arrangements that prior t.o the march the men will be
for withdrawal and i3. general direction rested and fed, and that they will carry
for withdrawal in case of a raiding Wlth them the "iron rations" necessary
attack. for sustenance during the operation.
Only arms. ammunition and special
weapons prest'ribed in orders will be car
ried. and selection of these depends on
H. ReconnaIssance -t-As already indi
the task in hand.
catpd, careful is vltal for
Actw'!2 Dunne thp Attack.-No text
E'v(;'ntual su('cess. If all possible, phy
can prescribe exactly what should be
folcal leconnalssance of the objective and
done onre the attack takes plaee. A night
the 1'00lte to the obJechve should be car
attack dependA. for Its final success up
l'led out a numbElr of officers. The
on the initIatIVe and courage of the small
alternative IS to make a study of maps,
group The following points should, how
ial photographs. patrol and intelli
ever. be observed:
gem'c lPOl'tS and to make use of the 1. All ranks should know preCisely
knowledge of ground already m pos::oes
what is to be done.
SlOn of the L.D.F. or friendly inhabitants.
2. Silence in IDltml movement pro
Ao;; mamt(;'nance of directIOn is difficult,
Vides the ehance of surpl'lSE'.
prelnmnary reconnaissance should cover f Speed, dash and mdIvldual cour
examination of ground for well-defined
brmg success.
land-marks, obstaclE'S and directlOn aids 4. The "small group" commander
such as streams, rivers, ravmes, etc. and hiS p{lwe)'s of leadership are of
b nl1crtwlI alld CfJlrtlol-The value pari.lmount importance.
of lo{'al knowledg,e ppssesf,erl by L.D.F. 5. Stal t the a'5sault from posltlOns
pNhonnp} IS Naturally, the as close as pOSSIble to the enemy.
best choice is a man of officer or NCO SUMMARY
I auk bel:au<;,e of h)s e'\tra mIlitary The mam gUIdes to sucCess in night
tno\\ile.dge and trmmhg Compass bpur. operatIOns can be summarized as foI
ann conn('ctmg {iles are uf,eful for
Blmntalllwg dll'eetion and control a SImple plans.
c DFlfp/glllShwg Marl.s.-Once or b. LimIted obJectIves.
deJ"b Jl'C received, anangcmf'nts ruu"t be r. SurprIse.
made to In<.,ure that each man carrIes d. Care m preparatIOn and recon
as pre:,ocr:ihed. nm<;sance.
d. T"l<IPS - F,JO'}- Alms - Amuw- ('. Use of locallmowledge.
111(1011 -The gooJ commander msures f. T I"amed 'men.
A Famous British Weapon and Its
Methods of Working
(Illustrated on Page 63)
These explanatory drawmgs of the BrItish 25-pounder
Illustrate Its outstandmg f(;'atures and methods of transport
and operatIOn The deSIgn of the 25-poundE'l' allows for it
to he swur.g In a rapId for antitank shootmg. two palts
spe(,Jall;y oe\;lg-nE'd for thiS ea<;e of traverse bemg the wheel
like finng--platform and the boxf'd "spade" at the rear of the
tnul. The flange and track of the firing-platform are identi
cal With those of the pneumatIc-tIred wheels, WhICh thus swing
thl' gun in a smooth cIrcle, whIle the boxing of the "spade"
has thE' dQuble purpose of pl'ovIdmg easy traverse over the
ground and preventmg the traIl from embeddmg itself. With
facilitIes for qUlck changing of dIrectional fire, carre
latcd provISion had to be made for stability; so specially
deSIgned prevent the gun from moving on
all recoil belllg taken up by the reCOil mechanism. The
gun is operated by a crew of SIX men who are protected by a
!'.ubstantlal shIeld and who have the benefit of very effiCIent
apparatm., mcluding illuminating gear for night
\vOl k. The 25-pounder IS a qUick-firing gun and employs
three types of shells, as shown, fired by percussion, operated
by a firmg leloer. The tapered barrel is 92.51 inches long and
has a bore caliber of 3 45 mches. The breech ls of the vertical
sll1..1mg--blpek type--lt IS shown open for loading In one of our
prOVIsions for automatic prevention of
the cartridges shppmg backwards during loading when the
gUll IS at a hIgn angle of elevatlOll.-EMract from The
1((lIatratpd, l.Qud(Jn .Vews 5 September 1942.
The British 25-Pounder
DRAWN BY G. H. DAVIS, Special Artist of The Illustmted London NpW8
The Illustrated London News.
(See Page 62 for Text)
Officers and the Soldier's Mess
Commandant. School for Bakers and Cooks, Seventh Service Command
The fol/owing are extracts from lectures de
livered by Lieutenant Colonel Bmwn on the
subject of Mess Management before officer
groups sta1io'ned within the Sr,'enth Service
Command,-THE EDITOR.
Nothing herein contained should be construed as
a condemnation of all officers and all messes. I am
meeting many fine officers whom it is a pleasure to
know and a joy to serve with. Likewise. 1 have met
many of the opposite type. I have seen many good
messes. but few of them were as' good as their officers
seem to think.
I believe in an eSI",;t de and its value to the
unit. It is fine to sell your organization the idea. but
just repeating over and over again that everything
is in tiptop shape does not necessarily make it so.
Many officers have too much on the state
ment of the experienced leaders who say that an or
ganization commander should develop hil"h morale
by telling the men over and over again how good
they are. What these organization commanders 'fail
to understand about such advice is that to make it
work they themselves out of their quali1lies as offi
cers must give to the orgamzation those things that
really and truly make a man proud to belong.
I doubt if there is an officer in the United States
Army who, if he is doing all the things he ought to do.
can find eight hours out of twenty-four in which to
sleep. 0,," thing most young officers and a sizeable
group of older officers fail to understand is that the
moment they accept their commission. they assume
the position of an expert in everything. None of us
have all the answers. but it is incumbent upon us
when we do not know the answer to get it and get it
In the process of finding the answer. and develop
ing yourselves as officers, you will come to one sub
ject that merits much more attention and study than
has heretofore been given to it by the average officer.
I refer of course, to the subject of Mess Management.
It is no. less important to the well-being of your men
and the success of our Army than the medical atten
tion provided or the training for actual combat. I
am not asking that you devote long hours to this
function. It is not necessary. But it is necessary
that you give to your mess twenty to thirty minutes
a day of intelligent and understanding effort in solv
ing its problems.
I am quite certain that most of us have at some
time or other had the experience of witnessing an
experienced inspecting officer at work. We were
: astonished that anyone man in the very few mo
ments it took him to walk down the line through the
barracks, could see so many things. Sometimes it
seemed as thoug}! the inspecting officer possessed
super-natural powers; nothing seemed to escape him.
, If you were to ask such an officer the secret of his
: success. he would probably tell you that he saw what
he was looking at. You, too. must develop the faculty
of seeing what you are looking at. And in the pro
cess you will develop within your organization the
feeling "do not try to put anything over on the old
man; he sees everything."
For some reason officers have felt that there was
something mysterious about the army mess. that
only an expert trained in mess management could
solve the many intricate problems. It must be for
that reason that many officers inspecting a mess
make a quick dash through the kitchen, listen only to
the frequently meaningless palaver of the mess ser
geant and observe only those things he wants seen.
Officers seem hurried and most anxious to get the
kitchen inspection over with and get out. They do
not know anything about cooking or running a
kitchen and. therefore. do not feel qualified to argue
a point with the cooks or mess sergeant.
There is nothing mysterious about the army mess.
Reduced to its simplest form, it means the converting
of raw food stuffs. by the application of heat or cold.
into a nourishing. palatable and well served dish for
the soldier. You may not be a cook, but you have
been eating food for a great many years. and I
would hate to think that after so long a time and
such a close association. you did not know which
foods you like and the way you like them. Nine
times out of ten, what pleases you will please your
Your associatioh with di rt is of equal long stand
ing. It dates back to the admonition of an exacting
parent to "scrub behind those ears and wash your
feet before going to bed." Dirt is dirt wherever you
fmd it. on the soldier. his equipment, or in the kit
chen. You will not stand for it in a rifle. Why stand
for it in your kitchen?
Young soldiers are eager to do a job, but they do
not know and will not know until they are taught.
This means. then. that in newly activated organiza
tions particularly, the company commander is fre
quently his own first sergeant, company clerk, supply
sergeant and mess sergeant. He has to dig in and
learn each of these jobs. Only by so doing can he
teach them to others.
When it comes to breaking in a mess sergeant as
in everything else, the officer should realize that there
is no substitute for knowledge or hard work. Ac
quire a store of knowledge; then you will have
something to pass on.
I repeat there is nothing mysterious about an army
mess. Do you know where the food comes from
that you see in your mess? Are you acquainted with
your unit supply officer? Have you visited the ration
breakdown point to see how the ration is broken
down for your organization? Do you know why
there are substitutes in the fielAation and what to
do with the accumulation of unused supplies in your
store room?
Get acquainted with your unit supply officer and
commissary officer. They will provide you with the
answers to these questions.
Do you inspect your mess just hefore meal-time?
Are the mashed potatoes fluffy white or a dirty
grey, lumpy mass? Is the meat sliced with or
against the grain? It makes a hig difference. Are
the canned peas put on the stove an hour or so be
fore they are to be served, or are they merely
heated through? Is the soup made from a rich meat
stock, or were various vegetables thrown into a
pot, water poured over them, seasoning added, and
the whole thing cooked for probably half an hour,
thereby resulting in little more than hot water lack
ing flavor and body? Are the green vegetables
bright in color, or do they have a dirty green appear
ance, indicating over-cooking and loss of nutritive
value? Are hot rolls served frequently to tone up
the meal, or is it always bread, bread, bread. Is the
bread fresh or stale?
Some vegetables are less desirable than others
from the soldier's viewpoint. Do you know which
vegetables they are? Are they always served the
same way, or do you suggest to your cooks various
ways and ideas for fixing these vegetables so the
soldier will eat and enjoy them?
Do your men complain that lamb is served too fre
quently? Do you know that seventy-five percent of
the people, when lamb is properly prepared, cannot
tell when they are eating lamb? Do you know what
gives it the mutton flavor that so many people dis
Many soldiers do not like fish. Do you make it a
point to see that your menu on fish days is sufficiently
complete so as to insure every soidier a satisfactory
meal. or is it a case where the soldier eats fish or goes
to the post exchange?
Do your cooks complain about the lack of hot
water and blame it for the greasy dishes? Do you
know why there is not sufficient hot water?
Cooks frequently complain, when criticized because
of tardy meals, that the ranges are slow because of
a lack of drafL Do you know that coal and wood
,ranges have to be cleaned daily, inside and out? Do
you know what the flues look like when they are
dean and free from soot?
Is your kitchen infested with roaches and flies?
Do you know that there are ways to exterminate or
control them, and what those ways are?
I When your kitchen police scrub the floors, do they
change rinse water frequently and scrub and mop
,with the grain or against the grain?
The answers to these and thousands of other ques
tions are yours for the asking. Consult TM 10-1;05,
The A1'nlY Cook, and TM 10-205, Mess Management.
Do not be afraid of your mess. Take an interest
in it and you will be most agreeably surprised at how
easy it is to acquire mess knowledge and how quickly
I the mess will improve.
: For some unknown reason many officers have con
cluded that messes will run themselves, food will be
I plentiful, and that if there is a shortage the civilian
population will be rationed so that the Army can
have all it wants. The Army is not entitled to all it
wants. It is entitled only to that which it needs.
I assume that all officers are patriotic; yet there
is much evidence to indicate that in some cases at
least, the donning of the uniform constitutes the sale
contribution and sacrifice for their country. For
many months I have been preaching the gospel of
food conservation, saying over and over again that
food was fast becoming a critical item. Food is not
plentiful, as we are now finding out, and will become
less so as we go forward with our war effort.
As patriotic gentlemen, sincerely interested in the
success of our Arms, we must wholeheartedly sup
port the policies and programs laid down by those in
, authority.
, Right now much of our canned goods, both fruits
and vegetables, are restricted to over-seas use. That
means you must see to it that all fresh fruits and
vegetables coming into your kitchen are properly
prepared and served to reduce to an absolute mini
mum the use of canned products. For the same rea
son we are asked to consume other meats as a sub
stitute for pork and beef. The civilian population
is being forced to do it, and we in the Army should
do no less. All these things and many mQre need to
be done to win the war.
Wherever possible, we, because of the high patri
otic motives that prompted our entrance into the
service, should set the example for all others to
The Man Who Stopped Hitler
A Study of the Russian Soldier
Writing from Moscow
(Reprinted from The New Y.ork Times 8 March 1942)
In Tolstoy's "War and Peace" Andrew
Bolkonsky talked with Peter on the eve of
the Battle of Borodino. "Vlctory" snid
he, "never can be and never has been the
outcome of positIOn, numbers or charac
ter of arms-least of all. position."
"Of what. then?" asked Peter. and
Andrew replied: .
"Of the feelmg in me and In him"
pointmg to Tlffiokhine. "in every soldier."
You could tl'avel very far searching for
the &pirit of thE' Russian fighting man
the senior officer. the subaltern, the sol
dier in the rank and file of the Red Army.
From the craggy ('oasts of Rybachi penin
sula near the Arctlc. where, in bedoun
like robes of white, lonely watchers
are on the alert for enemy -convoys
bringmg suppltes toward Petsamo. to the
frequently contested heights of Sevas
topol studded with pll1-boxes. the front
stretches 1,800 mIles. AnywhE're along
the sinuous line you might find the men
of the Red A}'my sniping from pine trees
in the north, manmng guns on the verge
of a forest. sma5hing German block
houses round Leningrad, turning
the bleak, swampy landlOcape to the
delivered soil of RUSSIa, thundering on
Wiry hor::,es from Orenburg across the
beaten snow of the Northern Ukraine,
waist deep in the icy waters of the Black
Sea as they supphes onto the shores
of the CrImea.
But need not leave Moscow wlth
the front-line atmosphere to have a
shrewd idea of what IS in the Red Army
man's mind-hIs convictIOns and the
spirIt WhICh balked the Germans far more
than their unpreparedness for the Rus
sian Winter. Tn Moscow you see him in
all stages of his development-the young
recrUIt formmg up untidily lTI suburban
squares or flockmg goodnaturedly mto
parks deE>p With snow, the youngster who
has become a veteran with deep-set eyes
holdmg memories Qf the front as he walk'5
through the WIth a group of his com
rades, the lIeutenant at a balJet clasping
a rifle between his knee.s In order to a11
plaud each pirouette in "Coppelia," the
polItICal commissar with the frank
expre.ssion of a good mixer who has
snatched a few days between two engage
ments wlth the enemy In order to attend
lectures in the capital, the wounded ill
hospItals recountmg their experiences
and impatient to return to the front.
Each of these soldiers has hIS own men
tal pIcture of the war's splendor and ig
nominy. One of them :remembers a wheel
of a German motorcycle shlI spinning
after hIS shot had caused the rider to
pitch forward dead Another speaks of
fresh snow settling on the faces of the
murdered ciVIlians he :found at Rostov, of
the monstrous havoc on the roadside, with
d1sabled tanks lurching in ditches and
staff cars belching documents in confu
sion. Another recalls the standard-bearer
galloping down the lines with a Red ban
ner when the regiment met with haggard
partIsans of Soviet Russia on the verge
of villages where they had hidden from
the enemy throughout the Winter in earth
Hpre is a wlde variety of personality
and experIence, with human materIal as
vaned m race as the Ukranian and the
Turcoman-war experience as different
as that of the men who, with headphones
over their fur hats, control mine-detect
mg machines, and blood-stained Cossacks
III the van of Timoshenko's southern
armies. Yet out of all thIS it is poss1ble
to create the prototype of the Red Army's
fhrhtlng men-that is, his character.
To begm \\,lth. he IS essentially an 01'
dmary 50\'1(>t CItizen. There is no army
castc and the traditIOns being formed
are not of a kmd thut depart from what
IS to be e ... pected of a fightmg ex-ciVIlian.
EducatIOn under the Soviet has no differ
ent Impress for a cOll!.batant and a non
combatant This IS true of the army m
war as In peace.
The polItical staff of the army does
more than arrange perlOdical pep talks.
The <11 my is taking its full share in milI
tary engagement':>, anti It thp Job of the
pohtical officer to broaden the mental
hOl'lzon of the soldiers by keepmg them
\\1(>11 mformed and explaming the reason
for operatlOns and the tactics employed.
The deSIre for knowledge on the part
of the SOVIet citIzen, in or out of uniform,
IS the heIghtening of that burning curi
oSity which foreign observers since the
seventeenth century have noted in Russia.
It is apparent when you see how the Red
Army man spends his leisure.
Like most young people in this country,
he is the son of parlO'nts who were Illit
erate when he was born-SO percent of
the Czarist Army in the last war were
illiterate. He has the same eagerness to
use the gift of literacy which he receives
from Soviet education as causes the
people of Moscow to stand in line for
hours to obtain daily newspapers and to
dawdle around bookstalls in the streets
when temperatures are 40 below.
IllIterate Russia sought entertainment
m music, story tellmg and dancing, so
developmg a strong tradition to which
the young Soviet citizen is still faithful.
The songs of the Red Army are often set
to tunes that hIS grandparents would not
have sung-jaunty catching little tunes
that have been popular since the revo
lution. They are quatrain in form
"chastushky"-and they record current
events with the spontaneous vigor of
Calypso tradition. The history of the civil
war is contained in these popular ballads.
Among the dUties of young poets col
laborating in regimental newspapers is
writing ballads about the exploits of local
heroes, which are not only sung in the
army but find theIr way back to the rear,
becoming the folk-lore of villages where
the heroE's are known.
Generally, however, the Red Army man
spends his leisure educatIOnally. His is 8.
keen mterest in technical questions, and
1f you ask Soviet tankist opmion of
tanks or a Soviet pilot on
hawks, he WlIl speak with passionate
mtel'est, givmg a detailed explanation of
the merits or faults of the machines. If
you ask the wounded soldier how it
pened, he wraps up his personal story
with an intelligent account of the oper
It::. alms and tactics. The Red
Army's newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda
(Red Star), which forms the baSIS of
army lecturing, contains little of what
the press considers
tertamment. The hIstory of various
cal operatIOns is described in technical
Nothmg js farther from the truth than
the opinion sometimes heard abroad that
RUSSIan soldIers are of a simple, childlike
chnracter and blindly obey orders. Equal
ly unfounded is the belief that the
try's great resources of man power make
the High Command extravagant in using
troops. The of'the Red
Army man is not simplicity. He is alert
minded, with all attention focused on the
aim of fighting, and his mind is clear of
all doubts.
He is no .'less critical of the conduct of
the war as he sees it in his own sector.
The revolutionary discipline is founded
exclusively on recognition of merit. and
the superior officer is always exposed to
critical observation.
Economy in using man power is funda
mental to Soviet strategy. Extra stretcher
bearers were brought to the front during
the cold weather to speed up the trans
port of wounded from the battlefield, and
doctors hasten to apply modern treatment
at advance dressing stations. so saving
countless soldiers from the knife.
Two anxieties which come naturally to
any front-Ime soldier-how his family is
faring and whether the horne front is
puttmg forth its full effort-are easily
dispelled in Soviet Russia. In this social
Ist country people have come to accept it
as natural that the state takes full re
sponSIbility in such an emergency as war
for the welfare of the people, and though.
with the present huge-scale evacuation,
many families are out of touch with
members. there is a lack of anxiety,
caused not by indifference but by confi
dence in the authorities.
The Red Army man is gray-eyed with
frowning brow, who smiles when he sees
a chicken runnmg frightened a way from
his tank, who is moved to tears when
obliged to refuse lift in the village the
Germans are about to enter to the mother
wIth two little boys clutching at her
skirts and a baby in her arms; who is
coldJy tense as he mows down the enemy;
to whom it IS natural to tend a horse, sing
a song, and enter a battle; who knows a
little poetry-he likes to reCIte Pushkin
and remembers the song from the last
film he saw; who 'expects a task to be set
dearly by a commander he respects for
his merIts; whose sentiments are crystal
ized by slmple things-a bIrch tree, the
sunrise, a little child, a squirrel; who IS
a keen Judge of character and a great ad
mlrer of personal courage. His curiosity
is boundless.
"What do you think about when you
go into action? a fighter pilot was asked.
"I am wondering what the enemy looks
like and I like to get close to find out,"
was the reply.
The Russian soldier has great confi
dence in himself, and once he has learned
the foe's methods he applies his mind to
the problem of countlfring them. Now
that the Germans have lost the capacity
to surprise him, he feels that he is a
complete match for the enemy. He is
fighting as a patriot, defending his
motherland as did the soldIers of Alex
ander Nevsky. Pojarsky. Suvoroff and
Kutuzoff; and he IS fightmg as a Soviet
citizen defending the Soviet way of living
against FaSCIst reaction. with belief in a
righteous cause as fervent as that of the
soldiers of Pugachov and Razin, rebels
agamst the Czars of old. He believes pas
slOnately, stubbornly, utterly in the
values he is defending and restoring to
the liberated regions.
The Confusion of Combat
There has been much written about leadership, an
officer's conduct toward his men, the maintenance of
morale, bravery, conduct on the field of battle and
kindred subjects, but little if anything has been writ
ten on what an officer and especially one with little
or no experience is to expect when he moves forward
into battle.
It would seem that if these young officers and par
ticularly leaders of small units were given a thorough
insight into what to expect, a far more efficient hand
ling of the situation would ensue in practically every
Here is the trouble: An officer is taught how to do
things, how to lead his men, how to envelop this or
that flank, when he is to start, what direction to
take, what objectives to reach and so on; but did
anyone ever tell him what he is liable to expect
en route?
Did anyone ever try to prepare him so he would be
in the proper frame of mind as he entered and during
the battie, so that he would be able to meet the vari
ous situations as they occur, overcome them, use his
resourcefulness? his initiative?
Did anyone ever tell him that practically nothing
ever happens as he expects it will in war, that there
IS nothing but one new and unforseen situation after
~ n o t h e r to overcome and that id why he is there and
why leaders are necessary? Did anyone ever tell
him that this would be in addition to the order he
has been given?
Did anyone ever tell him that the order might not
apply when he arrives at a crucial point and that it
will be up to him to use his initiative and judgment
from that point on? Has he been told that there
"ain't no" smooth-sailing streamlining in the com
pany and platoon?
It would seem that if young, yes, and in most cases,
older officers had the above firmly fixed in their
minds before they came into the presence of the
enemy and later went into action, there would be less
breaking under strain, more officers capable of meet
ing the new and unexpected situations and less going
back to "Blooey" and reclassification.
What is a battle, anyway, whether it be a big one
or a small one, an army or a platoon or even a squad?
Isn't it a moving situation from start to finish where
the situation changes every minute, yes, every second,
and what is correct procedure at ten o'clock may be
absolutely wrong procedure five minutes later? Is
not the enemy under the same strain?
After all, isn't it the side, great or small, that is
able to meet the situation without going to pieces,
that is more resourceful than the other, which nor
mally wins?
If it were really known, in most cases young offi
cers leading their platoons and companies would
probably have done much better could they have been
made to realize' that practically nothing would go as
expected, this or that squad would lose its way, am
munition fail to arrive as expected, half a platoon
wiped out by machine-gun fire, artillery fire or a
bomb from the air. But most of all these young offi
cers should know that the enemy is in the same boat.
Things are going just as bad with him. He is having
a hen of'" time. These young officers should have
constantly in their minds: ,"Now is the time for me
to keep my head; nothing is going to stop me from
going forward; this is what I have been taught to
expect, and if I accomplish my mission no matter
what happens I will be doing what is expected of
me." Such is the state of mind the young officer
should be in and all the I.Q. tests and psychological
dissertations will not help him in the pinches.
Most civilians coming into the army forget one
thing. They have, in practically all cases, been in
positions where there was generally a normal pro
cedure, where things went on more or less smoothly,
with little upsets here and thei'e, perhaps. to vary
the monotony. Did they ever stop to realize that a
big depression is much the same in many ways as is
a big war? A big depression is a moving situation
changing every minute. How many banks. large and
small businesses go under? And the ones that keep
their heads above water are, in most cases, the ones
best prepar"d to meet any situation that comes along.
A nd so it is in the army: the officers great and small
(in rank, not stature) who are prepared. most re
sourceful, with the most initiative, who know the
;enemy is having just as much thouble and perhaps
: more, will be able to cope with the situation at hand,
overcome the difficulties and come out victorious.
, Battles are not like depressions in this respect. In
, the latter there are some rules governing the sitna
tion. But in battles there are no rules. Not any more.
We are fighting an enemy who constantly hits below
the belt; most of his blows are fouls and our young
officer must learn to hit below the belt and often and
know the enemy will do it every time.
In conclusion, it is believed that if at the various
candidate schools the candidates were given instruc
tion along the lines above stated, much benefit would
, be derived and they would go into the presence o{the
, enemy with an entirely different mental outlook from
what is generally the case. When one misfortune
after another comes in the heat of action and every
thing is going wrong, a young officer will then not
feel himself a failure but will know that this is
what he must expect and, what is even truer, his
opponent is having just as hard a time; and the one
will win who has the most resourcefulness, initiative.
pel'serverence, the one who is able to "hold on when
there is nothing in him except the will which says
to him 'Hold on.' "
A German Daylight Patrol
(ReprintC'd from T1"amwg BlIlletln No.lITP 930 Fort Bennmg, GeorgIa)
WhIle the follO'lt'tng article dates
back to the final months of the first
World 'War, it is still an ontstanding
example of n 1f'ell conducted drtyhght
1)(1t)'0/ It bl mgs home tllf' fart tlmt
the pw'pose of such a patrol l.S to
get the infolmatwn desil cd 1"11 spite
of the resistance M" obstacle that
may appear at ellery tzWfl -THE
On 22.:\1arch 1918 the German 229th
Reserve Infantry RegIment was pur
tiripating m the German offenSIVe whieh
had begun the day before toward the
west. After a considerable advance, the
attack of the 229th was slowed down as it
approached Saulcourt. The Germans
were in contact with the English, but it
was uncertam just where the latter would
offer their principal resistance to a re
newed attack.
A patrol consisting of a lieutenant, an
ensign as second-in-command, one light
machine-gun squad and one rifle squad
was sent forward to determine the loca
tion of the new hostile mam line of re
<'I"tancp Machme-gun and minpnwerfer
f i r e ~ by the regiment were to aSSIst the
The patrol moved forward about 11 :30
A:'II In a sUltahle fOl'matlOn_ Upon near
mg A it came under fire from a machme
gun (as mdIcated) and suffered two cas
ualtlC's, the leader being k111ed. The en
SIgn then took charge, and not wishing
to become Involved m a fight, he WIthdrew
the patrol to the rear. This action was
facilltated by the covering minenwerfer
fire WhICh was placed on the enemy ma
chJDe gun.
The patrol crawled forward again after
a slight detour, and near B surprised and
captured two enemy sentries. It contmued
forward, advancing dO\vn an old trench.
Heavy fire was then encountered from
the dIrection of C. The patrol leader
showed his map to 'his men and ordered
them to move back, individually, some
300 yards, then move south across the
road and assemble in the vicinity of D.
This was done. Hostile fire continued on
the area whIch the patrol had just v a ~
eated. At D the patrol leader could see
that the English held Sauleourt, but it
did not appear that the town was oceu
pIPd In force He noted that EnglIsh out
nosts were auvanced directly east of the
town but dId not extend far to the south
east SInce he could locate no enemy near
D. The patrol leader, taking great care
to avoid hostile obsel vution, then moved
his patrol to the small woods at E.
east. The attack succeeded with slight
DtScusswn.-The above article ascribes
::.uccess of the dIvision's attack in large
part to the leading of this one patrol.
The paragraph of the German Infantry
Regulations WIth which the article dealt
reads as follows:
From E he could see small English
detachments on the southeast edge of
Saulcourt, while directly to the west of
the town and 600 yards in rear. he ob
served strong hostIle forces digging in.
The right flank did not extend far south
of Saulcourt. The patrol leader imme
diately returned with his patrol to his
regiment, The patrol had been gone two
hours. The leader reported that Saul
court was held by an Enghsh outpost,
while the main lme of resistance was 600
yards m rear, and that there seemed to
be a gap in English defenses south of
the town.
Based on this report the dIvisIOn at
tacked without delay. makmg its main
effort on the south, only a demonstration
being made agaInst Saulcourt from the
"Reconnaissance may never be omit
ted durmg battle. No dIfficultIes of
terrain and no exhaustion of troops or
leaders should cause it to be neglected.
"Careful reconnaissanje requires
tIme, but it is Wlthout
value if the commander IS ljlot informed
at the right moment as to its results:'
Points of interest in the leading of this
lJatl'oi are as follows:
The patrol was led with VIgor and
deterrnmation. Havmg encountered re
Sistance at several pomts It moved
back in each ease and tried elsewhere.
It did not become involved in a useless
fight nor did It permit enemy outposts
to prevent It from accomplishing the
mission of locatIng the British main
line of resistance.
The fact that there were no British
near and east of E, although negative
information, proved of derisive impor
The patrol leader got his informa
tIOn back promptly In time for the
Important data he had obtamed to be
Immediately exploited.
InformatIOn IS of no value if it does
not reach the proper commander in
tIme for hIm to use It.
o __OU_T.......-:J _______________ R__ __
Foreign Military Digests
D'Vest., of' articles from {ardy1t pel"i"dicals; othe/" items of interest
from foreigll publicatwl1s are summarized 111 the Catalog of Selected Periodical
Supply Service on the Tundra Along the Arctic Ocean
[Translated at the Command and Ge>neral Staff School, Fort
Leav('uworth, Kansas. from a German artlcle in DH' tl'lIPPC
June 1942.]
[?(',?Of< J ('('fl,hl(:,<;;:; IS f/l(' (,Ill' fnctv)
11 JiIl'II often "('cules fli(' (llltC(HOf' of rl
bntile H'hf'11 fightmg 111 11j/I,<;IIn[
trlJfllll, 'nlt'h as tllf' '"lldla-tile
tl('pfCSS }llUJIl cliOIOC(('1 16tic "f I/o/th
(111 A I ('tlC ! ('gions "I esolfrcetII11l(,t>8
u::'811li/( S added lin/in. tOIl(t'. TIll'
101('gol1ly altu:lr Jll'/Ilf/Iltes S01I1f' of
'1,(' llloblf'JJI<; (,n1ltlonfl)l() Ill! (lImy
!'nf)flVu! III tI,(' fHI )101 til Qlld /(qlfJ,
Hog JlUl'",lIlIJt I(,SUllu'ctlliucss fJ()J1I
(If{ Innkfl -TilE: E.'DlrOIl.
1t \\as a busy tiay on the tundra. The
Il10Tmtam tl'oOPS had heen eng'agf'd In
hf'avy fightmg whit h, hard as It had
been. had been mastered
AmmunitIOn ('on<:.umJltlOn vel)
hea\iY. All wp}lly wOlked day
and night to bnng the l'eqUlre(l amounts
of ammuUltlOll and fup1 The -..uppiy
loute ""hleh wa" used in thl'S traffic
'-tal ted from nothmg When supply
troops \VE'1 f' first engag\:'d on the tundrR,
they \\'ele faced with almo">t un80lvahle
plublem::;' no hlg'hw.lY:::'. no I'oao.,., only
bouldel:" and I and
no natulul covel' through no
towns, nb no natne POpUl.ltlOn
In "hOlt, It wag a (healY land In tht'
fal nOI th!
At that tmw mlvanclng tl could
only 1)1;' '\uppli('d by means of e(l"
of pOl tCl::'. ;>';0t t1l1 the ill'st path." 'wpre
hp[,V.:n \\C'I'e park anllnab and hght.
hOI st'-dra,vn wagon ('olumns eng-aged;
latel, when a:f"oilllioad anll then R high
way wei f' huilt, thev III turn were 11.'
placed by 1ll0tOl v{'hiclef> In the con
,>tluctlon of thl'" ,>uppiy loute, many
tholl'>and;:. of mC'n welc employed wbo
weI C fUl"lll"'hed by cOlbtructlOll hat
tahons, the Reich's Labol' Sel Vln'
<tbo FInn1<:;h constl'UrtlO11 trooI) Olganiza
Howev('l', the highway po:,&e.... scd
on(' weak rumt a IHlllge 200 ym,ls long'
\".Iw"e govell1etl b:,. &tJl('t tl'_lf
fit 1egulatlOns.
It was, therefore, a bu':'oY du.", on the
tUlllira., perfect flYlllg
weathel" and goud view of the ten am.
Evpn m the mornmg l;>everal lowilylUg'
l'nelHY pl..tne':! had attac1-eJ hurlYlllg
columns In the afternoon, ho\v
ever, aLout eighty bombers appeared,
both EnglIsh and RUSSian, and tiloppeJ
thell' loads. The fuel supply statton wm,
hit uy e1ght of the bombs, but a few of
th(>111 ,,,eH' not on the tmget. By qUlck
,,,ork on the part of the officer and mpn
at the statIOn, a fire anti e'{plo:>'lOn \vpre
preventcd. Older was soon re'>torcd, and
Issue of fuel contIllued. In the 11leantllne
the enemy bombers had continued thell
flight along the supply route. Suddenly
the loal of the explOSIOn of hundleds of
powerful bombs was heard m the dll'ec
two of the only bl idge. The bl'1dge Itself
was nbt hit Lut the steep bank" of the
river were loosened for several miles,
and many tnn::. of bouldel s, day and
plunge!I wto the fOaJUlng ,vater The
hlldge ed In ia few mmutes and
With It the only supply route to the (h
,,;at:. IIIH'I rupterL The tas!... of
bupplymg the troops, again Lecame a
s.elIOUS task for the diVision supply com
mandel To be SUle, he han
thf'11l With Ull1mumtlOn and food fol' fOUi
days, but the bridge could not be re
paIred m thts tnne. The engmeers Ie
qlll!'t"1 at least twelve days. It was
utte!'ly impossible to \VUlt that long;
constructIOn was Ihst begun
With a nanD\\' footf-bl'ldge In thirty
hoUl\', It was ready!
1'1 column.... were already standmg
leauy 011 bllth t:.lde<;,. On the neat Side
of the lllidge. some 300 carrieI s pieked
up the needed supphe::.. earned them
across to the other shore and loader!
them on waitlOg trucks. tiresomt
movement of supplies went on contInual
ly. After three time, however, the
toot blldge had become unserviceable On
account of thp swampy nature of the
ground.. Because of wise foresIght. how
{'vel', a sPC'ond foot bl'ldge was already
under constl'uctlOn and was soon ready.
Thus, dally, In addItion to ammunition
\;upphe:o., hay anrl oats, the men carried
dO to the other side:
50,000 portIOns of meat.
22,000 pOl tions of brpuu.
20,000 hters of fuel
Plomptly at the end of twelve days
the newlycOn1'tlucted supply bndge was
openeu for travel anrl supply service
contmued In Its regular ('ourse.
F'Ol us supply troops it was the joy
and satl"factlOn that men in the front
lines had not noticed the loss of this
hndge-a bure proof that supplies of
ammumtion, fuel and food were ade
The Vulnerable Aircraft Carrier
[Rpprinted from The Ae}'oplallc (British) 19 June 1942,]
Airci aft call1elS are vulnerable craft.
Su"plllOn evnkt'u by thp hIgh pel"centage
of 10'i5 Ul1hmg BIltlsh allcl"aft carlleI<O,
b cOl1firmed by the still highet- rate of
100;s of the Japanebc In the pngagements
off Muh\ay blant! and m thp Coral Sea
and by thp Ulllted States loss of the Lex
ington The had onp carnel
M.lI1k In the Coral S{'a anu fOUl off :\1td
way. In t\,;O and a half :yeal<O, of the War,
thc Rlltlsh have loo;t four. To It'ply that
all Rntu:;h and most Japanesp canters
'\(>It' sunk by lanu-based all'nuft I'> to
the mum pomt Oil' InllnedJate
cherk on that argument IS the fact that
tht' was by ealrl(,l'
hOlI1(, aJlcl'uft-so badly rl'llnaged that
t:.hc blew up latel"
In sea warfar-e beyond range of ShOl e
hu<O,eu the ral ner I!> theoreth'ally
('<lpable of Plott'ctlllg by a combi
natIon of h).!;htel''>, artillery and maneu
l'npmy alr attack The of
thlo' LeXIngton .seems to deny the thcory;
and thp reason IS to find. Th(' Japa.
nt'sp welc stl'onger ill can Ie-IS than the
Amel ican:;. Flg-hters ha\'e relatively
ShiH t dm atlOn, and a mel e nO\'lCe in all"
\\arfal would kno\\ the \'alue of delay
lUI: hi!; mam attack on a call'ler until the
fightels wel(' ahout 1.0 land; conspqupntly.
both OPPOSItIon and eva<O,lOn WPl'f' redU(.'pd
to the lllmimum At some tIme III a sea
battle the carner I'> always likely to be
('om " a fairly easy target.
The real test of the carrIer's power of
self defense Will only COnIe If the Ameri
cans and Japanese should eventually fight
a big sea baitle out of range of land. And
If the Japanese contInue to fntter away
theIr carner strength III such dangerous
Illvasion WOl k. they \\ III be outmatched
III cal I leI'S when the tl'ue tt lal of strength
takes pacp. The call1CI IS always III the
dilemma of haVing' to choose between
fol' Pl'Ot(>ctlOn and bombers for
ofi'pnse Thp lllf'Vltable compl'Oll'nse may
OJ Io?e In dfectl\ieneSS by the lluaht;y
nf all' n.'connalssance on whIch wise em
ployment of available <lllcraft depends.
Knowleuge of enemy move1llents at sea
IS more Important than It ever was, be
cau'>p of the <o'peed at which a Situation
Cl'ltlcal for tht> carl lET, and thpI efore for
the reconnau:;sance system of a whole
flel'i. may develop.
So Sl'llOUS would b(> the los)'; of all' sup.
pal t to a fipet a.t that I phanre on a
slllgie cal'rIer IS apparently no longer
thoul!'ht of. Th(' multIplicatIOn of carriers
in .Tapanese fleet'::! off 'MIdway Island is
not ucc('<o'sanly ploof that the Japanese
hold this View, fo]" thC' Japane"e mtentiOn
was to use those caniel"s as forward
uas(>s fOl' bombel s and fighters to support
an lllvaSIon; but one result of that battle
WIll probably be to Cl'eate a demand that
an ocean fleet shaH be supplipd with at
Ipao;t one extra carrier for which the
bombers must seall:,h before battleshIps,
el UlSCI'S and destroyers can close in and
use thpII' guns Indeed, unless the bIg
ships soon succeed In engaging each othe1'
m the PaCific, thPl'C would sppm to be
I!'l'ounds for pl"c5cnbing a whole fleet of
aircraft calrie15 as the desliable answer
to Japanese naval strength Then a mas
sive all' defense could go hand in hand
WIth heavy air offense agamst sU1'face
One other Important conclusion which
has emerged from the Midway battle IS
that pattern bombing is still power In
<,peratlons agamst ships. The plowess of
the dlVe bomber has been too often and
too loudly ploclmmed Much too rarely
has there been testImony like that of the
naval office1' who took part m fig-htmg off
the NorwegIan coast in 1940, He
mated that cnly one bomb III every 500
found 'Its mark in those days. The
may have :,hOl tened a good deal since
then, but they are stIll qUIte long'; and
the AmerIcan Army bombers off :vIldwa;r
helped to the balance by show1ne;
that a bol'nhlllJ! pattern properly
ranged cannot be escaped by any normal
maneuver of a ship.
Said Col. Walter J. Sweeney, leader of
a squadron of FlYIng Fortresses which
hIt a Japanf'se carrier, "If we can get
enoulZh all'planes for attacks lIke these,
nothlllg can escape us, smee we can lay
hombs in patterns which no ShIP can
aVOid." To that should be added the
mar.k that no Fortresses were lost in that
attack. The devotees of the dive bomber
WIll be wIse to allow second
Battery Telephone Lines on a German Front
[A n article Whl('h appeared In AI tillerl$ttsche RlIlIdschau AprIl
1942. Translated from German at the Command and GE'neral Staff
School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.]
Many detalls and &f'lf-evident fact!:> are
dISCUSSE'U LU thIS al tlele. I t has been
",ho\\.n, howevel, that ('ven "uch thing::.
mu... t be thoroughly thought out
h<lI!d, 01 JlI",t at the CI ucwl moment the
connectIOn<; between observatIOn poc;t and
battelY WIll fall
The situatIOn. FIl position located
-about 500 ya\(!.., to the left of vII1a!!E"'A";
Ob,,(,>1 \'atlOn po:;t, ahout 4,000 yaxds ahead
on a dllect line in fumt of vlilagc "B" be
hlnu OUI' own flOnt hne. A g'l am fipld
.:luout :WOO long' lay bt'twt'en firing
p081tlOn and nbS-PI \ atJOn po-.t, l'E'arhlll)y
t, thl' neal sale of Ylilagoe "S." Ahead
and to the light, orchunh e'{tended be
tween fh-mg position and llOU ('dg-, of
"Jllage "B" V111ajTl> "B" \\as nnder
';\f' at tunes flam gun" and tlench mOl
t.'1I'<' of <;,111811 and medIUm {'ahbel The
t t ont lOW" of the vllla!!C' !-tl'cets \H"I e
p\.p,-s('u to ma'?hme-p'un nIP fl'OI11 the ('n
('my frem a \antage POInt III the hIll'"
\\ hlch by MedIUm caItbel at til
Y ::.he11::. and aer131 bombs fell over the
gJ'am field
Two had been laId between obsel'
\.;It1On post and finng pOSitIOn, se-pal'ated
Ly an Int.:'1 val of fro111 300 to 500 yat'd<;
tn ('1 del that If" one of the hnes faIled.
t,e oth(,I' might t-tlll function Fol' the
. ake of ':'opeed the two lme"> had orIgmally
bl..'C'n laid on the g'lOund at 111ght with aid
(If a compass and ran straight from
<;ervatlOu post to filing pOSItion Hence,
t:ll'Y had ongmal1y run acl'oss the unob
gram field and across VIllage
Cnfol'tunately,It became appal'ent that
\\e had trouble With thiS sort
of line, and It took too much tUlle to find
. .wl! 1 epair the trouble.
The lmes were constantly subject to
trouble whel'e they cro':"sed through
lage "E." In the beginning it was impos
. "
Sible fOI anyone to go from the obsel'va
bon post m of trouble during daY'
lIght hours, as the terram was totaliy
open ave,' thiS area. Therefore it took a
long' tIme for repajrmen leavmg the firmg>
pOSItIOn to find and repaIr any troubl,> 'n
VIew of the great distance between obser
vatlOn post and firing pOSItIOn In addI
tIOn to thIS we at first hild absolutely no
J lea Just \',-here the trouble wns along the
hnes In oldei to do away With thiS
desll'able condltIOn, we finally established
a permanent repaIr statIOn at the rear
ed2"e of VIllage "S " Two pieces of appa
'atm, were permanently cut mto the hnes
h(,l e \Vhen a hne went out of 01 del', it
('ould be ascertallled whether the trouble
\\a<.. In "dIage "B" or in the open field
In cusc' the former locatIon \vas the seat
of the trouble, repaIrmen were able to
I e[lch the damaged place much faster
than If they had had to come all the way
f'lm1 the firmg pOSItIOn Too, after we
hall a trench for protection
1t was unnecessary for anyone to set out
from thE' observatIOn post 111 search of
tlouble, for movements were now
:"lulc> over thl'l stretch dur111J?: the day.
ThIS pel n1ltted reductIOn 111 personnel at
the observatIon post. an advantage which
should not be underestImated m vIew of
the g'1 eat danger at this pomt and the
u:mally limited III the post. It
was also pOSSible to couple the hnes at
the repaIr statldn so that when, for
ample, lIne No. 1 from observatIOn post
to l'epall' statIOn was out of order, yet it
,\'ao In order from repair statIOn to firmg
pOSltlon; and in the case of hne No.2
the connectIOn between observation post
and 1 epalr station was III order but was
out of order between repau station and
firmg positlOn, then by coupling together
line No 2 between observation post and
repaIr station and line No. 1 between
repair station and firing position, a good
connection could be obtained_
We soon found that in village "B" a
great deal of trouble occurred early in
the mooung and evemng when the lines
were broken by the heavy traffic of
patch riders, units engaged In supplying
food for the men. changing of forces and
all sorts of other vehicles. In order to
overcome this trouble, we raised the lines
clear of the ground wherever possible.
At same time we were fully aware of
the dIsadvantages of elevated lines. We
knew that cable which is clear of the
ground IS more endangered by bursting
shells t_han cable laid on the ground and
that it IS harder to work on elevated hnes
In exposed places than where lines are
laid on the ground. It soon became ap
parent. however, that the trpuble result
ing from gun fire in the case of elevated
hnes did not reach the bans of the
tJ'ouble resulting from fire in the
ca">e of hnes laId on the nd when dis
tU1'bances arismg from traffic were added
to the latter. In addItIOn, raised lines
showed the followmg advantages' cuble
laid on the g-round was pressed into the
ground by traffic where it passed over
soft roads and Village squares. It was
then dIfficult to find the separated ends
and pieces, espeCIally at .nIght, partlcu
larly when one stops to conSIder that a
great number of cabIes_ crossed and re
crossed In the .all of them being
more 01 less damaged. On days when
there was a great deal of trouble in the
lines thIS lattel SItUatIOn led to an ex
eu_sable but none the less disagreeable
mIX-Up of cables. If one of the repaIrmen
found a piece of hIS cable missing. he nat
Ul'ally beg-an pullmg at some of the other
loose ends lymg arQu"nd, If he succeeded
m pullmg out a long piece, he put it into
hiS Ime. \Vhether thIS was a lost piece of
cable belongmg to hi!> Ime or whether it
belonged to some other line was not easy
to determme on account of the speed with
which the repairman always had to work,
and at mg-ht It was even more difficu1t.
It IS obvious WIthout that
none of these condltIOns eXIsted In the
case of raised hIles Too, in the ease of
raised hnes, the various conductors were
better shielded from one another and con
vel satwn was more mtellIgible, some
thmg whICh was very much to be desired
In view of the great number of repaired
places (as hIgh as 30 per 1000 yards) and
the msulation whIch was none too good.
Matter:; would have been very bad in the
case of cable laid on the ground when
fleezing weather suddenly set m. As
('QuId he seen m the case of other cables.
the latter were frequently frozen on or in
the mud. an entirely Impossible condition,
espeCIally when It is considered that it
would be impossible to pICk them up un
damaged m case It were necessary to
move observation post or firing position.
'When we agalll movli!d our cables, we
saw to It that they followed a route as
lIttle exposed to enemy view as possible
and so ran through streets of the village ,..
whIch had been proven not to be the ob
je{'t of enemy fire We ran the cables over
two routes which were entirely separated
III order III this way to obVIate the danger
that both"cables would be put out of com
miSSIOn SImultaneously. Incidentally, it
should be noted that it cost not a little
trouble and a great deal of search before
two routes could be found which met the
requirements as closely as we have stated
There were disturbances in the cables
running from the rear edge> of the VIllage
to the firing position on ai!C()unt of enemy
artillery and aerial bombs. We were not
x RepaIrStallan
able to escape this diffic'Qlty by shifting
the but this wa5 not urgently Dee{'s
sary. SInce such dIsturbances were rela
ttvely few. It was much more unpleasant
at night when heavy vehicle tra:ffit' moved
m every dir('t'Uon across the field In this
way hundreds of yards of onr cable \H!l'(,
often torn loose, dragged away or ('I u"hed
mto the soft earth. It \,as then much
harder to find and splice the ('nds WhICh
were lYIng around somewhel't' III the fil'1d
than In vlllage "B" where at least the
houses preventf'd the cabli' fl om gettIng
too far away. It would have been no u ...e
trym!!, to 1alse the cable here, fo)' at nIght
even the poles would have been lUll {lVei
and broken by the vehIclE'''. We dpCldf'u,
therefore, m spite of the ll1Cl'cused length
of the route, to run the pable to tht> light
and through the olThuld-.. aheadr men
tlOllcd. Hplt' It was Pl'otcCtt'l} aga!l1-t
Wp found that the bhO! t(,,,t )/lute IS not
always the best for a cabl(', \Jut undcI
('('I'tum cIrcumstancE'S 8 lout' whH'h may
be considelably longer I ... flnlll
the pomt of VIE'\\, of gun fill', nfi'E'r, mpl'P
protedlOn tramc and lec.R \''\
posen to the encmy NeIthl'l time nOI
pam!'; should be SP81t'U III ""p1(>ctlOn of
'cuble loute", and. the "nnw con"H.h'latlon
should be gl"en to thl .... mattel that
given to thp of vatlOn po<;ts
and finng pOSItIons Ii'or of what use aloe
the finest ob:;,Cl'vativn po':.ts ami finn!!
pOSItIOns whcn th(' ("onnection behvet'n
them IS not functlOnmg' and falls at ('I u
cwl lllOlllC'nt.-.!
It I" absolutely neCl'Sf>alr. If pvely
thmg- 1& not to bt' In !l o;tate of contmuous
confUSIOn, to name tli(> Imps' fOi
line No. 1, Imp No 2, Battalion hne,
R.ldlO Dct<tehment Line, ptc Evell
1he WII es Illu,:;t be mal hed III St'l1W
'll'uplf' Inanm'l at ev;eq. fOI
in">tanrp, line 1 htu, onC' knot, lme
No 2, two knots, etc It IS rccomnwnneo
that thiS d(''-lg"nallOn .... hould be 1 PCOI dl'U
lt1 WIlting at .. tJtlnn beruu.... C' tIlne
Jnrl al2'aln, II! ea,';H;' "ualtl'}"> ale l'ro\.,.ded
OJ th(,I'C' l'l a change In !let s.onncl, the
<lliien'lIt line:, all' nll"'\ed vp 'Cntll sueh
Hla,lnnu-s all'', It hu", not huppenpd
onl.', at 1'1l:-t but 1'{'P(,dh'dly that repaH"
men g'ot hold of the wrong \\11(, ... III theil'
ha:-.te aiHI lellal!' delu.',('u, to
not hmg of th(' \'1TOI t \q\.... t"'d
\\'e .-,tnth1npd OUI tullln dptuchlllcnt
nhout a hundlf'd yaHls flom the Ob';'l'l
"fltlllll po\:>t, which \ViIS un advdntng'pou,;
pOSItIOn ffll th(,111 and \Vnultl not
thl' PI'{'I">('n('(' of th.!.> oO"'l'rvatlOll po,t III
ca,,>p thq th('Jl1<;eIH'h \\('Ip (li"'COVCICt\
Thy ronnpct('d \\,1th the ObS('1 \atlOn
by a "'htH t 1)] nnch cubl,.
How the City of Yukhnov Was Captured
[An artlc](' from the Red Army nc\\SpalWl !\'U/"I1trIU Zl'c;:;drr
6 :vIarrh 1942 Translated fl"ol11 RuqsJaJl at tllP Command und Gen
eral Staff School, Fort Lt'a\lpHWOI tho Kanf>as,]
The battle of Russin has b)'Mlght
mfn }1Iort1CC 11WII;! 11/110;flfll)1lS 1/1
fif'ld tactlcs TIle nbs('llc( of fl 1"tq1fl
/IOllt hllf",aftel tbe pattcru nf Wmld
War I. flud the flltul1ty of both of
feuse oud ricfc7Isf' hart' caused both
SIdes to eOllstlllct theil' rief('},sc[l
alQI/)ld st)'ollgly fOl"t1ned p0111f8 at
r(,Slstancr. Clites, t01V1IS and ('1'('11
sliIull }lo}J/llated hurc bccl!
fIUltt-lo/lIIal iuto ."IUollg ]Jowts u(
tillS typC". The?1 have /J('ClI 1011/',[
capable of Offenl1fJ pi olonged ?eS1S
tl/I/('( to tll( O(h-flll('llIf] pi/emij, j{<ho,
It 11)/111)[1' to ("(1}lt,1) (' [l/lP!t a sflony
jlUl!!t bl/ " fj (IlJtal o(tll('I,:, Pi o('('('ds to
If (o,d OCCI!}l/( 8 the 1>1(1) V)II/d
roy locflllfl(,<; A 11 ('! (j IIIple of (I('fI011
of tillS f;lll!' IS IlllIstloful 111 tillS fll
t,cl(', d(S'iI/bIllY a baffle 1chich tool..
}/fll(,(, III ('clItl'ol RUSSin dllll1l(] the
$(Jllet lI'Jllt('1' oifruslI'c.
-Tile: EDITOR.
Thi'.'l ll1o)'l11ng. 5 :\larch 1942, our umts
by a &\\Ift blow threw out the German
o("cupying forces from the city of Yukh
nov and captured it. This is a new Victory
for our armies whICh eontmue to press
the enemy westward.
The Germans regardf'd Yukhnov as one
of thelr strongest centers of reSIstance m
thIS region. They even began fortifying
It durmg the battles for Kaluga. Already
huvmg felt the power of advancing Red
Army Ulllts and seeIng that thpy would
bp unable to hold Kaluga, Medyn and
l\I\atlt'vo, the l'nC'Il1Y attempted to create
a defem,iv(' line m the region of Yukh
nov. They did not succeed in creatmg
such a lUll' The Germans failed to anticl
patp certam things. For mstullce, their
plan rhd not fore!'>c(' a specdy advance of
our forrf's south of Yukhnov. Advanemg
SOVIet units captured .:.\leshchovsk, Mo
Ral!'>k, Sukhmichl' i.e. CltH'S on the Ime
which the enemy wtended to eonsol1datf'
for d('fenRe. The enemy also rhd not thmk
th:lt ollr fOlces would captll!"f' the city of
Kll'ov. 1n thp l)leanWillie thl' Rf'd Army
f'aptUl"pd Dorog'obuzh, whieh prevented
tlw \'t'rmans fillm fOlming any kmd of a
d, f(,IHlIVP lwe IWl"e. All th('y retained was
POlI1ts of I'('Slstane(' the center of
wlll('h was Yuiihnov, whl('h was hlocking
our advance to the> w('st ami served partly
as I1l"0t('ctlOn for V\,azma from the south
Th('sf' are the reasons why the enemy
attach{'d such Impol'tanc(' to Yukhnov
and was holdIng it WIth su<.'h tenacity.
The Germans oul. not heSItate to lo<;e
oti1l'r nelghbonng localItIl'S and were
fOl ccu to w('alien oth('1' but they
contllluec1 to hold on to Yu"hnov.
Thl,,) also p'\plallls the exccptionally
natUl'(' of the hattks for Yukhnov.
At fh st the Gel"lllan& tried to offer reSIS
tance on the to the CIty hut m
... pitl' of theJl' dl'tf'r111ll1l'tl dpf('nse of popu
lut(>o.. fairly strongly fortltied pomts. the
l'lll'my fail('d to hold them. Durmg recent
uays, battles pluee around the City
and 10 pI act's on ItS outsl\lrts.
A charact(,l"lstie featul c of the battles
for Yul,hnov IS tlll' g'IlJ1dmg
np In OCl"8oS of pel'llOllneI and the
de<;trllrtlOl1 of 111s llmtCl'lE'l. The German
cOIlHl1and had l"l'mfOl"ct,tl the Yuldmov
g-arnsoll and pomts ('ast and
";IHlt('llst of tIl\' ('It\". Thl' (;C'rmans were
thl"owmg 111 all Q{ th'l1' I ('serves avaII
ahl., neal by, l1WllHhng local s('curIty
UTllt:;, tIOOP"', Ptc Our forces,
how('V"}", \\('n' moving forward slowly
but WIth det('rmmatlOn and \\I(,le grad.
uull)- dl'stroymg thes(, enemy replace
l11(>nt>;. It can he WIthout fear of
CllOI that the hattl('s fo1' the city have
co... t till' enemy thousand klilen
<ll1d a alnount of materll'l and othel
\'C]ulpuwnt. That tl111'1 1<; a fact may be
judg'('d by th(' I (,<"iUlts of battles for a
lUI gf' Cl'nt('r of i'l'slstanct' situatt'rl on th(>
<tpproachcs to Yukhnov.
ThiS pomt (a Village) was defendeJ by
a ';Cll1lan Icg-im('nt It wac; bloclung the
loar! to the CIty, UIl(l the Germans were
fortlfymg It With all thfllr strength Our
Ul11tR undf'rtook their first offenSIve ac
tIOn at Illght. It b('g-an by heavy artillery
nrc on the en('my fortIficatIOns, and when
the POInts at the eastern
hrlllts of the VIllage were partly de
qhoye>rI and partly SIlenced, advancmg'
llnits attadwu the enemy. Artmf'ry ac
lompanymg thp infantry contmued to de
-.tn1Y nest", of enemy fir(' while lead was
pOlll'('d flOl11 automatIC weapons on ene
my fOl'tifkatlOns. ptnnlllg down the ene
Illy insiJp. Advancing umts oc
(upwd tlw edge of the VIllage, but here
they e>ncountered strong enemy fire. In
thIS engagement the enemy left 260 dead,
four guns and 12 machine funs.
Towards noon the battle flared up whh
renewed Vlgor. The enemy moved up rem
In the strength of about two
companies and SlX tanks and counter
attacked. The counterattack was led by
tanks, but two of wel'e numf'dlately
dIsabled by our artIllery. Intense Soviet
fire pmned the enemy mfantry down to
the ground,. Theleupon our mfantry
strongly attacked With the bayonet. 1\1ore
than one hundred German boches httered
the streets.
However, m spite of heavy losses the
cnel11,Y contmueri to hold pal t of the vIl
lage, DUlll1g the mght one of our bat
talion" we-nt around the VIllage and cut
the road over which (;l'l'man reInforce
ments were l11Qvmg up. Towal'ds 11101 n
ing thIS battalIon aitac],cd the enemy
from thc real' \\ hlle othet SOVIet UllIts
\,,'cre attackmg- fl0111 the front. "\ft('r a
short engagf'll1E'nt thp bf'gan to
throw Uo\-"11 thell' arms and ran III all
dIrectIOns. Here tht>y lost an adrhtlOnal
110 f>oldlL'rs and officels l\llled.
After thIS cpntl,l of re<;;u"tanc-e cap
t\.1IE'r! hU!' unIt" CIlH'l.t.'.cd dlle('tl;y neal
Yukhnov, but here the enemy had strong
fOl'tlfieations The advancing force, hav
ing met resistanct', was delayed. It was
decided to by-pass the CIty. After several
days our Ullits succeeded In placing
Yukhnov under pressure on three SIdes
IntentlYe battlC's contillueu by day and
nIght. Our UnIts contmuC'd to decimate
pnemy mfantry. During the first days the
encmy attempted counterattaeks, but al_
most all these were repelled WIth heavy
German losbcs.
Gpl'llltm power was bE'lllg' uls5lpated,
antI the only thIng enabling the enemy to
lllaIntalli themselves at YUhhnov was the'ong fortIficatIOns and defenSIve fire
\"hICh contmlwd With sOllle power
Ypstl'rday our Ullits struck agamst the
CIty sImultaneously from several di1'f'c_
tlOnl:) Thc LIO\vs were so SWIft that the
GC'rmans Wt'l'e unabh" to offer any kind
of ':'PlIOUS l'l'sIstancp. i
Thc battle '\ac: ...... ery short tn the city
and tooK. plaee only In a few sectors. At
tacked ::>uddenly, the Gt'lmans speerhly
lc!ll'atpd ahandonmg gl'f'at amounts of
and supplu?s.
Crash Technique
Hu.... ..,Ja,n.... Ram A",is
[ReprInted from the ...111' FOfCC8 Scws LettcJ i\tay 1942.J
One of the of RU%!all all,
men III thell bnttlt' thf' Gelman
.ll! force lOS tIll' tact1('", of I enclllY
planes Thp sacnfice of u dymg pIlot In
a damagf'!l planE' by a dl-'hbl'latl' ('ollhlon
\\Ith h1s foe IS a IC'l1c!lf the' fil..,t "-olld
\\'al, 1mt the' h.l\p dt'v\'Iopt'd
lallllllmg ac, .1 dt'flnlh' tat'tlt flom \\h1ch
Loth pdot and plane may l.""lape undam
Ramming' \\<1::' devl'lnIlId b\ th0 Ru"t-I.ln
alrmcn aftel they ub"el'Vcd that freqnent
Iv l,;C'I'lllall ll1ultl-motOit'd lllllllbel'h P:..
caped after bemg hal d hIt and "'Cl'lOtl"'.Iy
d}llllaged by Ru:.stall PUI "Ult... Often the
PUIS11It pi10t heaVily, ]lmt
,If the bombel's Cl pw and dl"'ahlmg onl.' 01
1ll1))'1' moLl\)'" H nWP\'t", t!1t.:'he attack:-.
u.,ually CXhdU:.tcd tht, IHlIMllt'b lllllltl'd
. nlllluunItwn ..,upply, the bOl11b
{'I tn Ill1lP behmd It., , \\ n lillE':-
I" de..,lg'l1cd to dC''''U,y thp..,p cllpph'd
plane:-. It take,; a\ cnmu!I1atlOn of t:.kIlIful
pt!otlnj:>: and utIhz<lttun nf the elIPl1!t,t!
\ICtll1l'.., Inch of lllanclI\,{'lilhIJay ttl "'<c
1',!lC a succC'!'.,full'itl11l111l12' oPC'I;.ltJnn \\Ith
a Il1lnlmUm uf damUg'l' tIl tbl' attucbng
pdot and plallc MOle (,ften th(' .Itt.tckllll!'
plan!.' I" tlU' pilot 1)<lIls out
Threc I\lf'thod:.
111 a If'N'nt CS oS R Emha,,::-)' Bulletm
"Ilw most ,langei UUb IR the .Ill'l'Ct bInw
Hitting' thl" enemy planl" \vlth a pdl t nf a
RUSSIan plane and cuntlol SUI
faces slIght propellol contact tll'e n1"n
In (It! The iattpl lIlt'thnd l'<.111 ... fIll" the
c:lull ;>nd Ofrt'15 the bl""t chance
of "'urvlval
Major pOint... out th,Jt the \lltJ
pellO! cllPPlnl! I1It,thOlI (' .!lh fOI an ap
"Ioach flom the leal' With the aUndone;
1l1anl"s ad}u....t,'d t \ that of the <'11('
IllV. As soon as shg-ht 16 felt thl-'
attac-\;;('l' may drop away to avoHl CI ash
'I<.{ With the enemy pbl1e <)s it falls. If
the l'umnllng flycr I" too slow he may
ea..,lly become t'ntangJed With the
plane and be dragged down \\ Ith It
AnlPIICan All' ob..,t>lvel':'l <turoall
IE'IIOIt 11llll1ellluc, cxamp!pt- of thE' HU5
litt1I11IIl!g tactic,> and thE'l(, Hie ae.
couut, avallable from Sm-'H?t rlyen. who
haVe> lammed Lombel'" and malIc
Iiludw.r;t:. HCl e IS the aC("O\.1.1t
g-I-..'l'll by Junll)J LlE'utenant V Talakahlll
\\ ho wa" a\\.lld(d the oldel' of Hero of the
S'J\lPt l'nlOII fOl hI; l'}"llloltS
'Un t/I(' nlg'ht of ti Augu... t 1:141, whf'n
b,'lllUP1 .... IIlHlk Ol,e <)f their
1Pl1lpt to) In cal, thl otlg"h to !-'"Iot-co\\i, I
"ldcl'cd to take off In m)' fh:htel' and
patrol the approaehe" to the CIty 1 soon
"potted a HplI1kt'l 111 at an altitude of
about 15,000 feet. Swoopmg do\\n I man_
ilgnl tu on It<; tU1I und attac-kl'd
Hu"' .... IUJ1 De<;cribe5 AttaCh
"',"Ith ,lIlP of lilY nlst I put the
LOl11bel ':;:, l'lght engnw out of COllnl1lt:.'>IOn.
Thl' Illdlu' h,tnkl'd ,:>hul ply and set Its
C,'lll:.P fOl hml1e, h)slI1g' altI
tnde I t'ontll1Ul'd to nttack the enemy
dnd c,.lve hun dbout t:.1:" IHH"t<;; follo\\ II1g
hUll down to ahollt /.50a feet when my
.Ul\llIUllltWll gavE' out. 'Yhdt W<l" I to do?
I could ban' follow('ti th' Lomuel fal theI
but tll.1t \\Ollld have Leen u:,c1c...,:; WIth
only Dill' e11U'lll(' It l'ould stIll fly qUite a
and pel hap'> ('t-capl' Tla'll' \\as
ouly nne thlll!!' h) do I eli11 the cnt.:my
':1 d('cukd to chop off hi" tail \\ Itb my
Vlopellor dowl opened my throttle.
about ,ll) feet now septll'ated the. t\\o
I could clcUlly <'(>0 the arlllOl plat
l'lg on the hombers belly ns 1 apPloachc-d
flom h(>hll1i1 and below
"At that 1110111('l1t thl' l'n(,111Y opf'ner! filf'
with a h('<1vy machine A spallng
}lum tOl'e through my right hand. 1m
mE'lhately I wave my thp gun and
the \\ hole lIIachine. not ju:'>t the PI opellol,
... tluck t!1e bombel. ThelE' was a tl'l'Ilfy .
1112: CI ash. My fighter tUl'l1ed up"ide down.
I ulIfu"tcl1c'i Illy belt and (hew up my
fE'et, cJawlet! to the openll1(:!: and threw
Illyself ovel'llOard FOI" 2,-100 feet I fell
a stOltI.', not openmg lilY parachute
Only aft.:>\' I healll the roal of my plane
to one "Ide (.hd I pull the I'lpconl 1
lJ.l1ded m a f>mail lal,e antI made my way
to f<hote."
Landed Plane Safely
PIlot Mlchalev of the Soviet Fleet Ail"
SerVIce was credited WIth - rammmg a
liemkel 126 m one of the first appear
ances of thIS new German aIrcraft on the
RUSSian fl'ont. Mikhalev dIved on the
bomlJel aitel exhaustmg hls ammunition.
HIS propellor rIpped the Heinkel's stabI
lIzer and rudder. A fiymg pIece of wl'eck
..tge stl uck lV1Ikhkalev on the shoulder but
he managed to bring hIS plane down
safely. The Hemkel crashed and burned.
Pilot Vinogladov did hIS ramming in
the old-fashIoned way. Fightmg a smgle
aZI bombel over a vulnerable RUSSIan
target he e""hausted hIS ammumtion
\\ Ithout gettmg a deci"Jlve hIt. Meanwhile
a bullet punctured hiS gas tank and hIS
::.hlp bUlst Into flamE'S Vmogradov hurt
mto the :--; aZI bomber and both planes
\\eIE' destloyed.
Anothel pIlot who I'ammed and
lIved to tell about It IS Alexandrovich
He escaped WIth only a scratch
on hiS cheek after ballIng out, HIS plane
was lost.
"It didn't come off so wen," said Kise
lev dE'::>cl'lhing hiS l'amuung. "I am sure
It IS pOSSIble to ram an enemy ship WIth
out IOl'oll1g one's own maehme. I was a bIt
f'xclted .. and I suppose that IS why I
muffed thf' Job.
.. My aml1lumtm ran out. The enemy
had hIt my 011 tank and radiator and my
engme \Va:; just about gwing Its last
gasp, I dIdn't want to Jet him get away
so I went at hllll from below to get at hIS
tall WIth my propellor. It was possible to
calculate the movl'ment 50 as to clip him
WIth the uP" of my pl'opellor. But a
..,tn'am of 011 messpd up my wmdshield
and I coulc.ln't see velY well,
",Just as I was apPloachmg him the
of thl' all' whitIs caused by the
plane my machme upwards.
I /:ot Inad then anti rammed him from
above dlg-g'Ing mto hi" left SidE' I knocked
face agam.;;t my stick, If I had figured
It out lJlOpeIly that wouldn't have hap
IWnt'd, I
"The enpmy plane ch"uPPE'al'ed. own
plant' went mto a Spill, J trwd to pull out
but It wa,::; no use. I took my feet off the
contloIs, stuck my head outSidE' und was
knot:kE'd buck mto my seat by the air
blast I pushed off With one foot. counted
to eight, npped and floated dOWll,"
LIE'uh'nant Katl'lch of the Soviet Ail'
Fmc!;' lelatcs anothel rummmg mCldent:
"At about 10'00 AM I was told that
.'11 enE'Jl1Y pInne' had bee-n SIghted headmg
for 1 took off at oncE' and soon
..,p,)tt('d a yap{\) tlall at about 18,000 feet
The C'ncmy \\ as above and ah('ad of me I
put on my o:xygen ma:::.k and picked up
altitude, I dlCW up to wlthm 300 feet of
the> plane 1 spl'ayed hIm from stem
to stCl n. It was only then that the NazI
l'II'W not1('(>1\ me The cabll1 gunner re
tume} file. 1 gave thern another long
Illil"t untIl I suw flame:;. streaking fr0111
th('ll' pOi t englIle. A fter the third attach
my ammul1ltion gave out theIr tail
gunncl stlent. The left engme was
hUl11l11g' hut plane continued to fly.
Thp pilot was apparC'ntly countmg on my
fuel :"upply hemg exhausted. It was then
1 deCIded to ram hIm
Thought of Ramming
"I had thought a lot about ramming
The first lepol'tb-of lamllllng by our flyers
mtelcsted me hut In most of them the
plane::- had been lost. I thought it would
be possible to ram WIthout sucrlficing
011(,'", own plane and here was a chance to
test my theory
"I approached the bomber from the ..
left of It5 ::.tern and aimed. my nose at its
tall, calculatmg my attack so 'as to ehp
Its stabIlizer and 1'uddel's with the tips
of my propellors. :.\1y calculations proved
correct. There was a slight Jolt I throt
tled back and bankeu. When I ('arne out of
the turn I saw the enemy ghdmg sharply
downwards. I gbded after it. The Nazi
pilot made sevel al attempts to level off
By gunning hIS motor he managed to fly
level for a fe'., seconds before droppmg
. off agam He finally lost control and dove
mto the- ground. The ,>hlP burned. I
landed at my home aIrdrome, My plane
was undamaged eKcept for a dent III my
plopellor whIch caused heavy vIbrahonfOi."
One of the most spectacular mstances
of rammmg .... hlCh thmwR an mtel'e-stmg'
s.idehght on the combat psychology of
Russlan.alrmpn ,\as told by eyewltneSSeg
at the ulldlOlUe ovel WhICh the battle oc
curred RCl'geant-::\lajor Ndtolal Totmm
took to the all' as hiS home field wa'> at
tacked by eight Ju-88 dIve bombeu,
escorted by a pan of Me-109 fighters
Totmm <,pt one bombel 's port pngme afire
wIth fir'>t hUI,t hut wa.., attached by
the Me fight'rs before he could finish the
bomber. Totmin banked sharply to battle
the- fighters One- M{' follov,'ed the bombers
the other stayed to take,n the Rus-
Totmm and hiS NaZI opponent went
mto a tIght circle tl'ymg to turn inside
each other. The NazI went mto a qUIck
cbmb and Totmm fol1owed hIm. The !'Jazi
then turned to attack and Totmm banked
sharply to brmg hiS plane hUltlmg head
en at the NaZI. Both plane-s sped toward
('ach othel' but at the last moment
eolltslon the NaZi heeled hIS plane OVC1.
At that Im,tant Totmm banked III the op
posIte d1l'ectlOn and dlove hiS plane mto
the NaZI's wmg
Totmm's plane stagg;ereli undel th('
shock and both planps spun pal thwal'd
Totmin tWice trIed unsucccs::.fully to uall
out but the all' pI'e5SUle forced hllll bach
mto thE' COCkPIt. The thIrd tune he got out
but hp was only 120 fpet from the ground
and hi'" chute didn't have tune to open
He fell not far flom the wH:,ckage of the
planp he hau rammed.
Tank Attacks on Occupied Villages
[An article from thp Red Army newspaper Krasiloyn Zpczdu
23 April 1942.j
At the prp."ent stage of the
man the Red Army has had to use
tank5 many times to fulfill combat l'(,
of breaking thlDugh a fOltl'
fled regIOn or succe-c;sfully developlllg an
attack Thp tank applIcatIOn IS pal tICU
lady true \\lhen attackmg an ene-mv who
eoncentrated hI'" defcn">e 111
due to S-l'\,elE' willtel \"t;'J.thel.
On occasions I"'> ha.. bE'en
clearly <1>mon,';tlate-d that It 1'::> to
attack WIth small tank g1'OUpf', the f1l st
echelon to Include heavy tanks When
posslblp, echelon approaches the
j:!"IVen locality flom an angle and can
celns IU;elf only \vlth the edge<, of VII
lages. Moving at high spt't'd the tanks
shoot at firmg pomts sItuated III and be
tw(>cn tht' hou..,e"l. '>lieneE' ene11lY machme
gun ne<,tt; and emptacenwntt:., and dbol'
galllze the E'nemy defenSive ::.ystem On
one occasIOn mfantIy sui.Jumts movmg
along With mid parallel to the tanks were
qUIckly able to capture a vlllagp In ,,,hlch
the enemy defenSive s.tcm had been dI">'
l'uptt'd by tank file. When nece%al'Y to
make a frontal attack, as when a VIllage
IS splead out III a hollow, deep gully or
dlong: <l liver dcfemlell by stee-p Illchnes.
tanks must move directly the VIllage.
Tanh of the fll''':!t echelon must '>11 ike
and qUl('tly. They move in "\'" for
mallon, apeX lpadlllg The leading- tank
travels at top speed along thp pdg-p of thp
VIllage, firIng Its cannon and machIne
guns. The 1l1lamdE'l" of the tanl.;.f:, foHow
at "-ome dlstanc{l, obs(,1 vmg the sources
flom which the enemy letUins. file. \\'Ith
thlS p["hploll, It IS to havp In
fantry shock tl'OOpS armed With automatic
nfle" and hand machme gun::. They )!et off
;Jt th(' l'dge of the VIllage.
The ,,-econd echelon dpvelops thp
In roopelUtlOl1 WIth othel Infantl y shock
tlOOpS. The thIrd ('chelon IS charg-ed With
the mfantlY, \\Ipll1go out r{l
mdlllmg cncmy md
takmg advantageou'> defenSive PO'C.ltIOOS
Hg'UllIbt po\>::'lhle countelattacht:>. Attack
mg Infantl y umtf> hrea].. mto the VIllage
along With the- tank::.. sku t the' enel1lY
and cut off hIS lme of letl'l'at. The
engagement can only be consl1iclf,.'d con
duded \., hen th{l tank:, have reached tIll'
opposite SIde of the vIlla},'p and thl' m
fantly has. pntl'C'n'h'd It<;elf. Battle con
dltlOns call for complete coordmatlOn be
tWPl'n tanl, and mfantl'y unIts together
WIth an excellent of C,)IlllnUlll('.1.
For somp tIme the Gt'lllIans haH' em
ployed III :"t1'ee-1 fightIng" \\" he'll
fighting js alt'eady gOIng' on III a vlllag-e.
they attempt to cut off tanh thl'ough
smoke screen.;; With thl' aim of outflank.
Ill!!: and dl"5tloymg the tanl,"" In <;;u('h
cases the tank" quickly assume a defen
sive fOllJl.l.tlOn; motollzed Illfantl'Y sho('!;:
troops and PH'!'>"> fO! wal d to
ward off pusslble COUlltpl"attaek!'l launcht'rl
under eovpr of the smoke screen
Development of the Antitank Gun
[An artIcle from The Tl1IleS (London) 8 Apn11942]
Tn the last 10 munths' fightmg In LIbya,
tank warfare has won or lo&t every battle.
and the tanl-s in use have change-d beyond
recogmtion. They cannot get enough
al'mOl' and armament. As one Side ha<;
Imploved Its tanks the other has tried to
out-do It, pach side favoring Its own basic
machme The Germans' chOice IS the
heavy, well-atnlOred tank, mountmg a
heavy gun, and they rely on one shot from
thIS gun to be 8ufficleT't The BrItIsh favor
hg-hter armor and greatel speed, and rely
nn a hghtel', quickfiring gun which has
to get !'.everal s-hots home to be effectIve
The Gel mans that from a
movmg tank is ineffectlVe and maccurate
The BritIsh disagree
But tanks are lOSIng 'thpH personahty.
l'p till now the chIef functIOn of the tank
has bt'en to knock (mt other tanks Now
they are also becoming 8. ferry serVIce for
mfantl'yand antltanH guns, and mfantl')T
are used to clear out the enemy's antItank
guns. Behmd the infantry come the tanks
WIth then own supportmg antItank guns
which are mOl'e of a menace- than the
tanks themst'lves beCa1.l8e the latest anti
tank weapons are Incledibly advanced
and good
The "Coming" \Veapon
LIbya has proved that thl" IS the "com
m:!" weapon. It IS no longer defenSive but
has hecome an ofl"l'n.;;nre weapon and i::,
\\eU on the way to neut rahzmg the tank
completely. SUI of the Libyan offen
"Ive Illthcatc that both Mdes lost more
tnllks by glound antitank guns than welC
l,noekPd out by othel' tanl, .... Roth SIde"
have rleyp!opeu 11(>W antltanl\ weapons of
le.,olutlOnary de::'lgn, and the
type IS partIcularly l'evolutlOnary. It is
a 105-111m WIth a tapeled bnllel. The tap
('I Illg }1E'1 !lilts the fOJ ce to hf.- concentl at
('.I, g'IVll1g gTeatcl muzzle Vl'IOclty and
staYlllg pm\el' The ploJectHe IS so heavy
that It does not nee(i explmllve
I t has tremendou;- powel' over a Ion!!
I ang-e and gH.'at pcnetration.
Thp htlVl' dp\'l'io}led thell' own
t\'pe::. Thl' ent'rtl\l'np""p, of these weapons
I.annot be In r/ptml, but dcvelop
ment IS to,\alllo, l!ghtly-aIBlnred, power
ful weapons, opelated by :-.n1<111 Cl'ews.
Tht'Y ('an out)!un five tll11t-'S thell numbpi
m tanio, nnel aI(' cht>apel and easlei" to
pl'lHluce. lnduripd III the antitank gun
dl"l'lopmellt IS the titld <tltillpl'J. whJ('h
IS about to ('onw mtu lb own agam
In mobIle \V<ll fUl'e and medium
al tlllpi y ate !'eldol11 fol' anythmg but
tanl,s. \V11l1e the 5pPclfir
antitank gun ip, deve!opmp,: 111to an offen
<.,IVP weapon, tht' fil;'ld artlll(,1 Y IS be
\:ommg- a defl'n<"IH-' pl'lmal ily
But fOl eIthel artillcl Y 01 antltank
gun ... to bl' effcctlve they must havl' ade
quatl' mfnnt!':\' pl'Otl'etlon Thp mfantry
now fight 111 clnp,t> coopt' ratIOn With the.
t.1.n1\." m th.... thick of the battle. They mc
Icturnlll!! to tht> old do.::.e ordt'l ap
pltlaCPCS and Ull' I('lymg on mu('h hand
ttlhand rlghtullr. ll""U1U"-C' nf thIS the
('qUlppmg of mf.:lntlY With hlrht auto
lllntle :l! mOo 1.l'V(,1 IlL'pn lllOlP mlpOl
tant, unu 1t 1<; thuught that the Japan's('
have th{' ld('a WIth their 22 lepeat
mJi JlI">tOI::. This gun ctl<lbl('s each man
to bc fOl long pellods, be
C.IUM' can be eal'lled bv one
nwn. 115 IS ('flual to the sub
machmegun \.,hleh th,' 10'1011" uSPu. and
It 10;; not \',0 heavy
:nethod and :llaterial
Sinulally, dli'craft at p changmg". Aftel'
the Blltl"lh offen"ave both the Army and
AH FOI ce spol,' hopefully of an "all pur
po::.p' all plane. Thl'" I:> an all plane fast
to fight md heavy enough
ami With a long clloug'h range fol'
medIUm (listan<;e bombmg. Such air
planp could bp th(> perfpct "battle all
pLme" that Douhf't ('nvlsaged as able to
bc pi nuucpd m lUI u(' qUantltle" and suffi
clently to pelllllt contmuous su
pel'lOlltr In the bombing or fightmg
of ait fOI ces. To Douhet's con
ecpt ha.:; bl"'('n added the Il('('esslty of
mounting cannon and the low-flying char
actCrIstlcs that allo'v all'('raft to destroy
tank,,_ The Gelmans hav,", an all-serVice
all plane III the l\1esserschmltt 110. and
the Bntlf.h III the Bnstol Beaufort. After
the RUSSian lesson the Germans are con
centlatlllg on tank destloymg aircraft. A
few 109 F's have recently appeared over
the desert, obVIOusly adapted for speclal
use against tanks. ThIs will probably be
Germany's surprise weapon in the COlU
ing offensive.
The commg test for all these transitions
In arms and tactIcs will be dIsastrous for
the army that has not made sufficient rev
olutIOnary ehangps to meet the SItUatIon.
If both sides have matie equal changes.
then the defenders.. as always, should
have the ill1tlal advantage. WIth antitank
guns suddenly loommg as the key weap
on whole armies may be moved In the
best mterest of these guns. Tanks, in
fantry. artillery, and aIrcraft wIll move
in support of them, around them, and
over them. That is why method and ma
terIal are so Important In the commg
offensive. The change m applicatIOn and
In methods of warfare is so strange and
sImple that it IS as yet unbelIevable. In
SIX months It may well be a dIfferent
Armored Grenadiers
l"ew "eapoD-Old Tradition
[An article In the German .. "Iihtm-lVochenblatt 25 September
1942. Translated in the Army War College, Washmgton, D.C.]
For the first tllne since the ongm of
the NatlOnal Soclah&t Army the Fuhrel
has glVen a name Ol'Igmatmg In the best
traditIOns d1 German mIlitary hIstory
to an arm of the service which has been
tested In battle, the Armored Grenadiers
ThIS event not only gIves deserved con
&IderatlOn antI recogmtIOn to a nw and
proved \\-eapon but also conne('ts the
Armored Glenadu:rs. the youngest con
stltuent of the Armored Forces. with the
proud tI'atiltIOns of the German mlhtary.
The name "Grenadlel" WIll immedI
ately call to everyone's l111nd the picture
of the GrenadIers of Freuerick the Great.
perfectly alIgned, drawn up,
and well formed. who advanced frontally
against the enerny as though actmg un
tiel dIvme command
This plctUle is a complete contrast to
the anginal wOl'h of the who
were supposed to advance fal ahead of
the attao.:kmg troops ill Older to throw
hand grenades into the runks of the
ConcernIng thC' GrenadH">I:-', a hl&tor
Ian wntes, ..... one uses them for the
attack and for dangerous actions a& v!"e
nade thlowen. and must abo supply
them WIth mushets and swan!::,. For such
\Vorl-.. one chooses men m the physical
conuitIOn. strong. of great endurance,
and stout, ordinarIly taI,mg eIght to ten
men from each company.. . lnbtead
of a hat they wear a large GrenadIer
cap. in the large ammUnItions pochets
they cal ry three gI enadec:, filled WIth
iron. and ready to e:xplodc ..."
TIns original use of grenadIers neces"
sarIlv made the name "Grenadier" one
whIch cal'"rled high honor. The }11st01'1an
WrItes fUl'ther, ..... Thel'e weI e entll'e
I'eguuents and battalIons formed from
GI enadler corps, SimIlar to the guards of
anCIent rulers. whlch were of remarkable
SIze and character...."
Even mounted troops, who had nothIng
to do WIth hand gl enades, acqul1 ed the
honorable name of "Mounted Gren
adiers." Baron von Reffinger's regI
ment of dragoons was espeCIally referred
to by Frederick \VIlham I because it
"showed so much distinction," and \Va"
therefore raIsed to a reghl.1ent of
"!\Tounted Grenadiers."
In this manner, the name "Gren
adiers," rather than becommg the name
of a branch of infantI"Y or cavall'Y. be
came a generally accepted term to de
SCrIbe ehte troops
One might believe that the Armored
Grenadiers had only theu' name m com
mon WIth the Grenadiers of the old army.
however, that is not the case. Closer ex
ammatIOn reveals that thIS new branch
of the servlce-unhkely though It may
seem-is closely allied in it<; tactIcal and
operative employment and III Its meth
od& to the proud tradItIOns of Gel man
mIlItary hIstory.
The ongmal purpose of the Grenadlt'l"
wa" to deploy far ahead of his company
WhICh was advancmg to the attad, 111
block formatIon m ordel' to destroy the
defenSIve hnes of the enemy by mf'ans
of grenades, thus prepanng for the
breakthlough of the troops WhICh fol
,"Vhat was done in a llllllted way then
IS done 10 a large way today.
The Grenadiers who fOl merly ad
vanceu to the attack ahead of the gen
eral fI'ont hne can be compared to the
Al'lnOl(>u Grenadier umt In the Armored
Ul\IlSlOn, whIch advances deep mto the
enemy\, pmntion. fal' ahead of all other
troops, and by spreading death and de
:.tructlOn destroys the enemy's defenSIve
line'S m order to aSSI&t the UnIts WhIch
follow 111 their task of de}Ivel mg de
CISIve blow.:>.
No less SIgnIficant for the ArmoI'ed
Gtenadlers as a branch of the "Motol'
lzeu Troops" is the fact, parftcularly im
portant. that these mounted regiments
have become associated WIth the Idea of
bpeed, and have been petsOlllfi
eatlOns of the "Mounted Grenadiers."
Both pIctures-the ongmal GrenadIer
as symbol of the attackmg force
Illg III front of hIS company to throw
hu, grenades mto the enemy, and the
Grenadier as a symbol of the element of
persomfied by the .MDunted
nndlel s-bind the new weapon WIth the
old name m a living tradition.
The Al'mored Grenadier battalIons.
l'egllllenb and brigades repI!2'sent a pro
duct 1011 of the armored forces m theIr
organizatIOn. personnel and, eqUIpment.
Tu'hen from cavalry, mounted nfle. In
fantlT and I'lfle reglmentsl Its actual
buthday IS on 1 October 1935. the day
the fir:.t German armored diVISIon was
set up. :
Since that day the Armored Gre

of thJ war, tanks
and Armored Grenadiers qave cooper

German armored dIVISIOns III this war is
overwhehmng eVIdence of the exemplary
cooperatIOn of th.e main ele*lents of the
"Mechanized Troops," the and the
Arllloreu Gl'enadIel's. ,
The tank regiments are thr maIn force
of the armored dIVISIons. while the
Al'mored Grenadier regimen s constItute
the storm troops. !
The varied nnssions which are given
to the Armored GrenadIer regiments
quire a SImilarly varied personnel, or
gamzation and eqUlpment suitable for
the obJectIve. Therefore, III a Grenadier
battahon, besides the Grenadier com
panies eqUIpped with varIOUS 'heavy and
light weapons, one also finds a headquar
tels company, a rifle c0n:tpany, a heavy
weapons company WIth lIght and heavy
weapons platoons. tank destroyer
toons of varIOUS calibers, a motorcycle
platoon, a communicatlQns platoon, units
for reconnaIssance and gUlde work, and
pIOneer platoons for pal tlculal' mISSIOns.
RepaIr troops or UTIlts tahe care of the
maIntenance of vehIcles, and supply units
see to It that troops have sufficient mu....
mUons, eqUIpment and food.
The employment of the units of
Armoretl. {;renadiel'b In the sphere of
an ulmOl'ed dIVIsion IS indicated by theIr
extenSIve almament \""ith medium and
heavy weapons. ConsIdermg that the
Armored Grenadiers aloe equipped with
small a1"111S of all types, vHy many lIght
anti heavy machmE' guns. tlench mor
tars, light and medIum artillery and
antItank weapons of val'lous caliber&,
they ar unbelievable fire power
However, the dUSposltIOn of this new
weapon ,becomes perfectly dear only with
the eqUIpment of a completely armored.
land operated. specially equipped truck
m WhICh the of armor and speed
are Partly protected agamst
mfantl y nre and splinters, the Armored
Grenadler& can generally fight WIth most
of theIr lIght, medium and heavy weap
on& from theIr
In case the COUI"Sf' of battle oj' the POSI
t10n of the enemy uoes not pelrmt use
of the armoleu car, the lilenadlels
would proceed to battle on foot.
The battle of vehle1es and the battle
on foot. and the combmatIon of both
methods of warfale 31(' the IdentIfymg
marks of fightmg by the ArmOied Gl'en
adteI's Thel1 mam object IS to bring
theil' gIf'at forcc, which can be con
ti ollpri lIke that of tanks, Into play In
(om JmatlOn wlth tanks.. Often the At
mOIer! Gl'enaUler units ale obliged to
pleceJe the attack of the tanks and ad
vance storm 1l'Oops. Such mISf'lOnS
are. fOI p\.ample. stleam at
tack of partIcular RectOl'b of tell ain. at
tacl, agamst an ellemy In and behmd
f01tlficJ POSItIons, attucht- on bunkers,
battles in inhabited places, '"ootIs, bat
at nIght 01' In fogs lV1isslOlls which
ale pal ticulady &uIted to the individual
Ity uf Lhls weapon ale '>Ul'pni>e attack.
utIlIzatIOn of favOi able and
follow-up work in succesSluI tank at
At the same time It can be SaId that
the tactIcal employment of the Armored
Grena(her UUltS is part of the entIre mIS
sion of the al mOl"ed diviSIOn.
VarIOus examples &hould thlOW light
on the possibilitIe& for the
employment of this arm. In many in
stanct::. It was as follows.
Some\\thelf' the point of an almored
(livislOn ha., fought its way to the VI
cinIty of a strongly fortiHed sector of a
stream. It IS threatened by antitank
guns, al tIllery, enemy tanl{5, strong
bunkeI"S and field fOl'tIfilcailons. On the
same banh. the enemy also mamtains a
:.uong bndgehead It is. necessary to
take the brIdge over tha- river. so that
the motorIzed UUlts may advance. A
flontal advance by tanJ"s would cause
the enemy to blow the-brIdge sky high,
In.fantIY for a surprise attack is st111 far
III the real'. What IS to be- done? At
tackmg troops of the Armored Gren
a-dier.s detruck. It i:5 possIble to make
a surprIse advance at night and take
posseSSlOn of the brIdge. QUletly and
alone the Armored Grenadiers Cl'eep to
the brIdge; through close combat, man
against Ulan. without the use of firearms.
the garrison is dispatched, the bridge
is manned and secured, and the
charges are removed. RadIO commUDlca
tIOn With the rear announces "brIdge
taken." Together Wlt/1 Armored Gren
adiers the tanks move forward to the at
tack, break thlough the enemy poslt1ons
10 front of the brIdge, relieve the advance
troops, through the enemy posit!ons
on tne OPPOSIte bank, leave the moppmg
up of flanking pOSItIOns to troops which
fflllow, and then the tanks and AI mored
Grenadlel's the enemy toward new
Somewhere 90 mIles east of the broken
enemy flont the mo::.t advanced gloup-of
an armored dIvISIon has reached the high
way to 'l\Ioscow. It 1::, necessal)' to block
the road amI bar the retl eat of the en
cudeJ The hIghway IS bordered
by dIfficult terram hills, val
leys and many small woods The nights
are cloudy and pItch dark, the days dark
and ,henry, fog amI the traces of snow
can bE' Durmg the day the tanks
command the field of fu"(' naturally nar
rowed by the difficult landscape, but duro
mg thE' mght It IS pOSSIble for entire regl
me-nts ot' the enemy to slIp through un
noticed between the varIOUS tanks, free
themselves flom the fatal trap, and break
our weak hue::. from the rear. What is
to be done'? Can the Arll10red Gren
Workmg off theIr trucks, they
crect hasty emplacements, well adapted
to the ten-am, thus tlghtenmg the 1 Illg
of tanks and stopptng the flight of the
enem:; untIl the next mornmg when OUl
Stukas attac1{ the uammed-up mas">C's
and Armored Grenadwi s and tanks ad
vance to deal death and Jest! uctlOn
Hl'ldg-eheads must be established, nnnf'
fields lemoved, v.ood" and mhabited
places mopped up, and field forti
ficatzons mll">t be WIped out, CitIes
stormed- all such operatlOn!:> 10 WhICh
the Ideal coOpel'atlOn of tanks and AI"
moted Grenadiers cannot be fully
achIeved, that IS where the A l'mOI ed
Grenadlels storm then way thlOUgh to
prepare for <1;1 new and powel ful attack
by the tanks. In every such case the Ar
mOl'eJ GrenadIers uJ'e the actual execu
ta}'!; of nUSSIons to entire armored
dlYlSlOnS, In the aClomphshment of theIr
auns they can expeL'Ience the wonderful
sensation of mdIVldual combat-and then
entl'uck once more, on their Armored
Gl"enadier-cal's and attack In the VICInity,
thus resting their \'1eary bodIes while
fighting from the armored car, moppmg
up enemy pOSItIons along the road, ad
vancmg through vll1age!; m the first at
tempt. finng with aU weapons, overpow
erIng onemy battenes from the rear,
bl'eakIllg mto the supply hnes or hnes
of fleeing enemy troop!">, smashmg ve
hlcle!"> and columns . , .
lhgh speed, armor and strong fire
power pl'oduce the tactIcal versatIhty of
an ArmOled Grenadier lhvIsIOn, WhiCh,
If the occaSIOn, ('an undertake
autonomous miSSions aIded by antItank
guns, antItank troops, antitank engIneers,
and aI'tIllery. An iAl'llwled GrenadleJ
,('gIl/tent 1S a tll1.:1sion In nllllW
t",(" tilt Idcal aUael.! gJOl!p. llnd 1tS COlli
I1rondcJ ('all un'!' d the most dallllY as
Padi('ularly varIable are the tactIcal
pOSSIbIlities of the battalion, the com
pany, and even_ of the platoon. It IS
really a chmax III military experIence to
go out With an ArmoredGrenadler
truck on mbslOn, a cIuna). WhICh
::annot ht" surpassed III Its unpreSSIOn on
the minds of both officers, nOncommIS
sIOned officers and the men,
In eV('lY case the strong armament,
the eqUIpment WIth a speCIal armored
cal, weapons and tools ::;upphed to all
ArmoreJ Gl'enadle11s. officers and men,
and the deCISIve ImpOl tance of so many
of the must make a strong IllI
preSSiOn on e\lery Armored Gl'enadlel'
Flesh, danng-m fa('t, foolhardy-blood flow III thell' 1;ellls; only real men
who al e filled With unqualified determina
tton to fulfill theIr honorable tasks ('an
be used
To all A rmOI ed GrenadIers the name
given by the Fuhrel' means both recog
nltiOn anJ obligation.
I t IS a matter of plIue to them to ad
vance III the thIcl, of the great break
throughs and partIcipate 10 the advances,
the pUlSUlt and encll'cll?ment battles,
nghtmg btlongly in cooperation WIth
then SIStel weapon, the armOl ed dIVISIOn,
to bring victol'Y to the German flag.
Attacking An Enemy Within Field Fortifications
IAn artIcle from i1ItlttUJ'-Woc1!enblatt 3 July 1942. Translated
from German In the 'Var Department, Washington, D.C.)
The enemy SInce September 25 ha::;
been holdmg Village B, elevatIOn RO, and
the l'mlway embankment, With perhaps
one remforced company In field emplace
The Icmforccd 1st BattalIOn lWlthout
the 2nd Company), not supported on
rIght or left. has prepaIed Itself dUl'lng
the mght before Septembel 27 In the
vIcmlty of Village A, for attack at 0530.
The MISSlOlI IS to take and hold eleva
tIon RO and VIllage B
Heary a/ 111S: one lIght field hOWItzer
battery ha5 been aSSIgned to cooperate.
Light mfant}y hQ1t'ltzer and
gun platoon are attached
The mISSIon IS well sUlteu for bat
taiton combat fire. Sm1ultaneous follow
mg of Infantry Training Manual No.9
is recommended. Attack phases, coopera
tlOn of the arms well as accompam
ment of our file are e5peclally im
pOl"tant. From a dbtance of 400 yards
the fire combat of ea(,h mdlvldual gun
must be e.xecuted' under control of a
The shetch of 'the battle therefore
for evaluating the pOSSIbIlities,
The sket(,h must be followed attentively,
btnce In the text what has already hap
pened 1::' often not mentioned,
The most llnportant detail IS orgQllJza
tlOn 01 the attack ill VIllage A The bat
talion does not wlsih to become involved
10 costly fighting in Village B but alms
at dehvermg the atta('k at the right
(3rd Company) of'the pomt of concen
tralIon. Here is :the battalIon leader
hImself. and here is the bulk of the ma
chmegun company'. Artillery and lIght
jnfantry howitzer platoon, receive mIS
sions for divet'ttng the enemy in Village
B if the attack by the 8rd Company
seems about to be flanked from this point.
At 0600 the 3rd Company, deployed,
leaves the vegetable garden east of ViI
lage A. Iml11admtely behind follow two
heavy mal'hlne-gun platoons and the 1st
echelon of the battalion staff. Shortly
after the 3rd Company has reached the

heavy machme-gun platoon, which is in
emplacement here to wati+h, has
ously dug in and therefore suffers no
casualties The 3ed Company must not
RapId deployment and forward! Bat
talIOn staff and machme-gl.ln company
remam close bE'side! Take covel' from
artillery fire!
Now the moment for the 1st Company
has al'rned. By platoons, it leaves the
shrubbery west of Village A in dashes
and reaches the creek, platpon and group
leaders at Its head, as qUickly as pos
Wlnle the 3rd Company WIth en
larged distances and mtervals climbs
the slope to the railway embankment,
the 1st Company orgamzes itself III its
cover. A t1'ffllsdory assembly under good
cover causes no damage.
At thiS moment there is complete op
po:,ition in the distribution of the 31'd
and the 1st CompaDies.
The attack terram of the 3rd Com
pany as far as the raIlway embankment
is a stubble field 800 yards wide, entirely
lackmg m cover A machine gun from
VIllage B flanks the left platoon with a
few hnes of fire Artillery and hght
Infantry hOWitzer open heavy fire (firing
miSslOn) and dhert the enemy on the
southeast edge of Vlllage B. The attack
":)pealheads lfrontmost machine guns)
engage the enemy's fil e on the railway
Now further advances must be made
dependent on thE' dIrect hItS (fire ref
The [lgM machwe guns contmue firmg
1eClpl'ocally From a dIstance of 400
yards, the drI('s come IOta action and
contribute to the fire. Both platoons on
the rIght succeed in penetrating across
the railway embankment The hea1,'Y
mac1linegllll platoon makes ImmedIate
usC' of thIS and goes mto pOSItIOn (see
sketch). The left gun-platoon is wIthm
range of two machine guns and digs in.
The heavy 1nOl tm' UJOUp has unfortunate
ly not succeeded on the left, It was de
flected III advance by arti11ery fire. It
ca1lnot remam on the stubble field and
n1Ut:.t dIg in. At tha, moment the
fallOn leader IS also of motion.
I n the continuatIOn of the battle, how
eVel', he has the advantage of being able
to come into actlOn directly WIth the
company at the point of concentration.
The 1st Company, beyond the creek,
also has coverless terrain. It works for
ward in mdlvidual thrusts to the straw
In dOIng so, a transition is made
from dIstribUtion in depth to dbtribution
for fire combat. The enemy is stIll stub
bornly defendmg hImself in Village B.
The arlIlery does not reach him on the
railway embankment. The 1st Company
Ht/jst thercfoH conduct its fire wtth 'tts
OWlt j01'ces Every man must fire t After
fire supel'lority has been won (observa
tion of h1ts)' the company leader by per
sonal example, nfle in hand, gives the
call to attack, bringmg the VIctOrious
platoon out of firing combat into a8sault,
PO)'lions of the enemy are leaving VII
lage B northward under the effect of
the artillery fire and the assault of the
1st Company. Here they are attacked by
the flanking fire of the machine-gun com
pany and flee farther back. The lst
company takes Gu prJ50nerl'.. The {'n{'my
can no longer hold elevation 80.
5 In terraIn poor in over, quick
tUggmg In acquires Import'ance.
6. From 400 yards heavIest
fire combat with all arms! of the rIfle
company. Contest for fire Isupel'iol'lty
The attad( objective has been reached.
SummarIze,I, the following lessons are
1. No schematiC employment of the
}HIe companies. Form concentratIOn
2. VlsuahzatIOn In advance of emu
bat miSSIons for artlllelY and infantry
In thIS case, better ti, e SUpPO} t
than file plepaJatlO1L.
3. Heavy machinegun platoons diS'
trlbuted forward In open terraIn.
OthprWlse, under enemy nre. they can
no longer go mto
4. The rifle compames move forward
widely dl'3.tnbuted. For fire contbat
they close up.
7. DJ::,contInuance of fbe! With call to
S. The mfantry combat up to the
nnw of the hand to hand fightlllg IS
fire combat. \
The enemy rcmalllIng In the exeava

pn&Onl"l'S, 2 mOl tars and 4 machwe gun::.
captured Losse::. m our battlahon were G
dead, 22 wounded. A largel part of the
at.tack (l'om the dustance of 400 yaIds)
was conducted acro"" terrain.
Auout 12,000 rounds of shellf were fired.
01 gan17atlOn. deCISIOn and fll e brought
success. 1
From a .!=.tudy made in India
It IS ObVIOUS that the British realize
that dust is a very great problem under
certam CIrcumstaneE'S For mstance, they
now hsue at least two types of goggles
that fit close to the faN' for use of truck
dl'lvers workmg in motor convoys In India
and issue respuators to tank crews
In Near and Middle East theaters of war.
That many eye result from
dust IS known. These are ujually
fied In bulk in IndIa as '. OpthalmIa."
That the nasal mucous membrane must
become hardened is to anyone
who has experIenced long, 0 e":,,en short,
exposure to the effects of d st m the ex
tremely dry all' of Central Western
India between the months of November
to late June mcluslve. DUring thIS period
the fine particles of dust which are in
haled through the nasal orifice adhere to
the mucous membrane, drYIng up all the
secretions and formmg Mud crusts which
often are to remove except by
douchmg SImilarly, thf'se fine particles
of dust are mhaled into the air passages
of the throat and lungs causing Irritation
and reSUlting in the productIOn of a large
amount of mucous and consequent cough.
Illg to expel this mucous. Often when
('oug-hmg up thi" mucoid materIal it will
have the of muri. there being
);>0 many du:::;t particles present.
Under normal circUlllstances the ef.
fects of dust are mJurious to the people
of IndIa. but It IS ObVIOUS that dust
thrown up by motor tl affic such as is
pl'esent III 1TI1htalY motor convoys wil1
pI esent a very much more dlfficult prob.
lem. It IS pOSSIble that milItary personnel
subjected to dugt might be invalidf'd from
that cause, provided they do nut have the
uenefits of some form of protectIon such
as goggles and respirators. It IS also pOs
sible that thiS factoI' might become reo
sponslble for a pension hazal d through
to &lllUses 01' un91scovered lung
Effect on Motors
Up to a pomt, dust has a benefiCIal ef.
feet on camouflaged externally pamted
face", helpmg to blend those surfaces
to the local color and textUie On tn'es
and rubber parts the erOSIve action of
and dust conslflerably ShOI tens the
effective hfe of the articles by from one.
half to fourfifths Exact data in this
It'spect IS not aVaIlable here. but un
doubtedly has hC'en l'epO! ted from the
Westetn Desert.
The most mju'riolls action of dust is

axles, bushmgs. etc The guard ag:amst
must be constant :md the counter.
actIOn thorough, lei>s m the case of WE'aI'
on lelatlvely unnnpol'tant sulfaces as
t-pllngJeavcs; 1110re on tho"e palts which
by thel1 constant close fit insm' long life
safety 01' preCiSIOn as axle bushings and
flont wheel bealmgs Where pOSSIble the
weal mg' pal t covered wah cloth 01'
leathel, (>at'lily 1 emovable for cleamng
(gun axles) 0\ enthely dUstPloof en.
d08t>d (bavelslng geals). In any case
whether pal tlal1y or not protect_
ell flum dust, It IS always neces"at' to

nance must
Intel nally.- -Smce a motor breathes
all, dust IS present III val'YIng quantltles
dependmg on the eqUIpment fUl'llished
and the pi ecautions and care observed
The problem of lettmg In dustless ai;
has been solved almost completely by the
motor manufactutE'I'S, but the driver of
the vehIcle and the motol' men of the unit
must continually Implement thiS excelll'nt
begmumg. All concerned must be taug-ht
the far reachIng Importance of dust
weal'; they must be made dl(st consciOus
and thoroughly educated not to under
ec:;timat(> the harmful pifect of grit ac
cumulatIOns lfl thell' motors
The avetage per minute
of the rnodel n automobile engme amounts

as 27 cubIC feet through the engme ventI
latmg 01' "breather" pipe The concen
tl'3tlon of suspended dust and grIt par
tlcles In the aspired au' vanes to a great
extent. From data recorded in the Umted
St.ates;'a concentl atlOn of approximately
1 ton of dust per CUbIC mile of air may
be regarded as llormal ill mduslnal (,ltH?,$
and may, m certain loeahUes, l'eacn as
high as 6 tons pel' l'ubw' nu1(1
Thf're is no lecOldeJ data all <lmt con
, "entl'atIun l:l the III fndm but
It IS cel tain that In al em, the ahove
figures will be consldelahly e,cce leJ,
Even the mObt all' deaneI
fitted to automotive vehicles do not en
tn'ely elimlnatc all the du::.t <'llSpentied
In the Intake all', and any all' filtermg
devices of In esent day capablc ot
tlf'lnenng' ab':1olutely dust free ail to the
engme woulJ he so bull,y m, to occupy
:-;everal tIme" the ::.ize avallaLle under
the aVel'ag'p automobile hood,
hy Its ::nhcpou<; natUl'e has
an ablaslve actIOn \\h1Ch causes &prlOU'->
anJ rapid wear of thf" pl .... ton"', ling'S,
lylmder \\alb anel vdlve meL'ham:',IU, H'
III t;>}\.ces ... lve 011 and g-asohne COll
sumptlon \VhE'l'l e,\ces<,IVe Oil {'on!'oump
tlOn tai-.t's plat'p. WhICh om' nf the fllst
<':;Ih"n<, of weat blought about by
many clvlhd.n ownel and Jl'lve)"'.'> have
adopted the' .,hOI t policy of
cheap, mfel'lul engme 011 \\-hleh hn.:; In
tU1'n 1 liwed J ('olbldel able number of en
gu:e., mvolvlng- 1.11 ge of l110ney for
lah01' and lIlatl'lwl to (,OV(,1<.,t of
, lepmfs,
Test::> made on truck l'ng1l1eS fitted
wIth and wIthout felt t.\ Ill." all -filtel"s.
del "Ientlcal of sel vIce lUtl!
cated lllne tllllf'S th(> amount of \Veal on
the cylmdel walls In the (a):.e of the ('n
gmp tbat not fittNI \\ lth an all
filter, four the weal' on the
aBu ten tlllH'., the wt'<U on the pIston
\"allOus dl"slgn!;l of cal bUJ ('tol' all
cit'unel!;l ha\l(> appeared on the mill het
over a numbel of yeaI S to ovel (,Oille thl::'
problem' They IIlrlude I pmnvnl of
by ('entlifugal actIOn, the u"e of lwavy
flltel matel wI slich <.\s felt. and the
I emovnl of du.. t hy pat.<"lUp; the all' OV(,I
I',('tf I ,(d nffr)}t 0" to T'f 9" II/to ill
ql'('/lt d(({IIiHY (/JHf fI,,'SlIllIiJ liT nil ('le(lll
Intt"tval.., at Whll'h all' cIe<mel':'.
"h<Juld he <,el'vlced dcpcnd Oll operatlllg
conditIOn." In the of l,<l:-<,png-er
toUi mg' ovel tlm,ty 10wis III thl .... ('ollnt] \',
miles should not bl> c-.:ceedf'li with
out thOi Gugh llfl3ll1g of the all-nltel
element In kelob('ne, \\lth lllot01'
011 and lU the of Oil-bath filtelt>
-c1eaOlng the ot! reb('!'VOIl and l'l:'nlhng
to the COil (:'ct level wIth 1I10tOi 011 (SA E
5u glade), The an'-tiltel cl(llllent on the
CI anl\cu'-.c ventilator 01 "hl'eathel''' plpe
!Jl,ewl!:>e liE' Sl'I'vlced
In the case of motOi Vt'hlt'it'S ttavehllg
III column" and ,;;uliJect to heavy con
tInuous dust <'OUdltIOI]", It may be adVIS
able to r(,du(,e dc-anIn" wt.ervals to
1,000 ulII(l" or ('\en Ie:,.s In the of
tl actors. dally \ Icanll1g' of all' filtl'l s
advl::.ed by the munuf.lctull"l b If engagf'd
In (,'\(,l'ptiOnally dusty WOI k, ::.uch as
1aad buildmg \\!th "bulldozell:-" In the
dry bea.::on, cleanIng- i:l.t fl 'Illl hour.,
1Iltcl'vuh, IS at1vIsabk
If veillcleb have- pm;.,ed through sand
01' dust ::.tor11l::>. lmnleillatE' dE'3nmg of
the air filtels .lJvl<;ahle
It should be vorne In I11l11d In thl':> con
nectlQn thut of the all" deanel
pjE'ments with dUbt ob:-t I ucts the all' pas
::;age to thE' c:ll'hUl'etol' and thereby
gleatly reduces the operatmg effiCiency
of the IO'ngme
(' {,lM/lllatioll (If d,'st, salld Ulld
gilt l'flltlelrs tlcel/llll1latu/w tll(' ern"l..
case III by mOl (' f! ('queut ad
('hn,'g('$ accolllpamed by thOlough flm,ll
mg of the englllE' wIth a hghthotheu
"flushlllg" OIL
Even the most efficient oil filters. as
attBeheJ to m()J:el.'n engmes
arE.' not of the contmq,ous flow-type but
opel ate on the ('ontmtious by-pass prin
clpl'e, filtering or 're-tondItIOning" part
0f t.he OIistl e-am only End do not
fO! e speedily eliminate,excessive amounts
of dust and grit partIc1Ies which may en
tPI the crankcase through the bI eathel
pIpe The contmuous flow stramers on
the other hand. which are usually pro
\Ided In the 011 pump, do not anest
anll l'etU1J1 fine dust particle-s_
I u the casE:'- of vehicles operating un
der abnormally dw:,ty conditIons it
thelCfole imperative to resort to
dl ammg and of the engme Oil
at mOl e flcquent IntElI vals than under
lhH mal operatmg condltlOns_ Cleanmg
('hanging of oll fi1tf'r rartndges
"bould likeWIse be attended to more fre
quently, There is no ,relwble yard stick
to define the exact or operatmg
hOUl mtel vals at whl('h 011 changes
..,hOIlI,! bl" effectf'u to prpvent excessive
\\ P.ll but an change at the
eal he!oot opPoi'tunlty should he made If a
\-plllcie has pa'-,."erl through a prolonged
Even undel nOl mall opel atmg condl.
tlllllS It 1<., better to en on the SIde of
lathel fIequent 011 ('hangIng' as a safe
g'tHlld llg-amst engine \\Teal'. A policy of
fl('quent 011 changmg IS be:>idcs not 111
(,tlIllllatlblc WIth 011 as, espe-
('I ally whel e a lUI ge numbe-I of vphlcle")
al e 0ppl'uh'd Il1 umts forming a fleet.
til(' drained crankcase oil can bl:'
('a<'lly coilpcied and ffiClentiy l'E'stored
f,)} fUI th(,1 ORe m I C Eng-me'5 With a
11111l1l11111ll lOf;s With the help of modern
hltPllllg' anrl I E'C'onriltlOlllng plant':>,
l!w 1 eeonultlOnmg" of the lalest "ad
dltJ',,(," aI' "lllhlbited" type I C, Engine
(111 .... fill fUlther U"ie III engmes pl"P
."c1I1', a ,.light difficulty ll1asmuch as the
Cttl hon and gum solvE'nt spE'ciui
pnUllris 111 thf'Sl' OIls become exhausted
In tlw eoul "-C' nf <'e-l'vice ant! cannot he
I p .... hl! {'Ii IIv nItratIOn 01' any othel
1llethod of II:'COnrhtlOnIng- Such ut'ed ")ll
hil)Jted" type of 011". If I econlhtlOneu.
can IHl\\PH'1 be \('1 y satisfactOrIly put
to n.... {' ag,{Jn as I"pg"ulm' type,
hl\))t('11 .\IOtOI Oil..
In the case of g-asohne engmes, thp
(1/1,,,/, tH' (' III 1111 II}lJICI ('!JI/J/('! I '"blle'nllt
to the g>H;;,ohn..? in OllieI' to prevent dry
runnll1g of the top pal tIOn of the llll('r
whIch IS subJC'ct to the heaViest 1ate of
Wl'<11 I." advocate,l Thl:- ll1('ac:,Ule aha
Imill'oves valve stem lubl icatlOn,
In addltJOy) to fittlllg the vehicle \\ith
the propel' all tilter the followmg mam
tC'llancp Lp pel fOl'mE'd
1 FIf'!luent change of 011 m all' cleaner
..: Frequent change of 011 In motol'.
; I'lequent luhllcation of the chaSSIS,
.\. :'tlaIntamlllg" motor mclean (onul
;) Pel'lOdlCal Inspection of front wheel
6 Penodlcul lU'iipection of bnlkes
.. Change of tlansl1nssion 011, and dif
{'ill' lllbn{'utwn and If eat of chassis
(OI!l/)f}lI( Ids. such as the 5teel'lng geat'
SPI mg bolt::. and &hachles, etc" are also
affected to a gre-at e-:xtent by e'{cess dust
conditions as encounteled on the maJor
Ity of loads in this country, The use
of a buhstanttal-bo(hed. stllngy and fi
blOllS consistency grease with a high
meltlllg' point, which will "stay put" even
undel the hIgh summer temperatures
in India, is strongly ad
A soda soap-base gTe-ase with high oil
content whIch IS capable of' forming a
semi-fluid, tough and shock resistant
lubricant film on the moving surfaces
and yet-by re aming "plastiC" at the
outer edges of e bearings-seals them
eff(>('tively ag t the entr:Y of dust
and water-IS the 1 al chaSSIS lubricant
for all heavy duty service conditIOns,
Correct chassis greasing intervals also
depend to a great extent on serVIce con
ditIOns, but should never exceed 1,000
Some manufacturers fit their motors
With speCial dust preventmg parts, for
example: A sp('clUl valve cover assembly
has been l'e-leased by Chevl'olet under
part No.605939 w}lIch does away With
the IOUV1'e-S normally found in the valve
covel of a Chevrolet engine antI has In
ItS place a filtered bl"eathE'l', the purpose
of which IS to catch the dust before It
entel s mto the valve rocher chamber,
Anotht;'r modification released by Chev
rolet as a safeguard agalllst dust enter
mg through the crankcase !..Il,'eather pIlle
attached to the 011 filter, IS a speCIal
valve assenlbly, the use of whlllh permits
of the breathe!' pipe beIng entirely
blodted and yet <'atel'lng for the l'equlreJ
amount of crankcabe ventIlatIOn, ThlS
aSl:>embly has been l'eleased by General
Motors. Canada. but can be adapted to
the U S. Chevrolet engine,
So far as actual lubricatIon m IndIa
I") concel"neJ, the fonowmg recommenda
tIOns have heen receIved from General
MotOl's IndIa Lllmted, Bombay. to be
ubE'd as a gUide only,
Roads TTO-cks
Miles lIIlles MIles
Chunge motOJr
-- ---
1,000_1200 500'100 300400
dE'nnrr oil 1,000 600 200_300
tiDn ('very 1,000 500:
Front \vh",,}
be,'lrmg-s ",<cry 10,000 5.000' 2,000
fhanVf> trnn!!
mlbblcH., ",}
... 10,000 5 0 0 0 2,000_3,000
Effects of Du..t on OthE'r Ji;quipment
In genpwi It may be stated that IndI
vJ(\ual orgamzatlOna\ equipment Simply
wear::, out III dUbty coontlY, Arms
and weapons of all sorts from the
mattc to the i.ll'tIllelY piece be con
mamtaIned. Cloth and leather
.lIe "orn out by ahrablOn In from one
tenth to one-fourth the normal tIme, and
the llwnta} wear and tear 011 the ownel
1b equally subver:':lve
Cel tam e):.pedients ale helpful m
cOllnng the effects of tIm,t and
for mstance <.,and mats anrl sand
tlUcks me bsued for the U::5e of VE'hIcle:..
opel atmg ovel' sandy ::.01L
Effects on Operation:'>
Opel ations by mechalllzed Uillts m
hcury dust (LIld SGlldstoJ inS may be com
pal ed WIth those at night. DIrectIOns
and HientlficatlOns are made difficult.
WIthdrawals made easy. FIring of pieces
by dllect IaYlIlg IS restricted because of
thE' muzzle blast, The locatiOn of ArtIl
lery OP'", requires extra consideration.
Stl ateglc moVE'S may be made without
thsclo;,Ul'e, but close-m attacks by tanks
are not conSIdered profitablE'. Infiltration
by variou.s type::. of units is favored. but
surprIse IS apt to be double edged,
/11 heGl'Y dllsf a/cas each vehicle moves
In its own small dust ::.torm. Surprise
Iluposslhle and offensive maneuver dif
ficult The artlllery IS hampered espe
ciallY in dIrect firing and all vehicles
must move at increased dIstances and
down wind from occupied points
In any ease operatIOns are eonslder
ably slowed not only h'cuu,,' of Iowan,}
mtenlllttant vl::.iblhty but most oftPH
by eXCeSSIV(\ tnl1es-out for mamtennncf'.
leco.. ery, and lepaa of vehH:les; and the
supply of equipment, e},:tI a pRets. III fact
In all categol'les, de"-el ves gleat thought
and cale In plannHlj;,
Dust doe'S affect nllhtaty In
this country by actIOm, on m.en and
materiel, and therefore it be com
hatted, not toward Its ehmlratlOn, but
to mmlmlze its effects.
Staff planmng should cons1der:
1 PI opel' eye and throat prptection for
dllVCI:' and crews of v('hH:lesi.
.: Tl aIllIng ill care and maintenance
of mlltol'S and other mated;':'l both ex
telnally and Illtprnally. !
and !'eplacement wIth the I' operatIOns
The First Battle with Russian Heavy T-34 Tahks
fTranfila-u.>t1 at the Commanu and General Staff School, Frlrt
Lcuvcn\\.orth, Kansas, from a German artIcle m Dw Panze, tl1l1 pe
Jtln{' 1942.1
Bt'hwC'n the "Kessf'ls" Vyazma and
R.rYan!>lt. the motorIzed divISIOn worked
,\ay ah('atl toward the nOltheast over
I !lads whleh 1 un thlough anCII2'nt woods
\\ e of the advancl' detachment welt' a
day's mal ch ahead In the mum body of
thc tlOOph of the ud\anc(' detachment
thele wel' antltan\{ and bIcycle troops
DUrIng the ,lay \\e attacked and cap
tUied three 'nl1ag'p<; than 100 pns
,meN wel'e taken The to\\n of J _____ ,
\\hlch occupied a cummanllIn_t{ pOSItIOn
and \\, hlCh was the key pO<'ltlon of the
Imt' of RUf;Slan fOI uficutlOns, was rpally
unlya few fOI(,(,8 behmd to protect thIS
IH?Y pm,ltIOn For plactIcul reasons, those
truop::, whose fud hud become exhau"lted
\\ere thu"> left. 10'01 all tank wele
In the muddy loads, as wOI'e all
tIUCb-. By dlvIdmg up our fm,l \\(, suc

The mam body of the battalIOn pu..,hed
on towal J the nOJ th III Ol'clel to pl'event
the l"O';lte(l eHemy fJ'OUl obtammg any
VI Ith the pIHle and ('aut IOn of VIC-
to! IOUS the pomt of the detach
11lpnt B1udp up of antitank and bicycle
tloOpS dashed ahewi. And what bohliel
\\US nut filled With JOY b)- r:.uch ill
a.l!reement WIth the old <Ofast,
bold and hard as lion!"? The tH.1van(>('
guard harl already passed thp chuI'ch
which stande; alone In thp center of a
cleat'lng In the \\-oOtls onC' mile of
11. when bullets ('aminI" fl'om the
light began \"hl:-.tlmg about OUI ealS

whICh always pI'ovldc::, one of the pl'oudM
(' ... t momcnts fo1' u.., antltank 111pn: "AntI
_tank men fOl'wUld! Enemy tank",!"
In a momf'nt all \V2.'" III a statt' of wild
activity! In thp woods thcle were pnem.v
1111e tl and, In addlUon. enemy tanks
up ahead. Away we \Hnt after thc111, III
advance style! AutomatICally the
la;:,t of the antItank guns of the 1st Com
pany }oulet! to the flont. OUI' only med
lum antItank g-un \VhlCh was WIth us
rolled up ahead_ A 5.pll'lted fight
qUiddy dl,V<'lllpet!_
These wele fl'esh enemy hoops
lllU",t take the wmd out of their sat1s
doubly fast, When close to the chul-ch the
commander cllrtl:<r' gave the OJ'der to at
tack: "FI('sh HOOps WIth tanks al'e farmg
us on the hig-hway_ We attack the enpmy
on both Sides of thp highway, repel him
and take of 1\1 ___ . __
"Ftllll1el' advance guurd, the Vohburg
Bicycle Company WIth subordmuted 1st
AntItank Company, to the left of the
hlghwI}; to thf' I'lght of hIghway,
Antitank Company WIth s b01-dinate-d
bIcycle troop; 2d Company at my
m w\)od:;, 500 yards s uth of the
chutch Commander of Rec
Battalion \\llth rest of RattaHon assumes
1111Sf;]On" of reconnaissance and
on flanks and 111 real'_ Battalion command
post-the ehU!ch" I' :
While the newly engaged units' \verp
pushing fOlward agamst Il'nemy 1'lfle
troop"> m the woods to thE' r.ast of the
hIghway, a dl"ama clevelopcd around the
til of the tanks
f }:%t
moved unconc(,lnedly thl'Ough the mIdst
of OUI hne like an IllvulnPluble prehls_
tOllC monster, It if> one of it hose thick
ullnol'ed tank& which can hardly be
tratcrl by light antitank cannpn_ Evident
iy, It ha.. a small field of VleW_ It ran

pOSItIOns and its fite went mth empty aIr.
To bc surE', the men at thf' antItank can.
non knew how small a chanCe! they had of
<'ucce&s, hut m Spite of thatl not one. of
thC' antItank ,stopped fi'mg It IS a
mattel of honor hpre whethel' tank 01
nntltank cannon Will wm; It must
be shm\n, thel'efou2', who WIll hold out
the langei Shot after off
the tank FIfty hits had aITready been
counted "AntItank men: r:.t'l'Y with it!"
rang In the ears of evelY and hiS
heI]1t'ls and c}oo:,p1' c;amE' the lnM
vulnerable col08,,>6s. It was, now hardly
mOle than 30 feet flom twolof the antI
tank guns of the Fllst COJ;npany_ And

to no;; the hopeles&nt'% of bur task by
Hwans of the 1'1cochetmg' Pl'JJectIles. But
OUl anlitank men stood dog,tedly on the
Job and contmued to firf' at range
at the tank WhICh was now passIng bf'
tween them And as It passe on Its wa
unhurt they suddenl-y turned hell' cannon
and filed at the I'ea,' end of Ithe armOled
monste,' which was to create
havoc m thE' midst of our co pany ThiS
SrelJ.ed doom for the RUSSIa tank for in
the pO,",IUon which It oe{'u ied momen_
tal Ily, our projectiles were hIe to stnke
It With the desired vertical Impact, ThIS
was ImmedIately recogmzed*b
the gun
ners Now the shots qUIt ouncing off_
OnC' of thC'm imbeddetl ltself in the tank.
A fraction of a second hltel
the second
and third projPctiles pen trated thiS
"Achilles heeL" Severely ounded, the
tank stopped but like a morthny wounded
prehistoric dragon, it roared desperately
and with prImative rage,.: spewed fire
from all Its guns. Three morl shells which
penetrated it did not put an end to its
raging gun fire, Other means had to be
used_ Who woujd undertake the job? Who
was the man'! For a long tIme the daring
company commander had waited for thIS
moment, He was not wIllmg to lose such
a tasty morsel as this, In a few short
da&hes he was there He chmbed atop the
tank flOm the rear and threw a couple
of origmal Russian "Molotov cocktails':
at it. And at the very moment that the
glass bottles broke on the armor. the
whole tank was engulfed III bright flames.
One of the antitank men threw a bottle
of gasolme mto the fire_ It now got too
warm for the RUSSIans. The turret lId
opened, some so!'t of object like a short.
thick bal reI appeared, and With his rna
chme pistol spIttmg fire, a man e1amb
01 ed down I)ut of the turret. The man
was laId low with a pistol shot. The am
munitIOn m thf' tank began to explode
m the bIllowmg flames and soon developed
surh power that the entire turret was
blown off_
To the nght of here the antitank comM
pany and the bIcycle trQop, fightmg stub
bornly With bayonets and hand grenades
ag-amst the RUSSIan rIfle\l'OOPS who were
well concealed m the bl ush, had advanced
to the same pomt WIth untted strength
the attack was carried forward through
the woods on both SIdes of the hIghway
and thlOUgh the town of M ___ . '
Sevel al tanks of the sa,me 34-ton brand
as the wrecked tank (more cautious,
ever) fired from all pOSSIble places of
concealment at our assault troops_ The
antitank men of the 1st and 3d
pullpd and pushed theIr guns through
brush and woods and from house to house
a .. the tanks went on ahead of them. One
platoon of the 2nd Company was just
being brought forward when SIX tanks
wei'' discovered. 'While the bicycle troop
was advanCIng stubbornly against the
Russian mfantry, raging duels agam de
veloped between antitank troops and
In spite of the fact that as before
all the sheUs bounced off the armor of the
tanks With a loud ('rolsh and bright flash,
they succeeded not only In preventmg
the tanks from engagIng- In the mfantry
actIOn hut by gI vlng ant' another fire pro
tectIOn. the antItank troops wele able to
get up to WIthin a dangpr'Ous lange f01
the tanks - ('
Many a blCyde troopel, among them
OUI youngest lieutenant, fell severely
\\ounued in flont of a RUSSIan machme
gun nest and many an antItank man
dropped beSIde his gun. Our loudly roar
lUg medlUm antItank gun which had won
the sperlal hatred of the tanks, received
terrific fire from the 75-mm tank cannon.
One of the cannon wheels was torn to
pleces ...... lth a thunderous crash by one
The gunner was struck in the leg
by a flYing fragment, but with clenched
teeth, he remained at his gun_
The first group of prisoners were
brought back to. the battalion CPo The
examming admInistratIVe officer learned
that they were hoops who had just been
brought m flOm the VICInIty of Moscow.
Strongly supported by tanks. they were
supposeJ to prevent the Germans from
penetrating the lme of fortifications, Un
fortunately, they had arrived a few hours
too late for this. We notI('ed their fur
caps, the practical winter headgear of
the RUSSian soldier. We saw them here
for the first time
The ant1tank men of the 1st and 3d j
Compames succeeded in gettmg so close
to a tank and m pouring such a thunder
ous hail of shells onto it that it was too
much even for the nerves of the,Russians.
The tank tried to WIthdraw across a small
bridge. It got out of contrQl there {thf'
men wen' probably dazed from
the effects of the ('t'aselt,ss 1 am of shells
on the armor plate) , ripped off the bl1dge
rail and plunged tullet dO\l;nWUtU Into
the sticam. The second tank "as put out
1of' actIOn.
This sight well the contmumg
I'apid fire of the antitank gun probably
hastened the deCISIOn of the uther tanks
to bleak off the fight and to wlthdl'aw to
..\ ard the nOI,th.
But while the attack pl'OglE'SStd 111 a
llveTy mannci on the front, the til mg In
thp I ear of the battah,m kept
mort' mtNl"p Tbe OpCI ato! of a company
l'adlO statIon sought the commanclel whn
up ahead WUl> leadlllA thE' attack of thl'
combat gloup'" "Radlll 111C'':'>saJ[E' fl"{lnI bat
talion combat A l{u<,<\lan b lttahon
ts. caill/flg f10m th<: south Heillforcel)l('ntg
uigently lequebteu." The antltanli nla
toon of the 2nd company could be '"pal ed
up flont It wa"> qUld,ly wlthul',-fwn fl,)nl
the IIV;ht and <:ent tn thl' It'<ll. A HlotOI
cycle roaleu up Tbe Adjutant Jumped
oft' hun Inl t<l the COIlIIII<l.nUel. And
what he lcported not t'xactly Juyful
news! A uattHllOn WIth hpsvr
weapons was attackm).! flom til{'
\\'hat IPmamed of the RI(')oc1e TIOOP
the 2nd Antitank Company could not
, hold out much EVt'l one
the staff who wa,,; available' lH1I1 al1eully
bpen engaged by th(' cOJ1l1lHlnder of the
le('Onnm::"sance bnttallon '1'111' ca.... llaltlC'..,
were mountmg Onl' of the antitank g'un..,
had H'CeIVl'U fI till N't hIt Thl' <o'ltuatjon
had become thll'atenll1g' Thl}' ag-alll call1'li
fOl cool hcadednefifi awl
We had to get from Olll "1\"\0 flont"
war and get hac}... to .1 hat'(l-lllttmg
fl'ont, F'Oi thIS I'Nl<.,<J1l our north(,l11 ene
I11H'o;:. had to bt' put 0\' the 1un With ,1 hal d
attack Aftpi thl' <lttach had bl'I'!l
I epu}:"ed, \w had t<l h, ('[tk the backb<JIJ(.'
<Jf the n ft'.-.lfltnllcc of thl'
lnfantlv, The light tlcHch 1I10\'t[ll'''> ;m,l
thell bIg, fat hl'llth('!>i, spat thpil \\mg-pt\
out of tlwll b.J.1'lpl,." the l\g'lIt 1'1<1
chine g-un.., file'{ \1<lIL'Iltl)' III lapHI
btwst<> of the The heavy marhtn(l lOun..
cut III a clath'rmg of ::-tl'.ul).
nil.' ano no\', the ICPOlt ()f the
antitank l,tnnnn \\,1::' lH'ald fillll!! \\lth
e,\plo,.,l\,'e- ..,hell" The "V\)hbuig" m(,l)
lea{wd fOr\\UIU, and thl' men nf the
The t of the Illall ,\ ittl h,v', 5U... h
undl>l hiS cOllllnand lKat" mOIl'
\"\Ith prHle and J()Y. an<1 tlw:c:.l'
moment::. \\ III 11('\ l t bl' fOI J!llttcn allY
on(' \\ho pal tlClptcd In thc'-,I.' event:..
\\ hO('\'l'I' (It the ('nenlY did llut <;I'eh
III tlJp.:ht \\l'nt dO\\11 UlIlit! file or
tell,pn III'IS-fll!el !\IllH' than half a
hundh'd d('ad HU;.,",hm.., covel ell
the battle field an<l '-.I:-.ty \\('Il' blouc:ht III
as S The villacl..' of )1. _____ \\ a.;
taiH'n and the \\<)out> elf tlIt' ('n('
my Then thl.' mam of thl' hattalHlll
stopped and In the JI1Pun
while the enemy, \\ho WJ.S 1U letlcat, \vas
\\atchl,d only ..,c\\utJne tIOl1P';',
The nOI them front 110\\ about. and
\\Ith fnmt towal<l thl' south attacked thE'
RU.s.SJall uattahon \"\ Ith Its old energy 1t
\Va" a bat1allnJ1 whIch ha(l thp
encilclement at Vyaz1ll3 and \\as tl)-lI1:
tn figtht It<; back to :'.Io<O,co\\ ..1<; \\as
leallwd flom the f,tatl."nwnt of pll:'.onel'"
OUI attack \\a::-. no\\ ('<111Iell out (II fill It'>
details and mtenl'lty, The une,\:pected and
hard ('ountf'l'-attack \'VtJ..:: too })Iuch of a
",urpI'lse to the Rus",lano.; Our \vl'e('ked
antltnnk guns \\'e>1 e now doubly avenged
The battalion hau already been repul"ed
by our security at J ------. It wa'S now
thIO\"fl back ag81ll toward dus security,
A steady attadl: flom the front and now
fire III the I'l'ar III addItIon-tile RUSSians
could not stand t1.1" In a very short
tIme, as may be 1Il1<lg-med, the battallOn
\\ao.; ('(lmpif,tply dISl"Upte>d. The threaten
Ing dangel \\as l'emovNl.
".p \\10'1'(' able to report to the DlvislOn
a;:, the 1 of thl' day'<-, \"\olk "300
pl'lsoners. two heavy tanks. two antitank
g'uns desh oyed, many weapons of all
kmds as well as horses, motorcycles and
a "al' chest captured" On our side 5
brave comrades sealed their fidelity to
the Fuhrer and the Fatherland WIth their
death, ThIrty men were wounded.
The dIVIsion rewarded the brave cyclist
hoops and the valiant antitank men with
a 181ge number of d(.'('olatIOn">
German Defense in Encirclement
(An artlcle from the RUSSIan nl'wspapC'l' J{1"USnaya Zrezda 4
AprIl 1942 TJanslatelf at the Command and GenPl'al Staff School,
Fort Le>av('n\\ol'th, Kansas.)
Generally, \,,'ht'n encIrcled. Gcrman
kCl'P to normal methods of defense
ta('tlcs Howe\el', thE' abs(>n('e of !>trong
rl'serv('s, shortage of ammumtiOn, eve!"
PI thl eat of attndt froll] any pomt
In the l'll1g of enell'clement and finally,
depressed 11101ale of German personnel
have fOi c('u tIlt' German command to m
h oduce coo5iderablc mnovatIOn m the
orgamzatIOn of defense.
It IS known thaf under normal conul
tlons Gl'l'nHln<; exert their mam efforts
toward (Te>atlon of rleff'l1se centen, In
populated locailtll'S. HousE'S, ",">pcc1311y
those built of stone. are transformed mto
\\ell fortified firmg pomt":l. Basements
SCI ve as shc1tel s Barricades rise on the
All points of resistance and cen
tpl'S of deftnsC) alP Interlocke>u III a sys
tem of fh e and constantly maIntmn co
operative actIon I>urmg the tntt131 p>r
.otl of actIOn agaillst (>ncIl'cl(1(1 enemy
our has (,lIcOtlllt(,l'E'd till'"
lllE'thod of dpff'llse.
Cnder the> conrhtlOns of havlIlJ! ad
JOllllng flanks, when the activIty of thc
rear wa<., nnl'll1.lI. thiS llH?thod of dl'fcIIM'
\\a8 conSidered by the pncll1y to be th/.,
llHlRt favorable, but wlwn fael,t! \\ Ith
complptl' IsolatIOn It IS not entIrely satI&
', Om fou'l'''> havE' gleatcr oppor
tUllltll'S for outrtaJI1"ng' and cllcllc1ing
mdlvHlual of fl'''lstancp. th('y lo
cate \H'.1.1- spots III tile dpfpn";lvl'
\\ Ith gl E'atn t'a:".c and dellver mOl e tpllmg'
blo\\ GI eat IOSM'!:' .In' mfllctl'd by small
fnoups of Olll' IIIfantry which penetrate
dl'l.'p hehlnd til(> l'llemr rcar
Tn thiS I til(' mfOl"matlOn glvcn

h(' WI itt'<., about dll' I(>;..'>on.., of one Illg'ht
of SI)\lct InfantlY,
TUlle of attacl, 3'40
Stil'ngth of atturJIIllg fOICI'-:W to
..If) llWll
ClllthlIlg'-canlouflagp robE'''
EqUlpnwnt- nfle!;.. 3utomailC \"\pap
ons, hallJ grenadcl::'>. tll'd unndll's of
gn'naJes, incewhaQ bottles
ClicullIstanct''>' attach e:wcutel! SI
I1lUltallPOusl} on all Sides, Hand gre
nades thI'O\\ n 1I1to WIllI lows, of honsl's.
Barus s('t on fire, RUSSian auvance to
",'al ds vlllug'l' cOl1lplete>ly concealed
RUSSians cume SI} l1t'al' that mterval
bet\w'pn alarm slg-nal and tahmg up of
combat po.!>t" was not eVI'J'ywhel'e "uffi
clent to pl'o\,Hle rf'5lstance .
Drawtng bitter kSROllS fr01ll thes('
e\lcnts (thele Wf'll' very man:} of them).
the Gf'l'l1lans applied a nUl1Iber of lllpas
ures. They rCll1fo[ced po:".t'> of outsIde and
InSide secunty, For defl'nSI' agamst hand
gre>nad('s they placed special shlf>lds
(Shuttl'l'S). They hl'ld frequent alarm
dnI1s. Ho\\evcr, all thiS was too little
AVJatlO11 attad\s and artlllt'l'y-fire raIds
\\'(>I'e antied to deep sorties of our mfan
try Tlw C'lll'Illy was unable- to counter
them effectIvely. D(''Spltc cIrct11a1' defense
11 IS difficult to create a solId system of
artlliclY and mortar fire on all SIdes ThIS
was speedIly explOIted by OUI' artIllery
men. Slnllfully they located convement
approaches, rolled the guns out mto open
pOSItIOns and demolished fOl'tlfied enemy
positions wlth point blank fire
All this taken tngether (SOl'tIPS mto
the rear. at!' raids and deadly at,tillery
fire) have fol'cCU the German command
to change tactics. ThIS 1'3 what ".re read
In a captured document:
The fnmt hne of l'eststance 15 not to
be defendpJ uccol'umg to the principle
of POJllts of reslstanCE' based upon
populateJ lo('ahtJooes, but 1 atheI, tem
porary POSltlOllS are to be 'r'ccted, mak
mg l1<;e of all lllean,,> present, No firIng
an' to b{' mane In hou">es . ,
1\1ach111e gllns HI e to l'emjlm Silent.
Only If ,Henly Infant1"Y COU1(>S up too
closely llIas mach me guns b(>gm ac
tIOn Arttllcry IS to change pOSItIOns
fr\'quNltly , . ,
At the pl'esl'nt tlll1l' the Pilemy IS graJ
ll,dlr pa..... (l1g to l'l ectiol1 of po::.ltlOm, on
c!P\ atlons WI11('h h'l1d for de
fpll<;e. and \dll<,h UIfOld good eJl'culal'
field of 1ire and oLgpnatlOn. To placl's
WiWIP PO"ltlOnf> ate.' to IIp cl'('ctcd, e"pIo
sive agents arc brought up to speed the
\"\ 01 Ii of tiemoilshlllg bUlldmg&, From logs
of dClllolIshed peasant homws the- enemy

tlOllS are candully camouflaged and SUl'
rOUlHll'd by a great waH of snow, more
than two yards hIgh.
In mg'<l.l11111lg' Ilf'fl'n::;e on open tenaw,
(;prillan umt::; undel' condltIons of enCll'
clement pay even gH'atCI' 1.ttentlOn to Cll'
(,It),t} field of file, Thl:, 1'" cleUlly 1Hus
tl ateu by the fire plan of n c('nter of
l'l'slstan('(' (FIg, 1) captured by our for
ces. BeSides the baSIC fields of fire shown
on the UUlg'l'um. platoons have r('serve
trenches \\ hl('h p(,l'mit ('onuuct of fire in
any dIrectIOn. X (>Ighbol'mg centers of re
SI'3taoce on right and left (along the
front Imp) are situated at short intervals,
thus formmg Do solid defense line. All de
fenSIve constructIOns protect each other1s
flanks, whIle In front all kmds of ob
staelC's arE' bUilt and a zone up to 400
is completely cleared
In order to ehmmate the danger of
sudden attack, espectally at mght. the
make hap-hazard arrangements
for Illuminating Signals. In some cases
thpse consist of Iron cans with a very
t'ap IIlsIJe; III othel' calles thele arc
special petards (for frightening eifect)
and fixed hand grenades with attached
cord. As soon as the advancIng RUSSIan
touches the cord, the grenade explodes.
On some sectors of enemy defense special
mines were encountered WhICh upon ex
ploding produced a cluster of light simi
lar to a light rocket. When er('ctmg
obstacles in front of the front hne of
"esistance, the Germans are unable to
ere-ate solId mine fields. Mines are placed

'" ,
., 4)\ /
e \,
c .\
___ c __
If unable to get clasp to tl'e then
the Gel mans place a mme alr-ng Its line
of movement Thl!': onc<.> mere emphaSIzes
the Importance of mutual fil' asslstance
among our am} unmtcfTupted co
operatJOn of artillery and III antry With
tank<; Of great aiel III thIS regard are

to find the enemy lymg III nmbush and
dlSpOf:.e of hIm III tlllle. i
0---0....0 SJ9nal wIre
Mcc/une gun
=-t Anfltank gun I
o altnaagerc""rheadcLermg)
-Path '
FIGl'RE 1.
only where there are concealed ap
proaches or where concentratIOn for a
counterattacl{ IS pos51ble. A favorite Ger
man method is mIllIng' demolished hOUSl'S
and destroyed bridges.
It 1"\ y to give separate con
QIeleratlOn to the qUestIOns of antitank
defense. Havlllg experIenced the powel
of blows from our powerful tanks, the
Germans long ago recogmzed that their
artIllery alone IS unable to cope \\ Ith
Soviet armored forces In additIOn to
thIS, German artIllery \.. hen enCircled
needs ammullitlOn and b fOlc('d to filt'
only III the most e,tIenw This
why the Germans are begmnmg' to <;earch
other means of l'esl,>tanC'e agaInst
Tn one of the captured dorunlC'nt<; the
fplloWIng' is lead:
The appeal'3nce of RUSSIan tanh
"tlll IS f!"aught WIth the greatest dangel
for some companIes. Antltank weapons
amI artillery are by themselves In
suffiC'Ient for antItank actIOn The ('om"
pany should take Its own measures
SppcJaI antl-armOI ed 111 detach
ments which consist of five men and one
leader are form('d within Units. Thih
g,QUP has five hpeclUl glenades, com
pI essed chal'g-e<; each \....ejghing eleven
pounds, four antitank nnnes, tht"ee sm?ke
candles and three bottles eaeh contamlllg
U'1 In(,pndwry ugpnt.
ThE-H tactical n1C'thoris are rlehlgnerl
maInly on sudde-nnes'3 of actIOn. As soon
ab uur tanks penetrate beyond the front
I ne of resistance. the Gelman gloup at
t.:::mpt::. to take posse"'sion of the dead
alea and tosses a grenade on the turret
or the motor compartment of the tank.
1 I
-S I
Lack of a Sl1ffi('lcnt Iisene b the great
(><.,t clffilctlOll of enCll'clt'd fOJ ce'>
AhllO::.t all thplr uVHlld'ble fotcps, lI1clurl
hat. In place of an opPl'atlvl' 1 P"('I ve the
GClman':' tl y to USr2 any at all fnl

thl' Gel mans attempt to counte!'"
attack WIth ttJ(> fOlce.., of &l1ch a SUPPOIt.

(liately brought back to the h'al' If un
"l1cccssful, umts thus plessed lIltO ('Oni'
bat the dcfen:>e and C<lVel the
l'E'tl(>at of the <,urvivmg to the
l1e,t pO'>ltlOns It 18 understood, of course,
that \\he>n OUI 1"> well OIg-anlzetl.
\\0 hell 11". powel IS not and on
the conhalY, ",hen It glOW" to ':neater
"tll'ngth ftll the moment of d('cIsIVP
blpw, th<.>n a" a rule, not only the countel
[Ittach.lIlg' German groups uef-,tro:\-ed
1ut al"o those German fOl"('ts hurt:',lng
to :2k<.> up the next defenSive poslt10n 81 ('
the GermanJ tI'V to com.
pen'>utf' of rc'O,el'ves by h ansfpl
ling small units flom othel kl'CtOiS The
dlrr:>ctlOn of such tlansftns lmay differ
TI;e 1110<;t .characterlstH val al"e il
lustrated III FIg 2 It lsI) <;e"ln here that
the Gt>I'l1WI1<; spnd fm CP<; flO1)1 the nel!!h

IS ft.l to enrll'cied
fOlces by all, they are at first !'-ent
to the paSSIve sectors, units
\VhlCh have been under fite and these
latter proceed mto the sertor where com
bat I::' active. The German command has
been compelled to do this because the
"spnng reserve"_ (BI-satz battalions)
thus brought up conSI::.t of men with phy
Sical thsablhtles and who are poorly
trained. To faCIlItate thIS maneuver the
I eserves clear old roads and make new
ones leading from the center to the out
Flam all this It 1<; not difficult to draw
the conclUSIOn that it IS necessary to de
lIve!' simultaneous blows on the enemy
flom <;everaJ directIOns. Only thus is the
enemy deprjved of the opportumty to
maneuver hiS pprsonnei and equipment
at the e'\pense of othel df-fensive POSI
tIOns The lack of operative reserves
make.., the SItuation of Gelman forces
'Still worse,
Along with thIS, anotner thing is im
pOi tant-the protectIOn of the flank and
n'ar of our advanclllg forces. During one
of the operatIOns the follOWIng situatIOn
arose OUI umts, haVIng-broken stubborn
enemy reslstancc, scattered the German
g'IOUp. They followed thIS by turnmg
theII flont to lIght and left and began to
Widen the breach thus formed (Fig. 2).
The enemy at fil 8t mobile de
fen::.e and somewhat later, having as
sembled forces witnrn hlS prlllcipal group
(not pnclrcled), undertook a counterat
tack III 01 del to bl eaI{ a gap in the direc
tIOn of the encircled Germans to join
them and thus cut off our forces which
had broken thlllU!2'h In the advancE'_
Thank::. to the deep echelon formation of
our adval1eIng fOl'C(!S. careful reconnalS
."ante of flanks and thorough security
prOVIded fOi them, the enemy counter
blow was I <.>pellpd and heavy losses were
InflIcted on the Germans,
The tendency to Jojn the encll'cled Ulllts
compels the enemy to mto combat
all hiS fOI'ces without 1egard for losses.
Thf' ('''penenee of battle emphasizes the
fact that under such condItIOns deCISIOn
and "pp('d are the g'reatest gual antet' of
5ucces::. In solVing two problems simul
tan('ously-th(' dN,tl uC!Jon of enCIrcled
Line ofGerh>on defense
. R"'S:S1on forces I
/nJe>rlor reg"-ouptnS of6e"''''''onfol"C'e':S
:<;=::::nE17emy re,nfo"-<ernenf:; ,
:..- _ OJrpcltan 01enemy
FIGl'RE 2.
g-arnsons ami the further Widening of
the bl"eal{through It IS necessary to de
tOI mine the more Important one, and the
maIn effOlts should be ('orrespondingly
concentratpd. Evidelltly the
pi oblem will be destructIOn of encircled
enemy UnIts. and thus havmg a free hand,
all our forces must be thrown into an
offenSIve agamst the mam enemy force.
The dE'SCl'iption of the construction at
thIS pneumatIc raft carriel' is very short.
from German at the Command and Staff One needs:
A Practical Method for Transporting Pneumatic Rafts
School, Fort Ll'uvE'nwol'th, Kansas, fro111 an article In D1(! PunzeJ
(a) 2 extra motorcycle wheels
(which are to be found in any
motorIzed umt),
'Vhenever a river to be crossed, It IS
of highest ImpOI"tance that pneumatIc
rafts be floated III the water speedily_
Usually they are mflated shortly before
It is tIme to USE' thl'm and then earned
to the rIver by 6 to 8 men in double qUICk
OrnE'. Aside from the phYSical eXertIOn
required by thiS method, It ha:=. thE' dls-
. advantage of exposmg the 6 to -S lhE'n as
a massed and vulnerable target
The method descnbpd here may bt'
eaSIly employed by any umt and has the
followmg- advantages
1. The pneumatic raft may be mov('u
long dIstanCE's by one man and With al-
most no elfolt (see figule 1: The luft IF.
fastened With 'llts c('ntf'1 of gravity ovel
the board).
2. The raft, Inflated, and ready fOl u"'e,
may bp to\\E'd by a motor vehIcle, fOi
m<.tul1ce, a :Hde-cal motOicycle, and
tl anspOi ted any de:'lled distance \\"Ithout
taking' any mOIl1 on .:l tmck fig-ull'
2: The I thll d of the I aft ll,,,t ... on tlw
bom d)
3 Tran">ported In an II1fiated conditIOn,
the tllne for unpacking and mfiatmg' at
the destmatlOn IS saved (of importance,
for instance, in cases of surprIse
ings and in scoutmg operations).
4. Because rafts may be tl'anspol ted
in thiS mannel by means of motorcycles,
motorIzed tl'anspol'tatlOn IS possIble on
the far SIde of the stte'am across WhICh.
on account of the lack of heavy ferrymg
eqUlpnwnt, It IS lI11posslble at the
FlGlJRE <1
tn mo"f' anything but motorcycle,::, ((',"'p('c
Ially 111lpultant whpn 5f'vel"al watel'
couI<.,es have to be I..'los'>eti 111 qUick suc
(b) 1 huck seat-board or a beech
board of the same dimensions (7
feet long', 12 mches broad, 1
mches thick)
A motorcycle axle 1<:; fastener} at each
end of the board and by means of hinged
(as may hE' In figUlE'S ',:
and 4) arranved so that it may bc foIde!1
back anti thp board uSNl ag a tl uck seat
Loops are wE'hled to the hmge
llh.nt to which the a-.;les are attached an,j
t) which, In tl1ln, the rafts may lip t1('d
With the 1<)Pf'l'> of thC' I aft It<;plf
Thus. no specml l'quipment has to be
callied and the weight of thp (,,,tIa pall"
(the fiat, hmgt'd 1.11 rangenwnt 'vltl'- .It
tachNi 19 slight.
TIm, type of appalatu" \\a5
fully elllploYl'd III the campaign m tIl{>
th(>at(>1' of OpCI atlOm, by the
!\-lul1lch Battalion, whosc he,ul
mechaniC fh put thl" Idea mto praetIcP
Artillery of a German Tanl, Division
[From the RUSSian ne\'\>Spaper J(losnayo Z?'t'Zrill. Translated
III the War Depm tInent, \Vashlllgton, D.C,1
Till' follOlcing 01 t?cil' 18 wtt'/'('st
l)I!l HI that It dl'sf'1 d)f'S th(' ('OIl/1mSl
tuw of lIIa,ch C(lllllll11S Ollft nttne/,
fOllllntwlIf> 111 nddttiolt to dlSCIISS1/1g
tnctl('a/ ClIIjilOY}'U'l1i. Also, nil /1/,
.]JOItnnt fact bl'lmyht oot 1S t/tnt /'t'
gUII11(,88 pf thr s?I(,('(ss of /Ill!
tl1Hk8 III n 7)rcak-tl1J'P)fyh, tlil' 111
!Ullt/V mOl/lOg ill "illppn/t or th"
fnl,l,c ""'f't b. "'tHllperl. ns }I/('_
I'Nlts flit' (t,tIl1(,1!J fl <lIlt m<ll'r"fi "II
II/,d dqJ1/1'f's the tanl,s Ilt th(lI (Ii,('('t
811}1}I()/ t Th. tll)/1.-8 ell)l tll(lI be drnlt
untl, mllrJ, II/Ill'( (osily, - THE
The organic artIllery \'.nth a GNl11an
tanh dlvl<;lOn, as uspd agalll:::t the SOVll'h
on the SOvll't-t;el man hont, normally
COIISlsts of two 105-mm battallOm, an;1
one ho\\-'ltzer battalIon, but
usually H'mfol"ced by one or two hat
of lights.
On tht> malch. the of thc artl11('1'\
regiments, Lattahons and ph.;,,>
a 111Il1IIllUl11 of their respectIVe "-tuffs ftnd
control unit:::., !lIlllch at th,' head of tht'
column The mtllIery
party ma!ches With thf' tanh leconnms
sance Ulllt. Battery reconnaissance parM
ti('<; ('onsist of 1\vo a! ll1o!"eJ cars and two
motorcycll>s In cast' one of the can; 1&
the otl1(>r can Cal l'y on thl' "Ital
1 e('onnaJssancf' \\IOI'l-..
Artillery oblwrvto'rs ride in armored
cars, pI'S and 254 lwmg thl' most
usual. \vhlch 3]'(' armed With macll1nl'
guns. In each car tl1l'll' I" an observl'l'. thl'
obSpl'Vel'S aSSistant, a radio operator and
a drlvpl' Thpl'f' are two such observatIon
vehIcles pf'l uattelY. TIlf' battery com
mander rules III onf', and another officer,
who firE'S Illdependent nW;;SlOns, In the
othe!"_ Battalion has three such observers'
are assigned to \"01'1\ With the
artllI'l'Y of the (hVISIOn and are subject
to call by the CO of the artillery who as
signs through battalion one plane pel"
battery, depending upon the amount of
planes avaIlable. In the attack, nO!
nne> Jig-ht al'tl1lelY battalion supports 0\11'
tank l"egll\wnt m Ihrect ,>upport and the
mellIum battalion IS 111 genelal support.
But 10 the majorIty of ca<;('s (>xp{'l'l>IH'eli,
the artllll'ry of thE' tank ha&
b('l'n remforced so that two lIght bat,
talions can be asslgnpd to a lpgi1l1('nt 11I
till' first ('chelan. which a11O'\\s one light
battalion PCI' b.lttallOn, Ollt' battn y
of caeh battalion f:upports till' rIght l'h'
l1I('nt of a tunl. Latt.:llion, allntlwl' till' h'ft
dellle'lIt, wIllIe the thll d I\'; e{'helolll'l\ to
the l'par al1(1 1<; With tinnl, Sl'
{'til'tty alHl l'l'al'.
post:=-. cOll1mand po\';tf' and
iJattl'ry pO\';ltlOns atl..' all movl'll a<; far foi'
warn a"l pO"l&lhll' Battl'l'll''- firc frn111
lonlP<i1t:u pn'>lttnns, liOW(,V(,l, as a
Precpdlng an nttac!" PI eparatIOn fill'
I\,> Clllliluctl'd from fiftpI'n n1ll1utf'S to a1\
h01l1' on encmy altll1l'lY and tank as
al ('as. and Ob"l'1 vatlOn POlllt& ,lll'
"IllOkell. Enemy flont-llllP mf.n.tJ
g'l'n('l'ully dlsl'l'gal\ll,d dUl'mj! tIl' pl"P
pmatlOn as tlwl1' llt'utralizatlOn I"" ldt tn
the Du'-'ct support battalions do
not always partlclpatl' III the prl'jlaratloll
fire but al(;' put III order \\lth full
supphes of ammUnitIOn, l'l'ady to .lump off
With tIll' talll,s.
The hattahon commander\'; ami hattel.Y
commanders of direct support units
_mam at thell' ob::-ervatlOn posts III an at
tack until the head tanl, passes thell" lme',
at which time they take up their positions
III tiw attad, Battalions not a<:'M
signed to d1l'ect support, how('vel', push
then ob<:.eI vatlOn ahead WIth the attack
109 echl'lons_ The Gprman genel al sup
Pol't artIllery does not change pOSItIon
in an attach which is deslgneJ to go no
further than the enemy artillery P0>;I_
In an attac1, Whll'h JS mtentled to
J pnet!nte beyond et)C!l1Y pO"'I
+'''nf', however. thev do move forwaul
when practicable. If. however, the Ger
man mfantry lags and IS finallv held up
but the tanks break through and contmue
forward, the general support artillery
does not move forward. During the Ger
man break-through at the of October
1941 from the CIty of Orel in the direc
tion of Mtsensk, German tank units suc
ceeded in hreakmg through the SOvIet
infantry lines. but the German infantry
Establishment of a Bridgehead i
lIo'rom the article in Aftlital-n-oehellblatL,xoJ 37,
1940. Tlanslated In the War Department, Washington. V- ,]
Till'> a1 tlrle was only I cccntly re
! thel at the COlnmand and Gene1 al
Stat! School Library, ho1t'eve}', old
as the Hlc/dent is, tlus a. tlCie as one
of the few whteh gwes the taciles
of the Ge1"manS in pUTsuit. F01' t1l1'S
I ea301l lt was thought 1f'ell to mcIudf'
On the evemng of 8 September 1939
Rze5zow ..... as taken by the troops of a
light dtVl'slOn. The enemy fled farther to
the east.
On the mot'mng of 9 September the dI
vision deCIded to create two purSUIt de
tachments. One detachrnent received the
nllSSlOn to advance on Radymno from
Rzeszow via Tyczyn. Blazowa, J awornik
PolskI. the crossroads ::,outh of Kanczuga,
PI uchmk Miasto and Roluetnica to take
the town of Radymno and to establish
a brIdgehead on the San. ExeeutlOn of
the mISSIOn was started In the way which
had been tested and found best in the
preVIOUS days IndiVIdual obJectIve;,
were set by the detarhment commander.
the reaching of each one being immedi
ately reported to the dIVI&lOn.
About noon a pal:!>sage was made
through Rzeszow, and after crossIng the
Wlslok bridge whIch had been put III
conriItlOn for the O('CRSlOn, a Hun was
made southward toward Tyczyn. Taught
by the hard experIence of past
pllllcipal attentIOn was gIven to road
mllles. Some had already been recogmzed
,',l101't1y before Rzeszow; a tJmely halt
sa\'ed us from casualties QUIck calling
up of a pwneer platoon promptly made
a ;,tr:p of mmes lymg dIagonally
the road hal mless by blastIng The de\
lay, however, harl robbed us of two mOle
of meet-
rUI ther mIne field8, the advance flOW
ploceetled at a ltvely pace. At Pruchmk
:'I11asto we had already overtaken the
last portIOns of the retreating Poles and
blasted and drove them mto flight
by he-avy fil (' from Now
an harrYing by the enemy
hcgan \

abandon a 6-team gun WIth mumtlon
curts havmg the same number of team:;.,

(Jut of DIugl an enemy ('avalry squad
ron :;uC'ceedea In escapmg wtth great
tll1'f!CU1ty and, m the :fire of guns
whIch we qUIckly unhmbered and fired
pOint-blank, :fled into the woodl> Their
fire. Which was, deli:rered from rifles. w:as
returned; and III spIte of already heaVIly
thleatened flanks, pursuit was contInued
along the road.
Captured Poles stated uniformly that
in the woods south of our route of ad
vance, ,troops in effectives of at
a battalion were located, With ar
tillery and supply trains, on theIr with-
supporting the tanks was {'ut off and
forced to dlg m. The artillery

artillery, were compelled, h-fter
ing heavy losses, to return their
inal positions. I
drawal to Radymno or and

How surprlsmg to the P6les and how
Ulllelfl.Xed was our purbu,ti IS shown In
south of the road two ciVilian automo
bll(>s \"hlch advanced wlth1ut SusplClOn
up to the begInnIng of IOU! column.
to Radymno resistance.
When the first mto the com
mumty, however, a hvely machine-gun
and rifle fire began coming from houses
and fences In all the streets. Never
theless, one squadron pushed forward to
the prinerpal square of Radymno. There
a lieutenant WIth his platoon ImmedIately
turned to the road leadmg off toward
Jarm,law, WhICh was full of fleemg Polish
baggage tIains fil'lng to the rear. The
i'est of the ;,quadl'on was immediately as
::-embled by the squadron leader for fur
ther penetIatlOn through the clty. By
continUOUS fire from lIght machinE' guns
It was posslble to brmg the Poles mto
des pel ate confusion, SoldIers hidden m
great numbers in all the houses and ve
il1l'ies standing In the streets soon began
to tlee towurd the San III wlld filght. The
a thou&and stl'ong. We had bl'ol,en
mto the (lity so suddenly and unexpected
ly like a WIld raId that the Poles, as theIr
astollished faces showell, could scarcely
compleheud It.
Polrsh officers &lttlllg In automobIle
dIscovered too late that thelcloUd of d:ust

Greatly astOI1lshed and niortlfied. theJ
had out on road l'econnal!:;san('(l
ahean of the Polish troops\retleatmg at
the sldt- of us. A furthel ,e'lample was
that horses of'captured ca\1alry men had
seal ('ely any breath anu dead
from exhaustIOn. !
Rapidly growmg darknesr> and the fact

45 miles) mduced the detJachment (am
mander to organIze a mgpt bivouac at

scattered through endless p!iel'(,s of wood
land on our flanks, the nigHt passed
at the sale of the l'oau III an ope!1 field
In the fOlnJ of a rolled !1 he,';gehog
Dead tired anrl covererl wi h dU6t. With
011t food-the field kltchI' n wel"e not
able to keep pace With th pur stilt-we
went to For the det chment com
mander the decision was fixed
to take up pursuit agam a early as pos-
SIble the next morning tow rd RadYl1mo,
hardly- 10 kIlometers tab) ut 6 mIles)
away. 1
At 5 AM on 10 Septcm er we started
again and reached the we tern
I \.
On leal hing the eabtern e.... lt from R.a,
d:\ollUlO, a tlcmendoUfi detonatIOn was
denly heal'll, undoubtedly from a blasting
ThIS only ul"ove us on >mol'e, ann paymg
no more attention to the Pole,;; firIng at
flOIl1 gardens and alleys, it was our
PUll)ose to reach the on the
San. With ('on"tant fire on the Poles
wading through the San on both sides, we
reached the bridge, unfortunately al
ready blasted, Undel' the collapsed por"
tlOn;, thele stili Wel'e dead and ::.enously
\VounJeu Pole;, and h01<,e&. as \\en as au
tomohiles that had gone down In the
lapse of the bndge.
The squadron leadel ordereJ the light
Illachmc-gun squad which was available
.fo1' u.,e to ('I'OS" the San in "'"man fishing
bouts that were fast-2ned at the bank ancI
to set up a brIdgehead For lack of oars,
slabs of .;tone were u::.eJ 1"01' the ma
chille-gun platoon drawn up on the- bank
of the San m frunt of the blasted bridge.
there appeared many favorab1e targets
In the Poles fief'ing tluough the meadows.
The detachment commander, who im
medIately after reachIng the bridge had
come up to the latter, shouted while mov
ing alieal}, "m the raIlroad statlOn IS a
tran:::pOlt 11 am about to pull out. Cavalry
gun-platoon and al mOl'ed squad-car to the
statIOn Immediately." They, ahead of
the detachment commander, immediately
l'oared away; and behmd them, th(' squad
ron leader with the quickly assembled 3rd
p1atoon. The three armored squad-r-an.
and the cavalry gun-nlatoon made use of
a road running parallel to the l'ailroad
traehs and fired with extnlOrdmary effect
at the locomotive already under way
This locomotIve was soon punctured like
a sieve, envelopf'd In a ('loud (.f
and forced to ",top From the fl'f'ight
cars, however. machme-gun fire was
opened. In flont of the now attacking
rifle platoon there stretched t11p tram
crew. and soon their weapons were Imd
down. The raIlrDad statlOn \Va,,> Dccupi'f'd
ann the fl eight tram cleal'ed and db
armed There were about 500 rf'serve<;
uboard under 01 dei's to appf'ar at PI'ZC
mysl on 10 Sr.>pteHlbel SolJlel's had bf'en
provided as the accompanymg crew,
While thn, wa" takmg place at the raH
rDad station. the platoon contmumg
through the cIty m the dll'ectlon of Jaros
law was heaVIly attacked by a Polu,h
('ounteI'lhl'I'bt. The comman
Jel' Immediately blought In anothel pia
toon QUlChly the of thE' attacked
battE'IIeS opened firC', aud 10 then fire and
that of the two l'1fle platoons the "oullter
thl ust was "'oon ('l'u::.hell Not "oatIsned
With thl'-, hmvpvcl', Loth platoon:. went
off after the enemy In the dH"eetIOn of
,Jal05law, and III thell 11llpetuoub PUisUlt
could only be Intercepted by the ordel of
the cOlllmandel' at O<>tl ow.
Since conntt"lth,u'2>tf-. flom all dlrec
tlons \\('Ie to be at Rauymno,
the uetach!llent ('ommandel uH'('cted a
watch 011 ail b1l.le:;,; by the ('ntIle detmh
l',(>;.t now
The c01ll111anthng general. \\ho al'l'lvpd
at the bl'llig'f'head at 10 A]\I, tOD\, thl'
hand of the de>tachml'nt commandt'l' and
said, "Forcmg of the crosbmg of the San
dnJ ('I cation of the bndgehead at Ra
dymno are of as much value as the faB
of Warsaw"
In the meantIme another transport
tram, also With soldIers and reserves,
had started toward Radynmo. It exper
leneed the same fate as the first one. Two
othet ratlroad tlains coming later were
captured by our supply umts and othf'r
porttons of troops.
On the othel' side of the San at about
noon the enemy ttlf'd another counter
thrust, apparently for recapturing the
hl'ldg;e. The attack wa'> noted In time and
thlown hack by the light machinegun
"quad that had been sent across. In front
of umts that hat.! been landed III the
meantIme and Wf're broadenmg the
b!'lngr.>head, a ('avalry rifle regiment
dlovt.' the enemy 10 the ulI'ectlon of
The :;.helhng of the city and meadows
along the San, where many Poles w('re
stIli in hillIng, contmued throughout the
Jay. and the number of prisoners as
III thp prInelpal square rose to
2.000 '" Ith uncounted I05Sf'S m machme
guns, rifle,> nnd fully loaded supply auto
A countc) attacl{ constantly expected
flom Pr2emysl, only 15 kilometers
10 miles) away and stili In enemy hands.
did not develop. 1n the course of the
aftel noon the detachment moved out of
Radymno and waf> bent to Sosmca for
&PCulltJ-' agamst Przemsyl. Thele 1t was
gI anted a nay of rest.
The CDI p:;, ordel of the day on 11 Sep
temher l:>tated. "I e'\press to the mlxeJ
detachnwnt which In detel'lllmed per"'lst
ente wa:;, the 1iI st to I'each the San on
10 Sept emLer, my full appleCIatlon "
The le'-l1lel of the army on 2 October
abo expre.:>sed to the detachment com
mander and to the leader of the squarlfon
thanks and appreciatIOn
Destruction of Enemy Front Line by Aviation
[An artH.'le 111 j{utSlInyn Zt'rzlia 16 )lay 1942. Translated from
RUSSian at thr.' Command and General Staff School, Fort Leaven
worth, Kansas.]
In a certain sector of the front OUl'
aVlatlOn was the taf>k of de
stroying el1emy defent-Iv\" works situated
on a hill. Accordmg to thp plan of uc

place in a steppe (prullle) tell'am, de
void of any onentmg pOint"! The enemy
was protectmg' thiS l'eglOn 111 daytime
WIth fi)4htf'r ulIl'I'aft of the ";\.fe,,
">Chl111tt-l09 and Helllkel113 types The
pnemy abo had a gl'eat number of anti
all CI aft al ti11el y and lIIachine guns of
all tailbers. In order to ('xccutp the bat
tie IllI"SIOn It was necessary. first to e"
tabhfo>h tal gets COl I 'ctly, OIganlZe tal get
mdlciltton on the t(:'rl am and to
h!'\h proeeduiP fOl the rf'cogmtlOn of OUI
own flont lIne pOSitIOns, especiallY at
I1lght; second, to orgamze prot('ctlOn fo!'
our own all' fOI'ees agaInst enemy fightel'
rl'aft and to sllenrp hl<; antialrrraf't fil'e
Thf'rp \\las no opportunity to make
ael'lal of the entHE'
III WhICh actlOn was planned due to lack
of tmlE' and hecause mclement weathcr
pl'eveilted OUl aircraft f1'0111 1'15111g to
altitudes necf'ssal'Y for aerial photog
l'aphy Therefole. thE' locatIOns of en
emy dugoutf>, trenches. mortar and gun
poo;;ltlon5 welt' indicated on maps accord
ing to data obtained from available tn
dlvidual photographs and artillery bear
mgs. As tIme proglessed. targets were
from ne\\ly made aellal
phvtogl aphs and ohservatIOns of plmle
The first Ime of the Gelman fortlfiefl
Lont' (''\ tended about 1 2 miles along the
front. It from 500 yards to about
onf' Ol1l\.' III depth The fl'ont Illle of l'e
slstaHce was about 250 to :350 from
OUl front Ime pOSItIOns Tn order to de
stlOY f'npmy fortIficatIOns m proper ,:,ue
u"t-.o,lon we agreed to diVIde the entire
f"neill.Y pOSItIOn mto tillee sector:;.. cen
tl <11. nOi thel nand southel'n. Bombal'd
Ill{'nt accompit:;,hed from altitudes of
2./l00 to 4,000 feet. Talj?;ets were well
fl'om all craft and therefore OUI
bombtng wag ac('urate, The methorl of
bOllll)Jng was b}' aerIal salvo m the day
tune and mdlvulually at mght when
fime:. wel(, employed Bomb cahber
\ <trIed
The fielJ of actIOn - ab ali eatfy pomted
out-was protected by enemy fighter
aV13twn and :;,t1 Dng antiancraft ele
nwnts Thelefort", each of OUI' groups of
bombel s was pre(,pded at a short mter
val by attack aircraft which was to SI'
lence enemy antiaircraft fil'e and engage
mdlv1dual machme-gun and 1110rtar nests.
Bombers engaged In the destructIOn of
enemy dugouts were protected by two
groups of fighter aircraft, One group,
was the g10Up of dIrect protectlOn,
ploceeded with the bombers at all times
and dld not enter combat immedjately
The second group, which may be caned
the repelling group, engaged enemy
fighters in aerial combat. preventing
them from reaching our bombers.
The enemy offered fierce resistance to
OUl' aviation. It IS natural that every
bombll1g raid was accompanied by aerial
battles However, these battles developed
only when our bombers were turning
hack after having unloaded their bombs.
The reasons for this were as fol1ows:
The tnne of our air raids was never
known to the enemy. The Germans were
l'onstantly patrollIng the air. But the
patrollmg twosome or foursome of Mes
serschmltts did not risk attacking our
compact formatlOns. In attemptmg to
stop the bombing, the Germans would
send up an additional ten or twelve
fighters but these usually al'l'ived too
late and attacked OUt' group as It was
turnmg away from the target 01' from
the 1'ear. In order to counteract this
enemy action our attack and fighter
planes rallied the nearest enemy air
drome. This raid was one of the meas
mes assurmg successful execution of the
mam miSSion
Special attention was given to methods
of recogmzmg our own forces. Inasmuch
as target& were but 250 to 350 yards
away from our positions the strictest
pl-eCISlOn was needed. ThiS was organ
IZl:'d by all' liaison officers assigned to
g'l'ound UllitS. In the daytlme our front
hne pOSItions were llldieated by cloth
panels In eolol's agreed upon and by
colored flares which were fired in the di
rectiOIl of the enemy. At mg-ht lt wah
nece:::.sary to employ more comphcated
mf'asures which fully assured safety of
our forces and guaranteed the precise
IoeatlOn of targets by OUI' bombers, All
thiS enabled our aircraft of all types.
mcludmg the heavy onE'S, to act against
the enemy at mght at a distance of but
350 yards from om posltlOns. These
,>ame measures served. quite naturally.
f:n tal get mdl('atlOn, as. they gave our
all cl'aft the limits of the sector and
OrIented the crews a .. to locutIOn of tar
gets In some mstan('es we used urtll
lery Thus our artillery was fil'mg at
mght on dugouts the bearings of which
Well' aceuratt'ly determined. ThiS helpeu
OUl all"craft in unloading their bombs
WIth aim.
Ot' couno,, the enemy tried to counter
act our night raids. They fired on our
antiaircraft :;.earchhght. However, dul"
mg the entire action the Germans fired
btlt th11 ty rounds at our searchlight,
and their fire was confused, the nearest
hIt bemg some 300 yards from the
searchlight ThIS can be explained by the

German artIllf'ry pOJ;ltlOns The Gel"
mans feared to dlsclo.f:,e their artillery
dlspobitlOns and were silent.
It should be noted that our aVIatIOn
th&('hal'ged the miSSIOn assigned to it
rather well. This was attained, thanks
to a correct dIstribution of previously
reconnOitt'l'eu targets and the exact
lecog-nltlOn of our forees both in the day
tmle and at ntght. and due also to th1
fact that air formations were well con
ceived so that fleXIble cooperatIOn was
realized between bombers, attack and
fightel aircraft, By means of aerial
photography and ground reconnaissance
It was estabhshed that our bombers de
elght dugouts. destroyed and
silenced German arttIlery in firing paM
sitlOns as well as overlapping full-profile
enen'ly trenches. During the entire ac
tion our aviation suffered no losses from
antiaircraft tire. Five enemy tighten.
were destroyed in air battles while OUT
losses consisted of one bomber and two
It would not be beside the point to
outline certain shortcomings discovered
during our aerial action. Thus. for in
stance, our attack planes did not always
1"E::'tire from actIOn in an tlrgamzed man
ner. Some flights of threE>. planes. and at
tImes individual ships. delayed and later
returned independently without protee
tlon. On the return flight the fOi matIOn
of attack planes stretched out. which
marie It difficult for fighters to glve them
protection In addition to this, our at
tack planes were too fascmated by ac
tion against enemy machme-gun em-
placements and infantry 1 in theIr
trenches. Their miSSIOn, ever. was
to silence the antiaircraft. achine-gun
and artillery fire_ Not until a ter the de
parture of bombers was it Imeant for
them to attack other targets
At tunes our bombers als made an
error_ When leaving targets, t elr groups
stretched out due to the fa t that the
leadtng shlps eouId not wit stand the
neces:.ary speed. Without f 'I thIS VIO
lated the sureness of protecti n and com
phcated matter$ for our fight rs_
to conslderatIon in further
aerlal actIOn against the enemy front l111e
of resIstance_ t
Tank Alert j
[An article in The Journal of the Royal Artlllery October 1942.
-- I
In spite of the marked improvement
in the general standard of
shootmg by 25-pounders-due to the tn
spirations of those m authority and the
persplration of those who are not-It IS
an undoubted fact that the average
standard at home is still not as hIgh as
It could be. In serVIce 25-pounder bat
tel'les there are genel ally two reasons
for It: possibly medIOcre lllstruction and.
more usuany. the allotment of unduly
large pel'lOds of the traming program
to other necessary matters so that the
tIme aVaIlable for antitank t1'ainmg be
comes either beautIfully less, or
suffers from lack of continuity. For
once the weather cannot be blamed, as
this type of shootmg IS both an outdoor
alid an muoor sport.
There IS no lack of guidance in these
matters. But in tank shootmg there IS
a greater need for cold common sense
than In any other form of field artillery
trammg, and m the wrIter's OpInIOn
there has been rather too much theory.
not all of "hich has been sound. GIven
the time and the contInuity, any half
dozen good Be's will arrive at a reason
able standard of hIts if left to then' own
deVIces. It IS. however. a bugbear of
traimng that there nevel' tS the tIme,
and Be's are rarely left alone for long,
ao;; they are necessarIly part of the di
VIsional machme WIth other urgent calls
on their time. Faced WIth this m hIS
own Untt, dIssatIsfied With the standard
of hits obtamed, and detel'mined to get
Bomething Letter, the wrIter devoted a
good deal of hIS leisure to the mattel
and hopes that the methods used may
be of some assistance to his brother of
ficers faced wlth a slmllar set of circum
The percentage of obtamed at
practIce by the l'egiment has been 23.
The known time avaIla.ble was three
weeks. two of them interrupted by ShOlt
exerCIses but available m part; the third,
a blank one, was dubbed"Anitank Week"
m the hope that by going flat out then,
evt:'ryone would get maximum value
through doing nothing else. and 50 work
up to a climax. All hands were to take
part without exceptIOn; as a result the
rooks and batmen promptly copied those
grand men of Tobruk and formed their
own Bush Artillery; by their enthusiasm,
they inspired the others to take the
greatest interest in what was hoped
would show tanglble results on the bat
tlefield, and a financial profit at practlee
('amp. Human nature being what it is,
the latter thought was probably upper-
most- There Was no tIme flr detailed
lnstructlOn; so the "course" htd to be of
an mtenslve type; and though
first class shf)utmg wa::. the mam Item,
good all l'ound knowledge was also
That hard ridden hunte-I! r'Apprecia
tion" went.over the course fi t; and the
obstacles were soon Jotted d wn as
i Hlttmg tanks.
11 Only hlttmg enemy ta ks_
lit Where to hit enemy tanks.
Tanks versus gun
11 BattlE' dt ill compE'tItlo s-
In oruer to get results 0 the same
lInes. all the kE'Y lectures for (lffirers and
No. 1's were given reglme.ptally; dJ
rectIve:; were bsued to keep training
programs together, and posters
and so on were made goo common
pi opel ty. The QM "found" a lost USE'ful
stock of SAA. mc1udlllg smine tracer;
anLl a range laster was madlp allottmg
8AA Ianges In the sand pit. the Vaud
rey, and best of all the ponU. to each
troop III turn. Without further ado we
copleJ Sam and "let battle dommence."
malong 51Y" of hits the standard.
Htttmg tanks.-lt was soon.found that
PIovlIled the unll was kept on orthodox
hnes. certain aids to tanks shqotmg were

mto the dlscard wIthout l-egret. "Point
of .11111, COn"lIstency, quick change of tar
get" were well hammered home. and the
cal'dhoarJ tanks soon Sho,vet that we
had found the first flaw weakness
amongst No. l's in correctin and also
m Judgwg distance. In spite of all we
did &ome No l's Improved so $10wly that
they spoiled the layers; so I a special
class was run in each battelY using first
a hla('hboard and then the nd, until,
bY..sheer grindmg hal'.d wOlI{, he.y really
('auld ordel a defIecion or correctIOn
WhICh meant pomethmg and one which
,,,as quickly yet clearly enu Clated m
stead of gabbled, or worse, muttered.
DIstance Judging was taught y gettmg
the surveyors to set up II. beafing pwket
and panorama In the center If the gun
parI" fortunately endowed. WI-h a view,
and taking small squads over n turn. A
good deal of trouble was tak n to dem
onstrate. by using suitable po ts and by
shooting. the relationship b tween de
flectIons and their distan(' on the
ground. There was a surprisi g lack of
knowledge of these essentIal alues, and
it undoubtedly accounted for s me of the
earlier indifferent shooting. Known points
were fixed on the moors, and instead of
marching drill, dhstance judging rambles
were held and afforded useful variety.
Penny sweeps were allowed. a.nd the look
of pleasure on ,the face of the winner
of a small handful of copper was well
worth walking out to see_
Much ingenuity was expended on vary
ing the runs and on bobbing target::.;
and the stop wat('h soon showed up the
next weak spot. that of "one quick hit"
as It was labeled. Constantly It w,*
found that the layel's required
two shots to get one hlt, while the more
delIberate took one shot but too much
time. It was explained that once the gun
filed at a tank; it had in all probability
glven away its positIon. On the other
hand there was by no means a guaran
tee that even a well hidden silent gun
woultl not be spotteu by the tank or the
tank artillery ob.:;erver, who would be
looking out specially for it. Therefore a
CIl1lck and certam hit was of prIme Im
portance. "or else." This pomt apprecl
ated. "one qUlcK hit." was tackled me
thotJlcally and mtelhgently with qUIte
gratlfying results, though It gave a lot
of trouble at first. A good deal of a.m
mumtLOn had been tired on normal role
shoots, and the loading therefore was not
III qUestIOn; zeromg was then unknown,
the necessity for careful SIght test
mg had alteady been well rubbed In. The
effect of varymg light upon the target
was explained by SItting m a dark room
and ::.howmg a target in the different
lights obtained by changmg the colors of
the bulb. Thls was rather a crude method,
but impossible to show m any other way
as mother nature usually took too long
over It or staged it at Jllconvenient tlmes
After thIS It soon became obvious that
contInUIty of traIning was the only thIng
that mattered as far as the Jaying went
Dilly hztlmg enemy tanks.-Lovel's of
IdentIficatIOn of tank tests aU had then
pet theol'Ies as to how It should be
taU'.;ht. C:oncensus of Be's opmion was
that to make a good quick job of it we
had only to know OUI own and shoot all
others; but there was a cry of protest
from troop commanders who hated the
thought of throwmg away what pl'ogress
had all eady been made III l'ecognizmg
then It\vonte pz K_W. So it was agreed
that identification would be based on our
own tanks plus salient features of the
enemy. keeping to platn facts. For those
who lIke mnemonics "ATA. AT" was
thought up and u!'ted for
"Appearance of three points" came
from studymg the available models and
photos. as well as pictures cut from the
illustrated paper,;. VISIts to the next-door
tank regiment did a great deal of good
as they very kindly 'lent us all their
models and pictures, WhICh were both
tnterestmg and varied.
Turrets were grouped roughly as being
rounded for most, though definitely not
all. BrItish and U. S. tanks; and box
shaped for the enemy (except the Pz.
K.W. VI. for example,' which is of course
lOund). If a tank came at you with its
tUl ret gun turned to the rear (engaging
the enemy) it was either one of ours or
an enemy playing a trick, and further
identificatIOn was necessary before mnk
lUg up one's mind. '
Ae1'ials on the turret for the BrItish,
and away from it for tbe eneny-some
pains were taken to show that dangerous
catch, the aerIal behInu a turret at such
an angle that a Naz.I may be mistaken
for a BritIsh tank in a poor light"
Identification pennants flown flom aerI
als were mentioned br1efly.
A nnalltent was left at the fact that
enemy gun jackets are usually thIcker
, . looking than ours, and hUllt up in layered
steps makIng them easy to Identify.
Tlucks were taught as s1mply as pos
hlble, emphasIs bemg laId on the uneven
spaclllg of our bogey "\vheels antl the even
spacmg of those of the enemy, plus the
fact that the lmk bar and SC'15sor type5
of snspenslon are all enemy.
Wltf'fe to IHt the enemy tanlcs -Again
lecourse was made to catch phrases, and
(a) "HIt 'em in the 81ats"- made It
clear that a side hIt III the suspenSIOn,
or on a track, was a knochout
(b) "KICk 'em In the pants"-was
promptly vulgarized into mOle robust
English whIch can be guessed by the
reader. It emphasized the fact that m
rear of the tank was the engIne and
trol, not over heavily armOl ed. and If
the chance came, It mu'>t never be' ne
(el "Punch 'em on the Jaw"-The
thickness of front armor was shown;
but over-emphasis had, it was fE'lt, been
latd on the pxtreme da1iculty of knocking
out tanks ftontally when out on
cn,es; so It wa" explained that it was
pOSSIble to do so With effeL't as
long as the outer thirds of the target
frontage including the tracks were shot
at. A slight and harmless variation of
the theOl y of aImmg at the "center of
By treatmg the subJl'ct of hitting
tanks m terms of humorous contempt,
it was hoped that the detachments wonld
hIte on the famIliar catch phrae"l when
then testing time came, and so lose that
awe of tanks WhICh the unmltwteri are
apt to feel m fil st antitanl-. battle.
COllCf'ltlmenf -Much of thiS was al
ready known, but fUl't1wl" attentlon was
paid to fhatle and Itf etrects and the- use
of the gun net to it}. foliage so as to
IJl'C"ak up the ground ob"el'Vl'l'S view
The need fOI a field of fire defiladed
from the ft ont to get flash concealment
was gone over agam; and the effects of
blast marks on dry grass and on snow
wete Jiscu::-sed, as thcse teUtales are a
certam gIve tway. MakIng the- detach
ment keep absolutely hIdden and stll1
for any Ie-ngth of tIme was the harde<;,t
lesson of all to teach
Tall!.";; I f'J f,lfS GlIll (uc(/cs. Thanks to
some CanadIan friends, theIr tanI-. bat
talion came III whole hem tedly on thf'
antItank week. TheIr CO lectured on the
attack of an area by tanks. took part In
an antltank TEWT and rounded it off
by malong hI':> tl'ammg scheme fit ours,
attacking the regiment WhICh had been
deployed III a 50
( nOimallole, We were
rather surprised and lllte)'ested that the
tank offirel's' ve-rdlct was that they felt
sure therr troops. actmg with one stooge
tank forward and the other two back
(the guns had deliberately let theit light
reconnaIssance can. go through 1 would
knock out most antitank guns sooner or
later, but that attackmg the normal role
gmlner troops was pretty fair hell as
they are less expected. The gunners.
who were finng SAA. were, on the othe-r
hand, delighted at the 5lze of these
"real" targets and the jeer was heard
later-"you couldn't hit a haystack
why I don't even believe you could hit
a tank,"
HUll-down attacks were then practIced
as a second phase in the scheme, and the
men saw the valuE' of bobbing target
practice for the first tIme. A tendency
to fire at the very sltghtly exposed part
of a tUrret showmg behind a bank needed
consideration. It may pay to shoot
through the bank itself. Or. It may be a
trap to get an unwary or Jumpy detach
ment to expose itself WIthout hlttmg.
and this is followed by an attack by the
"hornets" whose machme guns make hfe
1110st unpleasant for any detachment
The tanh.s all reported unfavorably on
the drIll pOSItIOns of the No. l's who
",md could be seen qUIte clearly and
"'....wld not have lasted for long. The dnll
\\a." therefore made more realistic by
makmg No. l's stand or crouch in a
camouflaged silt near the gun just clear
of the flash. but near e-nough for control
and ('orrectIOn purposes, the- slit endmg
at the nem wheel.
The need for glas5cs by No. l's wa:::.
got O\"e1' III some caf-CS by exammmg
dflllbtful tanks through the layer's tele
scope, 3 changmg over WIth 1. ThIS IS
often not po!;slble, and J should be
taught to qUlcl1y IdentIfy tanks
so that, if No.1 is in error or doubt, he
can aSSist by callmg out pomts for
IdentIficatIOn before the tank closes the
Battlf' DJ zll Comprtdlt)/ls.-These tooh
place partly at practIce camp and partly
over rough country. CompetItIons were
orgamzed on a troop baSIS and small
prIzes for detachments were offetet!. The
cooks and batmen were allotted a special
event known as the "Dough
Stakes," and very serlOusly it was taken
too. The first or practIce competition
consisted of an SO-mile march to camp,
bivouac, and shoots next morning at
jinking targ"ets varying from 400 to 1,000
yarus. This could only be marked on a
troop baSIS In spite of the apparent
evenness of all troops WIth SAA the per
cf'ntage of hits worked out at just under
60 for thp best. and 35 for the weakest,
SOllle of It under varying conditions of
lIght; but the object-that of an average
of 50' f of hIts - -was pretty well achieved.
The- s(>('ond competitIOn conslsted of hId
ing a gun uetachment on the edge of a
wood, and after judgmg It for
flage effect, man-handlIng it over a ditch
and down a slope against time, and then
filIng SA.A at a hull-down tank only to
uP Sf'pn frum the finishIng Ime. All com
petitions took place m F.S.M.O, no al
iO\\ianec bemg made for the weather,
con'le what may.
COJ1t"W"lOll -Thele IS no doubt that
whlne BC's are worried by difficulty In
ull(lJ'ovmg theIr pel centage- of hits, an
"antItank week" ,vill certamly make a
ma).lwd Impl'f'SSlDn, even on theu' most
uad,\\aI'l1 men. Rut It must be followed
up by reasonable continUity (If training
i'0I" the i\lo. l's and layers, and for an
other antItank 'veeli: set aside once a
qUillter. There IS then no apparent
,\- hy 50', of hIts should not be
th6j.l mmllllum standard under average
EUlopean condItions, and anythmg less,
on a seconu front when 1t comes, is not
hl,cIy to do vel y much good.
Leadership of 'Pioneers
And Their Cooperation with the Other Arms
[From the German Taktisches Handbuch fur den Truppen
fnhH'" Wild seme Gehdfen. Translated at the Command and General
Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.]
The combat engmeer officer must
try to forcsee the needs of the tl"oops
and meet them in advuure.--Moltke
The combat engineers are the technical
combat troops of the Army. It IS their
duty to prepare the way for the other
arms m special and dIfficult circum
They playa deCISIve role in rIver
crOSSIng operatIons, overcommg obstacles,
attarI-mg- POSItIons and fortIficatIOns,
and III combattIng tanks
Employment of combat eng-meel S at
the same time mcreases mfantry fightmg
power. But as a rule they may be
ployed as mfantry only when other forces
are not Combat engmeers are
difficult to replace. 'Vhen used on infan
try mIssions, combat engmeers should bc
lemfol'ced by heavy weapon", uccordmg to
the need.
The combat engtneer tactical unit With
m the diVISIon IS the battalIOn; for small
er umts It may be a company; and in
e'u'eptional cases, a platoon
On the march combat engmeer units
at e u5ually allotted to the advance guard.
When necessary, parts of the brIdge
tram are assigned to the umts allotted to
the advance guard. Combat engineer foot
elements which are not used with the ad
vance guard are generally Included m
leadmg units of the main body. In
ing when it IS necessary to remove
stacles and hIndrances, combat engmeers
are frequently subordmated to the d1f
ferent infantry and artillery units. This
alone freque>ntiy make-s it possible to
make an engmeer mam effort. In order
that combat engmcelS may hase enough
tm\e ta plepale for employment, their
commander be promptly mformed
of the mtentlOn of the commander under
whom they al e aperatmg.
rIme reqUired for pr(lparation depends
upon the nature of the engmeerIng work
lequired. The amount of time required
for preparatIOns mcreases as more use
ta be made of emel gency equipment
lllstcad of eqUIpment prppar'd III ad
the commandel of the umt to which
engmeels are attached assigns
a 1l1lSSIon to them How the situation is
to :be accomplished is deCided upon by the
commander of the combat engllle-ers.
The combat engmeer commander must
always auapt theIr employment and hIS
chol(,(> of means to the> changmg SItuatIOn.
H must also make proposals for the em
ployment of his umt well ahead of tIme.
file combat cngmeer commander mltst
l!Ot neglect to make prepamtions, eSl1e
cf(f.lly of a J econnaissance nature, {01" a
employment of his troo11s (or he
ml/st be ready to have such preparation
lItCtde) even when 1t is not celtarn that
Ins men WIll be employed.
Breakmg up combat engineer units re
company employed on a given task.
combat mJssions engineers coordi
nate theIr actions closely with the arms
with which they are to cooperate. Wheth
er pioneers are to be subordinated to
other combat umts for defimte tasks 01'
whether indIvidual arms are to cooperate
with the pioneers depends upon the SItu
ation in each caSf>. When large obstacles
are encountered in an operation, attach
ment of other al ms to a combat engIneer
unit may be advisable. OccasIOnally the
enginPer main effort COincides wIth the
tactical main effort.
As soon as the SItuatjon permIts, the
combat engmeer commander mu"t make
every effort to reunite under hiS own
command any elements that have been
Prompt estabhshment of commumca
tIOn is of greater Importance for the
UnIfied command of combat engmeermg
units operatmg III a large al'ea. It may
be nece'3Sary to assjgn SIgnal umts to re
inforce combat englUeermg SIgnal pla
Combat engmeer-communication units
assure communIcations WIthIn the com
mand as well as cooperatmg WIth the
.arms (especially in a teLse combat
sItuatIOn)_ t1
It IS always desirable to re
serves of engmeE"r personnel nd equip
ment. but often this is. Impo sible until
after action has begun and whIch
replace losses.\
unc1rtain; and
In most cases It WIll be pos<>IplE" to wIth_
(haw engineers already empl9yed in or
der to them to more important

tances) .
The supply of materiel
be InItIated early, es.peFially if It
fil'st has to be. brought forward and as
and road<;. m rear areas l
On What Does Success Depend in Russia? I
Lt>ssons learned by an Officer in the Eastern Front. (
. [An article m 28 August 1942.
jhe Comma, d and General Staff School, F?rt
Th'lS article nnportant m that lt
onee m01'e confirms, this hme by the
Germans themselves. the stubborn
ness and ejJeetneness of Russian re
sistance_ Admitting, as '1.t does. the
multIplicity of difficult1'es
teled by the Germans m thezr ap
parently futile effort to el1"minate
then- Soviet adversary. the at'fule
Ca17leS mote than a sllggf'stwn of the
1'anOu.s "ZC'lssztudes eJ:penenced by
the tnvaders. Things left unsaid are
thus as Important as those brought
out into the open. Above all. the ar
llcle tends to attest to the t1"1rthful
vess of reports of heat'Y Gelman
cosualties_-TllE EDITOR.
lOne 11l1lst be a hmJiel. The German
<;oldler In RU%la IS faced With an adver
... ary who, culturally. IS not hiS equal by
bll'th The l,P ath-antage possessed
Ly the IS In their hIghly de
\ doped i' 11l1ull Instmct." and their lack of
.... l'nsltlvl', to climate and terram If
\\(' al(' t, (l1l!jUf'I' them. we must be at
hnJlll' lIl' do:; anti <;wamp. \Ve must be I
.Iule to fill' t \II \vay by nIght and III fogs
a ... l'H"'II\' ai'o n broad daylight. We must
f l' tn ..,talk our em'lllY and creep up
nn hnll a5 a hunler 011 his prey.
must be able to bulld a shelter for our
',l'lves In the woods \Vhoe"l'er. therefore.
deSIres to tram soldiers. to fight agamst
BolshevIsm wJll go out WIth them mto thp
nC'ar'st swamp land where -he Wll1 tram
them day and night, suinrner and wmter.
2. One must be able to The
Russian IS a master of ImprovizatlOn. He
drops artIllery shells from glIders j he
Immedlately puts captured weapons to
use; he hurrIedly gathers collectIve rarf'l
ers together mto troop umts, eqUIpS tpf'ln
with horse carts and tells them to i:nd
their arms in the woods He has crossed
over broad rIvers on pneumatIc rafts
when he had no other means of crossing".
He hurriedly loads reserves into L'om
mandeered trucks and sends them mto
tattle. We have learned from him. In the
Bummer we motorized our supply
umns; in the autumn we carried our
<;upplies to the front by means of porters,
m the winter by means of sleds. in the
spting by' the use of horse carts. We
learned to bUlld portable quartelti of ply
wood_ We made pack animals of cart
horses. We bUilt ('orduroy roads through
marsh lands when the hIghway was in
the of the enemy
3. Ire WI,st iealn to be t7lelessly acthc
The RUSSIan I" not naturally mdustrIOus,
hut he IE' given no rest by the commissar
whIch gets out of him all there IS
to bp had Sean'ely a day passes that the
will not attempt an attack. be he
evel so weah. He \VOl h", every day at Im
plovmg his POSIt 10m., bUilds roads and
fO! tl'ncatlOIl::, m places where at the mo
ment no attack IS to be e'pE"cted We even
found 'Stl'ong fOl'tIfied pOSItions of
Lenmgrad WIth the front to the east. The
Russmn,:>. thelefore. must have counterl
on the enClrciement of the cIty SInce the
begmning of the wal and madE" pI'epam_
Hom. fo}' It. When a fight lusts for a con
SHiel able length of tune. the German
soldIer hecomes How much blood
ean be saved by working every day on the
Also by working at It evel'y
day. the shelter can 1;e made more corl1
fortahle. mOle dry and pleasant. How
much vehll'ie", can be saved If on' WIll
on them con:.tantly; how much
other mateJ'lul I:an be spal'ed if C3mou
HUg'e is erected to keep It out of ::.ight of
the enem,h etr It must be clear to the
soldier who c()mes to RUilSJa that It is
not an mdJ('atlOn of cowardice to wOl'k
on the posltlon. but an ObVIOUS duty
4. Olle 1II1!st be sl'sjliclOllS ot ]Ieo}}/e_
As far as pOSSible, the Russian employs
cunmng and trIckery in hIS fightIng_
DestructIOn lurks in a thousand places.
fir&t of all WIth the RUSSian CI popula
tIOn \\ IHch under no cJrcumstances must
be tru:,ted no matter how innocent they
may appear to be. Pns.onel Sl e&pecIally
the young, are completely sold on Bolshe
vi::.m. They are capable of any tl eachery.
In Lettie mines. camouflaged SUits,
ambuscades. etc., a great role, Only
a person who is accustomed to being al
ways closely on the watch wll! escape
these thl'eats_
5. 01le nil/sf be wtde awake_ The
attacks almost exclusively at night
and during fogs. He is constantly sur
pnsing our troops. In the front lines
therf' is no other way than to watch at
night and rest In the daytime. Where the
terrain is close. detachments in the rear
often pay with their lives for lack or lll
sufficiency of guards In the usual sense
of the words, there are no front lines and
rear areas in RUSSIa_ Any one who lays
hIS gun aside east of the old Reich fron
tier may greatly regret it the next
6. Rf'C01l1laissancc. Reconnaissance
saves blood. The Alpha and Omega of all
fightmg m Russia IS reconnaIssance, Only
by good reconnaIssance is it possible to
learn qUlckly of the Russian mtentIons
and take proper measures to neutralize
them. Casualties resulting from recon
nmss.ance are surpl'lsmgly few. In
sm it is necessary for the soldIer to be
trained to thE" utmost In scoutmgo, ob
sel'vmg and listening
7 [<'o()d supply. On account of dIffi
culties presented by the terrain, feeding
the men IS an extremely difficult task.
I t reqUIres both dependability and versa
tIlity on the part of the men entrusted
WIth this duty. Breaking an axle or fail
ure of a horse are no reasons why the
vehicle should remam behind with the
much-desll'ed food All means must be
employed to get it on. All men, including
the master sergeant In charge of bringing
up the food. are expected to brmg the
"l'ehicle ahead even through enemy fire.
ServIce WIth a field kItchen IS no sinecure.
8. One must be clean. Any person who
does not take care of his bod th the
greatest faIthfulness, conquerin an
tendencies to mdolence. WIll becom tter
ly degenerate_ There lS no excu<,> for not
bathing daily. There is plents of time
always and m all placE"s, but th re IS no
8carclty of water. But in ce must
steadily be overcome has al
ways bf'f'n and stilI IS the greatest remedy
agamst vermIn. but It makes Its mark
Inwardly, also. and glves him the sense
of bemg a cultural man in contrast with
the RUSSIan populatIOn.
9. Oue must be hard. It takes real men
to \Var In temperatures ranging
flOm 104 deg'l'ees above to 40 degrees be
low zero, knee deep m mud or in heavy
riu"t. CaRualtie:s l'csultmg from the Rus
sion mass attacks often present pIctures
to the young soldier agamst which he will
have to fOltify hIS heart. He must count
on the fact that he may lose hIS own hfe
and be reconCiled to It. Only men who In
the hour of death do not lose theIr com
posure are able to stand battle agamst
the RUSSIans. ","eak natures must be
made to realize the fact that leadership
IS hal d enough to punish cowardice with
death. It is only in this battle between
thc>;c two world philosophIes, m the
tacks. of Red weapons. that one becomes
conscious that the lifE' of the individual
counts absolutely for nothing in this war.
10_ Onp must be a comrade Those
thmgs which have appeared impossible to
those who are not partiCIpating In' this
war are only accomplished by the com
rade&hip of the German soldier. The hard
ness of this war wields an iron band about
officers, noncoms and men, This, however,
reqUIres from each of them, especIal1y
from those who have but recently joined
the ranks. the ImmedIate task of getting
rid of all peculiar or undesirable traIts.
It IS only possible for one to exist here by
entering wholeheartedly in the union of
comradeship. casting aside all individual
traits; by lieing willing to dIVIde the last
PIeCC of bread wlth one's comrade and to
shIeld hIm at the cost of his own life. One
will become strong then and be able to
satisfy the requirements of this war.
Qmunltlon car/'
.. J for
p,atrel 41 patrd 5 o.c.Q.paf..ol med d"p I,,"irelerr oc minpatrd 2. Ipot" 3

I ride"

t"Vd. h.w:l,
ar patrol
0' pat..ol Carl 01 With moto_yct.
.oIrorth d",1L
..t iOc.wt
dl!> 1 <iiI9 patrol 20;;'

... ...
""'f"'U"'I,HE 20/tim,.'1
200pdI "
:SO"Tm..... , I
'" G
Technical platoon
General , no I'll'
About noon I recPlved information that
the dE:'molitions numbered 2 and 4 on
Map 1 would be ready before 1 PM, and
that my demohtlOn project for the eastern
area had been accepted by the commander
of that alpa.
In view of the Importance of the
Kl'zeczow-Pcim road, I accompanied that
pattol myself III order to judge the prob
able effectiveness of the proposed ob
stl uction. I found that the bridge near
Tenczyn (No.3 on Map 1) was not very
important, as Its demolition would cause
only about two hours' delay to enemy
motor-cars and cycles. The bridge near
Lublen appeared to offer more favorable

road It might be hoped that the enemy
A Polish Sapper and Miner Company in Action
[An article by Lieutenant K. Bilski, Polish Engineer Corps, in
The Royal Engineers Journal.]
Lieut. Bilski's was attached
to the 10th Polish Motorized Cavalry
The sapper and miner compames
formed by engmeer troops in the Polish
army several years before the present
war werE' mamly intpndE'd to oppose ar
mored vehicles by means of antitank
mInt's and demohtlODs. Their mission was
mamly defensive. They formed part of
engme"r battalIons of armIes or mecha
nized cavalry brigades, or of some in
fantry dIVISlOns.
The accompanying sketch shows the
ef:tablishment of the' company. from
which it will be seen that it was eqUipped
to cany out the following tasks.
1 The demolitIOn of roads, brjdges, etc.
2 Laymg mme
3. AntItank obstacles and traps.
4 DestructlOn of fords.
of fords. This was done by drIving special
pIpes into the bed of the stream, pumpIng
water down them untt! SUItable chambers
were formed for the 7-1b. charges, where
by craters of 4 yards m diameter were
obtamed. The technIcal platoon, besides
the high exploslves and fuzes, carried
SUffiC1E:'nt fuel to supply the company for
a :l20 mIle march Owmg to the lIght type
of Its vehicles the company was very
The company whose actIOn I am about
to deSCl'Ibe had been under my command
for two years and remained so during
the whole campaIgn Two weeks prevIOUS
ly It was attached to the 10th MotorIzed
Cavalry Brigade This brigade, as a cov
ermg umt, was awaiting the outbreak of
hostihties in the envIrons of Cracow.
On 3 ,september when it first went into
actIOn, the company was billeted in the
forester's house at Pcim. On the preced
o.c ... coy H Q Reeonnoil/ance platoon 11 ,"err platoon
admln"tr ,ection
A..-, e,tabl"h. 6off' 56NC.O'1lS f""vate,

LI'3ht N. G. . '5
Motorcycle, 5

lorry 040 26
HE 5000 pound,
A,T mlnel

AT mine, /empty/ 2000
Electr.", mechanical raw, 2
12', 4

'3"nerator 1 Motorpump- 1
:gg t,
The }"econnaissance patrols had, be
Sides their normal dutIes of engmeer
reconnaissance, other tasks:
1. Passing iniormatlOn between taco
tical unrts and the demolitIon parties
wOl'kmg In their area.
2 In many cases the decI<;ion when to
fire the charges.
3. CO\'ering the demolltlOTI parties
when ,...orkmg mdependently of tactical
A l\lmmg Patro1 was orgamzed to work
at five dIfferent places at onrE:'. An abatIS
patrol. WIth Its mechanIcal eqUIpment,
was capable of constructing an abatis in
a wood, armed With mines and traps.
about 50 yards long, in about 2 hours.
The speCIal patrol, with its motor pump,
was mamly intended for the destructIOn
mg night three nllmng and two recon
naIssance patrols had prepared for demo
hUon and laId out rome fields at 1, A and
B. (see Map 1) and at each object firing
posts, each two men strong, were detaIled.
That mornmg my company receIved
orders to prepare demolitIOns and layout
antitank obstacles in the Jordanow
Tokarma and Krzeczow-Lubien areas,
held respectIvely by our 24th Lancers
and 10th Horse RIfle regIments. SpeCIal
attentIOn was also to the Pcim
region, where the condItIOns for very
Important demolItIons prevaIled.
The order also stated that the pngineer
working partIes were to be covered by the
fightmg troops, that the demolitions in
the Letowma and Lubien areas must be
ready for firing before 2 PM, and that
the commanders of the fighting troops
had been given general mfOl'mation about
the demolItions.
It will be seen from this that the tIme
aBotted was vpry short and that, as the
enen;ty was fully motorized, the number
and quality of the demolitions might ma
influence hIS speed of movement.
The.leason for the speCIal importance of
the .t'Clm regIOn was that It was the point
of hmctIOn of many roads from the south.
DemolItions at that point would obstruct
the only road leading north to Myslenice
and Cracow.
Owmg to the limIted time at our dIS
pos3il, normal reconnaissance was impos
slblq, and I declded to dIstribute my work
mg parties from an appreciation of the
tP1'rain as shown on the map.
I .consequently sent to each area an
officer WIth one reconnaIssance patrol and
two mming patrols. In order to msure a
rapid supply of hIgh explOSIves 1 sent
two tl'urk-Ioads to the bridge marked 7c
m Map 2. As I expected that there might
be a fut ther retreat on the following day,
I sent a patrol to reconnoItre the PClm
Myslellice lme.
advance would be checked fo-r a 'consider
able time. HIS motorIzed infantry and
tanks would then be obliged to make a
detour over the mountain slopes which
would be very advantageous to us. Thp
bridge could not be reconstructed under
4 to 6 hours. But the brIdges at Pcim
(see Map 2) wele far more nnportant.
DemolItions and obstacles carried out
there would effectually hold up the ene
my's advance, and the terram offered good
conditions for the defense of the obstacles.
I anticipated that the enemy might be
halted there for as long as the defense
could reSIst them, and even then the re
constructIon of the brIdges would reqUIre
some consHierable time.
The mmIng patrols began with the
wod\. on Nos. 3 and 5 (see Map 1 ) and
fimshed by 4 pm. The work was delayed
by the want of proper dnlls. The stone
embankment made the use of our drIlls
meffectlve PneumatIC drtlls would have
shot tened the tune by one-half. It was
only po<;sIble to bore dllll-hol('s and suc
ceSSIVely fire m them 4-lb charges of tro
ty!. In this way after three houl'<;' work
6 of SUffiCH?nt depth were ready,
and the normal churges of R E. had to be
doubled. The main charges on bridge
N0_ 5 Were 240 Ib each.
Durmg the mornmg I presented the
commanding officeI' of the 10th Horse
RIfle RegIment my scheme of demolItions
m the Lubll'n area lIe dId not agree to
the mmefieJd at the bndge, as he was
afl"ald of not bemg able to mfol m hIS
fighting units of Its eXIstence. All the
othex arrangements were approved. He
01 dered me to place warnmg posts at the
mille-fields EI and Ell (see Map 2) and
to leave them untIl dark. He added that
dUrIng the afternoon he was g'omg to 01'
g-amze a second lme of de>fense on the
heIghts 2702 and 2450 north of PCIm in
order to cover by fire all the projected
demolitions The order to fire the charger:.
was to be gwen by the commandmg officel
of the brigade reconnaIssance tank pla
toon, whIch was to be the last to retIre 1t
would however be advantageous if one of
the engmeer officers could establIsh con
tact With him and I?);.plam the arrange
ments. I &f.>nt the commander of my com
pany reconnaissance platoon on this mis
SIOn. On my way back to the company y.
lllformed the sappers at the vartOu::, posts
of the general SItuatIOn and the anange
iUE:'nts for firmg the charge'3.
I deCIded to remam for the re:;t of the
day at the PCIm brIdges, where the last
mInIng' patrol was workIng. It was an e'\:
cellent post for the company commandel
as the traffic passed that point from all
directions, includmg the di",patch riders
and the leturnIng mmmg patrols of mv
company. By questIOnmg dispatch rIders
and passmg officers I was m a position to
gam the latest news from the battlefield
and by this means to control the work of
the engmeers. "
About 2 PM thE' enemy delivered a
strong attack on the Lubien heights. slow
ly driving back our troops towards the
north. A sapper who passed reported that
the brIdge at Krzeczow, of WhICh he had
been m chaI'g'(', had been blown up. A
few hours later I learned from another
sapper that the brIdge at Tenrzyn had
also been demolished They had experI
enced great uncertaInty a& to when to
fire tht: chaH{('s, as they had not seen OUI
tank commander nor I>eceived orders from
anyone else, but when the enpmy were
only a few tens of paces distant they had
fired the chal ges on theIr own mitlatIve_
About 6 PM the pnemy were approach
Ing Letownia and Lublen and our troops,
I'etirmg m motor-cal' columns along the
highway, became more and more numer
ous. The mining patrols from both areas
began passing, reporting that their work
was ready. The officer whom I had sent
WIth the eastern party reported that he
had had a lot of trouble WIth our retreat
ing troops, one sectIOn very nearly
walked over our mine-field near Letowma,
and near Tokarnia a peasant cart struck
our marked D III Map 1, owjng
to the negl!:nee of our warlllng picket
The mine-fi d had been Ieestablishpd and
the inhabIt nts told how to avoid it. My
battalion commander passed and asked
me what had already been blown
up, and he told me that in the morning
German m:f1antry passed OVE:'l" our mine
field In the Naprawa region. He had wIt
nessed It from hIS observation post. The
Germans as soon as they became aware
of the presence of mines retreated help
lessly. I
In the meantime the works in the Pcim
area were nearing completion. That on
the road bridge (7c in Map. 2) offered
the greatest dlfficultles. The ground there
was practically all rock. Again the shafts
had to be drilJed like and the
charges increased four-fold. While talk
mg to the battahon cotnmander I had
missed seeIng that the western wing of
the mine-field was being made too close
to this brIdge. so that th..e blast of the
demolItIOn mIght have destroyed several
of the mines; I consequently moved the
wmg some 20 to 30 yards forward.
Meanwhile the sounds of battle were
commg nearer and nearer and troops in
small columns were retiring on both sides
of the road to occupy a new line of resis
tance. I was awaitIng impatIently the
return of the officer whom I had sent to
the commander of the tank platoon, for if
he had failed to find him, the firing post
at the Lubjen bridge would remain with
out orders and thIS important communi
cation might be left intact. Actually this
officer never returned.

craft. About ten planes took part In each
.attack and. nrjng' fl'om a hNght of from
about a hundred to two hundred feet,
our troops and bombed
the roads. Several bombs fell near the
bridge and one hIt a motorcycle carrymg
two nonv('ommlSSlOned officers The Gpr-
from the front for news of it, but they
could tell me nothmg. At. last I de<!lded
to go forward myself. OU1' umts, appar
ently the last ones, were ):unnmg out of
the woods near Lublen. jumpmg into
parkmg place. but all got :,\way in tIme
and none \'I'I e hit, 1 was lymg with our
..-:.- .......... ................
bridge mode l'eOd
to be 6Io\'1n up
irin ort,
.MAP 2
man al Ullery now directeu a heavy fire
again::.t Lublcn. It had eVidently mmred
forward and was now supportmg their
mfantry attal'k Should they occupy Lu
blen the whole Jordanow road would
come under their fire and It would be
difficult to withdraw our firmg post. To
m.v relief I then heard a loud PxploslOn
in that dlrecllon and appreciated that
they should still be able to join us.
The Gl2'l'man artIllery was soon
ing Its fire on the north side of Lubien
and still the ret'onnaissance tank platoon
had not arrived. I asked several officers
finng post m a ditch by the l'oad",\dc It
wa" the first time that r had t>)"peIiencen
a battle and as the cars passed J saw that
the men were very exhausted, coveren
With dust, and some ",ere wounded
Agam the enemy advanced his fire and
shells fell m front of the brldge (7c m
Map 2) that we were waltmg to demolish.
One fell so near that We \vere compelled
to change our post, We hId behind a barn,
but the thatch caught fire and the barn
was soon ablaze. Agam we had to move,
thls time to a shell crater, the men carry
mg the leads and I the powder. The men
looked enquiringly. Should not bridge
be blown up? But our tanks had not yet
The Germans were now to be seen
among the houses of Lubien. within SOD
yards of us. Now, m turn. our artillery
was dIrecting its fire on Lubien. The
Germans moved off eastward into the
woods, but after a lIttle time they re
newed theIr advance towards us. Soon
they would be upon us.
I was begmning to get anxious. Should
I demolish the bridge or walt a little
bt> cut off. At that moment two tanks
appeared from thE' west of Lublen, but
wel'e they ours? They were advancmg on
us, followed by two more just debouching
from the woods. I 01 dered the key to be
put mto the exploder. We stramed our
eyes. They were ours.
The Gel mans opened fire on them, but
It was meffectIve. Soon they had reached
the load. I SIgnalled to them to stop and
enqull'pd fOl' theu" commander. He was
m the fourth tank I asked hun if I could
now blow up the bridge. Apparently one
tanI;: was still behmd, so that I eould
get no relIable mformatlon. The Ger
ma!lS started firmg on us, but they hit
the last tank without damaging It and
then \\ounded my corporal m the leg, sel
Ivuhly I found aftll"wards.
1"s,tllI dId not know whether to blow up
the bndge or Walt for the- remain!ng
tank. But the G 'I mans were coming
nearer. A fe\\-' tanks appeared from the
westel'n of'Lubien, and I saw
shells, eVldpntly our own, bursti1y,g near
them. That cleared up the SItuatIon, our
mIssmg tank would not return. At last I
dpClclpd to fire the charge. The bridge was

reverberated with the echo. The sapper
e-....cialllH'd wlth relief "All in order."
Then we WIthdrew, and I realized how
difficult was the task of a fil'mg post
undt>l the circumstances
The Germans oc('upled Lublen and. the
adJoming hNghts but dId not cO.ntmue
thell' advance that day. Returnmg to
P('lnl I found e'\cl'ythmg m leadmf'ss
Thl:' cubles to all the charges had been
blought tOgE'thl'1 mto a common station
and It wa" thus pOSSible to fire them sue
ce::,slvl,!!Y 01 simultaneously. The firing
post::; werc on the alert. Dusk was fallIng.
The of battle grew weaker and
wlth thp fin,t cold mght breeze
ft'll on the battle front. ,"
The followmg conclusions may be
dlawn from our expel'lence m the cam
patgn In Poland
( 1) Sapper and miner companies Qt'
and eqUIpped as shown in this
al tide are of value only in the defense.
When supported by relatIVely small num
bel'S of antitank weapons and infantry,
they can check an (Jnemy's advance for a
tune on any kmd of terrain.
(2) TheIr equipment must be ju
dICIOusly selected and adapted to their
most difficult cond]tions of work. The
of some. patrols, and_ even
platoons, to a glve>n kmd of work, IS not
adVIsable. All should have uniform organ
IzatlOn and eqUipment so as to be able to
carry out every kind of task, whether
demolitions or obo;;tac1es.
(3) The deciSiOn when to fire a cbarge
IS a very dIfficult matter. Soldiers charged
with that duty shOUld bp instructed with
the SItuatIOn, and they must finally make
the decision from informatIOn receIved
from the in final contact with
enemy. They must be courageous, w1th
plenty of intelligence and mitiative.
(4) At all larger demolitions at least
two men should be left as firing posts.
The so-called "enemy hunting" may often
produce dIsastrous results, as the enemy,
1 allowed to corne too near. may kill the
firing post and gain the object undam
aged. DIrectly the demolItion becomes
possIble it should be carried out without
(5) AntItank mines should contain at
least 2% lhs. of hIgh explOSIve for other
WIse they are too weak to destroy tanks.
(6) Staffs of the larger umts should
carefuUy study the employment of anti
tank mines wIthm their units, in fact all
commandmg officers of Units of every
descrIptIOn should understand the use of
these mines. Prmciples for their use
should be establIshed in the whole army
and rigorously observed.
(7) In a delaying actlOn the ground
condItIOns often make It Impossible to
brmg fire to bear o:p. completed demolI
tIOns. In such the defense should be
reenforced by traps and mines.
[Translated from a Russian article in the Red Army newspaper
Krasnaya Zvezda.] __
The German defense along the Mara
RIver was the strongest ::.ector on the
whole Moscow front. This sector was
generally betieved to be a stable and
qUIet one, but as a matter of fact the
most VIOlent and prolonged battles took
place here. Havmg been defeated near
the Germans took a position
on the i\Iara RlVer. When our troops
undertook the offenSIve It was clear that
to break through the defense of
the Germans on a WIde front was too
dIfficult It was eaSIer to do thIS with
stlong forcE's on a nal'lOw flont.
ThIS mISSIon was accomplIshed by
Erastov's diVISIOn WIth the objectIve of
penetratmg deep into the enemy posi
The enemy SItuatIOn was as shown on
the sketch. The strongly defended pOS1
tIOns were on the left at Romanovo and
on the rIght neal' Kamenskoye. The dIs
tance between thebe two POInts dId not
eHeed two and a half miles. The Ger
mdns had dug then tn:-nche& neal' the
edge of the forest. and areas between
trenches wei e COVPI ed by enemy sup
portmg 111ortars, machme guns and
The commander had to deCIde how he
was to penetrate thIS positIon. Along
the whole front -and lliSslpate his
..,tlength? on the right? 0'1' the left?
Between stl'ong-pomts the areas wer'
covered by an impenetrable fire The di
VISIOn cormnander stuclIeri the terram
and dispOSItIOns from various observa
tIOn POlllts Romano\lo ""as located on
an open spot. dIfficult to approach. It
was appal ent that the best approach
was neal' the village of Melmkovo over
WhICh OUt observation was the best, By
breakmg through here and qUickly tTIOV
mg mto the forest It wou Id be
to penetrate to the enemy artillery
slt1Om; Also it was probable that the
enemy fire power \vas weal\el hel ethan
at Romano\o. The road between
kovo and lklinskoye had an Important
mfluence-It was so temptlllg to have a
load as the aXISI of movement, especIally
In a forest and III the winter.
The diVISIOn commander made his de
cision: to penetrate the enemy defense
on a narrow front WIth a determined in
fantl y attack heavily supported by
artillery fire. The place chosen was on
our rIght flank which pel mitted heavy
mortar fire to be delIvered on the strong
pOSItIon to the ::>outheast of Kamenskoye.
A glance at the sketch WIll show thp
scheme of maneuver. On a front of 700
yards was concentrated three-fourth& of
the infantry units WhICh attacked In the
direction of Our
UlviSIOn commander was determined- on
a concentrated effort. He took all
ures to decrease the effectIveness of en
emy strong pomts and against each he
sent a battalion of infantry, supported
by altllll'IY. These unIts had to
antee the success of the mam effort. ThE'
neighboring unit assIsted by attacking
the enemy left. His plan was to break
through the defense on a narrow front
m order to paralyze the enemy artIllery
fire m the rear_
The diVISion was supported by artiI
lei y of all calibers whIch mamtained
close lIarson between the artIllery and
mfantl'Y commanders. Each artillery
battalion commander was right w1th
the infantry commander. As action
pl'ogl'cssed It became nl"cessary to attach
heavy artIllery to the Infantry regiments
m whIch case the al'tillelY battalion
l'emamed wlth the infantry
battalIons; but the artIllery regimental
commanders remained with the chief of
diVision artIllery who. in turn, remamed
WIth the mfantry division commander.
ThIS close lIaIson permitted uninter
rupted artillery support during the
whole battle.
The dIVISIOn commander could com
municate at any time from his observa
tIOn post by telephone with the infantry
and artIllery regim.ental commanders;
the latter were in direct communIcation
with the11' battalions; if direct communi
cation was cut off' to some point it was
pOSSIble to telephone through other
units CommunicatlOns worked ,success
fully even when the troops moved into
thl" forest. This played a big part in
the final outcome. "
Although all did not go sm.oothly, the
Lattle developed according to plan. The
artll1ery broke up the f0rward positions
of the enemy defense, especially near
Romanovo and Kamenskoye. ,As soon as
the main effort jumped off, the artillery
delivered support on the narrow front.
The enemy mortar fire from the rear
was effective in open areas, and to avoid
losses the mfantry mcreased its speed
of movement.
The main attacking force broke through
the euge of the forest, overcame the re
slstance It met. and penetrated the rear to
the -enemy artIllery.
The enemy attempted several counter
attacks WIthout SUCCE'SS_ Automatic rifle
men trIed to break up our combat
formatIOns in the forl"st, and we sent out
small combat patrols to overcome them.
These patrols greatly assisted the rather
WIde maneuvermg in the enemy rear-up
to four and a half miles. TactICS through
out the diVIsion were to pin down an
enemy UnIt from the front and have a
maneuvermg force attack from the rear.
The enemy tried to take up po::.itions at
Al'lstovo and Alopovo. but units of our
dIviSIon were able to out-maneuver them.
The Germans withdrew.
The Germans used attack aVIation and
nnttall'craft artillery against our infan
try troops. but once the penetration was
made they could not stop the attack.
, __--;M""lf-LE.,.,-___..:;2

There is no justification to presuppose
this direct form of attack from the ail,
Protection Against Air-Borne Troops
. With Particula:r Refoerenee 'Fa Vulnerable Points Such As Airdromes
howevet<, If suitable landing areas exbt
[From Canadian Army Training Memorandum Number 15 June 1942.]
In the VIcimty of an airdrome, the enemy
may concentratl\:! there and the attack on
German Air-Borne Troops
carried, to the
scene of actIOn by air are called aIr-borne
troops and they are sub-dIvided mto
(a) Parachute Tl'oops
(b) Alr-landmg troops who land In an'
Cl aft, eIther transports or gliders
Palachute Troops:
These are pit'ked and tramed by the
G.A.F. They are young and fit, belIeved
to be all volunteer." who arc wllhng to
l'lsk an early death for the added adven
ture They are dIstingUIshable by narrow
bnmmed h'lmets and grey-green UnI
forms The e-qUlpment carrIed vanes With
the task but may include: Tommy gun,
L M.G. 2" mortar, wtth 3" mortar, M.
G 's, 3" mountalll guns. AA and AT guns
In th' battalion.
There are- approximately
120 men to a company.
baat;!!i:ent (QUI bri
gade), three regiments and SUppOl tmg
acrms III an all' dlvlston.
They ale earned In JU 52's, 10 men
WIth eqUipment in each aIrcraft They
are supposed to leave the aIrcraft from a
heIght of 2DD-3DD feet whIch means they
take only 10 seconds to reach the ground
and they get mto actlon ill 2. to 5 minutes
They a1 e tmmed to leave the aIrcraft at
the rate of one man evelY se('ond and as
It 15 trllvehng onlr 80 mph at the tIme.
the 10 men land withm a space of about
360 yards long. Thus by havmg three
hnes of followmg aIrcraft, a whole com
pany of 120 men can be dropped m an
alea of 400x200 yarus and can be a('tmg
together as a UTIlt III about 10 nunutes
after landmg.
Colored parachutes are used to 111;'
tmgUlsh commanders so the others can
see whele one IS landmg amI rally there.
DIfferent colors are used also for the
varlOUS types of eqUIpment and nmmum
tlOhe parachutlst whilE:' uescending and
unul he gets rId of hIS hal ness and gets
hold of hIS weapons, IS almost defenseless
-that IS the ttme to catch hIm. Actually
on hIS person he carries a knife, gl'enaflps
and PIstol-occasIOnally a
tommy gun strapped on hIS back.
Air Landing Troops
These are drawn from oldmary dIVI
SlOns and the only special trammg 1S that
of In and out of an aIrcraft qUJek
ly. For all' landmg the diVISIon IS about
half the norInal SIze, Ie. 7.000 to 8,000
men, and would not have anythmg lIke
the eqUlpm<!nt that ordmarlly goes WIth
It. However some ltght artIllery, trans
port vehIcles. motorcycles, al'UlO) ed car
r and possIbly lIght tanks may be an
ticipated. The use of captured transport
1:' largely contemplated-a pomt to note
EIther captUl'ed air fields or other SUit
able landing ground such as clear
beaches, unobstructed roads or fields IS
neces5alY for employmg these forces But
the German IS not too fussy and WIll rIsk
any kind of crash landmgs, onee he IS
COlllmitted. It IS obvi.ouo:. that the slow
movmg J U 52's and glIder':> are extremely
vulnerable to both air attack and AA
While It leqUire::. 500 to 800 JU 52's to
carry a dIviSIOn of 8000 men, dependmg
on whether or not gliders are being
towed, It doE'S not follow that the enemy
must ha'V 10 tImes thIS number to t1'an5
pOl t 10 diVISions, With close all' bases
such as exist In France in relatIOn to the
British Isles, these troop earners would
shuttle buck and forth as they dId In
Crete- I f we were ('on5Idermg an mvasion
of BrItam, therefole, as compared to one
of Iceland we would have to ('ount all a
deal heavlel weIght of airborne
In the battle for Crete- the Gellnans
a ll:lodlficatton of all' landmg troops
m the form of ghder-borne- shock troops.
These were G.A F. like the
parachute troops.
:\ature of Employment of AirBorne
These are pretty obVIOUS dependmg On
the type of operatIon
For the I altl, they would be
'VIl'(>les,,> statIOns
Power plants.
Sabotage and 5th column actiVItIes.
For the mva:"lOn, -on the other hand,
obj('ctlv(l'S, of the followmg type would j,l'
At}" firlds, WIth complemC'ntary task:;
Local niIhtalY HQ';" all plobably
based on a strateg'lcal plan to
.sPCUl, a bllrlge head, IncludIng
a port SUItable for lanulI1g sen
bOI ne fOlces
Scale of A. ttack
ObVIOusly thiS IS gomg to depend on
the C'l1cmy'.5 estunate of the power of the
defpllS(> and ultlillately on the factor of
tm1' and space as all (lady pOlllted out.
In thIS H'Sp('ct. however, om' IS unlIkel)
to rnake an 0\ ('r-t'<:.ttlll.lte. The German
belIeves m C!lficentratlOn of effort. At
Crete the tJcll1enuous 10">5es In tht' eat!)
stap,es did not <\('tel" hll11 nnd as soon a-.
he has '.:.u('cl'edC'tl at one pomt-posslbly
cHug-ht off Its guard-he mIl e.xplOlt the
landmg faCilities there to then maXlluum
It 1& dangelous to WOl k to any Pi econ
ceptlOn of tactlcs to be employed by an
enemy. Prior to Crete thp '.:.equence of
attack had generally been
(a) Heavy bombardment (most
ly dIve bombel s).
(b) Para('hutl"-ts landmg and g-ammg
some degree of control of the nIl field
(c) Landmg of troops In JU 52's and
towed glIdeis. These qUickly attacked
posts and gun POSitions that were hold
mg out and gtadually gamed control of
approaches to the allurome.
(d) EqUIpment and suppoltmg arm;,
were- landed and column<; rapidly stru!!k
out to complete the strategIcal plan.
At CIE'tp how(,ver, whether accordmg
to plans or due to the stubborn defense,
attacks of parachuti5ts and glider-borne
shock troops \\-02re made sImultaneously
\vIth the dIVe bombers neutl ahzing th'e
aIrdrome uefense d?!1Yng the landmg-s.
It was found that the prehmmary bomb
mg atta('ks had really been close re('on
naIssance to pin point the AA and other
ground defenses. These were. then svs
tematlcally neutralized when the real at
tack took place.
the all'drome Itself may be entirely a land
operatIOn. Agam parachutists may land
at mght and attempt to seize the air
drome by stealth and surprise.
The Defense
AIl"fields WIth runways for modern
bombers are not easy to hIde, but where
there are no runways they can be pretty
dIfficult to find Jf the au-craft are not III
eVidence on the ground.
The ground defenses definitely can and
Illu<:;.t bl' hidden, however. The Idea of a
:'Ilagmot defense surroundmg the aIr
dlome IS ruled out. PIll boxes which are
almost impossible to hIde, cannot be
moved when they have been located. Field
\\lorks should therefore take the form of
bht trenches and open gun emplacements,
all carefully camouflaged. Some mush
I'oom type pIll boxes a1'e permiSSible.
The questIOn of the mrdrome battle
HQ opE'}'atwns rooms, etc., IS really a sub
Ject in itself, but obviously it should be
\\Tell off the aIrdrome proper and in its
own ddenderl locality.
The natUl'e of probable form of attack
mdI('ates that a fairly mixed force is
lequlletl to deal with It
(a) AA artillery-to deal with attack
Ing aIrcraft and troop can-iers.
tb) Infantry-to protect AA artillery
fmm ground attack and for norma]
Riound defense mIl'
(c) A mobile fOl'Ce-to rQund up para
chutISts and attack enemy concentrations.
ThIS force \'.'ould conSIst of infantry (In
l\lT) U'lth ('arners, field artillery, and if
pOSSIble, tanks; some form of A.F.V. is
Countel'atta('k on the airdrome,
<>;hlluld It be temporarily lost, would be
mduded as a secondary role.
Object of t he Defense
Ref01 e WIth tactical plans it is
well to be qUite cleal as to the object of
the defense. This may be stated as
"To secU) e the airdrome for use by
O\ll' own aircraft To attam thIS object
It 13 ObVIOUS that the enemy must be
use of the Ull'drome and that the
on the ground must be pro-
Tactical Plan
A fixed conceptIOn of the ideal plan is
not sounu. but a baSIC doctnne can be out
lined It must embody
(a) E,,'ery lo('ahty must be capable of
all upwards.
(c) MobilItY-SInce It IS unhkely that
a force WIll be available to ade
quat('ly cov(,1' all open spaces III the
As fOI all system5 of ground defense it
must be bUilt up on a series of defended
localItIeS. each not less than a platoon
ami ul'l'anged for all 'round defense.
These lo('alitles in turn should be linked
With .the company layout, and the whole
wil In. The flexibIlity is obtained by
havmg alternatIve pOSItions within the
company localItIes and the troops trained
for mobz1e tasks.
The \new IS held In some quarters
both AA guns and field artIllery should
be located wlthm these defended locaii
tie::., so that sItmg becomes a pt<obiem ill
volvmg lequirements of all arm:; con
cerned, and some compromise is ineVI
table. The AA guns must be sited to cover
the an'dl'Ome against direct attack and
some infantry localitIes must be SIted to
it with small arms fire. Ground
will invariably dictate, but in all but
exceptIOnal cases these localities must be
clear of the perimeter of the airdrome
and statton buildings.
The inclination to rtng the station WIth
defended posts must be avoided as this
invariably leads to difficulties in arrang
mg zones of fire. Again ground will bt'
the controlling factor.
Depth must be obtained and thIS 15
found by haVIng "mner localIties" and
"outer localities." The "inner localItIes"
Wlll be responsIble directly for denymg
the enemy the use of the landing ground
and WIn be prImarily sIted for command
of it. They will not contemplate a mobtle
role but should rather be m the form. ..... f
self-contained units capable of holdmu
out for some tlme If cut off from sources
of supply They must therefore be amply
sloeked WIth ammumtIOn, food and wilter,
and medI('al supplies. As long as they a1 e
not overrun the enemy cannot use the
aIrdrome. The "outer localIties" should
be well clear of the station, covering it
from "outSIde" attack. Some field artIl
lery must be able to brIng fire to bear on
the audrome, preferably using open
sigbts from theIr localItIes, but the pri
mary task of the troops III these locali
tIes will be
(a) Locatmg enemy forces hy usc of
(b) Destroymg enemy forces !.eforc
they can concentrate.
As far as possible they should be dIS
posed to cover tactical features of value
to the enemy':. When mobIle tasks are
a 'E.kplpton defpnse furc\" must
be ,left In the defended locality. A resel ve
m the hand of the StatIOn Commander
must not be overlooked. ThIS reserve
should be "hIdden" untIl reqUIred for
local counter attack or "dog fighting"
among the statIOn bUIldmgs
AA Defense
Whether the AA guns should be located
wlthm defended localIties or only between
the lllner and outer localItIes is a debat
able pomt, but whichever tactical plan IS
adopted, there must be at least two alter
natIve 'posItions for each gun They must
not be too close and guns must mOve
qUickly durmg any lull III the attack
(lesson from Crete).
Defensive Wire
The ordinary prmciples for field de
fenses apply! namely, aVOId ":.tandan1"
construction; use mgenuity; hide- wire III
hedges, etc.; use trIp wires.
Cable telephone system IS the> most
lsfactory, With loud speakers, but It IS
not likely to last under enemy 'lttack.
IntercommunicatIOn by R/T must be per
fected and the pOSSIbIlity of using VIsual
signals not dIscarded.
Antitank Defense
This must not be overlooked. Bofors
crews and field artillery are traIned in
thIS role. Infantry must be tramed in
Camouflage and Concealment
To be of any real value thIS feature of
the defense must be really b.oth
m respect to aIT and ground
ThIS is ODe element that can be defimtely
tested as to effect. It. reqUIres constant
maintenance. and expert advice should be
sought. Camouflage and concealment does
not stop at nets, pamt, use of _
Other vital aspects are track dl8l!Iphne
and dummy field works inc1udmg Ilnt too
obvious wire to mISlead the enemy.
German Defensive Reinforcements
[Translated in the War Department, Washington, D.C., from
the Red Army newspaper K,.asnaya Zvezda 25 March 1942.]
On many sectors of the front the Ger
mans usually occupied small villages
which they used as the basis of their de
fensive plan. The area outside the village
was not occupIed by troops except where
positions were previously pre-manned by
automatic rIflemen and machine gunner,:,.
In using villages for defensIve posi
tions, such villages usually straddled the
road; and the Germans counted on the
difficulty in moving off the roads in win
ter. Our troops, however, used the inter
vening spaces and operated agamst thE'
open flanks, and supported by artillery
and aviation they were successful.
.. A,.,.. I"nksun

In all around defense. such as we met
m one sector of the western front where
the Germans occupied tbe forest UDolgi,"
(see Sketch No.1), not only were the
VIllages defended but also the intervening
areas. In such places a whole net of dug
outs, machme-gun nests and pill boxes
was developed. Firing positions were
e.che>lonE'd in depth. Mortar batteries were
placed along the whole front. Roads lead
ing up to pos1tions were covered by anti
tank guns. Some weapons were placed
outs1de the village toward the front.
The Germans paid great attention to
Germans, was found
papers. Upon comparing the plan With
actual preparations it was found to he
almost fully executed. The only difference
was that there were fewer dugouts than
shown and the wire obstacles had not yet
been completed, probably due to lack of
The wooded area was a net of ground
works. Some were machine-gun nests and
others "dzott" or dugouts. Along the edge
of tbe forest they dug trenches in the
snow in which they had machine-guns;
they also dug connectmg trenches to all
The depths of the dugout averaged six
and a half feet and were of dIfferent
SIzes from 6x9 to 12x16 feet; the walls
were lme>d with boards or timbers. For a
roof ther: were: 2 to 4 thicknesses of
beams covered by 16 to 24 inches of dirt;
It appeared as a small mound of earth
about three feet high. In every dugout
wel'e wooden bunks and a stove. If the
dugout was used as a gun position, the
gun mount was placed on a wooden table i
finng was done thrugh one or two aper
tures. The Germans frequently placed
such gun pOSitIOns on elevatIOns and in
open tel'ram.
The Germans made extensive use of
('ommUTIlCatIOn trenches dug III the snow.
These snow tre-nches were also used for
finng pomL:-. in fonvard positions Some
times snow banks were piled up in front
of the dugouts as obstacles on the roads.
For the remammg structures used by
the Germans, the "fire points" deserve
specml attentIOn These "fire pomts" are
used for 360" field of fire and are octag
onal In ::.hape. They al e hned WIth tim
be>l', and personnel may fire from either
standing or kneeling positions. Firing is
done through apertures m tbe wall. In
the center of thIS structure is a protectIve
dugout for personnel not on duty.
The' depth of such German positIOns
extends two or two and a half miles to
the rear.
Where there IS no opportunity to go
around such pOSItIOns our troops rush
them. The success of an assault depends
first of all on careful study of the defen
SIve system, the type of defensive works
and the dISposition of fire power.
A careful reconnaIssance will disclose
vulnerable spots. In attackmg a wooded
area, such as shown m the sketch, artil.
lery must dehver a heavy preparatory
Special ('are must be taken to insure
complete coordmation bet\veen infantry,
artillery and tanks of attacking troops.
It has sometimes been found useful to
haVe> some mfantry rIde on the tanks.
The>se men can seize the" first objectives
and greatly aSSIst units followmg the
Planning An Attack Against a Village
[An article originally appearmg in Russian newspaper
!\rasnaya Zve.zda. Reprmted from an English trans1ation appear
A section of regimental artiBery is us- .
unIly E.>mployed for close support in an
attack. These guns are definitely at
tached to the compames. They are ex
Canndtan Army T1'uwing
.vOTE: Vtllages 111 the ViCHl1ty of
the southwestern flout zn RliSSla un'
"gene)'ully qlllte lurge u'lth poplIla
tlOns of from 1,000 to 5,000. They
gellcrally sprawl over a unde a1 en
tn a nver valley or uro/, nd ponds.
Cottages jaCa'ng the stt'eet stand be
hmd u'hzttle fences aud have lUI ge
htchen gardells, also fenced. at the
Wmter condItIOns have forced the Ger
mans to cpnter their whole defensIve 5yS
tf'll towns and villages, The- en
emy have been aVOldmg fightmg In the
open. Often, well prepared defensIve po
sitions in front of towns or vIllages or
between them are held wIth much less
tenaCIty than eVE'ry house and evelY
street This B easily undel stood; the men
prefer to die fightmg rather than
mg to death.
The concentratIOn of forces m towns
,and vIllages has forced the enemy to
leave gaps, or lIghtly held areas. along
the front. ThIS has enabled us to make
WIde use of the tactICS of penetratIOn,
mfiltratlOn and fiankmg operatIOns to cut
off enemy strong pomts; but at the same
tIme these tactICS have mereased our dlf
It has forced us to reduce every
'Village as If It were a fortress, and street
fightmg has been partlculal'ly bitter and
The defendmg garrIson can turn any
house mto a btrong pomt. and often It IS
more dIfficult to find out where these
strong points are than It IS to reduce
them atter they have been dIscovered.
It IS the surprise nature of enemy fire
In the VIllage that hns the ef
fect. If the attache1 IS not thoroughly
acquainted WIth the layout of the pd.!'
ticular town 01' VIllage, nasty surpilses
aWait hIm at every turn. On the other
hand, If one hat:. a thorough knowledgt'
of the place hefOlehand, It IS
to foresee where the enemy 11101 tars and
MG's al'e hkely to be located and escape
enfiladmg fire.
In our battalion we have a fIxed lUle,
before an attack we must obtain a de
tmled plan of the layout of the vlllage
Its :;,treets, squares and If such
a plan is unobtamable we mu."t make It
up ourselves by questlOl1lng the mhabI
tants of neighbormg vIllages_ WIth such
a sketch one can usually gouess the en
emy's scheme of and where hIS
mam weapons ate lIkely to be, We then
send out scouts WIth defiIllte obJ('rti\oe::.
for theIr reconnaIssance_ The attack It'
then so organized as to get around the
strong points of the ene-my and get at
thE.>m from behind. For instaHce, a COI1l
mander knows pe-rfectly well that a largt;'
square is lIkely to be covered by ('}'o,",s
fire from sevelal dIfferent pOints and
therefore he would aVOId such a spot
He would probably advance behmd
fences, through, bU11dmgs and bach gat
and hIt the enemy m the rear.
It would appear that in any town 01
vil1age one's power of maneuver is lImited
-but there is no reason why It can not
be extended. The street may be straIght,
but there is no reason to advance along
it m a stratght line. In sending out
scouts we demand that they not only dn,
cover the stlong pomts of the enemy but
also find covered means of approach_ It
..lfemorandum Number 15 June
IS Ulllmportant If there are no streets
01' lanes Il:'aJmg to It, or that they may
hf' blocked_ Infantry ran still get to Its
ObjectIve by gomg through walls to ef
fert pnse, and sUl'pl'be IS always the
nuun lever of victory_
Some time ago our battalion was tak
mg the VIllage of Klndeloek. On Its way
,to Its objertlVe the platoon of J UnJor
Llcutl;'nant Davidov got mto a bhnd al
ley_ Davldov knew about the existence
of this blind alley and that behmd It was
a large yard 5.urrounded by farm build"
Ings which would probably be employed
as :"tl'ong pombo by the enemy. Another
platoon was attackmg these buildings
from a rhffei"e-nt dllectIOn. but DavIdov
declIled to bleak through the wall of a
barn, WhICh formeu thIS blmd alley, in
ordel to emerge on the other SIde and
attack the enemy m the lear. ThIS he
did and the sudden blow surpnsed the
FascI:=,ts who gave way and ran.
Control of compapies and platoons
very difficult durmg stl eet fight
mg', The narrow WIdth of the
front (>nahlcs balson to be m
depth by the rham method and Jt mo::,t
llnpoltant that commanders should keep
well up With the troops, The sruttered
natu! e of the Villages 1ll WhIch we have
to do our fightmg does not hinder thiS
1,ll1o of haI&On, If a platoon or company
moves away flam the mam aXIS of at
tack, we uetach more men for lIaison
!n fightmg It IS most Important
to have the closc':>t contact hetween In.
fantlY anu wpportmg al"t1llery. In an
opell field of Lattle, gunners can eaSIly
dl ... tmgUlsh the locatIOn of our own men
.1l1d the enemy. hut 10 stre"'t fightmg thIS
hcrOllU':. llllpo":,slble_ There IS an old ele
mental y rule that as soon a,; the Infantry
lcaches a gn'en bound In the course of
an attack a Vel ey ::Hgnal IS fired.
Unfoltunately thIS lule IS not alv.ays
oh::-.el \oell, "ome commandel',,> prefer to
l\eep in touch \\Ith the artIllery by
of field telephone, others send bach
mounted lilspatch ndl'l's Whl('h wastes
valuable time. ThIS IS the method We
have adopted: hefore the attach we agree
wIth the gunnel s as to the type of Verey
tha1 WII! be fired at the end of
earll bound. and as :;:,oon as the bound IS
I tlus SIgnal IS fired_
The advance of the urtIIleI y keeps
Ihlll' \\ itlt thf' advancc of the mfantry
clusively over open sites. Rome-times guns
are actually emplaced in occupied build
mgs. In the same village of Kladezek
the following things happened: the en
emy held a barn behind the village in
some strength and covered an approaches
to it by heavy mOrtar fire; repeated at
tempts by our infantrymen to get to this
barn failed; they then dragged one of
our 76-mm infantry guns mto a hut on
the out-skirts of the village and the third
shE'll silenced the mortars-the strong
pomt \\-as destroyed.
The fightmg inSIde towns and villages
IS mostly close fightmg, and hand gre
nades, bottles of lllcendiary mixture and
shootmg at dose range have the widest
use. We are constantly teaching our men
the"e methods in lulls between fighting.
Each new battle fOt a village brIngs up
::;ome new pomt or experIence which must
be pas<,ed on to the troops_
Unce when we were attacking a VIllage
a group of the enemy began to retreat_
Two of our men noticed thIS and decided
to get around them and ambush them.
A fter the first few shots knocked out
home of the FaSCists the rest scattered
among the buildings and began to fire
from thf>m We were f01"('ed to besiege
each bUlldmg, and hence we came to the
following conclusion: that ambushes are
very uheful but should be arranged at
some dI::,tance behmd the village so that
the enemy could not use the cover of
buildmgs. It IS much easier to destroy
the enemy m the open, and it is not dif
ficult to set ambushes when flanks of the
enemy are WIde open, and therefore now
we always st'nd out an ambush party at
the begmning of an attack on a village.
It IS never safe to assume that the
village IS free of the enemy unless every
building is checked. Once we occupied a
VIllage and advanced beyond It, some
suppers arrIved to destroy mmes and
booby-traps set by the enemy when sud
ut:'nly they were met by machme-gun fire
cOllllng from one of the hUb. Thh, wa..,
.t German \\'ho managed to conceal him
self from us. Now we make the most
careful check of every bUIlding. If we
or('upy and remain m a vlllage we Im
medUl.tely send out patrols to check the
mhabltants of every house. If the bat
talIon has to. move on Immediately, this
check IS earned out by detachments de
tailed for the recovery of captured
w(>apons and eqUlpment. A partIcularly
careful check must bE' made of all the
celiars. lofts and barm; whIch might hal'w
bor the
Overcoming Mine Obstacles
[An article translated at the Command and General Staff
S.chool, Fort LE.>avenworth, Kansas) from the> Russian newspaper
1\.J asnaya Z"(.'czda 11 June 1942.]
Combat expel Ience that success
of artlUn agamst mine obstacle":! depends
above all on sklllful orgamzation of en
gmeer Thorough en
g'meer ha1l always been
frUitful; It has been helpful in the speedy
neutl"ahzatlOn of enemy mmes and m
c1eanng the way for the- advanCIng in
The Germans employ the most varied
forms of mine obstacles. It 15 true that
no large nune fielus have been encount
ered on our sector of the front. The Ger
man::. usually mine small areas which
not infrequently are closely adjacent.
These mine obstacles are of anti-infantry,
antitank and combined ttpes.
Lately, cases have been observed where
detonation of one mine caused ImmedIate
dE.>tonatlOn of mines placed alongside the
first. To accomplh.h this the Germans
place a long, narrow board on top of
::.everal mines, or they attach cables to
one nune from several sides and connect
them with fuses of adjacent m.ines. Thus,
should a tank hIt such a mine It would
not be the only object to suffer damage.
The detonation of other mines may do
damage to other tanks or to troops rid
ing atop them_

rows, m isolated cases 5 or 6 rows_ UntIl
recently the Germans were placing mmes
In a strIct checkerboard design which
made It easy to locate them. At present
the Germans do not maIntain prE'CISe In
tervals between mIllE'S_ On the fields
WhICh were recently clearelj. by us the
mtervals between mmes were anywhere
flom 15 to 7 feet
The so-called "mextractable" German
mines are encountered WIth increased
frequency. In order to prevent our sap
pers from hftmg the mme, the Germans
attach a speCIal fuse at the bottom of
the mIlle to which a cord i::, tierL As the
sapper, who supposedly has rendered the
111Ine harmless lIfts the mme, the pin to
wInch the cord IS fastened is released
and the bottom fuse detonates the mIne
m the sapper's hands. I n order t-o de
CCl\'e our sappers the Germans sometimes
mIx such mines In among of the
common tj'pe Therefore, before lIftIng
the mine the "upper should walk about
165 to 200 feet away and pull the cord
attached to the mIne. Thus a check can
Le made on whethel' thel'e is another
fuse at the bottom of the mme.
In speakmg about antI-Infantry llllnes
employed by the mentIOn must
be made of their mmes." The
prInCiple of theIr actlOn IS based on a
charge whIch causes the mine to Jump
upwal ds, \\I hereupon the mine
at about a man's height, scattermg
shtapnel to a dIstance of about 33 feet
on all However, our sappers have
soon found weak pomls in these Jump
ITIg nunes and have Jllvented the Dleans
for combattlng them A mine of thIS
type has dead space When a man fall':>
to the ground the splinters will fly over
hIm. When on the move the roads must
be carefully watched, and sappel'S should
be called as soon as a mIlle Ib found
For antI-Infantry uctlOn the Gel'mans
also employ various tricky land mmes.
They COnSlf:>t of standard, metal covered
charges. Thel'e are two or three opemngs
for fuses_ The charges are square, also
round (resemLling food cans). Mines of
thl::l type are usually placed In houses.
bath-houses. bal ns, under gates, neal'
fences, on tree'S, etc. When the \vork of
sappers IS careful these mmes arE'
bpeedtly rendeied harmless
The mam thmg for the sapper IS to
locate the mIned area To accomplIsh
thIS, German methods and habIts should
be known_ In wooded terrain the Ger
mans as a rille mIlle the out<:;kirts of the
forest. lanes cut through the forest,
glades. paths, roads and intervals be
tween E.wamps_ In working on the out
shlrts of a forest and on approaches to
populated POints we have frequently
countered slgnalhng nnnes WhICh were
dug Into the ground 01' suspended from
tree:-_ COld 0.1. a thm \'\H'e attached to
the pIll was carefully camouflagued in
the grass_ As. Sooon as. one of our scouts
inadvertently touched the cord or wire.
a heavy e).plosion took place, which
served as a signal for the Germans who
then opened fire_ When engaged in re
connaIssance our sapper.:. efforts
to find such signallmg mines and render
them harmless, and of late there was not
a single case where such mines revealed
the movement of our scouting party.
The sapper should not only be brave
and possess special knowledge but he
should also have a keen sense of pre
ception. A mine locator and a probe are
not alonE' to be depended on. One must
be able to develop hiS eye In order to
find characteristIc symptoms which lead
to locatIOn of mme fields. In thIS respect
the sapper group command by Lleutenant
Seriy IS well trained. Mines whIch are
placed III glades and dells are located
by his men among clusters of flaCCId or
yellowed grass. Mined trees are revealed
by cut and broken branches' I.e" by
those signs WhICh the Germans leave in
order to themselves recogmze danger
areas. In populated points sappers seek
nnnes wherever there are protruding
rope and wire and fence markmgs_
It is most difficult to notIce a mIned
road 01' path from a distance. However.
even here the sappers tramed eye noUces
mdlcatlons of mines such as fresh
mounds, traces of work and thin wires
or COl d runnIllg from underground. These
symptoms should be well kno\vn not to
l'iappers alone but to infantry scouts as
well. When it IS belIeved there are
nlInes in the area, sappers proceed care
fully to examme the ground WIth the
aid of mine locators and probes.
The sapper should be able to work
" WIth SkIll III any pOSItion, particularly
when lymg on the ground III wl'uch po
SItion he must most frequently \vork on
the battlefield under enemy fire.. As the
passage for tanks and mfantry IS cleared,
the sapper commander contacts com
manders of UDIts engaged in the ad
vance and gIves them preCIse directIons
on the route they are to follow. Follow
jng thiS the sappers Immediately begin
reronnal.ssance of the ne).t enemy de
fensive line in the dIrectIOn of advance_
,V hen we encounter a mine field we
strive to lendeI- It harmless unbeknown
to the enemy_ We detonate the mines
whIle artillery is firing_ Frequently this
produces great effect. One of our units
had the mission of advancing against
the enemy flank and delivering an un
expected blow_ The group of sappers
commanded by Lieutenant Tyukov took
advantage of the artillery cannonade
and unbeknown to the enemy de-mined
several mine fields at the junction of
two German battalions. The Germans
did not expect our attack from this di
rectIOn whIch was so thoroughly pro
tected by antitank and anti-infantry
nllnes. Our unit crossed the de-mined
area and suddenly appeared within the
enemy pOl'iitIOn. The miSSIon was suc
cessfully e}"ecuted.
\Ve employ a simple method for de
lllllllng roads, paths and forest lanes_ We
have rollers made from thick trees{The
roller has an axle to each end of \'vhich
ropes are ticd_ Men pull the roller Whjch
by Its weIght presses the fuses of the
placed on the road and causes
them to explQde_
Frequently, sappers of our battalion
must act jomtly With tanks during com
bat, clearing the way for the latter
through mine fields_ When preparing for
a tank attack we send a large group of the
most experIenced. sappers Wlth general
and tank reconnaissance_ During recon
naIssance these sappers render enemy
uunes harmless and clear passages. The
sapper groups which follow them contmue
thIS work. If the advance must be de
veloped WIth speed, sappers are mcluded
In ndmg atop tanks. They help
tank crews keep the proper course and
tlnve through the cleared passages. As
t9.nks !pave the mmed area behInd them,
the sappers alight from the vehicles and
bE'gm to clear the eptlre area of mmes.
Defeat of a German Center of Resistance
[Translated at the Command and General Staff School, Fort
Leavenv.orth, Kansas. from a RUSSIan artIcle m Krasnaya Zvezda
7 June 1942.]
Among the May battles whIch took
place on the northwestern front, there
should be smgled out a one-day engag-e
ment Involvmg a certam unit_ ThIS en
gagement is characterized by the pre
CISIon of Its conception, execution and the
coordmated action of the varIOus arms.
The mission which was aSSIgned to the
umt consIsted III capturing three villages
situated on a road net in a terrain whIch
afforded seC'l'ecy m the concentration of
forces. llilIs with convement approaches,
prevalent in this sector, were to be help
ful In thIS operatIOn and It IS therefore
easy to understand that the Germans
tried every means III order to retaIn pos
seSSIOn of such favorable positlOns_ The
enemy had converted yery VIllage into a
point of resistance which was fortified
over a perIOd of several months. Alto
gether thIS was a powerful center of re
SIstance with a great number of dugouts
and mine fields strongly protected by
automatic weapons, mortars and artIllery
includmg antitank guns. As much as an
enemy regIment was engaged in defend
mg thIS center of resistance.
uur forces succeeded in lIqmdatmg en
emy units sItuated on the hills which were
directly covermg the center of resistance.
AII these hllh:., and espeCIally one of
them, dommate the terrain. For them the
German pOSItIOns forming the center of
\vere Visible III depth_ In thIS
111anner chances for"the organization of
combat for the capture of these populated
pomts were enhanced.
The attack began after a thorough
reconnaissance executed by the umt com
mander from several pomts on the ter
ram and after a many-sided preparation
fo!: which there was suffi-
At 5 :30 artillery opened fire simul
taneously agamst the full depth of the
defense This fire was from both open
and conceaJed P?SItlons. Enemy dugouts
and finng pOSItIOns III three centers of
resistance were placed under intensive
fire Guns of grea.t power were firing at
the German artIllery positions far in the
rear of the vlllages.
I t IS necessary to note one detail which
showS' how. well the
wa::. conceIved_ Durmg the mght, gun
C} e"\vs erected platforms for fire from
open pOSItIOns. At the appointed hour.
the artIllerymen rolled out their guns
fmm the concealments and opened fire.
In thiS particular umt we have observed
the followmg pIcture. The Gennans
opened strong fire from their heavy
tars agamst ?Ul' guns _which Were firing
wIth_ oppn SIghts. :Fmding themselves
wlthm the zone of frequent explosions of
enemy shells, our gun crews rolled their
guns back into the concealments ,and a
lit.t.le lawr roU{'d theU'\ back a.gain onto
the platforms. contmUIng to fire wlth
open sights. In this manner It \\a8 pos
sible to avojd unne-cp<;sal'Y casualties and
at the same time fire accuratel,Y.
All preparatjon"> for the battle were
executed with secrecy Thel'efore the
massed artillery nre 'which 1:'\0 suddenly
oroke down on tht> enenlY appmelltly
the German" It ehal ach'l'
l::.tIC that the Gl'1 man", thd not opl'n fll ('
from their distant artIllery pOSitIOn"
tIl after fOl ty II1111UtCS had elap<:>etl
The strongest arl111ery firl' W[lS concen
trated on tho,:,e objects which W(,I'(' to be
Immedmtdy attacked by our mfantr:,. and
tank!:> Accoldmg to the
plan, the mam effort was dllected agaillst
thc pOint of In thp tllst \'lllag'c
!'It,uatcd due south of the attaclnng- fOI'c/.'"
(c;C'e skl'tch). Not untn after de!:>tructlOn
of the' enemy battalion defending tIns
pomt \\,ould It be po<;slbh' to depend on a
"ucces,,>ful dc\elopment of thp
ment \Vlth its however.
a hreach was to formed \vhlch \\:15 to
111stulb the ::.y:::tem of fin.' of the ('ntile
center of reslstan('C' l'onvl'} .:;ply, bhnv'
ag-amst German POSitIon::, 1ll t he two nc'{t
VIllages did not au):!ul' the solu
tlOn of the genel al problem If reSl<;tnnc('
continued In the first Village. 1t Ie, iO!
thl!:> I ca"on that at. t.he beglnnmg OUI .11
tllll'l'Y dll ('ctpd the great of Its fire
on thiS particular c('nter of I eSlstance
At a slgnal, an attack agaInst
In the first Village began at 7:00 At the
same tlml' auxiliary forces began actIOn
ag-amst other pomb of It'sH;tance, The
latter actIOns we!,!", for the tlllle bemf!', III
the nature of delllnf,<;tlutIOU'S In order to
comrl1lt enemy forces
The attack wa", cool'dlllated T:lllk:.
\\ent forwmd from theh
tions dosch' followed by mfantry. Hele
e;el'tam details should he noted
Excellent I cconnalssanct:' of terlam
and encmy obc;tacles enabled the ,(,Ol'l'ect
markmg of the l'oute of tanks dUrIng the
battle. Passages were cleared by the
pers through mme fields. passages,
as well as the entire route, wele indicateu
by markert;. Thus every tank crew drove
Its vehicles With assurance, Without fear
of hitting mmes or a bog with which the
tt:'rrain abounded. During the periQd of
preparatIOn all tank personnel became
faJl1liJar WIth the groups of infantry
which, during the attack, were to be 'J)ro
wcted by the tank's armor. All tanks
were numbered and the numbers were in
!:>rrlhed WIth chalk on the tanks and stood
out pronllnently. Each groUp of mfantry
men knew Its tank. and everyone careful-
I\' watched the v(>hlclp Commanders of
t'1-ll1k:> and of lIlfantl'y groups established
::,.11mals and were carefully watchmg each
1.t hpl Therefol e mfantry and tanks ucterl
111 ,"oncert and mfanh'ymen did not bl'eak
a\\<lY fl0m thpJ\' \eh}('}e'3_
C'oop('ratJon With regard to tIme and
.,t.lgc" of ndvance was so organIzed that
then' \\t'It' no spn,lu'" delays durmg the
C!lUI of tht' After l'eaGh
!Ilg a pi e-tINel mme!1 11ll!;"' the arullery
f}j pI! a <;l nes of rockets to Signal the mo
ment for twnsff'l' of artillery fire. and the
,Itta('k fol1owpd llnmeulutely. Tanks and
III f.l11t I y broke mto the VIllage Wlthm
three hours the remaining enemy firing
positions were liquidated. At 10 :00 the
lmportant point of resistance fell.
It is sigmficant that our tanks did not
suffer losses. A portion of enemy anti
tank weapons were silenced even prior
to the attack, while the remaining ones
were being silenced by the accurate fire
of tank guns from tanks which were pro
ceedmg the infantry. Of thirty-.four
enemy antitank guns only a few surVIved
The artillery cooperated by successive
concentrations of fire on objects which,
at the tIme, were under the immediate
attack of tanks and infantry. Thus. dur
mg the second stage of the battle, our
artillery directed the mam mass of its fire
agamst the pomt of reSIstance situated
III the village to the south of the first. As
soon as our assault group reached this
pomt closely followmg the retreating and
disorgamzed enemy units, a new series
of rockets were fired and the artIlJer:,.r im
medlately transferred Its tire. Our as
sault and holding groups, engaged in thls
sector. attacked simultaneausly_ At 16:00
the second pomt of resistance fell.
In the meantime our second holding
group engaged the enemy at the ap
proaches to the third vIllage and our ar
tillery opened fire> against these German
positions. Enemy resistance at this point
was partIcularly violent. The Germans
made use of the stream which flowed in
fl'ont of thell' fl'ont hne of reS)st8nce.
In thIS final stage of the engagement our
aviatIOn was brought in to aid the jn
fantry. ImmedIately follOWing the aIr
bombardment our assault group attacked
the Gel"man positions from the east. while
the holdmg group attacked from the
west At 18:00 the engagement ended
With complete defeat of the entire center
of resistal1('e
Of intel e8t III thiS engagement is the
maneuver of the assault group whIch
was successfully coordmated WIth the
actIOn of aU}.lhary groups. As is seen
flam the 5hPtch, the group was
attachmg directly south. After captur
mg two village5 In successIOn It turned
we">t. all the time keeping In readiness
means and forces for repelhng any os
Sible counterattack., against its flanks.
Its attacks W'I e cool-dmated with attacks
of connecting g'IOUpS on the Hanks_ Dur
lUg thIS act10n thf'le no confusion
">llch as is sometImec; observed when
forces are weakly led and when cooper
atIon IS poorly ol'gamzed.
The Life of Artillery Pieces
[An artIcle m Ejelcito (Spain) June 1942, which was reprinted
from the German U'ehl'techlllsche Monatsheftc, Translated from
til' Spulllsh at the Command and Gent:'l"al Staff School, Fort Leav
enworth. Kansas. J
If we desire the longest life possible
fl'om any tit'em m. includIng artillery
plect's, It IS neccssal-y that certam rules
Le obsPl'vcd not only In time of peace
but a\Pto w tlllle of war Along WIth our
effol't'3 to iUlprove ballIstIC properties of
firearm." we should also make an effort
to lncrea'3f> theII' length of hfe. There IS,.
Il1vnhcJ In tlll" effort not only ronsidera-l
tion of d. tactical nature due to necessary
dlllllllutlOn of better actIVity till a gun
can be repIaceJ but also consideratIOns of
a technIcal nature due to the dIfficulty
lD oiJtainillg steel tIme of
The 11fe of a gun varies greatly de
pen(ilng on of materiel involved.
Fw-t of all it IS determined by heat of
combustIOn and amount of propulsive
charge employed. The larger the caliber
Df the gun, the more rapJdly wJlI it wear
out Powders containmg a large propor
tion of mtroglycerme are particularly
hai'mful. Also. ammunition emplOYIng a
shell to hold the propulSIve charge causes
mOle damage than ammunitIon WIth
which a separate charge IS employed.
Naturally. the better the steel from
WhICh a gun tube is made, the longer
the tube wlll last, too, the dlivmg band
should not offer too great resistance or
the edges of the lands III the barrel rifling
Will be slowly worn away. something
which occurs when drivmg' bands are
made of too hard copper or of substitutes
such as Iron.
The form of the powder chamber and
characteristics of the nfhng also influ
ence the length of hfe of thE:l tube. The
powder chamber should be of a size con
sistent wIth temperature of
the powder employed and should not be
joined too abruptly with the rifled por
tion. Likewise, the pitch of the rIfling
should not be too great and the edges
should not be too sharp, but rather the
point of their Juncture with the lands
should be rounded.
There IS conSiderable difference in
length of life between tubes of the same
These difference:; are due m&mly
to variations in constItutIOn of the pro
Jectiles, dlfferent forms of fire employed.
type of service they have been used for
as we-U as the care and attentIOn be
!:.towed on them. If they are subjected
to contmuous' and rapid fire wIthout
proper attentIOn to cooling. their lives
will be conSIderably shortened. FOt, thIS
reason the tubes of rapid-fil'e guns are
regularly shorthved. Good placement of
the prOjectile when the gun IS fired will
lengthen the life of the tube. In addition.
effort should be made to keep the inSIde
of the tube perfectly clean and evenly
greased and poltshed, keepmg it perfectly
smooth, OtherWIse rough spots will serve
as a pomt of attack for powder gasses,
destroying the bore.
In the case of the German 71mm field
guns, average dUratIOn of the tube dur
ing the last World War vaned between
J5.000 and 20,000 rounds. In the case of
the french 75-mm gun, thiS length of
life is at the present tllne between 6,000
and 23.00U rounds. (During the World
War the tubes of the French field gun:;
becaIne useless after 8,500 rounds.)
Generally speakwg. m works treatmg
of the subject one ha5 to he contented
With a statement of the characteristics of
varlOUS tubes III terms of the average
number of rounds of which they are ca
pable befol'e beeommg useie&s. Accord
ingly, we find that Culmann m hIS
Tacttque d'Artzllerie (Paris. 1937) gives
the following figures for the length of
hfe of the tubE'S of thp French artIllery:
Weapon of Rounds
75-rnm cannon ____________ 12,000
155-mm howllzpr __ .7,000
155-mm long-range cannon
(Grande pUIssance Filloux) 3,500
305-mm naval cannon _______ 1,200
The tubes of English cannon, accol d
ing to the NazlOne e of Decelllbel
1939, have only the followmg length of
Cahbcl of Rounds
75-mm _____ _______ 4,000
lOOmm . ... ... ..... 740
127mm .______ 640
152-mm ________________ 400
20J-mm ___________________ 250
234-mm _________________ . __ 200
2M-mm ____ ._ 160
:J05-mm ____________________ 150
353-mm ____________________ 100
40G-mm _____________ about 80
A compal"ison of the figures gIven for
French and Enght-.h tubes shows clearly
the mferlOrity of the latter. Apparently,
It seems that In makmg up the figures
for the English tubes the lowest pos
slble figure for the hfe of the tubE'S was
taken. ThIS Idea 15 fully l'Onfilllled If
It IS considered that according to EnglIsh
figures. the English 406-111m cannon lusts.
but 80 l'ounds while the same caliber
tube In the Amencan the Lf5{) 1.\1
11 1919, arrordlng to the Eh-1I1Clds of
Ol'dnance has a length of life of 180
From the facts Just pomted out. It can
be deduced that the length of hfe of a
gun IS mftuenced not only by Its tecnnical
qualIttef. but also by citcumstauc(>s af
tectmg Its handling and employment.
Forward on Roads Off the Main Route of the Army
! [An artIcle translated at the Command and General Staff
School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from the German lU Al't111ens
hsche Rundschau Aprt11942.]
On'Jhlghw8!jS are indIcated J'

It bas repeatedly been the experIence
of our horse-drawn, heavy
battalion, that what apparently were the
best firing positions and observation posts
were of but use if bad roads made
it Impossible to reach them in time.
The heavy battalion, which IS located
farther to the rear than some other units,
was obliged to travel continually with its
heavy loads over roads which had already
been deeply cut by hundreds of vehicles;
yet it was supposed to reach its aSSIgned
position promptly and open fire at the
same time as the other weapons. Attempts
to solve thIS difficulty m the usual manner
resulted in long delays, stoppmg the col
umn and gettmg helplessly stuck on the
It IS not strange. therefore, that an
effort was ruade to seek other routes off
the main lines of travel. Our scouts dis
tinguished themselves III this work. Under
conditions obtaining in. the Russian the
ater of war, these scouts did more Impor
tant 'Work, at tImes, than the "artillery
scouting detachments.
such roads were to be found everywhere
according to the map, it required investi
gatIOn to determ,me whether or not they
were passable for our unit. In this man
ner therefore, with the scouts-lieuten
ants on horse back accompanied by dis
patch rIders-in the lead. our march to
and through Dvinsk was accom.plished
early in July 1941 through terrain which
was entirely unfamiliar, inhospitable
and trackless.
Where the highway from Kalvinski
crosses the ratlroad 20 miles south of
Dvmsk and runs on to the northwest
stood the first of the road markers erected
by our scouts. There It stood on the east
slde of the tracks mdicatmg dIrection to
the noHheast. These road markers proved
to be of conslderable value, especially On
new roads. They saved a great deal of
exertIOn on the part of the horses and
distinctly marked out the roads. It was
unnecessary to have dIspatch riders fol
low us, and mIstakes were thus avoided.
Yet it requll'ed a great deal of thought on
the part of scouts to place these markers
properly. They had to apply accurately
to the unit for WhICh they were mtended
and take mto conSIderatIon that the
troops occasionally might have to find
them at a very dIfferent time of day Or
even under very dlfferent weather con
Whlle waitIng at the above mentioned
railway crossmg for the following bat
tahon, we saw that 0. few men, m spite
of strict order<; to the contrary, were
letting- their field canteens down into the
deep well at the crossmg. They claimed
that the water tasted fine that it was
cold When they arrIved the Latvian
g-ualds at the crossing said, however, that
thIS we-II along WIth others had been pol
luted by the RUSSians We got lDto con
versation WIth them about condit jon of
the road we mtendpd to follow They ad
VIsed "trongly agamst It, As a matter of
fact. the road did not Impress us favor
ably at first, and aftRr runnmg for a
"hort dlstance into the woods appeared
to be nothmg but deep sand. But we were
able to detour around the bad place m
the woods, and we found it to be satis
factory - agam a proof that one should
not trust the statements of natIves. As a
matter of fact, we were able to get over
the road quite easily with our heaviest
loads-much more eaSily than we could
have over the heaVIly travelled main
route of the army. Gomg along on the
east SIde of the railway, we came to Tur.
mont. and, farther to the northeast,
Torzhok on Lake Demmen.
A day latel"> in order to av01d terrific
heat. we did not :;et out until late after
noon. 'the road now led eastward through
fields of wavmg grain and many mIles of
lonely fot'est. Here we met neIther friend #
nor enemy, and there was no SIgn of war.
Off to the SIde of the highway lay Briga,
Senberg, and Senheida.
The headquarters proceeding ahead of
. the battalIOn in the brIght moonlight
l1l!2'ht ran onto som;!- members of the vol
unteer Latvian reservists of the old
classes on the market square of Borovkl.
They asSIsted us rode in the tank for
a tIme. The battalIon reached Skrudelino
at dawn
The next day we were forced to fonow
the common highway as we went along
the Dvma m the direction of Koplau.
Since thel"> were a few deep raV'ines
which could be crossed only over this
highway. we could not foUow off to the tl'enlely naTrow. SDme, we found, were
slde over minor rural roads. very sandy and at the same time had
Early the next morning we again steep stretches which could not be im
abandoned the highway and proceeded proved or detoured. In order to exhaust
across fields and woods. At times the all possibilities, both mounted troops and
roads were so narrow that' there was the battahon headquarters went on a
just room for the carriages reconnaissance at the same time The
of the heavy howitzers; yet they all were relatlVely best road was selected by put
solid. Durmg the course of the day our ting together informatIOn obtamed by
arti11ery engmeers rendered good serv both detachments. On the road so chosen,
Ices. Gomg ahead on bicycles and armed the battalion then pushed ahead through
with picks and shovels, they l'emol,-ed all the entIre night and next morning. When
obstructions. In some place'" they had our mfantry started to break through
deep holes to fill; in others. marshy places the Stalm line to the east of Rossita in
to bridge. They quickly cut down trees as the afternoon, the heavy artillery
thIck as one's arm, cut them to the right also m po::.itlOn after a march of over
length and put them III place, forming a hours.
l'PgulatlDn cOlduroy road across the
That thE' battalion was able to accom
marshy stretch. Wholly wrecked bridg'es
plish all this was due to selection of new
across ravmes WIth streams m thpm no
routes whenevpr possible so that the
longer form an obstacle WhIle part of
horses had to use thell' entire strength
the men cut trees for gll'der8. and tran
m only a few places and were not drIven
soms, others brought up bIg rocks and
ahead over r(lads that were constantly
stonps for holdmg the matelial while a
thIrd crew plied Its shovels and threw
bad All this Ume the supply of fodder
earth on the structure A bl jdge built m
fOI the horses was very limited. They
this manner also helt! for the entIre di
were fed mamly on grass and leaves,
visIOn following.
which had to be gathered dUring every
We agam reached the mam highway In ..hort halt.
thIS manner at Kraslavka. the Flom Rosslta on. bemg m constant
Dvma at thiS pomt and then followed ('ontact With the enemy, the battallOn at
the highway, crossed m sevenll places by fin;t had to renounce the use of SIde
ravines. eastwal d to Poshavka Here roatls Up to that pomt the scouts who
after several hours I'est. we received an picked out the roads and restmg places
order at 9:00 P).J t(' contmue OUI mareh had aho fulfilled thpir other task, that
ThIS tIme load reconna1<;-:,ance had to b(' of furmshing close security. There must
carried out In total darkness The mam certamly have been many enemies scat
hlgh\\ays were cut entIrely to piecE'S so teleJ through these ,voods where we were
WI?' saw that if we were to get ahead at now the first tQ go. But the attentivene::.s
all, we would be forced to follow SIde of our mobIle scoutmg detachmE'nt con
I'oad", even though they mIght be ex- ,.tantly Inote-cted us agamst surpflse.
The Army Convalescent Depot in This War
[An artlcle wh1Ch appeared In JOUJ"lwl of the Royal Army JIedl
cal Crwps AprIl 1942 ]
In hIS book, OI'gali/zatlO/I, Strategy tlIne.., \vlthout retUlnmg to England at
and Tactl(,q of thp Army .Hedlcal SCI1'- all
lCCR llt U'ar, LIeutenant-Colonel T B. The lmJ down to run a Depot
Nicholls says' "Convalescent are 'If of a "mali nuc1eu<., of DfficE'l"s and
mtendt'd fOl' the receptlOn of officers and llI('n of the R A fiT C., one of which com
men who lequlI'e no further actIve treat 111<\,1.1::, the Unit. and about four offieNs
ment anJ who. though not yet fit for and fifty other ranks fJon, [ural/flY
are hkely to become so Within a The""(> membl"rs from the InfantlY
reasonable pel'lod. The orgamzatlOll. 11'(. "attached troops," as a Depot IS
therefore, IS \vith a two-fold d(>fimtelY:1 iH(>rlical lImt
anTI, to hasten convalescence an!I hardr.-n The medIcal wodl entailed IS fol
by graduated e'll:erCIses under medIcal "",u- low"'" (a) The medical (';\aunnatlOn of
pervlslOn and to retain Its occupants It mcn on and dl<;charge. (b)
also lelieves the stram III Geneml Has The medical dassifkatlOn of men on ad
pitals m tIme of emergency" ln1""-lOn, and the weeJdy
ConSiderable experience was galllt'd I,f mcn. This may entail the Ie
rlunng the 1a.5t war m the ol'ganizatlon cla"''''lhc'atlOl1 of sn.ty or seventy l11f'n
and runnmg of s.uch Depots. T!1e estab- ('\'I?' y day when the Depot IS full. (c)
hshment then was for 2.000 patIents pel' The nllnor tleatme-nt of wound" (d)
Depot. though there- were one 01' hH) The medlcal treatment of emergency 111
With greater capacity, up to 5,000 Ilf'''>;, \U .1 specw1 cletentlOll wanl of "I',
patients. to ten be(1s. (c) The snperVl::'lOn of
In summer t11e patIents can he aCC'OlU- 1'(,ll1erJwi treatment and cases of massage
modated in tents and marquees but hut- and the u..,e of ::; remedial ap
me-nts or exi-"tmg bmldmgs have to be patatus nevlsE'd by Dr. Mennel (f)
used m wmter. The ;,upel'VISIOn of PhYSIcal Traming
The men go through a graded trainIng Cla::."i(>s
so that they will fit for duty on dlS- Other duties which fall upon the Staff
chalge. If the patient he IS rl?- {al The adminis.trahon of the unit
turned to hospital; If It IS found that a as a whole. (h) The holdmg of daily
patIent cannot be made fit to return to parades (c) The allocatIOn and super
vision of fatigues. (rl). The or
be dIscharged from the A rmy or hiS e:KeiTISe of patients. for WhICh a
meriical category lowered to mSUl'e that "ar1'a'1t Offi.;-er and sergeant of the
he shall be employed only on duties for Corps are attached. (e)
which he is capable Bv this means dur- The orgammtlOn of games out of do01's
mg the last war, large numbers' were and in the Depot. (n The supply of ("n
quickly returned to Army duties. some- tertainment for the patients.
The Medical Officers have to bear in
mInd that the Depot is primarily estab
hshed to get men back to the fighting
hne or war training as soon as possible.
In this country a Depot has been estab
lIshed m each Command to hold 1,000
patIents. The short campaign on the
contment dId not give time for the De
pots established there to function to full
caparlty. as in the last war, though two
or three were started.
4. Depot overseas may be supplied
With case!> from Field Ambulanres.
Casualty Clearing Stations and l\Iihtmy
Hospltals. In England dUrIng thls war
the Depot& have receIved patients from
Em(11 gency MedIcal Service Hospitals ac;;
well as from Military Hospitals-and.
up to the present, mOle flam the former
than the latter.
ThE' cases dealt WIth have been: (a)
J:l.len convalescing from Sickness. (b)
Men convalescing from operatIOns p"f'l'
formed to rend(>r them fit for mIlitary
servlcc. (c) Convalescmg casualties from
thc French and Norwegmn campalgns.
(d) QUIte a conSIderable number of
French, PolIsh. Czech, Dutch and Bel
gian soldiers evacuat.ed to thiS country
Many of the fil'st two groups-th{)se
convaleSCing from SIckness 01' remedIal
operatIOns-have had less than two
months' servIce tn the Army.
A number of cases of fracture have
passed through the Eaton Hall Depot
an(l have emphasized the gl'owHig im
pOi tance of the orthopaedic surgeon.
nIen, III some cases after quite a short
penon m the Army. have been admitted
to an E.M.S. Hospltal for some SIckness
or remerllUl operatIon. Here they have
had the advantage of a completely
ciVilian atmosphere. They have in many
ca"es been frequently VISltcrt by relatIve.;;
and flIt'nds and later sent on leave.
The',c men were not being trained to
make them fit for mIlitary duty prior to
their return to theIr Units Men are now
sent to Army Convalescent Depots after
leaving E.M.S. HospItals and come under
military Jlsdplule. Leave 1:; dependent
on good progle% 1'1 phY";lcal trammg
and hood behavior.
The 111 It Convalescent De
pot 1<, wlhtal'Y With 11urades and ::.t1'1l't
InIlItary rlj!:"l'lplme. The wal'tIs al'e simi
1:Ir to barrack bcdlooms and IliSCUIt"
:l.IC rllled the font of the ueds With
\dt e"el y mornmg" With lllihtm'Y pt"c
('1.,.lOn are not allowed to re
I1Mll1 ll1 bedr{)om:. after they have been
dear(',l m the mOl nmg'.
Th(' life In a Depot I':> a... follows:
Tlll' mOl nmg aftcl' at 1 ivai at the De
lJot the putlent appears before the MedI
('al OlfIc('l' at !J A:\l. and at the 'lame
tune and on the same day In each sub
-;eque-nt weeh The man IS ClaS8.1fied le
('ol'dmg to lll!'l medical comiltlOn for ecr
tam and fOJ a stage of physlcal
tlainmg Each man IS gIven an Identifi
catIOn card With hlb Bame and classlfi.
tatlOn for fatigues and P.T. written
thereon. ThIS l"" Iellewed weekly.
Fatigues are carned out from 9 to
10::10 A.M. The permanent Staff for a
Depot IS a very small one and the help
f'f patlents has therefore to be utIlIzed.
I f the umt IS under canvas the fatigues
are not sO numerous 01' arduous. In a
hutted camp the huts will usually hold
about thIrty men in each hut and are
eaSIly kept clean. Samtal'Y fatigues are
necessal y for both canvas and hutted
Patlents are }..ept busy WIth such oc
cupatlOns untIl a break at 10;30 AM,
when each is supplied with half a pmt
of milk.
There is also a dry canteen, run by
the N.A.A.F.I.. which is open after pa
The patients parade again at 11: 15
AM in their different categories under in
structors of the Army Physical Training
Corps of which there are five.
The present-day Army Physical Train
ing endeavors to inculcate rhythm. bal
ance and mental alertness as well as to
exercise the muscles. It can also help to
COl'rect certain postural deformities, The
syllabu::. of trainIng IS well devIsed to at
tam thiS object and includes the use of
wooden staffs, medu:'me-balls of variOUs
weights and elaborate children's games
The patients marked down for special
remedial exercises and not fit for gen
eral physical training, parade under
male masseurs of whom there are 61X.
These men give speCial remedIal exer
clses III small classes and a certain time
U";Wg' sp(l('ial apparatus, deVised by Dr
Mennel. whIch Includes wall-bars, the
statIOnary bIcycle with adjustable re
sIst.ance, the rowing machine and til('
:=.teersmans wheel. Patients are also
gIven massage and passive movements
on the couch.
On two days a week a routemarch l'e
places the Phy&ical Traming parade.
The lame and those in leg plasters are
paraded under a Warrant Officer of the
Army Education Corps and gIVen alec
ture on mapreadmg and kIndred SL1b
DInner is at 12 '30 PM, when a gen
eI'UUS and varIed (het IS prOVided includ
ing plenty llf fresh vegetables.
Organized games under the A.P.T. In
:;tructor:'l take place from 2 to 3.30 PM.
These ll1c1ude cricket In summer, foot
ball. hockey and baseball.. Those on the
early grades of phYSIcal trammg are not
allowed to play games
There are voluntary games from 3 :30
at P;\1.
A Warrant Officer and sergeant of th(l
Army EducatIOn Corps are attached to
the Staff. It is the duty of these men to
gIve talks and lectures to the patients
on topical subjects between 5 and 7 PM.
They also endeavor to ec;tabhsh classes
for mathematics or languages. The rapId
change over of populatIOn in a Depot
renders a contll1Ulty of syllabus impos
slhle and the mstructors are lImited to
i.solated talks on different subjects.
These members of the A.E.C. al:::o ar
range mdoor amusements for the pa
tients between 8 and 10 PM, such as
WhIst drives and darts and dommo com
petItions There are usually two or more
lillhal'u tables III a Depot.
Through the organizatIOn")
concerts and cinema shows are also pro
fhe proportIOn of patIents suffermg
from war wounds has so far been small.
The following table, whIch doe& not m
('lude forelgn soldiers, refers to ('ases
which have passed through the Eaton
Hall Convalescent Depot between Janu
ary 15, 1940, and September 30, 1940
No of Percettt-
Nature of Ca-ses Treated CaMS 4ge
ni-onchitil> .......... ___ ... _. . 130 8 U
Broncho-pneumonla, pnf'umonia.
pluerisy 157 107
Hermtl.s ___......... 121 g,a
AppendiX .. _... __ .. ... .. .. . 60 4.1
Other abdominal diseases ...... 40 2,7
Rheumatism, !>ciatica. etc 77 I) 2
Throat diseases ........ 62 4 2
DE>bility .. _... ........ 25 17
.. __ 136 9.3
Frtictures ____ __ .... ________ .. las 9.2
Cardiac conditions 20 1 3
No Of I'ercent_
Nature of Cases Treated
Cases ago
Wounds .... .... 132 90
NE>uroses ... ......... 48 3.2
MlscelJancous 216
.. ' __ .. 817
Disc}larged to umt _.. 1,268
DIs('harged to hospital 191
Died _. ___ __ ..
Cases WIth gastri(' conditions present
(,onsiderable difficulty. A Depot is a non
dIeted hospital and ('an only obtam cer
tain variants from the normal diet of a
healthy soldier through Allowance Regu
latIOns Provision of a special dIet to
('onvalescent cases would be very diffi
cult and would almost certainly lead to
discontent among other patIents and un
j ustlfied demands from them. Eaton Hall
Depot has been spared an mflu'\ of such
cases because hospitals were warned of
the1l' unsuitability before the Depot be
gan to admit patients
Should an expeditionary force functIOn
In the future we shall expect to gd
rather different types of cases through
the Depots. There will almost c(lrtamly
be a hIgher per('entage of men suffermg
fro111 war wounds causing ('onsuJerable
db-ability and perhaps a greater num
bel' WIth war neuroses.
It may be suggested that there IS
loom for a sectIon for Early Convall''''
cents m a Depot where patients can
have further treatment bef\)}'e they at
tam a stage of rerovely ':>uffi('}ent to suh
mit them to graduated retraining to
fit them for return to their units.
Such an arrangement would entail
the diVision of a Depot into two sections.
A. For cases in early stages of con
valescence as mentioned above.
B. For more advanced cases to be
gradually retrallled to fit them to return
to theIr umts.
SectIOn A would approximate to the
usual conceptIon of a Convalescent
Home and Section B would function as
the present Convalescent Depot. The
E::.tabhshment of the Depot would need
to be modIfied to deal wlth two such se('
It IS open to question whether it would
lJl' wise to have a section for more active
treatment III ('lose prmnmity to a Train
mg Section. Patients undergoing treat
ment might not be anxious to he pro
moted to the Trainmg Section whi'!h
wouM entatI harder work and indicate
an early return to theIr umts. A spe
ciallst In Physical Medlcme IS now at
tached to each Command Headquarters
to give advice 'on the early and late re
tl'Ullltng of disabled soldIers.
If a soldier be so dIsabled as to render
hIm unfit for retentIon m the Army he
may yet Improve suffiCIently to make him
valuable to the State. The question of
rehabIlitation of such men into mdustry
'VIII arise III the future and though this
may be of no immediate interest to the
Al my authorIties It IS yet a liabilIty of
the communIty as a whole.
Cooperation of Animals in War
[An article in "Oer Truppen DIenst" which was reprmted in
EJerczto (Spaw) July 1941. Translated from Spanish at the Com
mand and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.]
A t the present time the only animals
collaborating In war are the horse, the
dog, the carner pigeon, and, during the
World War, the small but valuable
canary. The role played by these anImals
m war IS generally known. The canary

least trace of gas which could not be de
tected by man on account of the ies::.el
senSItIVIty of hIS organs of smell
But the dog has always been the pl'ln
clpal collaborator Dogs for the army are
educated and Instructed III speCIal schools
They are not taught Cll cus a'Icks,
but an effort is made to get them to U::'(l
theIr natural instinct::.. Later al e
dIVided mto speCial groups of ,... atchJogs,
medical ('orps and messenger dogs and
dogs used for pulling loaus. When they
enter the school and Illstltute, each dog
has to take an exammaUon m WhI('h he
must show whether or not he WIll be use
fullater as an army dog. He is gIven
test when he IS SIX months old. The fol
lowmg is required of him: to follow hIS
owner at different times of day or night
across dIfferent tel'ram, to behave prop
el'ly m chmbing staIrs, In Into a
darkened room, in crossmg dItches and
streams, on hearing gunfire. etc, From
his examination with respect to these
matters, hIS value to the army IS deter
Timid dogs should be eliminated Imme
diatelY. The race to whI('h he belongs is
immaterial in admitting him to the
tute. Only a few physi('al chara(,teristlcs
are taken into account. For example, the
dog must not measure more than 27
inches from his breast to the ground.
They are well cared for III these traming
('enters. They are given two good meals
a day, at 11 ;00 A.M. and at 4:00 PM.
If theil deportment IS bad, they are not
heaten, but shut up for an hour or two m
a dark room, when they have commItted
some If to pumsh them
sevel'cly, a broad leathe1' belt is placed
around them, and they are stood in a
cornel on their hmd feet for twenty min
utes. A uog pUlllshed this way suffers
Intensely III a mental way on ac('ount of
the shame whICh he endures in front of
hi::. compamons
The Ill::.tru('tIOn lasts, on an average,
(lIght weeks, and the greater part of the
ttme 1::' glven to developing hIS sense of
smell, The dog uses twelve categories of
hiS sense of smell, the most important of
,\'hiCh IS that r(llating to the human being.
He must be able to dIstinguIsh betweep
the odors of varIOUS persons 'so as to be
able to follow a given trail. He must also
be able to p1('k up his trail again aitel'
havmg smelled tar and must be able to
tell by smell whether a man traveled by
road or across grassy areas, and in the
latter case whether the man was on foot
or mounted. The dog also learns other
slgns so as to be able to follow a given
\Vatch dogs are trained III another
manner. An uneducated dog will attack
anyone; a traIned watch dog, only a per
son who runs If his master is talking
with anyone on foot. he follows every
movement of the latter with great atten
tiveness; but if his master shakes hands
with the in that
person ceases ImmedIately, SInce he does
not consIder dangerous the person wIth through a number of places previously shore. On other occasions they fire over
whom his master shakes hands. Thus impregnated with a special liquid and open sights at short range. These speed_
dogs used in important fa.ctories as . located a certain distance apart. Caesar boats. skilfully maneuvered. and being
aSSIstants to the watchmen. is &0 mtelligent that he often takes a such small targets themselves, are re
The dogs of the Medical Corps have shorter path of his own accord. markably invulnerable to enemy shore
special instructIOn. If a dog IS sent to The miss10n of messenger dogs is ex batteries. The granite shores and fjords
look for a wounded man, hIS master puts tremely Important and the English have of the Barents Sea provide good shelter
a "holder" on him, which conSIsts of a related wlth pride how the worst enemy and protection for enemy guns. The
short strap hangmg loosely from the coI that they shot when they took a certam speedboats come close to shore to spot
laI'. If the dog I uns across a man who IS sector of the Maginot line was a mes enemy guns which interfere with the pro
.lymg down (pel'sons who are standing senger dog. gress of our land troops and destroy
or walkIllg do not Illtf'I est him), he seizes Besides the miSSIOns mentioned, dogs them by several well-aimed volleys OVer
the holder m hIS tef>th and runs to hIS are also used to pull loads. Two of these open sights. This assistance has been in
master. The latter takes hold of hIS cham a mmal5 can pull 500 pounds for a dis valuable to the Red Anny.
antI follm\-'::. hIm to where the wounded tance of 15 miles and up to 325 pounds
In the summer of 1941 two M 0 speed
man Durmg the late World War for a distance of 10 miles over bad roads.
boats of the Northern Fleet, returning
thousands of men owed theIr lives to these The work of these dogs In the mountains
after shelling certam land targets, took
dogoa of the MedIcal torps. IS of speCIal mterest as they.carry ammu
aboard a spotting post and were making
The most mtellIgent dog,> are reserved mtlOn and perform varIOUS other labors.
for shore. When they were quite close to
for thf' loll" of messenger dogs. The most Summmg up the work of these animals,
their destination, they were attacked in
famous of them is Caesar, who ran ten we reach the conclUSIOn that m modern
waves by 16 enemy dive bombers. How
and one one half mIles In 32 mInutes. The warfale the dog is the faithful collabo
ever, by skilful maneuvering and wen_
JogI'. go over thell' CaUl se by memory or I ator of man and is endowed WIth a great
trained fire from antiaircraft machine
else find thell way by smell, passIng SpIrIt of sac1'1fice.
guns and automatic rifles, the two speed
boats repulsed the attack and shot down
two of the 16 bombers.
MO speedboats of the Baltic Fleet have
scored considerable successes in anti
[An a1't1(-1(> m the InfQ1'mutwn Bullrttn of the Washmgton submarine operations. In the summer and
Embassy of l! S S.R., 4 August 1942.] autumn of 1941 the Germans in the Baltic
used submarines as their prmcipal weap
on agamst our fleet and communications.
::\ro motorboats arc known m the Soviet Enemy Land Forces Seven to nine submarines operated si
Navy as submarme huntcrs. That IS theIr
During the Gelman's unsuccessful of
multaneously in the Gulf of Finland
dll'(>ct purpose But In the present war alone in the early days of the war. Their
Soviet "MO" Motor Speedboats
fensive agamst Murmansk, MO speed
they havp ('oPI.'ri "nth so many tasks that
boats of the Northern Fleet systemat1cal
operatIOns were hteral1y paralyzed by
such a nanlP dOL'''; nothmg like JUsilce to
ly appeared on the flank of enemy land
1\10 speedboats which not only acted as
1hell' fightmg qualItIP<;.
forces, their rapId fire silencmg enemy
convoys for ships sailing m groups or
MO's are small motorboats
guns, dispersmg mfantry and keepmg
singly but also sought and hunted enemy
of :10 to 60 tons armed WIth automatIC
enemy rear communicatIOns and shore
submarmes systematically in the most
antIaIrcraft nfles, rapIdfire guns and a
roads constantly under threat. They were
dangerous waters near bases and ports
large &upply of dppth ('harges The':\-, are
also effectIve III keepmg enemy aircraft
and on the long sea routes.
us('d on all sorts of assignments both
away from the distrIct occupied by the
tn six months of war the artlilery and
mdppendpntly and m cooperatlOn \"lth
flank of the Sovtet land troops.
dppth charges of MO speedboats m the
other classes of wal'ships, air force and
Rometlmes the MOts land spotters' task
BaltiC Fleet destroyed SlX enemy sub
coastal deft>nsc. With relatIvely powcr
ll:'- to sIgna1 the pOSItion of targets on
mal'lnes and damaged seven.
ful armament and long range of opera
tIOll plus spped and great mobIlIty, these
8mal1 fightmg ShIPS arE' particularly SUIt
able for actlnn along enemy coast and
Pioneers Ever Forward
agamst enemy hasps ill fjords and on fAn artI('le from the Nelle Wtell?' Tageblatt 10 AprIl 1942.
cliffs. Translated flom German in the War Department, Washington,
1\10 motorboats have hE:'ell wldf'1y used D.C J
In eiff'cttng lanumgs. They have proved
e.:...tremely uspful m InItIal stages of such
Dunng the> gl'cat battles In the east. Impro\Cment of the Foremost Line
operatlons. for mstance, III landIng men
of tilE' Black Sea Fleet at Fedosla.
\\1.' often saw pIoneers. busy at ge The war III the east has now assumed
\'on"-tl uctlOn and makmg hIghway and
othel forms For pioneers, speCIfically,
... isting Commando Operations load':> pas.sable, workmg to ave orne
thiS means complete transformation from
A group of ,ftIO motorboats with shock
s\\amps, and whelever auxIl1ary workM
their prevlOUS type of combat. In attacks
detachments of mannes on board dashed
mg power was needed But only In bat
on communities, they stIll make use of
tle dHl they show the potentialitIeS of
flame throwers. In shock troop opera

thf'l1 tl'ammg and weapons. In the front
tions they break WIth a powerful surge
the moormgs on WhICh German guns were into enemy emplacements, and demolish
thVI$lOllS thf'Y Wf'1'e experts In takIng
mountl.'d, sile-nced enemy fire and landed
hi ltig-e.;, they knew e-xactly where the
combat installations and bunkers WIth
the marInes. DUrIng the further cours,
fUde hatI to be cut and where explosive
the1r explo<;lves. The principal mission
of the operatIOn. shield'd by the moor
('hm ge'" that had been laid had to be
III defense, however, wherever the front
mgs from enemy fire. they contnbuted to
tOln out III (ombat III cOlumunitles they
has assumed a r1gId form, is to develop
the success of the imtial landing party
rieul'C'd rows of housE'S with hand gre
the front Ime and reinforce It WIth their
and safe arrival nnd landmg of maIn
nade." and concentrated charges. If a
means. Thi::. is tedIOUS work consisting
forces from larger and troop
Il\'e}" crOSSIng was to be effected, It \Va::.
of many small indiVidual details. The
p1One-or::; With storm boats and mflated
lllfantryman has scarcely located the
It IS an aXIom of nnlttary tactic:; that
laft" who gUided infantry and other
most favorable defenSIve positIOn in the
when land forcC's aJ:e operatmg on shore
troops aero;:>-"> the rIver or often launched
telTam when the first work of the
It IS the function of naval vt'ssels to out
mIlItary bridges even under enemy fire.
pioneers begins. Holes are blasted in the
flank enemy land forces and shC'l1 them
Whenever. faced by a powerful developed
ground, often frozen to a depth greater
from the sea. Relatively large WarshIps
hne of fortIficatIOn, eqUIpment and
than 3 feet. machme-gun emplacements
are used as a rule--both gunboats and
\\eapon:. of infantry alone were no
are built in them, and communicating
monitors, craft especmlly adapted for
longel adequate, then the call was
trenches are estabhshed. At the same
the purpose, and other ships such as
heald: "Pioneers forward!' Enemy
time, obstacles are placed in front of po
coastguard vessels and destroyers. mmes were cleareu away. With eoncen
SItions. FIrst a simple barbed wire
The latter type of ships cannot be used trat'd ehal ges, lanes were blasted in wire
fence, then a second one and then mOl'e.
in aU circumstances. Sov1et 1\10 speed ohstacles and tank blocks. The trench
In front of this, furthermore, a wide
boats, howover, have ,;hown thpmselv's was sprinlde-d WIth hand gre
area IS stretched w1th trip wires.
capable In most cases of glVmg fun sup nades and one bunker after another Gradually, there develops a wire ob
port to the flank of land forces ashore. cracked open WIth concentrated charges. stacle so broa.d that it can be overcome
MO sp'edboats of the ;-':orthern Fleet Pioneers m attack are pathfinders with by an attacker only WIth great effort
have a partIcularly rIch experience III concentrated charges and flame throw and many casualties. Machine-gun em
such operatIOns.
ers. placements, previously nothing but im
proved holes in the ground, are developed through; and attacks by enemy mfantry about 600 planes and over ten infantry
mto fire-proof dugouts_ In the walls, remain immobilized in the mine fields. divisions.
made of many layers of tl'f'e trunks, Only the mitiated know the surveyed The offenSive started successfully for
loopholes are skillfully cut, and cellings lanes through the mine fields left open the Germans. Breakmg through the main
are covered with raIlroad tral'ks. timbers for our own reconnais'!ance troops and hne oj resistance with a mass of tanks
and sand bags. Only now can the in which in case of attack are closed by and aircraft, they began, to follow up
fantryman fire from a combat positIOn qUickly placed obstacles. For their success in depth. But at the ap
in which he is secure against enemy fire. men It is a comforting feeling to know proaches of Kupyansk their tank wedge
that there are' secret mines against was suddenly broken by a flank counter
Mine Fields and Mine Lanes
tanks and ag-aInf't guns In front of them. blow of Soviet tank groups from the
But the defense line must constantly The tasks of pioneers are not, southeD-st. Timely appearance of the tank
be made stronger, and more and more ever, finn,hed with thIS. More and more reserves deCIded the first stage of the'
routes to the fortifications on the front possibIlities are found. EXIts from com battle in the Red Army's favor.
must be located. WhIle the ial;t steps mUnIties ale closed with heavy barri Modern defense is based on the idea of
are still being taken in the development cades. Long obstacles of felled trees counterblows by mobile forces. Naturally
of antitank...gun emplacements and em must be erected. For obtaIning a field this type of defense calls for big reserves.
plaN1ments for the heavy guns, the sur of fire, entire woods are lopped or cut These teserves must be available even at
vey squads of pioneers aI' ' already do\'\ n The barriers, tree obstacles the expense of decreasmg the number of
meaSUl'lng off the mine fields. Laying and wire entanglements are sown with troops on the mam line of resistance
nunes. also a special sphere for pIOneer::.. connected explosive charges so that their
prOVided, of course, that the latter are
requIres the greatest dependability and removal by the enemy is prevented One
adequately armed with antitank weap
the most preCIse sort of work. From obstacle after another IS finished. The ons
thousands of wel1 camouflaged and con front con::1tantly becomes stlonger and
Counf.e.r Blows at Wedge Flanks
mmes. It must be immedwtPly more inVInCIble. and out of It the fire
In the early stages of all break
possIble to locate and pIck up each one arm::. at the proper tIme wlll speak de
throughs the adyancing army is hemmed
l again. These mine fields and mmed ob wort1s. In a short time in t1)IS way.
in. The important thmg IS to prevent the
stacles stretch along in front of posltIOnt-. pIOneers In thf> east also bulld a de
enemy from rapidly extending the break
and bet\\een infantry points of support. fensive hne that WIthstands the
through. The advanCIng enemy must in
Wherever mJOes he. no tank comes attacks.
eVItably leave hIS flanks uncovered.
Support pomts from whIch the base of
can be cut must be held
Principles of Modern Defense
The major SovIet operations whIch led
[An article which appeared in the Informati()n Bullettn of the to the defeat of the Germans at Moscow
WashIngton Embassy of the U.S.S.R. 29 August 1942.]
were based on flank counterblows. ThiS
was also the case at Yelets where the
advancmg Germans were compelled to
The war has shown that modern offen
turn back. hurrIedly drawmg away their
\vork before It met the second heavy blow
Sive methods can pIerce immobIle defense. For twelve hours thiS dIVISIOn, actmg as
troops who were spht beyond Verkhovye
Massed tanks. aircraft artIllery and auto
a rearguard. repelled the attacks of Ger
and Livny.
matIC weapons concentrated on narrow man mfantry and tanl<s.
The nature and directIOn of the count
sectors can break down the main line of
terblows of defense troops are dictated
After thIS the units occupied the
reSistance and drive wedges Into its depth.
by the particular SItUatIOn. In general.
heIghts on the second mtermediate line.
the counterblow is based above all on the
The forward drive of tanks that have
and here fightmg occurred which greatly
broken thl'ough mto the depth of the tac
counterblow is based above all on the
affected the further course of events. For
pnncipal of mteractIOn between big army
ileal defense zone and the danger of
two days stubborn battles raged agamst
mechanIzed plIlcers CioslOg in behmd the
formatIOns and in certain cases between
German tank& and motorized mfantry
defending troops may compel the COlU
the varIOUS fronts, usmg not only
that hiid broken thl'ough. The enemy lost
mander to WIthdraw to a new line m or
tical but also operative reserves Some
mOle than 50 machinps and wal; unable
tImes, In their eagernebs to stem an offen
der to keep hIS units intact. Hence. from
to follow up hIS offensive.
SIve, defense troops are mciIned to bring
mainsprmg of mIhtary OpE'ratlOns. POSI
beguInmg to end. maneuver I emaillS the
Tho::.e weH' CritIcal battles for the Ger
III then reserves too early. In such a case
mall'3, who took ten uays to tegroup thell'
tIOnal methods of defem-.e can no 10ngH
the mm does not justify the means. By
forces. brmg- up fresh reserves and renew
usmg up their reserves, the defense
guarantee success.
the attack. The dIVISIOn held Its ground
troops deprIve themselves of the oppor
Of course. at many stages of the battle.
when It IS Imperative to tie the enemy
firmly, and on1y when danger was Immi
tumty of takmg the lTIltmtIvc at the critI
nent (lId It make an orderly withdrawal
cal moment.
down and check his advance. well-engi
from the battle Clinging to mtermedmte
neered defenses equipped with modern
A massed blow must be met by a
pOSItions. It wore dOVvn the enemy's shock
massed blow: defending forces must not
weapons are of exceptional Importance.
Skillful. stable defense prepares the
UTIlts. be dU,sIpated. PurSUIt of a mobile enemy
ground for routIng the shock units of the
The battles which fruMrated the Gel' wastes time. men and materiel. On the
advancing enemy and gams the tmlC' re-
man's fir::.t blow at Kupyansk southeast other hand, evpn a deep breakthrough
qUll'ed to a counter blow.
of Khatkov, welP fought undel' mOle com can be liqUIdated If one has a strong
Defenses built in great depth are of
plex C'lIC'um::.tances The enemy planned a shock group at hIS disposaL
great arlvantage. ArtIllery and other anti_
plllcer movement emergmg on the Oskol Though modern defense is based on
tank means. including infantry. staggered
River. The mam dlrechon of the thrust maneuver, positIonal methods of defense
deep m the defenses can restnct the en
was flom Chuguyev on Kl1pyansk where ate by no means _excluded. Firmness in
emy's capaCIty for maneuver and break
the Gprmans had concentrated KleIst's defendmg a pOSItion, plus maneuver,
up his tank wedges However, these
thll d tank COl ps sent from the south, brmg the defenders victory.
methods do not always achieve the de
sired results. partIcularly when oper_
atIOns are lTI progress on an extended
Defense Against Night Air Raids
front and the attackers possess high mo
billty. Moreover. m a war of maneuver [An artic1e whIch appeared in Memorial del EJerctto de Chile
It cannot be assumed that the fhrhtinp; July-August 1941. Translated from Spanish at the Command and
will be restrIcted to areas which have General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas.]
been prepared for earher defense
Wearing Down Shock Foue
The problem of antiaircraft defense, will fire blind till the sound detector is
Here is an example. At the very be
difficult enough in the day time when
J!inning oj the German offenSIve near
visibilIty 15 best, is truly complicated
Volchansk northeast of Khal'kov. a SOVIe-t
There IS a great variety of sound de
when the planes approach by nIght and
dlVlslOn resIsted numerically superior en
tectors and projectors, nearly all of them
the only data available are the sound of
emy forces in battle for many hours.
SImIlar, and we shall divide them into
When the Germans threw their reserves
their motors. .
two classes only:
into action the Soviet command gave the
Therefore. in night combat, the main
order to withdraw. The division retreated
collaborator must be the sound rangin5'
1. Mechanical sound detectors which
III an organized manner to the next line
device with its Immediate auxiliary, the work independently of the searchlight and
and managed to complete simple trench
searchlight. The antiaircraft artillery battery,
2. Electrical sound detectors, electri.
cally synchronized both with the search
light and the battery.
The first, which are the most anti
quated, consIst of four sound collectors,
or horns, grouped m pall's so as to locate
the plane both wIth respect to directIOn
and elevatlOn through the use of two
graduated semicircular scales with which
they are provided, Each horn is provided
wIth a conducter at Its Up end, leading
to an earplece whICh IS jOined in two
dIfferent head pieces and go to the crew
occupleJ With dllectlOo and range, These
Cl'ews hflve contl'ol wheels WIth WhICh
they are able to tUi n the apparatus as a
wholE:', When thE:' of a plan(' 1':.
hNl.l d lfl one of the earphone'>, thE:' at
tendant contmue the sf'al'ch tll1
tllf' .;;ound IS heard In hoth emphones,
and th(' apllUl atus WIll then have located
the plane. With a few Simple (01'1'ect)005,
the COOl'nmntes of the tmget al'e th('11 oll
TIl\:' ;,E'<11chJlg'hth arE' from a5 to \;0
!Hche5 111 ,h.tltlPtpr and a candlE'
pUWE'! uf flom .lO to SO mIllion TheY.3.1e
PlovltiCd \\lth dynamos fOl ;,upplymg'
thrll \)\\n CUI lent ThC'lr IPfipctOl'R all:'
pal'ahoilc mId they employ the elect! JC
al (' u':'; then hg'ht souree.
Synchrollized hstenmg devI{'E's lliffel'
flom thp fOl egomg in thE" greatel' l)prfec.
tlon of thplI' nllC10phone<; and the fact
that the ::. .. I'> sym:hlonizeti to
follow thE:' 1l10V('lllenl s of thE' df't('ctol' and
tl'an"'l111t th!?> same data to tl,(' appal atu!:>
whIch till E'ets thE' POIntIng of the gunt'> of
thf' battt>r:,.
Now that \\e have hi Tetly ue::'l'nlwt!
the.;;e pO\\E'lfuI heIpel:' m nlg-ht uOn!'
b<li dment, let ut' e'hl.mme thell OJll'l'

There are two systems in use:
(a) The sound detectors and search
light operate separately, transmitting by
telephone the approximate locations ob
(b) Each battery possesses its sepa
ratE:' "synchronized limt" of listening de
VIce and searchlight
The system described under (a) IS the
most commonly used. In it, the sound and
searchlIght units work together under a
smgle command, searching the skIes with
thel r mechamcal eyes and ears, One of
the "synchrOnlZE'd UOltS" IS usually "the
g-lllde" and all the other& follow It. All
the UnIts must be pOInted exactly the
samE' as the> guns, making frequent checks
of the11' orientation by I eference to the
polar .<tar If VISIble. if oat checkmg by
ThC' systf'l1l OPscl'lbE:'d uoder (b) IS to
b(' on 3crount of greatE:'l' CXact
n('ss anJ I aplfhty In the transmiSSion of
data, as each battelY T&
eqlTlppcd with Its own ... aund detecting
and <;ealchhght equipment, these will op
PI ate on thE'll' own lflltmtlve rcducinf; the
l'fi'l'('tIveo'ss of the coheSively workmg
umt which should be fOlmed by the de
fen"e t>ystem of city. And this mad
'IItlOn to the fact that there are alway:;
:lOme npce:;sal'V elements lackmg m time
of wal'_
FilIng begms by direct pointIng at the
"::,ound," that IS, With the Initial data
tranMllttted by'the sound detector. and It
conti0l1l-'s along the trajectory of the
gUldmg SE'a! chlight with barrage fire of
g'luduatetl altltwies and runges_ If the
plane II:> located by the searchlight, the
I ang:e filld(,l' for the battel y ('omes into
operation. til lng becommg mrhrect, same
at> tim lng day tIme
The danger in this system lies in the
fact that planes usually attack from more
than one direction and in waves, series,
etc., confusing the signals in the sound
detector with resulting confusion for the
batterIes_ If the searchhghts succeed in
locating one of the planes, all the search
lIghts are turned on It, thIS;. bemg a mo
ment which IS taken advantage of by all
the rest of the planes for escaping from
thIS direction and dropping their bombs
In comparative securIty on the objectIves
of the CIty which, with the continual fire
of the batterIes, the exploslOns of the
Lambs and the light of the searchlights,
wIll be sufficiently wen lighted for a ('aIm
and seasoned pilot.
Other powerful enemies of defense are:
the moon and low-Iymg clouds. It IS Im
pOSSible to use searchlights under eIther
onc of these condItions for the reason
that their rays are not VISIble when the
moon IS m mmc than its first quarter and
because the latter cannot be pierced by
their rays_
AntIaircraft defense at night com
prl<;es another important element, oneJs
own pursUlt planes, Theil' zone of actIOn
should be limited and out of the zone of
fire of the battE"rlE's and should be under
the control of the antiaircraft defense
command The pOl'smt craft are kept
constantly mformed by radIO of the SItu
atlOn relathe to the {'nemy planes and
are not pel'nlltted to attack except when
arriVing or departmg or at express 01'
del'S to the eontl'al'Y
PurSUit planes havE' two methods for
findmg the enemy; the exhaust pipes of
the motors whIch become red hot by the
constant stream of heated gases and also
by means of a small listening devictl set
to reglster nOIseS greater than that of
their own motor, for mstance, multi
motored planE'S 01' bombers.
Australzan War f'u1flnres:
Austrahan war expendIture was ap
proximately double for 1941-42 as for
1940-41. (Thu, was on the rather formal
exchange rate more than a bllhon dol
War expenditure (In so far as It may
be computed on a constantly 5('al(')
equals half the natIOnal lncome.
IncomE' tax is SIX times that of thQ
last pre-war financlal year.
Australian wartlme income tax I"
high. But It should be noted that Income
tax represents less than two-fifths of
the tax revenue of the Commonwealth.
As a "socIal State" wIth a l11ultlpliclt;y
of !i?0CIaI serVICes, Australm has never
Leen a low tax country. ow it IS an
(>xtremely high tax country. The income
tax although steep does not mdlcate the
amount of tax revenue whIch the ConI
monwealth draws --partIcularly from low
m('ome groups.
(Bulletm of the Australian l\tf"wS
and Information Bureau September,
War Production:
. Canada's output in the aircraft indus
try has multiplied 80 times since the be
ginning of the war. according to Mr. R.
P. Bell. DIrector of AIrcraft ProductIon.
The Industry now occupies five mllllOn
"qua] e feet of fiool' space and emploY5
..ll),OOO lllert ancl women. There are order5
In hand for lllore than 10,000 81rplanes.
OnC' thOUt><llltl CurtI&s SB2C-l dIve
ranada's Atrc! O:.-f'_l_n_d_n"_'_'y=-.'____
bo)ubers are to be bUllt by the Canadian
Car and Foundry Co., Ltd., at Its factor
le'$ at Fort Wilham and Point St
Charles. The fir::.t h. scheduled to be ready
pal'ty next year. The motors and instru
ments Will he imported from the U S.A_1
(The Aeroplane)

$5,000,000,000 42
...,..._________ --,
A 11 Support For Ihm1l11er's S.S.l:
HItherto, the Luftwaffe has had to
meet calls from the German Army and
Navy only. but the reeent meeting be
tween Gormg and HIlllmle.r (when the
Relchsmarshall presented the hf'ad of the
8.S. wIth the hIghest German flying 01'
del\ reverSIng the normal procedure)
may fOi eshadow aIr support for Hitle-r's
private army. At the moment thpre ap
pears to be no suggestion that the S.S.
shall have Its own air force; but an in
dependent atr force is almost rertamh
planned for 1t. This may be either a
"FlIegel' D1visIOn" or a "Fliegel' Korps,"
and the unit most favored now seems to
be the "Rlchthofen Nahkampf" (or close
support) "Fhegerkorps!'
(Bulletins Bn-tam)
The Commander In Chief of the new
S_S air formation is lIkely to be Colonel
Geneml von Rlchthofen. accordmg to
"DIe Zeltung," the Free German news
paper printed In London
(The Aeroplane)
NeU' Gelman Gun's Muzzle Brake:
The two pictures of German tanks
captured In the Western Desert show
the curIOUS bulbous attachment on the
muzzle of a new, gun
mounted on a Mark IV SpecIal. Known
as a muzzle brake, the attachment is
designed as an additional absorber
of recoti-one of the problems al
ways facing designers of tanks. whose
necessarily restricted crew's quarters
leave httle room for recoll inside the
fighting chamber. The new gun illus
trated has a norma} recm} mechanism.
hut the muzzle brake forms an adjunct
to this by employing the dIscharge gases
as a further check.
(The Illustrated London News)
Ne'w Ge1"lnan Tactzcs:
Analyzing the operations that took
place during the early part of July in
what was then called the Kursk offensive.
General Yal'lnn, writmg in "IzvestIa"
points out that various changes In Ger
man tank armament tactICS were noted.
It was seen that the German tanks gen
erally tned to avoid battle with Russian
machines. the Germans recogmzing the
mferlOrity of their T4 type to the Rus
sian K.Vo's and T34's. It was Ie-it to the
Luftwaffe to deal with the Russian tanks.
A Close-up VIew of the Brake Muzzle of a gun mounted on the New
Mark IV. Special German Tanks In the Western Desert.
The German T 4 tanks have now been
furnished with thickened v1ate-armor in
front. the normal thtckness being 60-mm
for the front and 30-mm for the side and
back plates.
More tanks mounted wlth 75-mm guns
have been found. SpeCIal antitank self
propelling gun regiments have been
formed, and the mfantry prOVIded with
28-mm riflel;. Important changes in the
Panzer diVISIonal formations are also
noticed. Formerly these had two tank
regiments and one regIment of motor
Ized mfantry, but now the proportions
are reversed, though the infantry has
been provided with armored cars. Simi
lar prudence in the use of tanks has
been noted on the other fronts.
London Tunes Weekly)
A nny Eqmpment:
"Ejercito" of Madrid in the January,
1942 issue, gives an account of the arma:
ment and eqUIpment of the Italian al'my
according to a Spanish officer who had
beE:'n sent to Italy in 1940. Rifle: Now
bemg introduced, Model 38. caliber 7.35
mm, an improvement on Model 91. It is
lighter, faster in handling, has greater
muzzle velocity (757 meters) greater
strikmg power and flatness of trajectory
(hIghest pomt at 300 meters, 30 centi
ll1E:'ters). weight of bullet 8.3 grams. It IS
used in round by round fire on living tar
gets at 200 meters.
Light machine gun: "Breda" Model 30,
t'allber 6.5-mm, by changmg barrels, car.
also use the 7.35-mm ammumtlon Muz
zle VE:'IOCIty 630 meters per second, rate
of fire 150 rounds per mmute, sight
graduated up to 1,500 meters, air-cooled.
cartnlige bands 20 cartrulges each, bar
I el change after each 200 rounds. We1ght
IO.6 kIlograms. Each group has rIfles
and one light machine gun.
Heavy machme gun: "Breda" Model
37, cahbE:'l' 8-mm. a robust weapon.
weIght HJ.4 IHlogI alllS, muzzle velocity
'ilSO meten, pel' sE:'cond. Maxlmum range
at which It... striking power IS sufficient
to put a man out of actIOn, 5,800 meters
at sea level, 6.400 meters at an alutude
of 2.000 llwters, Larger angle of tra
\ersE:', all-coolen, sight graduated up to
solId cartridge bands of 20
cartridg't!s each. Highest point of tl a
jectolY at 600 metels 1.14 meters, pene
batton jn pme. 12 centImeters at 4.000
meters 1ange. Four different cartridges
are used: (a) The usual "35" ammUlll
tIOn WhICh IS qUite effective at f'>hol't
ranges, but is not used agamst planes.
(b) The "39" cartridge, WIth greater
penetratmg pOWE:'I". At 200 motel'S It
pE:'nE:'trates a stE:'el plate IO-mm m thick
ne<,s; at fiOO meters, a s.tE:'E:'I plate of 6-mm
t hlclmE:'ss QUlte pffective ag-ainst tanks,
planes and field fortificatIOns (c) The
tracer cartrlnge wll1ch IS against
molHle all' anti glound targets (d) The
registratIon cartridge whICh when used
against gl'ound targc>ts. pE:'rmlt'3 dptE:'rml'
natIOn uf the locatIOn of impacts. It
altet nate... m the cartridge band., WIth
the regular cartl'idgE:'<;. Both m attack
tmd defense the heavy machine gun IS
ubet! in dn'ect fire at rang'E:'s up to I,OOO
meters and m mdIl'('{t fire at ranges up
to 4.000 mE:'tel's. WIth all' agamst
ail' at range':) UJl to 1.000 meters
Infantry ami antitank cannon 47/32;
Caliber 47-mm. It is carried but may b('
transportE:'u on a pack ammal 01' cal
l'let! by SIX men 111 sE:'pal'ate loads, Used
as antitank cannon. It 1hes an antitank
proJPcUlp of 1.455 lulogl ams weight w1th
a muzzle- velOCity of (5JO meters per sec
ond antI a maXImum range of j ,000 me
tels. Practical range up to 700 meter:'>.
Used as an lllfantl'Y gun it fires a pro
jE:'ctile weighing 2.35 wah a
muzzle velOCIty of 250 meters per s(lconrT,
n.aximul1l range 3,500 meters rate of fire
'j to 8 rounds per minute. dlSpE:'rSl0n 6
meters at 500 metel'S, 22 meters at 1,000
Assault trench mortar: Caliber 45-mm.
Fires a projectile of 465 grams which ex
plodes on Impact and 1S effective withm
a 20 meter radius. Two dIfferent tra
Jectories may be used WIth open or closed
valve. ThIS gIVes a muzzle velocity of 59
01' 83 meters per second respectively. The
minimum range IS 100 meters, the maxi
mum 500 meters, mal(lmUm rate of fire
30 rounds per minute. Safety range in
time of peace 100 meters, in time of war
:M:01'e Detail of the Mark IV. SpeclRl and Its New Long-Barreled
Gun. The Tank Was Knocked out DurIng Fightmg III Egypt,
-60 meters. On account of lts small size,
It can find a location in any depression
of the terrain and may be used at short
Trench mortar; Caliber 81mm. Be
sldes the projectile usually employed in
othl.:"l' armIeSj also employes the G C shell
wIth great effectiveness. It is able to
penetrate armor Its weight is 6 85 kilo
grams. It is used at ranges between 300
and 1,500 meters, has five charges with
muzzle velocitIes of 45, 74.5, 97.5,117 and
135.5 meters pel' second.
Altogether, each of the three Tifle com
pames of the battalIon has" 12 light ma
chIlle guns, the battalion in its accom
panymg weapon company has 8 heavy
machine guns and 18 trench mortars. the
regiment has a tren("h mortar company
with 9 h"ench mortars and an mfantry
gun company with 8 guns and 3GO rounds
each, a thIrd of whlCh are armor plerc
Ing shells The regimental baggage tram
comHsi'> of 4 columns, one each for the
three battalions and staff and 1 column
of transpol'tmg I.'anlages for the trench
mortal::' and accompanying weapon com
In the way of communIcations appara
tus: RadIO stations are used only In the
I eglment whIch has 6 portable stations
wIth a range of 3 kIlometers for speech
and 10 kIlometers for code. They are
eqUipped ,.. Ith dry cells, weigh 17 kilo
grams and have a 5erVlCe hfe of 7 days
of 8 wolldng hours. There is also a plane
message recelvmg statIon which may also
be operated whIle marchmg, WIth a range
of 10 to 15 kIlometers and a weight of
15 kIlogram::.. It has a service hfe of 30
day5 of 16 working hours.
Telephones: Regiments and infantry
gun companies each have a, central ex
change with ten CIrcuits over WhICh b
dIfferent conversations may be conducted
at the same tIme. WeIght, 15.2 kIlograms.
In the way of telpphones, the regIment
possesses 8. the battahon 6, the trench
mortar company 4, the infantry gun com
pany 2. Each outfit IS provided with dry
L'ellf' good for ten hours of operatlOn and
weIghs 3.8 lulograms. For each of them,
1 kIlometer of cable in two rolls is ear
ned along.
LIght signalmg eqUIpment: The regi
ment has t) SElts of instruments, the bat
tallon 3, the' mfantry gun company 2.
WeIght with tripod 10 kilogram5, length
of life of dry cells, 5 days with 8 hours
per day. Range In day tune, 4
kilometers, at night, 15 kIlometers. In
additIOn aJ e found signal flags, flare
pistols and rockets WIth a range of visi
Inhty ot 3 Inlometers in day time and 6
1,I1ometers at mght, also gt'ound panels,
ll1f1tOl'cycies and bIcycles. The
may ut:' gnen 5 ba!:>ket::. WIth 10 carrier
pigeons each which are replaced every
or 4 days.
(lIJzhta1'- Wochenblatt)
C('yloll Rubbel SU]Jpiu:
WIth the Dutch East Indies and Ma
laya. the British have lost much of their
SOUlee of rubber supply. Now, help must
come from all possible places. Great
plans had already been laid for obtaIning
the rubber stocks of the Amazon region.
.\. fr1('a, especially the Congo region, is to
COllIe m for Its share of attentlOn. But
nowhere are more than fraC'tional parts
of the lost rubber stocks to be found.
Therefore, even the island of Ceylon is
to help out now..
In 1940, Ceylon produced around 90,
000 tons of rubber. Now the output IS
to be by every pOSSIble means.
ThIS is fir5t to be brought about by Ill
creasing the YIeld of the existmg planta
tIOns without tapping the trees. Thoughts
are bemg turned to the establishment of
new plantations and In domg thIS en
croachment would be made on the great
tea plantatIOns. Ceylon, WhICh up to the
present, along WIth IndIa was one of the
greatest tea growing countries on earth.
\vlth an annual production of some 100,
DOO tons, is now to becomE' a great rub
ber producing country. But that WIll
take a long time for rubber trees are not
ready to tap until they are several years
'lId. Experts do not believe that for the
neAt few year::. the productIon can be in
creased to much over 100,000 tons.
Fl'orn the pomt of vIew of one of her
mineral products, Ceylon IS also a very
Important country for the BrItIsh wal"
mdustries. It contains the greatest de
POSIts of graphIte known anywhere on
earth. Before the war, the exports were
235,000 Zentner (about 12,925 tons). By
1940 they had increased to 480,000 Zent
ner (about 26,400 tons). In 1938 England
got 39,000 Zentner <about 2,142 tons) of
graphIte from Ceylon. In 1940 it was
170,000 Zentner (about 9,350 tons). Dur
ing these same years, 50,000 and 118,000
Zentner (about 2,750 and 6,490 tons) re
spectIvely went to the United States. All
possible efforts are being made to in
crease delIveries. More than 20 new
mines have been put into operation.
(Deutsche Wehr)
(Bulletins From .Britain)
Brltam's Food Ratw?ts at a Glance'
- . I 0"__ r:;;;;; ....'.Yl
24 "

li ....
2 __

200m 1001J00

1 .. "
I_ I ...

46".,," 70".,," 93".,,"
i 13_, 1
24 ... 48 .... 72_ 96 ..:;
(Fulietms From Britain)
Health of Japanese Troops:
The state of health of Japanese troops
in Malacca and the other tropical re
gions, in spite of the.fact that the troops
are not accustomed to it and the climate
IS dangerous, is reported to be excellent.
Es.pecially as a result of the summer
campaIgn in central and $outhern China,
extenSIve precautionary measures have
been adopted. During the attack on Han
kow, the number of men sick with ma
laria had been much greater than the
number of those wounded. Now malaria
is guarded against by a careful choice of
camp sites (as dryas possIble and .re
moved from mosqUIto breedmg places)
and by the adoption of preventive meas
ures. PreventIve measures are also taken
against cholera. sinn and four
or five kmds of fever. The
tl'OOpS carry serum for use In case of
snake bites. Great pams arf' taken to
provide safe watf'l'. Thp troops carrif'd
filterIng apparatus e... en dUllng the Chi
nese campaIgn_ In Malacca m case of
watel' 8hOl tage the troops rely on coco
nuts, other sappy frUits and a speCIes of
tree flom which water may be obtaIned
by removmg a pOl'tlOn of the bark.
( .Uthtar-lVochenblatt)
Skl Tloojl TlaUlwg.
The trammg of troops has been
"tal'teJ by the mlhtaIY authonties m co
OpCl atlOn With the "Skllng Club," "Moun
talU ChmblUg Club" and the of
Ralh\'u) s. The fll'bt cour::.e lasted from
17 JanualY to mld;I,1al'ch
(FJuukful't(,J Z('1tnng)
A:, a medIum tank. the Japanese first
u!:-eu the II I-ton 8 M.K.C. tank.
flom England, which IS eqUJppeu wIth'a
57-1U1ll cannon and 4 machme gun.'> and
IS heavily armoreu From this they next
cle\-eloped the velY effiCl'nt 14ton tank
which IS eqUIpped WIth a cannon and 2
machme gun.;. and \\as ut-eLi in the Chi
nese war In HMZ and IS now beIng u:,eu
again m the pi (ibC'nt conflict WIth Chma
As to light tanks the Japanese had
already used ill thc campaIgn, a
7 to Etsu tanh, developed from the
Flench-Renault NC 27 tank whose mo
hile tUll et IS <,qUipped eIther WIth 2; ma
(hme g'un:. or one almo-r pJerCl11g can
non dnu onp machme gun. 1t IS no long-el'
bemg manufactured now. ami I". replaced
WIth a Japall(''Se development. a small
tanl\. equipped WIth one cannon.
In addItIOn, the JapaneRe PO%('s a ;l
to 4-ton tank. the i\I 2512 WhICh accoru
mg to Heigl, "Hand hool, of Tanh"-. 1935"
lb eqUIpped \'\"lth a 20-111m cannon m the
tUllet ant! 1mb a ('re\\ of two Illen It
ah,o has been replaced In the present wal
The Japanese 75mm mOllntalll cannon.
:o.lotlel F, has a bUllel of 141 mf'tel"
(L-'19.2,. Its elevatiOn range" from
Hunu;, ::; to plus 25 dep;l'ees. Its tl'av(>l ... p
covers 7 degrees. AccordIng to "Schwelt
Zf'I AltIllerlo;t" the gun In thmg PO<:,111011
\wlgh" G80 kilograms
Japan also a somewhat lighter
mountam ('annon available, the 75mm
Medl 41 mountam ('annon WhICh WIth a
pl'oje('tlle of lesser weIght. 55 lnlograms,
anu the hIgher muzzle velOCIty of 440
meters per seconll, attams the gTeatel
In,nge of 6,500 meters_ Itb elevatIOn may
be val'itd bpl\veen minu:, 10 and plus :Jj
deglees Smee the gun tube possesses a
length of only 14.5 calIbers (1 08 nlE'tE'1's>
the gun WE'1ghs but 550 l'llograms 10
fil'lng pO)-'ltlon.
For close the Japanefoe artil
lei Y IS strongly eqUIpped with machine
guns. The light a1 tIllery I'eglllient of
2,700 men ,of an otdmary dIVISIOn, ac
cordmg to "EJelcito" (11arch 1942) has
138 muchme guns at Its dIsposal, and the
light artillery legll'nent of 2,(iOO men of
a light dIVISIOn, has 72 machine guns
available. Thele is, one ma
chme gun fOi each 20 01' 36 men, 1 e
(.ll1l1tal .IVochc)lblatt)
Present situation as regards Japan's
own productIOn of necessary supplies is
represented by the fol1owmg figures:
Annuull'lce surplus in conquered regions
IS estImated at 300,000 tons. ThIS IS not
destmed for Japan alone. but IS to serve
as a general leSel'Ve for the eastern
urea. Japan WIll contInue her ef
forts to produce her own neces&ities. in
oruer to avoHl dependency in any respect.
Self-suffiCIency is not yet established III
the npld of tp}.tlips Sllice the conquered
regIons ploduce but little wool and cot
tOll. Chinese cotton productIOn which at
one time \vas tlOO,OOO tonb, hus dropped
to about a half of thIS quantity, but is
:;:lowly mcreasmg agalll. It WIll not be
adequate. however, under any CIrcum
stancE's. AdditlOnal cotton plantatIOns
are planned for the area, as a
If'SUlt of thIS situatIOn Thele are f-tlll
gleat :,tocks of arttficIaI SIlk and cotton
cloth III Japan !'l0 that III additIOn to be
mg 'aLle to co\-f'!' hel' own needs, she IS
able to c1I.port these materIals to the
:,outh. The gl eat area possesses a large
pim, only of hemp, which IS to be
:-.tOIeu The first development program
for WIth emphaSIS on heavy
1Olluhtlle::., ram' to an end WIth the pl'es
pnt fi"cal yeal. A second plan H, belllg
WOl ked uut III accordance wlth the needs
of the gl'eat al'ea, agl'l('ultUl e recelvlllg
as 11Iu('h attentIOn as heavy mdustry
CoalmInmg and soy bean ploductlOn ale
to be partlcuialiy de.veloped. The supply
of fi"h and meat s.atisfactoI"Y. The
ralt'-Illg of hogs III Japan lllcl'eased by
50'" In Hi42. The cattle SItuatIOn lS un
changeu. FIshmg \vhlch at first hal fallen
off, IS aguill on the mel eas.e n1umly on
account of a gl e-atel abundance of fuel
(,11 thtlll . H"ocltl'ublatt)
1'11/ H ('Dllt/II., HI IntaldlY
rla- Com- l1at
n'C{l.jJon fO!I. Won pa,,,, tal,o!>
(1) Rifle l:l 15G 472 lcl85
(2) Lt. JIG 1 H 27 81
(:1) PistoL... _ 12 411
(4) Gr>nade
Dli.. ('hul'gel" 12 :J2 96
(:1) Auto
Rifle _. _________ _
Hi) Calome ____ _
(7) GOmm
.MOl tar
pq Il,' m;
-. -iH
(0) i{l-mlll
Gun __ .
lID) ,nIUlil
Gun . _____________ _ .,
OIl .SaLer __________ _
72 232
t 12} 81-111111
111 01' tal" ____ _
(13) Cal
.50 :'HG
(14) 75mm
Gun _________ __ . ___________ _
laslwitH S m RlIss/Q
Rumanwil casualties lUling the first
year of war the Soviet UnIon.
[}pau, wounded and nllgsmg: altogether,
5,998 officers. 2,633 of
flcers, 148,941 men. Seventy per cent of
the total casualties I ecovf'reli and be
l aIlle agam fit for combat. Of the cas
ualtIes. 20 per cent occuned durlllg the
opel'UtlOns m Re%arabm and the
Vllla. 63 per cent m the operatIOns be
tween the Dmebtr and the Bug and in
the captUl'e of 5 per cent in the
operations between the Bug, Dniepr and
the sea of Azov, 12 per cent III the opera
tIOns of the year 1942, that is Kerch,
Donets and Sevastopoi.
(,l1ilitar- Wochcnblatt)
The light tank, designed by the Span
l",h officer, Captain Verdeja and named
after hun, III addition to two machine
gUllS, is also equipped WIth a 45-mm
cannon_ ThIS is built into the turret and
ha!> unlimited traverse (360 degrees) and
elevatIOn up to 75 degrees. According to
the tank carries a crew of 3
mf'n and IS radIO equipped.
(A rtllle) ishscl!e R1tl1dschuu}
Oe I hkol/ H'capons.
The Oedlkon machine tool works
manufactul es. ill the "arms and ammunI
tiOn department," infantry and anhatr
claft guns, naval armament, plane arma
ment and ammunitIOn, all of 20-mm cah
bl'l' These weapons are manufactured
not only for the Swiss armed forces but
fOI export to Bulgaria. Italy, Portu
gal, Sweden, etc. The 20-mm, Model "S"
cannon, With a 70 caliber length of bar
leI. fires PIoJcctJles of 0.128 kIlograms
(slightly over one-fOllIth pound), WIth a
muzzle velOCIty of 830 meters per second.
a distance of 5 k1lometers horizontally
ami 37 Inlometers vertically. MagazllIe
loadmg gIves a rate of fhe of 280 rounds
pel' l1l111ule. DIfferent mounts are pro
VIcif'd fOl" the 62 ]uiogram weapon.
pending- on Its use_ WIth the ILaS
mount, (Illustration No. 1) the gun m
flnng positlOn on It::. tl'ipod mount,
3GO kIlograms. Three men are
I eqUireil as new. The gun 18 made trans
portable by putting on the two wheels
(Illustiation 2). For mountmg on a
motor car, the model PLaS is used, a
pedestal mount of hght construction
which gIves a weIght when ready for fire,
of 240 kIlograms. The antIaircraft can
non. :l\1odel SLaSS (illustration No.3),
has a pedestal mount of heavier con
struction and is mtended as ship's arma
ment ,"Vlth thiq design, the complete
cannon weighs 600 kilograms. The- gun
has drum feed permitting a rate of fire
of 500 rounds per minute, The 20-mm
airplane wing cannon, Model FF (illUSM
tratlOn No.4), IS operated from the
pilot's seat. Cartridge drums are pro
vided with capacities of 45, 60, 75 and
100 rounds. The weapon weighs 23 kilo
grams, The 20-mm motor cannon, Model
FFS/MK, which files through the pro
peUer hub, on account of its longer bar
rel, weighs 49 kilograms and reaches a
muzzle velocity of 830 meters per sec
ond The rate of fire and feed apparatus
are the same in the case of Model FF_
As stern cannon. (Illustration No.5).
Model HLaF with 600 meters per second
muzzle velocity and a weight of 54 kilo
g'!' ams is used.
.... ,".
. ;pf
lite J4-lftlll AA Gun:
In firmg' pOSItion the wheels of thIs
automatIc, AA cannon, are raIsed, per
mItting the gun to rest on a four pomt
support. The tube is water-cooled. Ac
cOldmg to "Deutsche \Vehr," is has rate
of fire of 1UO rounds per mmute. Ac
cording to the book. "Twenty-five Years
of Swiss AviatIOn" (ZurIch, 1939) the
cannon IS un experImental gun. It IS
questionable whether it Will be adopted
as With a weight of 2,600 kg It IS' very
heavy and in short range fil e IS perhaps
not suffiCiently mobile.
According to "Deutsche Wehr," the
20-mm AA cannon. the Oerli1wn, (L/70),
In contrast to the 20-mm AA cannon of
the Bel"ll Arms Works, has a rate of
fire of 280 round5 per minute,
(A?,ttllertstzsche Rundschau)
Start of Airc1'aft Productwn:
The first airplane to be built in Tur
key. a product of the Etimesut Works at
Ankara, executed its first flight in the
presenC'e of the Minister-Pl'esident and
various assocIated members of the cab
(.'I1tlztar- Wochenblatt)
The Stt'1tch of the Ha'l.'es'" and Have-Nots
(Percentages of WOJ ld Productwn
of Raw Matcnals):
Ax... AlIM8
Now- $ YT8_ Ago Now 3 YT8. Ago
Rubber ____ 90 0
10 50
Tungsten _ 0
33 32
Phosphates _29 0 71 70
Cotton _____ 13 0
87 70
NIckel _ __ 2 0
98 97
Tm ________ 74 3
26 63
Petroleum __ 10 1
90 64
:VI anganese . 48 8 52 40
Wht:at ____ .40 10
60 40
Lead _____ 24 9
76 58
Sugar _____ 36 14
64 45
Copper ____ 12 5
88 54
Coal ______ 53 29
47 53
Steel ______ 3J 21
67 44
"'For the . have_nots." the figures thref' years
ago arbitrard} embrhl'e Germany, Japan and
for the 'have8," the Unit,d States, the
British Emplr(>, and France. Current figur(>s
are the present line-up of the Umted NatIOns
agamst tht' A'X1S. With neutral or {'onquerPd. rE'_
\,ollrces diVided between opposmg spheres of in
tiuenee. For example, 35 per cent of world
ruhher controlled by the Netherlands indies, not
10 thO' Allwd hne-up three ago, now shows
up In thp A')Iis ('olumn
NOTE The economie Implication of the recent
Allied :;UC{'csses m Africa are not covprflu by thIS
tablfl fEd)
U. S_ A.
Health of the Army m the ['mted Stl1tC3
D1II mg Wmter .Months.
AdmiSSIOn rates per 1,000 per annum
fO! the wmter perIOd November to Feb
ruary, InClUSIVe, U. S. Army m the
L'tnted States.
AU DUlCusc J!l'8plrutOTIi
Cau"..s Onlll Dl$CUSfS
1040-41 ___ 1,539 1,403 9:16
1941-42 ___ 776
668 278
These figures show a 50 per cent reduc
tIOn III admissions aU causes, 52 pel' cent
for dIsease only, and 70 per cent fOl
mfectlOns. These reductions
translated mto days represent a decided
adrhtIOn to the \\ar effort. not to mentIOn
the effect on morale and well being.
merous factors, known and unknown,
combined to produce such sah&factory re
sults. Among known factors we may sug
gest the following:
1. Health condItIOns throughout the
lJlllted States were very good, despIte the
marked changes due to war, and no ex
tensive epIdemICS occurred.
2. The Army was composed of sea
soned troops who had monthR of rIgorous
training in camps and maneuvers New
men were absorbed in old units.
3. The Surgeon General insisted on
limiting the increase in the Army to the
aVailable for housmg, supply,
hospItalization, etc.
4. The preventive meaSUl'es enforced
III the Army to assure proper food, pot
able water. adequate clothing, ventIlatIon,
heatmg, and wholesome exercise and
As to continuance of the favorable
health conditions experienced we can
only keep on the alert WIth fingers
crossed and pray,
(The Army Medteal Bullettn)
T he A laskan A i,way.
Radio beams are now in operation
along the air route from Edmonton to
Alaska and full radio fa('iltties are avail
able for commercial and mIlItary air
planes. Work on the ('ham of airdromes
to Alaska was rushed be(,ause of the war
m tht! PaCific and milttary airplanes
from the United States are flying to
Alaska by way of Canada,
(The Aeroplane)

u. s. S. R.
The Airplanes of the Red Air Pleet
Now that the mr forces of the U.S.S_R.
have been m actIOn against the Luft
waffe for many months, new facts have
come tQ".light, mostly by way of Gt:'lmany.
on the newer types of Russhm "h-craft.
WhICh have replaced
the older and more familial' types. in
clude the Storrnovlk dIve bomber and
ground attack monoplane, the MIG-3
fighter, the Yak-4 and light bomb
ers, and the fighter-bomber. All of
them seem to be of high q".lahty. and the
light bombers in particular appear equal
to those In service anywhere in tbe
World. RUSSIa has obviollsly (oneen
trated on ('105e 5upport types for co-oper
atIOn WIth the Army and has rather
neglected the heavy bomber,

Two new types are in service, the 1-26
and the MIG-3, Both are low-wmg single
motor monoplanes WIth inward retracting
The 1-26. whIch IS somewhat similar to
the HurrIcane, has a 1,100 h.p. M-I05
lIqUId-cooled Vee motor and an armament
of two machme-guns and a motor-cannon.
The MIG-3, known earlIer as the 1-18
and now abo known as the 1-61 and 1-200,
IS SaId to be the latest SOVIet fighter, but
there are certamly stIll newer types com
mg mto serVIce. The IS a low
wing monoplane wlth the wmg slIghtly
swept down from the wing-root to the
undercarrIage PlvOt pomt. The fuselage
IS short WIth the pIlot's COCkPIt placed
\\o'eU back towards the fin. The 1,200 h.p.
AM-35A hqmd--cooled V'ee motor gives
the 1\11 a top ::.peed of about 360
m.p.h. The armament, accordmg to Ger
man sources, IS one heavy and two light
machme guns It has probably been in
clez.sed recently.
Ground A ttack and Dwe Bombers:
The Stormovlk, mentioned first by Lord
BeaverbrooK after hiS Visit to Moscow,
IS deSIgnated the IL-2 (BSch) and IS a
single-motor SIngle-seat mono
plane with backward retracting
carriags. It was developed from the
Heinkel He 118, but IS also similar in ap
pearance to the FaIrey Battle. The
Stormovlk has a 1,300 h.p A.M.-3S
cooled Vee motor. The motor' and cockpit
are speCially armored for low-level at
tack, and the IL-2 IS reported to have
been highly successful against tanks_
There are two 32 mm. cannon and two
machine guns m the leadmg edge of the
The SU-2 (BB-1) is a low-wing two
seat fighter-bomber with a rear gun tur
ret, on the lines of the Brewster Bermuda.
The motor is a 1,000 h.p, M-88 air-cooled
radial. The bomber version has two for
ward machme guns m the wing, and ol!e
free gun in the rear turret. There IS
beheved to be a smgle-seat fighter version
with four forward guns.
Another machine in service is the SB
RK, WhICh is rpally the SB-3 wIth modi
fier radiators and Ju 88 type dive-brakes
under the wmgs. The motors are 1,100
h p. MI05 lIqUIdcooled Veps
Light Reconnalssance Bombel's'
The two new types of reconnaissance
bomber are very similar m appearance.
They are the YAK4 BB-22 and the PE-2
The former is the smaller of the two;
hoth 81 e lOW-WIng twomotor mono
planes WIth twin fins and rudders
and retractable underCarriages. The tail
pIece on both types is dinedral. The
y AK-4 carrIes a crew of two. A potnt of
distinctIOn between it and the PE-2 is
that the motors of the YAK4 protrude
m front of the nose. The iV1 105 12 cylin
der lIquid-cooled Vee mota.s develop 1,100
h.p. each. There IS a dIve-bomber vers!on
-the BBIOO and It IS also used as an
attack bomber.
The PE-2 carries a crew of three or
.four and has a Iarg-e area of glass under
the nose. The bomb load of about 1,700
Ih IO!; sowed internally The top speed
IS belIeved to be slightly more than 300
The m05t m,ed flymg-boat IS the GST,
which IS the Consolidated 28 built under
license, fitted wlth front-gun turret and
special ruotor cowlmgs similar to the 1-16
Although possIbly not very new, a type
WhICh has not been previoU!;Iy mentIoned
IS the KORl seaplane. Thls machine
looks like a two-seat bIplane verSIOn of
the 1-16 Rata monoplane on a large cen
tral float WIth two small wmg-tlp floats.
It IS used for catapault operation from
ShlP'3 of the Black Sea Fleet.
Thel'e lS also a foulmotor flymgboat
III t''\.I",tpnce, but no detaIls are available
The pllnclpal operatlonal typps m the
Red Ail' Fleet now appear to be:-
FIghters: Heuuy Bomber
1-153 TB-6B
J-16C Super Rata
117 (CKB.19)' TnmspOt't;
1-26 PS-35 (Ant-35)
MIG-3 (1-61, 1-200, PS-84 mC-3)
SU-2 (BB-1)
Llght Bombers: Ambulance
SU.2 (BB-l) 1'-2
YAK-4 (BB-22)
PE-2 Manne:
Medw1IL Bombers'GST (Consolidated
SB-2 2S)
SB-3 ARK-3
DB-3 (CKB-26) KOR-l
DB-3F .
Dlve BombelS:
IL-2 (BSch Stormo
BBI00 (l\Iodlfica
tion of YAK-4)
(The Aeroplane)
The Caucasian F?'ont: .
The map of the Caucasus, showmg the
military roads and passes to the south,
over the mountams, WIth the OIl pipe-hne
between Baku and Batu})'l, illustrates the
terrain difficultIes WhICh, coupled with
effectIve Soviet lesIstance, have stalled
the German drtve. The"e ddncultIes WIll
multIply WIth the advent of severe Wlntel'
chmate \VhICh 1S characterIstIc of the
regIOn. (Ed.)
Poltttcal Comm18sols Abolished:
By a degree SIgned by 1\Ttkhail Kalwln,
PreSIdent of the SupnmH' CounCIl of thE'
lJ S.S.R. published on October 10, 1942.
the politlcal commissar system prevalent
m the Red Army smce 1918 has been
Supplementary decree lSi>ued by Joseph
Stalm. Comml<;sar of Defense, formally
relieved the commIssars of then dutIes
which mclutled dl1'ectlOn of entertain.
ment, maintenance of morale and politICal
mstl'u('tJOn. The supplementary decree di
I ected that all commIsoo;al s be given offi
eels' rank" wIthm one month. Those of
the commIssars who lack expellence In
combat tactics to be ordered to undergo
two-month training courses
(Press Reports)
2lJo1tars .
The mfantry is eqUlpped wlth light,
medlUm and heavy trench mortars which,
accordmg to Wehrtechnische Monats
hefte, are of modern construction.
The light. 51-mm, M40 trench mortar
IS a muzz.le-Ioading mortar consIstmg' of
tube, bipod, laying mechallIsm and base
plate and a total weIght of 22 kilograms.
The traversing mechanism permits an
angle of pintle traverse of 30 degrees to
right and left. The mInimum range is 60
meters, with an elevation of 75 degrees.
The range IS SOO meters, WIth an angle of
elevatIOn of 45 degrees The maximum
rate of fire for the mortar is 30 shots per
mmute. AccordIng to the RUSSIan Man
uals, It thl'oWS a sphencal projectile of
0.9 kg welght whose fragmentatIOn effect
I'> efl'ectlve over an area of 300 sq.
meters. One man carries projectiles
In a case on hiS ba('k. (For the sake of
compal'lson, we can attentIOn to the
English 1\1-11 1939 51mrn trench mor
tar which weighs 9.5 kg. and with an
elevation of 45 degrees, fires the 1 kg ex
plOSIve mIssIle a distance of some 430
meters. ) The medIum, 120-mm trench
mortar, model 38, also conslstmg of tube,
blpod, laying mechamsm and base plate,
accordmg to j\heuwe Rotterdamsche
Courant of 29 October. 1941 is loaded
onto a two wheeled, rubhertired carriage
for change of positIOn. This carriage is
attached to a limber.
( Altilleristische Rundschau)
Infantry Equipment.
In the mfantry equipment are found.
among other things, machine pistols with
a caliber of 7.62 millimeters with drums
wlth a capaCIty of 71 shells, arranged for
single shots 01 steady fire. They are often
used in tanks. The self-loading rifle, the
Slmonov model, has a caliber of 7.62 mil
ltmeters. weighs four and a half kilo
grams and has a rate of fire of 20 rounds
per mmute. The magazine holds 15 eart
ridges. The light machine gun, Degtyarev
model, a gas-operated, aid cooled gun,
weighs 8.4 kilograms and IS also used as
armament m tanks Shells are supplied
from drums holding 60 shells. Rate of
fire, 550 rounds per minute. The tank
gun has a caliber of 12.7 millimeters, is
equipped WIth recoil brake, fires semI
automatically and weighs 25 kilograms.
For the 7.62-mm caliber (rifle and ma
chine gun) explosive ammunition is
available. The bullet is 40 millimeters in
length. Under the 0.5 millimeter jacket.
is a letld jacket which is broader at the
base and contams an explosive capsule of
copper alloy, 11.5 millimeters long by 6.5
mIllImeters In dIameter. In the explosive
capsule there is a steel rod 4 mIllImeters
In length WhICh, on impact, strikes the
explosIve capsule whlch then causes the
explode. The explosive am
munItion was provided for planes, ma
chine guns and AA weapons but is also
employed agamst hvmg targets. Shells
are fired from a type of firmg apparatus,

three superimposed rows. The firing
apparatus is mounted on a motor t1 uck.
(Militdr-Wochenblatt )
The 152-1tml HoU'ttzer:
The 152-mm cannon howitzer is a
trail 1J'un with shIeld. The tube has a
muzzle brake and when is
drawn back for better weight distribu
tIOn. Powedul equilibrators are neces
sary in order to compensate for the
weight of the excessively forward thrust
barrel. A range Qf 17 kllometers (about
10 6 mIles) is obtamed with a 45 kilo
gram (about 99 pound) projectIle. A
two-wheeled limber is necessnry in trans
portatIOn. For- the transportation of the
heavy hOWItzer WhICh, ready for transpor
tatIon weighs 'j ,000 kilograms (about
15.400 Ibs) a caterpillar tread tractor is
employed which develops a speed of 20
km per hour.
The Second World War
[This survey covers reports up to 10 December 1942.]
The War in Europe
Till' RlfbSlali FI otd.""-The sunUllel
campaIgn of the GClman arnlJ<'s, WhICh
bl'gun late III June, had clltl'led the
by 1 September ('lose to HItler'::,
prmcipal goah> Of thE' '\laZl objE'cUYeS
stIll l'll1aIllmg to be attallleu the most
Important was Stal1l1g1 ad. the f.elZUl e of
whIch would end the flow of Russian SllP
plu"s along the tran<;pol tnt10n 1Qutp
of the Volga. Fay to th", ,,>outh the- Ger
man 1me C'"t(>udl'd for more than t1H ee
hundred mIles along the foothill." of th",
Caucm,u::., At the ,,"e':'>tern end of thh,
line the Rus5wn naval bm-,E's at Novoros
silsk anll Tuupse on the Black Sea were
yet to be taken, while at the (>n."t('l'n end
t11e 011 fiE'lds of Gl'ozny lay only about
sixty mlleo;, frol1l the NaZI speal head:..
WIth the CaspHI.n another mnety miles
Early In September. StalmgIad on the
Volga apppared to be doomed WIth pow
erful German mechamze0 force::;, on
velY It Impossible that
the RUSSIans Clmld long ('ontInu,:> to hold
the rums of their city. but ne\ertheles::;,
they fought ferocIOusly for every street
and eve) y bUJldi.llg'. sh ugglmg at bay
onet'b point evpn flom room to room_
Tm1e after tIme admItted Ger
man advanC'Ps and the Invaders, 1110vmg
forward stl eet by street, finally claimed
that they had reached the l'Iver it::;elf
at several pomts wlthm the CIty. The
Russians, however, never devoted their
efforts merely to defense. Theil' counter
attacks WeTe almost contmuous not only
in front of Stalmgrad but also upon the
northelll and ::;,outhern flanks be
tWl'l'n the VoIg-a and the Don. and m the
I"egown of J\ seventy-five miles
1,01 tlw,p;<t of Stalmg"l'ud \\ lthm the gl'eat
hend of th(' Don
IJUllH,I.(' Septemu(,l" the RUS':Han count
appealed to gam httle, but
eat b In OctalJel they to uecoml"
lIlll ca::.mgl} e""!lccwIly on thE'
(;(,1 mans' northeln ftanl, ev

dllveb ag-amst the NaZlc,' southern flank
Although the til'lmanS wele ::;,tlll makmg'
"hOI t 111 their dn"ret attack upon
Stahngrau. the Bedin rat1lO on 8 October
,'nnoull{'cU that the High Command. to
,IVDld "U1111N'C'ssal'y had
adopted 11('\'1,' turtlCs-al'tI11ery and all'
l,ombal dment:-. were to be employed
I'nthel' than frontal assault::. by tanks
alHI mfnntlY. Durmg the of Octo
bel" antI the first half of :-;ovember the
Ru<,<;wl1 flank attachs male no &pectacu
l.ll' galllS. but as the weel<s passed It be
gan to appear that Stalingl'ad, helIeved
fol' two months to be doomed. nught yet
hold out
Then on 22 Novembel the RUSSIans
I!WllChed thpu' full fOlee :"',gainst the Ger
Ulan flanhs nnrth\\e!'.t and southwest of
StailngTud, In both aH'u!'. the German
hnt'.;, gave way In the liorth the Rus
til ave fal mto territory formerly
held fiI mil' by the Gt'rmans, reaching'
anLl elo::.smg the Don \,;est of Stalingl'ad
cO.ltmumg well beyond It. The 1\'1,0
1 mlway lines that the Germans had used
to supply theIr forces 'Vf'l'e hoth broken
by the advancmg Accordmg to
report);, at the end of November. there
1 emained only a Cal ndor about twenty
mIles WIde through wll1('h the Germans
could maJ.. c contact with then' estm1ated
:;00,000 men befme Stalingrad. But in
of these Imple'iS1Ve RUSSIan gains,
the Germans ::.howed no InClInatIOn to
flom then pOSItIOns before the
city although In early December their
chances of takmg; It seemed remote,
Meanwhile. fur to the n01th and to the
::.outh of StalIng'I'ad other sectors of the
2.000-nllle front were also acttve. No
vornSSllsk. the pi inclpal SOVIet naval
lIn::.e on the Black Sea. was claimed by
the Germans on 6 September, the Rus
""Ians ad111lttmg its loss six days later.
liel man dl'lves then contmued along the
toast and through the mountains toward
the lesser naval base at Tuapse. For
three month&. reports of fighting in this
UI ea mdlcateu German advances and
counterblows, but December
lOund Tuap::;e stili in Russian hands.
'Fr<lm thH' P{}Sitl{}nS m the foothills
of the Caucasus the Germans launched
dlives Into the passes of the great moun
tams usmg speCIally trained mountain
tronps_ There appeared no eVldence, how
ever. that any substantial German suc
cesses were achieved.
At the eastern end of the Caucasus
line the :o.truggie to advance the German
STJearhead& toward the Caspian continued
persistently, ypt in December the Nazis
had succeeded 111 pushing only a few
111 lIes to the south and east of the line
they held at the beginninl; of September.
TheIr drIves along the Terek River
ward Orjonikidze and Grozny apparently
failed to change the situation materially,
and the oil fields of the eastern Caucasus
stIll remained well beyond their reach. By
early December they had apparently lost
the initiative in this area, but they still
held firmly the positions they had won,
and it seemed that the RussIans lacked
sufficient power to drive them back.
Far to the north of Stalingrad the
RussIans struck again and again at the
German lines, apparently hoping to com
pel the diversion of troops from the
Stalingrad front. Russian efforts m the
area around Voronezh 250 miles north
west of Stalmgrad, at Rzhev west of
Moscow, and in the Lenmgrad sector still
farther north produced only minor gams
and it seemed evident that SovIet of
fensIve power was insuffiCIent to win de
CISIve results. Early m November.
however, Berlin began to report increas
ing RUssIan concentrations north of Mos
cow, and these reports continued to be
Issued wIth growmg emphasis as It be
came eVIdent that the Russians were
preparing a drive of very conSiderable
proportIons. In the middle of the month
an attack was launched against the Ger
man arm encu'clIng Leningrad, and Ber
1m admitted the loss of some territory.
Late III November powerful Russian
drIves in the Rzhev sector were reported
to have forced the Germans back sev
eral miles. In early December It was not
yet clear, however, whether the NaZI re
verses were to be attrIbuted entirely to
RUSSIan striking power, or whether the
Germans were withdrawing to a pre
pared "winter hne" somewhere in the
rear as they dId In the winter of 1941.
In spite of the gl eat areas taken by
the Germans in theIr Ru:;;sian campaIgn
of the summer and autumn, It dId not
appear that there had ever been an ac
tual German "breakthrough" or that a
RUSSIan army had ever dIsintegrated be
fore the invaders. The long Russian re
treats had apparently been carried out
wIthout confusion or collapse of rear
communicatlons, and the RUSSIans had
found It possible to bring up reserves,
supplies, guns and planes all along the
hne. And now III early December they
hali eVIdently taken the imtIatIve from
the Germans and were on the offenSIve
at every pomt of action on the entIre
front, The Germans on the other hand
were apparently being forced upon the
defenSIve without having gained the ulti
mate objectives of their summer cam
paign: they had not reached the principal
Oil fields In the south, they did not con
trol the Caucasus, they had failed to take
Stalmgrad or to dommate the Volga, and
above all they had failed not only to de
stroy the Russian armies but also even
to weaken them suffiCIently to remove
them as a potential threat.
Western Europe -The A Illes' air war
on Germany and occupied Europe con
tinued persistently through September
and hluch of October. The Royal Air
Force conducted a raid on an average of
every other night, and while none prob
ably reached the thousandplane magni
tude of some earher raids, immense
. damage was inflicted by the use of the
powerful new "block-buster" bombs. As
usual, Bremen and the cities of the Saar
industrial district came in for a major
share of attention, but many other im
}Jortant centers were also Mean
whIle. the Americans with theIr Flying
Fortresses were highly successful in
daylight precision bombing over N azi
occupied areas near the coast, and far to
the east Russian long-range bombers
Gittacked many points includIng Danzig,
o 100 200 300MiLEf
Koemgsberg, Budapest. Bucharest. and
the Rumantan 011 fields.
In October there appeared to be a de
clIne in BritIsh air attacks on Germany
as the big bombers. accordmg to a Bntlsh
statement, were diverted to Egypt to
support the Allied in their ap
proachmg drive on General Rommel's
army. Italy, however, came In for an in
cleased number of bombmgs On 22 Octo
her there occurred the greatest aIr attack
yet launched against that country. and
within about a month thereafter, thirty
five heavy raids were directed agamst
Genoa. Turm and MIlan. Through the
destruction of Genoa's port facilitIes and
many northern ItalIan armament works,
these raids must have contributed con
sIderably to the weakening of Italy's
efforts in reSIstance to the Allled In
vasion of North Africa in November.
The air attacks continued into December
and mass evacuations were reported flom
ItaIy's industrial areas.
In Unoccupied France, German efforts
to conscrIpt French labor for serVICe In
Germany met with lIttle success and
aroused widespread resentment. There
were reports of strikes. sabotage. demon
stl'atlOns and CiVI1 strife; but the Vichy
government with Pierre Laval virtually
rlominant contmued to insist upon "co
operation" with the Nazis.
On Armistice Day, 11 November, a
few days after the Allied mvasion of
.\'orth Africa, the Germans suddenly
da::.hed II1to t;'noccupled }I'rance and pro
reedeu to o{'CUPY It e:xcept for a sectIOn
In the southeas.t WhICh wa::. seized by the
Italians There was no effectIve OPPOSI
tIOn and thp Gel man:, apparently kept
the well in hand. On 27 No
\'l'mber, however, when they attempted
to seIze the sixty four vessels of the
French fleet at Toulon. the French acted
too qujckly for them and destroyed the
g-reater part of the fleet. Many of the
were blown up, some that failed to
c}.plode were sunk by gunfire. at least
one blew up when it hIt a parachute mine
while attemptmg to escape, and a few got
away. One submarme was later interned
III Spam. anti three others were reported
to have Jomed the Allies.
In December. Marshal Petain's Vichy
government was m a very doubtful posi
tion. for C noccupied France had ceased
to eXIst, and while the aged Marshal
continued to talk like the ruler of France
the whole country in fact had been placed
under the forceful control of Nazi Field
Marshal von Rundstedt.
Unrest and Reslstance.-Throughout
Europe there were reports of unrest as
the peoples looked fOlward to another
wIllter of hunger and cold. The relations
of Germany With both Sweden and
SWItzerland occasionally showed signs of
deterioration. In Sp-ain the changes made
early III September in General Franco's
cabinet apparently left it as pro-Axis as
ever, and lts first pronouncement strong
ly reatfirmed the "Imperatlves of the
New European Order." Yet in November
Franco was leported to have refused HIt_
ler's for ba:;.es ill Spam and to
have asserted that hiS country was pre
pared to defend herself ft am attack by
either bide. TUl mOll m hoth Rumania
anti BulgarIa was saId to be approachIng
open IllSUll petlon as Germany Increased
her demands upon tno::.e countl1es. Mal
tlal law was dedareJ throughout Serbia.
Albaman patrIOts fought I talians for
thell nULlonal mdependence, and General
Dl'uJu .fi..hhailovIeh with an ebtunated
150,000 men held out m the mountalllS of
JugoslavIa and caused the AXIS an
abundance of U ouble. whIle the Partisans
(.Jugoslav People's Army), stlong m
Slo\<ema and webtern Bosma, caused
trouble not only for thE' AXIS powers but
abo for the Sel Lian NatlOnaiu;ts sup
}J01 tmg General 1\.1 IhatlOVICh. ltalIan
popular anttpathy to the ''War was he
lieved to be mountmg, and was
f>tlcngthened by Mussolim's dmonItJOns
to hlb people on the "ubJect decbnmg
morale. In occupied Europe '('ports of
VIOlence eUlployed both by and agumst
to be frequent, al
though no conquered people In EUl'ope
vms yet in a positIon to take deCl&lVe
actlOn agamst the conqueiOIS. The New
Order was appmently proclucmg general
dl:"order whereVf'l It'> mfluence extended
outSIde of Germany
The War in North Africa
ggy/d al/d Libya -ThlOughout the
months of Septembel and Odobel' the
forces of the A)"IS faced those of the
Allies In the bottlenedl brtween the
gyptJan coa<.,tal town of E1 Alamem
and the Qattam fOI ty mIles
to the south. On :i 1 August, General
Rommel thlew hIS Gelman arulOleJ Ullitb
agaInbt the AlhE'd hne JUl"t nm th of the
Qattara DepreSSIOn. appal pntly With the
mtentlOn of sweepIng :"euwanl In thl
Allied lear and deluoll'"hmg op
pnnente:, as he had done at Bir llachellll
In May. This time. ho\\-e\<er, the Bntlsh
(rushed hiS advance With an overwhelm
mg fOice of altI1lety. tanks and planes.
A few days later Rommel wm.
where he had l>ta.rted, and It became 1Il
creaslugly evtdenttthat hu;, effort had cost
hIm a prIce. H IS weI e
rliftkult to leplucf.'. for while hiS snpply
lllles from Europe \\-el<> I ciatlvely short
they wel'e extlemely vullll'lable to AllIed
nttack and the AllIed all' forces nevel
cE'ased to pound them on land and sea
MeanwhIle. ovpr the long, loute
al"ound Aft ICa, suppltc<., and reinforce
ments flowed in steadily behmd the Allied
the night of 2:3 October the AllIed
fm ces opened the battle With sevel al
hours of all-out artlllel y bombardment to
prepare the \Vay fOt" the forward move
ment of i.nfantl), befOle
dawn the next day. At first the advance
",as conducted untIl the po$,
f'lbility of bl'cakIng the AXIS Ime ('auld
he definitely ascertamed. The Allies' ar
tillery soon proveu by far the mOl e pow
erful. thell' control of the all' ,\ as
complete, and the Royal All' Force gave
wellMcOOJ"dmated ::.upport to the slowly
advanCIng ground forces
For twelve days the battlp eontlllupd
with heavy pressure upon e\leIY pomt of
Rommel's flont. Then on 4 November
Rommel's hne {'racked and his forces be
gan a genetaI retreat that rapIdly became
a rout ThE' commander of the renowned
Afrtka Korps, General von Thoma, was
captured, and R,)mme}'s second in comM
mand, General von Stumme, was killed;
Dut a conSiderable portion of the Axis
escaped the Brtthh g-rasp and
l>eaded westward along the sea. It was
e-xpe. ted that the retreatmg forces would
make a stand at some defenSible point
on the EgyptIan coast hut, under thE'
pOllndlUg of the Royal AIr Force and
With the BritIsh hot on their heels the
{;emutns l'ushed on mto LIbya. A British
attempt to cut off the fleeIng NaZIS by a
dash southwE'stward toward Agedabia
barely faileu of succe""s, anti Rommel
WIth several thou:mnd Germans and
Italians succeeded In reaching the bottle
neck at EI Aghella LetwE'E'n the sea and
the f'ult mal shes.
The Britl::.h, meanwhIle, found them
seh'es With theIr supply route tremend
ously lengthened. and thetr problems
wel e compltcated by rains th<:.t bogged
down then motor vehicles and grounded
theIr planes. In early December they
were strugglmg to draw up uoops and
for what mIght prove to be the
tmal effort to ex.pel Genelal Rommel from
.A. fnca. Whether Rommel would attempt
to meet an attack at El Agheila 01" wou1d
tl y to escape elthet toward TUniS 01
overbeas l'emamed to he 1N'n.
J1(J1 (JCCO, A lOCI La alld Tunis - WhIle
th(> world's attentwu was fixl"d on thE'
btl uggle WIth General Rommel, one of
the most dramatIc epll>odes m the Allied
war effOl t suddenly occuned m north
west AfrIca when the forces of the
L'mtf'u NatlOm. launched thelr surprIse
mvaslOn of 1\1010(,CO and Algerm on the
nIght of 7 November.
Plans for buch an InVaSIOn had been
undCl consIderatIOn the beginnmg
of thC' Y(>8r tbgether WIth plans for an
il1\<8SJ(,n of Europe. and Ptesldent Roose
\lelt .md Pillne MIn1l:,te-r ChurchIll dll>
(u<.,sed the"e matten, when the latter
vlHterl Washmgton m June In July the
/ltoJect for a Emopean mvaSlOn was
nbandoned for the plese-nt. although an
J]'HlllCem!-nt::, ('oncernIng a European
"\,ecOIHl hont 111 1942" contmued to be
leleab('d.. tllP end of July funda
lYIpntal:3 hat! heen deCIded upon for the
n .. pellitlOn mto .:\'01 th Afl'lca and landmg
had been chosen. In August the
d'lt(' of the tnVaSlOn WdS fh.ed and
Chul"chlll, on hIS V1Slt to Moscow III that
month, laId the plan ill fun before Stalm.
Emly III September, Rommel's defeat
ltl hlb attacK on the AllIed lmes at El
Alamem ed the secul'lty of Egypt
and left the way open for a two-way
thrl1:>t aClOSS Afl"lca from Egypt
und from the Atlantic. InM
t!"lcate dlpiomatH' preparatIOns wele
umlcr way, of WhICh httle IS yC't known
In Octoller. Lleutenant Gpnelal .Mark
\\'ayne Cial J... of the AmerIcan forces in
illitalfl, accompamed by seven men,
landed from a subl11anne on the :-J"orth
AfrIcan coast to get InfOrmatlOn and see
\\hat support could be expected from thp
Flench officers there. He met the French
at mght and was hearly captured and
then drowned In the course of a
hanbreadth escape.
The AX1S was not unaware, of
that SIgnificant preparations were under
\\ ay, but eVldence l11dlcates. that the ac
tuul coun;e and speed of the InvaSIOn
came as a 8m prise. At the end of Spp
tember, AXIS reports stated that the
Allies \\ ere preparmg to seize Dakar
Large-scale Bntish landing exerci5es
,,,,'ere obsPrved at GIbraltar. There was
an extenslve evacuatIOn of women and
chIldren from Dakar and conSiderable
remfOl'cements, both mBital"Y and naval,
WE're rushed there. The threat to the city
seemed to mcrease throughout October
as news came out of the massing of
AmerIcan and BritIsh combat forces
along the AllIed coast of West Africa
from the Belgian Congo all the way to
Gambia. less than a hundred miles from
Dakar. In mid-October a large Allied
convoy was discovel'ed neal' the Cape
Verde Islands, headmg apparently for
Dakar, but the ships were later reported
to have landed an expeditionary force in
When, on the night of 7 November.
thE' gl'eat InvaSIOn was suddenly launch
ed, the plan was evident at once. Dakar
was to be ignored for the present whIle
the A1Iies pounced in force upon Casa
blanca, Oran, and Algiers, the CItIes
whIch are the key pomts of the whole
raIlway, hIghway, and airway system of
North West Afrlca, as well as the con
trolling centers of the economic and
pohtlcal structure of the area. The con
quest of Motocco and Algeria was es
sentially completed wlthm less than foUl"
days. The chief of Vichy's armed forces,
AdmIral Dal'lan, "happened" to be m
Algiers at the time, and thanks to his
orders that CIty wa::; taken within sixteen
hours after troops landed near by. Casa
blanca put up the stiffest resistance but
was soon reduced to submiSSIOn. Oran
ie-II aftPl' oppOSItion was overcome on 10

British fleet Ulllts rapidly advanced
upon TuniSIa, while Bntish Fll'st Army
tl"OOpS landed at Bone, sixty miles from
the TUlllSIan bordet, and American mo
tOrlzed forces rushed overland from the
west to JOIn them. At dawn on 14 No
vember, SIX days after the mvasion be
gan, the Alhe':> crossed mto TuniSia and
here for the first tIme they met Axis
tlOOpS in force. The pnncipal objectives
10 TUlllSIa were the city of Tunis and the
nr.val at Blzel'te, less than forty
miles apart BIzerte IS WIthin easy reach
of A::-"Ib m SIcily. and from these
fields A}'IS troops WIth light tanl.;:s and
other eqUipment ,vere rapIdly ferried
I)\'el to join the estimated 10,000 already
prepuJ(:od to leblst 811 Allied conquest.
By 1 December the A Hies had cut the
1 atlway hne between Bizerte and Tunis
and were reported to be withm twelve
nllieb of t11.e sea at one pomt and wlthm
an equal dIstance of Tums. The coast
lnad from Tums to LlbJlR hy Rom
mel mIght escape from EI AgheJIa l'e
mamou undel' AXIS conU'ol but an AllIed
column was lepol'ted udvancmg upon it,
\',hl;e a Flee French column was be
lieved to be moving northward from the
French colomes in Central Afnca. It
bcemed that the AllIes were lapldly
dOSlllg m from all directIons upon the
labt stronghold,:> of the A.xis in Africa. A
few days later, ho,vever, German counterM
attacks drove the Ailled forces back from
the11' forward positions west of Bizerte
Tums, and it was eVIdent in early
December that there was hard fightIng
ahead before Axis power m North Africa
could finally be destroyed.
The War in the Pacific Islands
The Solomons.-For several weeks
after the Marines landed in the southern
Solomons on 7 August, information con
('erning condltions there was meager and
mIsleading. In September the impression
JJl'evailed that, while a gl'eat sea-battle
was to be expected, there was little 1'e
maimng to be done in the occupied
islands but to "mop up" scattel'ed Jap
anese detachments. Only in October did
the American people realIze how desperR
ate was the struggle for the islands and
how much more remamed to be done. As
more complete information is released
concerning the battles m the South Pa
cific the story that can now be told will
probably have to be considerably re
The Japanese. It appears. were never
much mterested in Tulagi, Florida or
other nearby islands. but they were de
termined from the first to recovel' Guad
alcanal with Its airfield (renamed "Hen
dprson Field") and to drIVe the Mannes
from the small area they had been able
to occupy, a beachhead seven or Pight
miles long and four or five deep on the
northern shore of the Island. Wlthm
forty-eight hours after the AmerIcans
landed, a Japanese naval force struck
back, smkmg not only an Austrahan
cruiser and several other ves"iels al"
ongmally reported but also three Amerl
can heavy cruisers. Very soon Japanese
hombers began btrH,ing hard at HenderR
Field and Japanese remforcements
worked theIr way mto Guadalcanal m
conSIderable numbers, approachmg at
mght by short steps from Island to These infiltratIOn parties spem to
have suffered hpavy 10:,se8 hut still they
came, and the plessure on the AmerIcans
:,teadily Increased
Japanese naval movements mdicated
that a major engagement at sea mIght
develop at ady tlme. On 24 and 25 Au
Rust a Japanese fleet movmg from the
north was intercepted by an AmerIcan
force and the Japanese retired with con
SIderable damage Including the pOSSIble
105S of a plane-cal ner. ThiS battle was
apparently cal'l'ied on between carrIer
ba5ed planes WIthout surface engage
On 13 and 14 September the Japanese
made a violent effol-t to destroy entirely
the AmerIcan forces on Guadalcanal.
They closed in from three SIdes on Hen
derson Field and III the bItter struggle
that followed they succeeded for a Ume
In occupying part of the field. DrIven
back. they filtered m agam and agam.
hut eventually they were forced by the
f'xhausted Marines to WIthdraw into the
The small number of Amencan ait
eraft carriers was further reduced on 15
September when the carner Wasp
by a submal me near the Solomons.
Another naval engagement took place
OTt 11 and 12 Ot"tobpr when an AmerIcan
taH: force met a J apane;;(> task force off
the northwestern tip of Guadalcanal and
,mnl\ two heavy Japan(><:.e crUIsers. a lIght
Cl uber and three de:,troyers, WIth the le
ported' loss of one AmerIcan destroyer_
Meanwhile, landmg partIes
had become bolder. iafillmg in daylight on
the American side of Guadalcanai. ano
for weeks the lVlarmes weye fightmg for
theIr lives_ They to have mfllcted
far more damage than they suffered. but
they continued to be under a fearful
strain. For a long time fightmg y,.as al
most continuous around the beachhead.
On 25 and 26 October a United States
fleet engaged a strong Japane&e force
northeast of the Islands and thIS tIme
A I1lel'ican planes sank two destroyers and
damaged several other ves5els. American
losses included a destroyer, two smaller
vessels and a planecarl'iel,
By this time l:nited StateE. Army rein
forcements had joined the Marines on
Guadalcanal, and as Japanese troops con
tinued to land on the island they seem to
have met increasingly warm receptions_
By mid-November the Amencan forces
were reported to have extended theIr
beachhead to a length of sixteen miles.
J<'rom their distant bases, Genelal Mac
Arthur's bombers frequently attacked
Japanese naval concentrations at Rabaul
III New Rntam and at points in the up
per Solomons.
The greatest naval surface battle yet
fought for the Islands occurred on 13 to
15 November when a strong fleet, report-
In the United 'States there was a pros
pect that an absolute preponderance
of naval power III the Pacific might
be achieved within the commg year. The
forces at Guadalcanal, however, were
;;tll1 in a dangerous position for appar
ently the Japanese were determined to
recover the southeastern Solomons in
spIte of the cost in men and ships, and
the enu was not m slght.
ed by MacArthur's bombers to be head
mg for Guadalcanal, was llltercepted by
an AmerIcan naval fOice l':vIJently the
Japanese mtf'nded to make this the final
battle for the islands. for they were ac
compamed by transports canying troops
(..shmated to number over 20,000. As their
fleet approached, the Japanese attached
Henden.on FIeld WIth plane">, arhllpry
and mfantIy The Amencan Navy, how
<'Vf'r, v.on a deCISIve victory. smkmg
twenty-three ves<;;els and damaging sevpn,
according to a commumque of 16 Novem
ber, Amel'lcan losses mcluded at lea&t
1'\-"0 light cl'"J and "IX destroyers.
WIth damage to several other ShIpS. No
plane-carrIers were- reported in this bat
The next engagement took place on
the night of 30 November when a fipet
of Japanese cargo and transport ShIPS
::.trongly protected by destroyers was met
hy an American force northwest of Guad
alcanaL In the battle that followed the
Japanese were turne-d back wlth a of
SI}" warships and thl' other ve-s'>els
An American (l'uiger waE. reported sunk
and other Amencan &hlPS \\re saul to
have been so badly damaged that
of the enemy was not pOSSIble
By December It appeared that the bal
ant"e of sea power In the PaCIfic was
shlftmg toward the rmted Statps. The
proportIOn of hoth l'l'UISeI sand'oy
ers sepmed to be mol'P favO! able to
the Amellcans than it had been before
the battles in the Solomons. and WIth
new ships bemg lapldly consLucted
Guwea -The grea.t Island of New
Guinea remamed divided all sumIUer be
t\veen the Japanese and the Austrahans.
F10m theIr bases on the northern coast
at Lae-, Salarnaua, Gona and Buna, the
Japanese had pusheu inland during July
and August as far as Kol,oda, a jungle
\tIllage WIth a small airfield in the foot
hIlls of the lofty Stanley Moun
tams. TheIr use 01 the Island for of
fenSIves against Australia was ltmIted.
however, by the strong position of the
Australians at Port Moresby on the
southern '.oa5t. Clearly the princ!pal
obJeetlve Of the Japanese m Gumea
must bp thE! removal of thIS obstacle from
theIr path_
In the last week of August a Japanese
attempt to seIze 1\1 ilne Bay at the
easteln tip of GUInea faIled como.
pletely and l'ft th' Australians appar
ently in a strong pOSition in that area.
Unable to reach Port Moresby by sea,
the Japanese next attempted the over
land routp.
On 8 September it wa<; reported that
they were movmg fron:t Kokotla south
ward into the mountams. U&lllg their
well-known Infiltrat'ton and outflanking
tactICS, they reqUIred only a few days to
[!'et past the gap at the highest point on
thf' tl all anll by the end of Spptember
they had arrIVed wlthm thIrty-two mIles
(.f Port Moresby_ However, their supply
III ohlems seem to have proved too much
fOl them, Many of those who got over
thl' mountams wcre later found to have
thed of stal'VatlOn U"i well as of malaria
and dysentery, and when the Australians
finally launehed a determmed
tack the Japanese were u.nable tu reSl&t
them. While General MacArthur's
ers pounded at the enemy's supply hnes.
United NatIons troops advanced all the
way to the gap wIthout meeting resist
ance. Light contact was made with the
Japanese m the mountams hut the hat
tles whlCh were expected there seem
neyer to have developed, and on 3
vemher the AllIes announced the recov
(>1 y of Kokofla wIthout 5erI01,1S OpposItion.
Umted NatIOns forces pushed on untIl
they leached the northerrl coast, and
they soon I'eciuceu the areas occupIed by
the .Tapanese to mere, beachheads around
the VIllages of Buna and Gona. With Gen
eral MacArthur m personal command.
Amellcan troop'" s,E'em to have devoted
then attt'ntlOn princIpally to Buna while
the AustralIans attacked Gona fifteen
mIles up the coa::.t. At the::.e POints tht'
J apanc::.e were cleally determIned to 1 ('.
to the hmlt Several Japane&e
,:-('h. -'."aro;:,hlps,. \an\\mg and ('argo
('an teI'S-as well as many plane, wen'
destI In attempts to l'emfol'ce and
::;upply the defendels of the beachheads.
Allied pIUIH'S hl.'uvlly Lomued the
routes ami the Japanese bases at LaC'
alld Salamaua m New Gumea and at
In :-.Jew Bntain. whde the Amen
and Am-tl'ailan glOlwd forces at
taelong' Buna 8nu Gona measured theIl'
g-ah'l!' In yards l{l'ports fl DIn Am,tl'alw.
dated 10 De('!;'IIl\'Cl' t:.tated that the Allies
h,td finally taken Gona antI that the at"
tack on Buna was pl'ogressmg favo!'ably
The War in Asia
('iU'Hl und [JII)')IIO Nearly all the e:\"
tem;!V", territOlY conqm'Ied by the Jap
ane.;e dUl mg thell' :",ummel' campaign in
ea'-t-centl'al Chma \\fao:, abandoned by
thea fOi ce:::. In late A uguo:,t and in
tl'mber, and the mvadcts retll'f'd fo}' thc
mo:"t pal t to tIWll' fO! 111f'l' pO,,1110no;:, Ju:::.t
why thb I etJ eat took place never be
came cleal, hut It '.\a,> \vHlely as:>umed
that the Japanese haLi wlthJrawn \oolun
tallly to tloo115 for more flOItful
opel'atlons f'ls('whe'"e. The mystel'Y wa'"
deepened, however, by the fact that the
WIthdrawal not conducted III an 01"
derly anti nH?thotill'a1 manner Accordmg
to Chmese the Japanese fought
hal d at e'vel':i ptllnt anti always palti a
high pl'lce in men and nuttellel Lefore
abanaonmg a and III some C'
they countelllttuckC'd WIth ngol to 1 ('
l"OVL'j' lost ground. l'\eVf'l the
ChlOC'>l' :-eell1f'd con'vlllced that Japdne'3e
were bemg wlthdl awn either fOl
an attack on Slbel'1<l. a dII\'t' mto IndlLl.
or a push up the BUlmu 10<"1.11 mto
wl'stern Chma When DC'ccmber 3lTlveJ
thele had heen as Yl't no rlthe
III any of the:::.e .Ill l'''tlOns. By that time
the monsoon sl.'a"'()!l WIth Ib tOllentwi
haJ ende(l III BUI rna, although the
loads welt:' still plobably too muddy for
E'"\tenslve troop ant! supply mOVl'mE'nts
Aertal reconmussance conducted fronl
Indta and fmlf'd to locate Jap
anp",e f')l'ce& m a pO,>ltlOn to attack west
ward mto India. The Chinese, howevel',
dauneJ that the Japanese had 30,000
men WIth col1apsible boats and full eqUIp"
ment 111aSSeU ort the Salween River readr
to It and di'lV(' up the Burma road
toward Kunmmg and on to Chungking,
capItal of the fighting Chinese govern
In China, United States Army al1d
Royal Air F(lfCe planes were active,
RaIds WE're conducted far int(l the ll(lrth
(to Lmhsi) and southward into French
Indo-Chma (Haiphong), as well as to
Hong Kong and many points nearer the
Allied airdromes in central China. Aerial
activIty, however. appeared to be less in
tense than dOJ'mg the summer cam
palgns, and this was true also of ground
action WhICh faIled to produce any sig
mficant results during October and No
In Assam, across the border from
Burma, American ground forces were re
ported to have completed a sertes of air
drOU1eh and supply pomts from which
materiel could oe flown into China. Late
In OctoiJer. just at the end of the mon
soon :::.ea&on, the Japanese de\1vered a
f;Ulpnse attack on the tel minus of this
aenal "Burma road" and destroyed sev
('oral Amerlcan fighters and cargo planes
un the gl'ound. The AmerIcans lashed
hack WIth a of raids on Japanese
.... uppl!j points and strategic objectives m
Burma" Otherwise, both SIdes continued
to aV>'Ult more deciSIve action whICh wa5
expected to beg'lIl somewhere In ASla at
any time
The I8land of Madagascar m the hands
of the VIchy French was for a long time
a danger pomt on the Alhed trade route
alound South Afncll to the Near East.
When the Bl'ltlsh took the port of Diego
Saulez on the northern tIp of the Island
eady III May, it was hoped that French
officIal1'> el<;;ewhel'e In the colony would co
upcl"Ute WIth AllIed mtere&ts. but the
Flench showed just the OppOSIte tn
t ImatlOl1 Accordlng to reports, AXlb
">uhmarmes contmued to fuel in the
Island's pOl ts and Axis agents operated
flcely As a result. on 10 September the
Blilish opened an offenSIve along 675
llllies of the northwestern coast, and
aftf'\ occupymg the pnncipal ports then
fm ll1Ov'u Inland to complete the eon
qU\?::'t. fhe French bloch.ed the BritIsh

not ontll September that the capItal.
Tananall\'c, was occupIed by the mvad
forces The fact that the French
flu!; was hept flymg was not effective as
a gesture of appeasement, and reSlstance
contlllued III the south. Al mistice terms
wel'P offered by the Bntlsh and the ne
g'otiatlOns that followed only served to
dlO'luy thE' final settle-ment. At last, on
B 1\ovember. months after the first
lllltish ianrlmgs, the French in
j:.'l."cal' Signed the at lUIs.tice and tht;>
blnntl finally came under Allied conti 01.
Flcn,'h reSistance had seemed futile
fl om the fir:::.t. but by delaying the B"Itish
advance:> 10 every way pOSSIble and then
III along-Illg' negotlatlOns to the hmlt, the
fO! many weeks had effectlVely
tle,l up consHlerable BrItish nl1htary and
navaJ forces whIch nught have been used
to a'lvantage agamst thf' !LXlS elsewhere,
The Western Hemisphere
Lotm A merlca.-The only two coun
tries In the Americas that failed to break
\vlth the Axis, Argentina and Chile, con
tmupn to cause concern to those actIve in
the t'mted NatlOns' war effort during
the autumn months. On 8 October, Un
del' Secretary of State Sumner Welles
saId boldly in a public speech that Ar
gentina and Chile were being used by
Axis agents as bases for the transmis
sion of information leading to the sinking
of United Nations ships. and he could
not believe that they would continue to
protect these agents and thus permit
their neighbors to be "stabbed in the
back." Angry retorts came from both
the accused nations.' and President Juan
Antonio Rios of Chile cancelled the visit
to the UnIted States for which he was
even then preparing.
Thereafter matters began to Improve.
On 20 October the Chilean Cabmet re
signed to leave President Rios "absolute
lIberty of act1On," and a new Cabinet was
nppomted WIth stronger ten
denCies. Soon after thiS a spy ring was
broken up in Chile and Argentina also
undertook an lllvestigation of activities
of foreign agents. When Amencan forces

dent Roosevelt praising the action and
promismg control of Nazl propaganda
and espionage In Chile. and Pnesldent
Castillo sent assurances that his people
watched "WIth solidarity and mterest
the efforts made by the great and
friendly natlOn 1n safeguarding the se
cunty of the Americas:' Thus m the
dIplomatiC theater of the Western Hemis
phere it appeared that events were tak
ing a course highly favorable to the
mterests of the Ulllted NatIOns
Tbe War Effol't in the United States.
Durmg the months of autumn that eom
pleted the first year of America's partici
patIOn in the world struggle. the country
moved steadIly in the direction of "total
Provision was made for the fixing
of mdustl'lal wages and farm prices by
nn antimflation act signed by the Presi
d'nt on 2 October. On 13 November the
draft age was reduced from 20 to 18.
Increasmg the number of those eligible
for selectIve serVIce by an estimated
2.250,000. Coffee rationing became ef
fective on 29 November, and gasoline
ratlOlllng was extended to the country as
a whole on 1 December.
When President Roosevelt returned on
1 October from an tour of the
nation's war production centers, he re
portf'd that he had found morale good.
the war spu'Jt aggressive and production
94 01' 95
r of the goal he had set In J anu
ilry. Some nuthorJties thought his per
centage a lIttle too optlmistlc. but all in
dicatIOns showed a tremendous and
Illcleasmg output of war materials of all
hmds. In the vital matter of ship pro
ductIOn, progress seemed somewhat 11"
regular. WIth October's output of elghty
one new merchant ships fallIng twelve
ShIPS below the rec()rd production of Sep
tember, Obviously there was serious need
for al1 that could be built. with America's
battle line rapIdly expanding and the
submarines still takmg a heavy toll,
"There can he no question," smd Secre
tary of the Xavy Knox in September,
"but that today the submarme problem
18 the. major problem confronting us."
An Important Ameri('an strategic
achievement was the completion of the
Alaska Ihghway extending almost 1,600
mIles from Dawson Creek, British
lumbia, to BIg Delta near Fairbanks,
A lasl<a. Work on the road was Ol'del'ed
in February, and Its official opening on
20 November was more than three
months ahead pf schedule. The road is
expected to facilitate the movement of
supplies by ah' from Alaskan bases to
Russia and China.
184 pages ... McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., New York CIty.
ThIS text appears to be the answer to
questIOns arIsmg as to what to do in the
various phases of protecting oneself,
families, and property in the event of
enemy air attacks. Published for all who
need the mformation. It attempts to In
form and educate the reader In Its presen
tatlOn of well developed chapters. The
book tnes to leave nothing to chance and
seems to have gone deeply enough into
the varIOUS aspects of CIvilIan Defense
so that definite knowledge wlll be at the
hand of the reader In an emergency. One
of the chapters even goes mto nutrition
In the wartIme emergency.
There are many iUIustrations III the
Handbook, and the inSIde back cover con
tains a good chart on chemIcal warfare
agents. FolloWIng the mam part of the
book are a selected critical bibliography
and two appendices: The Col1eges and
CIvilIan Defense, and Available MotIon
PIctures Relating to CIvllian DC'fense.
334 pages. _ . Reynal & Hitchcock,
New York.
Author de Sales has lived in thIS COUTI
try for some 10 years, and up to the Fall
of France was the correspondent of the
Havas agency and of Paris-Soh-. In thIS
book he brIngs into the open the question
of what are the issues of World War II,
whIch he descrIbes as a "multidImension
al criSIS." The current world-wide strug
gle, to use the author's own language,
consists of two series of conflIcts.
.. the vertical conflwts m which
nations fight one another, and the...:..
horlzontal confllCts whwh 'ltieD
logical, political, social, and econom
tc. The latter b'anscend boundanes.
They are ca1Tied on withm each
country. They overlap purely na
tional and disrupt the
national fronts. They form the pat
tern of revolutwn, whzch ser1'es as a
backdrop for the actual battles whwh
are carried on on land, on sea, and in
the atr.
M. de Sales does not seek to offer solu
tIOns, but hiS book does provide a stimulus
and a medIUm for thoughtful conSider
atIOn of the impact of the forces of na
tIonalism, collectivism and pacatism-ln
the past, now, and III the years ahearl
366 pages ... D. Appleton-Century
Company, Inc. New York.
LIeutenant Colonel Azoy states in the
foreword that he has attempted carefully
to compile the contents to serve as a
source of ready and authoritative refer
ence on the fundamental requirements of
up to-date mIlItary knowledge and
The main part of the book mc1udes eleven
chapters deahng With organization of the
Army, the 5taff and staff dutIes, the UnI
form and equipment, dTlll and ceremonies,
military courte5ies, drill and combat sig
nals. display of basic equipment, tent
pitchIng, pay and allowances. military
correspondence and paper work, essen
tIals of court martIal. and selective $erv
FollOWing the main sectIOn are SIX ap
pendIces, profusely Illustrated, which
concern baSIC formations of foot troops,
mlhtary symbols, serVlce bibliography,
rIbbons of Umted States Army decOl'a
tIons and campaign badges, an outline of
military history. and a personal servIce
record for anyone who owns the book.
WhIle hIS book still conSIders square
dIVISIOns m dealIng with umts of the
Al'luy and does not contain the new pav
and allowance scales, Lieutenant Colonel
AZoy's volume does prOVide answers for
many questIOns that mIght arise In the
army officer's daily routines. The author
says that hiS book mtend"i to
ready reference in Instances where
'lar Army officers have become rusty m
some staff or line function and where non
profeSSIOnal officers must adjust them
to a daily endeavor In which "few.
If any, SlUS of onnssion or commiSSIOn are
92 pages ... E. P_ Dutton & ComparlY.
Inc., New York City
What you must know to }H otect
yourself, yOltl' faunly and yolO'
The sub-title explaInS the purpo,:>t' of
thiS little booh WhICh 15
among the first to make Its appearance III
the new and developmg field of Air-RaId
in CII!ian Defem,e III the Umtpd
The author states that hiS book IS q
summary of air-raid rule'S bemg' u-..ed ill
thIS country WIth the addItIonal con:-irler
atIOn of offiCIal procedm c as fo11o" ed hy
aIrMraId precautIOn authorItIes III Enq
Scattered throughout ate sketches that
serve to Illu<)trate varIOus sections wincl-}
mclude Safety III Home. Methods of PIU
tectlOg \Vindows, Air-Raid SheltE'l"s, An
plane Spotting, and Air Ga'i> Attack. as
well as some diSCUSSIOn of VarlOU., typps
of bombs, a littlf> first aid,<iUl-lald wald
ens, rescue partIes, and debns-rleal'an.'oJ
While thiS book of less than one hun
dred pages is of considerablp value it IS
belIeved that the Government WIll shortly
Issue official directtves on thIS subject
Captain Leyson IS a versatIle wrItel',
being the author of nine books, mcluding
this one, and co-author of "ThIS Mall
La Guardia" WIth Lowell :\1. Limpus. Th(
first of his books appeared in 1938, am1
with this volume, SIX have appeared in
the last two years: AutomotIve Occupa
tions. Flight Training for the Army and
Navy, It Works Like ThiS, Photographlc
Occupations, Wings of Defense, and 1 he
Air-Raid Safety Manual.

104 pages ... M. Barrows and Company
Inc. New York City.
This book is an attractively arranged
volume whICh contams the essentials of
treatment, handling, and care of sick and
IIlJured and IS WrItten In language readlly
understood by laymen. This little text
should prove helpful to the many classls
no\\ receiVIng mstruction III first aid in
our CIVIlian commumtles .as there are
chapters devoted to civilian defense and
blackout-mds mdlcated m the emergencIes
mcident to these defense measures.
185 pages . D. AI?pleton-Century Co.,
Inc, New York.
It IS stated In the preface to thIS book
that In time of war officers
of the Army of the Umted States, regard
less of rank 01' experience, are faced with
extraordInary problems m the manage
ment of their personal affaIrs. The
thor presents the material in hiS book in
the hope that It may lead to a ::.atisfactory
solutIOn of these problems
Openmg the volume WIth a diSCUSSIOn
of the juntor officer's finanCial problem,
the author proceeds m fifteen short
chapters to deal with the mam financial
f>ltuatlOns in an officer's daily Hfe. Some
of the chapter titles are: Pay and Allow
ances, Controlling Household ExpendI
turE's, Wise Spending, Credit, Insurance,
SavIngs and Investments, Taxes, Rights
of and TheIr Dppendents m
Event of Death or Disability, and
al Estate.
While not pretendmg to be exhaustive
In scope, the booli should give the reader
a good Idea of the expenses to be expected
In the officer's hfe, whether he IS in the
regular army or from the reserve; and
the author has advanced some solutions to
the problem which might provide a plan
of finanCial control.
284 pages ... WhIttlesey House, New
"Mechanized Might" is more than a
book about the armored force and mecha
nIzed umts of our army. Its subject
really is "Our New Armies." The Vlew
pomt of the author, stated In his own
words is thIS:
Noone ann 01' element can be
ly successful tn m,odern war. Tanks
nlone ca1z"t W1n. Airplanes by them
selves cannot be victorious. The
modern a)"mY, a most
pzece of machinery, is totally de
pendent on the functioning of all
lts parts.
The author draws for us a general
"over-all picture of our new armies, their
orgamzation and armaments." The rna

terial is not. in the mam, new, but is
clearly and interestingly presented. The
several chapters concerning our various
arms show not only the-ir composltion and
organization. but also their interdepen
dence In operatlon.
Two mterestmg chapters deal with the
plan for the Battle of France and the
battle itself.
The author was formerly a Major m
the Umted States Regular Cavalry and
served as a battabon cornmandel' in the
last war. The thoughts presented are well
1llustrated by examples I
Let the Al.h<: BbtzJ..r1eg upon us not
anRettle uS Thtl'J boole SIWU'fl that u'e
UTe embarked, not only m tratmng
bitt m actual WUJ, upon 'I11ethodfl
which, if re/Piltlessly we:;sed, 101fl
defeat the BlItzkrieg.
\Vhlle thIS book IS mtended for the
<'I al CltIZ<'llI-Y. mIlItary personnel ab.o will
finrl thf> dl<,cuso;;lOn of mtere'?tt
l1R pag<'s _ .. Harper Bros. :-';ew York.
The Tanaka MemO! wI stated'
Frll the :H1l..r 01 selt-protectlOn as
well u" tllr JI,otrctlOll of otllcls.
Ja]la1/ cnl!llot J ('I/!(}l'(> tlie dltJit'lIlt1es
/11 EoMerl1 AS1Q unless she adopts
(I polley of "Blood and Iron." But 11l
Cft! I-Yll!g OHt tIllS l/o11cy 11'(> have tn
tlie (!I/lt('tl States w/Hch has
/Icc" 1,<) Hf'r/ ayaW!'lt II" fly Crill/a'S
l,ot/ClI of /1ghtl1lg I/O/WI{ with pOlson
hI fhe flftHI!' If 1/'(' want to coutlol
Cluna, ire I/!ust first Cll!sh the 0'mted
States Just as m Ole past R'e had to
fight In the Jl"ar.
But m (lI'dei' to conquer Chl1la we
/!IlIst ti.rst conq1H'1' .lIane/llll-Ut and
.l101!9\Jba I Jt OJ nc, to (LIJlqJt('l the
I{',,!ld, u' Itt list COIlqUf.' Cl/lllG. If
U e suC'C('(>d III couqllel my Clnna the
ICst Of (11(' Aswflc coltJill'1cs and
SOll/h Sea ('Oll11t, ,(S 11 III Iral 1/1' and
.''''I('"d(! to 118 Theil th(' I{'olld wdl
1(1/1/;;,(' fl,at EaM('I,/ A."H! 18 01/18
Illn1 11'1/1 IlOt dnN to t'w/ate 01/1
The Tanaka M,emol'lal purports to be
addl essed to the Japallel>E' Empp)"or as thp
\\ork of Genelal Baron Tanaka. who was
th ' pr'll1ler m 1927 whl'n a ('onf(,rel1el' of
"civil all.l Iluhtary office I S {'llllnected with
:\fnnchul ta and :\Iongolw" was held. The
conferencp ended 7 July 19.27. The
1'18.1, as mdlcated by tht' above quotatIOn,
"ta1e'S Japan'B amhltlon':i and the ::.teps
fO! attammg' hel' lmpenuh... tIc goals.
The memollaI was fh 8t disclosed by
Chmese publl('u,;ts \\ no "aid a copy had
come Into then hands The Japane<;e have
alleg'ed the document "as a Chillese fab
llcatlOn. Howevel. as the author of thIS
book ('omnwJ;1ts, It was ten years to the
day (7 July 1937) followJng the close of
the conference refell ed to that the Man
chunan dispute broke out. In the mean- '
tllne, and sinep, Japan has tak!.'n repeat
ed step:; to carry out the program out
hned In the Tanaka Memonal.
Mr Crow also points out that althoug-h
the content", of the memOrIal caused a
g"l"eat deal of surpri.:;e to'those who were
unfamIliar With the history of the Far
East, It thd not contam anythIng that
had not been contamed m Hideyoshi's
letter (dated 18 May 1592 tellmg of hIS
triumphal advance into Korea and his
great plan for a world empire), in Lord
Hotta's memorial to the Emperor {sub
mItting the Townsend Harris Treaty
whIch followed Commodore Perry's suc
cess in indudng the Japanese to ag-ree to
open theIr country to foreign trade), or
m the Wlitmgs or speeches of dozens of
other Japanese patrlOts and statesmen
over a period of three centuries.
The memorial itself occupies about
nmety pages in the book, which can be
rpad in an evenmg, and the comments of
the author as well as the memorial itself
are well worth reading. The book gives

consummatIOn of which It IS now our mis
to prevent.
82 Page:;:; . The Military ServIce Pub
li-,hing Co, HarrIsburg. Pa.
Tmws change and people change III
them. but the fundamental prmciples of
wariare remain immutable through the
ages. ThiS IS the thought that first
curs after reading this splendid edItIon
of the great Prussian soldier's Immortal
Generally regarded as the spirltual fa
ther of the German army, von Clausewltz
was Marshal Blucher's chief of staff
durmg the NapoleonIc wars He saw
5ervlCE' 10 Russia with the Emperor
Alexander I ql1l'mg Napoleon's
invaSIOn of that country At Waterloo
he was chlcf of staff of the third army
corp':> under General Thielemann.
"PrIncIples of War" was origmally
wnttpn by von Clausewitz as an appen
diX to the thll'd volume of hiS monu
mental work "Vom KrIege" (On War).
and wai> mtended for the mlhtary m
structIon of the crown prmce of Prus
Sia, It was III Germany III
19JG i\Ir Hans W, Gatzke of CambrIdge,
Massachusetts, brought It to light in Its
pl'esent form III 1942 for the American
readmg pubhc
COJ'ps of Engllll'l')'S
108 Pages.,. Mihtaty Service Pub
lishmg Company, Harnsburg, Pa.
Colonel Thompson's book, "Engmeers
m Battle." comes at a very opportune
tun!.' when the officers of our
pandmg armIes are struggling to learn
the proper rol('s and capabIlItIes of the
vanous 3.1'111S. The author's presentatIOn
of his subJect IS as readable as any ad
ventUl'e story.
The vaned combat func\.lOns and
proper employment of Engmeers can be
learned f1'om successful operatlons in ac
tual war. .. Engmeers In Battle" is a
factual account of selected operations m
Europe \vhlCh Illustrate the proper em
ployment of Engmeers wlthm the dl
\'I::.lOn combat team. Their speCIal
ties III assault operatIOns, barrier tactics,
and stream crOSSing operatIOns are
shown in their proper relationship to
compan)On, but not rival, arms. The use
of modern equipment, the mcreasing use
of hIgh e}:"plosIves in war, and premIUm
set upon mobihty in operations are weB
Illustrated. ThIS book may be read with
conSiderable profit by all engaged in our
current war effort.
279 Pages _ .. Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.
New York, N. Y.
'''The BackgrQund of Our Warn is a
volume which should prove most useful
to every Army officer. Adapted from lec
tures prepared by the Orientation
Course. War Department Bureau of
lic Relations, and amply illustrated by
maps, this book provides a splendid
fount of information for those who seek
the "where" and "why" of the present
world conflict. Among the contributors
are names of such military scholars as
Colonel Herman Beu"kema of the United
States Military Academy, Lieutenant
Colonel G. A. Lincoln. Corps of Engi
neers, Lieutenant Colonel Paul W.
Thompson, Corps of Engineers, and
others. The bulk of the material was
furnished by the Department of Eco
nomics. Government and History, and the
Department of Military Art and Engi
neermg of the United States Military
The list of suggested readings which
the book recommends provides an in
valuable source of material for those of
ficers who are called upon to Instruct in
the War Department Orientation Course.
Revised Edition
GANOE, Infantry.
640 Pages, . D Appleton-Century Co,.
New York.
Colonel Ganoe's Histo)'y 01 the United
Statf'S Anny was ol'jginally published in
1924, It was the first attempt at an in
cluslve narratIve history of the army,
and wll.s mtended to be not merely a
stu-:ly of campaigns or battles or military
policy, but the story of the AmerIcan
soldIer In peace and war-"the hfe his
tory," says the author. "of that institu
tIOn which has been the greatest single
factor in the buIlding of our nation,"
The text of the present edition is un
changed In Its first 461 pages, but In
plal'e of the "EpIlogue (1917-1923)." a
chapter has been added entItled, "The
Army Hm,tled Into World Wars (1917
1942)." In this chapter Colonel Ganoe
takes "the opportunity to place the
seventh VItal and Immortal bUIlder of
cur Army and defense in hIS true light
before our country"-General Douglas
MacAlthul'; the other &ix bemg George
Washmgton, Fredenck von Steuben,
Sylvanus Thayer. Winfield Scott. Emory
Upton, and Arthur Wagner. The story
enus on a bitter note, with the removal
of Major General WamwrIght's foree
from Bataan to Corngldor in April,
In the 1924 editIon of thIS work.
there were thirteen appendices
ing a mass of military statistics. Of
these tmly one appears III the new edi
tIOn' Appendix A, reVIsed to date,
tammg Names of Incumbents of All
Prmclpal Offices in the Army si.nce its.
Cl'eatlOn." There are two new appendices,
however: Appendix B, "Commanders of
Larger Units III World War 1," and Ap
pendIX C, "Army Pay Scale" (pay ef
fectIve June I, 1942), The bibliography
IS unchanged except for the addItion of
a score of n 'w t1t1es.
For every officer in the United States
Army. Colonel Ganoe's book should prove
both entertaining and instructive.
Library Bulletin
ADAMS, JOHN QUINCY, - Parties In the United States.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SCHOOL, 1942. - Orders. A dlseussion and speCimen copjes
of general orders, special orders, bulletins and cirMliara.
AMERY, RT. BON L.S. - India and freedom.
ANDREWs, MARSHALL. - OUr new army.
AsAm. ISOSHI. - The economic strength of Japan.
AUlItralia. - Official handbook.
BAKER, ROBERT L. - Oil, blood and sand. NazI fight for oil in the Caucasus
and Middle East.
BAUMER. WILLIAM H., JR. - West Point, moulder of men.
BINGHAM & MOORE. - How to Interview.
BmGRAM, WALTER. - AptitUdes and aptitude t.estlng.
BtRNIE, ARTHUR. - The art of war.
BORNSTEIN, JOSEPH & MILrON. PAl'L R Action against theenemy'S mind.
BRADFORD, GERSHOM. - A glossary of sea terms.
Britannica book of the year, 1942.
BRYAN, LESLIE A. - The principles of water transportation.
CARROLL, WALLACE. - We're in this with Russia.
China after flve years of war.
VON CUUSEV;lTZ, GENERAL CARL Principles of war.
COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF. - Railway and highway transportation abroad
Trade promotIon aenes No. 155.
COPELAND, NORMAN. - Psychology and tho soldier.
COREY, HERBERT. - Tho army meanS business.
C01'PLAND, R. - The Cripps Mission.
Japanese-English dictionary of military terms.
CUFF, SAMUEL H. - The face of the war, 1931-1942.
Cullum's biographical register, 1940, Vol. VIII of officers and graduates
of the U.S. Military Academy.
CUNNINGHAM, BnYBSoN. - Port administration and operation.
CUNNINGHAM. BRYBSON. - PO" studies. With spE'cIaI rE'fE'rence to the 'll<cstern
porta of the North Atlantic.
DAVIES. R.A. & STEIGER, ANDREW J. - Soviet Asia. Democrac)"s first line of
DAVIS, FORRl!ST & LINDLE'I', ERNEST K. - How war came An American whItt>
papE'r from the fall of France to Pearl Harbor
Encyclopaedia Britannica 1942. A new survey of universal knowledge. 24
Federal Register. Annual Index 1941.
Federal Register. Vol.7. Ma':rch, April, Mal', Juno, AugUllt 1942.
Federal Roporter. Socond Series. Vol 127 F. 2d. Vol 128 F 2d.
Federal Supplement. Casf'.8 nrgul'd and dE'termmed m thE' District Courts of
the U.S. and the Court of Clauna. Vol. 44.
FERRERO, GUGLIELMO. Tho principles of power.
FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL. - Field Artlllory book 20, 1942 edition. Mihtary
FIf:lLD SCHOOL. Field Artillery book 30, 1942 edition. FIeld
ArtillE'J'Y fundamentals.
FIELD ARTILLERY SCUOOL. Field Artillery book 120,1941 edition Automo
ttve instructIOn
FIELDARTILLERvSrHooL. - Field Artillery book 160,1941 edition. Elementary
FIELD ARTILLERVSrlIooL. - Field Artillery book 223,1942 edition. Elementary
FINNIE, RICHARD. - Canada moves n0r;th.
FREEMAN, DOUGLAS SOUTHHALL. - Leo's lieutenants.
FREEMAN, ELLIS. - Conquering the man In the street.
FRIED, HANS ERNEST. - The guilt of the German army.
GALKIN, B. - How to get a rating or a commission In the army, navy, coast
guard, marlnes.lmerchant marine.
GALLAGHER, D.D. - Action In the east.
GARIS, FREDERICK D. - We Japanese.
GAUVREAU, EMILE & COHEN, LEsTER. - Billy Mitchell.
GOODALL. GEORGE (EditE'd by). - The world war In maps.
GnAlIAM, F.P. & KULICK, HAROLD W. - He's in the air corps now.
Military operations: East Africa. Vol. I: August, 1914-8eptember 1916.
GREAT BRITAIN WAROFHCE. _. Field service regulations. Vol. II. Operations
GREAT BRITAIN WAR OFFICE. - Manual of military law. 1929. Reprinted
Dec. 1939.
Organization and tactical fundamentals of the German army.
GRIFFIN & SHAW, LT COLONELS. - School of the citizen :soldier.
GUROV. COLONEL S G. - Combat action of the engineer platoon. Engml'{'r
employment lD combat and operations.
HA-GEN. PAUL. - Will Germany crack'l
HARRIS, MURRAY. - Lifelines of victory.
HAVIGHURST, WALTER. - The lotlg ships passing. Theatory olthe Grpat Lakes.
HILL, RUSSELL. Desert war.
Hoe Maak Ik Mlj Vel'5taanbaar In Engeland'l- How am I to bE' understood
III England?
HOFF. EBBE CURTIS, & FL"LTON. JOliN FARQUHAR. - A bibliography of aviation
HOLMAN, GORDON. - Commando attack.
HOLMES. HARRY N. -- Strategic materials and national strength.
HUNT, VIRGINIA - How to live In the tropics.
HUNTINGTO,," & WILLIAMS. - Business geography.
HUTCHISON, BRUCE. - The unknown country. Canada and her people.
DONOVAN. - India's army.
fJane's all the world's aircraft. 1941 ediuon.
JarIP's fighting ships - 1941.
JOHNSON, - Queen of the nat tops; The U.S.S 1.l>,!;Jngton and the'
Coral Sea battle
KING, GENERAL CHARLES - An Apache princess.
K!"'G, GENERAL CHARLES Laramie - A story of the Sioux War of 1876.
LA-NGDON-DAVIES, JOHN. - The home guard f1eldcraft manual.
LAWRENCE, CHESTER H - New world horizons. Geography for the air age.
LEEbUNG. JOSEPH. - Modo,.n ship stowage. lncluchng methods of handhng
cargo at ocean termmals.
LOWENSTEIN, KARL, - Brazil under Vargas.
LOGAN, MALCOLM - The home front digest.
LUDWIG. EMIL. - Stalin.
MARSMAN, JAN HENRIK. - :scuped from Hong Kong.
MICHIE, ALLAN A - Retreat to victory.
MIKSCHE. F.O. - Blitzkrieg.
MILLER, EUGENE H. - Strategy at Singapore.
MORISON, ELTINGE E. - Admiral SIms and the modern American navy.
N.A.M. Handbook on war production.
NAVY DEPARTMENT. - Port directory of principal foreign ports. 5th edition.
New map of the USSR. both In Europe and Asia. With pre-war boundaries.
NORWID-NEUGEBAUER, GENERAL. - Polish_German campaign of 1939.
O.E.M. (OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT). - Handbook: Functions and
PADELFORD, NORMAN J. - The Panama Canal In peace and war.
PITKIN'. WALTER B, JR.- What's that plane? U.S. and enomy.
Port dictionary of technical terms.
The principles of strategy. For an independent corps or atmy 10 a theater of
Propaganda and promotional activities. An annotated blbhography United Stste'$ C<Xfe Annotated. Title 2a. Labor. Title 30: Mineral lands and
PUSKr<n.. AS. - The captain's daughter.
Rand McNally Commercial Atlas anl5 Marketing GUide. Sc"unty-thlrd
edition. 1942.
RAUSCHN1NG. HERMAN - Men of Chaos.
RSVErLl..E, THO'lAS - The spoil of Europe.
ROOT, RALPH ROP"lEoL - Camouflage with planting
SAVA, GEORGE. - 5chool for war.
SAtE-RB, MICHAEl. & KAHN. ArRERT E. - Sabotage' The secret war again)
1\""11. H A first Russian reader.
l'Hl'lt\'''N - Champ Ferguson, confederate guerrilla
SUA"''', G""ERAL D C Management of t.he American soldie".
':;\l1TIJ, HOW4.RD K - Last train from Berlin
f,PMC,HT, J Blockade by air. Th" c;<mptugn ag... nst AXIS shlppmg
The Statesman's Year Book 1942 Se"pnty-mnth annual pubhl'-lltion
STF'vE""S, VvILLI"''' {) fiND \VEInCOT'f, Au",,-"'. A history of sea poweJ'.
Sm..lI'vAN. CIlA.m FA, J - Army posts and towns. I9":?
ThAD, \IRDWI\Y -- Art of leadership.
TU(l'fPsoN, Ll' COt""Ei. PACi. W Engineers in battle.
TlLl,Ol'so,,", LEI:. S - Articles of war annotated.
TnKllLEIl, - A pastor wings over South'America.
TUTAEFF, V,\\ID - The Soviet Caucasus.
U",ITED ST.ATES DEE'ARTMENT OF rNTERIOR. - Spirit leveling In f<ansas, 1896_
1935. Geological survey bulletin 889.
UNITED ST;l.TES HYDROGRAl'IDC - H.O. 165, Sailing directions of the
Paclfi" Islands, Vol. 1. 1938.
France pilot. Channel Islands. H.O. No. 132. 3d edition 1928.
United SUites Statutes at Large. 77th Congress 1941..42. Vol. 55, Part 2.
Private laws. concurrent resolutions, treatIes, agreement<! and proclamatU)lls.
\' ACCARf, ORESTE AND ELTSA.. - Complet.e course of Japanese cDf)versatIDn.
V.\VGRAN, liELEN GWYN''-E. SerYice with t.he Army.
WAiTT, COl.ONEL At.DE"'. Gas wi!rfare.
COU"-I YORCK \>ON - Atlas' To accompany Napoleon as a
Watpt Handbook Chenllcal analyses and interpretations.
WERNER. l\L\x. Great offensive' The strategy of coalition wjJrfare
Wlll'l&, JOH'" W. Argentina, t.he life story of a nation.
WHl'lE. W.L, - They were expendable.
WHlI'IAl'o., (:APT<\11Il J E >\ - How wars are fought: Tho prlnelphtS of strategy
and tactics
Who's Who in AViation.
WIEST, CAPTAIN Hur.o - Army, navy. all' forces - Germany.
WnTTERS' PIlOGRAM, '" P A TEXAS, - A history and guide.
Zu f. WILLJAM - Coming battle of Germany_
Directory of Periodicals
Included in this dIrectory are only those periodicah from whIch articles have
been sE'lected. See also "List of pprlOdicals Indexed and Key to Abbreviations."
Joint. Forces
Fighting ForcE'S IGn'at Britain)
Journal of the Royal Umwd
Sf'rV1Ce Instltution (Great Britain)
Journal of the Umted S('rVICf'
InatltutlOn of Indm. (Great Bntam - India)
General Military
Army Quarterly
An Cosantair (Irf'iand)
Dcfcnsa lMf'Xlrnl
A Defesa NUC'lOnal {BraZill
Deutsrhe Wehr
Elf'rclto (Spam)
Mf'morml Del F:stado Mayor \Colombla)
MHitarwissenschaftliehe Mlttf'llung'n (Austria)
MllitarWo('henblatt (Germany)
MIl.tary Affairs
R('vista Mliltar (Arg('ntmu)
Rf'vuC Mlhtalre SWSSf' (Switzprland)
Die Wf'hrmacht
WehrtP('hnischl' MonatBhefte (Germany)
Wissen und Wehr (Germany)
ArlnS and Services
Aeroplane (Great Bntam)
Air Forces NeWB Letter
Royal Air Force Quartrriy (Great Brltam)
Artillerlstlsche Rundschau {German},)
Coast Arullpry Journal
Fwld Artillery Journal
Journal of thp Royal Artillrry (Grf';lf Bntam)
121 ('uvalry Journal
121 Cbf'mJcui Warfarr Rulll'!m
r..hhtar" Jo:ngmt'rr 121
120 122
PIODlrrr (Gprm,my)
Royal Engmetrs Journal ,Gn'at Brlnnn) In
Infantry Journal
122 Army Mpdlcai Bullptm
Journal of the
1'22 Royal Army Mpdlcal Corps ,Gn'at Bntam) 1'?1
M ihtary Surgf'On 121
Army Ordnanrr 119
Ordnanef' Sergeant 122
Arm:y Motors 119
QuartrrmastPf Rl'vlf'w 122
Il;!O Om Panzertruppo (Germany) 122
121 Thr Tank (GrE'at Bntaln} 122
Manne Corps Ga:z;ette
Na.. ::1i instJtute Pro('('edmgs
Amf'rlCan JournJ.1 of International Law
Amerl('an LegIOn Magazme
Amf'rlcan Mercury
Annals of fhf' Aml'r1can
Acadf'my of Political and Sorml
The AtlantiC
C:urr'nt History
N atlOnai Gl'ographlc Magazme
The New Rf'pubbe
Psychological AbstraC'ts
Reader's Digrst
Round Tabl!'
Saturday E"enmg Post
Scieli,ce Digest
5cierltlflc Amf'rlCan
The Times (London)' Wf'f'kly EdItion
Umted Staff'S Nf'wS
Vital SpI::l'chf's of the Dsy
_ 124
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
This sertlOn catalog" thp artlcle<; <;,p!pctprl from Library pE'riodlCal" for thp
currmt quartPr. PenodH'als In thIS catalog arE' arrangpd alphabptlcal1y.
AEROPLANE (Great Britain)
31 July 1942
Am TRA"'SPORT '''' WAn
14 August 1942
21 August 1942
28 August 1942
4 September 1942
18 Septelnber 1942
DIVE BOMBING, Major C,S. Parsons
25 September 1942
9 October 1942
August_September 942
TBF. TRlc\CLE. LA"IDiNG GEAR. aptam James A
AlRDROMES 1Jo.1 WARTI'fE. Part II f'ut Coionf'fRu.
dolph E Sm}'ser
FRIEND on FOE'> Captmn F
1.]6\I'T. Oh1l<'r H. To",nsend
July 1942
COC"ITRlES ALOJ>.,G THE SOl'THEn'" ... '<0 t:Asnm..
SlA>.! GULF. Prepnrpd b;,- thr D,qsion of Uf'dwal
Intf'lhgencr, Pre"entJvE' Mcdt('lfi{' BE'nlCE', Offkf' of
The Surgt'on Gt'nprai, US ,4rm;,-
Da'lid E Thomas
ewar Letter No, June 11, 1912
AMPUTATIONS IN WAR. Colonel Norman T Kirk
August 1942
August 1942
September 1942
Scpt.clnber-Oct.ober 1942
THE MASTER WEAPON Major General Ll'vm H
V"IE'IPl,ODFD BOMBS Lif'ut Co\onp\ Thomas J Kanl'
ATTACh ON JAPAN Hoffmsn Nlrkerson
I\IR RAID DEFENSE. Co\onll George J.B, Fish",r
THE SOLDIER A)\.D THE M 1 RIFLE Lleutenolnt Howard
L Bagtr)'
November.. Dccember 1942
August. 1942
F'IGHflIIlG I" AIl\SSIMA, LlCut.Colonel J. Gifford
Major Gf'neral J F C Fuller
THE INDIAN . .tI.RMY AND THE WAit, Lleut.Gt'neral SIr
April 1942
lRcglmcntsubung mit seharfschiessen.l L.eutenant
General Bottcher
THOCGHTS RELATIVE TO MARCH COMPASS, zum Marschkompass.j Lieutenant Schauen
cmer Batterle an einer atand
igrn FTont.} Kohlmdorfer
May 1942
{SChlcksale von Beobachtungsstell= Jm}
Captam Stedler
[Zur QrgamzatlOn und AusbJldung der motoriziertf'n
Bathrie.1 Major-General Fors .
lVef\\('ndung der ArtlHenc lm Geblrge.1 Major Lang
September_October 1942
Eo;. Patton, Jr
Major Gl'neral