FILE NOTES:

This aff is meant to be a critical/supplemental version to the environmental monitoring aff. Any team running this affirmative should be prepared to debate the substance of that aff as well (and in fact should strive to integrate those arguments as much as possible). Any team negating this aff should use the environmental monitoring neg as a starting point to supplement the cosmopolitanism-specific evidence in this file. Hegemony good and every space mil good affirmative and argument (and their attendant K answers) are on-point impact turns to this affI did not reproduce that work here as we already have it in a bunch of different places. *** 1AC

Contention one(Inner)Space Colonization

What is space? What is its purpose? Who owns it? In a globalized world, the way we answer these questions effects and shapes the way we think about politics in general. Space is both a blank canvas and a mirrorhow we theorize space can aid or abet our thinking about sovereignty, cooperation, and violence Stuart 2009 [Jill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Unbundling Sovereignty, Territory, and the State in Outer Space, from Securing Outer Space, edited by Bormann and Sheehan] As well as considering ongoing events in outer space politics (such as cooperation, militarization and commercialization), this text explores the ways in which we continue to evaluate and develop conceptual frameworks to help us understand outer space politics This chapter furthers the engagement with how political ideas are reconceptualized in relation to outer space, and also how outer space has

implications for our understanding of those political ideas. The ways in which we approach the study of outer space politics helps to construct the meanings by which it is imbued, and to suggest ways of developing our theoretical approaches. One area in which outer space both challenges traditional political notions and also political and legal practice is in the definition and practice of sovereignty. This chapter argues that Westphalian sovereignty (also "modern" or "classical" sovereignty), which delineates a clear relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state, does not conceptually grasp sovereignty in outer space (and by a normative account, how sovereignty should and could be transforming). As such I argue that sovereignty has been "unbundled" in outer space, both practically through legal approaches which allow for a different relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state, and also theoretically in terms of leaving open the potential to reconceptualize sovereignty in a way that better embraces sovereignty in a globalized world (and indeed, going one step further, in a world where not all politics even occur within the "globe", i.e. in
outer space). The challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty can be seen partly as a product of (and reconstitutive of) globalization, whereby transterritorial issues l and the "shrinking" of the planet challenge the straightforward relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state. The reality of space

exploration can be seen as another radical and unique issue-area in which theoretical approaches to "global" politics must be reconceived. This chapter explores the ways in which outer space poses unique challenges to conceptual and legal approaches to governance. I also argue that there may also be a dialectical relationship between territorially-based politics and outer space politics, whereby notions of sovereignty are mutually reconstituting globalization and its conceptual challenge to classical notions of sovereignty. There are several different practical and theoretical approaches to
unbundling sovereignty in outer space. The two approaches used here are regime theory and cosmopolitan sovereignty. The approaches are very different the first taking a practical and conservative but perhaps static and a historical view of the international system, to understand how territory is de-linked from sovereignty in the governance of outer space; and the second suggesting a fairly radical departure from Westphalian

sovereignty, in delinking it from the state itself, and normatively repositioning "humanity" as the central unit of analysis in law. The chapter takes each approach in rum, applying it generally to outer space and then ro a common example of the international
Space Station (ISS), and then critiques the individual approaches. The final section of the chapter considers the tWO approaches in relation to each other, and draws three broad conclusions in relation to sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space: first, that understanding politics in the

space age requires moving beyond Westphalian conceptualizations of sovereignty, and unbundling the relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state; second, that exploration of outer space itself may be contributing to a wider shift in the practice and understanding of sovereignty; and, third, that future developments in outer space exploration will continue to influence our conceptualization of sovereignty (perhaps further validating some approaches and undermining others).

Sadly, the radical potential to think differently about space and sovereignty has been hijacked by militarization. This is not just a militarization of OUTER spaceit is also a militarization of our INNER space. Status quo politics and rhetoric is an attempt to militarize both space and the American psyche in order to maintain imperial dominance. Orr 04, Jackie Orr, from the department f sociology at Syracuse University, The Militarization of Inner Space, Critical Sociology, March 2004, volume 2, issue 30, pg. 451-481.

The editorial warns: "This

war against terrorism, should it come, is intended to mark the official emergence of the United States as a full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and responsibility as planetary policemen." 7 , the militarization of outer space is an essential component of Full Spectrum Dominance, and if the so-called 'war against terrorism'
must be situated within broader U.S. ambitions for global empire,8 it is perhaps useful for today's civilian-soldier to wonder just how wide and deep is a "full spectrum" of dominance? What borders must be crossed to fully dominate such an infinity of space? Perhaps the

domination of outer space in the interests of militarized technologies and intelligence requires the militarization of a somewhat more covert spatial territory -a territory more spectral, less smoothly operationalized but no less
necessary to global dominion. What happens in that elusive terrain of 'inner space' as outer space becomes an overt field for fully militarized command posts? Is the 'inner' psychic terrain of today's U.S. civilian-soldier another battlefield on the way to full spectrum dominance of the globe? What kind of militarized infrastructure is needed 'inside' the soldierly civilian called upon to support the establishment of military superiority across the spectrum of spaces 'outside'? To what extent might Full Spectrum Dominance depend intimately on commanding 'space power' in both outer and inner space? The

psychology of the civilian-soldier, the networks of everyday emotional and perceptual relations, constitute an 'inner space' that is today, I suggest, one volatile site of attempted military occupation. But the occupying forces I'm concerned with here are not those of an invasive, enemy 'other.' Rather, a partial and urgent history of attempts by the U.S. government, media, military, and academy to enlist the psychological life of U.S. citizens as a military asset -this is the embodied story that occupies me here. The militarization of inner space, a complex, discontinuous story that nowhere crystallizes into the clear knot of conspiracy but which leaves 20th its uneven traces throughout the scattered archives of the century United States, is now as it has been before a major concern of those most responsible for the business of war. Militarization, defined by historian Michael Geyer as "the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence," constitutes at its core a border-crossing between military and civilian institutions, activities I aims (1989: 79). The militarization of inner space can be conceived, 1, as the psychological organization of civil society for the production of violence, an important feature of a broader -tense and contradictory -social process. It got my intention to reify 'psychology' or
psychological processes as if they would be separated from social, historical, or economic contexts. Quite the contrary. By naming the constructed 'inner space' of psychological activities increasingly militarized -with the events of September 11 serving as an accelerator and intensifier of processes that are by no means new - my purpose is to deepen a critical sociological commitment to contesting the :e' of psychology as the radically social matter of political struggle, as radically material weapon of war. Or its refusal. While I refer to this psychological space as 'inner,' it of course is not

exclusively individual, and is never confined to a neat interiority. Inner space both produces and is produced by deeply social ways of seeing, profoundly cultural technologies of perception. And though I want to reject notion of a homogeneous collective psyche, I do want to conjure or condense sociality and historicity of psychology spaces. Psychological space occupies a difficult borderland, a 'between-space' where the question human confusions of what is 'inner' and 'outer' are repetitiously experienced, and consciously and unconsciously lived. Indeed, the space psychology is the very site where everyday
sensations of what's 'inside' no what's 'outside,' what's 'them' and what's 'us,' what feels safe and seems fatally frightening are culturally (re)produced or resisted; it is tensely border-conscious space. The politics of borders -how they're and unmade, what they come to mean -is one shifting center politics of nationalism, of language, of memory, of race, gender, of terror. What has come in the modern West to be called the logical' plays a dramatic, power-charged role within each of these sled political fields. The militarization of psychological space can be led then as a strategic set if

psychological border operations aimed at the militarization of civil society for the production of violence. The
historically-specific confusion and re-configuration of the borders between the psyche of the soldier and of the civilian, between the practice psychology and the prosecution of war, is the topic of several recently led studies of World War II and its Cold War aftermath. "New languages for speaking about subjectivity," writes Nikolas Rose, emerged World War II to address the new consensus that "[w]inning was to require a concerted attempt to understand and govern) subjectivity of the citizen." Research on 'attitudes' and 'personality,' on recently developed techniques of public opinion polling; and at managing both military and civilian beliefs and behaviors. The human psyche itself became "a possible domain for systematic

government in the pursuit of socio-political ends" (Rose 1996: x, 21, 7). According to historian Laura McEnaney, with the end of the war and the rise of the U.S. national security state, the "ambient militarism" of Cold War U.S. culture translated the very meaning of national security into a "perception, a state of mind" -a profoundly psychological state in which the civilian psyche became a difficult but pervasive variable in military planning (2000: 39, 12-15). Ellen Herman's chronicle of the imbrications of psychological concepts and expertise into the textures of everyday life in post-World War II U.S. society, recounts how efforts at "mass emotional control" in the name of national security led, by the late 1960s, to an unprecedented blurring of boundaries between public policy and private emotions (1995: 241-242). Today, one important contributing factor to civilian-soldiers'
willingness to serve may be a sanctioned ignorance of this history of previous campaigns to effectively mobilize 'inner space' in the interests of war and the organized production of violence. Remembering the militarization of psychic space as part of the full spectrum of tactics

deployed in 20th century warfare may help us better grasp the multiple dimensions of danger in the present,
post -September 11 contagion of terrors. "[W]hat one remembers of the past and how one remembers it depend on the social and cultural resources to which one has access," writes Fred Turner in his recent history of collective memory-making, cultural trauma, and the Vietnam war (1996: xii). Consider this text as one attempt to apply the resources of a critical sociology to a more public remembering of how the inner space of psychology has been already a calculated battlefield, a terrain of cultural combat where the measure of victory includes the possibility, or impossibility, of remembering that a fight took place. If, as Turner suggests, "memory takes place simultaneously in the individual psyche and in the social domain," then what I (want to) recall is intimately tied to what you (are able to) remember (1996: xi). The psychic space of memory is a cultural and collective landscape -nobody moves around there all alone. Is it possible for a critical sociology today to mobilize its scholarly and psychic resources to disrupt what Stephen Pfohl has called "the

hegemonic rhythms of public memory in the USA Today" (1992: 42)? Can a contemporary critical sociology -remembering its own insurgent origins 9 -contribute to counter hegemonic memories that are more public and more powerful? An orbiting U.S. doctrine of Full Spectrum Dominance calls for critical terrestrial practices of full spectrum demilitarization. Economy. Culture. Society. Psyche. Perhaps it's time for a few collective flashbacks. How would it be to publicly
remember the civilian-soldier as a central, contested figure of 20 century hot and cold wars? What difference could it make to re-frame and refuse today's

'war against terrorism' as the most recent theater of operations for securing the psychological organization of civil society for the manufacture of mass violence? Insisting on the productive border-crossing between the past and present tense, asking you live briefly in the question of the boundaries between 'then' and 'now,' text tries to contribute to an effective history of the present -one that might arrive in time for the fight for less terrorizing future spaces. 10

This militarized mindset is the cause of genocidal violencea politics based in bounded communities cannot result in anything save atrocitiesit can only solve wars between like-minded people Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Chapter 2 p. 41-43
SG) I previously cited Karl Poppers definition according to which democ- racy can allow a change of government without bloodshed. More precisely, as Bobbio asserts, democracy is a political system in which change is nonviolent. These theoretical tenets have a clear empirical correspondence: in the consolidated democracies, the number of

individuals sub- jected to violence for political reasons is far smaller than in nondemocratic systems (if we limit ourselves to internal political violence). Let us begin by examining the most
serious violence a government caninflict: mass extermination for racial, religious, social, or political reasons.38 Out of the twenty major democides that occurred in the world between 1900 and 1987, only one was carried out by a democratic regimeimperial Britain in its colonies.39 Likewise, the list of countries attempting democide starting from 1955 includes only two cases out of forty- one in the West: Bosnia in the period 19921995 and Yugoslavia in 19981999. The result is partially tautological: it would be difficult to defi ne as democratic a government that carries out the mass killing of its own demos because it would be violating the principle of nonviolence. A cer- tain congruency is expected between input and output in the demo cratic pro cess and historical experience tends to confi rm this expectation. This does not mean that a government that carries out democides cannot be an elected one. The case of Adolf Hitler is an example of this. However, by the time the democide occurred, Nazi Germany had long ceased to satisfy the criteria of a democracy. Statistical analyses are problematic and open to criticism.41 For instance, statistical analyses do not take indirect responsibilities, such as those deriving from funding, fomenting, or supplying arms to others, into account. The data cited exclude the victims occurring in the course of wars, while it is historically diffi cult to distinguish be- tween victims in time of peace and those of war, as governments of- ten unleash po liti cal violence, even against their own citizens, in times of war. A demo cratic government can also start wars that cause a large number of victims in other areas, such as those infl icted by the United States during the Korean and Vietnam wars and more re- cently in Af ghan i stan and Iraq. The observed absence of violence in the interior is certainly not a reason for satisfaction if the violence carried out in the exterior is very high. Likewise, countries with a long liberal tradition such as Great Britain, France, and the Nether- lands were embroiled in long and bloody colonial adventures.42 Even if these factors are taken into account, the fact remains that a state that perpetrates or allows a democide involving its own citizens can- not be deemed demo cratic. Important research by Michael Mann has situated the relationship between democracies and genocide in a new context. Mann claimed that po liti cal communities with a high level of participation ensure

the safety of their own members but can prove dangerously lethal to those who do not belong to them. This is the often neglected dark side of democracy.43 Typical examples of this dark side are the massacre of the indigenous populations by Eu ro pe an colonists in North America and Australasia. These massacres were often carried out by small communi- ties with a high level of internal participation and solidarity (often at local rather than state level) but that did not hesitate to defend them- selves and physically eliminate native populations who those communi- ties felt represented dangers or obstacles to them. In many cases simply because those native populations were different. Ethnic cleansing was practiced in the majority of eastern Eu ro pe an countries
when those countries established themselves as national states and founded their own legitimacy on the people, which was, however, defi ned in ethnic terms. In recent times we saw in the Balkans how the democracies being set up felt an almost physiological need to emphasize their difference from other groups, even when the ethnic dividing lines (for instance, between Croats, Serbs, Slovenians, Bosnians, Albanians, Montenegrins, and Macedonians and so on) were anything but obvious. As soon as the homogenization of the community had been obtained by such coercive

means as forced assimilation, expulsion, or even genocide, those democracies became oblivious to the blood they had spilt. There is nothing like self- satisfaction for helping to remove the horrors of the past and to perfect peaceful cohabitation. This confi rms that even though democracies minimize the amount of po liti cal violence inside their boundaries, democracies can be extremely harmful to those they do not recognize as members, whether they belong to ethnic minorities or other nations. External enemies are useful for developing a common identity on the interior by means of an
out- ward pouring of violence repressed on the inside. As Hegel had already observed, successful wars have prevented civil broils and strengthened the internal power of the state.44 The risk of this is all the more fre- quent at the stage in which a given demo cratic community is being established.

And, moreover, this psychological emphasis on the nation and the individual community first can no longer solve problems in the world. Every existential threat humanity faces war, terrorism, proliferation, population growth and total environmental collapse can only be dealt with via true international cooperation. The psyche of the status quo makes all of these impacts inevitable
Smith, 2003 [Rogers, Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard University. Stories Of Peoplehood, The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, p. 166-169.] It is certainly important to oppose such evolutionary doctrines by all intellectually credible means. But many have already been widely discredited; and today it may well prove salutary, even indispensable, to heighten awareness of human

identity as shared membership in a species engaged in an ages-long process of adapting to often dangerous and
unforgiving natural and man-made environments.20 When we see ourselves in the light of general evolutionary patterns, we become aware that it is genuinely possible for a species such as ourselves to suffer massive setbacks or even

to become extinct if we pursue certain dangerous courses of action. That outcome does not seem to be in any

human's interest. And when we reflect on the state of our species today, we see or should see at least five major challenges to our collective survival, much less our collective nourishing, that are in some respects truly unprecedented. These are all

challenges of our own making, however, and so they can all be met through suitably cooperative human efforts. The first is our ongoing vulnerability to the extraordinary weapons of mass destruction that we have been building
during the last half century. The tense anticipations of imminent conflagration that characterized the Cold War at its worst are now behind us, but the nuclear arsenals that were so threatening are largely still with us, and indeed the governments and, perhaps, terrorist groups possessed of some nuclear weaponry have continued to proliferate. The second great threat is some sort of

environmental disaster, brought on by the by-products of our efforts to achieve ever-accelerating industrial and postindustrial production and distribution of an incredible range of good and services. Whether it is global warming, the spread of toxic wastes, biospheric disruptions due to new agricultural techniques, or some combination of these and other consequences of human interference with the air, water, climate, and plant and animal species that sustain us, any major environmental disaster can affect all of humanity. Third, as our economic and technological systems have become ever more interconnected, the danger that major economic or technological failures in one part of the world might trigger global catastrophes may well increase. Such interdependencies can, to be sure, be a source of strength as well as weakness, as American and
European responses to the East Asian and Mexican economic crises of the 1990s indicated. Still, if global capitalism were to collapse or a technological disaster comparable to the imagined Y2K doomsday scenario were to occur, the consequences today would be more far-reaching than they would have been for comparable developments in previous centuries. Fourth, as advances in food production, medical care, and other technologies have contributed to higher infant survival rates and longer lives, the

world's population has been rapidly increasing, placing intensifying pressures on our physical and social environments in a great variety of ways. These demographic trends, necessarily involving all of humanity, threaten to exacerbate all the preceding problems, generating political and military conflicts, spawning chronic and acute environmental damages, and straining the capacities of economic systems. The final major
challenge we face as a species is a more novel one, and it is one that may bring consciousness of our shared "species interests" even more to the fore. In the upcoming century, human beings will increasingly be able to affect their own genetic endowment, in ways that might potentially alter the very sort of organic species that we are. Here as with modern weapons, economic processes, and population growth, we face risks that our efforts to improve our condition may go disastrously wrong, potentially endangering the entire human race. Yet the appeal of endowing our children with greater gifts is sufficiently powerful that organized efforts to create such genetic technologies capable of "redesigning humans" are already burgeoning, both among reputable academic researchers and less restrained, but well-endowed, fringe groups.21 To be sure, an awareness of these as well as other potential

dangers affecting all human beings is not enough by itself to foster moral outlooks that reject narrow and invidious particularistic conceptions of human identity. It is perfectly possible for leaders to feel that to save the species, policies that run roughshod over the claims of their rivals are not simply justified but morally demanded. Indeed, like the writers I have examined here, my own more
egalitarian and cosmopolitan moral leanings probably stem originally from religious and Kantian philosophical influences, not from any consciousness of the common "species interests" of human beings. But the ethically constitutive story which contends that we have such interests, and that we can see them as moral interests, seems quite realistic, which is of some advantage in any such account. And under the circumstances just sketched, it is likely that more and more people will become persuaded that today, those shared species interests face more profound challenges than they have in most of human history. If so, then stressing our

shared identity as members of an evolving species may serve as a highly credible ethically constitutive story that can challenge particularistic accounts and foster support for novel political arrangements. Many more people may come to feel that it is no longer safe to conduct their political lives absorbed in their traditional communities, with disregard for outsiders, without active
concern about the issues that affect the whole species and without practical collaborative efforts to confront those issues. That consciousness of shared interests has the potential to promote stronger and much more inclusive senses of trust, as people come to realize that the dangers and challenges they face in common matter more than the differences that will doubtless persist. I think this sort of awareness of a shared "species interests" also can support senses of personal and collective worth, though I acknowledge that this is not obviously the case. Many people find the spectacle of the human species struggling for survival amidst rival life forms and an unfeeling material world a bleak and dispiriting one. Many may still feel the need to combine acceptance of an evolutionary constitutive story with religious or philosophical accounts that supply some stronger sense of moral purpose to human and cosmic existence. But if people are so inclined, then nothing I am advocating here stands in the way of such combinations. Many persons, moreover, may well find a sustaining sense of moral worth in a conception of themselves as contributors to a species that has developed unique capacities to deliberate and to act responsibly in regard to questions no other known species can yet conceive: how should we live? What relationships should we have, individually and collectively, to other people, other life forms, and the broader universe? In time, I hope that many more people may come to agree that humanity has shared responsibilities of stewardship for the animate and physical worlds around us as well as ourselves, ultimately seeking to promote the flourishing of all insofar as we are capable and the finitude of existence permits. But even short of such a grand sense of species vocation, the idea that we are part of humanity's endeavor to strive and thrive across ever-greater expanses of space and time may be one that can inspire a deep sense of worth in many if not most human beings. Hence it does not seem unrealistic to hope that we can encourage increased acceptance of a universalistic sense of human peoplehood that may help rein in popular impulses to get swept up in more parochial tales of their identities and interests. In the years ahead, this ethical sensibility might foster

acceptance of various sorts of transnational political arrangements to deal with problems like exploitative and wildly fluctuating international financial and labor markets, destructive environmental and agricultural practices, population control, and the momentous issue of human genetic modifications. These are, after all, problems that appear to need to be dealt with on a near-global

scale if they are to be dealt with satisfactorily. Greater acceptance of such arrangements would necessarily entail
increased willingness to view existing governments at all levels as at best only "semi-sovereign," authoritative over some issues and not others, in the manner that acceptance of multiple particularistic constitutive stories would also reinforce. In the resulting political climate, it might become easier to construct the sorts of systems of interwoven democratic international, regional, state and local governments that theorists of "cosmopolitan democracy," "liberal multicultural nationalism," and "differentiated democracy" like David Held, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young, William Connolly, and Jurgen Habermas all envision.

The Plan
The United States Federal government should commit all available resources to developing a network of cooperative, internationally accessible environmental monitoring satellites. Well clarify.

Cooperative science projects like the plan make global cosmopolitanism an international necessitythe plan causes a shift in our collective mentalities. Stuart 2009 [Jill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Unbundling Sovereignty, Territory, and the State in Outer Space, from Securing Outer Space, edited by Bormann and Sheehan] Regime theory provides a manner of analysing sovereignty as de-linked from territory. The next section addresses cosmopolitan sovereignty, focusing on the writings of David Held, which presents a normative approach that assumes teleological progress towards sovereignty as de-linked from the state. As such, this approach also provides a manner of unbundling Westphalian sovereignty, in a time of globalization and outer space exploration. The approach also considers how traditional conceptions of sovereignty not only apply to outer space, but how those conceptions may

Contention TwoCosmopolitanism

also be affecting the way political space and community (and thus sovereignty) is conceived in world politics . According to this approach, and in accordance with wider cosmopolitanism, individual human beings are the primary political agents in the system. Cosmopolitanism can be taken as the moral and political outlook that offers the best prospects for overcoming the problems and limits of classic and liberal sovereignty. It builds upon some of the strengths of the liberal international order, particularly its commitment to human rights, and democratic values that apply, in principle, to each and all. (Held 2002: 24) Exploring cosmopolitan sovereignty starts with the shift from classical (Westphalian) sovereignty to liberal sovereignty . For Held, the liberal sovereignty model represents an attempt to delimit political power and extend the liberal concern with limited government in the international sphere (2002: 1). One achievement of liberal sovereignty has been the effort to distribute resources not according to statehood, but
rather based on the rights of individuals (2002: 15). The "common heritage of mankind" principle that developed for the high seas, and was later applied for treaties on Antarctica and outer space, is in part an embodiment of that effort. Common heritage approaches represent the exclusion

of a right of appropriation; the duty to use resources in the interest of the whole of humanity; and the duty to explore and exploit resources for peaceful purposes (Held 2002: 15). Transnational issues that challenge the state's ability to rule within its own borders further inspire the movement away from classical sovereignty (Held 2002: 20). As international law codifies common heritage principles, and transnational issue areas undermine the state, the moral significance of the state itself is challenged, and states and societies are opened up to judgement by general, if not universal, standards (Held 2002: 20). It is this moral shift as well as the increased focus on humanity as a whole that represents movement from liberal to cosmopolitan sovereignty. However the need to govern areas such as outer space is not simply a practical, but also a philosophical issue, in not only practically reconsidering governance of transterritorial areas, but also considering their implications for community, identity and the organization of political space. Cosmopolitan sovereignty and outer space politics In relation to outer space, this approach to sovereignty opens up two areas for consideration. First, it warrants a discussion on the aspects of present outer space politics that can be understood as part of the shift to liberal and cosmopolitan sovereignty; and second it opens up the consideration of how outer space politics themselves may in fact be reinforcing through a feedback loop the sense of cosmopolitanism in wider world society,9 A liberal and cosmopolitan discourse exists in the wording of ourer space law, with the aforementioned clauses that outer space is "the common province of mankind" and "for peaceful purposes" (Outer Space Treaty, Article IV); based in the accepted principle that outer space is neutral territory; in suggesting
that asuonauts are the "envoys of all mankind" (Search and Rescue Agreement, Article V), and that "The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development" (Moon Treaty, Article 4). These laws can be seen as part of the movement rowards "forms of regulation and law-making that creates powers, rights, and constraints that transcend the claims of nation-states and have far-reaching consequences in principle" (Held 2002: 23-24). However the degree to which behaviour has followed these moral dictums, and will continue do so in the future, is not entirely clear. It is indicative that attempts to violate these laws are normally undertaken with justifications worded in the context of those laws. For example, attempts by eight equatorial states to claim sovereignty over portions of geosynchronous orbit were justified by asserting that the Ourer Space Treaty did not apply to that region (Bogota Declaration 1976). Weaponization in space has occurred based on the justification that "peaceful purposes" does not imply de-militarization, but only the absence of war. If) China has said it plans to mine the Moon, but, vaguely, for the benefit of all humanity". II Cases such as these could be interpreted as a weakness in the argument that cosmopolitanism sovereignty is nascent in outer space politics, in that states continue to undermine the principles underlying the wording of the laws. Or indeed it could be interpreted as validation of the treaties, in that actors feel that going beyond those rules must be justified in the context of the laws themselves. The second point raised by cosmopolitan sovereignty regards how outer space itself may be

contributing to wider cognitive and societal shifts that generate a stronger sense of global community and common humanity (and hence cosmopolitanism), which is causing a shift away from Westphalian sovereignty. The concept of the Overview Effect (White 1987) suggests that outer space is playing a role in forcing into our collective social epistemes a greater sense of our common destiny and humanity. Cosmologist Carl Sagan described this as an awakening from our "slumbering planetary consciousness " (Sagan 1994: 215), which is forcing a reconsideration of our relationship to ourselves, and to the universe. The budding field of
astrosociology further studies the ways in astrosocial phenomena (such as space exploration and space science) and society are related (Pass 2004) and mutually constitutive. The potential influence of outer space on collective mentalities is said to be achieved

in various ways: through images of the Earth from space, which impact upon humans the ecological unity of our planet, and the arbitrariness of political boundaries; through the meta-experiences of astronauts which impact upon us the reality that humans can now go into space; through the role of satellites in connecting us through telecommunications; and shrinking time through real-time images (\XThite 1987) (a la rhe CNN effect). From this perspective, not only does outer space law embody liberal principles, but outer space activity itself may be contributing to a cosmopolitan shift that emphasizes the commonality of the human condition [our "overlapping communities of fate" (Held 2002: 35)}, and the arbitrariness of state-centered approaches to sovereignty. The need to cooperate on big science projects, combined with the planetary and cosmological perspectives that space exploration provides, powerfully demonstrate global interdependence, and thus potentially make the prospect of a code of universal moral conduct seem both required and justified. It can be pointed out that the root of "cosmopolitanism" and "cosmology" are the same "cosmos",
meaning "order" and "universe" .

Concentrating on ENVIRONMENTAL problems in space encourages peaceful, cooperative action as opposed to militarization Moltz, 08 [James Clay ,Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies, , Politics of Space Security]
What emerges from this revie\v of the main conceptual roots of space policy analysis over the past fifty years is a mixed picture. Each of the schools analyzed offers some explanatory strengths, but each also has blind spots and weaknesses. In seeking a better means of structuring our thinking about space security's past and future, we instead return to the discussion of space security that opened this chapter, one that made reference to both man-made and natural threats. In that context, it might be useful to move space security analysis from its traditional focus on states and

their militaries to the space environment itself. This shift encourages an emphasis on "softer" tools for achieving space security than military means and refocuses our attention on the "transboundary" environmental problemsc'e represented by space radiation and debris. Viewing space security from the
perspective of self-interested actors seeking to protect their access to space in a gradually constricting collective goods environment may offer advantages over tying space security debates to nuclear and other "hard" security issues, which Cold War competition encouraged. Recent recognition of such problems as global warming, the depletion of fisheries, watershed shortages, and deforestation has brought new collective action to address challenges faced by un-or under-protected global commons. To date, space has figured only marginally in these discussions, But growing concern~ about orbital debris may be a tipping point in pushing for more attention tc such questions in space. Looking back across history for lessons, we can conclude that neither excessive pessimism nor excessive optimism is warranted for space security. The outcomes to date in space have been mixed in regard to cooperation and competition. Yet it is worth observing that surprising levels of restraint emerged during the first fifty years of space

activity, despite a global context of political and military hostility. Making sense of these contradictorv trends remains a work in progress. Changing the focus of traditional analysis regarding space may be fruitful, as a different lens sometimes brings a new and more accurate perspective to long-studied problems. In the next chapter, then, we consider what might be gained from viewing space security as an environmental management problem.Although space weapons exist today, their impact on the quality of space security is influenced by two parallel sets of factors-one technical, one
political. On the technical side, security calculations must take into account the quantity of space weapons, their readiness (including test record), their distribution among actors, the nature of their deployment (in storage, on the ground, or in distribution space), and the availability of methods for overcoming or evading them. On the political side, space security is influenced by the breadth, effectiveness, and depth of international support for norms, treaties, and other agreements meant to ban, limit, or control such weapons. But such military calculations alone do not determine

space security. Overlaying these specific operational and political factors is an important and often underappreciated set of environmental factors that affect security in space. As suggested in Chapter One and analyzed in greater detail in the rest of this chapter, risks from electromagnetic pulse (E.vIP) radiation, the expanding quantity of orbital space debris, and the increasing population of operational satellites and spacecraft must be understood and taken into account. Failure to do so will affect the accuracy of any predictions about the current or future state of space security. Jessica Tuchman Matthews wrote presciently in 1989 about an emerging link between scientific understanding among
governments and solving security problems in environmental issue-areas involving mixed sovereignty and multiple actors." Although she did not mention space, her prescription that solving environmental security problems will require "far greater technical competence in the natural and planetary sciences among policymakers" is highly appropriate.' ~otably, she also called f()r involvement from the private sector in these decisions. The approach, focus, and skill set she invokes are very ditIerent from those traditionally applied to military-security problems, which to date have tended to emphasize national responses and have involved relatiyely limited cooperation with commercial actors. (One notable exception has been in recent efforts at orbital debris mitigation, as will be discussed later.)

Weaponisation is NOT inevitable, but US action is keywe need to take the first step towards international institutionalism Moltz, 08 [James Clay ,Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies, , Politics of Space Security]

A second and sharply contrasting perspective, developed around the time of the International Geophysical Year (lGY) organized by scientists worldwide for 1957-58, focused on hopes that space might become a sanctuary from world political conflicts. The IGY had helped bring new attention to space and the desirability of international cooperation in exploring this exciting new environment. The global institutionalist school emphasizes the

possible role of new forms of shared human and scientific thinking, supported by international cooperation, treaties, and organizations, in providing space security rather than weapons-based approaches. Its adherents take a far more optimistic view of the lessons of space history and the prospects for future cooperation, seeing space cooperation as a means of transcending cont1icts on Earth. As British space writer Arthur C. Clarke wrote in 1959, "Only
through space-t1ight can Mankind find a permanent outlet tor its aggressive and pioneering instincts."s7 German-born U.S. space enthusiast \Villey Ley similarly hypothesized that "nations might become 'extroverted' to the point where their urge to overcome the

unknown would dwarf their historic desires for power, wealth, and recognition--attributes that have so often led to war in the past.""' Ley noted in this regard the establishment already in 1959 of the 'U.N. Committee on the Peace- ful Uses of Outer Space.
Another early adherent to the global institutionalist investrne: school, physicist Albert R. Hibbs, asked rhetorically in arguing against military led nationalism in space and instead in support of a human-wide approach to the future manned exploration: "Is it not possible that we will

help [in this process] simply because we want a man to stand on .Mars?"60 Although global institutionalists rarely mentioned
political theory, their assumptions expressed concepts going back centuries within so-called idealist approaches to international relations. Seventeenthcentury Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotiu5, for example, observed that man is endowed by his creator with a higher form of reason than animals and argued that "among the traits characteristic of man is an impelling desire for society, that is, for the social life-not of any and every sort, but peaceful and organized according to the measure of his intelligence."61 A supporting elaboration of these views for space could be traced back to Immanuel Kant's assertion that "perpetual peace" could be achieved by universalist thinking and a federation of nations. As applied to space, analysts used similar

concepts to make the case that humans might be able to live peaceably in space through new methods of transnational governance. Indeed, early members of this school saw space as a means of escaping traditional patterns of human conflict, thanks in part to the positive pressures exerted by, on the one hand, international communications and, on the other, a desire to avoid catastrophic war. They depicted cooperation as the more likely outcome in space, compared to competition, and argued that as states integrated their economies and national identities began to break down, old notions of statecentric realism could become anachronistic and even fade into history. One especially innovative 1965 book suggested breaking out of superpower
military competition via the redirection of defense funding, arguing, "By inviting Soviet cooperation in an intensive program of space exploration ... we would tend to eliminate warlike preparations. This study concluded that heightened space mwstments would "make further armament expenditures immensely difficult if not impossible. While some of these more fanciful views did not take hold, evidence to support the global

institutionalist case began to emerge early in the space age. The 1963 signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, halting space nuclear tests, showed that cooperation between the two rivals had begun and represented a viable alternative to seemingly inevitable space cont1ict. By the the mid-1960s, the two rivals took another major step toward limiting the
scope of their competition by negotiating the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 and opening it to international membership at the United Nations. This agreement applied existing international law to space, banned all military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies (on threat of open inspection rights granted to signatory states), and most importantly, removed the Moon and celestial bodies from territorial ,competition by declaring them to be "the province of all mankind." Soon after, other cooperative efforts followed, including the ABM Treaty and the Apollo-Soyuz joint manned mission. In the commercial area, the Convention on International Liability (1972) and the Convention on Registration of Obiects added further stability and "rules" to space activity.'" As one analyst observed in 1976, "The USA and USSR have gone further to achieve arms control in space than in any other area."69 This evidence clearly seems to contradict space nationalist patterns and predictions. Peter Jankowitsch observed in 1976: In the past [such as with the oceans and the world's airspace], international cooperation was slow to follow new dimensions of human activity."~o But in '::ace, human activity was "soon followed by the development of new forms , C international cooperation, including the rapid formation of a new body of International law. The global institutionalist school quickly peaked in the early to mid-197OS, ,~cn the decline of U.S.-Soviet detente resulted in a sharp decline in civilian space cooperation and yielded to new military space testing in the late 1970S and early 19805. By the late 1980s, however, the school had resumed its development. Now somewhat sobered by past disappointments, the global institutionalists had largely abandoned idealist notions for more achievable notions of neoliberalism.~2 In other words,

analysts no longer predicted an ultimate philosophical convergence among states in space but instead a form of enlightened self-interest and improved behavior through the benefit of cooperative space treaties, international organizations, and new forms of bilateral and multilateral engagement in space. The rapid growth in U.S.-Russian
collaboration in a number of highly sensitive areas of spaceflight after 1991 seemed to confirm their predictions of a coming new era in space. But Bush administration policies after 20m, inspired by concepts of space nationalism, explicitly rejected new treaty-based approaches and additional "rules" for space, thus moving these ideas to the back burner of U.S. policymaking. Today, a growing international pressure for new legal

instruments to prevent conflict in space continues to motivate this school of thought, as seen in the nearly unanimous international support at the United Nations for the yearly resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Global institutionalists emphasize the role of international treaties in preserving the benefits of space and the need for expanded efforts to close existing loopholes and create strong prohibitions against the testing and deployment of weapons in space. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Bruce DeBlois, for example, rejects the inevitability of space nationalism. He describes the dichotomy of "either defending space assets with weapons or not defending them at all" as a "false dilemma."7; Instead, he argues for broadening the tool kit and abandoning the U.S. "do nothing" diplomatic strategv for space. DeBlois makes the global institutionalist case that a smarter U.S. policy would be one of undertaking "intense diplomatic efforts to convince a world of nations that space as a sanctuary for peaceful and cooperative existence and stabilitv best serves all."7.! As Theresa Hitchens
argues, new forms of international cooperation "will be ... necessary to ensuring the future security of space.'~5 Among European experts, German legal scholar Detlev Wolter has called for the negotiation of a Cooperative Security in Outer Space Treaty and the formation of a formal international organization to implement the new agreement.~6 :1The treaty would ban destructive weapons from space, including ASATs, spaceIi strike weapons, and antiballistic missile technologies. It would also set up an international system for monitoring and verification. Wolter's concept is consistent with treaty proposals at the United Nations offered by China and Russia in recent years but goes further to institutionalize decision making and implementation at the international level. In the United States, the 2002 proposal from Congressman Dennis Kucinich (Dem., Ohio) to cut off U.S funding for space defenses and to negotiate a binding treaty to prevent the weaponization of space fits into this school as welF-Political scientist and tonner State DeT II partment official Nancy Gallagher

argues that true space security \vill "require formal negotiations, legally binding agreements, and implementing organizations that have both resources and political clout."c8 \formal negotiations, legally binding agreements, and implementing organizations that have both resources and political

clout."c8

And, now is keywe are at a tipping point. Either you vote aff to endorse a critical cosmopolitanism or you cede control of outer space to the neo-cons. Dickens and Ormrod 07 Professors at the University of Essex (Peter and James, August 2007, Outer Space and Internal Nature: Towards a Sociology of the University Sociology volume 41 number 4)
This article has explored some of the past relationships between humanitys internal nature and the universe. We have also suggested some of the more troubling ways in which these relationships are developing in contemporary society. One development is the trend toward a cosmic narcissism in the ways in which elites and the affluent middle classes relate to the universe as an object for maintaining imperial dominance and

sustaining personal fantasies about omnipotence respectively. However, narcissistic relationships with external nature are intrinsically unsatisfying. Objectifying nature and the cosmos does not actually empower the self, but rather enslaves it. Even the wealthy and the technocratic new middle class who relate to the universe in this way become subjected to the objects of their own narcissistic desire. The other development is a return to a fearful and alienated relationship with the universe, again experienced as a frightening subject controlling Earthly affairs from on high. It is a 21st-century version of the Platonic and Mediaeval universes in which humans are made into repressed objects and thereby brought to heel. This is a relationship experienced by those not in control of the universe: those on the margins of Western society. Commodification, militarization and surveillance by the socially powerful are again making the universe into an entity dominating human society, as are contemporary cosmological theories divorced from most peoples understanding. Once more, socially and politically powerful people (some even claiming to be on a mission from God) are attempting to make the cosmos into a means by which they can control society on Earth. The combination of these two trends is a Wizard of Oz effect, in which power is maintained by those with mechanical control of the universe, but hidden by a mask of mysticism that keeps the public in a position of fear and subservience. Societys relations with the cosmos are now at a tipping point. The cosmos could be explored and used for primarily humanitarian ends and needs. Satellites could continue to be increasingly used to promote environmental sustainability and social justice. They can for example be, and indeed are being, used to track the movements of needy refugees and monitor environmental degradation with a view to its regulation (United Nations, 2003). But if this model of human interaction is to win out over the use of the universe to serve dominant military, political and economic ends then new visionaries of a human relationship with the universe are needed. In philosophical opposition to the majority of pro-space activists (though they rarely clash in reality) are a growing number of
social movement organizations and networks established to contest human activity in space, including the military use of space, commercialization of space, the use of nuclear power in space and creation of space debris. Groups like the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space and the Institute for Cooperation in Space are at the centre of this movement. The activities and arguments of these groups, to which we are by and large sympathetic, demonstrate the ways in which our understanding and use of outer space are contested in pivotal times.

Contention ThreeReclaiming Psychological Space

Space is an opportunityhow we understand space politics can change the way we view domestic politics, and vice versa. Cooperative Space exploration isnt enoughit needs to be combined with a methodological emphasis on terrestrial cosmopolitanism Stuart 2009 [Jill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Unbundling Sovereignty, Territory, and the State in Outer Space, from Securing Outer Space, edited by Bormann and Sheehan] Summary and conclusions Regime theory and cosmopolitan sovereignty provide useful theoretical frameworks for unbundling the relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space politics. As emphasized above, and by way of summary, regime theory provides useful tools for txplaining the negotiations and preference formations that lead to cooperative regimes, which creatively de-link sovereignty and territory. However its rationalist approach to actor behaviour overlooks deeper social and constructivist forces that may be influencing outer space politics. And its conservative approach to the states system causes shortsightedness in appreciating otber forms of governance and the organization of political space that have preceded the \X'estphalian system, and (especially in the context of outer space) fundamental changes to the system that may come in the future. Cosmopolitan

sovereignty usefully embraces the normative and teleological dynamics of outer space politics, and offers an alternative reading of outer space law. In accepting that classical sovereignty exists in the system, but that it may be at play with liberal and cosmopolitan forms of sovereignty too, the approach opens up new interpretations of outer space politics in the present, but also offers clear visions for potential developments in the future. The constructivist dynamic of the approach also allows us to see how outer space may not only be subject to, but also constitutive of, cosmopolitan shifts in the collective human episteme. In regards to the study of sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space politics, I draw three broad conclusions based on the above analysis. First, it is obvious that Westphalian sovereignty as a concept is inadequate for analysing outer space politics. The concept does not provide a language through which to understand spaces outside of the traditional territorial state. The concept is as inflexible as the boundaries it prescribes for states, and alternative approaches must continue to be developed to unbundle the concept itself. As exemplified by the two approaches taken in this chapter, theoretical approaches that go beyond Westphalian sovereignty can serve to de-link sovereignty, territory and the state from each other in various forms. Second, I conclude that theoretical conceptions such as sovereignty precede the meaning with which we infuse outer space politics, and conversely that outer space exploration is causing cognitive shifts that lead to changes in our key theoretical concepts. The different visions of outer space politics that the two theoretical approaches give exemplify how our conceptual frameworks precede our interpretation of events occurring in outer space -that is, analysis of outer space politics is in part dependent on our conceptual frameworks and worldviews developed in regards to wider world politics. Yet I also argue that the unique opportunities and events that outer space makes available to humans, and the unconventional political, legal and cognitive developments those opportunities and events inspire, is also influencing political practice and conceptualizations in wider politics. Thinking about outer space governance can partly be understood in the context of globalization, as one of many contemporary developments that challenge the role of the state and our perception of community. However outer space can also be seen as a new area that is also reinforcing changes in that perception, by providing imagery of the planet as a whole, by providing humans with information about the status of the Earth environment, and by "shrinking" the planet through technological developments such as satellite communications. While the governance of other global commons such as the high seas have challenged the conceptualization of traditional sovereignty before, this chapter shows how outer space re-introduces with some urgency those challenges, and provides new angles to that challenge. In line with the previous conclusion, and as emphasized at earlier points in the chapter, my third conclusion is that exogenous events and human-driven developments in outer space will continue to influence our understanding of sovereignty, both in space and in wider world politics, in the future. A major exogenous event or
technological development could significantly change outer space politics, and indeed something like an asteroid would then also influence world politics more broadly conceived. However, barring such a major event, the relationship between sovereign practice in outer space and our understanding of that sovereignty are likely to continually and dialectically re-constitute each other, as outer space continues to pose unique governance and conceptual challenges. Power political trends, such as indicated by George W. Bush's space control policy, could in fact reinforce realpolitik, although likely still in the context of increased globalization and diversification of actors in world politics. Or (and particularly in the longer term) outer space may

continue to reinforce liberal and cosmopolitan trends that more explicitly undermine Westphalian sovereignty. The analysis of sovereignty in outer space is dependent on conceptualizations and developments occurring on earth, in outer space, and by the dialectical relationship between the two.

The International Space Station exemplifies the complex relationship between power politics and the state on the one hand, and cosmopolitan ideals and interdependence in outer space politics on the other. The two approaches taken here offer different understandings (and methodologies) for interpreting where sovereignty has been in the past, for how it can be understood in the present, and for where it is (and should be) going in the future. For the

contemporary theorist, a fair understanding comes from appreciating both, in the context of the complex and unique politics of outer space.

This means that the role of the ballot is to investigate methodology and psyche before material or empirical arguments rejecting methodological nationalism creates a new research agenda that is critical to understand the world and advance cosmopolitanism. Beck and Sznaider, 2006 [Ulrich and Natan,. Professor of sociology at Munich's Ludwig-Maximilian University and the London School of
Economics; and professor of sociology at the Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, Israel. Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda, The British Journal of Sociology 57.1, Wiley InterSciences.]

Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nationstate societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and
externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization. The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions: [Like] stamp collecting . . . social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the American constitution, the British class system not to mention the more exotic institutions of tribal societies were the currency of social research. The core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated in the sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world civilization as wholes but with the domestic forms of particular national societies (Shaw 2000: 68).

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. One does not criticize methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual. Nation-states (as
all the research shows see also the different contributions in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? It adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. The decisive point is that

national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science. As many authors including the ones in this volume
criticize, in the growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, difference is that in the case of

nationalism the value judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodological nationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities. In the case of the cosmopolitan Wertbeziehung (Max Weber, value relation), by contrast, this silent commitment to a nation-state centred outlook of sociology appears problematic. In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distinguish
between the actor perspective and the observer perspective. From this it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination within

the context of its cultural, political and even geographical boundaries and distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences.
Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the nation-state's own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics, law, justice, memory and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of

the nationstate. That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner's paper in this issue (Turner 2006: 13351). This does not mean, of course, that a cosmopolitan social science can and should ignore different national traditions of law, history, politics and memory. These traditions exist and become part of our cosmopolitan methodology. The comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism. This is valid to the extent
that the majority of positions in the contemporary debates in social and political science over globalization can be systematically interpreted as transdisciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism. These premises also structure empirical research,

for example, in the choice of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusively national. A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is therefore difficult, indeed, almost impossible, because so many statistical categories and research procedures are based on it. It is therefore of historical importance for the future development of the social sciences that this methodological nationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and disciplinary organization, be theoretically, empirically, and organizationally re-assessed and reformed. What is at stake here? Whereas in the
case of the nation-state centred perspective there is an historical correspondence between normative and methodological nationalism (and for this reason this correspondence has mainly remained latent), this does not hold for the relationship between normative and methodological cosmopolitanism. In fact, the opposite is true: even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of

Cosmopolitan social science entails the systematic breaking up of the process through which the national perspective of politics and society, as well as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and law, confirm and strengthen each other in their definitions of reality. Thus it also tackles (what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of conspiracy of silence of conflicting basic convictions) the
reference. various developmental versions of de-bounded politics and society, corresponding research questions and programmes, the strategic expansions of the national and international political fields, as well as basic transformations in the domains of state, politics, and society. This paradigmatic de-

construction and re-construction of the social sciences from a national to a cosmopolitan outlook can be understood and methodologically justified as a positive problem shift (Lakatos 1970), a broadening of horizons for social science research making visible new realities encouraging new research programmes (Back and Lau 2005 and Beck, Banss and Lau 2003: 135). Against the background
of cosmopolitan social science, it suddenly becomes obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor, correspondingly, to make a convincing contrast between homogeneous units. National spaces have become de-nationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. New realities are arising: a new mapping of space and time,

new co-ordinates for the social and the political are emerging which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated. This means we need to mix our focus between critical theory and problem-solving --- Only this focus on method generates social learning that avoids error replication and changes international politics. Widmaier, 2004 [Wesley W.. Department of Political Science, St. Josephs University. Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The
Pragmatist Constructivist Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith, International Studies Review 6.3,]

This realignment of debate also would contribute to a more engaged IR scholarship if it led scholars to recognize that they themselves act as agents in such communicative interactions. They might then become more inclined to acknowledge concerns, not only regarding explanation and research design, but also for policy relevance and constitutional design. Deliberate reection on constitutional designconfronting and acknowledging the inevitable implications of any scholarly arguments for policy practicesis necessary because every theoretical and empirical argument offers a normative or policy lesson. For example, economists have recognized that classical theories teach students to behave in accord with their precepts. Robert Frank and his colleagues
(1993) have argued that exposure to contemporary economic theory itself constitutes agents to act more selfishly; in- deed, they found students enrolled in economics courses come to behave in an increasingly self-help manner. In the IR context, Wendt (1999:377) himself argues that problem-

solving theory has the practical effect in the real world of helping to reproduce the status quo and suggests that realism, despite its claim of objectivity is best seen in this light as a normative as well as scientific theory. In recent decades, the research design-style structuring of questions and cases has come at the expense of such constitutional concerns. Certainly, scholarly efforts should not be evaluated exclusively in terms of the correctness of their policy views. Academia would not work if subjective political differences became legit- imate grounds for dismissing arguments. However, scholars need to acknowledge that their views inevitably possess normative and policy implications rather than pretending that such implications do not exist. Consider again that despite their numerous differences, the constitutive lessons inherent in the analyses of Waltz, Cox, Ashley, and Campbell are quite similar: that state and societal agents must dene their interests in competitiveas opposed to collectivefashion. One sus- pects that this is not the moral that Ashley or Campbell sought to advocate. Unfortunately, the absence of a broader focus on such constitutive lessons, a neglect rooted in the structure of IR debate itself, limited their attention to such issues. In contrast, by more persistently asking questions about the constitutive effects of theoretical or empirical claims, scholars may enable a more relevant study of international relations. They might reclaim the public space to act as not simply academics in the narrow sense of the termwithin elite epistemic communities or as participant-advisors in the policy processbut rather they might aid one another in functioning as public intellectuals, focusing larger public debates in a more constructive, pragmatic manner. What are the potential benets of such shifts? The resulting academic contri- bution to public policy learning might enable not simply materialist-rationalist styled Bayesian probability updating (Iverson 1984), but rather could promote a kind of social learning. Such learning, as Albert Bandura (1962, viii) has argued neither
casts people into the role of powerless objects controlled by environmental forces nor free agents who can become whatever they choose, but rather recognizes that both people and their environments are reciprocal determinants of each other. Such social learning requires an

ability to make sense of intersubjective contexts through a broader dialogue among the public, scholars, and policy agents. International structures, from this vantage, offer no unambiguous lessons. Contrary to Kissingers (1979:5455) view (noted earlier) that the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high ofce are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in ofce, possibilities for intersubjective variation require a constant monitoring of the prevailing intersubjective mood. Just as balance of power rules are learned in a social context, they can be

unlearned if states come to expect cooperation instead of conict. Kissinger-like claims regard- ing the irrelevance of ongoing reection to policymaking seem misguided, as does the application of balance of power lessons in an inappropriate social context that may, in turn, contribute to new policy errors. Put simply, lessons that are applicable in one setting (for example, Europe in 1914) may be
counterproductive in another (for example, Europe in 1992). Such variation might, perhaps, be more readily recognized by scholars engaged in a more pragmatic, ongoing social learning. Conclusion Theory constitutes social reality. This realization highlights the need

for a prag- matist-constructivist approach to IR theory, one that involves an ongoing involve- ment in both scholarly and public debates. Unfortunately, the development of such a perspective in IR scholarship has often been impeded by the distinction between long-term critical theory and short-run problem-solving theory. The present essay has called this distinction into question by describing the ways in which John
Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith engaged in theoretical debates while also pursuing policy agendas. Both Dewey and Galbraith highlighted the importance of socially constructed understandings in the issue areas of education and economic policy. More broadly, their work itself provided a better sense of what it means to act as a public intellectual in both guiding and being immersed in public debates. In addressing the implications

for IR scholarship, this essay has, therefore, urged a more explicit stress on both the role of agency in advancing change and a rec- ognition of the constitutive effects of theory on social reality. In keeping with the tradition of pragmatist scholarship, let us conclude that distinctions between critical theory and problemsolving theory need to be relaxed considerably to highlight the potential roles of theory as a factor as well as of theorists themselves as actors in international politics (Edwards 1990).

***SOLVENCY

SolvencyCooperation key
Only prioritizing international space cooperation solves for space weaponization Johnson, 2006 [PhD at The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (Rebecca, 2006, Space without Weapons
http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm]

Recommendations Space can provide unparalleled resources for supporting our security in relation to humanitarian and environmental crises and diverse natural, criminal and military threats. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that potential misuses of space assets could turn outer space into a battlefield: such abuses would threaten global security as well as compromising a range of civilian and security applications on which our daily lives now rely. 1. We need to prioritise the collective, cooperative prevention of the weaponisation of space, with timely development of international legal instruments and agreements to ensure that no weapons are tested or deployed for use in, to or from space. Prevention and prohibition of weapons in and from space is cleaner, clearer and safer than belated attempts at disarmament or non-proliferation would be in left for the future to deal with. Operating within the multilateral framework, it is now urgent that we develop a strategy to reinforce the outer space security regime and prohibit the weaponisation of space.[13] 2. Countries with space assets and dependencies need to take seriously their active protection, through both technological and political initiatives. Useful approaches would include a. passive defences such as hardening and shielding, and enhancing space situation awareness capabilities; and b. the development and coordination of policies and strategies to play a more significant and effective role in strengthening the international legal regime and promulgating 'rules of the road' for space activities and uses. 3. More open, transparent, and rational analysis of the actual threats, prospects of, and alternatives to, missile defences and the weaponisation of space, including analysis - whether in the CD or some other forum - of the implications of certain policy routes for human, international and space security. Conclusion

Instead of turning to the sledgehammer of space weaponisation to deal with the potential vulnerabilities of space assets, a more sensible approach (and one consistent with the United Nations Charter) would combine arms control efforts with the
technical hardening and shielding of as many satellites as possible, plus space situation awareness, redundancy and other 'passive' defence means. Progress in nuclear disarmament, strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, further efforts to restrict missile proliferation, building on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) would also contribute to security and reduce the chances of space becoming a battleground - which would be in nobody's interests.

SolvencyCosmic Viewpoint
A cosmic viewpoint is key to establishing a cosmopolitan society Patomaki 10 (2 September 2010, Heikki is Professor of World Politics and the Vice Director of the Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research at the
University of Helsinki, Finland. He is also an Innovation Professor of Human Security Globalisation and Global Institutions at the RMIT University in Melbourne, Cosmological Sources of Cosmopolitanism Review of International Studies p. 191 SG) For a number of Enlightenment thinkers and their followers, the cosmic

viewpoint puts the drama of life and human history on the planet in a very wide perspective. In one sense this is an optical eect: the longer the distance, the smaller the within-the-humanity dierences appear. Moreover, distance and the non-centric Copernican perspective encourage judicious and at times ironic ethicopolitical sentiment towards ones own particular identity, and this sentiment is a key part of critical cosmopolitanism. In Kants case, critical cosmopolitanism also opened up a new temporal horizon by constituting an interest in exploring possible futures that can be dierent and perhaps better than the current realities. The cosmic vision also suggests that humans are not only dependent on each other but also on the physical processes of the planet, solar system and the universe as a whole; and on the thin sphere of life on planet Earth. Thus the new cosmological perspective encouraged scientists, philosophers, political theorists and novelists to think of all humans as part of an interdependent and fragile whole, the development of which has also given rise to consciousness, reason and morality. Awareness of the human interdependency and shared fate suggests widening the sphere within which the basic moral principles apply. Further, the idea of possible cosmic pluralism can also contribute to extending the variety of living and sentient beings with which we can identify. Any
adequate form of morality has to do with the capacity to generalise normative claims in an acceptable way and, most importantly, with the ability to see things from others point of view.32

SolvencyMovements
Seeing environmental risks as truly global undermines the political system and its insistence on bounded problemswe rupture the system and create a new one

Beck, 03 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Beck, Conversations With Ulrich Beck, pg ?)
I'll come to that in a second because it's a key point. But first I want to finish up an earlier argument. The

explosiveness of risk conflicts lies in the fact that they delegitimate the political system. Even though its institutions continue to function and continue to deny that there can be such a thing as an incalculable risk, such risks force their way into institutions like a virus that weakens them from within. Everyone tries to free themselves from risk, but it continues to multiply and permeate . It's as if we've knocked over a honeypot, and in our efforts to rub it off, we succeed only in getting honey stuck to every part of the social body. It's a self-negating process, in which everything society's institutions do to free themselves only spreads the risk and helps to dissolve their legitimacy. Hobbes, in his theory of the state, actually put his finger on the explosive core of risk conflict. If you ask when even this
deeply' conservative thinker thinks civil resistance is justified, you find a formulation that strikingly if unintentionally anticipates environmental problems and the spectre of risk as uncertainty. To paraphrase, he says the ultimate resistance is justified when the state can no

longer guarantee its citizens pure air and healthy food and the security that goes with them. When their air is poisoned and their food endangers them, then citizens are justified in rebelling against the state. What this makes clear is that risk is not something limited to the environment. It doesn't only affect the environment of the political system and it does so because it strikes at fundamental rights, institutionalized fundamental rights, namely the right to life and security, rights upon which both state and citizenry may even place a higher value than on freedom. When it's a matter of life and death or health, people stop kidding around. People feel this as an attack on the core of their existence. It is not the size of the danger that makes these risks so politically explosive. It is rather
the size of the contradiction, between the security that it is the state's raison d'etre to provide - and which we have up until now expected it to provide - and the systematic injuring of that expectation that takes place in risk conflicts. Diffused poisons are like diffuse enemies, which industry has let in through its sluice gates. And then the state, rather than declaring war on them, declares them to be harmless. I bring up this point because it makes clear both

how explosive these conflicts are, and that their epicenter is not where people think it is. It lies not in the risks themselves, but in how strongly they undermine the core of what legitimates state institutions and political action in the first modernity. This crisis of confidence then reacts back to increase risk consciousness. If a risk crisis goes far enough, we eventually reach the point where no one places any trust in the repeated announcements of the authorities that they have everything under control. At that point they start to have the opposite of their intended effect. Each announcement conjures up another image of imminent catastrophe.

Solvency--Human security focus

The plan and its mindset disperse political authority and focus on people instead of statesthis solves the root cause of war, poverty, and opression

Pogge 92-- the Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University (Thomas W., October, Ethics by the University of Chicago Press, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, JSTOR)

The human future suddenly seems open. This is an inspiration; we can step back and think more freely. Instead of containment or detente, political scientists are discussing grand pictures: the end of history, or the inevitable proliferation and mutual pacifism of capitalist democracies. And politicians are speaking of a new world order. My inspiration is a little more concrete. After developing a rough, cosmopolitan specification of our task to promote moral progress, I offer an idea for gradual global institutional reform. Dispersing political authority over nested territorial units would decrease the intensity of the struggle for power and wealth within and among states, thereby reducing the incidence of war, poverty, and oppression. In such a multilayered scheme, borders could be redrawn more easily to accord with the aspirations of peoples and communities. INSTITUTIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or personsrather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally2- not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone-not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like.

Solvency--A2: Cosmo is Impossible!

A cosmopolitan federation is possible UN proves and realism is wrong Kleingeld and Brown 2002 (Pauline, Professor of Practical Reason at the University of Groningen, and Eric, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/, Feb.
23, 2002, Revised Nov. 28, 2006, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/) It is often argued that it is impossible to change the current system of states and to form a world-state or a global federation of states. This claim is hard to maintain, however, in the face of the existence of the United Nations, the existence of states with more than a billion people of heterogeneous backgrounds, and the experience with the United States and the European Union. So in order to be taken seriously, the objection must instead be that it is impossible to form a good state or federation of that magnitude, i.e., that it is impossible to realize or even approximate the cosmopolitan ideal in a way that makes it worth pursuing and that does not carry prohibitive risks. Here political cosmopolitans disagree among themselves. On one end of the spectrum we find those who argue in favor of a strong world-state, on the

other end we find the defenders of a loose and voluntary federation, or a different system altogether. The defenders of the loose, voluntary and noncoercive federation warn that a world-state easily becomes despotic without there being any competing power left to break the hold of despotism (Rawls). Defenders of the worldstate reply that a stronger form of federation, or even merger, is the only way to truly exit the state of nature between states, or the only way to bring about international distributive justice. Other authors have argued that the focus among many political cosmopolitans on only these two alternatives overlooks a third, and that a concern for human rights should lead one to focus instead on institutional reform that disperses sovereignty vertically, rather than concentrating it in all-encompassing international institutions. On this view, peace, democracy, prosperity, and the environment would be better served by a system in which the political allegiance and loyalties of persons are widely dispersed over a number of political units of various sizes, without any one unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of the state (Pogge). Of the objections brought up by non- or anti-cosmopolitans, two deserve special mention. First, some authors argue that the (partial or whole) surrender of state sovereignty required by the cosmopolitan scheme is an undue violation of the principle of the autonomy of states or the principle of democratic self-determination of their citizens. Second, so-called realists argue that states are in a Hobbesian state of nature as far as the relations among them are concerned, and that it is as inappropriate as it is futile to subject states to normative constraints. To these objections cosmopolitans have various kinds of response, ranging from developing their alternative normative theory (e.g., by arguing that global democracy increases rather than diminishes the democratic control of individual world citizens) to pointing out, as has been done at least since Grotius, that states have good reasons even on Hobbesian grounds to submit to certain forms of international legal arrangements.

SolvencyOverview Effect
Space provides unique opportunities for borderless, cooperative projects that change human thoughtthe ISS proves Stuart 2009 [Jill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Unbundling Sovereignty, Territory, and the State in Outer Space, from Securing Outer Space, edited by Bormann and Sheehan]

Cosmopolitan sovereignty and the International Space Station As with the previous section, the politics of the International Space Station can be used to extrapolate the cosmopolitan sovereignty approach under consideration. The power political dynamics on [he ISS cannot bt overlooked -for example that the initial plans for [he station (originally called "Space Station Freedom") were conceived in the context of Cold War politics and the space race between the United States and [he USSR. Another example of power politics influencing the ISS is that, despite being an "international project", China's offers to cooperate have been rejected by the US. 12 Also, states remain the owners and decision-makers for the project, and tht US has been the dominant partner in the project (as discussed above, pp. 13-15). However the ISS can also be seen as related to the Overview Effect, which implies

shifts towards more cosmopolitan episteme and discourse. Evidence of this is shown by the language used to describe the ISS, in the practical scientific procedures carried out on the space station, and in how the ISS provides visual reinforcement of perceptions of the earth as a single community. Linguistically, the ISS is often toted as a significant cooperative and "human" project. A united Nations report has described it as the largest collaborative scientific
undertaking in history and the Canadian government heralded its involvement in the ISS as a "noble" undertaking. l4 Practically, the ISS also gives scientists the opportunity to study the long-term effects on the human body and mind of living in space, and the opportunity to experiment with things like growing food in space. This has implications for future exploration of outer space and, potentially, settlement of off-Earth locales. Visually, NASA is unique in being a government agency with its own television stream (NASA Television, or NTV),15 which provides live and prerecorded programmes on missions and projects, including occasional footage of the Earth as it passes beneath the space station. According to the Overview Effect, it is images of the

Earth, devoid of obvious political borders, which is pushing an internalization of space projects such as the ISS as for "humankind". Thus the space station provides images of the Earth that visually indicate how territorial boundaries are ultimately meaningful because of the value that humans infuse them with. 16 Thus the ISS employs the language of cosmopolitan ideas, as well as practically acting as providing study for future collective endeavours in outer space, and in visually reinforcing ideas of an interdependent Earth-community. The International Space Station can be also be seen as a microcosmic environment that embodies principles of interdependence, which exemplify the type of nascent conceptions of shared community affiliated with greater cosmopolitanism. Regime theory explains how the ISS was created based on state-related territorial and sovereignty terms. However, political negotiations aside. it is worth considering how the station itself is physically interdependent . \While treaties can legally assign liability and responsibility over component parts of the station to individual states, the fact is that, in Earth orbit, the station is dependent for its very survival on the smooth functioning of all the hardware, and the day-to-day cooperation of its crew (who are both representatives of their respective states, of "all mankind " [Search and Rescue Agreement), and who are also individuals
and who are, in some cases, the customers of companies). While regime theory explains how sovereignty of the station is rooted in decision-making procedures based on Earth, there is a less tangible social dynamic in which the station is a microcosm in outer space.

Politically, the survival of the project has also become dependent on the continued cooperation of members, in that the cost and, for some partners, public backing of the project is dependent on the continuation of the project as a joint effort. 17 Treating the ISS as a symbol of cosmopolitanism should not be overexaggerated; the station is still very much
embedded in terrestrially-based power politics, and rooted in rationalist negotiations amongst actors that result in the station's evolving regime. However cosmopolitan sovereignty adds to the analysis of sovereignty on the station by taking account of the moral and long-term implications of such a remarkable project. As Held himself suggests, while one form of sovereignty may predominate in any given political system, elements of others can also be found (Held 2002: 2).

***IMPACTS

The Status quos conception of sovereignty makes war, violence, and WMD use inevitableonly the affs reorientation solves

ImpactWMD War Inev2AC

Pogge 92-- the Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University (Thomas W., October, Ethics by the University of Chicago Press, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, JSTOR)
SOME MAIN REASONS FOR A VERTICAL DISPERSAL OF SOVEREIGNTY Having dealt with some preliminary obstacles, let

me now sketch four main reasons favoring, over the status quo, a world in which sovereignty is widely distributed vertically. 1. Peace/security. -Under the current regime, interstate rivalries are settled ultimately through military competition, including the threat and use of military force. Moreover, within their own territories, national governments are free to do virtually anything they like. Such governments therefore have very powerful incentives and very broad opportunities to develop their military might. This is bound to lead to the further proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional weapons of mass destruction. And in a world in which dozens of competing national governments control such weapons, the outbreak of devastating wars is only a matter of time. It is not feasible to reduce and eliminate national control over weapons of mass destruction through a program that depends upon the voluntary cooperation of each and every national government. What is needed, therefore, is the centrally enforced reduction and elimination of such weapons-in violation of the prevalent idea of state sovereignty. Such a program, if
implemented soon, is much less dangerous than continuing the status quo. It could gain the support of most peoples and governments, if it increases the security of all on fair terms that are effectively adjudicated and enforced. 2. Reducing oppression. -Under the current global

regime, national governments are effectively free to control "their" populations in what- ever way they see fit. Many make extensive use of this freedom by torturing and murdering their domestic opponents, censoring information, suppressing and subverting democratic procedures, prohibiting emigration, and so forth. This problem could be reduced through a vertical dispersal of sovereignty over various layers of political units that would check and balance one another as well as publicize one another's abuses. 3. Global economic justice. The magnitude
and extent of current economic deprivations-over 20 million persons die every year from poverty-related causes-calls for some modification in the prevailing scheme of economic cooperation. One plausible reform would involve a global levy on the use of natural resources to support the economic development in the poorest areas.27 Such a levy would tend to equalize per capita endowments and also encourage conservation. Reforms for the sake of economic justice would again involve some centralization-though without requiring anything like a global welfare bureaucracy. Global economic justice is an end in its own right, which requires, and therefore supports, a reallocation of political authority. But it is also important as a means toward the first two purposes. War and oppression result from the contest for power within and among political units,

which tends to be the more intense the higher the stakes. In fights to govern states, or to redraw their borders, far too much is now at stake by way of control of people and resources. We can best lower the stakes by dispersing political authority over several levels and institutionally securing economic justice at the global level.

ImpactWar, ENVNT, Economy

Democratic nations have become as bad authoritarian counterparts and are incapable of solving world problems such as violence, environmental, and economic collapse-only globalizing cosmopolitan democracy can solve anything Archibugi, 2008 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Preface and
Acknowledgements p. xiii-xv SG) Contemporary political life is

dominated by a paradox. On the one hand democracy has been so successful that it has become the only form of le- gitimate government . Moreover, countries with the more consolidated demo cratic systems are those that
today are eco nom ical ly prosperous and po liti cally dominant. In this part of the world, which we may defi ne as the West, political power has been partly tamed and citizens have the right to appoint, control, and dismiss those who govern them. However, as soon as we

venture outside this circle of privileged countries onto the world political stage, we fi nd that a lust for power marks the relations among countries in which the stronger dominate the weaker . If the hegemonic countries were authoritarian and despotic, this would not be surprising. But since these hegemonic countries today are highly developed and sophisticated countries in charge of the agenda of world politics, it is indeed surprising and even a reason for indignation. And at the same time an opportunity to understand, to act. It would ap- pear that in the liberal countries, or at least in their governments, no priority is given to sharing the strategic decisions regarding issues of relevance with the other peoples of the world. Indeed, proud that they come from free countries, leaders of liberal countries think they are au- thorized to treat the other peoples as pariahs. The leaders of the western world are constantly lecturing others on how alien countries should be governed and exhorting others to modify their
own methods of governance so that they more closely resemble theirs. But at the same time they do very little to apply these same principles in the management of global affairs. A state has therefore been reached in which much of the world population, including those who would benefi t most from the implementation of democracy in their own countries, accuse the

leaders of the western democracies of being hypocritical and egotistical, almost to the same degree as their own home-grown despots. The wars fought by the liberal countries have merely strengthened the opinion that rulers, whether demo cratic or despotic, are all more or less the same . While the actors,
singers, and writers of the West are applauded as heroes wherever they go, their leaders are greeted with vigorous protests. This is an alarming situation, as the West has not only produced good fi lms, songs, and novels but has also and above all perfected a system of governmentnamely, democracythat deserves universal approval and to be extended geo graph i cally and qualitatively enhanced. The incapacity of consolidated democracies to exercise their own powers of persuasion has environment,

had disastrous effects: some of the most press- ing world problemssafeguarding the fi nancial stability, securityare managed by select clubs that act outside all control. Others defense of human rights, natural catastrophes, epidemicsare not managed at all. At the same time, the pro cess of demo cratization, which raised so many hopes after the fall of the Berlin wall, seems to have suddenly halted. For their part, the western
democracies have to contend with globalization pro cesses that are radically modifying the relationship between those who make the decisions and those who are affected by them. In increasingly extensive areas, the demo cratic coun- tries are fi nding they have to face up to external phenomena and decisions made outside their own borders. While increasing efforts are made to boost existing checks and balances on the internal sphere, the inter- nal sphere is gradually decreasing in importance vis-- vis the external sphere, where the participation and control mechanisms continue to be rudimentary. This book contains a proposal for radically reversing this situation: to extend democracy not only inside each state but also as a

form of man- agement of global affairs. This proposal is not universally accepted; many consider that democracy was born and has grown up inside state borders and is ill- adapted to crossing them. I maintain the opposite the- sis: democracy can and must become the method of global governance. Just as democracy has brought considerable benefi ts to the peoples who have tried it out, so today democracy can benefit for the whole of humankind. However, this assumption means that democracy must be re- appraised and reinvented to suit the new
historical conditions, and on a different scale. Which rules among those that are applied inside the states can be applied to the global sphere and in international organiza- tions? Which principles must on the other hand be further discussed and reformed? Depending on the scale and the institutions to which it is ap- plied, democracy changes form, although certain basic principles may be identifi ed that remain unaltered whether applied to a small commu- nity, a national state, or the entire world. The present book presents the proposal for a cosmopolitan democracy, which a group of researchers at the end of the Cold War developed, as the management of different levels of governance. This proposal takes into account contemporary historical conditions, in which po liti cal commu- nities with different historical and cultural backgrounds interact

willy nilly with other neighboring and remote political communities. The form of repre sen ta tion of citizens in the global sphere based on the delegation of governance to a territorial state has become insuffi cient and in many cases an aberration. For this reason citizens of the world need to be given the possibility of directly participating in global choices through new in- stitutions
that are parallel to and autonomous with respect to those that already exist inside the states. Many fi nd the suggestion of a world par- liament annoying, as they consider it unrealistic and vague. Yet today it would seem a necessary path to tread in order to ensure that vested inter- ests do not trample the principles of democracy daily and to attain an effective global commonwealth of citizens. A world parliament would give institutional clout and a say in po liti cal and social affairs to those global movements that have appeared on the world political scene full of enthusiasm and often with a solid baggage of skills. The present book does not suggest building up a greater concentra- tion of force. The many problems facing contemporary

society cannot be tackled through new coercive powers. It is indeed a matter of strength- ening the rules and of imposing penalties for the failure to respect them in order to serve as a stimulus to improve the behavior of political ac- tors. The contemporary world is already based on shared choices, often among specific subjects and in delimited areas. Air transport and tele- phone communications, trade and fi nance, culture and information now increasingly involve individuals beyond their specifi c membership of a given secular state. It is in everyones interest to participate in these international regimes inasmuch as the failure to participate is itself highly penalizing. Globalization thus offers

the possibility of obtaining inter- national integration without using violence to a much greater degree
for this to occur requires both identity of intentions and impartiality, at least among those who claim to be champions of democracy.

than in the past. But

ImpactTerror, climate, war

Sovereign states legitimize illegal wars and fail to counter transnational terrorism, climate change, global
poverty and unbounded military violence, that only a cosmopolitan democracy can solve.

Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision, pg 124)

The issue of legitimation is a tough one. It continues to smoulder even after a military victory, as the war in Iraq demonstrates. Like no other event, this hybrid illegal-legitimate war both alarmed and individualized world opinion. It was as though each individual was confronted with the existential choice political dilemmas or appealed to the available positions to take a clear stance for or against. But the controversy over legality leaves the question of legitimacy open even after a military victory has been declared; indeed, it continually reignites the question. American and British unilateralism was justified, among other things, on the grounds that the present danger, that the Iraqi dictator Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that could be quickly activated, had to be averted. The collapse of this legitimation showed that the presumption of illegality makes the question of legitimacy explosive even after the war is officially over, both nationally and internationally, both in 'domestic' and in 'foreign' politics (given that these partial global publics cannot be easily sealed off from each other). In other words,

the absence of a global, or at least a Western, legal and procedural consensus on the Iraq War transforms illegal legitimacy into an open-ended issue in which 'defeats' (daily US press reports of American soldiers killed in skirmishes) and 'successes' (the painfully slow progress in democratization) intensify the explosiveness of the question of the legitimacy of the war, even in the electorally sensitive fault lines of domestic politics. Here too it again becomes clear how US military unilateralism set in train an unintended and unwelcome cosmopolitanism of side effects. The world is struggling to develop new rules for global domestic politics. The founding principle of the United Nations was the inviolability of the sovereignty of nation-states. But in the one world whose continued existence is threatened by transnational terrorism, climate change, global poverty and unbounded military violence, this principle no longer guarantees peace, and hence the internal and external security of states and societies. It protects neither citizens against tyrannical violations of their rights nor the world against terrorist violence. The ambivalences in the transition to the second modernity which breaks with the international legal
order should lead us to 'expect' contradictory positions on the Iraq War from a sociological perspective. When a whole global order becomes suspect, the unanswerable questions and undecidable decisions arc foisted onto individuals. The result is the inner anguish over the Iraq War experienced by individuals in modern, highly individualized and expressive societies. For this reason a decisive issue is how the relation between law and power in international relations is and should be regulated in the short and the long term. In order to counteract global

dangers, international law, instead of being thrown on the rubbish-heap of the Cold War, must be strengthened and made sensitive to the challenges of a world that is in the process of becoming cosmopolitan. With and following the Iraq War, a
historical 'moment of decision' has arisen which announced itself with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War and has been imminent since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Decisions over the reforms to be undertaken in the coming years will shape global political geography for decades. We are experiencing a decisive moment in which nations have a choice between a cosmopolitan

regime which interprets the values of modernity in such a way that the new threats can be effectively countered, and the return to a Hobbesian war of all against all in which military might replaces global law.

Existential risks dont heed governmental boundaries, leading state political structures to fail in response to crisis and rendering all citizens subject to the contradictions of experts. Chernobyl proves.

ImpactGlobal existential risks

Beck, 03 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Beck, Conversations With Ulrich Beck, pg ?)
That's exactly right. The epochal difference between the defined risks of the first modernity and the global risks of the second modernity is still not being taken seriously either conceptually or institutionally. By conceptual unseriousness, I mean our continuing blithe equation of risks with probabilities. We still seem unable to accept the crucial difference between probability and radical uncertainty, and to come to terms with the fact that the latter now dominates, at least among the risks that occupy the public stage. This basic misunderstanding permeates even the mindset of the natural sciences. By institutional unseriousness, I'm referring to everything that touches on catastrophe planning, like inspections, the provision of

medical services, and all the means by which costs are reckoned into our present accounts for future planning. Every time a global risk crisis occurs, it reveals to us in a panic that for all our calculations we had absolutely no idea of what was involved or how to deal with it. This has many implications. Chernobyl is a perfect illustration. As you probably remember, we were having a wonderful spring that year, the weather was just fantastic. And then through the media spread this news that there was this deadly danger. Our five senses failed us and there was no sixth1 I think it was this experience of cultural blindness that was the kernel of our initial shock. We were suddenly exposed to a danger that was physically imperceptible and which could only be experienced through mediation, through the media, which meant through the contradictory statements of experts. It was not so rnuch the physical danger that outraged people as it was this tutelage, the fact that people as citizens were no longer in a position to determine what was dangerous and what was not. We felt like we were hanging from the marionette strings of these experts and institutions who continually contradicted each other. They kept saying they had everything well in hand, and it constantly turned out not to be true. To get answers to the most everyday questions, like "Can I let my kid play in the sandbox? Can I buy mushrooms? Are all the vegetables poison, or just those from specific regions?" we were dependent on the minute to minute statements of experts who were simply blinding in their contradictoriness . And underneath it all was the horrifying thought that maybe food itself might now be poison.
There is a long series of differences between the risks of the first and second modernities. To start with, first modern dangers are clearly perceptible through the senses. A mining accident is an event perceivable by everyone. It is characteristic of first modern dangers that they can be captured in images, like the image of puffing smokestacks, which were once the symbol of boom times, and which even today are still spreading a haze along the banks of the Ruhr. In the second modernity, society becomes ever more technologically advanced, which seems at first to promise ever more perfect technical solutions. However, this higher technology generates subtler side effects that more often than not escape the immediate perception

of those affected. To add to the difficulties of perception, the people most affected are often not the workers, who have some proximity to the process and thus some access to the signs of something going wrong, but people : much farther afield, like consumers, or sometimes even people ; who have no connection to the products at all, who neither make nor use them or even live nearby.

Impactterror/prolif
Sovereign political structure fails to resolve transnational threats including chemical, biological, and atomic weapons. Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision, 126)

The fight against state-supported terrorism, together with the dangers of chemical, biological and atomic weapons, can follow one of two interdependent courses, the war option and the contractual option, that is, the containment and legal restriction of explosive conflicts that endanger international stability, and hence also the security of affluent Western states. The seemingly incompatible positions of America and Europe, viewed more closely, are actually complementary in that they reflect
critically on each other. Specifically, the European option 'Make law, not war' can be inverted into a social-romantic self-delusion if the military and security components are ignored. Precisely these deficiencies were revealed by the war in the Balkans, which showed that Europeans are helpless even in the face of violent conflicts in their own back yard. Overcoming its history of bloody wars can easily mislead Europe into the fallacious conclusion that only a pacifist political economy can lead to reconciliation and peace. Thus military conflicts unhinge the European Union, which was founded as an economic, not a military, power. There is a straightforward reason for this nonexistence of Europe: there is no European offensive military force, at least not for the moment, though perhaps one will soon emerge. But

even with such a military component the European Union will never be able to protect itself, let alone others, against the danger posed by terrorists bent on mass slaughter. Europeans like to cherish illusions concerning the fact that, without the military hegemony of the USA, they would have a rude awakening from the social romanticism of their politics of reconciliation. The superior power of the USA also has a cause internal to Europe, namely, its collective renunciation of the means of violence. Only when this deficiency is recognized and rectified will a European Union foreign policy worthy of the name become possible. It will require an answer to the critical question of the authority of common institutions. A European foreign policy will become
possible only when the individual state capitals recognize that transferring competencies to Brussels does not weaken but rather strengthens them, because it increases the global influence of EU states. That global dangers can found transnational commonalities provides a necessary impetus in this direction. Environmental and peace activists draw their strength from this fact in particular, and are now finding to their annoyance that the claim to solve global problems is being colonized by the US military. The Pentagon has discovered the legitimating power of global problems and is attempting to exploit it. An autonomous source of global politicallegitimation has

arisen with, and in, world risk society. Global actors - states as well as advocacy movements, and also corporations - can draw on it to avert, and even counteract, self-generated threats to humanity. With the insane images emanating from New York on September 11, 2001, the most powerful military and economic nation in the world saw itself abruptly empowered by the majority of humanity, as though by acclamation, to avert such dangers. The USA, the global military power, discovers in the terrorist risk the source of a global security populism.

ImpactLaundry List
Human rights, poverty, war, and environmental degradation are all global problems born of coerciononly the plans cooperation can solve Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Chapter 1 p. 2 SG)
The violation of human

rights, conditions of extreme poverty, periodic recourse to war, and environmental degradation are but a few of the many problems facing humankind today. These ancient problems have taken on a different dimension today, as they are increasingly diffi cult to confi ne to, and sometimes even to situate in, a circumscribed geographic area. The capacity for a territorial government to ensure security and promote pros- perity is therefore substantially limited. Can a single world power contrib- ute to fi nding a solution for this? There are many reasons to doubt that it can. Concentration of coercive power is always dangerous, and not even the most sophisticated checks and balances can rule out the danger that this power may be transformed into some new form of planetary despo- tism. This was the concern of Ladd, and of Immanuel Kant before him. Restoring the power into the hands of public opinion does not arouse the same concern .
Indeed, public opinion does not possess any armies, police forces, secret ser vices, prisons, mental hospitals, or other repres- sive institutions. Public opinion can only disapprove and express indig- nation. The public can also express its own opinion through collective action and, in the demo cratic countries, vote a government that has proved in effec tive out of offi ce. But at the world level, public opinion has no voting rights. It has been split into an infi nite number of rivulets. Over vast regions of the world, its power to express itself has been lim- ited by dictatorships. Even in the internet age, only a small proportion of the population is duly informed about or even interested in world poli- tics. Its power is, at best, symbolic, and its disapproval is often in effec- tive and uncertain. To appeal to public opinion and even raise it to the status of queen of the world is therefore a hyperbole. Yet giving public

opinion a greater role to play seems to be the only hope we have of tack- ling the many alarming problems that exist in the modern world. 2 The present book explores the chances of increasing the legitimacy of world politics by introducing the germs of
democracy and subjecting world politics to the citizens scrutiny. Under what conditions could public opinion become the queen of the world? To what extent can the general public control the actions undertaken by the various subjects, whether national governments, international organizations, or multina- tional corporations? What institutional instruments are available to confer an effective po liti cal role on the inhabitants of the planet? These are the issues to which cosmopolitan democracyan intellectual proj- ect formulated by a group of scholars at the end of the Cold War2must endeavor to fi nd a response. Cosmopolitan democracy is indeed one of the many offspring generated by the great expectations that blossomed after the fall of the Berlin wall. After the collapse of the Soviet empire and the decisive affi rmation of the western democracies, it was hoped that there would be some positive repercussions on the global system. It was thus deemed possible to reform the international organizations, to plan the geographic expansion of democracy, and fi nally to make hu- man rights more certain and to allow world citizens to express them- selves through ad hoc institutions. One goal has been achieved: it is no longer sacrilegious to consider that democracy can be applied even out- side the state. However, many, too many, of these hopes have so far been dashed. Why? And above all, what hopes remain today that democracy can make its appearance also in world politics?

You have a duty to embrace our attempt to reshape global institutionsthis is not just a negative dutywe must actively work for reform

Impact--Morality

Pogge 92-- the Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University (Thomas W., October, Ethics by the University of Chicago Press, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, JSTOR) The move from an interactional to an institutional approach thus blocks one way in which the rich and mighty in today's developed countries like to see themselves as morally disconnected from the fate of the less fortunate denizens of the Third World. It overcomes the claim that one need only refrain from violating human rights directly, that one cannot reasonably be required to become a soldier in the global struggle against human rights violators and a comforter of their victims worldwide. This claim is not refuted but shown to be irrelevant. We are asked to be concerned about human rights violations not simply insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are produced by social institutions in which we are significant participants. Our negative duty not to cooperate in the imposition of unjust practices, together with our continuing participation in an unjust institutional scheme, triggers obligations to promote feasible reforms of this scheme that would enhance the fulfillment of human rights. One may think that a shared responsibility for the justice of
the social institutions in which we participate cannot plausibly extend beyond our national institutional scheme, in which we participate as citizens, and which we can most immediately affect. But such a limitation is untenable because it treats as natural or God-given the existing global institutional framework, which is in fact imposed by human beings who are collectively quite capable of changing it. Therefore at least we-privileged

citizens of powerful and approximately democratic countries-share a collective responsibility for the justice of the existing global order and hence also for any contribution it may make to the incidence of human rights violations.'0 The practical importance of this conclusion evidently hinges on the extent to which our global institutional scheme is causally responsible for current deprivations. Consider this challenge: "Human rights violations and their distribution have local explanations. In some countries torture is rampant, while it is virtually nonexistent in others. Some regions are
embroiled in frequent wars, while others are not. In some countries democratic institutions thrive, while others bring forth a succession of autocrats. And again, some poor countries have developed rapidly, while others are getting poorer year by year. Therefore our global institutional scheme has very little to do with the deplorable state of human rights fulfillment on earth. This challenge appeals to true premises but draws an invalid inference. Our global

institutional scheme can obviously not figure in the explanation of local human rights violations, but only in the macroexplanation of their global incidence. This parallels how Japanese culture may figure in the explanation of the Japanese suicide
rate or how the laxity of U.S. handgun legislation may figure in the explanation of the North American homicide rate, without thereby explaining particular suicides/homicides or even intercity differentials in rates. In these parallel cases the need for a macroexplanation is obvious from the fact that there are other societies whose suicide/homicide rates are significantly lower. In the case of global institutions, the need for a macroexplanation of the overall incidence of human rights vi- olations is less obvious because-apart from some rather inconclusive historical comparisons- the contrast to observable alternative global institutional schemes is lacking. Still, it is highly likely that there are feasible (i.e., practicable and accessible) alternative global regimes that would tend to engender lower rates of deprivation. This is clear, for example, in regard to economic institutions, where the centrifugal tendencies of certain free-market schemes are well understood from our experience with various national and regional schemes. This supports a

generalization to the global plane, to the conjecture that the current constitution of the world market must figure prominently in the explanation of the fact that our world is one of vast and increasing international inequalities in income and wealth (with consequent huge differentials in national rates of infant mortality, life expectancy, disease, and malnutrition). Such a macroexplanation does not preempt microexplanations of why one poor country is developing rapidly and
why another is not. It would explain why so few are while so many are not.

Individual state political and legal systems are intrinsically incapable of dealing with disease because of flawed risk analysisEuropean mad Cow proves Beck, 03 Professor for Sociology at the University
of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Beck, Conversations With Ulrich Beck, pg ?)
Another result of the divorce of risks from place is that it gives them a banal cosmopolitanism similar to the banal cosmopolitanism of cuisine we discussed earlier. (See pp. 36ff.) And once again, at fi~t sight it may seem like it's giving rise to banal nationalism instead. For example, I only have to say two

ImpactDisease

words, "British beef," to immediately conjure the spectre of mad cow disease in every listener's mind. But even more so than with food, closer examination will show that banal nationalism will turn out to be the exception and banal cosmopolitanism the rule. It is in fact exceedingly rare that people are able to successfully hoist the national flag against the cosmopolitanization of risks, and mad cow disease is precisely the exception that proves the rule. The fact, as you just pointed out, that these risks have
now penetrated into the innermost sanctum of our private lives makes this kind of banal cosmopolitanism even more pervasive and volatile. Unlike with food, this is not just about tastes. It's about our will to survive. ,--It is important to emphasize that risk is not a thing. It's a social construct, a social definition. It is something that must be believed in to have real effects. First modern risks, risks defined as probabilities rather than as uncertainties, presuppose '- several key rationality claims before they can be successfully constructed. It's because those preconditions are lacking that second modern risks almost always give rise to risk conflicts. A typical second modern risk conflict starts existence as a media tale that

gravely unsettles consumers, and usually parents of small children in particular. This is the first stage of the development of risk consciousness. In the second stage it enormously increases its political force through the efforts that are necessary to overcome official resistance. This stage of initial official resistance seems like a constant. The first thing incipient risk consciousness always seems to run into is an institutionalized rationality that systematically blocks off any acknowledgment of the risk in question. It is institutionally incapable of comprehending that a risk can be based on uncertainty rather than probability. Instead the forces of order always seem to translate "uncertainty" as "minuscule probability." This misunderstanding is inscribed in all first modern social institutions. The legal principle we described in our French example is true for all law, including administrative and scientific law. It is a general, institutional principle: in any case where a clear chain of causality cannot be demonstrated, there is therefore no risk. When the affected and
worried people take their case to the scientists, they find themselves talking to a group whose most identity-defining belief is that the canons of causal evidence and inference must always be strictly adhered to. When these criteria can't be satisfied, scientists can be depended upon to explain away any new risk as a mere fantasy without giving it any further consideration. So in both directions, the affected run into the solidly institutionalized

walls of risk denial. We might even expand on our paradoxical formulation. The more the rules of law and the rules of science (working in
conjunction) find no valid evidence that a risk has been produced for, which someone can be held individually accountable the more risks it is possible for society to produce, and the more the total potential threat increases. But however much it is denied, this potential threat continues

to be perceived by those affected. It becomes a social fact which has consequences. The next step is usually that the affected or concerned population organizes itself into a social movement which, after gathering together alternative cognitive instruments that are more or less credible (other statistics, other experts), throws itself against these walls of institutionalized denial. This is how risk conflicts arise. On the one hand, such movements continually renew the credibility claims of the dominant institutions by demanding and requiring their seal of approval. On the other hand, they are continually calling those credibility claims into question. In the end it's never just about a factory that stands there dumb. It's about a legal system, and a political system, and a system of science which, by holding firm in their old rationality, seem, when seen from the outside, to be equal participants in a conspiracy to systematically deny the risks the total system has produced

ImpactGlobal threats
Modern risks spread globally infecting every aspect of the structure it seeks to collapse. State political structures inevitably fail, only a universal system can solve. BSE crisis is evidence. Beck, 03 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Beck, Conversations With Ulrich Beck, pg ?)

Yes, and this brings us back to the inescapability of the transnational dynamic, and how all attempts to evade it simply make matters worse. Let's reconstruct how it all began. I was actually in Great Britain the very moment it started. I was able to experience it at first hand, as it were. It began with a press conference by a government spokesman who in retrospect had clearly been given too much leeway. He said on behalf of the government that we could not rule out that there was a connection between mad Glow disease and the brain disease that had recently appeare'tl in humans. I repeat: he didn't say there was a connection. He just said it couldn't be completely ruled out. That was enough to set off the avalanche. The next day, when the same spokesman appeared, he was clearly on a much shorter leash, and the government forced him to make a retraction. But it no longer made any difference. The avalanche had already been let loose. In the very beginning, the British looked for the cause locally. They even enacted various local bans. Gradually it became more and more clear that the causal links couldn't really be Corroborated. They found themselves dealing with what I call known or regressive uncertainty, where the more facts we know, the more the uncertainty grows. In such situations, real knowledge consists of the realization that the uncertainty can't be removed and has to be dealt with accordingly. This is usually true of risk conflicts. Only in rare cases can unambiguous causal relationships be established, and even then they require more time for research than events will allow. What you get instead at the height of a risk conflict is competing theories (many of which previously existed and warned of the danger but were ignored). Then a struggle ensues over defining the risk, for example, what the chain of causality is, what the affected population is, etc. This is usually an important turning point, because the details of this definitional struggle always have economic and political consequences. And those consequences are themselves unpredictable and full of systemic risk. So, for example, at first sight it seemed that deciding on a certain causal chain would make the entire British beef industry collapse, and this would mean an enormous windfall for the French and German beef industries. But that expectation and the strategy based on it couldn't have been more misguided. Instead what happened is that consumers in France and Germany immediately renounced almost all meat consumption regardless of origin. . This was an excellent example of the paradoxical honeyscraping effect, where the more you try to get the risk off of you, the more you get all over you. People tried to use the definition of risk to push through protectionist interests. It seemed obvious that if you could brand your national competitor's products as being full of risks, it would open up new markets for your own. But instead the opposite happened. These efforts fueled the collapse of their own market. The struggle over risk definition produces a heightening of risk consciousness. It reinforces the feeling that no authorities, least of all producers who have a direct interest, can be trusted to tell you what's going on. The result here was a market industries of countries who had no direct connection with the production of this particular risk found themselves sharing in the enormous costs. If, during the height of the BSE crisis, you were wandering through upper Bavaria, and you sat down at an inn and opened up the menu, in all likelihood the first thing you'd see would be a smiling picture of the farmer who owned the place, standing with his whole family and his few remaining loyal cows, and just below a note that said that the beef that you were about to eat came entirely from this locality and had no connection at all with that diabolical British feed chain. This is a perfectly banal example of a person desperately trying to ward off a risk to his livelihood. But what it really evidenced was how unbelievably far these risks had spread, and how deeply they had endangered him even in his mountain fastness. Men like him were trying to combat the banal cosmopolitanism of risks by hoisting the flag of Bavarian localism; they were trying to rebuild trust by relocalizing their products. But in the face of the really existing global circuit of the meat and chemical industries, it was like throwing a straw into the whirlpool of placelessness. It wouldn't save him from drowning. . This brings us back once again to the most peculiar and, to the cynical eye of the sociologist, fascinating quality of risk conflicts: their dynamiC of entanglement. The risks of the second modernity have a peculiar tenacity. They seem to move in and make a nest for themselves not only despite but because of our attempts to deny them. This isn't only true of health risks. It also holds when they transform themselves into economic risks, like the collapse of markets and the devalorization of capital, or into political risks, like crises of confidence, the loss of authority, and the erosion of political parties. Second modern risks are, in a word, systemic risks, and they can spread from one system to the next. They are global risks.

Impactterrorism/genocide
Only a cosmopolitan form of security can solve terrorism and genocide--

Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision, pg 139)

All of this applies only with qualifications to transnational terrorism of the al-Qaeda variety. The active units and their 'handlers' are motivated neither by territory nor by the state, and they are not fighting for their own state. This is what makes them so inscrutable. What has shocked humanity since September 11, 2001, is a diffuse political terrorism directed against the foundations of modern society and the modern state, symbolized by the USA and the cathedral of the global economy, the World Trade Center. This form of terrorism - in contrast to the market for violence that arises in a failed state - can no longer be eradicated by constructing a state. Rather, the guiding idea of the state as the guarantor of security is being effectively put in question. The terrorist attacks derive their significance from their specific characteristics, on the one hand, and from the characteristics of hegemonic state power against which they are directed, on the other. The American President George W. Bush was literally rendered speechless by the horrific images in the mass media of the two civilian aircraft which, transformed into human missiles, caused the twin towers of the World Trade Center to go up in flames. Was it a crime? A second Pearl Harbor? Who was the relevant authority, the police, the US military, NATO? Unlike Pearl Harbor, no military base had been attacked. And it was not an attack by one state on another. Those who carried it out did not wear uniforms, the identity of the instigators is unclear, they have no address. Only when the word 'war' fell from the lips of the President - 'A war has been declared on America' - did the terrorist attack become political terrorism and then global terrorism, even though America continues to pursue this 'enemy' not as an enemy (in the sense of the laws of war) but as a criminal against humanity, devoid of rights. It may be that at first the talk of 'war' against terror was still meant in a metaphorical sense (like the 'war against poverty' or against 'drugs'). Yet the more the 'war' against terror narrowed into a military war, a war between . states, the more the inscrutable terror was elevated in world politics to the ,"" Status of global terrorism. Nevertheless, the means of control deployed by the global hegemon, in spite of its unique military superiority, are failing in the face of this terrorist threat. The power of the state rests both internally and externally on the logic of deterrence, which ultimately plays on the threat and the fear of death. But these kinds of terrorists cannot be deterred: how can you threaten suicide bombers with death? The deployment of the instruments of power at the disposal of states presupposes either control over or conquest of a territory. These terrorists, however, do not control a territory, and unlike the state they are not tied to a particular territory - they are stateless, present everywhere and nowhere - a bad starting point for military deterrence and intervention. One answer to the
problem of postnational wars is to treat them like classical wars between states and assume that the warring parties, though not states, represent quasi-states. This makes it possible, first, to take advantage of one's military superiority and, second, to bring about a negotiated settlement 'from above'. Examples of this approach are the Dayton Accord (through which Bosnia-Herzegovina was 'pacified') and the Oslo Agreement (which was supposed to bring about peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians). The alternative is to ignore ethnic

slaughter within 'sovereign states', to turn a blind eye, erect walls and take refuge in the protectionist fictions of a national global order. To be a mere spectator, however, is scarcely possible because streams of refugees, transnational criminality, diaspora groups in one's own country and, not least, transnational terrorism did away with these fantasy borders long ago.

***2AC ANSWERSGENERIC

A2: Privatization CP
The free market is motivated by a desire for private property and gain at the expense of othersit is antithetical with cosmopolitan principles. Neil, 2006 [a Policy Advisor, Intergovernmental and International Affairs Division, Environment Canada, Pacific and Yukon
Region (Ross M., 2006, Global Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century, Space technologies for Global Environmental Governance, University of Michigan Library, pgs 42-44 KONTOPOULOS)] In spite of the efforts that GMES, EOS and GEOSS may symbolize as a transition in thinking towards the communalization of Earth monitoring for environmental governance, free enterprise has also launched itself as an important new player

into pace commons. As a result of predictions that a private-sector EO industry would grow in a similar fashion to the telecommunications sector that spawned the Information Age, post-cold war military liberalisation and budget re-allocations ~ with policy adjustments such as the U.S. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 all provided the impetus for many purely commercial ventures in satellite EO to emerge over the past decade. Commercial gain within the global market system, quite apart from international cooperation and commons-based governance, work on the basis of competition and private property, a concept closely related to the traditional concept of sovereignty.
Far from the earlier concerns by developing countries (and countries with developing space economies) over the sovereignty-aspects of Earth monitoring from space, concerns now revolve around rights to privacy, government shutter control

policies and export control issues, all very important to the health and viability of the commercial remote-sensing industry. Presently, over ten countries including the U.S., Canada, Russia, Japan, China, EC (through ESA),
France, UK, India, Israel and Brazil all operate high-resolution satellite imaging platforms. Other states such as Turkey and Pakistan have expressed strong interest in purchasing data or developing indigenous remote-sensing satellites. Many other countries have chosen to purchase foreign satellite and ground station systems to gain a capability in space, including such countries as Algeria and Nigeria that have purchased satellite monitoring equipment to contribute to a disaster monitoring network for Africa. According to the UN registry of objects in space over 20 individual states now possess a capacity for remote sensing, each indicating the rapidly depreciating cost to countries (and private actors) wishing to gain a presence in space and an Earth monitoring capability.

Global competition in the EO market has been at the heart of U.S. policy efforts since the early 1990's to maintain its predominance in remote-sensing. High resolution satellite imagery -previously only captured by military platforms -has now become a market heavily pursued by the private sector. But high resolution optical imagery (visible spectrum plus near infra-red), while useful for urban planning,
insurance assessments, and the development of precision navigation maps is not always available or appropriate for environment and development planners who rely on recent and easily updateable imagery as well as wider spectral data that goes beyond the visible spectrum. With proven utility for military planners, however, military agencies are increasingly incorporating

commercial sources of satellite imagery into mission planning and execution. The U.S. Department of Defence gained substantial experience with the use of Landsat's multi-spectral imagery during the 1991 Gulf War and began to find the information useful for creating wide area maps for operational support.43 Landsat data
proved at times more versatile than military or intelligence imagery that provided high resolution in the optical range, but had very narrow fields of view. Landsat data could be combined with other available satellite images such as SPOT for lower cost, and could be unclassified for wider dissemination. More recently, U.S. defence and intelligence agencies have even grown a

dependence on commercial satellites to fulfill both their communication and imaging requirements and through subsidies provided to the Private EO industry in the U.S. and Canada, the military is becoming a growingly influential player in the private-sector EO business.44 Instead of the public or scientific use of EO satellites for long-term environmental and development planning being co-opted by the military, defence and intelligence agencies have had an influence on commercial remote sensing markets and in some cases have obtained exclusive contractual arrangements with private EO satellite operators, shutting out public access to certain spatial and temporal zones. Shutter control policies symbolize the military's historical preoccupation with surveillance and information denial to adversaries but the more recent economic importance of lace technology sector has also prompted competition with resulting duplication and incompatibility issues limiting the effectiveness of long-term global monitoring efforts. Even when such
technologies are developed by civilian agencies and shared through international organizations such as GEOSS, "control over resources of others in the name of planetary health [and] sustainability ... is never too far from the surface of many Western proposals for global environmental management."45 whereas overt military use of space to assure state

hegemony is seen as outwardly aggressive, commercial investment and societal reliance on space

technologies des impetus for space control strategies on the grounds that economic interests must be protected. In one recent articulation of the security implications of commercial space technologies, Gen. Thomas Moorman Jr. urged the U.S. to pursue new military space initiatives, stating that "as more commerce is placed in and as we depend more on space, [the Department of Defence] will need a comprehensive program to protect our assets."46 Suggestions that international consortia of private-sector commercial space activities might be beyond the control of states -slowly
and subtly eroding the notion of state-sovereignty by their ability to capture and transmit global information and geospatial data to anyone, anywhere ignore the fact that certain state interests are still being served through private

sector initiatives. As Everett Dolman (2002) has also suggested, "in formulations of state strategy, it would be disingenuous
and even reckless to try to deny the med pre-eminence of the terrestrial state and the place of military action in the short history and near future of space operations." Dolman, who bridged the field of classical geopolitical theory to the domain of space with Astropolitik, further s that even when states publicly denounce the use of violence and force in space operations, "all space-faring states today have military missions, goals, and contingency space-operations plans" that pervade the ideal of true cooperation and politcal unity in spaceY

A2: Treaty CPs

IGOs alone act in the interest of the nation-states and not the actual citizens our methodological change of giving up on nationalism must happen before treaties can be effective Archibugi 08 a Research Director at the Italian National Research Council (CNR) in Rome (Daniele, 2008, The Global
Commonwealth of Citizens, Introsuction: A Queen for the World?, University of Michigan Library, pgs 5-7 KONTOPOULOS) How must the political community be constructed at the time it is called upon to deliberate and make decisions? Who must be included in this community and who not included? This is one of the principal problems regarding democratic theory and practice, to

most significant evolution occurring in democratic practice over the past twenty-five centuries has been the gradual expansion of holders of political participation rights. Today the political equality of all adults is widely acknowledged inside democratic states, although the principle is lost in each issue that crosses the border. The institutional communities continue to be established in a rigid fashion, corresponding to the present-day territorial states. They call upon their own members to discuss and decide on the problems on the agenda but ignore those problems that lie outside it. Whenever a decision-making process has external fallout, the principle of political equality according to which everyone involved must participate in the political debate is violated. This originates out of the nature of citizenship, which allows the individual to participate in the political process in state A or state B but not in both states, regardless 'of what the individual's exact involvement actually is.
which no satisfactory response has so far been given. The Let us take the striking case of the atomic tests carried out by France in 1995-1996 at Mururoa atoll. The French government decided to carry out the tests in accordance with wholly democratic principles. 8 Obviously, however, the entire community of stakeholders was not involved: the Pacific Ocean populations were exposed to nuclear radiation, while the French people (allegedly) obtained the benefits in the form of national security and/or nuclear power. Although there were some protests also in France, French public opinion would certainly have had a different reaction if the same tests had been carried out in the Paris region rather than thousands

Intergovernmental organizations are one of the institutional modes in which the states attempt to set up political colleges to deal with existing problems. The IGOs apply several of the principles of democracy that are known in the states, and are widely used to resolve any contradictions encountered. But, as IGOs are composed of representatives of the governments rather than of the direct stakeholders, IGOs are inclined to favor choices that facilitate the interests of governments rather than those of the individual stakeholders. In the case in which these IGOs are composed exclusively of countries with elected governments, the decision-making process regarding these issues does not follow the democratic principle according to which all those involved should have a say in the matter, if for no other reason than because the principle of equality applies to the states but not to individuals (this topic will be taken up again in chapters 4 and 5).
of miles away.

A2: Kritiks--State action key

The state is an important agent for changedomestic politics create a model for positive changethe plan is a prerequisite to the alternative Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Chapter 4 p.
SG) Although the 90-92

demo cratic ideal has won converts among yesterdays ad- versaries, it is far from being established all over the world. The new democracies are in constant peril and are forced daily to overcome ob- stacles threatening their regime. Not even the more advanced demo cratic systems actually fully satisfy their own citizens demands. Here the problem is not the expansion of state democracy, on which an abundant literature is available,14 but rather the extension of democracy to the transnational sphere. I view the state as both a laboratory and an agent of cosmopolitan democracy . It is a laboratory in the sense that
nowa- days one of the problems on the nation- states agenda is to acknowledge the rights of individuals who are not normally considered citizensfor instance, refugees and immigrants. A great deal still remains to be done to ensure that these individuals have the same rights that native- born citizens have.15 Demo cratic practice has to come to terms with the prob- lem of who its citizens actually are. Are its citizens those who are born in a given community? Those living and paying taxes in the country? Those who would simply like to live there? Even inside a given community, distinctions are beginning to be made among the rights of the various citizens and groups. One of the most signifi cant developments in the modern theory of citizenship is the ac- know ledg ment of the rights of communities that uphold different reli- gious, cultural, and ethnic values. A demo cratic state is based

not only on equality but also on the ac cep tance and indeed on the appreciation of these differences.16 The principle of po liti cal equality is gradually begin- ning to be interpreted fl exibly and creatively. However,
acknowledging the differences among members of the same po liti cal community makes its limits much harder to determine. Indeed, one sometimes wonders about the logic behind the current dividing lines that sometimes group together individuals with few or no cultural, ethnic, and religious affi nities into the same state while on other occasions separate individuals with strong affi nities across different states. The need for a cosmopoli-

tan approach based on the principle of inclusion no longer arises only at the frontier but also in the schools and neighborhoods that already ac- commodate the whole wide range of ethnic groups. In addition to having an
internal dimension, a state is characterized by being a member of the international community. What distinguishes a good member from a bad one? John Rawls pondered what the foreign policy of a liberal state should be and noted several precepts that should unilaterally be followed by such a state.17 We shall take his prescriptions as suggestions for guidelines for a demo cratic foreign policy. Rawls nev- ertheless left agreements between states in a residual role; this would allow the statesas in the preUnited Nations conception of interna- tional lawto autonomously determine their own external behavior. In the cosmopolitan democracy project, a liberal state must distinguish it- self not only for the

substance of its foreign policy but also because it follows a shared procedure. A

nation- state wanting to be considered a worthy citizen of the international community should not only pursue a virtuous foreign policy (as suggested by Rawls) but also have the will to participate in the life of international institutions, to accept their proce- dures, and to respect their rules.18

A2: Capitalism
Our conception of sovereignty prioritizes individual human rights over economic concernsthis resolves the war and oppression impact of capitalism Archibugi 4 (Daniele Archibugi, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy,
Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review p. 455-457 SG)

It is often said that the hegemonic power of the US and its closest allies is a consequence of the present international economic system (Gower, 2001). Since cosmopolitan democracy focuses on the institutional aspects of the international order, on the superstructure, and does not give pride of place to economic dynamics, it is criticized for discounting the crucial centres of power. From a Marxist perspective, international democracy taken solely as an

institutional project would be impossible (Gorg and Hirsch, 1998), as the transformation of global politics can only be brought about by a new economic regime. But it is not easy to establish well-dened links of cause and effect between politics and economics. Many economic interests are indeed more than satised with the present mechanisms of control and have no interest in increasing democratic management over the ows of capital or international trade. However, there are many other interests, maybe more widespread, that are pushing for

greater accountability. The nancial speculation that is of advantage to some groups is an obstacle to others, and many economic powers are now looking forward to altering the current structure of international nance. Some of the most interesting proposals on how to limit the damage caused by nancial globalization come from George Soros (2002) himself; if we do not want to

write this off as a case of schizophrenia, we must infer that there is no such thing as univocal interests. Other Marxists argue that the project of cosmopolitan democracy suffers from an improper use of the term cosmopolitanism. Brennan (2001: 76) maintains that to talk about internationalism would be much more suited. Of course, what really matter are concepts, not words. Nevertheless, I maintain that it is more precise to qualify this project as cosmopolitan democracy rather than as international democracy. The term inter- national, coined by the Abbot of Saint-Pierre and Jeremy Bentham, recalls a type of organization that is characterized by two levels of representation rst, the existence of governments within states, and second the creation of an international community based on governments (Anderson, 2002). Adopting the notion of cosmopolitanism instead allows

for the introduc- tion of a third level of governance, one that requires a more active participation of individuals in global political matters (Carter, 2001; Dower and Williams, 2002; Heater, 2002). Citizens should therefore play a twofold role that of
citizens of the state, and that of citizens of the world. Nevertheless, Gilbert (1999) and Brennan (2001) evoke the internation- alism of other glorious

traditions traditions that share the spirit of cosmopolitan democracy: the international workers associations and the peace congresses of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The famous slogan Proletarians of the world, unite! heralded the essence of this spirit. Within this perspective, internationalism is no longer used to refer to representa- tives of the state. Internationalism refers rather to the political players within the state who

are in conict with their governments because the latter are believed to be the expression of the antagonist class, the bourgeoisie. The Marxist view maintains that the strength of common interest uniting proletarians in different states is such that conicts between proletariat states would be solved much more effectively than conicts between bourgeois states. This Marxist denition of internationalism was built upon the belief that the defeat of the ruling class by the proletariat would result in the cessation of all conicts between organized groups, since proletarian communities would never nurse the desire to subjugate any other (workers) community. Consequently, there would be no need to organize an international political system that could mediate conicts, as there wouldnt be any. Sovereignty would simply dissolve together with its holder, the bourgeois state. Marxist analysis maintains the existence of a permanent conict of interests between rival social classes; interests that now more than in the past are in conict not only withinstates, but also betweenstates. The creation of a global citizenship will not put an end to these conicts of interest, but that is not the ambition inspiring it. Its goal is simply to nd institutional lociwhere these conicts of interest could possibly be addressed and managed. If the prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone
were somehow linked to the diamond trade, and the traders from Anvers, Moscow or New York were thought to play an effective role in promoting the instigation of the hostilities, what kind of institutional channels might prove effective in resolving the issue? Policies that are decided within international institutions such as the certication of the diamonds origin offer the possibility of mitigating the conict. In other words, global institutions

should offer effective channels for mending conicts. What needs to be revised is the political programme not the spirit of proletarian internationalism. Cosmopolitan democracy suggests the creation of institutions and representative channels not limited to a specic social class, but open to all individuals. Its aim is not to overcome social classes, but an objective more modest but equally ambitious offering channels of direct representation to all people at the global level, regardless of their social status. This implies basing decision-making on global issues on the preferences of a majority, rather than on those of a single class. In this vein, Ulrich Beck (1999: 18) invoked, Citizens of the world, unite! Trans-national campaigns have already succeeded in inuencing the choices of political decision-makers take the decision of the UK
government to follow environmentally friendly procedures for the disposal of the Brent Spar (Prins and Sellwood, 1998); the institution of the International Criminal Court (Glasius, 2002); the decision of some multi- nationals to recede from their prot-making interests and allow for the free diffusion of the AIDS drug (Seckinelgin, 2002), or even military inter- ventions to protect human rights (Kaldor, 2001). An international public sphere (Koehler, 1998; Cochran, 2002) is moving towards public action, and some partial but nevertheless signicant results have been achieved (Pianta, 2003).

***2AC ANSWERSREALISM/HEG

The fear of conflict is an unfounded attempt to maintain nationalistic control their impact is inconsistent with our aff Archibugi 08 a Research Director at the Italian National Research Council (CNR) in Rome (Daniele, 2008, The Global
Commonwealth of Citizens, International Conflicts and Democracy, University of Michigan Library, pgs 59-60 KONTOPOULOS)

K of War Impacts

The interstate system exerts a direct and decisive influence on the way power is exercised inside the states. The possibility of a state becoming a democracy or boosting its current democratic status is directly linked to the existing international climate: The absence of a peaceful international climate blocks dissent, mortifies the opposition, and restricts freedom inside the states. Citizens' rights are curtailed and, in order to satisfy the need for security, civil and political liberties are often impaired. In wartime, people are prepared to place their freedom in the hands of the war leaders who promise victory. The threat of war, even more than war itself, bolsters the existing regime and anyone daring to criticize his or her own state is immediately viewed as antipatriotic and banned from social life. The elites in power thus have a covert interest in promoting international conflicts in order to consolidate their own internal power.
This is certainly no novelty. Already in the sixteenth century, Erasmus observed: "I am loth to suspect here what only too often, alas!, has turned out to hold true: that the rumor of war with the Turks had been trumped up with the aim of

mulcting the Christian population, so that being burned and crushed in all possible ways might have been all the more servile towards the tyranny of all kind of princes."9 In the eighteenth century, JeanJacques Rousseau pointed to the internal/external link: "war and conquest without and the encroachment of despotism within give each other mutual support .... Aggressive princes wage war at least as much on their subjects as on their enemies, and the conquering nation is left no better off than the conquered." 10 These observations took on fresh significance during the Cold War: in the eastern bloc the external threat was
used to prevent democracy, and in the West to restrict its potential.

The case of the Cold War is illuminating precisely because of its unreal and "imaginary" nature. A potential war, a looming threat that for decades is expressed only obliquely, can be much more effective than war itself in restricting internal participation. The instant the war becomes real, the consequences
are unpredictable. The need to mobilize the population can lead to upheavals in the social structure. A defeat and even a victory can be accompanied by radical changes in the political system of the belligerent countries, perhaps even leading to the constitutional norms being rewritten and the former leadership being completely removed and replaced. Paradoxically, the looming external

threat (the cold war) may be more effective than an actual conflict (the hot war) in enfeebling internal opposition and in consolidating the support of the public for the incumbent government; when a war ends, there are probably a winner and a loser, and accounts have to be settled inside each country. Many countries have actually embraced democracy after experiencing the horrors of a war imposed by an autocratic system. the latent conflict may be prolonged, even indefinitely, and may represent an effective way of keeping an authoritarian regime in place. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell had already warned of such dangers: "War is now a purely internal affair. In the past, the ruling groups of all countries, although they might recognize their common interest and therefore limit the destructiveness of war, did fight against one another, and the victor always plundered the vanquished. In our own day they are not fighting against one another at all. The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society intact."12 The end of the Cold War has not meant the elimination of extremist parties, even in democratic states, and those extremist parties maintain their power by pouring oil on the flames of international conflict.
However,

A2: Thayer
Their claim that democratic hegemony solves war relies on obscuring the violence that western hegemons do to all outsidersthis democratic schizophrenia guarantees inevitable failure and violenceonly a radical reform solves

Archibugi, 2008 [a Research Director at the Italian National Research Council (CNR) in Rome (Daniele, 2008, The Global
Commonwealth of Citizens, Introduction: A Queen for the World?, University of Michigan Library, pgs 5-7 KONTOPOULOS)]

Today it must be acknowledged that the situation has changed. The rigidity of the frontiers of the political communities, an element that historically enabled self-government to be born and prosper, now stands in the way of democracys evolving and even surviving. As soon as each political community receives and transmits the echo of its actions from and to the exterior, the state-based democratic procedure is eroded. In order to survive, democracy must undergo a radical transformation comparable to that experienced in the transition from direct to representative democracy. Democracy must be able to create new forms of management of public matters that are also open toward the exterior and to include in the decision-making process those who are affected by certain decisions. Many attempts have already been made to increase participation and inclusion. International organizations, for example, have increased in number and functions, and almost every country in the world is now a member of the UN. In the so-called Old Continent, a mighty effort is being made to create common institutions, and the Euro pe an Union
has been extended southward, northward, and eastward. Half a century ago, the EU was concerned solely with coal and steel, while today it is competent in all aspects of public policy. Other regional organizations are developing on the other continents. World

political life is beginning to assign jurisdiction and legitimacy to subjects other than state representatives, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, cultural associations, and transnational pressure groups. This process of institutional integration is still only partial and unsatisfactory, however, compared with the intensity and rapidity of the changes occurring in the global process. Who is willing to undertake the necessary institutional reforms? The West has preached the lofty principle of the sovereignty of the people, at the same time applying this principle with suspicious parsimony. The West has often declared its intention to promote democracy in other peoples back yard but is by no means willing to share the management of global affairs with others. This is what I call democratic schizophrenia: to engage in a certain behavior on the inside and indulge in the opposite behavior on the outside. It is a contradiction that is difficult to justify, although here the West can appeal to a powerful and sophisticated ideological apparatus, the function of which is to demonize any political system that opposes its own. The ideological apparatus is used to disseminate a Manichean view in which anyone opposing the will of the West is presented as a barbarian and a savage. It is certainly not difficult to demonize what happens in the world: you have only to open a newspaper to read about the atrocities committed for political reasons in places far and near. The ideological apparatus does not merely demonize, however; it must also sanctify, and so it proceeds to obscure the atrocities committed by the democratic countries. War crimes are transformed into collateral damage, aggression is converted into prevention, torture is modified to become coercive interrogation. The point is reached in which the democratic states are deemed to be peaceful by nature, and when they fight it is only because other states are not as democratic. In other words, a consolatory view of democracy arose that demonized its enemies and glorified itself. However, this view is analytically tautological and politically reactionary. It is tautological in that it not only defines democracy as good but also defines what democracies do as good. This prevents any assessment of the relationship between two variables, postulating as an axiom what instead remains to be demonstrated. And it is politically reactionary, as this complacency prevents an analysis of which
problems are still open and the transformations needed to fulfill the commitments inscribed in the constituent pact of the democracies. Consoling oneself about what democracy stands for is an obstacle to the

democracies progress.

A2: Transition Wars

The rigid system of the status quo is doomed to failureinternational integration of decision making--like the planis key to a non-violent transition Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Chapter 1 p. 3-6 SG)
We live in a highly fragmented world that is, however, dominated by a small group of countries that, using a loose but readily understandable term, is defi ned as the West. The West is an entity composed of countries that have a market economy and consolidated demo
cratic institutions. With the sole exception of Japan, the West involves Eu rope and its an- cient settlements. Too often it is forgotten that this part of the world comprises at most one sixth of the world population. Within the West a single country, the United States, has today emerged as

dominant. Never before has such a vast and profound hegemony been witnessed . Suffi ce it

to observe the distribution of

resourcesproduction, consumption, knowledge, military capacityto see how a relatively small part of the world became powerful. This

power is

not only material; its ideology is equally dominating. Cinema and science, literature and technology, mu-

sic and mass communications are all in the hands of the West. The prin- ciples of po liti cal or ga ni za tion that prevail today were also produced by the West: the western visions of freedom and democracy have become increasingly universal values, and there is no reason to regret this.3 The West has no cause to be ashamed of having proposed and developed forms of government that have gradually also spread to other parts of the world. The peoples of the fi ve continents have taken to the streets to de- mand them, often against their own

rulers, because they have fully un- derstood that freedom and democracy not only guarantee greater personal dignity but also allow more material benefi ts to be distributed. The West, for its part, has endeavored to make converts. Yet these efforts have proved incoherent and ambiguous. Freedom and democ- racy have been turned into ideological screens to defend vested interests and attack enemies. The vicissitudes of colonialism and then of imperi- alism show that only too often has the West claimed these values for itself and denied them to others. Can the power that the West wields today be used to involve and include rather than to dominate and sub- jugate? Is it possible to enlarge the number of subjects among whom to distribute the benefi ts? Cosmopolitan democracy has the objective of representing an intellectual contribution to the attainment of these objectives.
Cosmopolitan democracy opposes the idea of constructing a fortress in the western area and excluding all those who do not passively accept the new hegemonies. A strategy of this kind cannot but stir up new en- emies and lead to futile crusades. Such a vision of the cosmopolitan project is also based on the factual observation that it is impossible to draw a dividing line between us and them, between friends and enemies. The planet is made

up of overlapping communities of fate,4

to use the apt phrase coined by David Held, and it is a diffi cult, and often impossible, task to mark the confi nes between one and the other. What is the most suitable po liti cal community5 to demo cratically decide on navigation on the Danube? Does not the spread of contagious dis- eases affect all the inhabitants of the Earth? And what must be said about issues concerning not only all the present inhabitants of the Earth but also those of the future, such as nuclear waste management or the ozone hole? There is no obvious, easy answer to these questions. Nevertheless, the modern stateone of the Wests favorite offspringbased on the assumption of sure frontiers and rigid criteria of membership continues to be the main po liti cal subject in international relations. In just a few centuries, the territorial state has spread over the entire land surface of the planet. With the sole exception of Antarctica, there is no longer a strip of land that does not belong to or is not claimed by a territorial state. In order to participate in world po liti cal life, each individual is obliged to become a member of a state, and each community must contrive to speak with a single voice, that of a monocratic government. World politics is there- fore practiced by a small group of actors that

have set up a directorate, giving rise to what may be defi ned as an intergovernmental oligarchy . It

cannot be denied that the state plays an essential role in nourishing de- mocracy: without actually deciding, often arbitrarily, who is in and who is out, it would not have been possible to develop self- government. The intensifi cation of the pro cesses of economic, social, po liti cal, and cul- tural

globalization, however, has rendered traditional boundaries in- creasingly vague and uncertain, undermining the capacity for certain po liti cal communities to make decisions autonomously. The key princi- ple of democracy, according to which decisions must be taken only after discussion among all those affected by the decisions, is increasingly being questioned. Today it must be acknowledged that the situation has changed. The rigidity of the frontiers of the po liti cal communities, an element that historically enabled self- government to be born and prosper, now stands in the way of democracys evolving and even surviving. As soon as each po liti cal community receives and transmits the echo of its
actions from and to the exterior, the state- based demo cratic procedure is eroded. In order to survive, democracy must undergo a radical transformation comparable to that experienced in the transition from direct to represen- tative democracy. Democracy must be able to create new forms

of man- agement of public matters that are also open toward the exterior and to include in the decisionmaking pro cess those who are affected by certain decisions. Many attempts have already been made to increase participation and inclusion. International organizations, for example, have increased in number and functions, and almost every country in the world is
now a member of the UN. In the so- called Old Continent, a mighty effort is being made to create common institutions, and the Eu ro pe an Union has been extended southward, northward, and eastward. Half a century ago, the EU was concerned solely with coal and steel, while today it is competent in all aspects of public policy. Other regional organizations are developing on the other continents. World po liti cal life is begin- ning to assign jurisdiction and legitimacy to subjects other than state representatives, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, cultural associations, and transnational pressure groups. This pro cess of institutional integration is still only partial and unsatis- factory,

however, compared with the intensity and rapidity of the changes occurring in the global pro cess.

Current democratic practices use democratic schizophrenia to accomplish their imperialist goals, only world democracy solves Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Chapter 1 p. 6-8 SG)

Who is willing to undertake the necessary institutional reforms? The West has preached the lofty principle of the sovereignty of the people, at the same time applying this principle with suspicious parsimony. The West has often declared its intention to promote democracy in other peoples back yard but is by no means willing to share the management of global affairs with others. This is what I call demo cratic schizo phre- nia: to engage in a certain behavior on the inside and indulge in the opposite behavior on the outside. It is a contradiction that is diffi cult to justify, although here the West can appeal to a powerful and sophisti- cated ideological apparatus, the function of which is to demonize any po liti cal system that opposes its own. The ideological apparatus is used to disseminate a Manichean view in which anyone opposing the will of the West is presented as a barbarian and a savage. It is certainly not dif- fi cult to demonize what happens in the world: you have only to open a newspaper to read about the atrocities committed for po liti cal reasons in places far and near. The ideological apparatus does not merely de- monize, however; it must also sanctify, and so it proceeds to obscure the atrocities committed by the demo cratic countries. War crimes are trans- formed into collateral damage, aggression is converted into prevention, torture is modifi ed to become coercive interrogation. The point is reached in which the demo cratic states are deemed to be peaceful by nature, and when they fi ght it is only because other states are not as demo cratic. In other words, a consolatory view of democracy arose that demon- ized its enemies and glorifi ed itself. However, this view is analytically tautological and po liti cally reactionary. It is tautological in that it not only defi nes democracy as good but also defi nes what democracies do as good. This prevents any assessment of the relationship between two variables, postulating as an axiom what instead remains to be demon- strated. And it is po liti cally reactionary, as this complacency prevents an analysis of which problems are still open and the transformations needed to fulfi ll the commitments inscribed in the constituent pact of the de- mocracies. Consoling oneself about what democracy stands for is an obstacle to the democracies progress. How far back does this demo cratic schizo phre nia between interior and exterior date? Perhaps it is an intrinsic fl aw, already announced in the funeral oration delivered by Pericles, a great demo crat, to com- memorate those killed in the fi rst year of the Peloponnesian war, a speech that is justly considered the fi rst expression of demo cratic thought.6 Pericles lavishes deserving praise on the po liti cal order of his city. He refers to Athens as a living school for Greece,7 a model for all civilizations. Thucydides, the chronicler of the war, scrupulously notes the devastation and plundering carried out by the Athenians, but Peri- cles never asks whether that war was necessary, whether the demo cratic Athens had been compelled to fi ght it, or whether it was a war of aggression. Yet Pericles harangues his fellow citizens: Do not look at the sac- rifi ces of the war in horror.8 Only by excelling in war can Athens be a living school. Reading and rereading this famous speech, one gets the impression that the praise of the Athenian democracy is necessary to justify the blood spilt but also that the blood shed on the exterior is nec- essary to build that demo cratic society. The Athenian events have unfortunately hung like a shadow over the development of democracy through the centuries. The demo cratic regimes are certainly not the only belligerent or un- worthy members of the international community. The autocratic re- gimes are equally and sometimes even more violent on both the interior and the exterior. Students of international relations from both the real- ists side and the opposing idealists side have fi lled entire library shelves with publications assessing the extent to which the internal regime of a state affects its foreign policies. The method generally used, however, is to compare the foreign policy of the demo cratic countries with that of the autocratic countries, and it is not surprising to fi nd that the foreign policy of democracies is often, other things being equal, more virtuous than that of the autocracies. Nevertheless, the basis of the comparison is incorrect: the foreign policy of the democracies should be compared with their internal policy. Only when the two are based on the same principles will it be possible to declare demo cratic schizo phre nia to have been cured and the curse that has accompanied this form of government from the time of Pericles to have been lifted. It is perhaps possible to justify the crimes committed by democracies outside their own borders by the fact that they have so far lived in a composite international system in which the majority of the po liti cal communities were managed using authoritarian methods. For years and years, democracies have had to defend themselves with the sword as well as with rhetoric. However, this is no longer the situation in the twenty- fi rst century, when the distribution of power is such that the bloc of the demo cratic states reigns supreme. For these reasons I am often critical concerning what is done and even more of what could be and is not done by the democracies. This criticism is in no way meant to repu- diate democracy as a method of managing power, nor is it meant to deny the fact that all the peoples in the world could benefi t from democracy. The aim of the criticism is to prevent countries that have succeeded in constructing these regimesoften by means of blood, sweat, and tears from sinking into complacency, from discharging their aggressiveness toward their exterior and hindering further progress on the interior. Being critical, in other words, by no means signifi es a desire to return to a different system but merely a demand that democracies should rise to the expectations that the majority of the worlds population has of them. Never before have the

western countries been so powerful; never before have their enemies been so weak. The western countries no longer have to fi ght for survival as they did in the fi rst and second half of the twenti- eth century. No longer do any external obstacles stand in the way of pursuing a world of democracy.

Democracy functions by excluding an Othercosmopolitianism is all inclusive Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Chapter 1 p. 8-9 SG)
The key terms of the project illustrated hereindemocracy and cosmopolitanismencapsulate two of the loftiest ideals of po liti cal thought. Yet as is often the case with good intentions, both these con- cepts conceal insidious perils. The demo cratic ideabased on the prin- ciple that power belongs to the multitudewas established by drawing dividing lines between the persons to include and those to exclude. Power may be shared by the whole people but only on condition that we know who is being excluded. Paradoxically, the all- time enemy of de- mocracy, despotism, has not had to face the problem of whom to include: obedience is expected from all individuals. Throughout their journey, the democracies have gradually increased the number of citizens endowed with po liti cal rights: those rights have been extended from exclusively the free males of the polis to all adults. But even though the barriers have been whittled down, perhaps the most decisive one has remained standing: those who are in and those who are out. Extraneous peoples and individuals wishing to be included have been the most frequent victims of exclusion. The need to homogenize those who are different by means of assimilation, expulsion, or even elimination has brought out the dark side of democracy, transforming it into ethnocracy.9 This dark side has dominated the pro cess of nation building, but it would be wrong to consider this dark side solely as a problem of the past. In a world in which populations are subjected to great migrations, in which natural resources are scarce, and in which the pro cesses of globalization, whether we like it or not, throw together different individuals, this dark side is always liable to re- emerge. The clashes of civilizations are nothing but the latest version of the deviation that can affect democracies at any moment. Cosmopolitanism as a school of tolerance would mitigate this ge ne tic fl aw in democracy and should prevent democracy from withdrawing into itself and allow de- mocracy to continue to be a perpetually open and inclusive po liti cal system.

A2: But violence is inevitable!

Even if violence is inevitable, a cosmopolitan system focusing on human security is the most viable way to deal with itonly the aff can create non-arbitrary criteria for intervention Inoguchi, 2009 [Takashi, a Japanese academic researcher of foreign affairs and international and global relationships of states. He is also a
professor emeritus of University of Tokyo. He is the president of University of Niigata Prefecture since April 2009 Cosmopolitanism as a Potential New Framework http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~syrin22e/peaceconflict/cosmopolitan.html] The failings of international attempts at peacekeeping in the status quo can be summed up as follows: 1. Realist theory continues to dominate international policy formation, placing emphasis on the sovereign state as the ultimate guarantor of international peace and security, and viewing power as the ultimate goal of state action. 2. Current international institutions are insufficient to deal with international and subnational conflict crises, partially because they were originally conceptualized and realized under a realist framework. 3. Recent attempts to reform international peacekeeping methodologies have fallen short of sufficient transformation due to the persistent failure of policymakers to address the underlying shortcomings of the realist framework. A fourth and final consideration to respect when formulating a new solution to the problem of international conflict management is, naturally, the ethical critiques posed by those who oppose international preventive diplomacy and intervention in their contemporary incarnations. The evolution of

international theoretical thought suggests a shift toward a possible cosmopolitan future, that is as a component of a broader and emancipatory theoretical framework centred on the idea of collective human security [8]. The cosmopolitan framework primarily advocates moral and social unity with all other human beings; that is to say, it regards the global population as sharing certain common interests, rather than being primarily fragmented into disparate and arbitrary nation-states which compete against each other. The cosmopolitan identity requires the identification of oneself as
part of the human family [] an extension of the sense of kinship many already feel for their nation, hometown, and family [8]. In a cosmopolitan worldview, individual security is inherently and inexorably associated with the security of the wider globe; a threat

to one is a threat to all. The cosmopolitan framework was partially affirmed in 2000 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1296, which
confirmed that the deliberate targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in war zones constituted a threat to international peace and security [9], but the realist framework remains.

A cosmopolitan approach to peacekeeping would answer many criticisms leveled at the realist peacekeeping apparatus, and represents the most viable solution to the problem of a future humanitarian crisis. While it is
potentially difficult to envision a truly cosmopolitan system of international human security, it would certainly demonstrate certain identifiable characteristics. Cosmopolitan international society would certainly demonstrate international engagement

and use of force in containing conflict [11], motivated by collective international norms about individual and group rights [11]. Rather than existing as the establishment of a wholly homogenous international community, cosmopolitanism celebrates diversity and multiculturalism, and implies a variety of polities [9], and represents a post-Westphalian direction for international politics, which transcends the state-centricity of peacekeeping [9]. It recognizes that the borders of states artificially fragment the larger human community, and additionally, due to its establishment of a singular international opinion with regards to human rights and peace, provides the theoretical framework for instituting an objective system of evaluating preventive diplomacy and humanitarian intervention. In this sense, cosmopolitanism represents a viable solution to the limitations of the realist framework, and may additionally answer the philosophical criticisms of contemporary humanitarian intervention. While it remains perhaps legitimate to say that the implementation of cosmopolitanism upon the globe represents an imposition of values, cosmopolitanism certainly solves the problem of neocolonialism by individual states while acting to ensure human security . It
responds to the criticism of the ethic of compassion in that cosmopolitanism by definition does not sponsor the otherization of human beings; instead, the truly cosmopolitan global citizen is motivated not by pity or arrogance but by solidarity. Even where cosmopolitanism fails to

improve upon realism in terms of ethical critiques of peacekeeping, real human lives are ultimately more valuable than philosophical considerations. It is therefore much more useful for international relations scholars and policymakers to adopt a cosmopolitan theoretical framework when considering the future of our planet and its inhabitants. Movement toward cosmopolitanism will ultimately represent a solution to the conundrum of contemporary human security.

A2: Psychology = Realism

loyalty to the state and competiton arent psychological necessitiescosmopolitanism reorients these psychological desires towards collective advancement. Kleingeld and Brown 2002 [(Pauline, Professor of
Practical Reason at the University of Groningen, and Eric, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/, Feb. 23, 2002, Revised Nov. 28, 2006, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/)]

Another version of the criticism that cosmopolitanism is impossible targets the psychological assumptions of moral cosmopolitanism. Here it is said that human beings must have stronger attachments toward members of their own state or nation, and that attempts to disperse attachments to fellow-citizens in order to honor a moral community with human beings as such will cripple our sensibilities. If this is a viability claim and not simply a desirability claim, then it must be supposed that moral cosmopolitanism would literally leave large numbers of people unable to function. So it is claimed that people need a particular sense of national identity in order to be agents, and that a particular sense of national identity requires attachment to particular others perceived to have a similar identity. This argument seems plausible if it is assumed that cosmopolitanism requires the same attitudes towards all other human beings, but moderate cosmopolitanism does not make that assumption. Rather, the moderate cosmopolitan has to insist only that there is some favorable, motivating attitude toward all human beings as such; this leaves room for some special attitudes towards fellow-citizens. Of course, the strict moral cosmopolitan will go further and will deny that fellow-citizens deserve any special attitudes, and it might be thought that this denial is what flouts the limits of human psychology. But this does not seem to be true as an empirical generalization. The cosmopolitan does not need to deny that some people do happen to have the need for national allegiance, so long as it is true that not all people do; and insofar as some people do, the strict cosmopolitan will say that perhaps it does not need to be that way and that cosmopolitan education might lead to a different result. The historical record gives even the strict cosmopolitan some cause for cheer, as human psychology and the forms of political organization have proven to be quite plastic. In fact, some cosmopolitans have adopted a developmental psychology according to which patriotism is a step on the way to cosmopolitanism: as human individuals mature they develop ever wider loyalties and allegiances, starting with attachments to their caregivers and ending with allegiance to humanity at large. These different attachments are not necessarily in competition with each other. Just as little as loyalty to one's family is generally seen as a problematic feature of citizens, so the argument goes, loyalty to one's state is not a necessarily problematic feature in the eyes of cosmopolitans. Thus, cosmopolitanism is regarded as an extension of a developmental process that also includes the development of patriotism. This claim is just as much in need of empirical support, however, as the opposite claim discussed in the previous paragraph.

A2: RealismFactually Incorrect

Their realist conception of the world is an outdated constructionthe world doesnt operate by that model any moreglobalization is eroding sovereigntywe need a new model of territoriality. Agnew 05professor of geography at the University of California, Los Angeles (John, June, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,JSTOR)

Conclusion The

conception of sovereignty that has predominated in modern political theory relies on the idea of exclusive political authority exercised by a state over a given territory. This idea reflects the concept of sovereignty that emerged from Westphalia and then developed along with Enlightenment and Romantic ideals of popular rule and patriotism. Many governments continue to act as if the concept is actually descriptive of the contemporary world. But this standard conception is a poor guide to political analysis. It is a "truth" that has always hidden more than it reveals. In a globalizing world, this obfuscation is particularly problematic. We cannot meaning- fully apply the orthodox conception of sovereignty to the conditional exercise of relative, limited, and partial powers that local, regional, national, international, and nonterritorial communities and actors now exert. I have proposed an alternative to the orthodox ap- proach
to sovereignty that draws from recent critiques of the orthodoxy's understanding of political authority, to which I have added a critique of its understanding of spatiality as absolute territoriality. This alternative model relies on the idea of "sovereignty regimes," or combinations

of degrees of central state authority and consolidated or open territoriality. I have empirically illustrated the efficacy of this
approach to disentangling the impacts of globalization on state territoriality by examining various ways in which monetary sovereignty, perhaps the most obviously symbolic as well as important material manifestation of state sovereignty, operates ef- fectively. I have identified four distinctive currency processes under contemporary global political-economic conditions-territorial, transnational, shared, and sub- stitute-that may be mapped onto the four types of sovereignty regime, respectively, classic, globalist, inte- grative, and imperialist. This typology has the virtue of distinguishing various ways in which globalization in tersects with state territoriality to produce very different modes of actually existing or effective sovereignty in the world today. We do

not live in a world that is singularly imperialist, globalist, integrative, or Westphalian. The typology also provides a way of gauging differences in the meaning of sovereignty over time and space and thereby moves beyond the sterile debate over whether some sort of universal "state sovereignty" is eroding. When assumptions about the fixed and universal nature of ter ritoriality no longer work to locate sovereignty in place, we begin to see, for better and for worse, that there is political authority beyond the sovereign construction of territorial space.

Realism fundamentally misunderstands the way the world worksin a globalized world, power is more diffuseprefer our descriptive account

Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision

The national outlook or, to put it in terms of political science, neorealism, fails because it cannot comprehend the new logic of

power in global society. Anyone who believes that the global policeman NATO or the USA is merely pretending to play the role of global policeman while really pursuing unAmerican economic and geopolitical power interests in the powder keg of the Balkans or the Arab world not only misunderstands the situation but also overlooks the extent to which the politics of human rights (like the imposition of 'free markets') has become the civil religion, the faith of the United States itself.
In addition, the one thing does not exclude the other. The defence of human rights on foreign soil can peacefully coexist with geostrategic, economic and hegemonic interests. A new kind of postnational politics of mili. Lary humanism is emerging. .... , Postnational war must also be distinguished from other causes of war with which we are simultaneously confronted. Mary Kaldor (1998) and, following her, Erhard Eppler (2002), Herfried Munkler (2002) and many others, have analysed the privatization of violence in this connection. This can be viewed as a radicalized neoliberalization of the state, in particular, of the state monopoly on the means of violence. Where states in the European

sense never developed or have collapsed, force has never been monopolized by the state and has never been privatized. Such pre- or post-state wars are not fuelled, for instance, by age-old ethnic rivalries, as is often supposed, but by a 'civilwar market' in which the prices and profits for buying and using privatized force are determined or negotiated (Collier
2003).

A2: RealismWe Reform It

Even if realism is inevbitable, cosmopolitan ideology can still function to reshape societyit re-orients self interest to the collective good Archibugi 4 (Daniele Archibugi, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy,
Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review p. 453-454 SG) The disenchanted Realists

remind us that the worlds mechanisms are very different from how cosmopolitan democracys dreamers imagine them to be. They argue that the principal elements regulating international relations are, ultimately, force and interest . Thus, every effort to tame international politics through institutions and public participation is pure utopia (Zolo, 1997; Hawthorn, 2000; Chandler, 2003). I do not disagree with attributing importance to force and interest, but it is excessive not only to consider them as the sole force moving politics, but also as being immutable. Even from a Realist perspective it would be wrong to think that the interests of all actors involved in international politics are opposed to democratic management of the decision-making process. A more accurate picture is that of opposing interests in tension with each other. Thus at the

moment, there is on the one side the inuence exerted over the decision-making process by a few centres of power (a few governments, military groups, large enterprises); and on the other side the demands of wider interest groups to increase their role at the decision-making table. Whether peripheral states, global move- ments or national industries, these latter groups are not necessarily pure at heart. They follow an agenda which is de facto anti-hegemonic because their own interests happen to be opposed to those of centralized power. To support these interests is not a matter of theory,

but rather of political choice. Some Realists, however, reject not just the feasibility of the cosmopolitan project but also its desirability. These critiques are often confused; doubtless because a risk is perceived that the cosmopolitan project could, in the frame of
contemporary political reality, be used in other directions. It is certainly relevant that Zolo, in order to construct his critique of cosmopolitan democracy, must continuously force the position taken by his antagonists. In Cosmopolis, he often criticizes the prospect of a global government, but none of the authors he cites Bobbio, Falk, Habermas, Held ever argued in its defence (on the other hand, the inevitability of world government is discussed in Wendt, 2003). These scholars limited their support to an increase in the rule of law and integration within global

politics; they never argued in favour of the global concentration of coercive power. Cosmopol- itan democracy is not to be identied with the project of a global government which is necessarily reliant upon the concentration of forces in one sole institution on the contrary, it is a project that invokes voluntary and revocable alliances between governmental and meta-govern- mental institutions, where the availability of coercive power, in ultima ratio, is shared between players and subjected to juridical control. It would be useful to carry out an experiment to verify how often a Realists critique of cosmopolitan democracy could also apply to state democracy. If the Realist approach were to be applied coherently, democracy could not exist as a political system. Despite all of its imperfections, democracy does exist, and this has been made
possible due, in part, to the thinkers and movements all visionary! who have supported and fought for its cause far before it could ever become possible.

Cosmopolitanism solves every impact because of widespread cooperation Held 10 (David, Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, February 4th, Share the Worlds Resources, The Changing Face of Global Governance, http://www.stwr.org/the-un-people-politics/the-changing-face-of-global-governance.html) Today, there is a newfound recognition that global problems cannot be solved by any one nation state acting alone, nor by states just fighting their corner in regional blocs. As demands on the state have increased, a whole series of policy problems have arisen which cannot be adequately resolved without cooperation with other states and non-state actors. There is a growing recognition that individual states are no longer the only appropriate political units for either resolving key policy problems or managing a broad range of public functions. The policy packages that have largely set the global agenda in economics and security have been discredited. The Washington Consensus and Washington security doctrines have dug their own graves. The most successful developing countries in the world are successful because they have not followed the Washington Consensus agenda, and the conflicts that have most successfully been diffused are ones that have benefited from concentrated multilateral support and a human security agenda. Here are clear clues as to how to proceed in the future. We need to follow these clues and learn from the mistakes of the past if democracy, social justice and a renewed multilateral order are to be advanced. Or, to sum up, realism is dead, long live cosmopolitanism. The future of organised force in countries like our own is through regional and international organisations. Cooperation between states is still important, if not more so, but what has changed is the rationale, which is now deeper and more complex. The old threat was the other; the new threat is shared problems and collective threats.

A2: RealismFails and is False

A2: Need the state!

Cosmopolitanisim accepts the state as a certain level of power and authority your state good arguments dont apply Held 2 (David, Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, http://www.ipw.unisg.ch/org/ipw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/DC+Democracy+in+Developing+Countries+T ext+Held/$FILE/Held.pdf) In this conception, the nation-state withers away. But this is not to suggest that states and national democratic polities become redundant. Rather, states would no longer be regarded as the sole centers of legitimate power within their borders, as is already the case in diverse settings (see Held et al. 1999, Conclusion). States need to be articulated with and relocated within an overarching cosmopolitan framework. Within this framework, the laws and rules of the nation-state would become but one focus for legal development, political reflection, and mobilization. Under these conditions, people would in principle come to enjoy multiple citizenshipspolitical membership, that is, in the diverse political communities that significantly affect them. In a world of overlapping communities of fate, individuals would be citizens of their immediate political communities and of the wider regional and global networks that impact upon their lives. This overlapping cosmopolitan polity would be one that in form and substance reflects and embraces the diverse forms of power and authority that operate within and across borders.

A2: Heg Good

Abandoning the notion of sovereignty in support of international democratic institutions solves the oppression and abuse caused by current hegemons without the need for war
Archibugi 4 (Daniele Archibugi, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy,
Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review p. 454-455 SG) Todays world is dominated by a hegemonic bloc where a single state, the United States, is endowed with extraordinary powers and the mandate to defend very narrow economic interests (Chandler, 2001; Gower, 2001). This hegemon goes so far as to resort to military power in order to penetrate economic and political activity. Critics have described how many inter- national organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and NATO also serve

the purpose of maintaining and preserving the interests of this new hegemonic bloc. Basing observation on real-world conditions, these critics argue that a project that aims to empower global institutions to coordinate and monitor national policies leads de facto to a decrease in the independence of the various states and, ultimately, reinforces the ideology of the current hegemonic power. Authors such as Zolo, Gowen and
Chandler have noted how those same years that witnessed audacious projects for UN reform and the democratiza- tion of global governance, also witnessed the signicant military engage- ment of Western states. In the lead up to their use of force, these states employed a rhetoric dangerously resembling those discourses that long for a global order founded on the values of lawfulness and democracy. I have already argued that the amount of

power concentrated within the hands of the United States is excessive, and that its domestic democracy is no guarantee for the wise or lawful application of such power. However, the key is to nd a strategy that can effectively oppose this hegemonic bloc. Contrary to Zolo, Gowen, Chandler et al., I dispute the ability of the old sovereignty dogma to provide a satisfactory alternative to US hegemony, or to any hegemony, for that matter. Until this moment, the appeal to sovereignty has served the purpose of aiding governments in abusing their citizens, rather than offering weaker states protection from the greed of the strongest states. The strengthening of international institutions, especially if inspired by the values of democracy, would most probably produce the desired effect of obliging the United States and its allies to engage in a foreign policy much more in line with their own constitutions . Barricading ourselves behind the notion of sovereignty merely for the sake of counter- balancing Americas hegemony may cause us to forget the millions of people who are subjected every day to oppression from their own governments. The recent conict in Iraq seems to reinforce this point. On the
one hand, the lack of international consensus and legitimacy did not constrain two democratic states, the USA and the UK, from waging war against international law. On the other hand, the international community lacked non-coercive instruments to protest against the violation of human rights by the Iraqi government since it had the status of representing a sovereign state. The cosmopolitan perspective would, on the contrary, have urged the international community to take other actions, such as smart sanctions, to oppose and ultimately remove the Iraqi government.

A2: Heg solves the impact

Americas hegemonic democracy is decidedly anti-cosmopolitan--by asserting itself above all others states it only gaurentees violence Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision, pg 125)

Cosmopolitan America has an elective affinity with Amnesty International (this is also clear from the text of the global-national security

American mega-power throws its weight behind the global realization of human rights and democracy. Of course, this American cosmopolitanism is an abridged form of cosmopolitanism. By recognition of others it does not mean the recognition of their difference but of their sameness. The absolutistic variant of American universalism ultimately boils down to the assumption that the only true Muslim is an American Muslim. If Muslim, Africans, Arabs, Chinese and women behave in an
strategy):

un-American, or even an anti-American, fashion, the conclusion is that they lack authorization, they are trapped in 'anti-American prejudices', they are latent 'racists', and are in any case held " prisoner by an 'out-dated' self-image. The same pattern of an abridged

(anti-)cosmopolitanism is shown by the way the US government 'solves' the problem of the overlapping and interwoven sovereignties of the second modernity. It outlines and acts on an image of the world in which one nation possesses a super-sovereignty (guess which one), whereas all other nations are granted only conditional sovereignty. The problem of the collapsing boundary between the national and the international is resolved in favour of an 'American nationalism of the international'. The anti-cosmopolitan moment resides in the fact that the US government sets itself above all borders in an absolutistic manner, while demanding that all other countries and governments respect them, by force if necessary. But it thereby endangers not only the legitimacy but also the effectiveness of its interventions. For example, because the USA categorically refuses to submit to the disarmament norms whose global observance it itself supports (militarily), it destroys the contractual architecture which is ultimately the only reliable guarantor of the security of American citizens. Moreover, the contradiction between committing oneself to the cause of global democracy, if necessary militarily, while paying scant regard to democratic consultation and cooperation with its allies cannot be kept off the domestic political agenda indefinitely. For this hegemonic unilateralism conflicts with America's selfimage as an anti-colonial nation.

Heg is more likely to cause wars than prevent themwar is borderless and internaldisuasion and deterrence have no effect

A2: HegCauses war (short)

Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision, pg 132)

N ew wars' (Kaldor 1998; Mi.inkler 2002) were and are being conducted, adding new outrages to the old, which have not for that reason become any less. Whereas wars between states in the past ended with the victory of one side, wars of the new type know no temporal or spatial boundaries. Here too the law of reflexive modernity holds (Beck, Bonss and Lau 2001; Beck and Lau 2004), according to which the apparently fixed anthropological dualities - war and peace, civil society and military, friend and foe, military and police - are becoming blurred. This blurring of distinctions means that 'postnational war' (Beck 2000b) has become unpredictable. Whereas the classical wars of the first modernity rested on the state's monopoly of the means of

violence, now war has become boundless, first, because of the demonopolization and privatization of organized violence (by terrorists and warlords) and, second, because of the globality of dangers and of sensitivity to issues of human rights, and hence because states collaborate in preventing or stopping violations of human rights. We are here faced with a grim variant of the sorcerer's apprentice paradox: the means which are supposed to promote freedom justify new forms of war.

A2: HegCauses war (Long)

Hegemony encourages aggressive, preemptive wars and makes the us into a global pauperonly the aff solves authentic stability

Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision, pg 133)

This hegemonic role involves defending two principles which are highly controversial across the world: first, the principle of prevention of potential rivals and, second, the principle of preventive war. If the only hope for the world in the long run is the Pax Americana, this implies that the USA can never permit the emergence of a rival to its overwhelming power. Accordingly, the 'National Security Strategy of the United States of America' states that the military power of the USA must be so great that it inhibits potential rivals even from attempting to challenge it. At the same time, it is argued, it is necessary to engage in preventive military interventions, given the diffuse character of the terrorist threat. Thus the new resoluteness of the US administration is demonstrated by the fact that it claims the right to violate the prohibition on preventive wars, a fundamental rule devised by the international legal system to limit armed conflicts. Its validity can be traced back to the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact;! it underlies the Charter of the United Nations, and has been repeatedly confirmed by the UN General Assembly. This prohibition renders the power of 'preventive selfdefence' claimed by the USA illegal. Such a militarized definition of the global situation also implies that the role of actors, that is, states and international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, must be renegotiated and restructured. The territorial seJfunderstanding of NATO, the restriction of its operations to attacks on European states, must be suspended in order to counter the growing dangers resulting from international anarchy, the chaos of collapsing states and the privatization of the means of violence. The NATO states must be re-equipped and made 'fit' for the struggle against the global turbulences fuelled by economic disparities between centre and periphery, North and South, and by the outbreaks of violence and terrorism sparked by the confluence of poverty, religious intolerance, racial hatred and anti-Americanism, and by ethnic states and civil wars.
As noted, the alternative model of global order, global cosmopolis, rests on the contrasting principle of equality of states and accordingly emphasizes the importance of global (civil) law, even against the global hegemon. The global cosmopolis should be realized step by step through a corresponding reform of international law and international organization, in particular, the United Nations, in accordance with the principles of a cosmopolitan regime which rests on recognition of the difference of others, and in particular on recognition of multiple modernities. A global law would have to be formulated accordingly which envisages both contractually regulated possibilities for consultation of continental alliances and their obligation to act in concert. This would include, for example, something akin to a veto-free UN which could function as a global parliament equipped with a standing army for peacekeeping purposes and capable of imposing disarmament worldwide. The conflicting principles of the vertical and the horizontal are in fact reflected in the

conflicts between Pax Americana and global cosmopolis: American global unilateralism on the one side, multilateralism on the other; dismantling versus expansion of global law; weakening versus strengthening of the United Nations, etc. The mutual
recriminations are thereby pre-programmed. Those who want a stronger UN -let us call them Europeans - fail to show the necessary resoluteness; they are not ready to face the remorseless facts of a world balanced on the edge of the abyss. In the eyes of others, the hegemonic USA is in danger of becoming a 'war criminal' which betrays its own values democracy and freedom - both internally and externally. War is Peace 135 What so complicates the relations between the two models of global order and makes them an inexhaustible (and baleful) source of transnational misunderstandings is, in the first place, the weaknesses of both models: 'civil society' disappears in the Pax Americana, politics, by contrast, in global cosmopolis. The one side wants to make 'politics' the underlying principle of a new global order, the other the 'society of equals'. Europe as the advocate of global cosmopolitanism stands as the (unwilling?) defender of a status quo that is scarcely worth preserving. The US government, by contrast, makes unilateral distinctions between friend and foe and is unmasked as a 'global revolutionary' who promises and defends the globalization of democracy with military means. On the other hand, the question arises whether the two models are in fact mutually exclusive. That a ruthless either! or prevails between these visions of a new world order can surely be excluded. Also how far the conflicts extend and where the commonalities begin certainly depends on how rigidly or pragmatically the positions are defended. As regards the situation of Iran in summer 2003, for example, Europe could win the United States over to 'a common, realistic Iran policy that even some members of the Bush regime could actively support, a policy that takes account of Iranian realities in order to change them' (Navid Kermani). Generally speaking, the commonalities of the two models of global order depend on how 'realistic' the Europeans and how 'idealistic' the Americans are willing to become. Moreover, conflicts are not a crime but, on the contrary, necessary preconditions of a global liberalism and an open cosmopolitan society. This is all the more true because a new heterogeneous 'global class' (Sklair 2001) (composed of European and non-European governments, the military and the US administration, and also of global NGO actors, transnational experts of international organizations, etc.) is busy ordering the selfdestructive planet. In everyday (world-)politics different factions of the 'global class' are competing over how to accomplish for global society what elites previously accomplished for the nation, namely, creating a well-ordered society. The prospect of this taking place without alternatives and without opposition would be a nightmare. 2 On postnational war The postnational forms of war of the second modernity do not mean that classical war between states has been abolished. Rather, new, additional postnational wars are occurring alongside the 'old' wars between states. One cannot even preclude that postnational wars will culminate in national wars, and hence even in new kinds of world wars. For the purposes of historical classification, however, we need to distinguish clearly between old and new wars, between wars between states and postnational 'military interventions' for humanitarian purposes or as prevention against terrorist attacks.

A cosmopolitan use of the threat of war solves better than hegemonyit is credible and does not promote counterbalancing.

A2: Heg--Cosmo solves better

Beck, 06 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the
Department of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Ulrich, The Cosmopolitan Vision, pg 127)

The worldwide conflict over what the global order following the Iraq War should look like will have to reconcile two principles in a novel way. The idea of the national will have to be extended and reformulated into that of cosmopolitan democracy. This is ultimately the only way to alleviate the dilemmas of illegal-legitimate wars. The cosmopolitan global order too will not be able to dispense with the means of violence. If cosmopolitan law cannot be enforced, then there is no law. Of
course, there is also no law where the use of post-sovereign force is undertaken by nations alone without regard to the expectations of legitimacy of a global public. Here we encounter the problem of squaring the circle of how to coordinate law, force and peace at a time of global dangers. The despot Saddam Hussein, who led the UN weapons inspectors by the nose for years, underwent a Pauline

conversion before the American invasion and opened the doors previously barred to the inspectors. Why? The overwhelming military power of the USA, legitimated by the fact that it represented global law, left Saddam Hussein no alternative. Here an alternative to war or the status quo emerges which has not previously been systematically thought through, namely, a politics of military threats to bring about global change peacefully. This alternative resides in the dangerous distinction between war and the threat of war, and the no less daring dialectic involved in a refinement of the threat of war that excludes the possibility of both toppling a despotic regime and avoiding war. One might consider this as a kind of 'military enlightenment': only the unconditional threat of a multinational military force without rival can render the actual use of military force superfluous - this is the central paradox. Anyone who wants to make the world a better place and to avoid war must speak, and act on, a language of violent global change that comes across as completely dishonest. The recipe is, on the one hand, to reserve the option of military pressure and, on the other, to extend the scope of the UN agreement to cover serious violations of human rights. Then it would no longer be just a matter of weapons inspections; Amnesty International would have
to be granted access to prisons in order to thematize issues of legitimacy both internally and externally which are anathema to despotic regimes. Internally such regimes would be unmasked as despotic, and externally the threat of military intervention would acquire legitimacy in the eyes of a global public. The contradictions of this 'militaristic enlightenment' are manifest. Kant's rational idea of a 'peaceful, though not yet friendly, thoroughgoing community of all peoples on earth who can enter into effective relations with one another' is rendered suspect by the revival of the medieval doctrine of 'just war'. Only a rhetoric and a strategy of military force that does not let itself be deflected from the threat of coercion even by provisional successes can bring about peaceful regime change. Any flexibility, any readiness to compromise, any hesitation prevents dictators from recognizing that they have no alternative. The more inexorable military power is, the more futile is any attempt by a dictator, tyrant or despot to resist disarmament by military means, and hence the more probable that disarmament will succeed with just the threat of force, and thus by peaceful means. To be sure, the so-called peaceful means are synonymous from the start with incessant preparations for war. Indeed, their possible 'peacefulness' rests on the credibility of the threat of force. Only afterwards, when it is already too late, could they prove to be 'peaceful means'. Hence the paradox: the military conquest of a country tyrannized by a despot can be prevented insofar as military conquest is as certain to follow as night follows day. The hope that the moment war begins is also the moment it ends can, of course, prove to be a dangerous illusion. This highly questionable 'military humanism' presupposes not only absolutely

superior power, the absolute politics of threats, and the despot's recognition of the utter futility of any resistance. It also requires international cooperation, collaboration and the possibility in principle of arriving at a contractual legal agreement. (It may also be tactically expedient to leave the principal evil-doers and their henchmen the escape hatch of exile or amnesty.) The success of this politics of threats depends, first, on the weakness of the dictators against whom it is directed. It is not an option against North Korea, for example, which has atomic weapons, or against China. Second, its success depends crucially on the global political isolation of the despots in question. Hence a skilful accompanying diplomacy is required to avert any possibility of the despotic regime forging defensive coalitions. Third, the thumb-screw tactic of threatening military force is more
likely to succeed if the despotic regime is already rotten from within, and hence finds itself in at least a potentially revolutionary situation. For when the power of a despotic regime is hanging by the thread of the despairing apathy of a suffering population, at the

decisive moment weapons can easily change hands and sides. Thus the .'\. neighbouring states that are able to influence the despotic regime must be won over to the politics of threats. In this way, the internal elites may be emboldened to declare their opposition to the dictator at the decisive moment. It is absolutely clear that a uni lateral implementation of such a policy of threats is condemned to failure, if only for the reason that it sabotages itself by parading the internal doubts and divisions of the West before a global public, and thereby loses its cutting edge and efficacy in the eyes of the despots. Only a multilateralism based on the cooperative power of states and law, hence also on a cosmopolitan diplomacy, is capable of intensifying and directing the pressure, so that the chances of success outweigh the risks. Also the temporal dimension of politics, the gradation of
(feigned) impatience and (diminishing) patience, requires careful consideration and coordination. The contrary position of mere pacifists (Europeans) has two shortcomings: it protects the tyrants and torpedoes the peaceful democratization of the world through the politics of military threats. European protectionism, which sanctifies the sovereignty of the nation-state, is morally and politically

problematic. It washes its hands in public in an almost obsessive way and stubbornly ignores the burden of guilt it incurs. The Iraq War teaches us two lessons. First, we are experiencing the paradoxes of a politics of military threats as a means of promoting global peace; for it is making clear how difficult it is to win the peace after the war has been won if the latter is branded with illegal (il)legitimacy. Second, the division of labour in global politics, according to which the Americans play the freeshooting sheriff in the poker game of war while the Europeans play the peace-loving judge, does not work. If, by contrast, warlike America were to realize that even the most overwhelming military power is futile when it opposes global law, and, conversely, peace-loving Europe were also to become a military power, then the Atlantic alliance could be revived.

A2: Weaponisation Inevitable

Weaponisation isnt inevitablethe cold war provescapabilities existed to militarize space, but both sides refrained Moltz, 08 [James Clay ,Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies, , Politics of Space Security] If Washington and Moscow had maintained this direction of unilateral interests and technologically driven military competition in space, nuclear tests in orbit would likely have continued through at least the mid-196os, while other types of space weapons-including a variety of ASAT and ABM systems using nuclear and conventional warheads-would have entered full-scale deployment to counter the proliferation of each side's missile capabilities and those of other emerging powers (such as China). In all likelihood, some of these space weapons would have been space based,
requiring dozens if not hundreds of weapons in orbit to have enough on station at <ll1Y one time above each adversary's territory. Manned space bombers would have helped to diversify reliance on ground-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery systems while also serving as platforms to attack hostile space assets. Such

technologies would have been expensive and might have been seen as redundant by some, but they could have been .justified (and indeed were at the time in Air Force circles) as "necessary" to national defense, given the Cold War and the obvious threats to national security posed by long-range missiles and ASAT interceptors. However, such a militarily and technologically driven process-denying environmental concerns-would have involved important trade-offs. With continued nuclear testing in space in the 19605, the U.S. Gemini and Apollo manned programs and the Russian Vostok,
Voskhod, and Soyuz missions-regardless of cost-would have been too dangerous to undertake. Radiation stuck in the Van Allen belts from weapons tests would have also made steady development and reliable access to commercial and military reconnaissance satellites impossible. The destruction of any spacecraft, whether in a test program or through offensive action, would have released thousands of metal fragments. By the late 1960s, at

least the lower reaches of space would have been cluttered with an enormous amount of orbital debris, making any activity hazardous and extremely costly. As technologies advanced in the late 1970s in the absence of treaties (or norms) limiting weapons,
new types of ballistic missile defenses-orbital magnetic rail guns, lasers, and advanced kinetic-kill weapons-and even space based, multiple-warhead nuclear weapons might also have been deployed. Thus, by the mid-to late 19805, space could have been fully weaponized and treated simply as part of the overall

War might or might not have taken place in space, given conditions of military deterrence, but space would essentially have been ruined for a number of other productive uses. Under this scenario, there would have been no prospects for manned spacecraft able to run the gauntlet of debris and automated space weapons to explore the Moon or undertake zero-gravity research . .Military space reconnaissance would
U.S.-Soviet offensive and defensive anTIS race. also have become extremely difficult and costly, except for very short missions and at much higher altitudes than was needed for useful photographic detail.

In this environment, accurate intelligence about the respective nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers would have been scarce, thus increasing uncertainty, miscalculation, and the chances of nuclear war. Finally, commercial space services developing for the world economy-from near-Earth remote sensing for agriculture, urban planning, and weather forecasting to geostationary communications satellites-would haw been either eliminated or put at severe risk of attack or damage, thus raising costs. Overall, this highly 'plausible) weapons-driven scenario would have grounded human scientific and commercial aspirations permanently on the Earth, rendering late twentieth-century economic
globalization only a dream. For these reasons, it is fortunate that C.S. and Soviet leaders took a different route. Instead, they seemed to [oUm\, the advice of U.S. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, who argued for putting the army's nuclear-tipped Nike Zeus AB"'l interceptor on hold in 1958: "We should not spend hundreds of millions ... pending general confirmatory indications that we know what we are doing. Returning to the actual historical record, notably,

we see that none of these technologically feasible systems became part of the deployed space assets of either country. Although competition remained the driving force in space activity and military research programs continued, the two sides limited (through explicit treaties and implicit strategic norms of self-restraint) technologies that would have threatened their use of space for other purposes: civilian manned missions, commercial
satellites, and passive military technologies. Although the two sides developed small ASAT programs, these investments can be described as military "hedging" strategies more than full-scale weapons efforts. Despite

the potential military risks of such a strategy, this rationale proved sound throughout the Cold War. No incidents of enemy destruction of any satellites took place, even though Moscow (and later, Washington) had the capability to do so. Instead, the two sides decided to enjoy the benefits of mutual restraint. As historian John Lewis Gaddis observes about trends set even at the height of the civilian space race, "The pattern of the early was one ... of
refraining from developing the full-scale anti-satellite systems that could have been put in place by that time."J6

Moltz, 08 [James Clay ,Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies, , Politics of Space Security]
As we look back on the now fifty years of space history, the notion of inevitability is hard to sustain in any particular direction-either cooperative or competitive. A closer analysis of key decision points in the history of U.S.-Soviet space activity shows that much of what seemed predetermined could have SC -, either way had decision makers failed to receive key information from the other side or had voices calling for renunciation or expansion of space competition been heeded. Supporters of the view that space might somehow be innately operative were disappointed, and those who predicted extensive weaponization and eventual warfare were also proven wrong. 'What actually occurred is much more complex and had to do with periodic competitive thrusts amid cooperative regrouping, as new space activities revealed unexpected dangers and as U.S. and Soviet leaders sought to minimize risks by

The causal chain of this environmental security approach applied to the first fifty years of space history can be outlined as follows: (11 following military tests and other experiments, scientists and officials observed the negative security implications that could result from the deployment of certain technologies into this new environment; (2) national leaders gradually recognized that conditions of mutual interdependence existed in their conduct of certain harmful space activities; and (3) these new technical and political understandings promoted cooperative restraint in narrowing the scope of space competition in order to protect the use of space as a collective good. The net result was not the elimination of competition in space but its redirection into safer areas, such as manned flight and, increasingly, commercial applications and military support systems. These changes were turned into active policies through a process of interstate bargaining, tacit and formal agreements, and learning; for the most part, these space policies are intact today. As Goldstein and Keohane note, "When institutions intervene, the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations. Occasionally, however, "unlearning" took place, showing the contingent nature of such understandings as governments change. The 2000 election victory of Texas Governor George W. Bush, for example, threw the Cold
establishing norms of unacceptable space behavior. War space framework into disarray, allowing a non-status quo minority in U.S. domestic policymaking to mount a serious challenge to strategic space restraint, which they no longer saw as protecting U.S. national interests. To the dismay of many of these advocates, however, the Bush administration failed to accomplish its goal of establishing U.S. space-based defenses, largely because of the restraining role of Congress. Its use of a sea-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a non-operational U.S. reconnaissance satellite near the end of its decaying orbit in February 2008 represented the high-'water mark of this effort to challenge the norms of space security. China's new military space activities have raised an incipient challenge to U.S. post-Cold War space supremacy. But Beijing has not yet repeated its one destructive, high-altitude ASAT test. Perhaps remarkably, the first fifty years of space security closed without space war or deployed, space-based weapons.

That might be learned from the period from 1957 to the present that would help us both understand past successes and develop new mechanisms for managing the next fifty years of space security, despite the presence of a greater complexity of actors? These are the main challenges addressed
in the rest of this book.

A2: Weaponisation good

Only multilateralism works in spaceunilateral action doesnt take into account shared problems Moltz, 08 [James Clay ,Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies, , Politics of Space Security] The fourth school argues that the fundamentally transborder nature of space activity requires international responses and the formation of more powerful institutions and treaties. By and large, states continue to be the main actors, although the emergence of important commercial players, intergovernmental consortia, and other nongol'ernmental entities (such as
universities) plays a larger role here than in the space nationalism school Indeed, this neoliberal institutionalist model does not reject the notion that current American global int1uence could not be used to create a ne\\ legal and moral order in space, rather than a military-dominated realm, One of the more influential advocates of this perspective has been Bruce DeBlois. In examining the history of military space activity from his perspective as a military

DeBlois spelled out an argument tor continuing positive U.S. leadership in space, saying, "Forty years of cold war history show a successful pattern of es polio' aimed at supporting space as a sanctuary. The reason is that we have more to lose if space is weaponized.""' The vision that DeBlois outlined in his study portrays space more as a resource to be presented for use by all rather than as a territory to be seized and protected. Not surprisingly, this approach rejects the notion of unilateralism in space and the concepts of space dominance or control as even potentially successful strategies. The University of Maryland's
intelligence officer in the late 19905, then-Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Nancy Gallagher notes the need to maintain the Outer Space Treaty and reach "one or more supplemental accords." She suggests starting with bans on destruction of peaceful space assets or interference with those conducting "legitimate" activities. She would follow with an agreement prohibiting spacebased anti-ballistic missile defenses because of their possible utility for threatening satellites in geostationary orbits.49 Theresa Hitchens calls for a prohibition on space testing of debris-causing weapons to stem the harmful effects on other space activity and their tendency to lead to an arms race.c' Critics would argue that such agreements could unduly restrict U.S. freedom of action. Gallagher counters, "Space policy is but one of many security problems that illustrate the fallacies of assuming that the ascendance of the united States as the sole information-age superpower offers perpetual military dominance ... regardless of other countries' interests or concerns.";]Most European space security analysts share this perspective.;2 ~o European Union country today is actively considering space weapons, and statements by European government leaders routinely emphasize the importance of international cooperation. NATO countries in Europe have been unanimous in rejecting U.S. opposition to the yearly U.N. resolutions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. As former French and EN. space official Gerard Brachet observes, "We need to collectively reHect on possible measures to improve the safety of space operations, measures that we can all agree to and would not adyersely affect the economics of space operations. These are the priorities that

A key difference between the space nationalist and global institutionalist space policy schools can be seen in most vivid relief in the distinction between Dolman's notion of U.S. moral superiority and DeBlois's of American moral leadership in space. In the case of the global institutionalists, the United States is best served by using the attractiveness of its ideas to build voluntary support for its positions and associated consensual institutions. As DeBlois argues, "The idea of putting weapons in space to dominate the globe is simply not compatible with who we are and what we represent as Americans."3~
Europe hopes to bring into play in space negotiations and international space management.