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Right to Privacy as a Human AttributeThe right to privacy is not a hostility towards other individuals, the government, or society itself. It is but an assertion by the individual of his inviolate personality. Though the individual is inescapably a part of the larger society in which he lives, the individual must necessarily reserve certain areas- 3 -of his life to himself. To preserve his identity, he has to maintain an inner self, safeguard his beliefs, and keep hidden certain thoughts, judgments and desires.1The concept of privacy has many facets. It may be pictured as the individual’s relations with other people in terms of a series of zones or regions of privacy leading to a “core self”, viz: This core self is pictured as an inner circle surrounded by a series of larger concentric circles. The inner circle shelters the individual’s “ultimate secrets” - those hopes, fears and prayers that are beyond sharing with anyone unless the individual comes under such stress that he must put out these ultimate secrets to secure emotional relief. Under normal circumstances no one is admitted to this sanctuary of the personality. The next circle outward contains “ultimate” secrets, those that can be willingly shared with close relations, confessors, or strangers who pass by and cannot injure. The next circle opens to members of the individual’s friendship group. The series continues until it reaches the outer circles of casual conversation and physical expression that are known to all observers.2 Some anthropologists observe that in some primitive societies, the idea of privacy is almost unknown.3 But studies also show that “virtually all animals seek periods of individual seclusion or small group intimacy…usually described as the tendency of territoriality.”4 Some psychologists view privacy as “an outcome of a person’s wish to withhold from others certain knowledge as to his past and present experience and action and his intentions for the future. The wish for privacy expresses a desire to be an enigma to others or more generally, a desire to control others’ perceptions and beliefs vis-à-vis the self concealing person.”5 4 - One philosopher offers the following philosophical basis for the right to privacy: Once a civilization has made a distinction between the “outer” man and the “inner” man, between life of the soul and the life of the body, between the spiritual and material, between the sacred and the profane, between the church and the state, between rights inherent and inalienable, and the rights that are in the power of the government to give and to take away, between public and private, between society and solitude, it becomes impossible to avoid the idea of privacy by whatever name it may be called - the idea of a “private space in which a man may become and remain himself.”6 However, notions of privacy and the degree of sensitivity to the right to privacy are not the same throughout history and across nations. In tribal life, there was little opportunity for seclusion and solitude. People banded together for protection and their lives were lived in public view. In medieval times in Western Europe, life revolved around the castle or manor house. Life was essentially communal. There were no private rooms in medieval inns and even the wealthy and powerful lived their lives in public view. As late as the seventeenth century, the queens of France gave birth in public, and kings performed their bodily functions in the presence of courtiers. Apparently, the idea that one had a right not to be observed had not arrived.7 In many societies like China, the dwelling unit houses the extended family, even though there may be individual homes within the family or

communal compound. Under such living arrangements, privacy is limited. In contemporary Russia, shortage of housing has also been a critical problem. A vast portion of the population is not able to afford privacy. Language scholars observe that there is no Russian word for “privacy” as the concept has - 5 apparently not been so widely accepted as to require a word to convey its precise meaning. Among the poor in many parts of the world, the whole family consisting of children, parents, grandparents, others, and even animals sleep in the same room. There is hardly the luxury of solitude.8 In America, however, the notion of individual living space, free from the prying eyes of neighbors, the concierge, and public officials is embedded in the contemporary American ethos. Its roots may perhaps be found in the pioneer tradition of selfreliance and freedom from social constraints. Communal living has had little appeal for Americans. In the nineteenth century, there were a few unsuccessful efforts to build idealistic communities of group living but they failed miserably. Small town life in hovels in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are viewed disparagingly for being characterized by snooping, gossiping and lack of privacy. Not surprisingly, the concept of privacy as a legally enforceable right did not exist anywhere prior to its enunciation in the United States in 1890 with the seminal article on the right to privacy by Warren and Brandeis. For many generations, the American ideal has been a private home, whether a house or part of a multiple dwelling, for each family. Within the home, it is considered not only appropriate but likewise necessary that each child has his or her own room. Courts give great weight to these living arrangements in deciding custody of children. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution also values privacy. The state cannot just intrude into the privacy of one’s home without being armed with a warrant based on probable cause that a crime has been committed.9- 6 -In the Philippines, a noted columnist, Carmen Guererro-Nakpil wrote that there is a vast cultural gap existing between the majority of Filipinos and a smaller sector of urban intellectuals. She observed, viz: Privacy? What’s that? There is no precise word for it in Pilipino, and as far as I know any Filipino dialect, because there is no need for it. The concept and practice of privacy are missing from the conventional Filipino life. The Filipino believes that privacy is an unnecessary imposition, an eccentricity that is barely pardonable at best, an esoteric Western afterthought smacking of legal trickery.10 But while she noted that only the elite sector had sensitive concern about privacy, she concluded that “the case for privacy is starting to get around.” In fact, even among the early settlers in the archipelago, there was some notion of privacy owing to the chiefs and selectmen. Slavery was decreed for those who passed by the Chief while he was bathing in the river.11 The Code of Kalantiao punished with death any person who entered without permission a house of the principalia.12 Filipino culture, she said, shows that in general, privacy is not zealously guarded. When a Filipino asks how you are, he is not merely being polite, but expects an answer in some detail about your health, or family, or recent activities. On the other hand, an American asking the same question usually just gets the question back, neither expecting nor receiving more by way of answer. She concluded that the Filipino still maintains a degree of reticence- he does not broadcast his every thought or feeling and he still keeps to himself certain hopes and fears

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Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise(sec.26)
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

pass 3 readings Constitution.

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Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (sec.24-25) Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not

Transfer of Funds
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of NA/BP sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of ’77. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Sec 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department,

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bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment." Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.” The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.” ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from 1 dep’t to another here. CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991 FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item(bolinao vs Valencia)
Bolinao Electronics is co-owner an co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Valencia, then Sec of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his department. ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages

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HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 19621963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. FACTSguigona vs macaraig)

debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Facts: (gonzalesvs macaraig)

(16 Dec 1988) Congress passed House Bill 1918 or General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1989 (GAB FY89) which eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Congress presented the bill to the President for consideration & approval.

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.” The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.” ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for

(29 Dec 1988) The president signed the Bill into Law – RA no. 6688, where 7 Special Provisions & Sec. 55 “General Provision” vetoed.

(02 Feb 1989) Senate expressed in Resolution No. 381 the unconstitutionality of the President's veto on Sec. 55 (“General Provision”) of GAB FY89, therefore deeming it void and without any force or effect, and making Sec. 55 effective.

Hence instant petition for prohibition / mandamus (filed 11 Apr 1989) with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of Presidential veto on Sec 55 of GAB FY89 & seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing RA 6688

Note: Please refer to book (gigantinormous gray book, green book, orange book or blue book) for the exact contents of Sec. 55 of GAB FY89 “Prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved an/or reduced by Congress” and Sec 16 of AA FY90 “Use of savings”

Veto of Sec 55 of GAB FY89 is justified by the respondents by saying that exercising the “item-veto” power of the President (Sec.27(2), Art.6, Constitution), the president vetoed the said provision for the reason that they violate Sec.25(5), Art.6, of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would nullify the “constitutional & statutory authority” of the President to augment items from savings. The President added that “this provision id inconsistent with Sec.12 and other similar provisions of this General Appropriations Act.” The Solicitor

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General further argues that the matter is a political question and that at any rate Section 55 is a “rider.”

Sections 55 of GAB FY89 and 16 of AA FY90 are actually “inappropriate provisions” which should be treated as items for the purpose of the president's veto power.

The petitioners argue that; 1. 2. 3. the provision in issue is not an “item” subject to separate veto, but a “provision” which the President cannot veto without vetoing the entire bill power of “item veto” does not include the power to veto a condition without vetoing the entire provision the power of augmentation has to be provided by Congress and may therefore be restricted by Congress

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Subsequently, a similar provision appears in the Appropriations Act of 1990, in Sec.16, entitled “Use of Savings”, where the same objections surfaced and the same reasoning was given by the President.

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Although it is again correct to say that conditions are not covered by the President's veto powers, sections 55 of GAB FY89 and 16 of AA FY90 cannot be considered “conditions” for they show no necessary connection with the schedule of expenditures, therefore they are general law measures more appropriate for substantive & separate legislation. Power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law. Limited leeway is granted. It is a nonappropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure. Separation of powers is therefore not endangered because transfer is only within a department/branch of government, not from one department/branch to another. Sections 55 of GAB FY89 and 16 of AA FY90 impair the “constitutional & statutory authority” of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. Presidential veto can be overridden by 2/3 vote of the Congress, but Congress did not do this because of their argument that there was “nothing to override” because said veto is ineffectual. Therefore, Constitutionality of the Presidential Veto is therefore upheld, and the Petition dismissed.

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Issue: W/N the Presidential veto on (similar) sections 55 of GAB FY89 and 16 of AA FY90 is constitutional

Held: PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ A. FACTS: [This is a justiciable question because it involves interpretation of the Constitution.] RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and

[Sec.27, Art.6 of the Constitution discusses the general veto power of the President (par.1) as well as his/her item veto power (par.2)]

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Although it is correct to say that an “item” is different from a “provision” (check book for definition), sections 55 of GAB FY89 and 16 of AA FY90 cannot be considered “provisions” at least in the budgetary sense, because (1) there is no reference in both to any specific appropriation; (2) the disproved or reduced items mentioned are not found on the face of the bill, and (3) they are merely expressions of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than budgetary appropriation. To that extent therefore it is a “rider.”

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2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority. B. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? C. HELD: 1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling  Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. 2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs  said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. 3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance  Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. 4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip.  AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the socalled legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law.VET O VALID. 5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions  allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. 6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs  use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to

existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

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