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Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy
Gelson Fonseca Jr.
The article describes the evolution of Brazilian multilateralism since the First Pan American Conference in 1889. The impact of the domestic and international spheres are examined to understand the continuities and changes in Brazil multilateral attitudes. In our days, the increasing influence of Brazil international presence, especially in multilateral forums, is evident. The open question is how the emerging countries will influence the new international order. KEYWORDS: Brazil, foreign policy, United Nations, multilateralism.
IT IS EVIDENT THAT, AS A RESULT OF THEIR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL maturation, a number of countries once cast as merely “developing” have emerged over the past two decades as consequential international actors. Among the most prominent are Brazil, India, China, Turkey, South Africa, and Indonesia. A restored Russia, emerging from the wreckage of the Soviet Union, is generally seen and sees itself as a member of this cohort. Collectively, they promise to play a progressively more important role in determining the shape of global governance. It is equally evident that effective and sustainable responses to the great transnational challenges of our time, including climate change, armed conflict, terrorism, gross violations of human rights, and uneven and unstable economic globalization, have to be universal in breadth and broadly perceived as legitimate. Multilateralism in some form is the natural and necessary means for confronting these challenges. The difficulties and precariousness of extant multilateral institutions are well known. With their newly acquired influence, will the emerging powers move the world order in a better direction? Can we reasonably hope for stronger multilateral institutions? These questions require long and necessarily speculative answers. To the end of throwing some light on present problems and prospects for addressing them, this essay focuses on only one of the moving parts that is shaping the future; namely, Brazil. Specifically, I inquire how the Brazilian attitude toward multilateralism has evolved in the face of its own internal challenges and those that engage the entire world. To cope with today’s complex realities, Brazil has participated in the creation of new multilateral forums: Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC); India,
Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy
Brazil, and South Africa Forum (IBSA); and Group of 20 (G-20). But in Brazil’s view of the world, regional and other limited number forums are not a substitute for the universal forum that is the United Nations. It remains the preeminent multilateral institution. This view of the UN could be called the core of Brazilian multilateral ideology. And while it may not be unique to Brazil, it is nevertheless a key to understanding Brazil’s multilateral diplomacy.
Seminal Moments in the Making of Brazil’s Multilateral Principles The multilateral focus was a constant in Brazilian diplomacy even before the creation of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations. To be precise, that focus first appeared in 1889 when Brazil attended a meeting of Western Hemisphere countries in Washington, DC, convened by President Grover Cleveland. The meeting turned out to be the embryo of the Organization of American States (OAS). By participating in this meeting, Brazil implicitly accepted multilateralism as a useful means for advancing its national interests. At the same time, however, it demonstrated its determination to resist multilateral commitments inconsistent with its perceived self-interest by joining with other Latin American countries in rejecting the US government’s proposal of a continental free-trade zone.1 While opposing that particular US initiative, Brazil regarded amiable relations with the United States as very much in the national interest. Consistent with that view, in 1906 it consolidated what both sides perceived to be an “unwritten alliance” with the United States. The essence of the understanding at the heart of that alliance was that the United States would help Brazil defend itself from European threats and would also support Brazil in the event that it encountered diplomatic problems with its neighbors. In exchange, Brazil would generally support the United States with respect to issues that arose between it and other Latin American states. A case in point was the controversy over the so-called Drago Doctrine, which purported to bar the use of military means by one state to force payment of its debts (normally to foreign bondholders) by another, a doctrine strongly supported by most other Latin states and particularly by Brazil’s principal neighbors. Overall, while as noted above Brazil was not hostile to multilateral diplomacy, it approached with great caution any proposals of a multilateral character; in particular, proposals that would commit Brazil indefinitely to a system of obligatory arbitration of disputes and proposals for various disarmament schemes. This caution reflected a still relatively weak state’s sense of risks to its national sovereignty, a sovereignty achieved a little later (in 1822) than in the case of other Latin states after Brazil’s short period as part of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Algarves (1815–1822). Throughout the twentieth century, Brazilian diplomacy was informed by a sense that it was not yet one of the major powers that at any given time could
. Would adhesion imply an obligation for a state to submit all of its judicial disputes to the court? The issue was divisive and some countries rejected peremptorily any possibility of accepting mandatory rulings by the court. whether or not the rules coincidentally advance the general interest of the international community. that Hague moment coincided with the beginning of Brazil’s “questioning the exclusive management of the world order by the major powers. France. and Japan) and countries with limited interests.2 Brazil did not object to the creation of the two institutions. At the same time. Remaining aloof from the norm-making process was seen as a bad option. Brazil’s proposed compromise. 377 define the rules constraining state behavior in a way to advance their interests as they saw them. Lafer posits.”3 A third seminal moment of Brazilian multilateralism occurred during the negotiation on the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice established by the League of Nations Covenant. Great Britain. as equality of states. a view of the world and how it should be organized and that this view is important to preserve . Brazil successfully opposed a procedural rule that distinguished between countries with general interests (the United States. which dictates that every country is juridicially equal. however. was one of the traits of that balancing act between multilateral commitment and a permanent effort for preserving and strengthening political autonomy. The latter strongly supported the creation of the International Prize Court and the Court of Arbitral Justice. Despite the overall alignment of their foreign policies. but was concerned about the unbalanced manner by which the major powers intended to define the composition of the courts. According to former foreign minister Celso Lafer. Italy. Brazil’s foreign policy elite believed that an optimal diplomacy meant participating actively in the norm-making process while being careful to avoid potentially dangerous constraints.” an attitude that became even more pronounced during the Versailles Conference of 1919. became a defining trait of the Brazilian identity in the 20th century. that is. the specific interests of the country. on certain key issues at the conference the Brazilian and US positions diverged.Gelson Fonseca Jr. The defense of sovereignty and its consequences for international order. Brazil’s behavior at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 illustrates this strategic approach to multilateral diplomacy. The debate ended up going beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to the fundamental question for the international order: how to decide on who decides in international institutions. The choice was clear: the control of the decision process was based either on a country’s power or on international law. . One of the contentious issues was the jurisdictional consequences of becoming a member of the court. “The affirmation that Brazil has general interests. which would have allowed the latter to participate only in sessions that dealt with their direct interests. Manifest even trumpeted sensitivity about threats to its sovereign discretion was seen as part of a strategy of participation in multilateral fora. At the outset of the conference. which in the end enabled the establishment of the new .
President Franklin D. and Great Britain became the de facto owners of the plans for the new organization since the other participants had only the barest of opportunities to influence the directives drawn up in Yalta. it appeared that Brazil would realize its aspiration even while its economy was in a developmental stage. the proposal was withdrawn. Nevertheless. The United States. The differences from one period to another could be attributed to internal changes in the political system (democracy vs.”4 This episode began to delineate a possible role for Brazil in multilateral forums. For a moment. “the principle of equality of States was preserved and the interests of major or minor powers were safeguarded. the latter because it viewed Brazil as a likely US ally in the Security Council and the former on the grounds that the expansion of the number of permanent members would dilute the Council’s decisionmaking capacity. mediating and creating bridges between highly contentious positions. That clause is now embodied in the Statute of the Permanent Court’s successor. Another seminal moment took place in the 1920s. So Brazil decided within the following year to withdraw entirely from the League. when Brazil tried to obtain a permanent seat on the council of the League of Nations.5 Brazil in San Francisco The negotiations to create the United Nations were dominated by the victors of World War II. its effort was thwarted by a decision of the European powers to award the seat to Germany as part of the process of reintegrating Germany into the established order. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggested that Brazil could occupy the “sixth permanent seat” in the Security Council.378 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy court. Following Roosevelt’s death. This episode evidences a point when Brazil was still a young and relatively weak state with an aspiration to become an important actor in the international arena and a readiness to pay significant diplomatic costs in order to make that aspiration become a reality. was the so-called optional clause that allowed each state party to the treaty creating the court to decide whether to accept compulsory jurisdiction to some greater or lesser degree. the International Court of Justice. the UN’s predecessor. But aspiration remained just that because both Britain and the Soviet Union objected to President Roosevelt’s proposal. namely. That move was a way to compensate Brazil for its early entry into World War II on the Allied side and its substantial contribution of bases and troops. the Soviet Union. The Evolution of Brazilian Attitudes at the United Nations It is possible to distinguish four broad periods in the evolution of Brazilian multilateral positions. authoritarian regime and closed vs. Brazilian participation was not entirely marginal. As Lafer explains. if at all. In 1926. open economy) and to the external transformation of .
a principle that Brazil construed broadly. in part because official and unofficial elites perceived the country’s identity as Western and Christian. An equal motive behind the vote was Brazilian desire to strengthen the influence of the General Assembly in security matters. as noted above. of maximizing the Assembly’s authority. Brazil tried.7 While seeking to avoid antagonizing the United States. While seeing itself as an influential actor in the General Assembly and therefore being an advocate. even under a UN mandate. Specifically. was deemed politically imprudent particularly for a government that at the time was losing its political support. to facilitate peaceful settlement by having the UN foster negotiation of inflammatory international issues while upholding the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs. which sanctioned the UN’s institutional participation in the Korean War of 1949–1953. It was. ousted President João Goulart. as a rule. diplomatically. however. send troops to Korea.6 As a member of the Western bloc. Brazil turned to democratic governance following the end of World War II before submitting again to authoritarian control in 1964 when a military coup. by virtue of being elected multiple times to the Security Council. During the democratic interregnum Brazilian foreign policy was strongly influenced by its alliance with the United States. One author characterizes Brazilian presence on the Council as “prestige multilateralism” because it was not linked to concrete and specific national interests that could be secured through Council membership in that era. it became a champion of UN peacekeeping. The 1956 Middle East crisis stemming from the joint Anglo-FrenchIsraeli attack on Egypt precipitated strong Brazilian support for UN involvement in actively maintaining the peace. . This position did not amount to reflexive support for US policy. Brazil. Brazil felt a greater interest in and responsibility for the success of the UN as the keystone institution of global order. 379 the international system (decolonization was decisive for the “modernization” of Brazil’s foreign policy).Gelson Fonseca Jr. did not. Brazil generally endorsed US positions in the UN General Assembly and in the Security Council. Unlike the UN’s authorization for military operations in Korea by the United States and its allies. Brazil voted for the Uniting for Peace resolution. the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) established in the wake of the Middle East war to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces was clearly identified with the office initiative of the Secretary General. To engage Brazilian troops in foreign countries. As a consequence. despite strong appeals from the United States. backed by the United States. with its Latin neighbors.8 More generally it could be said that. Brazil was elected to the Security Council three times during this democratic era. In doing so it was often at odds. Loyalty to the Western World and Institutional Criticism (1947–1960) After fifteen years of authoritarian rule (1930–1945).
hence. despite opposition from US oil companies. a middle power can significantly affect their decisions.9 Despite a shared hostility to the Soviet bloc and communism generally. the peacekeeping operation appeared as a new door open to middle powers to contribute to the solution of global security problems. of the nationalization of the country’s oil industry. Through that door came Brazil. and the Brazilian Congress’s approval.380 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy moreover. Moreover. the Secretary-General ordered the entire peacekeeping force withdrawn. An emphasis on institutional issues became a recurring theme of Brazil’s speeches in the General Assembly’s annual general debate. on the threshold of a new Middle East war. Brazil played a major role in the creation of the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA). which assigned a battalion to UNEF that remained in Suez until. And at an early point in global trade negotiations. The reason for this emphasis is simple: except for the Security Council. UN institutions have been based on the equality of nations and. but the Brazilian attitude became more ambiguous and frictions with the United States began to multiply. They were also quite critical of the way that the permanent members were damaging the Security Council’s legitimacy by using the Council as an East-West battleground rather than as an instrument for promoting friendly relations among member states. Brazil’s speeches were mainly about the need for a more influential General Assembly or a more vigorous Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Brazil needed greater autonomy and strengthening multilateralism began to be seen clearly as a means to that end. a source of heterodox theories of international trade. Aggravating that disappointment was a gradual intensification of Brazilian nationalism and determination to accelerate and deepen economic growth and to be an important actor in world affairs. An independent line also characterized Brazil’s discourse about the structure of the international economy. during the years of democratic government. Subsequently Brazil provided troops for the UN Operation in the Congo and United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea–West Irian (UNSF). Brazil’s overall alliance with the United States experienced a process of gradual attrition. Emblematic of a certain ambivalence was the coincidence in 1952 of a military assistance treaty with the United States. an instantiation of the Uniting for Peace resolution and. This was in part the result of the disappointed expectations of the Brazilian elite about economic assistance from the United States. of the importance of the General Assembly. which practically made the two armed forces partners.10 The foundations of the alliance remained. under Raul Prebisch. The unfulfilled potential from the Brazilian perspective of the alliance with the United States and the need for economic development led to a substantial adjustment of Brazilian foreign policy. in theory. Brazil began to support the notion that a country’s underdevelopment should be taken into account in the . which would become.
381 trade negotiations promoted by the United States to produce a progressively more open international trading system. broadening the scope of its potential diplomatic linkages. During the Cold War. The inauguration of the country’s new capital: Brasilia. there remained through the 1950s and 1960s an omission. Brazil would not join in a vote against its “mother country” until the years of the independent foreign policy. In 1956. This new status somehow universalized Brazilian identity. and Latin American. to support for the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which became in a sense the anti–General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the forum for and research arm of third world countries striving for increased economic growth and dubious about Washington. Peppering the Security Council with vetoes. which became one of the tenets for the Alliance for Progress. Another important theme that entered Brazilian discourse at the UN was the promotion of tolerance and the condemnation of racial discrimination. the period in which these policy inflections became pronounced. But in terms of aligning Brazil with the growing ranks of the third world. so that the anticommunist struggle could not be reduced to its strategic dimension. the . This anomaly grew out of the country’s special relationship with Portugal and was not unrelated to the settlement in Brazil of a vocal and wealthy Portuguese community. democracy itself would be threatened in the region. The expansion of identity led to support for the idea of “collective economic security” and. President Juscelino Kubitschek launched the Pan-American Operation (OPA). DC’s pursuit of free trade. an ambiguity with regard to colonialism. later. the anomaly endured until Portugal’s 1973 revolution spelled the end of its colonial vocation and the imminent independence of the so-called ultramarine provinces. coincided with one of the most innovative moments in Brazilian history. in the mid-1950s. Opposing the liberal orthodoxy championed by the United States. The country became more aware of its potential and acted accordingly. The United States rejected the transformation of the OPA into an institution that could organize hemispheric cooperation policies but not the idea behind it. and the first stages of modern industrialization all happened in this period. Christian. the emergence of an extraordinary cultural dynamism (exemplified by the rhythms of bossa nova). But before that.Gelson Fonseca Jr. The core of Kubitschek’s position was as follows: without growth. The mid-1950s. it was difficult for peripheral countries to take unique positions collectively. After that intermission. the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1960 was certainly motivated by the new concepts proposed by Kubitschek. It was the first time that Brazil tried to rally its neighbors to create instruments and goals in order to collectively negotiated economic cooperation with the United States. This position became sharper when. Brazil contended that absolute reciprocity should not be required from poor countries. Brazil began to add “underdeveloped” to its hitherto established identities as Western.
then. one can say that this brief era before the coup d’état against the democratic regime augured the long-term course of Brazilian diplomacy. This heightened global “activism” was naturally reflected in Brazil’s positions on issues at the UN. the developing world tried with some success to make space in UN political discourse and even. It should be noted that this period was rife with internal problems. then came the military coup suspending democracy of any kind. Coincidentally. And even in the political sphere. His successor. after a referendum. In this new world where the rift between the North and the South became structural. There followed in rapid and stunning succession of events: first. it changed back to a presidential system. that Brazil was charting for itself a position that was unique. But in the case of decolonization. the decolonization process picked up speed and the developing countries created groups to increase their leverage in multilateral forums. to be sure. At the same time (and not unrelated to the military coup). groups such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77). and also to a considerable degree externally. João Goulart (1961–1964). since Brazil’s desire for greater autonomy was already apparent during the Kubitschek administration.382 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy two superpowers generally constrained UN action in the majority of cases where concerns with peace and security seemed to demand it. starting with Quadros’s resignation and followed almost immediately by the signs of military resistance to what most senior officers (and the United States) considered Goulart’s lunge to the left. the expansion of the Brazilian diplomatic presence and the country’s readiness. according to Quadros. it did assume a leadership role in the economic sphere. to act as a “bridge” between the rich and the poor contributed to the sense internally. and also a more active role in economic and disarmament negotiations. action for an issue deemed to be isolable from the East-West struggle. Brazil was far from silent. In retrospect. This meant deeper relationships with African and socialist countries. it refrained from joining the NAM and thus waived an opportunity to become an across-the-board leader of the developing world. occasionally. shared Quadros’s general approach to foreign policy. Quadros’s resignation a mere two-thirds of the way through his first year in office did not halt the effort to mark out an independent foreign policy. the political system was changed from a presidential democracy to a parliamentary system. a president with a leftist and labor background. The new president wanted to broaden Brazil’s international scope while maintaining its connection to the Western world. But as one of the main proponents of UNCTAD. On the one hand. A Universal and Independent Foreign Policy (1960–1964) The election of Janio Quadros in 1960 led to deep changes in Brazilian foreign policy—changes that were not entirely unexpected. The su- . They also limited the authority and activity of the General Assembly to the best of their ability. relations with the United States became increasingly conflictive once President Goulart announced in 1962 his opposition to the economic blockade of Cuba.
would systematically block the acceptance of international instruments that could promote growth for the underdeveloped countries. and even less so in its multilateral positions. The support for decolonization was stronger and. and decolonization. such as the one that characterized the treaty on the partial freezing of nuclear tests—a treaty directly negotiated by the United States. Broadly speaking. The disarmament issue provided a convenient vehicle for Brazil to insert itself into global security discussions since it had a record on the issue that was difficult to assail. the last of Goulart’s foreign ministers. The ideas of autonomy. This period marked. It had no nuclear weapons. the origins of Brazilian modern diplomacy. Brazil changed its vote from negative to abstention on the General Assembly resolutions dealing with Portuguese problems. 383 perpower restraints on the UN were sharply criticized. as commodity agreements that could guarantee equitable prices for their exports. nonreciprocal tariff preferences. Brazilian criticism of the superpower nuclear arms race became more direct and vehement. The Western group. Because of these assets and its size and influence in Latin America. disarmament. The first one. and. and so on. Despite its close relations with Portugal. Two examples of this rap- . Brazil was invited as one of the eighteen neutral nations to serve on the UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva. the USSR. voted for two Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 180 and 183) declaring that keeping the colonies in Africa was a threat to peace and demanding that Portugal accept self-determination. summarized the goals of the independent foreign policy era in terms of the prominence of the three Ds: development. as mentioned above. was at peace with its neighbors. and it was a consistent supporter of an effective UN. and. Araujo Castro. and Great Britain—and then presented to the committee as a fait accompli. a remarkable change occurred. at the General Assembly. from 1964 to 1968. especially the United States. in 1963. Brazil indicted closed decision processes. is characterized by the return to close alliance with the United States and a clearly pro-Western position in Cold War matters (the 1964 coup was partly justified by the need to stop a “socialist republic” from being installed in Brazil). Years later. was not involved in an arms race. increase in the levels of financial and technical assistance. with respect to Portuguese colonies. In that forum. universal diplomatic relations. which continues somehow to serve as a guide for Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil would voice a similar criticism of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). the Brazilian representatives began to speak against what many saw as “an invisible veto” on progress toward a more equitable economic order. and a strong multilateral presence corresponded to a sort of ideal foreign policy for the country. there were two distinct moments.Gelson Fonseca Jr. The Military Government: Alliance and Conflict Within the Western Bloc (1964–1985) The authoritarian period was not uniform in terms of foreign policy.
especially the military elite. The inevitable result was isolation from the third world movement and. claiming that it unfairly perpetuated a division between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. The military regime also drew back from any hint of criticism of Portuguese colonialism. diminished its presence in multilateral forums. such as criticism of the development . a country consequential not for its bloc leadership but for its own capabilities. when the country became less dependent on the United States (due to the Brazilian economic “miracle”). and aligned its votes with those of the United States and the Western countries. They sharpened when the administration of US president Jimmy Carter criticized human rights practices in Brazil. characterized by the traditional aspiration to become a significant power. In multilateral forums. Multilateralism was still a relevant option. a reluctance to compete for electoral positions in the UN and termination altogether from the now obviously unattainable pursuit of a seat on the Security Council. hence. the Inter-American Force. but its potential was limited by Brazil’s isolation from third world countries. Brazil refused to sign the NPT. In an increasingly interdependent world divided by “ideological frontiers. indeed nominal leadership of.384 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy prochement include the break of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Brazilian participation in.” the notion of an “independent foreign policy” was senseless in the military government view. Selcher mentions the vigor and competitiveness with which the Foreign Ministry led the domestic and international attack against any emerging international consensus spawned by developed states and perceived as a contrived or arbitrary obstacle to full development of national potential. Some of the government’s decisions—for example. which served as an after-the-fact veil over the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. This attitude began to change by the end of the 1960s. The course Brazil then took was to begin staking out a place for itself as an autonomous power. but with new features as well. Wayne A.11 Brazil’s twenty-year failure to participate in UN peacekeeping operations after the withdrawal from Sinai in 1967 is another sign of the country’s retrenchment at the very outset of the military regime from any sort of prominent role in global multilateral diplomacy. the first and most important objective of the new move in Brazilian foreign policy was limiting the creation of any formal obstacles to the expansion of Brazilian potential. A conceptual alternative to interdependence emerged in elite discourse. During the same period (specifically in 1969). Replacing Goulart’s independent foreign policy was a declared commitment to a close alliance with the United States and the shared defense of Western values. extending Brazil’s territorial sea to 200 nautical miles and entering into a nuclear energy development pact with West Germany—led to quarrels with the United States. except on some economic North-South issues. and the government decided to abrogate the 1952 military cooperation agreement between the two countries.
it sought to maintain close ties with the West primarily through energetic bilateral relations. needed all of the things that the Global South was demanding. The country. Its newly returned president. then called Principle 20. The first was a dispute with Argentina over the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant. Brazil’s activism in commercial and economic issues is easily explainable. The main interests it served were in the economic field where Brazil’s position coincided with those of other developing states of the Global South. Juan Peron. after President Carter’s election. Argentina set about using its position in the movement to advance the principle of previous consultation for the construction of dams in rivers that traverse several countries. including raw material price floors. The issue surfaced in the 1972 Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm. Then came the 1973 oil crisis and the related emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel as a powerful actor on the international scene. and in 1976 it led the group’s meeting in Geneva.12 Autonomy was thus to be maintained by avoiding multilateral “restrictive” engagement. Then. On the political front. the Non-Proliferation Treaty. to strengthen its relationship with the Arab countries and to adopt a pro-Palestine position. international pollution standards. reliant as it was on oil imports. In the 1973 and 1974 General Assemblies. This timidity became unsustainable when it faced two problems that revealed how vulnerable the Brazilian position was in multilateral forums. This was arguably the only occasion when Brazil had to adopt a multilateral defensive stand in order to deal with a specific bilateral issue. Within UNCTAD the government opted for a very vocal. in the view of its elite. Though. but it did not come up for a vote. 385 of the Amazon. The 1973 oil crisis induced Brazil. Brazilian leadership in multilateral forums remained constrained by the government’s timidity about Portuguese colonialism and also about Palestinian rights. in 1968 Brazil presided over the G-77. However. which were rapidly becoming a major issue on the third world agenda. it was brought up in the General Assembly.13 Brazil found it difficult to contain the pressure from Argentina. nonreciprocity in commercial agreements. At that point. Brazil concluded that an alliance with third world countries was more than useful—it was necessary. the military government was more than ready to use multilateral diplomacy when it served what were perceived to be Brazil’s interests. the birth control issue. and capital investment on favorable terms. instead. highprofile style. While unilaterally warding off any perceived restraint on national development and autonomy. even as it worked a rapprochement with the third world.Gelson Fonseca Jr. Brazil failed to defeat resolutions calling for previous consultation. an arbitrary twelve-mile limit on coastal sovereignty and potential restrictions on use of water resources shared by many states. Relatedly. as noted above. had immediately placed Argentina within the NonAligned Movement. tariff concessions from the developed states. the . however.
It probably was one of the most controversial and internally disputed decisions (as was the recognition of the MPLA government) of Brazilian diplomacy in the 1970s. autonomy was crucial. Castro realized that. The combination of the two crises (Argentina and energy) clearly effected an adjustment in Brazilian strategy. For Castro.”16 After analyzing the consequences of détente and using the NPT as a model. which constrained Brazil’s possibilities for ascension and its maneuvering capability. The “dramatic” turning point happened when Brazil voted in favor of the resolution that equated Zionism with racism in 1974. Castro showed how the major powers used the multilateral system to secure an advantaged power position. the international order had to change since it often acted as an obstacle to Brazil’s efforts.14 The greatest difficulty in executing this plan was conciliating Brazil’s desire for deeper relationships with Africa and its tacit support for Portuguese colonialism. prudence. Another problem mentioned by Castro was the association of power with “responsibility” in the international order. The government accepted unreservedly the proposition that a good relationship with the third world was essential for the promotion of the country’s global interests. one of them. to fulfill its destiny. which made up more than one-third of the General Assembly. there were already signs in 1973 that Brazil was abandoning its neutral stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and was starting to support Palestinian positions. when Brazil became the first government to recognize the legitimacy of Angola’s Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government. As chair of the Security Council during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. utilizes brute force to achieve its political objective of domination. Ambassador Araujo Castro’s writings best describe Brazil’s new aspirations for autonomy. Castro did not propose that Brazil acquire nuclear weapons. the USSR. Goulart’s last chancellor and permanent representative at the UN from 1968 to 1971. he made the following remark: In the precise moment non-nuclear nations are asked to blindly trust the actions or moderation of the nuclear powers. In the Arab case. and .386 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy country’s authoritarianism and its nuclear pact with Germany began to strain the bilateral relationship with the United States. but he pointed out how fragile were the disarmament commitments made by nuclear nations. the fundamental working concept to understand the international order is the notion of the “freezing of global power. The curious political assumption that power is synonymous with moderation. It was evident that any multilateral action could be compromised if it did not have the support particularly of the African countries. detailed the conceptual framework of the independent foreign policy.15 Castro. This contradiction was only resolved in 1975. The starting point was the idea that Brazil is a country “condemned to greatness” and. to achieve it. in contrast with the obligations of those states that had no weapons.
protection of rights and freedoms). democracy first affected Brazil’s self-image. initiating a period of institutional stability that lasts yet today. to achieve this goal. with a goal of self-defense to avoid. became ill and died within a few months. perhaps even spheres of domination. By invading Czechoslovakia.19 Not surprisingly. The democratic opening was in motion and the country was regaining self-confidence. several articles of the UN Charter. would create a doctrine of spheres of influence.20 As early as 1985. the possibility that multilateral institutions were an instrument for major powers to advance their own interests became again a constant concern to Brazilian diplomacy. General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo. The decision could be linked to the reshaping of the Brazilian image abroad. one of the permanent members of the Security Council ripped.17 Following Castro’s ideas. and it should be preserved as such. direct elections. an assertive multilateral attitude would be crucial. however. for the first time.. from the inside. Despite that motivation. Sar- . Brazil did not adopt an obstructionist stance while in the commission. His vice president Jose Sarney assumed the presidency and completed his mandate in 1990. There was no dialogue with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It is curious that.g. Brazil was elected to the Human Rights Commission. the foundations of Brazil’s multilateral politics has been clearly altered. and one year later. In 1977. attended the opening of the general debate of the General Assembly. It was not a sudden change. Besides the return to institutional democracy (e. a Brazilian head of state. which. if accepted. Its new and essential objective was to “recover its international status” and. with a growing number of NGOs and social movements becoming participants in the political scene. viewed as an instrument of Western powers. With democracy. in the first years of democracy. as Rubens Ricupero observes. 387 responsibility was disproved. any investigations on human rights violations in Brazil. through the indirect election by Congress of the first civilian president since 1964. continuity in foreign policy was viewed as positive. President Tancredo Neves. but a gradual one. Brazil’s attitude was extremely restrictive and any hypothesis of international cooperation was overruled by sovereignty. With regard to human rights. Democratization and the New Tendencies of Brazil’s Multilateral Behavior (1985–2011) Brazil once again became a democratic nation in 1985. and shockingly justified this violation by invoking a strange “limited sovereignty” theory. in a single night. President Neves used to say that the Itamaraty’s foreign policy is an area for consensus. there was a simultaneous democratization of Brazilian society. direct presidential elections were reestablished.18 In 1982.Gelson Fonseca Jr. A new constitution was approved in 1988.
war and liberty are incompatible . In this context. and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The adhesion to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. but the way to respond to their concerns passed through multilateral forums—a place where the voice of the social movements was being heard with increasing repercussion. human rights violators. the Covenant on Social and Economic Rights. with an active role in the UN global conferences of the 1990s. There was a movement of aggiornamento (updating). it was elected to a nonpermanent seat. Brazilian diplomacy had possibilities to influence the new design in the pattern of international legitimacy. . Argentina. After the solution of the Itaipu problem (1979). consequently. a legacy from the authoritarian years. from economic stability—to explore new ways to project the country internationally? The process to recover the international status began in the first phase of democratization. unusual as a matter of course for the military. it was natural that Brazil ran for a Security Council seat after a twenty-year absence and. in 1989. the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) agreement between Brazil. Brazilians were viewed as enemies of the environment. The second challenge is more complex and remains today: how can Brazil use the political capital it gained from democratization—and later on. getting closer to the principles of international legitimacy in environmental matters. in the inter-American arena. with the newly gained margins for maneuvering. President Sarney said that “war and democracy. First. Brazil could again be innovative in the General Assembly. during the Sarney administration (1985–1990). and disarmament. which established a mutual nuclear facility inspection process and. it had to transform its negative image. the dissolution of the two countries’ “strategic rivalry. Additionally. . the relationship with Argentina was deepened through the establishment of a gradual process of economic integration in 1988 (the origin of Mercosul). the country faced two distinct challenges. human rights.” Brazil gave a concrete and tangible demonstration of a new disposition in disarmament matters. In the general debate of 1985. We wish to be heard. The “accusers” were mostly the NGOs (international and Brazilian). notably in the area of human rights. but we have no desire to be hegemonic.388 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy ney’s speech in the general debate delineates the aspiration that will guide Brazilian diplomacy: “I’m here to say that Brazil does not wish anymore to have a timid voice. and. Brazil began to simultaneously change its internal institutions and its international conduct. Brazilian officials began to mention democracy in their speeches. the signature of the San Jose Pact (in 1986) made Brazil compliant with the new standards of international legitimacy. and distant from the disarmament struggle because the government did not sign the NPT. presenting in 1986 a proposal for a South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. timid in commitment to multilateralism due to a reluctance to engage in peace missions.”21 From the mid-1980s on. the Convention on Torture (in 1985). .
and the environment. This was a way. Since 1990. It became clear. The government followed the constitutional process and the crisis was resolved according to the constitution. The stature of the country obviously changed. giant hydroelectric dams) did not jibe with the new environmental consciousness of Brazil and the world.”22 Brazilian diplomacy had finally discovered Kant. not by repudiating the social and international pressures to cooperation. the principles that should guide the conduct of foreign policy. It also forbids. inflation was reined in and the process of economic opening and privatization continued. had an important international presence. The sum of the consolidation of democracy. that autonomy could be strengthened by integration in legitimacy mainstream.Gelson Fonseca Jr. Both. in Article 21. Internally.g. Brazil’s participation in the 1990s global . on the other. The second was a more significant participation in peace missions and a deeper engagement in international security issues. on one hand. pacific and consensual solutions will prevail. in their own ways. especially in the areas of human rights. though still revealing dramatic social inequalities. which lists in Article 5. then. the institutional democracy was consolidated when the country experienced a constitutional crisis that resulted in the impeachment of the first democratically (directly) elected president. promulgated in 1988. started improving when inflation (which penalizes mainly the lower classes) was controlled. An important factor in molding Brazilian foreign policy was the new constitution. The first sign of a greater international prestige (or soft power) is a more active multilateral presence. The style of development pursued by the military government (e. During the Sarney administration. to reinforce through the UN a national awareness of environmental problems and. the production of nuclear weapons. The arguments against international cooperation did not work anymore. the country’s first massive social assistance programs were launched and these were later improved under Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). including traditional concepts like sovereignty and peaceful conflict resolution as well as new ones such as protection of human rights and regional integration. economic stability. disarmament. and social improvement had positive international repercussions. Brazil continued shifting its foreign policy closer to the mainstream of international legitimacy. the Brazilian preference for multilateralism became stronger due to internal changes and the subsequent growing importance of the country in the international order. Another problem was the Brazilian attitude toward environmental issues. Social indicators.. permanent institutions. democracy. to show that the country was open to international cooperation in this area. 389 when nations have freedom. and popular participation. roads in the middle of forests. a functioning government. Brazil acknowledged this shift and offered to host the UN Earth Summit in 1992. In 1992.
in 1998 Brazil signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. At the same time. the valorization continues. to mention a few. illegal imprisonment. According to Jose Augusto Lindgren Alves. Take. for example. Brazil is worried about the system’s greatest vice. as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. the head of the Brazilian delegation. more linked to the society aspirations. that Lula was able to take advantage of the spaces created by the retreat of the major powers (such as the United States. Brazil opened its borders to human rights inspectors. created a national human rights plan. Brazilian diplomacy defends the idea that selectivity can be neutralized with the universalization of human rights review . which share meaningful similarities in UN issues. which is still going on today. which had its legitimacy undermined after the use of torture in the war on terror as well as the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan). however. in this connection. and approved a law dealing with the “disappeared. First. and the South America–Arab Countries Summit. but to Lindgren Alves. the Brazilian reaction has been twofold.23 It should be noted. presided at the drafting committee and played a significant role in achieving consensus over the final text. there are two distinct periods: the adhesion to international procedures (1990–1994) and the valorization of the system. created a reparation mechanism for those who suffered violations. politicization. Lula promoted several multilateral initiatives: the BRIC grouping. which weakens its foundation and leads sometimes to inertia when faced with the gross violations by major powers. After ratifying the covenants on civil and political rights and economic and social rights. nor discuss the differences between President Fernando Henrique and President Lula’s diplomacy. in 1993.390 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy conferences also brought about changes in the way foreign policy was formulated.g. Following through with the treaties. To correct the selectivity problem. The Brazilian positions for these global conferences were prepared by commissions composed of representatives from the government and NGOs (and NGO representatives also participated in the conferences as delegates). The space for proposals broadened and. even though after 2006. as in the case of the Iraq War (e.” In the Conference of Vienna. Brazil manifested some apprehension about the way that the international human rights system was performing. Foreign policy became more democratic. IBAS. The goal of this article was not to delve into all aspects of the evolution of Brazilian diplomacy in the past few years. In the recent phase. Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). the case of human rights. being elected for the first composition of the Council of Human Rights. it was approached with a certain grain of caution.. Brazilian diplomacy promotes the human rights ideals and is an active participant in UN institutions. G-20. sent the reports required by the various covenants. Yet the continuities are also worth discussing. the need to improve the UN mechanisms became another aspect of the Brazilian attitude. and torture). Ambassador Gilberto Saboia.
Even before democratization in the 1990s. 1993–1994. . Israel) that rejected the treaty. Perhaps the coalition’s most important contribution was the introduction at the revision conference held in 2000 of the thirteen-step proposal offering “an alternative to the maximalist disarmament proposals. Brazil had a long-running tradition in peacekeeping missions that began in 1956 with the Suez. Brazilian nuclear policies were unreservedly peaceful and so quite different from those of the nonsignatories. insisting that specific violations be dealt with in a discreet fashion and that enforcement instruments be used only as a last resort. Brazil’s role as head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti has a special meaning. now. 2004–2005. Furthermore. strengthening its legitimacy. Brazil signed the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and adhered to informal mechanisms such as the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. On one hand. Brazil participated actively in the conferences for the revision of the NPT.24 A similar movement toward mainstream legitimacy has occurred in disarmament issues. and. insisting on the adoption of realistic and practical measures. Haiti and Lebanon. A clear provision in the 1988 constitution prohibiting use of nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes is another factor to explain the decision taken by Brazil to sign the NPT. There were no political or strategic reasons to remain in the company of the few countries (India. A combination of national and international circumstances ultimately sealed the decision to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998. Recently. Sweden. New Zealand. second. Mexico. 391 systems and. Ireland. NPT membership was almost universal and Brazilian motivation not to adhere became somehow dysfunctional. Pakistan. East Timor. should be broad and global. by definition. and 2010–2011). and Slovenia).26 Progress was achieved. however mostly beyond the boundaries of UN multilateralism. 1998–1999.Gelson Fonseca Jr. The first is with respect to participation in peacekeeping missions and the second has to do with significant interventions as a nonpermanent member in the UN Security Council (Brazil held a seat at the Council several times: 1988–1989. the Brazilian attitude did not come without a good measure of frustration due to the limited relevance of multilateral forums at the helm of a process which. but also because it signals a willingness to more incisively assume a position of command in the solution of regional crises. forming in 1998 a negotiating group dubbed the Coalition for a New Agenda that brought together countries from the North and South (Brazil. Additionally. the 1995 review conference had decided to extend the treaty’s validity. Also worthy of mention are two other developments within the realm of security and peace. not only due to the dimension of this engagement in material and human terms. the most important contributions were in Angola (UN Angola Verification Mission ). At any rate. In order to complete the reshaping of the disarmament policy.”25 This is a remarkable example of Brazil’s effort to serve as a bridge in multilateral forums. Egypt.
in its current format. Brazil abstained in four of the thirteen resolutions adopted on the Haiti question and in one of them. Mozambique. attempted a similar move in view of the impasse holding back nuclear energy negotiations with Iran. In 2010. Evidently. which sometimes cannot be characterized as “security problems”. In many of its votes. following US missile strikes. As Antonio Patriota indicated. Resolution 948. He was assigned the task of organizing panels aiming at assessing the manifold dimensions of the Iraqi situation (e. bringing together permanent members in a direction that restored the authority of the Security Council in one of the most controversial issues on the international agenda. In Brazilian diplomacy. but not necessarily a monopoly over political wisdom. these are not the only ones. In addition to the impeccable assessment carried out (none of the contents of the final report were ever refuted). In 1994. insofar as it has opinions and proposals. are at stake. presided the Security Council. second. Brazil did not approve the demarcation of the frontiers between Kuwait and Iraq by the Council or the attempts to extend the Council’s jurisdiction to deal with issues such as drug trafficking or the environment. At the time. or East Timor. the panel proposed a framework for the return of inspection that guided the negotiations that led to the resolution creating the UN Monitoring. Brazil is there to represent the international community and. with Celso Amorim now acting as minister of foreign relations. Brazil fully exercised its ability to build bridges. In a similar vein.g. This impasse undermined the Council’s prestige and created doubts concerning the possession (or not) of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. after rotating back into the Council. Brazil had explicit concerns with the institutional limits of Council’s action. It is important to emphasize that. Brazilian permanent representative. it must act with the incisiveness that is called for. A noteworthy example took place in the late 1990s when.29 At that point in time. the Haitian situation was not characterized at that time as a threat to peace and so it was not deemed to be within the Council’s competence. and Inpsection Commission in 1999. January 1999. Permanent members have the prerogative of the veto. Nonetheless. opportunities for full-fledged action in the Council. Verification. are limited but can be useful nonetheless. and.392 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy Brazil’s participation in the Security Council especially stands out when issues important to it. Ambassador Celso Amorim.27 Another area for expanding the Council’s agenda had to do with the humanitarian agenda. in this case. and indemnities). for Brazilian diplomacy. the problem of efficaciousness of interventions that tend to deal with domestic matters. Brazil. disarmament. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss why the Brazilian and Turkish formula for . humanitarian conditions.28 Brazilian reactions were cautious for two main reasons: first. the conceptual difficulties involved in defining new areas for the Council’s action. Iraq prohibited the entry of nuclear inspectors. it acted alone. the nonpermanent status does not imply any restriction as to how to act or vote. as in the case of the responsibility to protect. such as Angola.. Haiti.
The stated goal consists of reducing in half the number of people in the world suffering and dying as a result of poverty and hunger by the year 2015. the Group of 4 (G4). gained momentum. launched in 2004 by the presidents of Brazil. The Brazilian emphasis—and that of many other developing countries—on “differentiated” responsibilities was germane to the idea of “sharing” costs. After the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92). for instance. Spain. domestically. which days later imposed a new round of sanctions on Iran. its commitment to the values and practices of the United Nations. The greatest risk is mutual demonizing of negotiating positions. The Brazilian credentials are indisputable given. France. and Chile. But some controversy remains regarding the “costs” of the candidacy and the strategy adopted in its pursuance. The criticism concentrated on the idea that Brazil does not have specific strategic interests in Iran and so its capacity to influence events in the region is modest.Gelson Fonseca Jr. Another revealing sign of Brazil’s multilateral stance was the Initiative Against Hunger proposal. But during President Lula’s term in office. Its candidacy thus seems “natural” and. The negotiating processes must strike a balance between a careful (and painful) sharing of costs incurring on the short run and the need for a global environmental solidarity. the traditional attitude in matters related to the environment was that sovereignty was the sole factor defining Brazil’s choices. which is always a possibility when issues that are at the same time highly technical and emo- .30 This item is crucial since curbing global warming implies costs that affect economic potential. the initiative was ignored by the permanent members. Brazil has cultivated excellent relations in its region and a good reputation at the global level. Differently than what occurred in 1999. one of the “emblematic” concerns consists of defining shares of responsibility for global warming. Brazil and Turkey voted against that resolution. As I indicated above. India. A mention of Brazil’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the Security Council is in order. there was no mandate to act on behalf of the Council and. On the other hand. The ensuing clash between rich countries (traditional polluters) and emerging countries (recent polluters) was more than expected. hence. They go hand in hand. this attitude evolved to admit international cooperation. Is the hypothesis one of causing harm to or enhancing Brazil’s regional presence? What is the effective cost of garnering more votes? Is Brazil prepared for global diplomacy? Answers have been varied. the Brazilian attitude was broadly discussed internally. the disposition to pursue alongside Germany. Nowadays. 393 enrichment of Iranian uranium in a third world country was not even brought up in the Security Council. a reform proposal establishing new permanent members. the effort to become a permanent member of the Security Councial has achieved a reasonable consensus. and Japan. Two important issues in which Brazil’s profile has been increasing must be summarily mentioned: trade and the environment. Brazil was a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol.
would it be worthwhile to maintain its engagement or would it be preferable to pursue partial solutions according to specific interests and selected partners. if we look back at the United Nations Climate Change Conference meetings. not least because several issues in this realm (e. But I think it may be sufficient to demonstrate one simple point: Brazil has had a consistent and clear multilateral vocation. the diagnosis made by Brazilian diplomacy is that partial movements are quite distant to under- . but the hard game of politics is the necessary means to realize those goals. the demands of the developed countries are concentrated in modernized sectors (e. developed countries are the ones with an illiberal attitude only to protect the more traditional sectors of their economies. Vocation and caution go together. The Brazilian attitude. Brazil has expended a large amount of political capital in the United Nations. multilateralism is seldom a clear path. and its view of the future conforms to the tenets of its multilateral vision. In a nutshell. into missions with considerable staffs and. This capital is translated.. This is not how Brazil sees it because the country is always motivated by a belief in universal solutions for trade. A sort of utopian realism marks Brazil’s attitude. have evolved to a willingness to accept greater responsibilities for the costs of attenuating the effects of climate change. Brazil is a fair partner in the game. greater access to industrialized products and services markets) in which the developing countries are not always internationally competitive and little is offered in sectors where they are competitive like agriculture. It has legitimate interests to protect. are ultimately becoming irrelevant. The road ahead is not yet clear. many believe that they are entering a terminal stage. especially the UN.g. On the other hand.. But again. This constitutes a natural path for Brazil’s projection into the decisionmaking arena of the international order. subsidies) are intrinsically global. morally. If it is to accept the notion that universal forums. for example as in the Group of 8 (G8) model?31 Thus far. The Doha Round negotiations are advancing slowly. without abandoning the need to find a balanced and just solution for developing countries.394 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy tional are at stake. Ideals and principles define the goals of the institutions. physically. The complexity of the Brazilian economy is crucial in understanding Brazil’s stance. Conclusion My examination of the evolution of Brazil’s multilateral attitude was naturally quite selective.g. characterized by a balanced view of the possibilities and limitations of the United Nations. Often. We need a stronger multilateralism because the multilateral forums are the ideal stage for the middle powers to influence global questions. but Brazil does not. into the acceptance of the legitimacy of the decisions made by the organization. They have the economic and financial conditions to subsidize their agricultural sectors.
O Brasil nas Nações Unidas (Brasilia: FUNAG. Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa. Selcher. 1919–1926 (Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS. if Brazil were to become a member of the Security Council. 7. p. So Brazil has. V. It does not aspire to be a military power. A Identidade Nacional do Brasil e a Política Externa Brasileira (São Paulo: Perspectiva. 5. More than ever. p. Brazilian diplomats believe that the country’s settled commitment to multilateralism is the trump card in its bid for a permanent seat. 1978). Presently. served as permanent representative to the United Nations from 1999 to 2003. and universal forum. 3. This article was translated by Jose Pedro Londres Fonseca. Brazil’s Multilateral Relations (Boulder: Westview. Brazil. Indeed. 82. there is a need for countries that know how to build bridges in a world in which clear consensus and easily convergent interests are difficult to find. O Conselho de Estado e a política externa do Império. The motives behind Brazil’s approving the bureau can be found in the report on the US invitation issued by the State Council on 7 November 1888. 2000). Ibid. Alexandra Barahona reviewed the text with care and intelligence. 2007). Benoni Belli.Gelson Fonseca Jr. 73. So. The author wishes to thank Tom Farer for his perceptive observations and his careful. but rather to strengthen it and to ensure that partial movements converge toward the universal forum. and it is still a developing country. Rubens Ricupero. this article reflects only his personal views. Celso Lafer. Brazilian diplomacy firmly sustains the belief that the solutions to the problems Brazil faces in several fields. p. 4. p. 78. Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa. and Gisela Padovan for their rich comments. E. 1. O Brasil na Liga das Nações: Vencer ou Não Perder. Brazil’s presence in the world is essentially diplomatic. from disarmament to the environment. 2010). its multilateral orientation would be an asset that could help to generate more diverse ways of facing conflict resolution and the issues of security than those that have tended to resonate with the present permanent members. Breno Hermann. He also thanks Celso Lafer. and as consul general (Madrid) from 2006 to 2009. The challenge is not to abandon the UN. Garcia. 2.. and sensitive editing of the text. intelligent. 395 mine the need for a strong. legitimate. it is not promoting an ideological agenda. Notes Gelson Fonseca Jr. been relating to the world primarily through diplomacy. 6. he is inspector general of the Foreign Service (since 2009) and professor at Instituto Rio Branco. Brasilia. 2009). perforce. And diplomacy should be the domain of tolerance—of the ability to deal with differences—which is a product that the world needs with urgency. Eduardo Uziel. as ambassador to Santiago from 2003 to 2006. O Conselho de Segurança e a Inserção do Brasil no Mecanismo de Segurança Coletiva das Nações Unidas (Brasília: FUNAG. 38. 2000). 1975–1889 (Brasilia: FUNAG. must be universal. . Ibid. See Wayne A. 8. While the author is a member of the Brazilian diplomatic service.
“the chief national goal became industrialization. Rubens Ricupero. p. 447. O Conselho de Segurança e a Inserção do Brasil no Mecanismo de Segurança Coletiva das Nações Unidas. Vargas. 16. 26. p. “Human Rights and the Role of Brazil. p. Ver Antonio Patriota. 2010).” p. Rodrigo Amado. as many of his predecessors. because it opposed the existence of permanent seats for the P5 on the Council. 23. A different attitude in regard to the Iranian problems was the first movement. See A. 219.. Patriota is now the Brazilian foreign minister and. See Carlos S. See J. during his 2004–2005 mandate. 75. Andre A. the campaign to obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council led to very different diplomatic mobilization efforts. Estocolmo.” in O Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG. because that would tend to over-accentuate some political vulnerabilities in areas not immediately tied to the national interest.. p. p. much more forceful during Lula’s government. p. G.. 2008). p. As Selcher (Brazil’s Multilateral Relations) explains. p. 231–249. 2008). See Uziel. 27. 2007). Lindgren Alves. O Conselho de Segurança após a Guerra do Golfo.396 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy 9. 80. 11. p. 50 15. 13. 84. 25. Ibid. Padovan. O Brasil na ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG. Correa do Lago. Brazil’s Multilateral Relations. For instance. “Os Três Painèis sobre o Iraque nas Nações Unidas. ed. given how irritated and disappointed a number of African nations. 457. Uma Esplêndida Tradição. 23. 18. . A. Rio. Gorgulho. 38. 22. 17. Ibid.” in Alexandre de Gusmão..” p. because it defended the notion that the Security Council could impose restrictions on the International Criminal Court. 2008). p. Uma Esplêndida Tradição: João Augusto Araujo Castro e a Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasilia: Instituto Rio Branco. 39. Seixas Correa. Patriota. The author mentions that. O Brasil nas Nações Unidas. 138. permanent representative to the UN. A. Some differences are meaningful. (Brasília: FUNAG.. Ibid. Duarte. 12. In a 1968 telegram. p. p. 19. starting with Kubistchek. Diário de Bordo (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial). Ibid. and Resolution 1646 (Human Rights Council). O Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG. and L. Araujo Castro (Brasilia: Editora Universidade de Brasilia. 10. Ambassador Araujo Castro. 190. 1982). Resolution 1593 (Sudan). whose mandate began 1 January 2011. because it disagreed with the characterization of the situation as a threat to peace. Brazilian president Dilma Roussef. who do not hide their hostility. 28. 21. “Por um mundo livre de armas de destruição em massa: desarmamento e não proliferação. Joanesburgo: o Brasisl e as três conferências ambientais das Nações Unidas (Brasília: FUNAG. p. and Brazil voted in favor of a Council of Human Rights resolution that designated a special rapporteur for Iran. has a strong multilateral background. pp. 2008). ed.. signaled that some changes will be introduced in human rights policies. Costa Vargas. 24.. p.” in Alexandre de Gusmão. 29. 45. Foreign policy ceased being merely expressive (declarative of what Brazil represents in the world) and became instrumental to concrete national programs. was explicit: “I see great difficulty ahead for any Brazilian aspiration to higher positions in the UN. 81. 20. Selcher.” The telegram can be found in J. 14. despite the same goals. Brazil abstained only in three votes in the Security Council: Resolution 1559 (Lebanon). 2nd ed. 441. 164. Ibid. Selcher (Brazil’s Multilateral Relations) correctly states that “Brazil has kept a low profile in not showing great interest in election to a Security Council seat at the present time.
397 30. see Lia Valls Pereira. 31. such as intellectual property. “A Política Externa do Governo Lula: o fim do consenso de Brasília. a similar criticism is also raised.Gelson Fonseca Jr. agricultural subsidies. . In trade matters.” Breves Cindes (August 2010). Moreover. The government defense says that there are areas. but global warming is perhaps the most revealing of the interests being negotiated. “A pauta do comércio exterior brasileiro e os acordos comerciais. Pedro Motta Veiga and Sandra Polonio Rios. the diversified (in terms of products and international partners) Brazilian economy tends to gain in absolute terms only with global negotiations.” Conjuntura Econômica (June 2010). and others. There are several other issues. that necessarily require a universal treatment or the results will be meaningless. For a summary of the discussion on trade policies. It is said that Brazil should have engaged more consistently in bilateral free-trade agreements instead of waiting for the dubious possibility of success of the Doha Round.
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