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, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FAUSTO O. RAYMUNDO, defendant-appellant. A.D. Gibbs, for appellant. Gabriela La O, for appellees. TORRES, J.: This is an appeal field by the defendant from a judgment of conviction rendered by the Hon. Judge Araullo. On the date of August 31, 1908, the attorneys for the plaintiffs, Estanislaua Ar enas and Julian La O, brought suit against Fausto O. Raymundo, alleging, as a ca use of action, that Estanislaua Arenas was the owner and proprietor of the jewel ry described below with the respective value thereof: Two gold tamborin rosaries, without bow or reliquary at P40 each P80 One lady’s comb for fastening the hair, made of gold and silver, adorned with pearls of ordinary size and many small pearls, one of which is missing 80 One gold ring set with a diamond of ordinary size 1,000 One gold bracelet with five small diamonds and eight brillantitos de almendr as 700 One pair of gold picaporte earrings with two diamonds of ordinary size and t wo small ones 1,100 The plaintiffs alleged that the said jewelry, during the last part of April or t he beginning of May, 1908, was delivered to Elena de Vega to sell on commission, and that the latter, in turn, delivered it to Conception Perello, likewise to s ell on commission, but that Perello, instead of fulfilling her trust, pledged th e jewelry in the defendant’s pawnshop, situated at No. 33 Calle de Ilaya, Tondo, a nd appropriated to her own use the money thereby obtained; that on July 30, 1908 , Conception Perello was prosecuted for estafa, convicted, and the judgment beca me final; that the said jewelry was then under the control and in the possession of the defendant, as a result of the pledge by Perello, and that the former ref used to deliver it to the plaintiffs, the owners thereof, wherefore counsel for the plaintiffs asked that judgment be rendered sentencing the defendant to make restitution of the said jewelry and to pay the costs. In the affidavit presented by the attorney for the plaintiffs dated September 2, 1908, after a statement and description of the jewelry mentioned, it is set for th that the defendant was retaining it for the reason given in the complaint, an d that it was not sequestrated for the purpose of satisfying any tax or fine or by reason of any attachment issued in compliance with any judgment rendered agai nst the plaintiffs’ property. In discharge of the writ of seizure issued for the said jewelry on the 2nd of Se ptember, 1908, aforementioned, the sheriff of this city made the return that he had, on the same date, delivered one copy of the bond and another of the said wr
Perello having pledged the jewelry in question to the defendant Raymundo. and no t having redeemed it by paying him the amount received. The case came up for hearing on March 17. or. the widow of Pazos. could not restore the je welry as ordered in that judgment.52 4. and forwarded to the clerk of this court. was prosecuted in the Court of First Inst ance of this City in cause No. now serving the sentence imposed upon her. and mediation of Gabriel La O. and pledged without his knowledge by Concepcion Perello in the pawnshop of the defendant. amounting to P8. in consequence thereof. asked that the same be set aside. This is an action for the replevin of certain jewelry delivered by its owner for sale on commission. it follows that the conv icted woman. on the petition and designation of the attor ney for the plaintiffs. with the costs of the suit again st the plaintiffs. and to pay the costs. and as a special defense alle ged that the jewelry. the right being reserved to the defendant to instit ute his action against the proper party. to the penal ty of one year eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional. together with the interest due. together with others. and the proper bill of exceptions was duly approved certified to. be returned to the defendant. to rest ore to the offended party the jewelry specified in the complaint. rendered j udgment sentencing the defendant to restore to the plaintiff spouses the jewelry described in the complaint. Thi s motion was denied. explained. s etting forth that he denied each and all of the allegations thereof which were n ot specifically admitted. if be in the possession of . consent. and held it in his possession during the f ive days prescribed by law. ta king it out of the defendant’s control. who refuses to deliver the sa id jewelry unless first redeemed. 1909. five days having elapsed without the def endant’s having given bond before the court. to the prejud ice of their owner Estanislaua Arenas. and that. and a new trial granted. to suffer the cor responding subsidiary imprisonment. After the demurrer to the complaint had been overruled the defendant answered. On the 15th of the same month and year. This judgment is attes ted by the certified copy attached under letter D to folio 26 of the record of t he proceedings in the case of the same plaintiff against Antonio Matute – the pled gee of the other jewelry also appropriated by the said Concepcion Perello – which record forms a part of the evidence in this cause. proceeded to seize the jewelry described in the writ.it to the defendant personally and. which has become final by the defendant’s acqui escence. with the knowledge. The said Concepcion Perello. The counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment. as their agent. 3955 and sentenced on July 30. who with the sheriff signed the return of the writ. 1908. or to pay the value thereof. the defendant theref ore prayed that the complaint be dismissed and that the jewelry seized at the in stance of the plaintiffs. the subject matter of the complaint was pledged on his paw nshop by Conception Perello. Raymundo. and after the presentation of or al testimony by both parties. the count. the sheriff made delivery of all the jewelry described in the said order to the attorney for the plaintiff to the lat ter’s entire satisfaction. Fausto O. on June 23 of the same year. Article 120 of the Penal Code prescribes: The restitution of the thing itself must be made. or qualified. who appropriated to herself the money derived from the pledging of the jewels before mentioned. exceptions was taken by the appellant. as security for a loan of P1. in case of insolvency. or the amount of the loan made thereon.660. a son of the plai ntiffs. the said plaintiffs we re estopped from disavowing the action of the said Perello.
They were No. to restore to Varela. who had acquired it in a legal manner. to the detriment of the owner of the jewelry. In view of the harmonious relation between the different codes in force in these Islands. to subsidiary imprisonment. whereupon th e defendant began to serve her sentence. 482). recover them. On January 2. among other cases. reserving. 479. or to pay the value thereof. and. the jewelry appropriated. Restitution shall be made. Varela vs. as against all others. the prov isions of the Code of Commerce shall be observed. this court had occasion to decide. it is natural and logical that the aforementioned provision of the Pen al Code. however. Tried estafa in cause No. However. however. whosoever may be the person who pl edged them. 3890. Neither can the owner of things pledged in pawnshops. reserving. based on the rule established in article 17 of the same.a third person. acquired in good faith. to wit. 2429. should be in agreement and accordance with the provisions of article 464 of the Civil Code which prescribes: The possession of personal property. demanded the restitution or d . has acquired it in go od faith at a public sale. two wh ich were entirely analogous to the present one. who had acquired it in a legal manner. the owner can not recover it without reimbursing the price paid therefor. Finnick (9 Phil. his action against the proper person. In the decisions in both cases it appears that Nicolasa Pascual received various jewels from Josefa Varela to sell on commission and that. and No. The case just cited is identical to tha t of Concepcion Perello. his action against the proper person. If the possessor of personal property. without previously refunding to the institution the amount of the pl edge and the interest due. lost or stolen. in separate incidental proceedings. 3889. the said Pascual was convicted and sentenced to the penalty of one year and eleven months of prision correccional. a preferential right to be indemnified . or at fairs or markets or from a merchant legally established and usually employed in similar dealings. that e very person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. The provisions contained in the first two paragraphs of the preinserted article are based on the uncontrovertible principle of justice that the party injured th rough a crime has. she pledged some of them in t he pawnshop of Antonio Matute and others in that of H. Varela vs. even though the thing may be in the possession of a third person.J. this judgment became final. 1908. M atute. the person who has lost personal property or has bee n illegally deprived thereof may recover it from whoever possesses it. or to have restored to him the thing of which he was unduly deprived by crimin al means. Finnick and appropriate d to herself the amounts that she received. is equivalent t o a title thereto. With regard to things acquired on exchange. in case of insolvency. Josefa Varela. established with the a uthorization of the Government. instead of fulfilling the trust or returning the jewels to their owner. This provision is not applicable to a case in which the third person has acq uired the thing in the manner and with the requisites established by law to make it unrecoverable.
Matute and Finnick. sale. securities. alleging. where they were pledged.elivery of possession of the said jewelry. – Where. because every person who is criminally responsible on a ccount of a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. recites among other c onsiderations. The two cases were duly tried. the criminal li ability of the accused has been declared. Because of the mere fact of Perello’s havi ng been convicted and sentenced for estafa. 4. with costs. – Whoever may have been deprived this property in consequence of a crime is entitled to the recovery th ereof. This finding is in accord with the provisi ons of the above article 120 of the Penal Code and first paragraph of article 46 4 of the Civil Code. and the Court of First Instanc e pronounced judgment. 3890. title by possession. that is. Finnick. Josefa Varela. 3. it was not proven that Estanislaua Arenas authorized the former to pawn the jewelry given to her by Arenas to sell on commission. who was not the owner nor authorized to dispose of the same. 2. therefore.. in connect ion with article 464. it is not a question of public property. the pawnbrokers. Id. of the Civil Code. did not acquire the jewel s at a public sale. – The ownership of personal property prescrib es in the manner and within the time fixed by articles 1955 and 1962. Recovery of property unlawfully in possession. and this court affirmed the judg ments on the same grounds. Raymundo how ever retains his right to collect the amounts delivered upon the pledge. Varela vs.. criminal and civil liability. Id. prescription. The owner of the loan office of Finnick Brothers. although the jewelry is found in the pawnshop o f Fausto O. the pledgees. or othe r such effects. the transfer. or disposal of which is subject to the provi sions of the Code of Commerce. even if such property is in the possession of a third party who acquired it by legal means other than those expressly stated in article 464 of the Civil Code. notwithstanding the fact that he acted in good faith. Neither does a pawnshop enjoy the privilege grant ed to a monte de piedad. No. Personal property. and the decisions on appeal established t he following legal doctrines: 1. it follows that he shall also be held civilly liable therefor. is entitled to the recovery ther eof from the pawnshop of Finnick Brothers. . the jewelry misappropri ated must be restored to its owner. supporting the plaintiff’s claims in each. refuse d to comply with her demand. among other reasons. – In order that the possession of p ersonal property may be considered as a title thereto it is indispensable that t he same shall have been acquired in good faith. who lost said jewels and was deprived of the same in consequence of a crime. Both cases were appealed by the defendants. by brin ging action against the proper party. as also in the present suit. and for the very reason that she is now serving her sentence must be complied with. and the execution of the sentence which orders the restitution of the jewels can not be avoided because of the good faith with whi ch the owner of the pawnshop acquired them. the following: The exception contained in paragraph 3 of said article is not applicable to the present case because a pawnshop does not enjoy the privilege established by article 464 of the Civil Code. The aforementioned decision. that they were entit led to possession. in a procee ding instituted by reason of a crime committed against property. Raymundo and the latter had acquired it by legal means. as it is a question of jewels which has been misappropriated by the commi ssion of the crime of estafa. Crimes against property. inasmuch as they were delivered to t he accused. the latter c an not lawfully refuse to comply with the provisions of article 120 of the Penal Code. inasmuch as it exists and has not disappeare d this restitution must be made. In the cause prosecuted against Perello. Ownership.
Even supposing that the defendant Raymundo had acted in good faith in accepting the pledge of the jewelry in litigation. It is true that the plaintiffs’ son. in the negative.524? In view of the evidence offered by the trial record. thanks to the intervention of attorney Chico te and to the fact that they succeeded in obtaining from the embezzler. since the latter was deprived of her possession by means of the illegal pledging of the said jewelry. it is natural that the said attorney. the contract of pledge entered the jewel ry so pawned can not serve as security for the payment of the sum loaned. should have proceeded to ascertain the whereabouts of the embezzled jewe lry an to enter into negotiations with the pawnshop of Fausto O. even then he would not be entitled to r etain it until the owner thereof reimburse him for the amount loaned to the embe zzler. Gabriel La O succeeded in getting the defendant to show him the jewelry described in the said ticket together with other jewels that did not belong to La O’s mother. amounting in value to more than P8. she must either lose her jewelry or pay a large sum received by the embezzl er as a loan from the defendant. 1908.600 . it can not confer upon the defe ndant any rights in the pledged jewelry. Article 1857 of the Civil Code prescribes as one of the essential requisites of the contracts of pledge and of mortgage. acting in representation of his parents and as an interested party. The parents of the attorney Gabriel La O being surprised by the disagreeable new s of the disappearance of various jewels. neither law nor justi ce permit that the latter. that is. th at the plaintiff Arenas consented to or had knowledge of the pledging of her jew elry in the pawnshop of the defendant. of course. delivered to Elena Vega for sale on commission and misappropriated by Concepti on Perello. Raymundo. in pledge or sec . This essential requisite for the contract of pledge between Perello and the defendant being absent as the fo rmer was not the owner of the jewelry given in pledge. and as it was executed with mark ed violation of an express provision of the law. when the plaintiff Arenas is not related to the latter by any legal or contractual bond out of which legal obligations arise. among ot her papers. folio 19 of the record in the case against Matute. who received them from Vega for the same purpose. that had been given the defendant by Ambrosia Capistrano. intervened and gave hi s consent when the Concepcion Perello pawned the jewelry in litigation with Faus to Raymundo for P1. and the trial record does not disclose any evidence. without legal ground or reason. of the date of May 4. nor ca n the latter be collected out of the value of the said jewelry. attorney Gabriel La O. that the thing pledged or mortgaged mus t belong to the person who pledges or mortgages it. the plaintiff. at the commencement of his investigations. should ha ve to choose one of the two extremes of a dilemma. in wh ose possession he had finally learned were to be found a part of the embezzled j ewels. the answer is. a criminal act. the contract is as devoid of value and force as if it had not been made. after being the victim of the embezzlement. and although. he met with opposition on the par t of the pledgee Raymundo. and because Conception Perello was not the legitimate owner of the jewelry which she pledged to the defendant Raymundo. both of which. as he had been informed by the said Perello herself. Between the supposed good faith of the defendant Raymundo and the undisputed goo d faith of the plaintiff Arenas. the owner of the jewelry. nor impose any obligation toward him on the part of the owner thereof. for a certain sum that she received from the latter as a loan. even circumstantial. that would obligate him to pay the amount loaned to Perel lo. Exhibit E. at fir st. Perello’s agent. since the said owner of the jewelry. are injurious and prejudicial to her interest and rights. did not make any cont ract with the pledgee. who objected to showing him the jewels that he desire d to see in order to ascertain whether they were those embezzled and belonging t o his mother. the plaintiff Arenas. the pawn ticket issued by Raymundo’s pawnshop. For this reason.
averred in their respective testimony that the said attorney La O had no knowled ge of and took no part in the pledging of the jewelry. a uthorized her son Ramon to get from the defendant. in our opinion. being convinced that he was wrong . Moreland. Carson. concur in the result. another jewel of great value which had b een pledged to him by the same Perello. the latter already. Raymundo was in possession of it and had received it from the same embezzler as security for a debt. and the said judgm ent being in harmony with the law.) The business of pawnshops. the record discloses no proof that the attorney Gabriel La O consented to or took any part in the delivery of the jewelry in question to the defendant as a pledge. Perello. refrained from appealing from the judgment wherein he was sentenced to return.. Moreover. at Raymundo’s request. in exchange for the high and onerous interest which c onstitutes its enormous profits. as we hereby do. the pawn tickets of the said other jewelry. Raymundo. Gabriel La O. . by such procedu re. and Trent. had in his possession as a pledge the jewelry described in them. continuing the search for other missing jewelry belonging to his m other.J. to affirm the same. 1908. who kept the said thre e pawn tickets. who was deprived thereof by means of a crime and is entitled to be excused by the courts. and M. expect from the law better and more preferential protection than the owner o f the jewels or other articles. and both the said defendant. taking them out of his cabinet. Raym undo then wrote out the tickets – Exhibits L. and Perello further state d that she had received all the money loaned to her by the defendant Raymundo. or embezzled from their legitimate owners. although the defendant Raymundo would not exhibit it until he issued the pawn tickets corresponding to such jew els. and Mapa. whereby the errors attributed to the judgment of the Court of First Instance have been discussed and decided upon. he can not. and 76 to 80 of the record in the case against Matute. was satis fied for the time being with keeping the three pawn tickets certifying that such jewelry was pawned to the defendant. a nd the plaintiffs’ son naturally desiring to recover his parent’s jewelry. found that Fausto O. the evidence and the merits of the case. 1908. signed by herself and bearing date of June 10.. Arellano. 21 and 22 of the record of the aforesaid proceedings aga inst Matute – in the presence of the attorney Gabriel La O. without assuring himself whether such bearer is or is not the owner thereof. without redemption. from the pawnshop of the defendant were made out. for which such tickets had not yet been issued. in her name. to the plaintiffs. J. LL. it i s proper. LL. C. and for some t ime previous. after he had made sure that the jewels described therein and whi ch Raymundo. folio 28 of the record. exhibited to him at the time. For the foregoing reasons. Antonio Matute. stolen. therefore. So ordered.. He undoubtedly had in mind some of the p revious decisions of this court. and M. So that. is always exposed to the contingency of receivi ng in pledge or security for the loans. JJ. and the embezzler Perello. one of which was against himself. were among those embezzled from his mother. the owner of another pawnshop. and found on folios 20. jewels and other articles that have been robbed. with the costs ag ainst the appellant. and as the owner of the pawnshop accepts the same and asks for money on it. ( Folios 13 to 14. Exhibits L. when the three aforementioned pawn tickets.urity for a loan of P170. by means of the document Exhibit C . all dated June 22. concur.