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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any rights under them to vacate the premises occupied by them, more particularly the portion on which are erected their respective dwelling structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot of plaintiff aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling structure/units from said subject premises of plaintiff; 2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month by way of monthly rental commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall have vacated the premises of the plaintiff; 3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees (retainer) and P500.00, Philippine Currency, for every hearing/trial attended by said attorney before this Honorable Court; and 4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993 EDUARDO R. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Respondent. DAVIDE, JR., J.: The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706, an action for unlawful detainer commenced on 5 May 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan while the respondent is the presiding Judge of the said court. In his verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator on 18 March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of the law and gross incompetence. The complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the answer in the said case was filed and "without notice and hearing," the 1 latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitled case. library SO ORDERED. He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its 2 Order of 19 January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 - a petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 - had already opined that the said decision is void upon its face because it: . . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious reason that the same cannot be considered a decision at all. Instead of deciding or ordering something to be done, it merely prays that judgment be rendered. but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June 1991] in order to nullify the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a 3 new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 promulgated on 25 January 1993. The dispositive portion of this new decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff by:

SO ORDERED. According to the complainant, the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision exhibits the respondent's gross ignorance in "decision preparation," and that respondent's "haste to amend the same to favor plaintiff was both appalling (sic) and downright improper." The complainant then prays that the respondent "be removed from office if only to save the integrity of the judiciary." In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993, the respondent denies the imputations and alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was not the original counsel for the defendants but one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented the latter until the time that the parties were directed to file their respective position papers, specifically until 29 November 1991 when Atty. Javier filed a motion to withdraw his appearance and the complainant filed his notice of appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered only after a preliminary conference was held where the parties with their respective counsels discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement and after the defendants failed to comply with the 16 November 1990 Order for the parties to submit in writing their "respective position statements setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidences in support thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt" thereof, prompting the plaintiff to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion praying that judgment be rendered in this case; (3) the defendants did not appeal from the 28 June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for execution on 2 September 1991, which the defendants did not oppose; instead they filed a motion for reconsideration and to declare the decision null and void on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trail brief and there was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4 December 1991, the plaintiff's motion for execution was granted and a writ of execution was issued, a copy of which was sent to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of 5 Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January 1991, he received an order from Branch 18 of the RTC of Bulacan directing him to desist from implementing the writ of execution; (6) the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr., issued on 19 January 1993 its order disposing of Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter, he (respondent) handed down a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25
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January 1993 that contained "completely the missing sentences needed in the dispositive portion" of its earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing therefrom, the defendants filed on 4 February 1993 a motion to set aside the decision, which the court set for its consideration and to which the plaintiff filed its opposition on 8 February 1993 together with a motion for immediate execution; (9) on 22 March 1993, the complainant filed a motion to inhibit the respondent by the former did not appear on the date it was set for consideration. He finally contends that the issue regarding the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was rendered moot and academic by the corrections made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that the charge of gross ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded; and the complainant's sweeping conclusions show his disrespectful attitude. In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993, the complainant reiterates his charge that the respondent is incompetent because he lacks the "ability to prepare a sensible and credible decision," and maintains that the respondent's attempt to convince this Court that the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision is permissible and proper shows "gross ignorance." Further, that the respondent believes that "he could correct the decision after its finality" and after the RTC of Bulacan had declared it to be null and void upon its face clearly manifests his "patent ignorance of our laws and jurisprudence." In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 7 1993, the respondent argues that while the 28 June 1991 Decision "could hardly be enforced for the reason that there is some sort of ambiguity or omission (sic) in its dispositive portion," he was not prohibited from having the defect "timely corrected and clarified," which was what he had in fact done, and that the "clarified decision" did not prejudice "the substantial rights of the parties" since they "were given their day in court and passed through the usual course of the proceedings." Accordingly, he could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of lack of competence. Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to Sur-rejoinder and 8 Manifestation on 28 July 1993. Not to be outdone, the respondent filed a 9 Manifestation to Reply on 9 August 1993. The Court referred this to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its Memorandum containing its evaluation, report and recommendation. After summarizing the antecedent facts, the said office submitted that the instant complaint is meritorious, and made the following findings: It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have overlooked the missing dispositive portion of his original decision which is considered the executory portion thereof. The only ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision before he signed the same. If only he devoted even only a little time to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be the most important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention. The alleged dispositive portion was a prayer. It did not have the effect of finally disposing the case. Presumably, this must have been simply copied from plaintiff's complaint.
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True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original defective decision since the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what was rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2 years to discover and correct his error; the error could have easily been discovered at the time the Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the writ was nonetheless issued on December 4, 1991. Hence, the belated correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no denying that the quality of a decision rendered by the judge such as herein respondent, is a reflection on the integrity of the court in dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very least careless in failing to read carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both the original and amended decisions still contained errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there was no adequate editing of the decision that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he would have avoided such fractured phrases as: 1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion, countered as follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28, 1991); 2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid); 3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid); 4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of lease of which right becomes one of a detainer plain and simple (page 6, Ibid); 5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the property (Ibid). It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for their fractured constructions have no place in a court decision. Careful editing and rewriting should have been done. and recommends that: . . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that any repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be meted with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is also admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions. We find the above observations of the Office of the Court Administrator to be sufficiently supported by the pleadings submitted by the parties in this case. After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do find its body to be flawed with grammatical and syntactic errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of, resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even be called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the plaintiff, such as the Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after the defendants failed to file their position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected by the Court Administrator. How

it gained entry into what should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any attempt to unravel the mystery may only complicate the matter against the respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance or incompetence. There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar and syntax and the fatally infirmed "dispositive portion" is the inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the respondent betraying the absence of due care, diligence, conscientiousness and thoroughness - qualities which Judges must, among others, possess. Respondent could have easily avoided the errors and defects had he taken a little more time and effort to at least read its original copy before he finally affixed his signature thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge to be an expert on the English language or an authority in grammar, he must, however, do everything he can, through constant study, extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce a decision which fosters respect for and encourages obedience to it and enhances the prestige of the court. As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two standard of conduct prescribed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an 10 industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him" and that 11 he should be conscientious, studious and thorough. Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed "decision," he even granted the motion for its execution and issued the corresponding writ with full knowledge that there was nothing to execute. He could not have feigned ignorance of such nothingness for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its execution, exhibiting once more his inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his incompetence. We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas. The counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to have known the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the obvious inefficacy of any writ of execution, yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution, while the counsel for the defendants - the complainant herein - merely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that there was no valid pre-trial order. Obviously, the complainant initially believed in the completeness of the decision. As a matter of fact, when he assailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was amended was a " final decision," a position totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter was void as declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court who owe to it candor, 12 fairness and good faith, both attorneys should have called the court's attention to the glaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991 Decision. We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very least, inefficiency, neglect of duty and the violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could not, however, be liable for ignorance of law and jurisprudence or for incompetence when he handed down a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June 1991 Decision was "incomplete" since, for all legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and could not attain finality, hence the respondent had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law and 13 justice. It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant suggested, that the

order of the RTC of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991 is "void upon its face" forever bars the respondent from rendering a new or amended decision in the ejectment case. We take this opportunity to stress once again that the administration of justice is a sacred task and all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and 14 act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. Every Judge should never forget that he is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of 15 justice. Therefore, he must constantly be the embodiment of competence, diligence, conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to preserve, promote and enhance the people's confidence in the Judiciary. A few words must also be made of record regarding the complainant. We note that in his complaint in this case he alleged under oath that after the defendants filed their answer, the respondent "without any hearing, or at least this counsel was never notified of any such hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course inaccurate, if not outright false. What the complainant conveniently left out in his complaint was that, as disclosed in the Comment which he did not refute, after the defendants' answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court, the case was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the parties were required to submit their position papers and the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence. We find that the case was properly placed and considered under the Rule on Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of the submitted position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further suppressed the fact that he entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only after the court had conducted the preliminary conference and issued the order for the submission of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to any notice before then. The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended by the complainant to give his complaint a strong prima facie case against the respondent. While he was entitled to adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to this Court absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its initial action. Complainant should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely. Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings, always keeping in mind his duty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. SO ORDERED.

Respondent. willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court. the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30. Manila. Oliva (Exh. Plaintiff vs. nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Viola. Philippines. obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath. the defendant in said Civil case. defendant". After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP.) Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return. and "Q-2"). RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In civil Case No.Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12. "S"). through counsel. Edelson G. (5) The demand letter of Atty. p. 84-24144. In view. "S". especially towards the courts. "Q-1" and "Q-2". . He has likewise violated Rule 10. "T" . Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the Summons in said Civil Case No. (p. Oliva). a messenger in the law office of Attys. as supported by the evidence. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts. he is required to swear to do no falsehood. (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons. Oliva. 2. agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. 196 SCRA 10 [1991]. Marcos Law Office. respondent Atty. and Exh.174. At this juncture. the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. and continue to possess. knowingly. ff. the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. A lawyer. in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge Pio R. Accordingly. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Florando Umali. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers.Sworn Statement dated February 28. plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan. Branch XLI. 1985. "J" . 1984 signed and filed by Atty. "T").Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A. which is the falsified Sheriff's Return). as shown in the Questioned Document Report No. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. at the Regional Trial Court. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter. It can not be gainsaid that candidness. vs. on the other hand. The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Chief Staff Asst.) After conducting the necessary investigation. the complaint in said civil case (Exh. Oliva (Exh. Exh. (p. however. it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess. "V-1" and"V-2"). Defendant. entitled "Pedro Cutingting.) "R" Motion to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. RTC. "Q". "V". 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Atty. Record. Final Report. Umali. The facts. through herein complainant. With respect to Atty. 1984 of Atty. that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry. 2. of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not his signature. 2837 October 7. Exh. Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the respondents (Exh.Sworn Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1. complainant. EDELSON G. SO ORDERED. the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. 84-24144. "Q-1". counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil case. the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). and Exh. 1985 of Mariano Villanueva. for payment of the sum of P70. (4) On March 29. "G". "I" . LIBIT.Demand Letter dated March 28. 1.00 (Exh.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:A lawyer shall not do any falsehood. the Code of Professional Responsibility. ALFREDO TAN. Oliva. a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice. 69. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING. has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. 1994 ESTEBAN M. Final Report. and the Canons of Professional Ethics. sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. No. Manila. For this reason.ch In this case. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. and recommendation. charged respondents as follows: That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila. is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. UMALI. the above-named Respondents. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. Edelson G. Complainant.C. did then and there. the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following order: The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will warrant. filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh. (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the Manila RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero. the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Oliva. "Q". the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation: There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that Atty. 1988. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan). ATTYS. "H" Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero. report. 1984. Atty. as Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. the Court finds that respondent Atty.

The explanation of Atty. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. 1989. against the Sps.e. J. 2-4. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was . A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Atty. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. deserves scant consideration. Alfonso M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. A lawyer. representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on. Martija. and continue to possess. The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.R. Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. She also filed. complainant concluded that civil Case No. 176 January 20. PABLITO M. has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Luisa and Solomer Abuel.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION CBD Case No. Pablito M. after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. Martija. Alfonso M. to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. Resolution) The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. on February 20. Martija. the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. Castillo paid P1. After hearing. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4. In this case. MARTIJA. 56934. 1989. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. under IBP O. 56934.040. 1995 SALLY D. apparently thru his negligence. the Sps. Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 7. Cubao. Respondents. WHEREFORE. Atty. where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof. whereas. Pablito M. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. against the Sps. 38374 was attached. one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. During the pendency of these cases. the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. 38374.: cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib ra ry In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15. a piece of real property situated in Pasig. complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. BONGALONTA. nor consent to the doing of any in court. Needless to state. The complaint against Atty. 2900538. for this reason. as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No. of his corespondent Atty. 1995. According to the records of the IBP National Office. Alfonso M. as required by the Supreme Court. issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon. Alfonso Martija. 246722 dated 1-12-88. on October 18. ATTY. Atty.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues. for estafa. Consequently. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. 1993. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. A writ of execution was. Quezon City. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess. 21st Avenue. on the other hand. that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. (pp. 7635-55. MELO. Castillo and Alfonso M. No. Abuel. finding respondent Atty. 1990. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. Alfonso Martija placed the same address. SO ORDERED. l ibra ry However. National Grievance Investigation Office. vs. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. members of the Philippine Bar. WHEREFORE. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases. especially when he practices before the courts. respondent Atty. for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time. PTR No. in due time. Complainant. Criminal Case No. which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. Abuel under TCT No. the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and recommendations: Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. RESOLUTION registered and annotated in said title of February 7. 58650 for collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note. a separate civil action Civil Case No. the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. the charge against the two respondents (i. addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline. the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. "246722 dated 1-12-88". with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Thus. No. Pablito M. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer. with unjust and unethical conduct. also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using. that in favor of Gregorio Lantin. he is required to swear to do no falsehood.

However. JOSE M.. and prior to April 15.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In a letter dated September 16.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From April 25 to May 6.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library and to conduct cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry Appeal. tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). taking into account the financial position of the former. sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows: We recognize it is your privilege both to strike picketing. Petitioners. but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. 1958. No. eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thereafter. the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. April 25. you may: chanrobles virtual law library 1. respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Meanwhile. Employees Association-NATU. or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. 1965 and October 20. while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW). if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily. FGU INSURANCE GROUP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library . the respondent Jose M. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices. Ltd. insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security. particularly on salary increases. the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. Enaje was hired on or about February 19. On May 13.. L-25291 January 30. 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies. by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17. 1957. the Companies on May 15.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 21. Ltd. 1965. 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals." By a letter dated April 17. OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies. the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1. Instead of giving counter-proposals.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga. 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies. 1958. vs. and Insular Life Building Employees AssociationNATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions). en toto. in Case 1698ULP. 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president.: bargaining.. Thereupon. as such acting president. 1957. LTD.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice.R. the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Insular Life Assurance Co. CASTRO. the Companies did not make any counterproposals but.. and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU. instead. Thereafter. LTD. as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27. Respondents. and requested the Companies to answer its demands. These employees resigned from the Unions. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes).. in a circular issued in his name and signed by him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia. Garcia. entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co. and he was soon receiving P900 a month. 1958. the former were also asked to drop their union security demand. point by point. 1971 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library of your intention to do 2. the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular demand. J. Take your meals within the office. 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands. the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 20. 1957.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective However.. promising money benefits if this was done. FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard so. 1957. in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals. to no avail. still refused to make any counter-proposals. FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU. otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1.

on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees. 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents. including a photographer. respectively of the Companies. 1958. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B. continued on strike. until further orders of the said court. were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which. all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions. through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez. If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies. Employees AssociationNATU. this petition for review. by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work. we may be forced to obtain your replacement. Incidentally. the decisions was yours to make. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others. Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence. On July 29. but we cannot hold your positions open for long. by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2. the Companies. impeding. the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. 2. However. again through the respondent Olbes. 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision. while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike. with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21. 1958. On August 31. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office. on May 21. in which both suffered injuries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At any rate. from stopping. Before. because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2.5. one Paulino Bugay. acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co. and paid overtime. The Unions. subsequently. when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office. tossed aside the placard of a picketer. 1965. 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint. After trial on the merits. and if there are no criminal charges pending against you. Garcia. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates. the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike. until it was called off on May 31.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However. succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. and. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours. Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision. stating special defenses therein. We do not know how long you intend to stay out. and their supporting memorandum on September 10. assistant corporate secretary. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action. rendered on August 17. If by this date you have not yet reported.. thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers. 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced. upon approaching the picket line. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20. with a promise of comfortable cots. On the same date. quoted hereunder in its entirety: The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958. out and in. 1965. The decision to make is yours . and asking for the dismissal of the complaint. Florencio Ibarra. we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. they might be replaced. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you. the Court of Industrial Relations. entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from. 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. issued on May 31. On August 4. 1958. free coffee and movies. before readmitting the strikers. etc. vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU. Hence. except three (3). and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. . 1958 Garcia. sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B). president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU. Act 1787. a fight ensued between them. 6. So it is now. the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2. obstructing. Ltd. who with the said respondent Olbes. and Vicente Abella. From the date the strike was called on May 21. Thus. Subsequently. the Unions contending that the lower court erred: 1. tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. 1958 an order restraining the strikers.whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families. of the Companies' building. and Isagani Du Timbol. however. 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. 1958. 1958. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra." without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. chief of the personnel records section.

In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike. and 4. Goigy Co. the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. accident insurance. though innocent in themselves. Inc." the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the letters. and cases cited therein. respectively. Inc. 332). since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work. whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications. and the employer's statement. exhibits A and B. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike. Indeed.S. Labor Laws 1956. urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership. 1958.without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining. Ford." "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours. Indeed. in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. I..) It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents.. Likewise violative of the right to organize. We do not agree. it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation. they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization. but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work. 35 ALR 2d 422). exhibits A and B. the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers. 213 F2d 70). some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. consequently. be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.. C. It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676. or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. constitutes unfair labor practice. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes. so they would abandon the strike and return to work.. 563. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted. or which tended. (Rothenberg on Relations.2 Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2. Jur. the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility. with attractive compensations. (Francisco. For success of purpose is not. 321 U. Montgomery Ward & Co. the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union. frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered. and should not. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters. 213 F2d 70. 323. 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance. p. Thus. and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that antiunion conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. despite the fact that the . from June 2.. p. II.. since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be." . as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. 211 F2d 533. former legal counsels of the petitioners. and a new building to work in. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which. NLRB vs. National Labor Relations Board. profit-sharing. Clearfield Cheese Co. or threats.by registered special delivery mail at that . 544. with full back wages. Besides. 1948. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters. as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary. which were calculated. with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking. was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing. 170 F2d 735). wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union. should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. NLRB vs. to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor. citing NLRB v. 146 ALR 1045) Indeed.1 Moreover. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions. The same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2. exhibits A and B. the letters. of unfair labor practice. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually . And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees. (31 Am. when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots." and "arrangements" for their families. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit. citing NLRB v. when they are represented by a union. form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain. CCA 7th. 133 F2d 621). 374. 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.3. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine. or reprisal (31 Am.. made about 6 weeks after the strike started. The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act. otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. This assertion is without merit. Clearfield Cheese Co. Jur. it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia. they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and. to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice..A. Vol." "free coffee and occasional movies.

this [sic] unions intends to go on strike against THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. however.) The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies. the letter. However. escorted by armed men. 1958. respondent Jose M. 1958. 1958. As a result of these criminal actions. the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters. when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office. the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Manila chanrobles virtual law library THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP Plaza Moraga. decided to declare the strike.of which Ramon Garcia was a member . were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. obstructing. Incidentally. Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano.. 26. namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies. Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges.to the strikers. Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals. which was filed on January 27. you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958. was sent . despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies. 1958. entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from. only three of which were not dismissed.refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges. that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office. citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates. it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility. otherwise he would be replaced." (tsn. Feb. 1958. Antonio Castillo. and (3) he must report for work on June 2. etc. . 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved. out and in.. despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. Sec. After the petitioners went to strike. brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others. 1958). Exhibit B. the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. 14. 1953. And the actual and main reason for the strike was. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. p. the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping.) II. It is not." However. the respondents thru a screening committee .. tsn. Olbes. who. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act. Enrique Guidote. letter dated April 15. 7. the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents. however. 8. thru their president and manager. It should be noted that exhibit 4. threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2.. reads: 3. On the same day that the injunction was issued. It is beyond dispute. Plaza Moraga. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof. the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. Verily. 1958. they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor.. Manila . "When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith. 62. Federico Barretto. inter alia: TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MANILA Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. Oct. 14. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2. 1958. impeding. p. the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period. LTD. but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned. enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. However. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers. (2) there must be no criminal charges against him. 1958. the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. the respondents. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2. the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A. p. reckoned from January 27. 14 of Rep.." which so far as material." (tsn. They were soon to admit. such as the coercion of employees. 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents.. By letter dated April 15. Two days later. the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella. respondents' letter dated April 7. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers. Sept. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. 49. Emilio Carreon. 1969. for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. exhibit A and B." (exhibit 8. their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. of the Companies' buildings. 1958. Manila INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION Plaza Moraga. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop. however. But when most of the petitioners reported for work. and these three only for slight misdemeanors. that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts." without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and continue their business. disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23. states. yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them. (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop.again individually and by registered special delivery mail . entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process.

admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. pp. 1960. all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. v. 1958. to a job in another mill. the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances. emphasis supplied. Thus. Feb.were hostile to the strikers. The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike.perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work . the U. Air Lines. Sept. and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant. the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn.The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2. Tabasondra called on June 21. As earlier mentioned. the respondents . OLBES President. p. but when all. except three. chief of the personnel records section. L-8197. 6. the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10. Oct. In his testimony. FGU. the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. to screen the unionists reporting back to work. dismissed only the leaders of the strikers. as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers. 20. 1958. Indeed. however. it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return. pp. Tabasondra be given "his day in court. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement. the respondents still refused to take them back.tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible. as the one who received them and later directed them . 7-8.to rebut his testimony. In one case. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers. 4. were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances. several of them later received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor: This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.) JOSE M. Aug. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella. they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. and Ramon Garcia. corroborated by many others." At any rate. 1961.. Vicente Abella.to Felipe Enage. 14-18). on the picket lines. Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay. is a form of discrimination in rehiring. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut.. although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike. Moreover.who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions .) Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers. which was imperfectly organized. Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2." (tsn. 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor. Emiliano Tabasondra. Air Lines Emloyees Association. 31. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines. had abandoned his office.. 56). head of the Companies. assistant corporate secretary. 48-49. Sept.the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. while those whose participation was serious were not. hence. it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage . If Tabasondra were not telling the truth. 62. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated. Needless to say. 6. citing Phil.930. Very truly yours.. 43 NLRB 545. we are giving you the amount of P1. Anent the third assignment of error. Labor and Social Legislation.S. p. is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on record. citing Sunshine Mining Co. 1958 and. when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2. But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge. Insurance Life Acting President. placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn. disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU. Inc. 1962. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary." (Carlos and Fernando. But the management. So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer. Phil.) It is noteworthy that . 1958. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct.through Ramon Garcia . (Sgd. such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them. speaking through the respondent Olbes. The Law on Strikes. De Asis. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy. the Companies' personnel manager. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed. Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees. the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal. (Morabe. pp. does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement.) Of course. Instead. Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company. the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement. 473. or lack of it. (tsn. 23-29). The respondents did nothing of the kind. while admitting the discrimination. but instead of doing so. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause. Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike . The respondents. 19. Cleveland Worsted Mills. negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. not a single union officer was taken back to work.when Olbes refused them an audience . p. 1962.." III. 1958. chairman of the management's screening committee. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary. 15-19. 7 NLRB 1252. reported for work . It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees .

13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. (NLRB v. 591. and an outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. B.which the respondents never denied or tried to disprove . 1958. Co. about adverted to. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: . Said the Court: .. insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. the chief of the personnel records section. Ct. and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported. Tuason Building at San Vicente Street. 1962. We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike." which the picketers did. 1958. 333. attests that they did not resort to violence. of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination against them. First. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Moreover. offices at Makati. 1381) (Mathews. chief of the personnel records section of the Companies. Being a union man and one of the strikers. Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. speaking. or the fact involved in any labor dispute. 547.. Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. Labor Relations and the Law. hence. but were told that there were no openings. is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution. Inc. Labor Relations and the Law. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. (Teller. opined the lower court. 304 U. 58 Sup. should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men . however much it is to be regretted. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21. p. (Republic Steel Corp. et al. too. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo. an allocation of $1. Gonzales. 3 in CA-G.000.) The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information. 430. Ct. Garcia. Thus it has been held that: Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. Paulino Bugay. not being one of the supervisors.) (Mathews. p. or objectionable working conditions. patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence. It was only on January 21. that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up.acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. Narciso Da�o. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos. 725. If this were not so. and Ayala. must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. We do not find this allegation convincing. 1958. 904. 728) The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2. the assistant corporate secretary. Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip . he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. L. Violence of this nature. Pacifico Ner. (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Ed.. p. that. N.) . Yet the police blotter. 1952. After all. whether by advertising. they refused to grant union demands. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals. reported for work at the Insular Life Building.. is not persuasive. assistant corporate secretary. Ed. 89 L. the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. the lower court should not have given them much weight. from entering the Companies' premises on May 21. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos. the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. Moreover. it is not only the right. they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful transgression. II. as pocket money. cited in Mathews. is this stated.R. Rizal. there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened. And his statement. 378) Hence the incident that occurred between Ner. Labor Relations and the Law. was peaceful (see Police blotter report. this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Manila.. that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. No. per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9. 323 U. 315. Rising passions call forth hot words. The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. Manila. president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to.000 for the vacation trips of officials. The employer. and Vicente Abella. although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta. 82 L. hence. Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80. as reported in the police blotter. Inc.000 or only P2.his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute. we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning further. he was not a part of management.. per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks). 1958. 107 F2d 472. if indeed made. 6 NLRB 171. upon the other hand. employer unfairness. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. to turn its publicity on any labor oppression." Indeed. Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez. enforced 105 F2d 167. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon. 516. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Vol.. R. exh. v.S. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed. Exchange controls were then in force. at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar. In labor disputes.at various times during the next three days. where Ner was acquitted). under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Labor is free . The Board found. Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining. were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia. The picketing on May 21. it is as well the duty. this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. 163. Collins. in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of. p. in taking back six union men. substandard wages.S. And his competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public accountants. but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead . 65 Sup. and Abella. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement. Jose Garcia. Besides. that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. The Unions. both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies. took a trip abroad in 1958..

B. 1964. Co. p. a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU. that is. pp. especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. p.) . gives rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection. For under the circumstances. 23 NLRB No. assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law. N. 12 SCRA 124. 853. from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations.. 2d 606.. intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the line. R. The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice. "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with. Labor Relations and the Law. Decision.' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. R. citing Waterman S. to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable position . as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU. v.another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. C.they were discriminatorily dismissed.. R. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice. 119 F2d 760. L.) Lastly. the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when. 108 F2d 390. Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C.. picketing is inherently explosive. the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion. by officials or supervisory employees of the employer. Conn. Sept. citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938]. p.. all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions. B. although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. N. v. it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office. but those strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. However. Kentucky Fire Brick Co. B. L. Vol. Labor Relations and the Law. were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. [W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2. Court of Industrial Relations. he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. L.) A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is. supra. p. Resolution on motion for reconsideration.) And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements. p.. L." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective. are such instances of interference. 30. L.) Finally. The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2. Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining. if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found. Even if this were true.." the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. B. Decision. coupled with settled decisional law. [W]here the misconduct. if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike. [W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice.. (Teller. they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement. p. if necessary. It may be marked by colorful namecalling. or surveillance thereof.) [A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was illegal. they were readily admitted. even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. . with or without the advice of Ibarra. 135 F. or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer. Richter's Bakery. 854). Lacsina. the Board has usually required reinstatement. Paulino Bugay. 1958. p. charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities. 106 F2d 61. the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. however. 418. B. since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than ten years) during .Furthermore. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil. 99 F2d 99. Besides. A great number of them. 13 SCRA 258. v. as pointed out by one author. the employer must discharge the replacement employee. Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining. N. L. and that when the strikers reported back for work upon the invitation of the respondents . 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Id. 854. p.see also Mathews. who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents... "The picket line is an explosive front. 765-766. whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is opposed. restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize." (Teller. If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike. p. . the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful." (Mathews. 730 and the cited cases). IV. At any rate. N. We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination. citing Ford Motor Company. 211. 422 and cases cited. and cases cited.. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order. For. v. S. Jr.." (Teller. or an exemployee. 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. or in other ways. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller. Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. v. R. G. v.. Corp. supra)." (Id. II. with full back wages from June 2. 140 F2d 870. . and Jose Garcia. form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice. In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement. However. Ltd. which the latter did. Id. 27) . restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges result. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case.. (Id. Court of Industrial Relations. Under such circumstances. Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union. R. from what date should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike.. 28. Southern Wood Preserving Co. N.. 752). N. B. L-19778. American Mfg. and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line.. Jr. R.

Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. therefore. because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. et al. et al. Upon the other hand..g. Philippine-LandAir-Sea Labor Union.. it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. vs. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees. can be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. however. The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents. by paying the required compensation. or. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice." which actually amounts to a public accusation. Indeed.. clerical errors may escape their notice. in the least. L-20179-81. take their bearings. the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n.. should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution. of the criminal charges against him. et al. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and. . We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda. in the absence thereof. . dismissal for union activities. is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees. that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee. 99 Phil. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance. Moreover. 205 [1955]). Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions: In a proceeding for unfair labor practice. there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. 97 Phil. 1964. vs. Certainly. 904 [1956].. 91 Phil. This apparent error. and to incorporate it in their brief. on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari.** (Emphasis ours) It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-2017981. we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings. V. that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees. the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision. in the absence thereof. Anyway. but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion. In the herein case. the mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts. is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees. resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. of the Philippines v." are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort.. While Republic Act No. "For it must be remembered . and faithfully reflects.. which charge. 93. but even on the assumption that this is so. v. while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .. should the act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads. G. would sully the employer's reputation. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office. December 28. to copy it verbatim. does not erase or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees." whereas it reads.e. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged. No.. by paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination of his employment. ..R. Sr. pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company. but in the immediately succeeding paragraph. Philippine Education Company. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice. the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled . i. Finally. (Yu Ki Lam. of the criminal charges against him. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. it is the bounden duty of courts. such Act does not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination. e." in this Court's decision. appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is. should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.which they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood.. or.. does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels... the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as. 11 SCRA 134 [1964]). Nena Micaller.. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified. the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law. (Lopez. judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Progressive Federation of Labor. does away with the presumption of malice. and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work. involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them. we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. et al.) Finally. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee.) (emphasis supplied) The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the above citation read however as follows: Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente. et al. the particular ruling in this Court's decision. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education Employees v. as well as lawyers and litigants.." Be that as it may. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land.

as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct. 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. Costs against the respondents. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. with backwages from June 2. the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark." Thus. admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. . et al. ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions. the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning. It is our view. they should be. 1965 is reversed and set aside. ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted. as they are hereby. to the detriment of other courts. Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation. ACCORDINGLY.Imperial. nonetheless. and another is entered. that for their mistake.

P.P.. JR.A. nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen. private respondents maintain that R. and Ruben Magluyoan. this Court has therefore. 7691.EN BANC G. A-1444 and A-1445. NOYNAY. Allen. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage. Provided. Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code. Judge Juan Lavilles. 1998 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. Blg. and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN. In an Order2 issued on 25 August 1997. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic] vs. Northern Samar. Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan. R. irrespective of time [sic]. J. In light of the foregoing. b) Criminal Case No. ESBEL CHUA. that in offenses including damages to property through criminal negligence. 129 as amended by R. against private respondents Diosdada Amor. TOMAS B. d) Criminal Cases Nos. and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. and DAVIDE. Act. Petitioner. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 129 as Amended by Rep. respondent Judge Tomas B. Regional Trial Court. 6 It reads as follows: . No. moreover. In their Comment. 32. Acting Presiding Judge. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code. nature. DECISION Sec. Northern Samar. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment. against private respondent Diosdada Amor only. as presiding judge of Branch 23. In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998. No. and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.A. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts. which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years. A-1439 and A-1442.) Blg. a public school principal. The two motions4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997. 132365. both public school teachers. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows: [I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec.: The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is whether R. No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996. Act No. vs. Respondents. AMOR.A. No. On 17 February 1998. against private respondent Esbel Chua only. for having engaged in partisan political activities.. they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.R. Branch 23. Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. We resolved to give due course to the petition. value and amount thereof. 7691 expressly provides that all laws. (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon. 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.5 the petitioner filed this special civil action. July 9. Noynay. Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses. and docketed therein as follows: a) Criminal Cases Nos. and DIOSDADA F. A-1446 to A-1449. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases. the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor. Esbel Chua. A-1443. In its Minute Resolution No. In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998. the Municipal Trial Courts. Jr. 76911 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses. which under Sec. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years. Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan. the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence. public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him. However.A. Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Forthwith. decrees. It contends that public respondent has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. no jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years. The antecedents are not disputed. c) Criminal Cases Nos. HON. it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.

the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza vs. the Judiciary Act of 1948. thus: .P. 10 to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself. The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section. as any. in the case of Alberto -vs. 129.. Otherwise stated. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R. however. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts. Blg. It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B. That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution. as amended. Municipal Trial Courts. Prohibited Acts. regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Jurisdiction of courts.A. Director IV of petitioners Law Department. Balbuena. prescribe. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction. they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.11 to be faithful to the law. value or amount thereof: Provided. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan. MTJ-94-1009. Blg. as amended.P. Undoubtedly. 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses. 32. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i. irrespective of kind. as the case may be. as amended. provides as follows: SEC.P. This Honorable Supreme Court. arresto mayor. special forces.P. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B. and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. home defense forces. Jose P.A. 268. Atty.A. Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan. including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon. That Congress never intended that R. or MTC. Balbuena stated: As a matter of fact. directly or indirectly. Any officer or employee in the civil service.The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code. No. Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. in this petition. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. No. It is thus an opportune time. 1996. Noting that these provisions stand together with the provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles.(Underscoring ours) Also. Omnibus Election Code). is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.. if he is a peace officer. A. March 5. as well as other judges. where the Supreme Court succinctly held: A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec.P. except those holding political offices. Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B. We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. 8 and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the COMELEC. 263. From the decision of the courts. prision correccional. (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. to remind him. Jr. 261.Judge Juan Lavilles. jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan. or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. the Metropolitan Trial Courts. R. Atty. No.Judge Juan Lavilles. except that of failure to register or failure to vote. Hence. and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine. by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. of his duty to be studious of the principles of law. R. Jr. Atty. and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties. barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who. No.e.. Blg.M. 129. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction. nature. (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property. . As we stated in Morales. has ruled. thus: SEC. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code. Congress has the plenary power to define. or arresto menor). it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.9 as amended.A. any officer. or any police forces. Court of Appeals7 that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32. except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code. In the motion for Reconsideration13 he filed with the court below. The Metropolitan. jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. election offenses also fall within the exception.SEC. intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity. No. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts. Jr.12 Counsel for petitioner. 129 providing for the exception. namely. Section 32 of B. employee. we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B. Balbuena states: 16. except to vote or to preserve public order. the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts. and to maintain professional competence. Municipal Trial Courts. 7691. appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. or.With respect to the other charges. as amended. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. but ALBERTO NALDOZA. he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neitherAlberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition. Atty. our own words. 129. Rule 10. a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. Jose P. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and. the instant petition is GRANTED. Consequently. the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition. The truth is. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. . Reg. Worse. but in volume 254 of the SCRA. If Atty.01. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264. ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3. Moreover. Atty.P. The Metropolitan Trial Court. Reg. the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. Omnibus Election Code). SO ORDERED. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings. No costs. put a little differently. 129 by Republic Act No. in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition. Balbuena was diligent enough.P. further. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. We submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B. the amendment of B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos.

Dacanay who dictated to me the contents of said petition. Inc. Canon 10. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. that it was only then that I realized the mistake I committed. more importantly. RESPONDENTS. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws. he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals. with more reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders.‖ The case of petitioner is no better. counsel for petitioner Adez Realty. 12 of the same statute. MORONG. Gonzales.‖ and explains that ―x x x whenever he prepares petitions either for the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. he told me. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992. provides among others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons in possession of the property. x x x I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact that ADEZ REALTY. that at the time he was preparing the petition at bar there were other pleadings necessitating equal if not preferential attention from him which could perhaps be the reason why his secretary committed a very grievous mistake. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that. indolence and ineptitude. making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject property – when in fact it did not make such a finding – is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and. Benjamin M. ―In the case at bar. 100643. Thus. REGISTER OF DEEDS... has so many cases being handled by the law office that I presume I could have copied or my intention was distracted by other pleadings atop my table at the time. it was Atty. much less innocently. review and recheck the allegations in their pleadings. Inc. Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer‘s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. Branch 79 (not 89 as stated in the Affidavit). After due deliberation. Rizal. RIZAL. by his inveigling. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal cases. We directed ATTY. in Bautista v. This ―passing-thebuck‖ stance of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza v. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. rather. In Chavez . petitioner versus The Hon. he unfortunately drags his secretary. xxxx ―7. which is the final arbiter of litigations. clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the filing of pleadings. RIZAL. Dacanay. and by the secretary at that. and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful. motions and other papers and for the lawyer‘s dereliction of duty is a common alibi of practising lawyers. Inc. Chapter III. the language or the argument of opposing counsel. it can be worse. Castro. counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of a judicial record to which. to deceive and misguide this Court. to copy the particular pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Somehow. October 30. or assert as a fact that which has not been proved‖ (underscoring supplied).‖ without counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been a providential mistake of the secretary as it was very material. SP No. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel.R. down to the last word and even punctuation mark. the First Division referred his case en consulta to the Court En Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the possible sanction that may be imposed on a member of the Bar.[5] The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. BR.‖ was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place.[6] The distortion of facts committed by counsel. MORONG. or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment. before filing them with the court. representing them to be true copies. some words were intercalated on a particular paragraph noted by the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to explain. typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks. et al. but it was only after our office received the copy of the decision of the Supreme Court in G. is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly. RTC. and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar. ―4. x x x in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court. Indeed. however.A. stating among others that – ―3. committed. No. For. more particularly the quoted portions. Barinaga. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL. save in certain instances. x x x when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the Court of Appeals as instructed by Atty. because it is a clear and serious violation of one‘s oath as a Member of the Bar. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check.[7] We suspended respondent for six (6) months for. Adez Realty. purportedly his Secretary. x x x in the preparation of the petition. incompetence. No. submitting to the lower court falsified documents. or the text of a decision or authority.[4] where the Court observed thus – ―Making the law office secretary. ―5. by no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed the petition. respondents. Adez Realty. INCORPORATED.. QUEZON CITY. and on which could have hinged the fate of a litigant‘s cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard. Benjamin M. of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that ―[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper. in relation to Sec. 26. with the willing assistance of his secretary.‖[2] Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex ―A‖ is an Affidavit[3] of Alicia A.‖ In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992. The inserted phrase ―without notice to the actual occupants of the property. how could the secretary have divined the phrase ―without notice to the actual occupants of the property. not only because it may set a dangerous precedent but. motions and other documents dictated or prepared by them. counsel‘s shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence. DACANAY. he dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to be appealed from have to be quoted. Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. Rule 10. the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsel‘s explanation that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. to ―SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo[1] thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. 23773 entitled ‗Adez Realty.02. Section 13 of R. I did as instructed. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Morong.R. however. making it highly improbable to be unintentionally. BENJAMIN M. AND AGUEDO EUGENIO.En Banc G. as he is wont to do whenever he prepares a petition. He remembers. among others. VS. PRESIDING JUDGE. Dacanay ―humbly prostrates himself before the Honorable Court and throws himself at its mercy. Certainly. Atty.R.‖ Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel. PETITIONER. 1992 ADEZ REALTY. The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings. he simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages of the said decision or order. 100643 x x x that Atty. Benjamin M. Such mistake though he does not condone and he feels upset at the turn of events. Dacanay confronted me and asked me where I got that portion which was added to the particular paragraph noted by the Supreme Court. on which petitioner bases one of his causes of action. 79.

guilty of intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari. DACANAY. Viola. 125 Kamias Road. The case at bar. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness. entered upon his personal records. . Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the practice of law. Consequently. Otherwise. should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice. Dacanay at his given address at Mezzanine Floor. and no other. counsel for petitioner. especially towards the courts. of misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Worse. BENJAMIN M. counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land. Quezon City. and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. the last forum for appeal. although akin to the aforementioned cases. what We have already said – ―x x x that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess. perhaps to the point of satiety. BENJAMIN M. ATTY. that they are above all x x x sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry. nor consent to the doing of any in court. thereby altering its factual findings with the apparent purpose. is essential for the expeditious administration of justice x x x x A lawyer.[8] We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false statements.v. he is required to swear to do no falsehood.‖[9] WHEREFORE. and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts throughout the country. Those who attempt to misguide this Court. We find ATTY. the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. For this reason. has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. and continue to possess. SO ORDERED. on the other hand. It is well to repeat. Benjamin M. he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him. Indeed. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. the administration of justice would gravely suffer x x x x It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts. WIL-VIC Building. and thus miserably failing to live up to the standards expected of him as a member of the Philippine Bar. has more serious and far-reaching repercussions.

which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration. by an impartial tribunal. I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law. 944. J. it should. very loudly. or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one. 1949 the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4. 419. Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. respecting the same. 944. to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court. (In re Kelly. 945. Act No. the hearing being later postponed to January 10. who was required by their Court on December 7. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts.: This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. who. Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt. and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law. 53.. the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer. and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows: The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority. but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members. In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years. In many instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by statue. But he therein contends that under section 13..Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC VICENTE SOTTO January 21. and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure. practice. 35 Phil.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo. or tending to influence the decision of the controversy. uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. with reference to the suit. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct. 35 Phil. the officers of the court. the case was submitted for decision. a constant peril to liberty and democracy. which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading. "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens. in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement. because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. is contempt of court and is punishable. Vicente Sotto. but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous. for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper. as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any special express grant of statute. pending a suit. which statement. the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat. but such statutory authorization is unnecessary. 1949. etc. but he has not attacked. This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his answer. Victorino Mapa. I announce that one of the first measures. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing. Vicente Sotto in his own behalf. and in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower them to act. under the protection and forms of law. the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal. the counsel. is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States. As it is now constituted. 190. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction. FERIA. reads as follows: As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. reflecting upon the upon court. Parties have a constitutional right to have their fairly in court. in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases. 12 Jur. influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. To his effect." And he also alleges in his answer that "in . in no way. I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil.. for contempt of court. and procedure. among them In re Kelly. erroneously decided the Parazo case. (Contempt. because it is different from what he. so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned. reporter of a local daily. in In reKelly. whether they are State or Federal. is to change the members of the Supreme Court. as proponent of the original bill which became a law had In re VICENTE SOTTO. Any publication.. held the following: The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause. IT is possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several states. soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all court. In his answer. Article VIII of the Constitution. the parties. so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano. 1948. It need be said loudly. because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. has always been considered as misbehavior. who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment. this Court. and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. pp.) In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American Jurisprudence. amended. But. 418. tending to obstruct the administration of justice. Upon his request. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue.) Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness. in his opinion. free from outside coercion or interference.

which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions. and he is hereby sentenced to pay. but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices. and that. he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment that is degrading. and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic. To this effect. his criticism might in that case be tolerated. but the cause of the imprisonment. S vs Sullens (1929). In view of all the foregoing. so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case. in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court. who according to his statement. but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding. when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress." In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu." In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. in the Manila Daily Bulletin. to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions. conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr. a fine of P1. is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered. would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court. we find the respondent Atty. 1949. The respondent in his petition of December 11. and. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication. are incompetent and narrow minded. as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof. the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case. I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil. 36 Fed. the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act. Vicente Sotto. 239: "The administration of justice and the freedom of the press.]. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen. In a clear case where it is necessary. A. from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction." if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is. in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts. published on January 3. this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven. and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. for in his above-quoted statement he says: In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years. within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment. as a last resort. (2nd). 1948. . 238. 230. R. but it cannot close my mouth. for said publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.intended. Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. in the same paper. which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom. 1948. the respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed of our countrymen. is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court. 586. within the same period. As it is now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U. they might be driven to take the law into their own hands." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court know that I came here on vacation. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty." reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars. 594). The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws. it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent. In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December 9. The respondent is also hereby required to appear. Justice Perfecto. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court. as a individual exercises the right of self-defense.000. and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. like any other." and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. under the Constitution. the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon. alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for contempt." It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts. . for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court. . in many cases decided during the last years. and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or inserted. But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press.S. and neither should be violated by the other. though separate and distinct. the court can not close his mouth. he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. [N. So ordered. and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. are equally sacred. is to change the members of the Supreme Court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press. of which he is one of the members. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress. " and in his other statement published on December 10." that is to say. which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. . I announce that one of the first measures. reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members.

and N-0993 for Qualified Theft against one Gloria Naval by respondent Judge Adriano R. JUDGE ADRIANO R. petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction or restraining order. 1989 ANTONIO T. distressing and mortifying and moral damages therefore would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behavior .1987 of Criminal Cases Nos. Branch 16 of Naval. CEB-6478 did not constitute direct contempt but may only.. Biliran. N-0989 to N0993.. reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated and spitefully scorned. This. No. 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection-without any moral or legal basis-a case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. 1988. Carlos. Determinative of the first issue is the distinction we made in the case of Delima vs. N0991. defendant judge should also visit upon him . he issued in Criminal Cases Nos. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court. which would shake the foundation of judicial authority and even of democratic stability.J. Based on the foregoing distinctions and the facts prevailing in the case at bar. Leyte. 1987 in Criminal Cases Nos.. CEB-6478 reading: 12. obstruct. Guerrero filed before the Regional Trial Court. criticize or condemn the dismissal of said criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 14. 1 To stop the coercive force of the Order of Contempt issued by respondent judge. On March 22. respondent Judge maintains that petitioners harp too much on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore the language or words employed to describe. 7 As the terms connote. Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion free from bias. such criticism was directed to him when he was no longer in the process of performing judicial functions in connection with the subject criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms .. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to imprisonment of five (5) days and a fine of P500. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of defendant Honorable Judge-not only shocking. whether or not the language employed in the complaint in Civil Case No. Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent judge nor in the criminal cases from which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by another judge and involving a separate action. N-0992. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations. 3 Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed against respondent judge in the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 were served on respondent judge on December 10. Adriano R. so that the absence of such proceedings should not be made a shield to sully the court's prestige.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. 1988. Petitioners. 6 It is an act done in a distance which tends to be little. whether or not respondent judge can issue an Order of Contempt against petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos. docketed as Civil Case No. herein petitioner George D. Branch 16 of Naval. In his Comment dated April 14. degrade. Sub-province of Biliran. VILLAMOR. according to respondent judge. N-0989. this Court sustains petitioners' contention that the alleged derogatory language employed in the complaint in Civil Case No. The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent judge are the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining respondent Judge Adriano R. 0989. thru his lawyer and herein copetitioner Antonio T. On the following day. for. CEB-6478. ruin or disturb the dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent judge. the word direct" would relate to an act stemming immediately from a source. It is direct when committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the same 5 and constructive or indirect contempt is one committed out or not in the presence of the courts.00 for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court. Leyte by reason of the alleged contemptuous language in the complaint in Civil Case No. Gallardo: 4 Contempt of court may be either direct or constructive. 6478 against respondent judge in another court before another judge is contemptuous and whether the same is absolutely privileged being made in a judicial proceeding. if at all. HON. cause or reason and thus. petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were merely words descriptive of plaintiff's cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the wilfull infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. N-0989 to 0993. Villamor from enforcing his order of Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11. but appalling-giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful. interrupt or embarass the court and justice. FERNAN. and secondly. opine. N-0989-0993 an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against herein petitioners. CARLOS. Respondent. the rule under the law that it be done in the presence of or so near a court or judge while "indirect" would signify an act done not straight to the point and thus.: Consequent to the dismissal on February 18. vs. 6478 because whatever was mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a case before it... N-0990. Furthermore. 0990. 15. The complaint and summons in Civil Case No. the offended party. 1987.. petitioners in the proper proceedings. legally speaking would pertain to acts done out or not in the presence of the court. 2 Petitioner submits two issues for resolution in this petition: first. C. as said court was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice. N-09890993 of the Regional Trial Court. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability because the defendant Hon. Branch XXI of Cebu City an action for damages. Although the allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the wisdom of respondent judge's act of dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. CEB-6478 for damages against respondent filed in Cebu. GUERRERO and GEORGE D. is a very dangerous perception for then the court becomes vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults. the civil case for damages against respondent judge. against respondent judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases. 82238-42 November 13. constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that may be raised by said. 0991.

as it is hereby set aside for being null and void. being relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case. The second issue raised by petitioners has been resolved in Lubiano vs.as direct contempt of court. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Said Order must therefore be. a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: xxx xxx xxx Not only was the Order of District Contempt dated December 11. petitioners may be adjudged guilty thereof and punished therefor only after charge and hearing as provided under Section 3. if at all. "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office.(to) insist on similar conduct by others. Indeed. 1988 is hereby made permanent. We have consistently held that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly. should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and . Castro: 8 "(T)he use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect. 10 Any abuse of the contempt citation powers will therefore be curtailed and corrected." 11 This respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed. contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. however false and malicious the statements may be. As categorically stated Ang vs." (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners' alleged disrespectful language falling. But like the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any speech or debate delivered ill the Batasan or in any committee thereof. which had long been terminated. No costs.After charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel. not direct. 1987 is declared NULL and VOID. The assailed Order of Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on March 22. a lawyer equally subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession. as such. the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Strong words were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner Carlos as a result of the dismissal of the subject criminal cases to justify the award of damages being sought. 13 WHEREFORE. the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. We find no necessity to dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the statements in question are relevant.. it was likewise irregularly issued as an incident in Criminal Cases Nos.. under the classification of indirect contempt. . are covered by the mantle of absolute privileged communication. on the other hand. to rule on whether or not the statements under consideration are contemptuous would be premature in the absence of any contempt proceedings against petitioners. While technically." 12 And it is "through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers .. lawyers. N-0989 to N-0993. . We agree with petitioners that the same are merely descriptive therein plaintiff's cause of action based on his reaction what he perceived as a willful infliction of injury on him by therein defendant judge. 9 in this wise: Respondent would argue that the statements in question. and that. thus: Section 3.. we deem it wise to do so to avoid circuity of action in view of our finding that the statements complained of are not contemptuous. SO ORDERED. but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. 1987 issued without charge and hearing. they cannot be used as basis for any action. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. so much so that judges should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal the power being intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. for in either case this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Gordolla. Be that as it may. but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said speech or debate.

It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar.‖[9] It should be stated likewise that Major Edgardo Maristela assured the Court that petitioner had been released. REYNALDO P. 1975. except for one final note. [5]Hence this petition. Atty. 1975:‖ * * * III. The return stated: ―1. and he was discharged only on December 13. his confinement has to be in the Rizal Provincial Jail and that by virtue of said transfer.: It is settled law that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for release from confinement of a person who has served his sentence. There was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. worded as follows: ―1. VIII.‖[6] On the date set for hearing. Criminal Case No. Neither petitioner nor his counsel.‖‗[3] Then came this paragraph in the petition: ―That on the following day. That he was not able to make the return of the writ immediately on the ground that he was at that time confined in the hospital. 1975. thru counsel. Municipal Warden of Makati. * * * the undersigned respondent released on said date the petitioner as evidenced by certificate of discharge from prison * * * and that is the reason why he cannot produce the body of said person before this Honorable Court. was present. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN. did likewise. the undersigned filed the motion on said ground. MAKATI. The Court further Resolved: (a) to set this case for hearing on Monday. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared. That the petitioner was brought back and confined again to the Rizal Provincial Jail on Dec.m. the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. 1975.On December 8. Honrado imposed upon him the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. in the very same case where your petitioner was convicted and for which he served sentence. Sta. respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. and in the honest belief at that time that the proper remedy was the filing of an amended information for homicide. he entered a plea of guilty. it was upon his motion that the respondent Judge issued the Order * * * ordering the warden to hold the release of the accused (herein petitioner). Pimentel. The information concerning the death of the victim was given to the undersigned by the victim‘s father only on November 19. January 9. 1975. is still entitled to due process of law and to some justice. Thereafter. ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL. PETITIONER. that the victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason the undersigned will file an amended information. RESPONDENTS. the offended party in this case.m. Fiscal. Ana. further. It is to such lesser offense that on September 10. despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he had no jurisdiction to act on said motion because the case had long been terminated and his decision therein had already been executed. Sta. a resolution of the following tenor was adopted by this Court: ―When this case was called for hearing this morning. by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. Sta. while maybe a convict in the eyes of the respondent Judge. * * *. the Office of the Provincial Warden received a commitment order issued by Judge Reynaldo Honrado. the present petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic. 1975. Manolong. L-42032. MUNICIPAL JAIL. and (b) to [reset] the hearing of this case on the aforesaid date and time. the respondent Judge. 15289..[1] It is on such a doctrine that reliance is placed by petitioner Manuel de Gracia in this application for the issuance of such a writ. informed the movant (respondent Asst. 1975.‖[11] On the morning of December 17. the last day of the prison term imposed upon him. There was this manifestation though: ―[Petitioner]. and (b) to [grant] the motion of petitioner to litigate as pauper in this case. but it was fruitless. 1975. PASIG. as stated therein. 1975. a ‗Motion to Order the Warden to Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia (your petitioner)‘ alleging as a ground that the ‗father of the victim. V. 2. the matter had indeed become moot and academic.‘ not at all minding that your petitioner. 18. That by virtue of said order * * * and the Order of Release. RIZAL. respondent Municipal Warden could not produce the body of the petitioner before this Honorable Court. Jr. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL.‖[8] As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for hearing by respondent wardens. PROVINCIAL JAIL. That period of confinement he had duly served by November 19. * * *. as he was going to be charged with the crime of homicide and therefore. 18. Sta. PASIG. the Court resolved (a) to require Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Jr. Beltran. Gilberto Valenzuela. for which reason the present petition has been rendered moot and academic * * *. That because of the necessity for immediate action so as to avoid the accused being released so that he could be held to answer for a crime of homicide. No. That the petitioner Manuel de Gracia has already been ordered released by this court per order dated December 11. respondent Judge Reynaldo P. 1975. It is undisputed that while the information against petitioner charged him with the commission of frustrated homicide to which he pleaded not guilty. THE WARDEN. by virtue of Remittance order issued by Judge Pedro Revilla. and Major Edgardo Maristela appeared for the respondents. not the People of the Philippines). it may be assumed. he was transferred to Makati Municipal Jail. 1976 IN THE MATTER OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE BODY OF MANUEL DE GRACIA ON A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. RIZAL. but the filing of a new information for homicide upon the authority of this Honorable Court‘s ruling in People vs. BRANCH XXV. AND MARCIANO P. Jr. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing. Beltran appeared for the petitioner while Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. That the petitioner was not in his custody when he received copy of the petition as the petitioner was transferred to the Rizal Provincial Jail on December 3. after being able to study the applicable rule and jurisprudence. HON. HONRADO. 1975.‖[10] There was likewise a return of the writ on such a date on behalf of respondent Cresencio T. Ana.‖[4] There was a motion for reconsideration. December 15. as alleged in the petition.Second Division G. Jr. and. 1975. November 20. 1975. * * * and prior similar cases. still [he] persisted in acting upon the Fiscal‘s motion and granted the same ‗in the interest of justice. to serve his prison term thereat pursuant to Presidential Decree No. ―respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. even assuming that the respondent Judge could still act in the case. the petitioner in this case. It was therein declared: ―1. 3. 2. therefore. directing him to release Manuel de Gracia. DECISION FERNANDO. That disposes of this petition. 3. respondent Judge Reynaldo P. notwithstanding his motion entitled ‗Motion to Order the Warden to hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia‘ dated November 19. December 12. respectfully manifests that he has already been released from confinement. 1975 at 10:30 a.[2] This notwithstanding. VS. 1975. 1975. VII. Ana. . 1975. MANUEL DE GRACIA. ANA. Honrado filed this return. considering that he had been under detention since July 18. Rizal. the undersigned concluded that the proper remedy is not amendment of the information because judgment had already been rendered on the first information. that he was informed of the death of the victim and he was going to file an amended information. the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed for being moot and academic. it was later amended to one of serious physical injuries. Ana. Sta.‖[12] It would appear. J. Sta. That on Sept. Wherefore. * * *. That by virtue of that commitment order which the petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day. Ana. 1975. 29 as said prisoner is classified as Municipal prisoner. That the petitioner is not in his custody or power although. That in view of the release from custody of Manuel de Gracia. has not as of this time filed the amended information for Homicide after the death of Florante Valenzuela. Jr. 1975 and required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ not later than the aforesaid date. That on December 12. of Wednesday. * * *‖[7] Respondent Marciano P. IV. the petition alleged that he was not set free. However. to file a [return] of the writ for the respondent wardens not later than 10:30 a. 3. that with the release of petitioner. the Office of the Provincial Warden of Rizal received an Order from the Court of First Istance of Rizal presided by Honorable Judge Reynaldo Honrado. Salvador N. 1975. What was declared orally by him was thereafter set forth in writing in accordance with his return dated December 16. That the reason for his said motion * * * is. December 17. Ana filed with the respondent Judge. RIZAL. the last day of confinement of the accused. Executive Judge CFI Rizal dated Dec. this Court issued the following resolution: ―The Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court on Friday. * * *. STA. a lapse explicable. he could not and should not act on the Fiscal‘s motion because the same was not set for hearing and no copy thereof was furnished to your petitioner whose very liberty was being sought to be deprived. On the very same day. dated 16 September 1975. the reason being that on November 19. RIZAL. in view of the fact that Trial Fiscal Marciano P. PASIG. on Sept. 1975. Salvador N.R.. VI.

Before the guardianship proceedings were instituted. Fernandez in his own behalf. Fernandez and Braulio Fernandez to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. As there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner. respondent. the only way to settle it is by selling the nipa land. redemption price of the nipa land and as assignee of the credit in favor of Maximiano Umañgay and Ricardo Perreyras. exonerated him of the preferred charges. On January 21. On January 30. Torres. and as the wards had no money with which to pay the debt.00 to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay. (Annex L. and the court. After hearing their testimonies. instituted Special Proceedings No. 3931. the court again issued another order directing Atty. So he asked that the charges be dismissed and that the guardian be warned not to make unjustifiable complaints against him. Fernandez as her counsel. including that made to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. However. and the giving of full opportunity to the respondent to appear and defendant himself. she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common with the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umañgay. appellant. Manuel L. Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. This is the first order sought to be annulled in this appeal. that he acted in good faith and the guardianship proceedings were instituted by him only to help the minors the action being less expensive than an intestate proceeding. Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay were summoned to appear for further examination on the proceeds of the sale of the nipa land.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Bello. Timotea Perreyras. Fernandez to submit in ten days a written answer to the charges stated in the order of January 27. HON. 211.00 was paid to Atty. Venturanza. Of the purchase price of P1. and that he was paid only P50. 1958. 1958. It has been held in the following case that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of law: The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold person guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. disapproving all payments made by her. 1958. found Atty. Fernandez. Manuel L. the minors Federico and Pedro Perreyras. The charge may be made by the fiscal. or even by a private person. Fernandez. 3931. [2] 769. 1952 (Annex C). Braulio Fernandez. Atty. 1958. 1958.000. and requiring Attys. exonerating her of the contempt charges. prepared and notarized by Atty. After hearing the guardian Timotea Perreyras. The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt court on two grounds. Judge Eloy Bello. (People vs. Manuel L. Fernandez to annul two orders dated June 16 and July 29. must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the petitioner was more beneficial to the wards when they appointed a guardian and approved the sale of the land. considering it satisfactory. Hon. The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay by Florentino Perreyras. et al. 1960 MANUEL L. The facts do not. presiding. 98 Phil. but alleging that when he received the amount he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation had terminated when the guardian secured the services of Atty. Coquia for respondent.00 was given to said attorney. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel.. issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt for failing to account for the property and money of the wards. On February 10. Fernandez. Jose Y. entitled "Guardianship of the Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed Perreyras. B. the record does not show that these payments were authorized by the court. by the judge. Eloy B. P200..00 to Atty. Manuel L. from whom Judge Bello took over. 52 Off. The second order denies petitioner's motion for reconsideration and warns him not to use improper terms in his pleadings. J. The second order is that denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent attorney.00 for his services to the guardian. L-14277 April 30. The contention that a formal information filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin proceedings must be overruled. and in another order dated January 27. in turn.00 from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the court. ELOY B. 1953. LABRADOR. sold for P200. . he submitted an explanation (Annex H. in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father of the wards in a civil case.). 1958. however. was executed by the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umañgay for the sum of P1. the court issued another order date January 20. the petitioner was duly advised thereof and was given an opportunity to file a written answer thereto.) The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be briefly stated as follows: Timotea Perreyras. the wards were indebted in the sum of P200.: Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. petitioner-guardian.). The above requirements were complied with by the filing of the order on September 30. The court also found the conduct of counsel to be anomalous for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid attorney's fees due him from the father of the wards (Annex J). and causes a copy of the order to be sent to the Supreme Court for corresponding disciplinary action on the petitioner (Annex J). Braulio Fernandez submitted a written explanation.00 collected by him." orders him to return to the guardian within 15 days the sum of P200. The request was granted by Judge Villamor. The other P200. petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. 1958 (Annex G). The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as counsel in Special Proceedings No. who took over the court from Judge Pasicolan. Manuel L. Manuel L. On February 1. vs. So the petitioner must have believed that guardianship proceedings was the proper remedy. the first is that he instituted the guardianship proceedings for the sole purpose of facilitating payment to him of the debts of the wards. father (now deceased) of the guardian and the wards. for her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her brothers. 1951.R. the court on June 16. M. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay were. 1958. the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with the guardian and having taken money from her without previous approval of the court (Annex D). FERNANDEZ. through Atty. defendants. This sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17. In the same order. Manuel L. The judges of the court below. the finding on this point of the court below should be reversed. The court motu proprio preferred the charges in its order dated January 20. Manuel L. of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. 1958. It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings conducted in the court below are irregular because no formal charge was filed against him. There is no merit in this contention. and on August 24. BELLO.000. admitting receipt of the sum of P400. Gaz. No. Manuel L. Upon her appointment and upon her qualifying as such. Fernandez guilty of contempt of court because he had taken the amount of P400. bear out this finding. But the land could not have been sold by the minors without intervention of a guardian.00 from the guardian. a deed of sale.

the orders are modified as above indicated. and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be stricken out for employing strong language. That P200. Without costs.00 and the closing of the guardianship proceedings after such return. for services rendered in a civil case.00 is without prejudice to petitioner's right to demand payment for the services rendered the deceased out of the proceeds of the property left by him (deceased). While the reprimand is in order for petitioner's mistake. In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order for the return of the P200. But the order for the refund of the P200. The reprimand is. the mistake is no sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his client could not pay before his death. fully justified.00. and that they could not be and expended without the latter's permission. he who sows the wind will reap a storm. which must have provoked petitioner.00 on the ground that petitioner is "below average standard of a lawyer. We believe the said strong language must have been impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." The opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fee. Wherefore. is not justified. Certainly the court can not deny them that right. it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders. the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1. more especially so when the money taken was to pay the debt of the father of the wards. the deceased father of the guardian and the wards. therefore. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself. there is no law that authorizes them to do so.However. to say the least. which services are admitted to have been due from their father. This portion of the final order is hereby modified in the sense that the return of the P200. it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.00 is the amount of the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing petitioner to return the P200. Petitioner claims that he won a civil case for his client.000 was in custodia legis and could not be taken and used in payment of debts without its previous authority is correct. As a lawyer the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of the wards are under the control and supervision of the court. and in effect denying him the right to collect the same. The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered. . would deprive petitioner of the fees that he was entitled to receive from the father of the guardian and the wards." If any one is to blame for the language used by the petitioner.

1989.. [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel.. 2 . Sangco filed an explanation. and uncalled for. Petitioner. 82281 August 30. intimidation. INC. No. it is the office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior To be sure. it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for reconsideration. vs. J." 9 We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his clients. and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. such as those summarily ignored in this case. Petitioner.R. INC. and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION.Air Village. and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. RESOLUTION SARMIENTO. VIOLETA MONCAL. 74376 August 30. 1989.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G." 1 On March 2.. but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance.R. among other things. Certainly. and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because. is a manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account. the influence of any of the parties. precisely. Cezar Sangco. 1989 BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION. No. an unfounded accusation. [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the current campaign of this Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts? 8 disparaging.. G. Petitioner. 4 .. THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ Respondents. but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. In that event. COURT OF APPEALS. as a former judge of an inferior court. his client's success is wholly subordinate. GASTON and DOLORES R. it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity . Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language. No. Sangco. 5 JOSE D. The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration. Respondents. Respondents. But if we did not agree with the findings of the court a quo." 10 And while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal. as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity.R. Respondents. and not to outside influences.. He should be aware that because of his accusations. BRIONES. as well. Atty.. Respondents. DOLORES FILLEY and J. documented and admitted facts not put in issue.. 1989 BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION. counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang." as Ayala's Counsel himself would like to do but did not even contend. FELIX C.. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming.. smacks of judicial arrogance . vs. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION. In rendering its judgment. or rule that respondent Court's admission of said fact is "inaccurate. petitioners.. Atty.. intervenors-petitioners. and to the records alone. vs. and innuendo. but as we held in Laureta. 7 ... a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. Atty. Atty. Petitioner. INC.. 1989 .R.. the Court yielded to the records before it.: The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. one party prevails. much less. 6 To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in BAVA which clearly state that such membership is necessary because it is a new development in their relationship with respect to its intention to give its commercial lot buyers an equal right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving any reason therefor. No. intemperate. he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general. 76394 August 30. As we held in Laureta. and CECILIA GONZALEZ. 78182 August 30. are unparalleled in the history of this Court . 3 The blatant disregard of controlling. the Court issued a Resolution. should know better that in any litigation. GASTON. It is a blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted factual findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the true significance of those facts which both the respondent court and this Court did not bother to read and consequently did not consider and discuss. No. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D.) On February 2. least of all in the manner it did with respect to those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable to Ayala. ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO. INC. 1989 BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION. G. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. 71169 August 30. 71169. [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary . Sangco is entitled to his opinion. BRIONES and ALICIA R. litigants should not "'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words' ". JOSE V. the extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom. reproduced as follows: This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for Ayala . ROMERO & ASSOCIATES. to that end. G. As a former judge.. That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to .. COURT OF APPEALS.. No. SANGALANG. requiring. vs.. Atty.... Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the findings of the trial court (in which his clients prevailed). G. challenge the thinking in the Decision.R. J. 12 As we indicated (see Decision denying the BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION. but comes. 1989 [i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. INC.R. 11 comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is in fact and plainly. (G.

Nos. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace criticisms of my decisions".. aside from contempt. Sangco in contempt. Atty. In our "show-cause" Resolution. Atty. 1989)..05. and 82281. Thus. the movants have raised no new arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with inflammatory language. as follows: CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. WHEREFORE Atty. he does not practice what he preaches. his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 13 Apparently. Rule 11. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice.01. 71169. .. however. offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. but provided they are fair and dignified. Of course. Rule 11. J. Rule 11.00 payable from receipt hereof.motions for reconsideration in G. No. the Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions. of the Rules of Court.R.. and deciding G. Clearly. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's rebuke. dated August 25. 74376. specifically. of Rule 71. and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.02. Atty. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his record. 76394... 60727. IT IS SO ORDERED. 78182. Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from receipt hereof.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous. for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1. Rule 11. we sought to hold Atty.R.

virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. R. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. In other words. cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. or doing it through ignorance. 1972). Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'). Santiago O. (promulgated on Sept. made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines." The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov.respondent. Respondent del Mar. evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice. respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200. On December 5. and RAMON G. and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court. Gaviola. it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment. 1973. on December 8. 1974 JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR. Quirico del Mar when. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats. Leuterio and Ramon G. L-36800. and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". FRANCISCO M. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24. instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision. Magno S. respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. filed without leave of court. the next appeal that will he interposed. 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code. for lack of merit. will be to His Excellency. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. resorted to innuendos and veiled threats. Mr. he reiterated his threats. the President of the Philippines. respondents. JOSE N. 1972. Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead. 1972. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). LEUTERIO. the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Justices of the Court of Appeals. For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration. Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious. Although the petition for certiorari has been denied. It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. for Atty. 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court. and in Civil Case No.000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice. On the same date. ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored . 27. GICA. and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10. 1973. Jr. MAGNO S. it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar. reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. 1972. even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment. personally and individually. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence. stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. In Re Quirico del Mar. R-13075. and that the Appellate Court. Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC petitioner Francisco M. vs. respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines. particularly Articles 171. ESGUERRA. Not content with that move. and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. by virtue of the proclamation of martial law. Gica vs. he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence". R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No.R. We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5. 1973): G. impelled to assert its authority. GATMAITAN. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14. that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. No. GAVIOLA. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. he would like to assume the role of this Court. 1973. 27. Hon. in the interpretation and construction of the laws. 1972. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views. noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages. petitioners. 46504-R.R.:p Petitioner Atty. furnishing them a copy thereof. as counsel for Montecillo. 24. as Commander in Chief of the AFP. 1972. plus costs. Santiago O. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G. R-28782. No. It admonished Atty. No. Tañada. L-36800 October 21. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5. J.

for on May 25. No. had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. 46504-R. 1973. let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". No. R. so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. He. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. L-36800. among other things. L-36800. if he is just. requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1. 1973. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat. Gatmaitan. although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction. is not at all true. Our resolution of September 4. No. 1973. We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision. 1973. Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and. As manifested. When We denied in G. To add insult to injury.R. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. filed a manifestation dated July 1. 1973. just or unjust. No. that the case for damages (R13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. R. We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1. Jose N. 1973. Gica. became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed. before Us.. was to require by Resolution of July 16. R. if the latter. G. 1973. he submitted an explanation dated August 1. fanned by the wind of frustration. thus making him liable for oral defamation. Montecillo should be exonerated. therefore. civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who. 46504-R and G.. 1973. not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government. whether the threats do or do not succeed. To Our resolution of July 16. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned. there was arrogant abuse. before Us. 9 of Rule 139. and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. No. p. reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu. in its tenor. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15. Leuterio and Ramon G. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. Gica vs. if he is unjust. Jr. We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. but the offense is committed. No. he would be liable. No. "I can at this time reveal to you that. against the authorities. I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion. Jose N. R. On September 26. his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court. If the statement uttered was the former. 1973. not excluding even the President.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Jr. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5. 1973. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us. any man." . respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R. can be threatened. it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New. p. of the so-called civil liberties. in his letter to his Excellency. complaining against those justices. 1973. respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation. asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. 46504-R and our own in G.. This so-called explanation is more. corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. No. 1973. 1973. R. At this juncture. denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. he will not. which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. No. let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities. he will succumb. rollo. wherein he stated that ". including the courts. trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G. there was abuse. fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200. 19. Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. 1973. I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same. 46504-R. therefore. L-36800 the petition for review oncertiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. Jorge Montecillo. decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied). R. 145. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements. No. he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. 1973. respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court.. as stated in my manifestation to you. Gatmaitan. turned against Us when We denied on May 14. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). worse than abuse. 1973. This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5. respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. 46504-R. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court. 1973.A just man can never be threatened. Our immediate reaction to this manifestation. stating brazenly. required respondent Atty. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society. what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). On July 13. dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice. 150. he.. wherein he stated. he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition. among other things: "Graft. respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10. 46504-R. Gaviola. Our resolution of May 14. leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies. then. together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola.

and injustice in and out of the government. We. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. 20 SCRA 441. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. R. 1974. he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them. We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision. We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge. 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. No. 1973. there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. respondent del Mar. however. that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness. in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case. by Our act in G. 1973. all without basis. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions. constitute a serious disrespect. 77 Phil. and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal. corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. 1967. illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong. We quote: The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. by resolution of January 10. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should. fettered by fallibility. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men. to deny said prayer of Atty. 1973. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. As an officer of the court. emphatic but respectful. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft. he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision. J. Some such frame of mind. graft. because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which. 444-445) Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. And. he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases." It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts. it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity. perhaps much more effective. Carillo. imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused. 595). With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law. To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines. was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. are among the corrupt. requesting Us to reconsider said directive. 1973. he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. 572).. S. As We stated before: We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. That is his privilege. with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court. that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty. In Our resolution dated December 17. 20 (b) Rule 138. Up to now. Rules of Court). should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. No. When this Court in the resolution dated November 19. were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. L-36800. he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code. and men are encompassed by error. convincing but not derogatory. would be resting on a very shaky foundation. that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days. with understanding condescension. justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable.. respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12. . lawyers may come up with various methods. 7). in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved. after he had been interpellated by the Court. We resolve. an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor. the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. He answered in the affirmative. that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays. the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. This is his misfortune. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice. but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor. respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically. without such respect. He hopes and expects that. We said: . according to the oath he has taken.Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1. June 26. of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. L-22979. In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20. is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption. In other words. Ferrer G. R. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients. To be sure.

46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. In both instances. R. such suspension to take effect immediately. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. in seeking both abstract elusive terms. both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. No.G. 6150). suspending Atty. shall be.As an officer of the court. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court. as he is hereby. suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE. it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). with supposed physical and mental ailments at that. Carillo. No. C. We in turn denied in G. in disposing of the case of his client. No. SO ORDERED. We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.R. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that. We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. as implemented by Our resolution of November 19. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals. It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case. 562.) The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. dated March 5. In short. the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. if not with gross ignorance of the law. 5021. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. 1973. . he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. 46504-R. the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. 12. 43 O. 31 SCRA. 1970. G. For a lawyer in the twilight of his life. is hereby affirmed. p. (People vs. his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice. 1973. R. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. No. L-27654. De Joya et al vs. As already stated. I. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. Respondent Atty. F. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance. coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances. (In re Almacen. p. 18. Feb. he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice.

RTJ-89-439. A careful study of the charges in these complaints. "pending resolution of the matters raised by complainant in the Supreme Court. the complainant challenges the due exercise by respondent judge of his discretion in the following instances: (1) RTJ-89-331. and (3) RTJ-89-438.. the Comment in RTJ-89-361. 1990. 280. In the resolution dated June 20. the complainant resorted to the filing of administrative complaints against respondent judge instead of availing of the appropriate legal remedies from the adverse rulings. From the foregoing. complainant. made a similar request. Nos. the OCA recommended that complainant be strongly reprimanded. as evidenced by the following: (1) a Manifestation dated March 1.R.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A. DBP. the Third Cause of Action. opposing respondent's application for disability benefits because of the "pendency of administrative cases against him filed by me and some more will follow as soon as I consolidate my evidences" [Emphasis supplied]. No.e. i. 1990. 4." there being nothing irregular in such order. He also threatened to bang more cases. no prima facie cases have been established in: (1) the Seventh Cause of Action in RTJ-89331. Sr. which contains accusations that respondent has a "conspirator" in the Office of the Clerk of Court. respectively).) Complainant did not heed this admonition. after enumerating some of the charges. against the presiding judge. the denial of a motion for inhibition. RTJ-89-362. et al. . and the memorandum of the OCA dated July 13. and his Compliance by way of comment in RTJ-89-355. (2) his Reply to RTJ-89-361 dated May 18. grave misconduct. namely: 1. which charges respondent with falsification of three separate orders in three different cases. violation of his oath. . RTJ-89-361. complainant continued to file charges against respondent. 2. Complainant. 1990 as scheduled he will be forced much to his regret to file the following administrative and criminal complaints. the Sixth Cause of Action. (2) RTJ-89-361." Also brought to the attention of the Court was complainant's letter dated June 7. Hidalgo of Regional Trial Court Branch 68 of Tarlac. maliciously delaying the administration of justice. in his Reply in RTJ-89-355. the Eighth Cause of Action. Tarlac. powerful and influential and against his foes. noted that complainant's persistent filing of administrative cases against respondent "signif(ies) a desire to unjustifiably bring respondent to public disdain and ridicule. the Fourth Cause of Action. [G.This claim will be discussed lengthily in the next administrative charge which complainant will file against the respondent [Emphasis supplied]. 355. vs. RTJ-89-331. 362. the respondent judge asked that the other administrative cases by the same complainant be consolidated. PENTICOSTES. the Tenth Cause of Action. (3) his letter to the Court dated August 8. 439 September 28. and 205. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. and supplied lies in respondent's comment. knowingly rendering an unlawful order. Second and Fifth Causes of Action in RTJ-89-331 (which arose from respondent's dismissal of Civil Case Nos. the Compliance filed by respondent in RTJ-89-355. July 13. the rich. the Court admonished the complainant "to exercise more care and decorum in filing unfounded and unsubstantiated charges against officers of the court in order to maintain and uphold the dignity of the same of which he is a part" (also dismissed was RTJ-88213 in a Resolution dated July 18. The conspirator allegedly inserted inconsistent words in a final Court resolution. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: Complainant Prudencio S. v. 438. 1990 PRUDENCIO S. the records of the consolidated cases. falsification under Art. RTJ-89-355. 1990 (submitted to respondent judge in relation to two civil cases). Third. 1989. 1990: It is respectfully submitted. (2) RTJ-89-362. and RTJ-89-438. since the same grounds have already been found to be without merit by the Court in Prudencio Penticostes. the Ninth Cause of Action. appeal or petition for review or for certiorari. the order granting a motion for reconsideration. 1990. in the First. clearly reveals that all but three cases ** can be dismissed outright because: (1) the complainant failed to establish prima faciecases: (2) the complainant filed administrative cases as substitute for the appropriate remedy in rulings adverse to him. 1990]. which reads: Counsel will make it appear on record that if the motion and joint motion will not be acted (upon) on March 21. if not suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months. JUDGE RAFAEL HIDALGO. 234. and the order deferring action on a motion for an accounting of harvests. by motion for reconsideration. the order setting aside an order of dismissal. which takes issue with the order to archive Civil Case No. First. 89620. In his Comment in RTJ-89-361. the poor and powerless. 198.M. and (3) the complaints involve the appropriate exercise of respondent's discretionary authority. 1990. In a memorandum dated July 13. 361. The Court directed the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to gather all charges filed by the complainant against the respondent judge and thereafter consolidated six (6) administrative complaints: RTJ-89-331 (which recites ten [10] causes of action). 1989 admonition. . the denial of a motion to dismiss. Subsequent to the June 20. that the respondent has made Branch 68 as his personal court thus making it as a court for his friends. 5. the order denying a motion to declare defendants in contempt. Second. Penticostes has filed a series of administrative charges against Judge Rafael B. respondent. 3. separate orders setting aside the amended complaints in Civil Case . the OCA. since no indication of such falsification can be gleaned from the record. the denial of a motion for inhibition and two motions for reconsideration. 1989 dismissing RTJ-89-294.

Considering the nature. complainant has transgressed the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and miserably failed to observe conduct expected of a member of the bar under the Code and in accordance with his lawyer's oath. which complaints were amended to implead respondent as co-defendant for his alleged use of his judicial powers to prejudice complainant during the proceedings of the aforestated cases. except as to charges for which comment has been required. resources and forbearance of the Court and diverted the energies of the respondent judge who has been called upon to comment and defend his every action. fairness and good faith to the court. direct contempt orders. Through his imprudent filing of administrative cases against respondent judge. with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely. The suspension shall take effect from the date of receipt of this Resolution. or IMPRISONMENT of ten (10) days in the local jail in case of failure to pay the fine within the time appointed. having found the charges above-mentioned to be absolutely without basis. and (3) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for one (1) year for his willful disregard and disobedience of the admonition made by the Court in RTJ-89-294.00) payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. RTJ-89-361 and RTJ 89-439 are likewise dismissed. but not every order or ruling adverse to a party can be made the basis for an administrative charge. 255.000. and his violation of Canons 10. the complainant imposed upon the time. 1989. Canon 11 provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the court and to judicial officers. the complainant has responsibilities to the judiciary. (3) RTJ-89-355. SO ORDERED. which the complainant willfully ignored and disobeyed by manifesting the intent to file more of the same. 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. while Canon 12 mandates that a lawyer shall exert very effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. the Court Resolved to: (1) DISMISS outright the following complaints: RTJ-89-331. RTJ-89-438. and (4) RTJ-89-439. . 228. WHEREFORE. and RTJ89-355. As a member of the bar. Penticostes. frequency and indiscriminate filing of groundless charges and despite the admonition previously given by resolution of the Court dated June 20. RTJ-89-362. and spread in the personal record of Atty. 253. This is not to say that a judge may not be answerable for violation of the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct.Nos. The Code of Professional Responsibility and the rules thereunder impose obligations on the lawyer in relation to the court: Canon 10 states that a lawyer owes candor. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of this country for their information and guidance. the failure of respondent judge to strike out the answer in two civil cases. and (2) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P1.

Rayos claim that he was just "lawyering" and acting as "the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client" is untenable because his (Atty. 1993 order. since this will be the last case to recover the partnership property. They argue that "when a person. 5 respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Branch 134. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to appear before him on January 7. and although said case was dismissed. Inc. which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of December 17. 3796. it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case. that he assumed his new office on October 11. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge.It appears that on November 18. PAUL T. she was not presented.00. while the other counsels were present. Makati. offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18. 14048. 1993 and started holding sessions on October 18. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit. was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. 1993. but eventually. Atty. while in their petition dated November 29. Santos and the latters witness. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty. counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises. nevertheless. as petitioners alleged. 1996 KELLY R. 1993 and December 17. Branch 134 of Makati. Mrs. 3Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory. that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated December 3. 112869. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present. as Presiding Judge of the RTC. plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. because their absence was an indication that Atty. he should immediately move for his inhibition. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos. were all absent. brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises. 14048. 1993. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 5. 1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. January 29. for the execution of their sentence. for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park. Inc. since it involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory.: This is a petition for certiorari. and others. What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt. plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle.R. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos. asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case. RAYOS. was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Remedios Porcuna. which they filed with the Office of Court Administrator. 1993. J. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief. impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner. with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co. DECISION MENDOZA." for Kelly Wicker. 3. filed a motion seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration of the case. in other words. Inc. who said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by the Court" had advised him to have the case reraffled. docketed as Civil Case No. when the opposing counsel Atty. 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court. against whom plaintiff Kelly R. he was "personally recruited from the South" by Atty. Kelly Wicker and Atty." respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on November 26. Orlando A. 2. Atty. Wickers counsel. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing." Wickers sense of disquiet increased when at the next two hearings. ARCANGEL. defendant LFS Enterprises. 1993. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over. vs. Orlando A. WICKER and ATTY. as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. Considering the allegations to be "malicious. Rayos." 2 In a pleading entitled "Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity.m. 1993 of this Court and not because." In his comment. and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case No. petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of the case. In one hearing. that Atty. was able to maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs. Petitioners. he does not thereby become guilty of contempt. The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker."In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge. petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their accusations against him. held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five(5) days and to pay a fine of P100. just lawyering. finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100. The antecedent facts are as follows: Kelly Wicker. Wicker and his Counsel. he issued an order dated December 8. the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing. respondent judge. that after holding petitioners in contempt. Meantime. one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council." Atty. 1 The motion alleged in pertinent part: 1. The former has been held to be equivalent to "misbehavior committed in the presence of . 1993. Rayos contend that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. 1993 to enable petitioners to "avail themselves of all possible remedies". 154-93 dated September 2.00. in an order dated December 3. 1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati. No. and that by tendering their "profuse apologies" in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3. which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased. ORLANDO A. The case. Santos and/or his wife.SECOND DIVISION G. Santos knew who "the judge may be and when he would appear. Arcangel. Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground that he had a "full grasp of the case. Rayos) duties to the court are more important than those which he owes to his client.. Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove their case. Respondent. 4. the new judge as well as Atty. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court. assailing the orders dated December 3.In their petition 4 before this Court. 1994 at 8:30 a. 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. Atty. HON. derogatory and contemptuous.

They suggest that lawyers. After all. whom he thought to be employed in the court. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young man. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati.Be that as it may.In extenuation of his own liability. plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. particularly the following paragraphs thereof: 2.P. there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises. or from participating in the consideration of a case. 15 which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the judge "corrupt. the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina). the order of December 3. as he claims. . 8The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.00 to P200. and although said case was dismissed. Inc. A reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have come from him but were additions made by Atty. The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that "Respondent Judge Paul T. VIII of the Constitution. Hence even if petitioners are right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt." 13After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners "profuse apologies" and indicated that he would let them off with a fine.leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City. In one hearing. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition. Rayos and not Wickers. 3796. nevertheless. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" 12 and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case." He was just "lawyering" and "he cannot be gagged. Atty. while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt. MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable. they have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of contempt.To be sure.00. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. It would. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos. Meantime. considering the background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. Santos. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice. Moreover. belligerent and disrespectful manner. Rayos. Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court employee who was the source of the same. the contemnor may be punished only "[a]fter charge in writing has been filed. College of Law. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100." If nothing else. and while he owed him whole-souled devotion. 1 of the Rules of Court and. removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court for the reason that Here. he is not just an instrument of his client. 154-93. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. by virtue of Administrative Order No. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife. appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been "personally recruited" by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been "eased out" were Atty. were asked to inhibit themselves from trying. Atty. a flouting or arrogant belligerence" first evident in petitioners motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith. Atty. 11 Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty.Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. the Court sustains Judge Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. that it seemed the opposing counsel. against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.The same justification also holds true in this case. therefore. and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel." the Court. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause. WHEREFORE. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge. he cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963 graduate of the U. the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing. knew who the replacement judge was. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief. if they are well connected. 3." even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it was his client who verified the same. arrogant. he "deliberated" for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do. what Wicker said in his note to Atty. In Ceniza v. which necessitated "easing out" the former judge to make room for such transfer. this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude. 7Consequently.Atty. therefore. can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. Atty. 5 (3). It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case. Atty. without any jail sentence." whereas in case of direct contempt. In response to this. and even members of the Supreme Court. because Atty. It is the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to P500. to whom or to whose wife. one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council. cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. it is hard to resist the conclusion. while the words were contumacious. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present. What is important to determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for direct contempt. As a lawyer. Art. Rayos. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. precisely "in the interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. Rayos stated in the motion. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a "mouthpiece. but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt. done in a malicious." 10 This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Sebastian. however.or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Rule 71. a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. where complex cases are being filed. In addition. direct contempt.We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 6 It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt. Atty. Atty. Rayos. These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. 9Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts.SO ORDERED. Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. Masaquel: 14Numerous cages there have been where judges. the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable.00 for each of the petitioners. the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati. it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. whereas in cases of direct contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs. Santos did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to come. that movants were held in contempt of court.

There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service. 3.. JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT. 1998. Administratively. — The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court. ABIERA. Antique. The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court. in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.. May. much less resolved by. Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. and (2) the Order dated November 22. However.. the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load. 102781. The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. No. respondents. where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties. .. the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. — However. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf. ID. seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February.. PURPOSE. and assuming that it can. all in 1989. and the months beginning January up to September 1990. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. ID. petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. 1993. 2. whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.. the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.. On the other hand. since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties. Public Attorney's Office for private respondent. NOCON. — Thus. ID. The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. REMEDIAL LAW. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1. JURISDICTION. Sandiganbayan. ID. ID. as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. ID. or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter. PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE. which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . HON. .. and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. Furthermore.R. We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service. In fine." when in truth and in fact. vs. 1989. by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31. the investigation being conducted by . respondent Napoleon A. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. the question before Us is this: should a judge. petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC 4. June. SYLLABUS 1. having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him.. Presiding Judge. REASON. ID. which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question? DECISION G. .. Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. REASON.. April. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES. 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner. J p: BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA. report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with. ID. this Court. Regional Trial Court. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. April 22. petitioner. Sandiganbayan. to submit its records. July and August. NAPOLEON A. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. as one of the three branches of government. Branch 12. or for a total of seventeen (17) months. as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . ID. — Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. ID. . the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties. ID. REASON.

Thus. the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. the question before Us is this: should a judge. without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. WHEREFORE. the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. 4 The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. Article VIII. SO ORDERED. where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties. . The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court. having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him. in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load. this Court. much less resolved by. Napoleon A. as one of the three branches of government. Administratively. No other branch of government may intrude into this power. report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with. it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws. or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter. By virtue of this power. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. to submit its records. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question? In fine. 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel.the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.

Its objection is that the order of August 26. The answer filed by respondents. which fell to the sala of respondent Judge. It was alleged therein: "1. Inc.. however.00 for alleged bad faith on the part of the lessor. 1966. a motion for dismissal of the case and for payment of the supersedeasbond was filed by the plaintiff. Respondent Judge. including damages.800. That on June 23. the legal issues subject of this appeal have therefore become moot and the continuation of the trial set for August 2. It was issued at a time when the matter was still subject to cognizance by respondent Judge.00 thru the Economic Insurance Company. 8. 2. upon failure of the defendant to make the required rental deposits to comply with the provisions of Sec. 1967: "Upon motion of the plaintiff in view of the fact that the possession of the property. 1966. 567 for the amount of P8. damages and costs as adjudged by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. Thereafter.[G. 1967. That on November 23. manifested that he has no longer any interest in the further prosecution of this case and would have no objection to the dismissal thereof. upon surrender of the premises to the plaintiff. Supersedeas Bond No. L-28056. within the thirty-day period.00. granting the prayer for a writ of execution against petitioner "for the amount represented by its Supersedeas Bond covering rentals rightfully due to the plaintiff.. limited his first order to ordering the dismissal. this Honorable Court issued an Order dismissing the instant case as prayed for by undersigned counsel but did not resolve the prayer for the payment of the amount represented by the Supersede as Bond in this case. 1967. issued a Writ of Ejectment Execution against the defendant. INC. there was a manifestation and motion to execute bond to this effect: "1. VS.[2]The decision of the City Court of Manila of October 20. defendant filedSupersedeas Bond No. seeking dismissal of such a suit as well as a counterclaim for reimbursement in the amount of P15. apparently overlooking the prayer for the payment of the back rentals guaranteed by the supersedeas bond.. and (b) that the Economic Insurance Co. has been restored to the plaintiff. Inc. DECISION FERNANDO. That on August 2. BRANCH VI. such as it is. be ordered to pay to herein plaintiff the amount of P8. 4. That defendant having vacated the leased premises and possession thereof having been surrendered to the plaintiff. The order granting the writ of execution by respondent Judge is sustained. plaintiff is entitled as right to the payment of the amount represented by the aforementionedSupersedeas Bond as rentals due and owing to the plaintiff before this case was elevated to this Honorable Court on appeal. the defendants having vacated the same. 6. 800. a supersedeas bond was executed by such defendant as well as by the petitioner. Inc.800. this Honorable Court. there was a complaint for ejectmentdated August 12."[7] It was noted in the answer that on August 22. That counsel for the defendant did not raise any objection to the enforcement of said writ of execution by the Sheriff of Manila whereupon said Officer placed the plaintiff in possession of the leased premises subject of this appeal. possibly because it could not deny. the case having been dismissed. respondent Uy Realty Co.100. it was enabled not only to have this Court give due course to such petition. respondent sought for an amendment of the above order to include execution on the bond filed to cover the past rentals due. 567 for P8.. 1970] ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO. entitled to the withdrawal of the amount covered by the aforementioned supersedeas bond in view of the dismissal of this appealed case. IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA. but also to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting a bond of P1. its liability on the supersedeas bond.. Inc. however. petitioner Economic Insurance Co.00 for alleged improvements made on the leased premises and for damages in the amount of P5. PETITIONER. said bond having for its purpose to guarantee the payment to the plaintiff of the accrued rentals up to the time of judgment in the City Court of Manila.[1] There was an answer by defendant onAugust 27. as of right. It did not even oppose the motion for its execution. The result thereof was the challenged order of August 26.000. As clearly pointed out. That the Economic Insurance Co. the undersigned counsel filed with this Honorable Court their 'Motion for Dismissal and For Payment ofSupersedeas Bond'.00 which represents accrued rentals due the herein plaintiff up to the time of judgment in the ejectment case rendered by the City Court of Manila."[8]The prayer was for a writ of execution to be issued against now petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedeas bond covering rentals rightfully due respondent Uy Realty Company. upon motion of undersigned counsel. UY REALTY COMPANY. attorney's fees and costs. sought merely the dismissal of the case. Inc. 3. 1967 was issued at a time when the matter was outside the jurisdiction of respondent Judge. 151874 in favor of plaintiff. 1967. 1967.00 representing rents in arrears plus the sum of P1. the premises having been vacated.R. 000. 4. We find for respondents. and that proposition alone." [6] Then came this order of respondent Judge of August 2. That the records of this case will show that on November 23. It was apparent therein that previous to such order of dismissal. 1967. As shown by the petition itself. Inc. has teen duly notified of plaintiff's Motion for the payment of the Supersedeas Bond as of August 1."[9] Petitioner does not deny.. defendant filed with this Honorable Court through the Economic Insurance Company.000. subject matter of this litigation. That defendant. 3. however. 1966.00 guaranteed by theSupersedeas Bond No. RESPONDENTS. That was the basis. 2.00 a month beginning September. would have been bolstered. 5. HONORABLE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL. It is on that legalproposition. this case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs. That on August 1. That considering the dismissal of this case. J. under date of July 31. to enter the action into this Honorable Court. there was a motion by respondent Uy Realty Company for the dismissal of the case and for the payment of the back rentals secured by the supersedeas bond filed by petitioner. 1967 will not serve any purpose."[5] It sought in the prayer that "(a) this appealed case be dismissed. would impute a grave jurisdictional defect to an order of the then respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel granting a motion of the other respondent Uy Realty Company for a writ of execution against petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedeas bond "covering rentals rightfully due" the other respondent as plaintiff in anejectment case.500. By its stress on the claim that the above order of August 26. 1967 and the undersigned counsel has not been served with any opposition thereto. The order now challenged was the result thereof. the Economic Insurance Co. that it seeks to make out a case for prohibition. 1966 filed by now respondent Uy Realty Company against a certain Co Hing.: In this special proceeding for prohibition. [3] Upon an appeal being taken. the aforesaid order of dismissal of respondent Judge being received by respondent Uy Realty Company only on August 15. 1967. 1967. 1966 for the use and occupation of such premises. 5. It would thus appear that this petition lacks merit. thenperhaps the case for petitioner. 1967 was issued notwithstanding the finality of a previous order of dismissal of the case by respondent Judge. August 31. AND THE SHERIFF OF MANILA. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. altered the picture thus sedulously sought to be created by petitioner. the motion precisely sought that petitioner be ordered to pay the . If the motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. 567 filed in this case representing rentals. 1966 ordered the defendant and those claiming under him to vacate the premises as well as to pay the sum of P4. No. [4] During the pendency of such appeal. That plaintiff is.

amount of P8. of such attempts to evade liability to which a party like petitioner should respond. Villamor.[10] we have stressed that we are not to lend the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort. however. Inc. respondent Judge ignored that portion and merely ordered that the appealed case be dismissed. what respondent Judge did was clearly within his authority. through haste or inadvertence. 1967 is set aside. With costs against petitioner Economic Insurance Co. to crown with success an unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by perverting the ends procedural requisites are intended to accomplish. Technicalities. not as a means for its frustration. In the appraisal. it would be.800. We do so again. to execute on the bond filed by petitioner. Unfortunately. Within the period. It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the law allows it. "should give way to the realities of the situation. Not once but several times. from Alonso v. before such order attained the stage of finality.. One last observation. however. Even if the petition were impressed with a greater degree of plausibility. a modification thereof was secured as a result of a manifestation and a motion of respondent Uy Realty Co.00 guaranteed by the supersedeas bond. Under the circumstances. considering all the circumstances." [11] WHEREFORE. and the challenged order can stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny. this petition should fail. in the appropriate language of JusticeMakalintal. . Hence. the result of which would be to render illusory substantive rights. the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us by virtue of our resolution of September 25. it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to justice. and this petition for prohibition is denied.

Sanchez 5 is worth recalling: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. 1965. . No. one Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash such writ of execution based primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7. This appeal. Simplicio and Domingo. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely for embodying in the order complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court." 4What was said by us in Li Kim Tho v. G. we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. and one Felicitas Bagawisan. therefore. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. On February 13 of the same year. CECILIO AGUINALDO. the lower court. There is no dispute as to the antecedents. SIMPLICIO AGUINALDO. It was succinctly put in Amor v.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC plaintiffs. substituted as defendants. far from commendable. 1965. as shown in this case. where. Necessarily. had no choice but to ask the court in a motion of April 7. seen to it that a new counsel was appointed. administrator. The prayer was for the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order requiring counsel for the defendants to furnish the court the names as well as the residences of the heirs or the legal representatives of the deceased in order that they could be substituted in his stead so as not to render nugatory a decision. once a judgment has become final." 2Had the defendant. any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. appointing appellants as legal representatives of the deceased defendant and substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of Court in order that the execution that ought that have taken place long since could at long last be effected. defendants-appellants. if not to defeat. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23. Still undeterred. 1965. or give other or further relief. Defendants cannot be heard to allege that it is much too late now to apply the above rule. final and executory in character. Yet. the enforcement of a final judgment. the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Jugo 3in these words: "And with more compelling reason the respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ. 1969 certified the matter to this Court. especially so. executory in character. then presided by the Hon. 1970 VICTORIA AGUINALDO and SIMEONA AGUINALDO. administrator. 9 a 1910 decision.: Any effort on the litigant to delay. the order of October 5. L-30362 November 26. Segundo Aguinaldo. inviting attention to Sec. guardian. the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a pending case. it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of his executor. Branch II through its clerk issued a writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31. Hence the writ of execution. Anastasia. requiring one of the defendants therein. It is equally vital to remember that the judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached. this time presided by Judge Andres Sta. or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court. the question involved being one of law. Villamor. Ricardo C. 1. much more so of this Court. in order that such a decision in their favor be not rendered nugatory by the above technicality. There was an appeal. 1965. the lower court.R. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. 1965 that he had ceased to be such as of May 31. Thus: "Whenever a party to a pending case dies. through a mere subterfuge. for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal. and FELICITAS BAGAWISAN. predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. That would be to set at naught the principle consistently adhered to by this Court. Reyes 7 is equally relevant: "There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary. it rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals. is quite obvious and indisputable. It was further set forth therein that on January 5. plaintiffs-appellees. becomes incapacitated or incompetent. From Alonso v. ANASTACIA AGUINALDO. and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that. 1965 is affirmed. then upon his death there could be compliance with the above provision. 1965 within which to submit the name and residence of the executor. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Puno gave counsel of record up to March 22. moreover. 1956. The aforesaid counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23. guardian or other legal representative. a motion for its execution was granted. 16. There was an opposition to such motion on February 25. courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. 1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. that is what the move taken by the defendants in his case amounted to." 6 An excerpt from Villaflor v. The lower court as was but proper did not lend its approval. Considering the turn of events. On January 14. and to pay the latter the amount of P300. 1965. We have done so before. vs. administrator. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. should fail. 1 now appellees. defendants Cecilio. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. defendants. PRIMO AGUINALDO and RUFINA AGUINALDO. by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level of a technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or any court for that matter. 1965. FERNANDO. it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death. guardian or other legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. which in turn by resolution of February 17. to reconvey one-fourth (¼)pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to appellees. WHEREFORE. deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 1958. or quash it or order its stay. a granddaughter. is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts. DOMINGO AGUINALDO." 8 2. in effect. On October 5.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. and that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid order. As noted at the outset. J. we find for appellees. they would appeal. all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate children. We do so again. They ought to have known better. There is no reason to refuse affirmance to the order of the lower court complained of. when the judgment had been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court. Maria. and to give the name and residence of his executor. or their legal representative and alleging that there was a failure on the part of the counsel to comply with the above provision. thereafter deceased. incapacity or incompetency. to evade the operation of a decision final and executory. SEGUNDO AGUINALDO (deceased). On March 4. granted the aforesaid motion and substituted defendants in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. 1959 during the pendency of such appeal. the winning party be not.

4. 1992. 1455. as he should have expected . Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. 1990. In this disbarment case.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION Respondent. the Dionisio spouses. 1964. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9. 1989. SYLLABUS 1. Lee. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law. Despite repeated verbal and written demands. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal. Instead. June 21. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. On October 24. On June 9. and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista.C. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10. This was docketed as civil Case No. CRISANTO L. through Francisco. Civil Case No. 1989. Through Francisco. On March 29. 5. 1964. Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL. 3. 1455. 2. 1989.R. 1989. Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. Francisco knew or should have known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari. he alleges that Civil Case No. March 30. laches and prescription. the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Judge Singzon. Crisanto L. 1990. Sp No. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and different. Garcia and her husband Godofredo. Q-89-2118. the petition was denied. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera. Concordia B. Lee did not appeal. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Garcia and the other lessors. 1989. 90-5852. vs. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On April 6. Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. — The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. Branch 98. Francisco. not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. On September 5. CONCORDIA B. 1990. . through Francisco. This was docketed as Civil Case No. On May 29. in his comment. Lee through Francisco. 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. On July 13. This is not true. In filing this petition. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Lee. Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Garcia and the other lessors. he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . On November 13. 1989. On May 31. 3923. 1990. Civil Case Q89-3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal. p: In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6. . complainant. Concordia B. the petition assailed the January 9. In Francisco's comment before us. presided by Judge Cesar C. Docketed as CA G. This was docketed as Civil case No. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM. Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action. Again. 20476. On July 2. 1990. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice. he deserves to be sanctioned. On June 14. he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Paralejo. No. he filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. Lee did not appeal. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. respondent. Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the . . Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property. 1993. On March 9. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties. however. commenced various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. 1989. By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. 1989. VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE. A. The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows: 1. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above. thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping. LEGAL ETHICS. continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied. Upon motion of the complainant. respondent Francisco. the complainant claims that Lee's counsel. SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. 1990. FRANCISCO. he lies. filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Q-89-3833. GARCIA. through Francisco again. ATTY. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly. on.

not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. On September 24. filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of the motion. Accordingly. 1991. This Court denied the petition on January 27. Judge Singzon. 1992. No. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2. 1455. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant. . SO ORDERED. filed a motion for reconsideration. he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. still through Francisco. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. 1992. he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above. 1991. he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar. Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. as he should have expected. on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had come final and executory as June 30. and Lee. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8. Two days later. 6. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice. This was dismissed on August 4. filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals. 1992. 1991. continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied. Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case.decision in that case. he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. 1956. On September 27. 1990. According to Francisco. Lee. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon. he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending. Garcia and the other lessors. 1991. Lee. he deserves to be sanctioned. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. Atty. By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. who was obliged to defend herself against his every move. Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. and reconsideration on April 8. through Francisco. 22392. 8. through Francisco. 7. Finally. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws. through Francisco. Lee.

364 and was assigned to Branch 36 thereof. with ignorance of law and bribery in that the respondent (a) issued a writ of execution with respect to the restoration of possession in the said case despite the fact that it was already on appeal with Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. 2833-III was decided by the MTCC of General Santos City (per respondent Judge) on 6 April 1993. the complainant and her co-defendants filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof. hence. J.00 in connection with such execution. Complainant. he did so only in compliance with the order of the RTC directing his court to cause the execution of the judgment with respect to the restoration of possession."3This order was complied with and the appealed case was docketed in the RTC as Special Civil Case No.00 a month as rental until they vacate the premises. On 17 May 1993. immediate execution of the judgment appealed from should have been ordered by the trial court before the appeal was perfected. After the issues had been joined. He further alleges that Lily Mocles "is the complainant only in name. 2 chanrobles virtual law libraryIn view of the appeal.000. SO ORDERED. DAVIDE." and that she is merely "the stooge of her counsel" who is the real complainant and who has an axe to grind against him. He avers that since he assumed office in April 1972. The uncontroverted facts as disclosed by the pleadings are as follows: Civil Case No. the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the respondent judge and giving the defendants three days from the said date within which to deposit the supersedeas bond as well as to deposit the rentals in arrears . MTJ-93-873 December 14. He then decreed: WHEREFORE. 7 On 25 August 1993. the amount of P75. the judgment had become executory.: In a sworn letter-complaint dated 11 September 1993. In her Reply-Affidavit. 364 filed with the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution 4on the ground that the defendants had failed to file the supersedeas bond and to pay the adjudged monthly rentals and that. On 21 September 1993. JUDGE MABINI M. MARAVILLA. The defendants opposed the motion 5contending that only decisions of the RTC may be immediately executed pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure of 1991 and that the motion did not comply with Sections 4 and 5. the respondent issued on 30 April 1993 an order directing the branch clerk of court to transmit to the clerk of court of the RTC of General Santos City "a certified copy of the docket entries together with all the original papers and processes in the case. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and that the alleged receipt by the respondent of P20. the plaintiff in Special Civil Case No." and to each pay the amounts indicated therein as rentals in arrears as of 3 August 1992. Judge Estoque issued an order 10directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from notice. is noted for his integrity in the legal profession.. General Santos City that rendered said judgment is ordered to cause the execution thereof with respect to the restoration of possession only. Estoque. the complainant asserts that the respondent's admission of the issuance of the writ suggests "not only clear ignorance of law but deliberate and wanton misapplication of the law". the MTCC. this Court received from the respondent a copy of the resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao which dismissed the complaint filed by the complainant on the ground that the questioned writ of execution was regularly issued by the respondent pursuant to Section 8. 364. 1994 LILY MOCLES. Judge Estoque issued an order 12in Special Civil Case No. JR.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A. the respondent admits that although he issued the writ of execution after his court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal. On 26 August 1993. inter alia. and (b) was rumored to have received P20. Rodolfo Taasan. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.M. Judge Estoque found that the complainant and her co-defendants did not file any supersedeas bond and did not pay the adjudged monthly rentals and held that pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70. Branch 3. In his comment. He states that there is no truth whatsoever to the unsubstantiated rumor that he received P20. and thereafter. 1A copy thereof was received by the complainant's counsel on 16 April 1993 and on 19 April 1993.00 was based on rumor and unsubstantiated by evidence. the complainant." and prays not only for its outright dismissal but also for appropriate action against the complainant and her counsel. Atty. charged the respondent. No. and that the charge that she is merely a stooge of her counsel is imaginary and gratuitous.000. The respondent then concludes that this complaint is a "wicked farcical and malicious imputation which pained him gravely. He contends that the complainant's counsel is guilty of forum shopping for also filing with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a complaint against him for the violation of Articles 206 and 210 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with the issuance of the writ of execution. filed a "Sheriff's Return of Service" 11on the writ of execution stating therein the steps he took to implement the writ and informing the court of the "total failure of the implementation" because some of the defendants he approached refused to vacate their respective houses. that her counsel. after which the appeal would be deemed submitted for decision. On 17 June 1994. he has not asked. who was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. a day after the receipt of a copy of the order of Judge Estoque dated 11 August 1993.000. without prejudice however to whatever will be the result of the pending appeal. presided over by Judge Apolinario F. 2833-III of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of General Santos City. or received any amount from any party in a case before his court. the presiding judge of Branch 3 thereof. demanded. physically and mentally. In compliance with the order of Judge Estoque. the respondent judge issued the writ of execution on 23 August 1993. in the light of the foregoing and this being an appealed judgment. "vacate and surrender their respective possession and occupation in the area in question to plaintiff including their respective improvements therein within 10 days from notice. Felizardo Requillos. from date of demand on 3 September 1992.On 17 September 1993. vs. upon agreement of the parties. 364 suspending in the meantime. Respondent. They expressed their willingness to do so in their separate manifestations. the complainant filed a notice of appeal. the Court required the parties to inform it if they were willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed. a young practitioner from Davao City. pursuant to Section 8. The respondent judge rendered a decision ordering the defendants to. 8Judge Estoque then issued an order 9directing the plaintiffappellee to comment on the motion for reconsideration. Sheriff III of the MTCC of General Santos City. In his order of 11 August 1993 6in Special Civil Case No.

ordering them to pay their corresponding monthly rentals of P75. . even if erroneously ordered by the RTC judge acting as an appellate judge in such a case. Court of Appeals 13and Sy vs. furthermore. 15In 1918 yet. It appears. the respondent judge must be administratively sanctioned for issuing the writ of execution. Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE. per Judge Estoque. Since Judge Estoque is not a respondent in this complaint. and chanrobles virtual law library 2. Nevertheless. he ought to have known that pursuant to the clear language of Section 8 of Rule 70 and the pronouncements of this Court. 190. which can be issued by the regional trial court under Sec. Said court. 17this Court ruled: The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the regional trial court and the decision of the latter itself is elevated to the Court of Appeals. She did not even disclose the source of the rumor and the occasion. giving the defendants-appellants three days from 21 September 1993 within which to deposit the supersedeas bond and to deposit the rentals in arrears from the date of the judgment of the MTCC up "to the present". Since. however. this Court.from the time of the judgment appealed from "up to the present". with a warning that a subsequent commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. as amended by Act No. if the circumstances warrant its issuance. and time when she heard it. However. applying Act No. it is of the opinion that the respondent should not be blamed solely since it was Judge Estoque who ordered the MTCC to issue the writ. Estoque be FURNISHED a copy of the Court's Resolution in this case and be likewise ADVISED not to order the municipal trial court to issue a writ of execution in a case which is pending appeal and to issue the writ himself. should not have issued the 11 August 1993 order directing the MTCC to issue the writ of execution with respect to the restoration of possession. Maravilla a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P1. 16already held that upon failure of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case to make the payments prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of First Instance. which amounted to grave abuse of authority if not ignorance of the rule on execution in ejectment cases. moreover. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).the appealed case. that no damage was done to the defendants because the writ was returned unsatisfied and in the meantime. Maravilla be ADVISED not to repeat his mistake of issuing a writ of execution in a case which is pending appeal. Romero. under her solemn oath. He knew that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case and. Section 8 of Rule 70 is a reproduction of Section 8 of Rule 72 of the old Rules of Court.00) for grave abuse of authority. The lawyer who assisted her in the preparation of the complaint should have. A mere advice to the respondent not to repeat the act is not enough. to which this case was referred for evaluation and report. and (c) the charge that Judge Maravilla received P20. 2588. the court "shall cause the full implementation of the order of execution issued by this court.00 from issuing that writ be DISMISSED for lack of evidence to support such a charge. as a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 2588. for utter lack of merit. (b) Judge Apolinario F. the RTC had issued on 21 September 1993. Instead of subsequently establishing the truth of the rumor by volunteering to offer some evidence. The only exception is the execution pending appeal. In the 1991 case of City of Manila vs. Rumors are not evidence and the complainant was grossly irresponsible when she imputed upon the respondent. SO ORDERED. It is the RTC which should issue the writ of execution. IMPOSING upon respondent Judge Mabini M. Obedience to or "faithful compliance with" the said 11 August 1993 order of Judge Estoque cannot be pleaded as a justification to the respondent's issuance of the writ of execution. 364 . the defendant did not deposit the adjudged monthly rentals.000. the commission of a grave offense solely on the basis of a rumor with the full awareness that she could not prove it. 2833-III after the appeal to the RTC had been perfected. He should have informed the RTC. We agree with the OCA that there is no evidence of the alleged bribery. shall order the execution of the judgment of the court a quo relative to the possession of the property in litigation and that such order for execution shall not be a bar to the appeal in the Court of First Instance until final decision thereof on its merits. the RTC was the proper court which could issue the writ of execution in its Special Civil Case No. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. and declaring as moot and academic the motion to reconsider the 11 August 1993 order and the motion for preliminary injunction and restraining order." Judge Estoque also declared as moot and academic the motion for reconsideration of the order of 11 August 1993 and the motion for preliminary injunction and restraining order. the OCA concludes that it would be "unfair" if it recommends that the respondent judge "be penalized without Judge Estoque being likewise penalized.000. the latter." It also found that there is no evidence to support the charge of bribery. upon their failure to do so. otherwise. the absence of any damage to the complainant does not totally absolve the respondent from any administrative liability for having wrongfully issued the writ of execution. place. execution of the judgment with respect to the restoration of possession was in order pursuant to Section 8. the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for execution. which was duly complied with. under his oath as a lawyer. His court had lost its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. indeed. the charge of bribery against the respondent. found that the respondent erred in issuing the writ of execution because his court had lost its jurisdiction over the case. DISMISSING. through appropriate means. The plaintiff did not file in his court a motion for execution for failure of the defendants to file a supersedeas bond. A fine of P1. it was beyond his court's authority to issue the writ. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Sec. during the pendency of the defendant's motion to reconsider the RTC order of 11 August 1993. the complainant agreed to submit this case on the basis of the pleadings. The complainant herself states in her complaint that her charge is based on a rumor. judgment is hereby rendered: 1. He knew that on 30 April 1993 he had directed his clerk of court to transmit the records of the case to the RTC.000. Accordingly.00 and a warning would be in order. of this constraint. It then recommends that: (a) Judge Mabini M. whose decision thereafter became final. upon motion. upon agreement by the parties. That motion was filed only with the RTC. prevented her from making the wild accusation. which was taken from Section 88 of Act No. 14Nevertheless. It states that it should have been the RTC which should issue such writ pursuant to City of Manila vs.00 each which should be deposited within the first ten days of the month during the pendency of the appeal. no supersedeas bond was filed and. an order suspending the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the respondent. 10 of the same Rule.

. 1997. respondent. Inc. . MTC. Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando of the National Labor Relations Commission. 1993. et al. FLORES. the case was submitted for resolution on the basis of their documentary evidence. 89070. 2738-R (.) in NLRC Case No. report and recommendation. Case NO. seeking his removal or suspension from the bar for forum shopping. .R. . 1993 (.] two of the losing members of the Board of Directors of BENECO in the aforementioned case. As found by Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C.) that Branch 7. . NLRC. Cordillera Administrative Region. the respondent instituted a suit docketed as Civil Case NO. we received a resolution from the IBP Board of Governors. . 209 SCRA 55). . Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet Electric Cooperative.C. 1993. however. because the respondent indeed interposed an appeal such that on May 11. Respondent Atty. issued a Writ of Execution (.) with the Regional Trial Court. No.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila The Facts EN BANC SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for violating the provision of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.). The Writ of Execution was issued on motion of Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO for short) to collect the amount of P344. ATTY. viz: RESOLUTION NO. . INC.). the minute resolution to wit: "to note without action the aforesaid motion". a lawyer who trifles with judicial processes. pending resolution of the main action in PANGANIBAN. Ernesto B. which dismissal was [sic] became final due to respondent's failure to perfect an appeal therefrom which claim according to the complainant. proceeded to levy on the properties of the losing board members of BENECO. . 1993. seeking to enjoin the defendants Clerk of Court. was dismissed by the Presiding Judge Clarence Villanueva in his Order dated March 18. Jose. While respondent "never essentially intended to assail the issuance by the NLRC of the Writ of Execution .) the complaint in Civil Case No. 1993 for investigation. the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case. and violating with impunity his oath of office and applicable laws and jurisprudence. . No. . Accordingly. . on the basis of its decision ordering the respondent board members "to reimburse petitioner BENECO any amount that it may be compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan by virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T.000. unduly delaying the administration of justice. Regional Arbitration Branch. On August 15. Branch 7. Inc. filed a Motion for Clarification with the Third Division of the Supreme Court in G. 2738-R for lack of jurisdiction on March 18." After issuance of the writ of execution. and finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules. Accordingly. 89070 (Benguet Electric Cooperative. .R. the RTC 7 of Baguio City transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. vs. 2 Because the parties 3 agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence. as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED. vs. The Case This is an administrative complaint against Atty. (BENECO) before this Court on July 5. Atty. dismissed Civil Case No. vs. 4058 March 12. constitute[s] deliberate misrepresentation. On February 25. . RAB-1-0313-84 to enforce the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on May 18. . Baguio City. 1993 (. 1993. . 4058 Benguet Electric Cooperative. dated August 21. . 2738-8 to the Court of Appeals per certified machine copy of the letter transmittal of same date (. . J. Flores RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE. the respondent. hereinmande [sic] part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A". Thereafter. .: The profession of law exacts the highest standards from its members and brooks no violation of its code of conduct. 1992 in G. XII-97-149 Adm. . 1993. Ernesto Flores is hereby . from levying on their properties in satisfaction of the said writ of execution. No. ERNESTO B. at 10:00 o'clock in the morning in front of the Baguio City Hall. finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months. nor sought to undo it" (. 1998 BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. the facts are as follows: A. Respondent claims in his comment (. Inc." 1 After the respondent submitted his Comment.). Adquilen. we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 27. which amounted to "grave misconduct. if not falsehood. Baguio City. the Office of the Clerk of Court. a sale at public auction was set on June 1. That case. 1993. complainant. engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies in his pleadings must be sanctioned. Baguio City. 2738-R which he filed prays for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary writ of injunction for defendants Clerk of Court andExOfficio City Sheriff to cease and desist from enforcing the execution and levy of the writ of execution issued by the NLRC-CAR. per Sheriff's Notice of Sale dated May 4. of the properties of Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping[. motu proprio. through Sheriff III Wilfredo Mendez. . as new counsel for the losing litigant-members of the BENECO Board of Directors. Thus.00 which it paid to Peter Cosalan during the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court. .

the complaint filed by the respondent in Civil Case No. Benguet.) and 93-F-0415 (. Effect of splitting a single cause of action.said court (. docketed as Civil Cases Nos. RAB-1-031384. 199 SCRA 677. but the assailed complaint for injunction was filed on March 18. . 8 this Court declared that "(t)he rule against forum shopping has long been established and subsequent circulars 9 of this Court merely formalized the prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against transgressors. 1994. 2738-R was not appealed on time 2. . If there is any other action pending.) praying for temporary restraining order in these two (2) cases. 93-F-0414 (. 5 dated September 4. Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency. Failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. — If two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action. and thus Exempt from Levy and Execution the subject properties with Damages.R. 28-91 which took effect on January 1. In sum. 1992 to the effect that "to the best of his knowledge." Among the other penalties." 6 We distinguish. separate complaints for Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted. 28-91 on forum shopping Commissioner Jose ratiocinated: This Court's Ruling We adopt and affirm the recommendation of the IBP suspending the respondent from the bar. 89070 in complete disregard of settled jurisprudence that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions. 28-91. a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx A cursory glance of (sic) . Ope Lege. because the complaint he filed before the RTC of Baguio City "lack[ed] the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. in accordance with section 1(e) of Rule 16. requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before this Court and the Court of Appeals. CA. respondent again filed for Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping with the Regional Trial Court. Falsehood. This circular did not only require that a certification of non-forum shopping be attached to the petitions filed before this Court or the Court of Appeals. La Trinidad. Court of Appeals. The IBP found that the respondent had violated it. fairness and good faith to the court and exert[s] every effort and consider[s] it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. On May 26. and the IBP Board of Governors concurred.] he should notify the court. xxx xxx xxx 10 Sec. Branch 9. which provide: Sec. In Chemphil Export and Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency[. . — Within the time for pleading. 1. Be that as it may. tribunal or agency within five (5) days from such notice. If he should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court. it is clear that the respondent violated the provisions of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility under which the lawyer owes candor. Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. etc. no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court. Recommendation of the IBP As noted earlier. 28-91. and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others. 1994. . reveals that it lacks the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. but we increase the period from six (6) months to one (1) year and six (6) months. 4. . 7Likewise inapplicable is Administrative Circular No. 1991 which took effect on January 1. 04-94 dated February 8. . . the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others. he must state the status of the same. . which complaint was signed and verified under oath by the respondent. 04-94 became effective only on April 1.). Circular No. 1994 which extended the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than this Court and the Court of Appeals. No. 4 (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. This circular was revised on February 8. The third paragraph thereof reads: 3. because the said requirement applied only to petitions filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals. it also decreed that forum shopping constituted direct contempt of court and could subject the offending lawyer to disciplinary action. for stating in his comment before this Court that the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No." The prohibition is found in Section 1(e) of Rule 16 and Section 4 of Rule 2 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Forum Shopping Circular No. and the petition for the constitution of a family home was instituted on May 26. 1993. orders and awards rendered in labor cases citing the case of Cangco vs. . a display of gross ignorance of the law. 11 The prohibition is also contained in Circular No. . . the said circular further provides that the lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for non-compliance thereof. respondent is still guilty of forum shopping. 1992. He also filed an urgent Motion Ex-parte (. 1993. The complainant further alleges that respondent's claim for damages against the defendant Sheriff is another improper and unprocedural maneuver which is likewise a violation of respondent's oath not to sue on groundless suit since the said Sheriff was merely enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job. that respondent be suspended from the bar for six months for: 1. Grounds.) which complainant likewise claims as an unprocedural maneuver to frustrate the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court in G. 1993. Jose recommended. Penalties. Respondent's failure to attach the said certificate cannot be deemed a violation of the aforementioned circular. 2738-R before the RTC of Baguio City. which are essentially similar actions to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. 28-91.

or before April 6. 14 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause. the respondent stated: Branch 7 (of the RTC) motu proprio. to forestall the execution of a final judgment of the labor arbiter. for violating the proscription against forum shopping. Respondent Flores. with Damages. On March 18. a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. Breva. Thus. acting as counsel for BENECO Board Members Victor Laoyan." 32 Falsehood The investigating commissioner also held respondent liable for committing a falsehood because. the respondent filed with different courts a total of six appeals." docketed as Civil Case Nos. dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on March 18.." 20 When this injunction case was dismissed. Holding that "respondent 'made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered [and]. 18 and upon motion of BENECO.'" 31 this Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for one year. pending resolution of the main action raised in court. etc. the respondent was also suspended for one year from the practice of law. 30 respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one year. he stated in his comment that he had not "perfected an appeal on the dismissal" of his petition for injunction. 28 In consonance with Millare vs. under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The suits for the constitution of a family home were not only frivolous and unnecessary.Court of Appeals. a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. 15 The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.13 In a long line of cases. So that today this case is no longer pending. i. (c) The submission of false certification under Par. as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum. in essence. et al. not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. Nicasio Aliping. the order of dismissal became final under the Rules 15 days after its receipt by respondent on record. a family home as contemplated by law. 1993." as well as a writ of preliminary preventive injunction ordering the clerk of court and the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to "cease and desist from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of execution from the NLRC-CAR. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415. until further determined by the court.(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint." 16 After this Court rendered its Decision 17 in Benguet Electric Cooperative. vs. Modequillo vs. the subject properties are deemed constituted as family homes by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. In his said comment. they were clearly asking for reliefs identical to the prayer previously dismissed by another branch of the RTC. complaints and petitions which frustrated and delayed the execution of a final judgment. 27 The Code also enjoins him from unduly delaying a case by impeding the execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. 26 he had a duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Not having perfected an appeal on the dismissal. Rimando issued a writ of execution 19ordering the clerk of court and ex officio city sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction personal and real property of the members of the Board of Directors of BENECO. In his deliberate attempt to obtain the same relief in two different courts. ope lege. Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. thus. Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal. Respondent Flores filed with another branch of the RTC two identical but separate actions both entitled "Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted. Francisco. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. 1993. Inc. their real objective was to restrain or delay the enforcement of the writ of execution. In Garcia. Exempt from Levy and Execution. (Emphasis supplied. National Labor Relations Commission. That they were filed ostensibly for the judicial declaration of a family home was a mere smoke screen. 04-94. (b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his lawyer wit the filing of multiple petitions and complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court. Adhering to the Court's declaration in said cases. If the family actually resides in the premises. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute contempt of Court." Civil Case Nos. Mendez from proceeding with the auction sale of plaintiffs' property "to avoid rendering ineffectual and functus [oficio] any judgment of the court later in this [sic] cases. Montero 29 and Garcia vs. this Court has held that forum shopping exists when. without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party. 23 reiterated in Manacop vs. on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a "friendly" forum which would capitulate to his improvident plea for an injunction and was thereby trifling with the judicial process. the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.) The foregoing were substantially reproduced in Revised Circular No. 21 The said complaints were supplemented by an "Urgent Motion Ex Parte" 22 which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. filed with the RTC an injunction suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) "to preserve the status quo as now obtaining between the parties. 25 We remind the respondent that. 'abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice. xxx xxx xxx . 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits. 28-91 12 and Administrative Circular No. The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings. 1993. in this administrative case. In Millare. therefore. it is.e. xxx xxx xxx The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such. This Court held that "he deserve[d] to be sanctioned. 24 shows the frivolity of these proceedings: Under the Family Code.

in denying that he had appealed the decision of the RTC. we find it opportune to urge the IBP to hasten the disposition of administrative cases and to remind it that this Court gives it only ninety days to finish its investigation. and the parties submitted only documentary evidence to prove or rebut their respective cases. resulting in a total period of TWO (2) YEARS. 34 Moreover. we suspend the respondent from the practice of law for another year. which was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 15. 37 He shall neither do any falsehood. Upon the receipt of such certificate in the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had ever been taken. But it is likewise true that he had actually filed an appeal. False then is his statement that no appeal was perfected in the injunction suit. however. Civil Case NO. 1993. Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and. Respondent's explanation misses the point. Should it require more time. WHEREFORE. The withdrawal of an appeal shall have the same effect as that of a dismissal in accordance with section 2 of this rule. 2378-R which seems to give basis to the present Complaint was deemed terminated. xxx xxx xxx Sec. he withdrew his appeal. . Inc. for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping. the clerk shall return to the court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the court showing that the appeal has been dismissed. giving the reason for such request. effective upon finality of this Decision.. Effect of dismissal. Respondent argues that the withdrawal of his appeal means that no appeal was made under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. and let it be deemed final by the Rules and jurisprudence. 1993. report and recommendation. Court of Appeals 40 and Erectors. Withdrawal of appeal. respondent was making a false statement. and that this was perfected. — Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal. 1997. 2738. he made the statement before this Court in order to exculpate himself. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 for family homes and damages were filed in the court below on May 26. NLRC. — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appellee's brief. 1997. nor consent to the doing of any. It was deemed submitted for resolution per the investigating commissioner's order dated May 10. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Respondent Ernesto B. he owes candor. However. his falsehood is aggravated by its brazenness. But in Flores' case. The original records of the injunction suit had been transmitted to the appellate court. 1995. he is SUSPENDED for another period of ONE (1) YEAR. the IBP transmitted its recommendation to the Court only through a letter dated July 31. the investigating commissioner submitted his report only on May 5. True. . Moreover. After all. 38 For this offense. and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. fairness and good faith to the courts. in Ordonio vs. vs. . Under the Code of Professional Responsibility. vs. Eduarte. vain as it was. 2. the Court of Appeals issued a resolution dismissing the appeal. Let a copy of this Decision be included in his files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant. from the charge of forum shopping. Worse. 35 Thus. though in vain. Before we close. there being no appeal formally taken and perfected in accordance with the Rules. it should file with the Court a request for extension. is that respondent did file an appeal which was perfected later on. 1997. He also has a duty not to mislead or allow the courts to be misled by any artifice. 33 (Emphasis supplied. and the judgment of the said court may be enforced with the additional costs allowed by the appellate court upon dismissing the appeal. The pertinent provisions of Rule 50 36 read: Sec. xxx xxx xxx And that precisely was the primal reason why respondent decided not to appeal any further anymore [sic] the order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the court below in Civil Case No. 41 we imposed a suspension of only six months for a similar malfeasance. Why it took the IBP almost four years to finish its investigation of the case and over two years from the date the parties filed their last pleadings to resolve it escapes us. Thus. the case did not require any trial-type investigation. . for violating his oath and the Canon of Professional Responsibility to do no falsehood. Inc. True. SO ORDERED. 4. for it was committed in an attempt.) The indelible fact. we note that this simple case was referred to the IBP on September 27. to cover up his forum shopping.It should be noted that when Civil Case Nos.39 Porac Trucking. He is WARNED that a repetition of a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

1932 discounting the sum of P1. Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court. 8. was subsequently resold by the bank for P2. to Mariano Santos for P8. UY TENG PIAO. vs.600.600. granting that the latter has actually given such promise to condone. señor. Nat. no recuerdo bien. M. and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment. Transfer Certificate of Title No. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment. 1925. In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the complaint with costs. 26328 for the sum of P17.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. plaintiff-appellant. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila.600 (Exhibit 2). 4. Endriga for appellant. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. No. L-35252 October 21. 1924.000 respectively. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8. and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14. plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs.33.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1. Antonio Gonzales for appellee. The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11.: This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint. VICKERS. 5. and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264. renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional. In finding that one Mr. 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said judgment. the said judgment in civil case No. 1924. Pecson. 3. The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant. the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct examination was as follows: P.300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said property. me haba dicho el señor Pecson. The appellant makes the following assignments of error: The trial court erred: 1. with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1. Balboa and Dominador J. Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said judgment from February 11. J. 8274 in consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint. 1930. 8274. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D1. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. could bind the appellant corporation. Si. 7. reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the appellant bank. ¿quiere usted explicar al Honorable Juzgado. In other words.R. por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa. the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.net THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK. 26328 has been more than fully paid even Evidently the other parcel. In finding that said Mr.574. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street. On September 9. because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11. cual es esta consideracion de valor? — R.232. 2. 1924 for P300 and P1.300. the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao. 1awphil. On February 11. 26328.700. porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos . the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land. 6. defendant-appellee. Manila. without a special finding as to costs. En este documento aparece que usted.

¿Que era el del Banco Nacional. ENDRIGA. a Chines business man. algunas veces los alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado. Entonces dije ya. When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.600. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo. such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco. Sr. P. al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? — R. p. GONZALES. and that the defendant. el de Ronquillo o el de Paco. Era encargado de estas transacciones. JUZGADO. Excepcion. he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. 1930. Que la termine. Entonces me dijo Pecson. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta. With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney. Sr. JUZGADO. (Malcolm. would have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1. como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. si le dijo a usted algo el señor Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? — R. Puede contestar. P. P. No recuerdo mas. una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1? SR. P.000 resold it at the instance of the defendant for P8. Y cuando le dijo a usted el señor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes. Entonces hable al señor Pecson que somos comerciantes. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. ¿Y que le dijo a usted. the decision appealed from is reversed. ¿Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo. P. el que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? — R. absolutamente. Exhibit 1. ¿No recuerda usted muy bien? — R. and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11. primeramente. Parece que Paco. ¿le dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? — R. it is reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land. P. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. ¿a que se refiere. the defendant replied that he did not remember. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar. asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. El señor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes. One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo. Cambiese la pregunta. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem. Furthermore. if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims. Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the trial. ¿Cual de esos terrenos. Era encargado de este asunto. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion. Pero este Exhibit 1. P. Paco. or his deposition. usted sabe? — R. ENDRIGA.574. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows: When a lawyer is a witness for his client. and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos. For the foregoing reasons. ¿Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo. si. P. "¿como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted intereses?" P. and the costs of both instances. except as to merely formal matters. we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause. Al Banco Nacional. R.intereses mensuales. Except when essential to the ends of justice.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1. because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it. There is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement. The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness. . Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al señor Pecson." ¿a que bienes se referia el ? — R. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. ¿recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? — R. and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale. ¿Quien es ese señor Pecson? — R. it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such agreement for the bank. ENDRIGA. Nada. P. Sr. There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. 148. P. TESTIGO. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims. si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria? Sr. JUZGADO. Sr. because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to pay therefor P8. the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary. Me opongo. Me dijo el señor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "¿por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir sus deudas. Legal Ethics. the defendant answered that he did not know. a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client. No recuerdo. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit 1. los dos ambos. Nos openemos.

1987. "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal. Espinas. No. Jose C. counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees. the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner.. We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. Atty. who was still recuperating from an operation. 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof. Dante Escasura. and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias. Jose C. Union of Filipro Employees. Jose C. and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers. petitioner. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending. No. and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members. WHEREFORE. nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court.R.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. however. Ernesto Facundo. an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area.G. Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14. To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated. set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. such right.R. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. therefore. Jr. respondent in G." 3 The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. MA.M. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. vs. Atty." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court. natural and inherent though it may be. Espinas. Grievances. respondents. in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence. COL. REY L. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: During the period July 8-10. counsel of record of petitioner in G. Lito Payabyab. the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect. No. Espinas. on July 10. the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs.. officials and employees. when his attention was called by this Court. and Antonio Gonzales. union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity. Yap and Marcelo B. should not. Potenciano Flores.. March 30. be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom.R. HON. and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly 2 Independent Labor Union. 1987. did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. No. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES. LANADA. prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK). must be ventilated through the proper channels. if any. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts. INC. No. respondents. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. et al. Jose C. and Atty. represented by Atty. SANCHEZ. at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices. through appropriate petitions. Jose C. INC. Fausto Gapuz. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution. vs. Atty. . 73721. has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference. ESTRELLA ALDAS. ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA. the above-named individuals appeared before the Court. apologized to the Court for the abovedescribed acts. 78791. that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries. union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record. MANUEL AGUILAR. Atty. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans. prejudice or sympathies. Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17. 75029. 1987 at 10:30 A. 1 He. which respondents complied with on July 17. uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks. No. no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts. i. Espinas.e. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Thus.R. 75209 September 30. Henceforth. 1987. free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice. AUGUSTO S. 78791 September 30. Espinas." 4 Moreover.R. together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. 1987 NESTLE PHILIPPINES. CAPT. petitioner. but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. 1987. SO ORDERED. however. and petitioner in G. rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection. Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno. However. in the absence of Atty. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them. 1987 KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY. Atty.. On the appointed date and time. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. Tony Avelino. Eugene San Pedro. for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice. Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity. 78791. We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. and Messrs.

83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of 1 Experanza. LANTORIA. which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. At last. that if the preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration. thru your kind mediation. the records of the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi. PER CURIAM: This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. in this wise: June 1. Agusan del Sur. However. In relation to the same three (3) civil cases. and corruption of the judge and bribery". ATTY. 81. Very truly yours. Constancia M. dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. respondent. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. 1974 Dear Major Lantoria. Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas. on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption. vs. Agusan del Bur. My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza. the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular 4 judge of the municipal court of Bayugan. presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties. complainant. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. IRINEO L. I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters received. seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. which reads as follows: Butuan City 23 April 1974 Atty. xxx xxx xxx Dear Atty.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A. Constancia Mascarinas and all. dated 23 April 1974. No. xxx xxx xxx CESAR L. (SGD. Bunye: . Bunyi. Agusan del Sur). in due course. Lantoria. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic) possible. kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please request for each copy for our hold. 1992 xxx xxx xxx Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him. you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted defendants. receiving as such a monthly 2 allowance. 81. Mrs. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there. namely. in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. Agusan del Sur. and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm. 1769 June 8. These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza. then I am ready and willing to accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were. Herewith now. respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases. member of the Philippine Bar. 83 and 88 sought to 3 eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. And to this effect.M. Not only to Mrs. Mrs. Ireneo Bunye 928 Rizal Avenue Santa Cruz. Manila I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development. BUNYI.) CESAR L LANTORIA Major Inf PC (ret) Executive Director 5 On 01 June 1974. it is my request to Judge Galicia. declared in default.

) In its resolution dated 28 November 1977. 1974. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success. d) Fourthly. letter of June 1. had demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage. Galicia. from his several letters. with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. dated 04 March 1974. September 29. the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph. it could be made thru you personally. This is an additional request. But. the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts. it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received. or copies to be furnished me. which he told me to prepare and he is going to sign them. 23 April and 01 June. the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. respondent. dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. (emphasis supplied) Truly yours. as in fact. the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. According to him. But. the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph. Butuan City.. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16. the contents of which read as follows: 928 Rizal Ave. is self-explanatory and speaks for itself. you can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about them. Ibid). and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him. Cruz. as the acting Judge of Esperanza. 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979. the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court. b) In the second place. with the following averments. or. this Court referred the case to the Solicitor 9 General for investigation. the said letter of June 1. to expedite receiving those copies for our hold.. complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case against respondent Bunyi. Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph. this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No. who considered such preparation as a big help to him. in the same letter. deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. on 11 April 1977. At the same time. Calo St. Furthermore. that is. Inside the envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C. Ibid. are the Decisions and Orders. strictly personal and confidential. in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint. 1974 Dear Major Lantoria. report and recommendation. By way of answer to the complaint. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default. and December 18. of course. that if ever the same was written by the Respondent. admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974. both respondent and complainant appeared. Thanking You for your kind attention and favor. 1974) c) Thirdly. Manila March 4. BUNYI 6 Counsel It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria. Unless. If you please. if he is not in Butuan City. Brotherly yours. at Bayugan if you happen to go there. in the some letter. 1978. it came from the under-standing between the Judge and the complainant who. but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared. (SGD. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein. the Solicitor General reported the following development — Atty. BUNYI 7 Three years after. because he was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other. but explained the contents thereof as follows: xxx xxx xxx . 345 M. Instead. praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn. Sta. after he signs them. 3) that at the same hearing. 1979 sworn to before the investigating Solicitor. he was not prepared to prove his 10 charges. (SGD. during week end.) IRINEO L. to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12.) L. and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there.Please excuse this delay. predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March. 1974. he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint. and hence. For his part. if the information comes from him. On 21 July 1980. that the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia. respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint against him. both of Agusan del Sur.

3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him). Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. and which he in fact prepared. On 28 October 1981. With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative complaint is based. and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics. showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 13 and Rule 13. the hearing was postponed until further notice. He also offered his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to. b) that those letters indicated that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions. The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent. In his answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General. to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which 11 he is counsel. A selfrespecting independence in the discharge of professional duty. c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said letters. and 88. the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case. which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant. for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer. On 10 December 1980. Clearly. respondent manifested that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer. SO ORDERED. Hence. 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza. respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General appeared. and be affirmed the existence of the letters. 81. Agusan del Sur. he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to 15 influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge. respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases. Irineo L. in his report. the date set by this Court for bearing in this case. Therefore. which read: CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension. nor seek opportunity for. without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station. or gives the appearance of influencing the court. the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. 83.01. respondent violated Canon No. 12 We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent. WHEREFORE. admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case. On 9 March 1981.In his aforesaid report. 81. and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court. subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. and that he even asked for an apology from the Court. is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar. and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. respondent filed a 13 manifestation alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980. and he requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up. which provides as follows: 3. March and 1 June 1974). as respondent Bunyi. 16 . Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration. the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court. In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked. respondent Atty. and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Rule 13. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to 17 influence the court where he had pending civil case. addressed to complainant. by way of disciplinary action. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. as an officer of the court. cultivating familiarity with judges. In 14 said memorandum. the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist. as shown in Canon No. deserves suspension from the practice of law. the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty. uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties.

: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. petitioner. As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily. contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all. Jose de Jesus. and written statements of several others. Atty. no court. It seems that pending appeal. in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty. In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee. there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal. the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. G. Timoteo Cruz. for according to respondent. Respondent Salva. FRANCISCO G. as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION July 25. scheduled for September 21. of which the motion for new trial was based. H. we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties. when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.R. J. On that day. Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. No. counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated. petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21. either repudiating. Cruz against Francisco G. Oscar Caymo. The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy. it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested. neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.. . Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. The connection. CRUZ. Hipolito Bonifacio. Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in said crime. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if. intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive. City Attorney Francisco G. the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo. Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. Inasmuch as he.R. in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City. to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Philippine Constabulary. and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. In the meantime. the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court. possibly. is pending appeal and consideration before us. the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Atty. No. the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated. L-12871 TIMOTEO V. Salva in his own behalf. Consequently. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. 1957.‖ On September 19. et al. due to the fact that this counsel. Taking advantage of this opportunity. action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. SALVA. however. to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court. would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. vs. questioned the jurisdiction of the committee. was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee. Pablo Canlas. if any. H. H. Moreover. and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. in the communication. Salva. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants. 1959 G. L-10794. Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena. After a long trial. Bernabe. on the contrary. Avendañio and Ernesto A. . Acting upon said request for postponement. to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September. petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21. the Chief. respondent. Crispin Baizas. to testify ―upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo. such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman. 1953 in Pasay City. questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession. head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements. pointing to persons. 1957.. Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner. 1957. implicated petitioner Cruz. Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the investigation. By resolution of this Tribunal. To better understand the present case and its implications. much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva. for murder. 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15. Philippine Constabulary. Oscar Castelo. is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal. even desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions. two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below. be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend. particularly respondent Salva. had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced. may be stated. he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court. modifying or ratifying the same. et al. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200. Bienvenido Mendoza. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz. and which were being investigated. not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation. Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him. it was because of the latter‘s oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection. usually. that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal. Anyway. addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation.

respondent has. had scheduled the hearing at an early date. if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own‖. H. the prosecuting officer ―is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy. June. ―Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours. Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. in our opinion. but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses. this according to the transcript now before us. Realista remained to stand trial. which we consider and find to be contempt of court. in the interest of justice. the first. the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. then he. In view of the foregoing.However. After mature deliberation. even encouraged. respondent. Consequently. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case. cited in the case of Suarez vs. the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions. insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned. respondent Francisco G. even a penalty to the one liable. is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure. the whole thing becomes inexcusable. even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. in the original criminal case against Castelo. addressing the newspapermen said. for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation. 1935. But. as contended by him. the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation. 1957. as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation. No costs. he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. if not the encouragement by the respondent. on two occasions.‖ Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation. but that justice shall be done. he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions. the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. and. However. Platon. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States. like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants. But he need not be present at said investigation because his presence there implies. wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary. he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us. it is unquestionable that they may. under the law. the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent. et al. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities. Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. For. we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case. in appropriate cases. the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside. much less publicity. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action. whether to present the same evidence. after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva. he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced. he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. quietly. Not only this. and the second. the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism. news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. ―Gentlemen of the press. established a justification for his reinvestigation because according to him. 556) With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation. is difficult for us to understand. in favor of the members of the press. 6. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor – indeed. but in the course of the investigation. he should do so. he could not be compelled to do so. the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo. could well have conducted the investigation in his office. in order to do justice and avoid injustice. and this Court. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation. (69 United States law Review. If. if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right. oral and documentary. 69 Phil. but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all. In this. unless he. according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent. again said. presented in the original case and trial. In conclusion. and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent. we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. Cosme Camo and others by questioning them. even when it being tried in court. was being retried and redetermined in the press. unobtrusively and without much fanfare. in the present case. and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. even abhorrent. according to respondent. to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding. but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed. But. for the present. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Fortunately. even if. Frankly. Naturally. after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva. respondent. addressing the newsmen. furthermore. p. the investigation was conducted not in respondent‘s office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal. he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. In other words. including members of the press. is dissolved. In this. We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them. and whose interest. at the instance of Realista. when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal. discretion and good taste. as contended by him and as suggested by authorities. respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation. petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated. petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation. The trial court. then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista. that is in August. . apparently with the permission of. No. for which reason. A number of microphones were installed. reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. while he may strike had blows.. As such. we have finally agreed that a public censure would. or. as claimed by respondent Salva. and this involved headlines and extensive recitals. 309. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. be sufficient. including Salvador Realista. therefore. affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. that in view of petitioner‘s objection to appear and testify at the said investigation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence. and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation. narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation.

" and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment. "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice. a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence. earlier." He ends his petition with a prayer that .: Before us is Atty. Almacen said in this petition. the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Almacen received a copy of the decision. xxx xxx xxx There is no use continuing his law practice. who. 1970 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. Atty. the appeal. after due hearing. printed record on appeal) CASTRO. the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS. he moved for its reconsideration. dismissed the appeal. the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment. wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.. in the following words: Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27. vs. CALERO. xxx xxx xxx He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living. Calero." and that "whatever mistakes. 1967.R. who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.1 in which Atty. on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Almacen himself. Yaptinchay vs.. for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5. saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind. in his own phrase." has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. But the Court of Appeals." His client's he continues. or on July 5. 1967.. who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. upon verbal motion of Atty. 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. On June 15. 1966 Atty. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond. 1966 (pp. L-27654 February 18. was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30. 1966. the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination. without knowing why he lost the case. we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. that is. 1966. in an unprecedented petition." filed on September 25. as it hereby dismisses. 1967. June 24. filed by plaintiffappellee praying that the appeal be dismissed. Pacis commented that Atty. In connection therewith. YAPTINCHAY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum. had already perfected the appeal. vs." The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y." He indicts this Court. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion." Almacen deplored. his client was condemned to pay P120. Antonio H. Almacen's statement that ." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice. he ridicules the members of this Court.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice. The trial court. on July 18. No." so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court. Inc. For "lack of proof of service. said he did it to expose the tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason. This second motion for reconsideration. ANTONIO H. Twenty days later. RESOLUTION Atty. J. who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28. Batu Construction & Co. 1967. but also deaf and dumb. He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. (Emphasis supplied) G. on August 22.. however. L-16636. and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant. 90-113. and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. theManila Times published statements attributed to him. as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice. our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice." the trial court denied both motions. in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court. rendered judgment against his client. Thus. on September 26.000. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself. as follows: Vicente Raul Almacen. Almacen filed on August 17. 1965. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. VIRGINIA Y. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration.. Meanwhile.. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. 1966. 1966. .

one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. May 30. the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G. case. Therefore Republic vs. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. let me quote passages from the Holy Bible.. No word came from him. so that this Court could act on his petition. vs. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. Batu Construction & Co. Atty. L-16636. L-27654. G." "Therefore all that you wish men to do to you. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution. thus: Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9. the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution. within five days from notice hereof.. which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender. the appeal was perfected out of time." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent. Batu Construction & Co. It was at this juncture that Atty. a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced. and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes. Inc. based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26." In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct. vs. in an open and public hearing. Patiently. Inc. Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28. that they tend to bring the entire Court. which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case. Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. June 24. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. Chapter 7. 1967. praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8. even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets. No. 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act. Venturanza. decided by this Court on May 30. 1962. Thus: At the start. There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. 1965.. against this Court as well as its individual members. is not decisive. 1967 resolved to require Atty." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye. No. there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite." he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor." citingRepublic of the Philippines vs. you shall be judged. he "chose to pursue the negative act.does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is. L-20417.R. Far from being contrite Atty. Calero vs. relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8. the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous. Gregorio A.16636. this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . which was June 24. urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. this Court on November 17. 1965). Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26. vs. Yaptinchay. 1962. June 24. without . 1967. grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court. that you may not be judged." In the main decision in said case (Rep. 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. 1966. as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened. first cast out the beam from thy own eye. In the case of Republic vs. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations.. 1966. and by minute resolution denied the appeal. compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood.R. we waited for him to make good his proffer. Inc. On the contrary. oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision. and behold. nor consent to the doing of any in court. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Atty. Republic vs." xxx xxx xxx Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. offers -no apology. otherwise.. a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. 1965. G. his reasons for such request. Matthew: — "Do not judge. and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother. as the applicable case. contemptuous.." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense. he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument. Entry of judgment was made on September 8. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. and that since his offer was not accepted. Venturanza. St. 1967. and. Hence. We refused to take the case. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.. Appellant further states that in the latest case. which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. said case is now final and executory. L-20417. 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate. Further. and with what measure you measure." that this Court's September 28. No. L. dismissing the appeal. For with what judgment you judge. the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. it shall be measured to you.appellant. consequently. Almacen to state.R. "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye". he refirms the truth of what he stated. Venturanza. prosecutor and Judge. His written answer. Again. therefore.

it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. We were compelled by force of necessity. after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection. what crimes are committed in thy name". A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses. GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason. . carefulness. that even our own President. that inspite of our beggings. Is this. this Court in the reverse order of natural things. appeals for charity. is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith. He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. we must uphold the latter. we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate. generosity.. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers. it is plain callousness towards our particular case. for the nonce. and to spell out the reasons for denial.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency. then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. he reiterates the same statement with emphasis. understanding. the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments... into disrepute. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. 'O JUSTICE. but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. fairness. xxx xxx xxx The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. understanding sympathy and for justice. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity. impersonal state of things and nothing more. you remained unpunished.. xxx xxx xxx Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We were provoked. Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. we may dare say. however. what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately. We detest the ACTS." xxx xxx xxx We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses. . We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement.justification. the way of life in the Philippines today. IN TRUST ONLY. — what did we get from this COURT? One word. in simple word. a marketable commodity in the Philippines. sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE. We only describe the. not the SINNER. dumb in the sense.is to its truth. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. confidence and wisdom". xxx xxx xxx Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client. most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. what injustices are committed in thy name.. DENIED. the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court. "O Liberty. said: — "the story is current. not the members. let us examine the grain of his grievances. We attack the decision of this Court. with all its hardiness and insensibility. DID YOU? Sir. NEVER. supplications. We have added only two more symbols. words of humility." xxx xxx xxx We condemn the SIN. not one word was spoken or given . xxx xxx xxx To all these beggings. and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED. there is no choice. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. but fail to.. Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE. fairness. generosity.. not the ACTOR. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court. your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech. and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law. our pleadings will bear us on this matter. CHARITY. supplications. withstand critical . to state the facts and the law. But in the end. that it is also deaf and dumb. xxx xxx xxx As we have stated. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. "O JUSTICE. But overlooking. xxx xxx xxx What has been abhored and condemned. are the very things that were applied to us. though nebulous . only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial.. . Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution. Truth to tell. We have been asked to do away with it. xxx xxx xxx The phrase. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. .

Revilla. 1963 (60 O. and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement.105. he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. If Atty. By and large. is not a matter of right. The proper role of the Supreme Court. he looked for a "whipping boy. 224 cases. This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. May 31. Supreme Court. We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. For the same three terms the Court denied. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment. Chief Justice Vinson of the U. he has only himself to blame. et al. The following. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Damasco. indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance. 566: A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ. and Director of Lands vs.260. 1. were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject. respectively. it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. respectively. 8099).. this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket. for refusing to take these cases. (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Congress has placed the control of the Court's business. but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). That is why lawyers are given 'wide . Recalling Atty. . to the uninformed." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26). It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr. it was patterned after the practice of the U." it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. et al. supra: The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15.18638. By the way. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. which provides that such notice shall state the time.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. Almacen's petition for review. ed 562. 1963. 217. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. Batu Construction & Co. not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness. as Mr.scrutiny. Six years ago. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites: Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary. and records. we found.21098. but of sound judicial discretion. and if he objects. which. and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. vs. 42 Phil. There. incidentally. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable. and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941. since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260. we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. Atty. Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari.S. 28. however brief. this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. This axiom is implied in sec. The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion. and as to the same petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result . articulated its considered view on this matter. I. upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. Supreme Court has defined it. is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. There was. Practical considerations preclude. and. in offering to surrender his professional certificate.. 45 Phil. Hence. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. and. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties. 1. Baltimore Radio Show. Sanz. therefore. Since there are these conflicting. the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons. Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. on their merits. Be this as it may. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs...G. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. 81. as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision. wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed". or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court. Court of Appeals. the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did). the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. 117). Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.189 petitions calling for discretionary review. nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right. 1. no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal. in Novino. through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon. the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.. the same question has been raised before. 94 L. and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. this Court. 866. in effect. while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion. Feb.1. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. Municipality of Unisan. 41 Phil. For one thing. citing Manakil v. within the Court's discretion. Said Chief Justice Bengzon: In connection with identical short resolutions. to hear him on his objection.S.

lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. (In re Ades." As Mr. Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume. nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. 487) . (Bradley. on the other. Judicial officers.8"are public property. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right. 657. not only the courts' rulings but. but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. also the manner in which they are handed down. as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. 641: No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity. Circuit Court. 28 Am. 216) To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. criticize and censure them as they see fit. has always been encouraged by the courts. and the bar should at all . .. 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers.W. but as to his demerits there must be profound silence. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic. Hence. been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Dee. . 126 NYS 2d 286)." is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed." (Case of Austin. They are in constant attendance on the courts. membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. 652) The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. 72 N.W. he points out the errors of lower courts. "Under such a rule. Moreover. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. v. In the prosecution of appeals. as well as of the judiciary. and voice their disapproval of. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege. Lyman. because he is the tribunal appointed to decide. and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof." so far as the bar is concerned. but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. 196) But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood. when they are admitted to the Bar. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed. 11 Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. The reason is that An attorney does not surrender. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches. Above all others. impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. 4d. is a position too monstrous to be entertained. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity.. and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them.. The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge. is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws. to the courts. the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society.6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. with "imminent danger to the administration of justice.latitude to differ with. Justice Field puts it: . every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right. but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. 40 Am.4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer." said the Supreme Court of Nebraska. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court. more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. in the — assertion of their clients' rights. indeed. if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves. his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude." (State v. 647. on the One hand. by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose.. but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism. Rep. and the independence of the bar. every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. Criticism of the courts has.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions. 116 N. .5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation. must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion. For. which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer.. 6 F Supp.. and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties. in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice. 20 Law. No law may abridge this right. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office.. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges. 665). competence and honesty. to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman.. as citizen and officer of the court. Hart. Hence. 212. Fisher. Hence. like other public servants. both as an officer of the court and as a citizen.

In In Re Glenn. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office. but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. In re Collins. June 26. to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld. 2d 672. of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth. 481) We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. 116 N. In the first case mentioned it was observed. Judges are not exempt from just criticism." which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error. Metzen. was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public. In In Re Humphrey." adding that: It would be contrary to. lies. The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public. should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions. The letter began: Unless the record in In re Petersen v. L-22979. Ordering the attorney's disbarment. especially in their criticism of the courts. Rep. 1967) In his relations with the courts. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND. and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. 4. 212. as a lawyer. 1. may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. an attorney. however. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. 2d 604. when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise." the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. who are officers of the court. Ferrer. Thus. 2. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. honesty and fairness. 130 N. 220. nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties." Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the respondent here. 637. every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at.S. 60. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice. but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused. and was ordered suspended for a period of two years.. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. 163 Pac. Unjust criticism. and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge. could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author. However. representing a woman who had been granted a divorce. 608. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel. and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys. Some such frame of mind. statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political. I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants." and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. In a public speech. See State Board. Calhoon. attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. and the bringing of the unauthorized suit. 123 N. 40 Am. Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents. That is his misfortune. and perjury committed in the cases involved.W. 40 Atl.E. etc. together with the write-up in the Sunday papers.times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. had a right to do. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct. which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity. v.) 585. or integrity of the courts. saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. directed against a judicial officer. Further. an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA. he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged." Said the court: We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity. a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed. v. But. Hart. cannot be permitted. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. The Court said: . in our view. 81 Pac.W. it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. (In Re Scouten. for instance: "It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money. a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 17 LRA (N. the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. 102 So. impartiality. insulting language. 734.. the Supreme Court of Illinois declared: . 3. campaign. 220. 5.

6." "a corrupt deadfall. the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct. The charges. 747. an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties. In Re Troy. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. Philbrook. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days. will be encouraged. is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. but are an unwarranted attack.." "calculated brutality." "colossal and confident insolence. and interfere with the administration of justice. . 8. the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt. and when such charges are made by officers of the courts.. 170 Pac. 71 So. While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him. who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice. The letters were published in a newspaper. 111 Atl. 723. notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements. under the guise of disciplinary proceedings. the expressions above set out. . In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. however. 10. and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public.. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton. saying that: The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good. In State ex rel. and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. 116 N. direct. and wicked conspiracies.W. if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself. Hart.A calumny of that character. Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not. could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law.. as well as to the ethics of the profession. as well as to public officials." "criminal prosecution. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a . would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. 258 Pac. the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. 725. and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar. One of the letters contained this paragraph: You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. and the person making them protected. a lawyer published this statement: I accepted the decision in this case." "criminal confederates. 7. The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that: . 9." and similar phrases. or the reasons announced for them.. or by insinuation and innuendo. bring its judgments into contempt. as my clients were foreigners. 215. or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him. The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. 111 NYS 879.. were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court. whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise. that. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state. has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual. Dabney v. or the right of the Public generally. has the right and it is his duty. it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here. charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. to criticise the decisions of the courts. constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice. Every attorney of this court. . In In Re Rockmore. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens. and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.. 440. We well understand that an independent bar. with patience. through its duly established courts. The Court said: We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties. upon the motives and integrity of this court.. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered. would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members it was made. if administered at all. undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court. the Court said. Such action. when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised. not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism. an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case.. to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. as well as every other citizen. and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust. however. if based upon reasonable inferences. if believed. In In Re Mitchell. as well as independent court. and such charges to the tribunal. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded. Breckenridge. in cases that have reached final determination. 467. In State Board of Examiners v.

" Matter of Manheim 133 App. wrote a personal letter to the trial justice. as has been shown. as we have said. willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. 136. People v." And it was decided that.) 1 N. 65. Such a communication. "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges. at his home. . is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court. 408. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court. wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge. uninfluenced by passion. from the penalty here sought to be enforced." The recent case of Johnson v. however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally. 3 Pac. 646. as we hold. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right. and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute. could never subserve any good purpose.. after being defeated in a case. Div. he exercised no right which the court can recognize. The result is I have been robbed of 80.) 355. has been directly decided. as regards the principle involved.Y. guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy. 214. 7 Wall (U. State (Ala. and. Supp. 481.) 44 South. Ed. induced by his official act. neither is it common sense. State. he was immune. aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright. and quarantine after it is made. and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one. or a committee chosen from its rank. in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months.. 22 Ark. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. and for any words. While the court in that case. oral or written. addressed to the Judge personally. can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law. and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle. 270. and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. which the latter received by due course of mail. or indecent. active students. or the faculty of the University Law School.fraud. Atl. in which it was stated. constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed. United States. The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable.S. ..Y. Commonwealth v. it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it. "Is it in the power of any person. 7 Colo 237. can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision. 13 Wall. 179 Pa. but. watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue advantage. wholly different principles are applicable thereto. Law (2d Ed. The distinction made is. we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. Ed. however abusive. The Supreme Court of Minnesota. "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts. Scouten's Appeal. complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice. he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. 244. which shall not require fumigation before it is stated.) p.S. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation.. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence." said the court. but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct." says the court. and with robbery. could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. "An attorney who. or if any member of the court. 186 Pa. Rep. Beene v. manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions. the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years. 374. Enc. 2 Va.Y." That a communication such as this. 351. either as principals or accessories. . Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. to charge them with ignorance. addressed secretly to the judge alone. 172 F. which has power to discipline the attorney. between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge. or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? . or any other person. Smith's Appeal. Green. 149. 49 Am. or of any privilege which any reputable attorney. it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner. as we have found. on the contrary. with due regard to his position. No high-minded. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. No judicial officer. And there appears to be no distinction. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer. The accused. to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity. while not holding court. or umpire. 14. 19 L. Dandridge. while such conduct was not a contempt under the state. fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended. if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building. but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen. with the court acting as a fence. and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys.) 364. 641. we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley. or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association. vile." 18 Am. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. 36 Atl. 20 L. This was done. The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable. so made. When. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. 1017. in that case a commissioner of the court. for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. to which reference has been made. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication. in reference to his decision: "It is not law.) 3 N. an attorney at law. with unjust rulings. and in support of its application to the facts of this case.. the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court. Cas." Bradley v. 671. (U.. for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct. 99 N. it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer. Fisher. delivered its opinion as follows: The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. In Cobb v. 134." "If. and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. 11. & Eng.

the rights to the parties.. Of course. in defending the cause and rights of his client.. In In re Sotto. the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude. 2d 659. counsel. the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo. made by lawyers. an attorney. reaching to. . 13. is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public. Grimes. but it is not.. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress. 1. and 'of the untoward consequences. they might be driven to take the law into their own hands. whether amounting to a crime or not. too. In In Re Graves. under the Constitution. but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. . Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court. 61 Phil.. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts. 2d 108. dissatisfied with the loss of a case. In In Re Doss.E. said the court. and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. who according to his statement. where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls. Vicente Sotto. 2. 221 Pac. said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court." this Court. critical of the courts and their judicial actuations. even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.. of justice . or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. 354 Pac. caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law. found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as. and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice. in many cases decided during the last years. nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices. so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is. like any other. which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. 411. for which reason the lawyer was disbarred. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda. prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices." There.or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge. rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. 82 Phil.. an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity.. Significantly. despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech. Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. Without such guaranty. . Finding him in contempt.12. 595. but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case. 12 N. in its opinion. 14. that is to say. and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom. and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. of which he is one of the members. are incompetent and narrow minded. that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered. the statements made disclosed . because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws. Victorino Mapa. Francisco's client . criticising the court in intemperate language. constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases. In Salcedo vs. reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which. is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court. invoking said law. is to change the members of the Supreme Court. a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law. the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon. this Court declared: But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press. should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable. Hernandez. to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney. In State v. refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper. The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications. 724. the only remedy to put an end to go much evil." and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years. His disbarment was ordered. although conceding that It is right and plausible that an attorney. the Court therein hastened to emphasize that . Atty.. and consequently to lower . The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case. although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end. A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment. in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court. who." which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano.

Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.A.R. consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations. which upheld the rule above-adverted to. came when. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes.. "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute. 18 A publication which tends to impede. Almacen's professional identity. and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. By constitutional mandate. 23 This. in the interest of Of course. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. In this inquiry. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. 586. the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. 22 our is the solemn duty. the contempt exists. to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court. we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect.) 3. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right. The first stir for a modification thereof. 19 Atty. his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court. More than this. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated. constitutes likewise criminal contempt. Thus — The power to discipline attorneys. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court hasrepeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. in People vs. it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: . has lost much of its vitality. In the second.S. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction. in the first kind of contempt. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. They bring into question the capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to render justice. he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.]. no comfort is afforded Atty. in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. and cannot be tolerated. however. So much so that — which. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. however. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court. 21 a contempt proceeding. In the second kind of contempt. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending. 594. Laurel. et al. blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. Alarcon.. this is well within our authority to do. is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17. 1967. an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint." Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases brevity. Undoubtedly. So that. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession. implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. supra. need not now be reviewed in detail. constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. What is sought. Articulating the sentiments of the Court. Justice Sanchez stressed: As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration. [N. with or without a pending case. This is of no moment. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. Accordingly. because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect.. Mr. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority. the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. who are officers of the court. obstruct. For sometime. is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record. amongst others. in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof. and is equally punishable by courts..the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements. Virtually. where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into . speaking thru Justice Jose P.

The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. but the duty.. and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating. and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney. and requires detachment and disinterestedness. it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts. Beyond making the mere offer. bring . the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear. Almacen for his transgressions.the premises. alluding to the Scriptures. in the exercise of its disciplinary powers. whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts. Almacen's part. and the need therefor is unavoidable. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature. he expressed no regret. it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.to startle the public. in a calculated effort . It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. By constitutional precept. these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. inflict punishment." he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations. the Court is not. virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him. Called upon to make an explanation. even lives." With unmitigated acerbity. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. aggrieved parties. but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. And more than this. Unorthodox though it may seem. Almacen would have appear. if there be any complainant in the case at bar. in this jurisdiction. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct. Hence. fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. Instead. if not a total distortion. stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy." And. valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy. prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. However. only as a duly constituted court. the individual members act not as such individuals but. 24 Indeed. gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity. As marked out by the Rules of Court. Finally. In haughty and coarse language. it can only be the Court itself. that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum. real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. with characteristic arrogance. not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights. to withdraw the privilege. fortunes and properties.. he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit. Accordingly. we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. 29 In such posture. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of . of the court which made him one of its officers. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy. that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they. but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. no law stands in its way. the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. he went farther. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal. should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. Almacen's petition." he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb.. the members of the Court are the "complainants.this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. it becomes. prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent. of course. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court. offered no apology. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney. This is an utter misapprehension. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. As such. the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. as Atty. Any criticism of the Court must. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is. and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. attract public attention to himself and. this power is vested exclusively in this Court. 28 Public interest is its primary objective. in a very real sense. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties. being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice.. Atty. primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers. heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired. there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Courtmotu proprio. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. however. to a certain degree. 30 So that. We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. The present is such a case. he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons. not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein. the members of the Court are. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is. above criticism. 27 Not being intended to. and should not be. That the misconduct committed by Atty. nay. not as a matter of right. In the end. that. nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in . acting as a Court. 26 It is not accurate to say. more important of all. 25 Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable. imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice. purely potestative on Atty. Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. of course. Undeniably. no statute. not only the right. he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and.

which is lesser in degree and effect. suspended from the practice of law until further orders. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. as he is hereby. be furnished the Secretary of Justice. ACCORDINGLY. IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be. the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance. This. can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law.candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect. . accordingly. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and. we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because. we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. even without the comforting support of precedent. there is no reason why indefinite suspension. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For. Let copies of this resolution. at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. the suspension to take effect immediately.

R." 11 Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism. whose common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy. the amount of P316. . Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as follows: VI That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division. the Court dismissed the petition on July 26. much more. Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. the Court received from Atty.) VIII That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice. 9 Atty. . 1-88 of the Court. 1989. on February 7. 1989." the Court finds the various statements made by Atty. so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest. as he should know as a lawyer. Atty. who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division. 1990. Thus. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court). 7 On March 21. Castellano. moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 1990. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned. No. the dismissal of the petition was based more of money reasons. 90083 October 4. 13 (Emphasis ours. as Respondents (sic)." 4 Three months later. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order. Ernesto B. contentment and progress of your people and the only country which God has given us. allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 10 Thus. Marceliano L. Atty. is that they are may be Marcos-appointees. Atty. . Atty. specifically the non. Atty. playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good faith. 14 IX . By reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocentaccused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person . the motion for reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY. 1990 to be exact. — PHILIPPINES. accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution. as complainant.) VII That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally created. yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accusedcomplainant." 5 The complaint was signed by Atty. firm and determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts. vs. so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Castellano. and also the IBP O. has no jurisdiction to discipline. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental. or otherwise. as assigned to that most Honorable Supreme Court.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. 3 This time. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of Circular No. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19. which. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Presiding Judge. filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang. 2 On September 9. according to him.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration. No. 1989. . and the date of the payment of his membership dues. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.payment of P316. . accused-petitioner." 8 In his "Opposition". Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic). Castellano for petitioner. People of the Philippines. for the happiness. the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and just investigations.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. . 1989. remove. it's the fault of the Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court. or on January 22. 12 (Emphasis ours. but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic). This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino. Marceliano L. Justices of the Supreme Court. he could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for beingmaliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court). respondents. through his lawyer. which the accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle. Supreme Court. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President." was filed by registered mail with the Court. 1990 KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG. Negros Occidental. Maglasang.R. . Templado. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On June 22. in a Resolution dated October 18. being bias (sic). Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. . as counsel of the petitioner. If such circulars were not known to the undersigned. 1989.

"[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. RULE 11." and that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons. Atty. as proved by records of both cases mentioned above. intimidation. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices. they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it. even the most basic tenet of our government system — the separation of powers between the judiciary.) xxx xxx xxx 5. After all." They are not relevant to the cause of his client. it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that: CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Thus. the means by which Atty. . his client's success is wholly subordinate. Atty. 19 and indicated his IBP O. At any rate. On the contrary. were so strict or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant.'" 24 Consequently. after due publication.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case. against practicing lawyers. xxx xxx xxx RULE 11. however. however. 1-88. on the other. a circular on expeditious disposition of cases. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. Castellano. But then again. Rather. seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court. to that end." It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. but effective January 1. party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak. under paragraph 5 of Circular No. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.R. not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts. as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18. As an officer of the Court. as a common tao. he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. xxx xxx xxx We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division." 22 To be sure. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration. for the Respondents-Justices." 23 In this regard. but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism. offensive or menancing language or behavior before the courts." and his insinuation that the Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice — one set for the rich and another for the poor — went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." Precisely. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close relation. and innuendo. public and private. and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges and Justices. for the respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate. concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. 1988. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates. No. the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons. hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. the explanation given by Atty. and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers. "no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought. "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal. Finally. 1-88. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division. in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. It is true that Atty." 21 Thus. 16 xxx xxx xxx D. on the one hand. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous. Unfortunately. 1989. composed of fallible mortals. Atty. extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the President. adopted by the Court on November 8. it is through the criticism of its actions that the Court. reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. the executive. Templado. are grossly improper. and owing to the foregoing. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court. and the date he paid his dues. and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice. Atty. Castellano. 17 scurrilous and contumacious. 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed trial court's decision.

with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava. Marceliano L.000.00) Pesos. and be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. for their information and guidance. and is hereby ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. WHEREFORE. . and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final. the Court of Appeals. and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country.Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court. SO ORDERED. Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably. Castellano's record.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION September 6, 1918 G.R. No. 14576 In Re VICENTE SOTTO. Vicente Sotto in Attorney-General Paredes for the Government.

his

own

behalf.

STREET, J.: Complaints having heretofore been laid before this court charging the respondent, Vicente Sotto, an attorney practicing before this bar, with unprofessional conduct, said complaints were by resolution of the court referred to the Attorney-General for investigation. Upon November 30, 1917, the Attorney-General, after inquiring into said charges, reported that the charges were in his opinion well-founded and recommended the institution of disbarment proceedings under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent was thereupon notified of said report; and, after he had put in his reply, evidence was taken, pursuant to our resolution of December 14, 1917, before the clerk of the this court. The matter is now before us for consideration upon the evidence so taken and the arguments submitted in the form of memoranda by the AttorneyGeneral for the Government, and by Sotto, as respondent. The charges involved in the report of the Attorney-General were primarily four in number, to which the Attorney-General has added a fifth, based upon matters connected with the present proceeding itself. The four original charges are based upon four distinct transactions; and, in order that their nature may be fully understood, we herewith set forth in detail the facts connected with three of these transactions, namely, the first, third, and fourth. The other two charges will be dealt with more summarily at the end of our detailed statement. On June 16, 1917, Natalia Enriquez of Paombong, Bulacan, sold to Santiago V. SyJuco of Malabon, Rizal, two parcels of land. The contract of sale was embodied in a document duly acknowledged before a notary public. For some reason or other, the vendor, on or about the first day of August, 1917, instituted an action against the vendee for the purpose of securing the rescission of said contract. The plaintiff‘s attorney of record in this proceeding was one Jose Galan. While the action was pending the respondent, Attorney Vicente Sotto, intervened in representation of the plaintiff. On August 10, 1917, he went to the house of SyJuco in Malabon and attempted to procure his consent to the rescission of the contract above-mentioned and endeavored to induce him to sign for that purpose a document already prepared rescinding said contract. As SyJuco was reluctant to rescind the contract, the respondent, Vicente Sotto, intimidated and threatened him, telling him that unless he signed such document the respondent would procure his discharge from the office of notary public which he then hold, would file charges of estafa against him, as a result of which, he would enter Bilibid prison, and further that the respondent would publish in all the newspapers an article to the effect that SyJuco was an impostor. These threats, especially that relating to the publication in the newspapers that SyJuco was an impostor, had the desired effect; and on August 11, 1917, SyJuco, although aware that the charges imputed to him were false, and in order to prevent the respondent from carrying his threats into execution, acceded to the respondent‘s demand and executed document rescinding the contract in question. Sotto seems not to have been fully satisfied with this; and a short time after the occurrence of the events above narrated, he wrote to SyJuco a letter dated August 13, 1917, in which he asked the latter to pay him the sum of P2,500 as supposed losses and damages to his client Natalia Enriquez, and giving him two days time within which to settle the claim extra-judicially. To make his demand more effective and probably to impress upon SyJuco‘s mind the fact that

the respondent would surely execute his threats he caused to be published in the issue of August 13, 1917, of the newspapers ―El Comercio‖ and ―La Nacion,‖ an article prepared by himself and entitled ―Grave Charges Against a Notary.‖ The same article was by him caused to be published in the issue for August 16, 1917, of the newspaper ―El Ideal‖ where it appeared under the heading of ―The Mother of Dr. Valencia Victim of an Imposter.‖ The difference in the headline of the article as it appeared in ―El Ideal‖ and as it appeared in the other two papers, and the slight difference which may be found in their context, is the result of changes made by the corresponding editors of said papers for the purpose of evading any responsibility. These articles refer to SyJuco and in substance impute to his acts constituting fraud and deceit in securing the execution of the contract first above mentioned, and further informs the public ―an information for estafa will be filed against the impostor (referring to SyJuco) with Attorney Vicente Sotto acting as private prosecutor, unless SyJuco should pay all losses and damages.‖ Four or five days passed. The respondent, meanwhile not having received any answer from SyJuco, wrote him a registered letter, in which he reproduced the contents of the first letter and when concluded with this remark: ―No answer having been received from you, you are advised that I will present the complaint with its consequences.‖ In this letter were inclosed two pictures, one of Atanasia Enriquez, and another of Natalia Enriquez, the latter bearing a note in the handwriting of the respondent and saying ―To be published on the 25th.‖ This note, together with the demand for the payment of P2,500, was a veiled threat to the effect that unless this sum of money was forthcoming the publication of scandalous charges against SyJuco would continue; and this was probably one of the ―fatal consequences‖ which the respondent had in mind. Such action on the part of the respondent finds it a cause in SyJuco‘s not paying any attention to his first letter, and had the object of impressing all the more upon the mind of his intended victim that he, the respondent, had all the means of exposing him to public ridicule and contempt. Still no answer was received from SyJuco; and the respondent caused to be published in ―The Independent‖ for August 25, 1917, together with the pictures above described and the affidavits of Natalia and Atanasia Enriquez, detailing the acts alleged to constitute the supposed fraud and deceit, the article he had already caused to be published in the newspapers above mentioned. As it appeared in ―The Independent‖ the article was entitled ―An Aged Lady of Seventy Years denounces under oath the Adventures of a notary public of Malabon‖ (referring to SyJuco); and, to make it appear that he had taken or copied it from ―La Nacion,‖ he placed upon said article an epigraph which reads, ―What ‗La Nacion‘ says.‖ However, the truth is, as has been said, that it was he who provided ―La Nacion‖ and the other newspapers with said article. In spite of these publications SyJuco maintained his silence; and the respondent, in pursuance of his threats and of his intention to make SyJuco come to terms, committed the following acts: He asked SyJuco‘s mother for a picture of her son and for a copy of the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a case between SyJuco and his parents, without telling her the purpose for which he wanted them. Then he caused both the picture and the judgment to be published in the issue of ―The Independent‖ for September 1, 1917, under the heading printed in big type of ―Son Sued by His Parents. Santiago V. SyJuco is sentenced by Judge McMahon.‖ Just below the picture is printed the name ―Santiago V. SyJuco‖ and above it is the satirical phrase ―Men of the day.‖ This publication had an introductory paragraph which states that ―SyJuco, the notary public of Malabon, Rizal, who recently, according to the daily papers, attempted to defraud an aged lady of seventy years, making her sign a fraudulent document of sale of a fisher worth fifteen thousand pesos, had just lost the suit pending between him, and his father the Chinese Vicente SyJuco and his mother Cipriana Viardo. This woman ages more than fifty years, has appeared at the office of ―The Independent‖ in order to ask for the publication of the judgment.‖ But the truth, as already stated, was that it was the respondent who published it without the permission or knowledge of the old lady. The respondent denies having made any threats against SyJuco but we think that the proofs tend to show that such threats were made. The testimony of the witnesses for the AttorneyGeneral to the effect that the respondent stated that information for estafa would be filed against SyJuco, that he would surely enter Bilibid prison, etc., agrees with the respondent‘s attempt, as shown by Exhibits 4-A and 7-A of the Attorney-General, to make and that he committed a crime and that he admitted its commission.

Denial is also made of the truth of the charge that the respondent had sent to SyJuco the picture of Natalia Enriquez, which bears the note ―To be published on the 25th.‖ There are numerous circumstances, not necessary to be here detailed, which in our opinion conclusively show that the charge is true. We now pass to a consideration of the third charge, with respect to which the fact are as follows: On June 29, 1917, Jose Tortajada, a resident of Manila, executed a document by which he appointed the respondent as his attorney for the purpose of settling, judicially or extra-judicially, certain differences which he had with his wife, Amada Mestres. In said document Tortajada promised to pay the said respondent the sum of P2,000 for his services. For the purpose of acquainting the respondent with all the details of the case, Tortajada sent him on June 30, 1917, a letter in which he described in detailed the proud, haughty, stingy, and despotic character of his wife and the insults, humiliation, maltreatment, and remorse that he had suffered at her hand – all of which, if published, would surely injure the reputation of both spouses and expose them to public ridicule. The respondent, in pursuance of the contract of employment, began work on the case and had some interviews with Tortajada‘s wife. Whether as a result of the respondent‘s services or not, all differences between Tortajada and his wife were soon afterwards settled extra-judicially; and the respondent, not long after, made a demand for the payment of his fees of P2,000, which Tortajada refused to pay. Later on, Tortajada received in the mail the following documents: (1) a photographic copy of a letter which purported to be signed by Tortajada and addressed to the respondent; (2) a typewritten anonymous letter addressed to Tortajada; and (3) an envelope addressed to the same person bearing the name of the respondent on the upper left hand corner and in all the respects of the same class as that admitted to have been used by him. The photographic copy above mentioned is a copy of a letter which Tortajada had previously written to the respondent and in which the latter was urged to expedite the case. The anonymous letter reads: ―Attorney Sotto says that as you are looking for trouble, he had decided this morning to present a complaint against you, in which are reproduced all – absolutely all – of your letters, and, if you compel him, he will cause the complaint together with the photographic facsimiles of all the letters to be published in ‗The Independnet‘ and in all the local papers so that the public may know you and your motives.‖ Believing that these things came from the respondent, Tortajada sent him a letter in which he stated that he was not afraid of the respondent‘s threats and that the latter could do anything he wanted to do and yet the former would not pay him a cent. To this reply no answer was received from the respondent. Thereafter, the respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila a complaint against Tortajada for the purpose of recovering the sum of P2,000, the amount of fees agreed upon. In paragraph 6 of this complaint there is an exact copy of the letter of June 30, 1917, which Tortajada sent to the respondent and in which details are given of the domestic troubles of Tortajada. There can be no doubt that, supposing the anonymous letter had been sent by the respondent, its language considered with the relation of the parties at the time, especially with the persistent refusal of Tortajada to pay the respondent‘s fee, would constitute a threat against Tortajada of a type similar to that employed by the respondent against SyJuco. But the respondent denies the authorship of the anonymous letter and that it was he who sent it. The Attorney-General, however, contends that he (the respondent) is the author thereof and that it was he who sent it. This contention is based upon the following grounds: (1) The fact that the anonymous letter was received; (2) the similarity of the envelope in which it was contained to the envelopes used by the respondent; (3) the fact that Tortajada answered it addressing a letter to the respondent, and yet the latter never made any reply denying that he sent it; (4) the fact that only the respondent could have taken the photograph of the letter delivered by Tortajada to Amando Calleja and addressed to the respondent; and (5) the fact that, as was stated in the anonymous letter, all the letters sent by Tortajada were reproduced in the complaint. This combination of circumstances in our opinion shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent sent the anonymous letter as charged.

The respondent as a second defense to the third charge contends that it was not he but his clerk, Amando Calleja, who prepared the complaint filed against Tortajada and that the respondent signed it without first reading its contents. We are, however, of the opinion that, taking all the circumstances into consideration, it was the respondent himself who prepared the complaint, or at least, if somebody else prepared it, the respondent ordered or approved the insertion of the letter in the complaint. But the respondent further contends that, even admitting that the letter in question was inserted by him or by his order, he was under no obligation to keep its contents as secret. In this view we can by no means concur. The letter was written confidentially by a client to the respondent in his capacity as attorney. Hence the respondent was under obligation to keep the contents of the letter inviolate; and as it is wholly immaterial in the cause of action stated in the complaint against Tortajada, its insertion therein constitutes a gross violation of professional conduct and of the oath taken by the respondent that he would always conduct himself with entire fidelity to his clients. The facts material to the fourth charge are these: Sometime in the month of September, 1917, Natalia Enriquez was looking for someone who would buy certain parcels of land belonging to her. Atanasia Enriquez, a niece of Natalia, was aiding her in this work, probably in the capacity of broker. It appears that the respondent was also acquainted with this fact and was also probably looking for a purchaser for one of two reasons, to wit: (1) Either because prior to that time Natalia Enriquez was indebted to him in the sum of P2,000, which he wanted to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale, or (2) because he wished that the document of conveyance should be executed with his aid so that he could earn his fees. It also appears to be probable that there was an understanding between Natalia, Atanasia, and the respondent, that when a purchaser should appear, the document would be executed with the intervention of the respondent. On one of the last days of September, 1917, a person named Bernardo Dagala, or rather his wife, Enrica de Guzman, was found who was willing to purchase the property. When the sale had already been verbally agreed upon, Atanasia Enriquez accompanied by Dagala went to the office of the respondent to notify him that a purchaser had been found and probably with a view to the execution of the proper document. But in order that they could easily withdraw and find another notary who would draw the document for a less sum, in a case the respondent should charge them too high, they withheld the name of the purchaser and Dagala was presented merely as a person who aided in looking for a purchaser. But the respondent, more resourceful that they were and with the intention of securing information from them as to who the purchaser was, met them with the statement that he too had found a purchaser who would pay more and who had ready money in the bank and that the sale to this person should not be delayed. Thereupon, Dagala, anxious that the sale should be made to him only, declared that he himself was the purchaser. Thus seeing that Dagala was so intent to purchase the property and believing that he would be willing to pay any sum for the drafting of the document, the respondent told him that the other purchaser was willing to pay him P500 for that work, and that Dagala has to pay this sum if he wanted to purchase the property. After some more discussion as to the proper fees for drafting the document they parted with the understanding that they would again meet the next day at the respondent‘s office. However, believing that the fee demanded by the respondent was too high, Natalia Enriquez, her son Juan Valencia, Dagala, and his wife De Guzman went the next day, September 30, 1917, to another notary public in Manila, Miguel de Leon, who drafted the document of conveyance for a sum much less than the exorbitant fee which the respondent proposed to charge. The next day the respondent was informed that the document had been prepared at the office of Miguel de Leon and on the afternoon of that day the former went to the latter‘s office and representing that he was the attorney of Natalia Enriquez demanded that the document be shown to him alleging that his client had told him that she signed it without knowing its contents. Miguel de Leon showed him the document and explained to him in detail the circumstances under which it was executed, and which leave no room for doubt that there was nothing illegal about, nothing that could invalidate it. The object of the respondent in going to the office of Miguel de Leon was of course to verify the information which he had received and which he found out was true. Irritated at the fact that he had thus lost the sum of P500 which he expected

to get as a fee for drafting the document of sale, the respondent, on October 2, 1917, sent two letters to Bernardo Dagala and two other letters to Natalia Enriquez. In this first letter to Dagala, he states that, according to his clients, Dagala had made them sign a document which they did not understand, that Dagala‘s conduct was improper, and requested that the latter should see him at once. In his second letter he reproduces in effect the substance of the first letter and adds: ―Come immediately to my office if you want to avoid the fatal consequences of what you have just done.‖ In his first letter to Natalia Enriquez, he ordered her to come to his office in order to talk about the document she had signed. In the second letter he advised her that the fault was hers and again asked her to see him. On October 3, 1917, Dagala went to the office of the respondent, afraid of the ―fatal consequences‖ which the latter covertly threatened in his letter. Here the respondent told Dagala that he had acted improperly in not coming to the former‘s office on the day agreed upon, that the former had lost the sum of P500 which the other purchaser promised to pay for drafting the document, that he needed money, and that he would cause trouble unless Dagala should pay him the P500 he had lost, and guarantee with the property acquired by his wife the debt of P2,000 which Natalia Enriquez owed the respondent. Somehow or other, instead of a mere guaranty, Dagala on October 3 was caused by the respondent to sign a document by which, beside guaranteeing Natalia‘s debt of P2,000 with the property sold to his wife, he assumed the payment of the same. This done, the respondent, who knew beforehand that the property purchased by Dagala‘s wife was subject to a lease and right of option in favor of one Marcelo Estrella, then requested that Dagala should convince his wife to appoint him as their attorney to secure the delivery of the property from Estrella. Dagala promised to come back with his wife the following day, October 4, 1917, which they did, to inform the respondent of their answer. On this occasion Dagala paid the respondent P500 upon the account of Natalia‘s debt for which a receipt was given. The Dagala spouses then executed a document by which they appointed the respondent their attorney to secure from Marcelo Estrella the delivery of the property, and by which they promised to pay him the sum of P500 as attorney‘s fees. Acting under this appointment and in representation of the Dagala spouses the respondent had an interview with Estrella at his own office. Estrella manifested his willingness to deliver the property provided that he be indemnified for damages and improvements he had made upon it. Several days later, that is, on or about October 16, 1917, the respondent appeared at the office of the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila and acting as attorney for Natalia Enriquez asked that an information for estafa be filed against the Dagala spouses upon the ground that these persons had defrauded Natalia Enriquez in the sale of the property heretofore referred to. It will be noted that at this time the respondent was attorney for the Dagala spouses with respect to the same property and knew all the details of the transaction which led to the sale thereof. An investigation was held the result that the prosecuting attorney, seeing no good ground for filing the information for estafa, refused to do so. But the respondent insisted and stated that he desired criminal proceedings to be instituted against Dagala and his wife because he was sure that as soon as they or at least Dagala should be arrested, they would immediately consent to a settlement in order to avoid the scandal which the respondent intended to create with the filing of the information and which he would publish in his weekly, ―The Independent.‖ In spite of this insistence, however, no information was filed; and the respondent on October 25, 1917, wrote a letter to the Attorney-General in which, after relating the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to file the information, he says, ―for this reason my client comes to you in demand of justice.‖ Thereafter in the month of November a civil action against Dagala and his wife was brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila in which the plaintiff Natalia Enriquez sought to secure the annulment of the contract of sale, upon the ground that it was executed through fraud, deceit, and duress. The complaint was signed by Attorney Jose Poblete, who at that time was a salaried assistant in the law office of the respondent. Upon the facts above stated it is evident that the respondent in violation of his professional duty, improperly represented conflicting interests, inasmuch as, while obligated to act for the Dagala spouses in securing the delivery of the property, he opposed their interest, by attempting to have the sale set aside.

The reply of the respondent is: (1) That it was not he who asked for the investigation held by the prosecuting attorney but Natalia Enriquez and that he was with her during the investigation not as her attorney but merely as her companion; (2) that it was not he but Jose Poblete who was the attorney for Natalia Enriquez in the civil action brought by her against Dagala and his wife; (3) that he had from the beginning acted in good faith. These assertions are not established. The evidence shows that it was he who personally asked for an investigation, chose the prosecuting attorney who conducted it, and delivered the papers upon which the fiscal acted; and that he took an active part in directing the investigation, asking now and then questions of the witnesses. It is also clear that in the course of the investigation he acted as attorney for Natalia Enriquez. When the prosecuting attorney, finding no good ground for it, refused to file an information charging estafa, the respondent wrote to the Attorney-General a letter in which he admits that Natalia Enriquez was his client. He there says: ―For this reason my client comes to you in demand of justice.‖ The evidence shows that Jose Poblete was previous to and at the time of the filing of the complaint an assistant in the law office of the respondent receiving a salary from the latter but with the privilege of handling his own cases. Prior to the investigation of the professional conduct of the respondent this person was called to the office of the AttorneyGeneral and there he declared under oath, after reading the complaint signed by him in the case between Natalia Enriquez and Bernardo Dagala and his wife, that the case was a case of the respondent, who gave it to him in his capacity of assistant in the respondent‘s law office, because the respondent desired to appear as a witness but had the mistaken opinion that if he should sign as attorney for Natalia Enriquez he could not appear as a witness. The said Jose Poblete was presented as a witness in the subsequent investigation but there he turned out to be a hostile witness, and testified, contrary to his statement at the Attorney-General‘s office, that he was surprised when he made those declarations, that he was nervous at the time, and that he was referring not to the case of Natalia Enriquez against Dagala but to the case of Sotto against Alcala and Sotto against Desierto. The testimony of this witness is important in determining (1) the capacity in which he signed the complaint against Dagala and his wife, and (2) the propriety of the respondent‘s professional conduct. Special care therefore has been taken in perusing his testimony at the investigation, as a result of which we come to the conclusion that his conduct during the investigation is censurable, that his testimony thereat can not be safely relied upon and that what he had declared at the office of the Attorney-General was the truth. As to the third defense, the evidence conclusively shows that from the beginning the respondent was acting in bad faith. In writing the two letters to Dagala in which he made the latter understand that he had committed something wrong and that fatal consequences would follow unless he should come to the respondent‘s office, the respondent was not authorized by Natalia Enriquez. This lady had not had any conversation or correspondence with him about the document of sale which she had signed; and this is apparent from his letter in which he asked her to come so that they could talk about that document. As the Attorney-General well says, there was no ground for Sotto to believe that Dagala and his wife had committed any crime. If he acted in good faith and believed that the sale to Dagala and his wife was illegal and fastened upon them grave criminal responsibilities, it would be impossible to explain why he made them sign a document guaranteeing Natalia‘s debt to him with the property acquired by the Dagala spouses as a result of the sale. Certainly, this conduct of the respondent is tantamount to an acknowledgment of the validity of the sale. The terms of the contract and the circumstances under which the document was executed were fully known to him as they had been explained by Miguel de Leon. In fact, in his letter to Natalia Enriquez he even told her that she was to blame for what had happened, from which statement it may safely be inferred that Dagala and his wife were not censurable. The respondent‘s purpose in trying to secure the filing of an information against Dagala and his wife for the crime of estafa was, as by him stated, merely to make them settle the matter with him extra-judicially, in the hope that he could get more money out of them. The simple narrative of the facts connected with charges 1, 3, and 4, given above, suffices to show that the respondent has been decidedly lacking in fidelity to his clients and from motives of private gain has grossly abused the honorable profession of which he is a member. In each of these transactions his conduct was reprehensible and unprofessional in a high degree and evinces a moral obtuseness incompatible with the office of attorney. For purposes of extortion

The publication of this matter was a manifest violation of the oath which the respondent had taken to conduct himself with fidelity to the courts. The occasion which called forth these libelous effusions from Sotto‘s pen was that Judge Del Rosario had lately imposed upon him as fine of P500 in a prosecution for criminal libel. in his dealings with his clients and with the courts. . Charge No. and he may be deprived of the privileges and character which it gives him. Torres. in denying. speaking of offenses of this character. 5 in the final report of the Attorney-General sets forth that in the course of the present proceedings the respondent deliberately deviated from the truth by testifying falsely in regard to certain important details of the matters under investigation. when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows. The existence of the good faith on the part of the respondent has thus been belied by the aforementioned acts. he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney. 789. on the part of the respondent Vicente Sotto. we examined each and every one of them separately upon its own merits. independently from the others.‖ (2) having sent to Tortajada the photograph of one of the latter‘s letters addressed to Sotto with the anonymous typewritten note. by pleading that he is also the editor of the newspaper wherein the charges were published. which appeared in articles published under the heading ―Sin Malicia‖ in the issues of ―The Independent‖ dated respectively October 13. and the fact that the respondent made them shows not only the weakness of his defense but furnishes additional proof of his unworthiness to remain a member of the legal profession. may and should be. . del Rosario. Thornton. to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused. to inflict the greater wound. 788. in respect to his official conduct. . Avanceña and Fisher. saying: ―To be published on the 25th. In this he proved himself not only unworthy of membership in the legal profession but unfit even for the responsible position of editor of a newspaper. and reveals the existence of a deliberate plan to foster his own interests. and by virtue of the provisions of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. His position at the bar enables him. the said Vicente Sotto is hereby removed from the office of attorney and incapacitated from hereafter exercising the legal profession. disbarred from further practice. Nor can an attorney-at-law shield himself as against a charge of having libeled the court or a judge thereof. V. and (3) having acted as attorney for Natalia Enriquez in the proceedings for the institution of criminal charge against Dagala. as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct. it is the duty of the court.. The certificate heretofore issued to him authorizing him to exercise said profession is accordingly annulled. namely. and that. . However. in the Attorney-General‘s report relates to certain malicious and unjustifiable insinuations against the judicial integrity of the Honorable M. We agree with the Attorney-General that these denials are shown to be false beyond reasonable doubt. a judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.and blackmail he availed himself of his de facto power as the responsible director of a newspaper to blacken the reputation of his refractory clients or others who refused to submit to his demands. that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person. under oath. and. in his work on Attorneys-at-Law. in such case. or who procures the writing or publication of such a charge. In deciding the several charges made against the herein respondent. it must be observed that the act alleged in said charges taken together show a systematic tendency on the part of the respondent. Johnson. and let the surrender thereof to the clerk of this court be required within five days after this decision becomes effective. An attorney who is guilty of writing and publishing a libelous charge against the court or any member thereof. One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character. PAR. says: PAR. by suspension or expulsion. and having written the note found on one of them. by a series of acts. 20 and 27. In view of the repeated acts of gross misconduct above specified. JJ. by means of an illicit use of his two-fold capacity as attorney-at-law and newspaperman. as guardian of the interest of society. concur. (1) having enclosed the photographs of Natalia and Atanasia Enriquez in the letter that he sent to SyJuco. 1917. The costs will be taxed in accordance with section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Charge No. without infringing on the freedom of press. 2.

Baizas and Associates for petitioners. or. to "be paid by their counsel. 1963. however. the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. Perez and her counsels. for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. HON. that Mrs. vs. wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage. alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt. this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners. 1968 than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed. the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions. knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs.1 As a matter of fact. at some stages alternatingly. 1963. More . Almeda for respondents. which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone). intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court. sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would. respondents. Ruth Cobb-Perez. Corollarily. specifically directed against the following observation therein made: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below. Some of the actions were filed. The foregoing motion. abetted by their counsel. PEREZ. 1963. 1968. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions. Perez. which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice. his wife. and the same has yet to be satisfied. J. Mrs. among others. lifted on October 4. the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. Crispin D. the movants. It is clear. the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. Alvendia (L-14598. this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution). counsels for the petitioners. and. Incidentally. when the motion was set for hearing on December 21. was already prepared with another "remedy. as represented by their counsels. looking to Acosta vs. 1963. GREGORIO LANTIN. we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation. was designed to cause delay. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought. CASTRO. petitioners. 1963. filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15. have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. a month before the said writ was actually lifted. October 31. 1961. on November 8.R. that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. Attys. The herein movants. however. on the ground. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. On the very day the injunction was denied. while submitting to the judgment on the merits. After November 15. For instance. as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels. Baizas and A. now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback. Mercedez. No. on September 3. Perez herself sought. to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion. Crispin D. seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued. in CAG. which denied his wife's abovementioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. In a determined effort to prolong the litigation. N. Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion.R. 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy. then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1960). prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order: When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing. at the latest. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case. why did they not adopt this position from the very start. as expected. and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent. was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank. RICARDO P. Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal). after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution. Damaso Perez. only to be abandoned or withdrawn. he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19. 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. The petitioners and their counsel. 29962-R. far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19. At first blush. in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose. November 8. the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Bolinas. as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing. however. Isidro T.: This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22. Judge Alikpala. presiding judge of Branch XXII. in connection with civil case 7532.". alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Mrs. knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin). the Perez spouses. L-22320 July 29." as in fact on that day. causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. prayed for the issuance of another injunction. initially or ultimately deny their prayer. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA.

until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9. Bolinao. Bolinas. the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution. but the promise was never fulfilled. a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned. the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. one remedy had been exhausted. The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that. they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay. denied the said motion for reconsideration. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. Jr. which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. But the fact is that Mrs. ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law. upon her own motion. (Emphasis supplied) . which. Atty. on the merit or lack of merit of his case. And because of this statement. devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively.dividends within five days. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407." A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended. Jr. in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction. 1963. in the course of the protracted litigation." or about August 3. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction. anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case. 3 Meanwhile. as in the case at bar. 1963. In this regard. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client. 1964.N. and often simultaneous. justice was delayed. 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. ACCORDINGLY. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless. the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses. . It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above. such that even before. the remedy is not the recall of the writ. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. Bolinao. upon his own admission.. the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit. The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners. Our decision of May 22. and temper his client's propensity to litigate. 5 However. rather than traverse the incontrovertible. was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs." From the chronology of antecedent events. its primacy is indisputable. coached by their counsels. curiously enough. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. 39407. they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt. 39407. In reality. the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged. Incidentally. only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other. the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292. what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 2 Consequently. it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive . the respondent Judge on January 4. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Civil Case No. The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15. they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. with Atty. what they attacked is not the writ of execution. Perez. 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. A. 1963 when he filed. but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October. and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid. had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. The movants further contend that "If there was delay.N. with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari. but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3. antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client. 1962. Anent civil case 55292. Crispin D. in the event of a successful claim. 1964. Atty. so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407. Baizas and A.. The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No.