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Achieving Irreversible Momentum

By Richard Dunbar, Major, USA Editorial Abstract: MAJ Dunbar provides a boots-on-ground perspective of operational level influence operations. As a companion piece to LTC Frank DeCarvalhos Capacity Building Solidifies Gains in Security: Task Force Marnes NonLethal Targeting [IO Sphere, Summer 2008], Dunbar examines recent successes in planning and executing non-lethal operations in Iraq. He emphasizes how proper synchronization of all information operations core and supporting capabilities can produce almost unstoppable strong positive trends in achieving commanders objectives.

pon completion of my third tour of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), this author has come to the realization that the war in Iraq cannot be won without an effective Information Operations campaign. As part of the surge of forces, the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) deployed on 18 March 2007 from Ft. Stewart, GA to support OIF V. 3ID, also known as Task Force (TF) Marne, operated within the Multi-National DivisionCenter (MND-C) battlespace. TF Marne consisted of five standard Brigades including 2nd BDE, 3ID, 3rd BDE, 3ID, 4th BDE, 3ID, 3rd Combat Aviation BDE, and 3rd BDE, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). TF Marne also had two non-standard BDEs with the 214th Fires BDE from Ft. Sill, OK, and the 1st Georgian BDE from Gori, Republic of Georgia (Allied forces), and several additional supporting units. This was my most mentally demanding deployment experience, by far. Yet the benefits included better defining IO, facilitating successful predeployment activities, and organizing IO or G7 sections. Host nation-related topics, to include ways to manage Sons of Iraq (SOI) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Counter Malign Foreign Influences, and prioritize Civil Military Operations (CMO) are the major focus. Additionally, this article offers some specific examples of the TF Marne Commanders starfish model community program that helped influence Iraqis perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. Plus, included here are tactics, techniques, and procedures on establishing working relationships with various agencies to include Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Combat Camera (COMCAM). This article is

intended to assist IO practitioners, staff is also a prime opportunity to have members, and commanders at brigade personnel attend the Tactical Information and division in planning and executing Operations Course (TIOC). There are non-lethal activities. My goal is to two ways to receive training: attend the provide useful insight into what an IO resident course, or coordinate for mobile planner and BDE IO officer can expect training team representatives to conduct to encounter in a combat environment, the course at your home station; both last and how to obtain an edge on the enemy a period of three weeks. The TIOC is in the cognitive domain. In a complex particularly useful for individuals at the environment, its very difficult to gain battalion-level and below to recognize irreversible momentumbut this should significant enemy IO activities, report always be an IO goal. information to higher headquarters, and There are no perfect systems prevent US soldiers from conducting in combat and every unit is unique. themselves inappropriately. Often times, IO planners must make The IO Staff Composition adjustments in order to operate more efficiently within the given environment. The TF Marne IO section fell One key factor is developing an IO under the leadership of the divisions campaign plan prior to deployment. Effects Coordinator (ECOORD). The The commander must approve the plan ECOORD was responsible for all nonto ensure adequate support from staff, lethal operations, and held the rank of subordinate units, higher headquarters, Colonel/O-6. The ECOORD was the and attached units. Once in theater, the first-line supervisor for the division chief operational tempo is extremely fast- of information operations or G7. The paced, full of unforeseen events, and thus G7 (Lieutenant Colonel/O-5) provided often difficult to manage. Hence, during guidance to the commanding general on garrison operations, its more advantageous to dedicate the necessary time to build a comprehensive IO strategy. As an example, critical personnel such as the G7, Deputy G7, IO planner, Public Affairs Officer (PAO), and Civil Affairs officer must be involved to achieve synchronization of efforts in influencing Local Nationals (LNs) to support specific Figure 1. IO Task Organization Chart objectives. This (Task Force Marne)

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IO activities, PSYOP products, themes and messages, and talking points. He also provided guidance to the IO section, reviewed products, gave presentations, and provided oversight to all activity within the IO staff element (Figure 1). This consisted of five sections: current operations; plans; targeting; Iraqi media; and PSYOP, all of which was closely managed by the Deputy G7 (Major/O-4). The Deputy G7 also facilitated the 3IDs IO Working Group, providing opportunities for IO officers and key staff members at BDE and division-level to provide updates, crosstalk, coordinate, and synchronize myriad non-lethal activities. Current operations focused on daily events in the divisions Operational Environment (OE). Current operations officers (Captain/O-3 and civilian equivalent) tracked significant activities, conducted numerous IO battle drills, and disseminated information across the division staff. Current operations also required coordination with higher headquarters and subordinate units to synchronize efforts. The IO planner (Major) incorporated non-lethal planning efforts into each phase of current and future operations. Most importantly is linking into the division planners and producing a detailed IO annex for BDE IO officers to easily understand and accomplish the mission. The targeting officer provided input on ways to strategically target, engage, and kill or capture criminals or terrorists. This included face-to-face engagements, distributing wanted posters, and airing radio messages. Two vital assets within the G7 staff were the Iraqi Media Section (IMS) and PSYOP. Although Iraqi media is a non-doctrinal responsibility for an IO section, TF Marnes Iraqi Media Officer established over 90 media contacts, conducted battlefield circulation missions, and monitored Iraqi news on a daily basis. The IMS also coordinated with Public Affairs to synchronize efforts. This proved invaluable because TF Marne disseminated immediate press releases, and assessed the effects by monitoring television broadcasts

and websites. Often times, traditional PA focus is on communicating with Western media. Although this role is important, information disseminated on satellite television is far more influential than one would imagine. Iraqi media interviews and news clips can reach large masses of people in a relatively short period of time. Hajji Vinn Jahn, tribal sheik, being interviewed on The PSYOP officer improved security with SOI representatives in the assisted in the production background in Vinn Jann Village, Iraq. (TF Marne) of a large quantity of print products, television (IEDs), indirect fire attacks, and small commercials, billboards, and radio arms fire attacks decreased by 60% in messages. Most Iraqis rely on television TF Marnes OE. Casualty rates (civilian/ as their main news source. The division military) decreased by 63% within TF PSYOP section (Major and Master Marnes operational environment. The Sergeant/E-8) made big dividends with grass-roots SOI program, consisting of rapid response radio messages, leaflet both Shia and Sunni groups, gets much drops, and television commercials. In of the credit for these improvements. TF addition, the PSYOP planner staffed Marne averaged 25 attacks per day in products at BDE and division level. April 2007, and by January 2008 attacks Some PSYOP products required Multi- decreased to an average of two per day. National Force-Iraq approval, which SOIs range from 18-72 years of at times was quite time-consuming. age. They are people who are tired of TF Marne PSYOP representatives Al Qaeda terrorizing their communities communicated with division legal and threatening the health and welfare advisors and higher headquarter on a of their children. Each certified SOI regular basis, to facilitate the approval member can earn a paycheck through process as much as possible. The entire Commanders Emergency Response PSYOP approval process was a team Program (CERP) funding. Going effort. forward with this program immediately assisted the local population, while Sons of Iraq achieving focused effects. Most Iraqi Implementation of the SOI program, males take pride in providing for their formerly known as Concerned Local families, and this program allows them to Citizens, morphed from a modest do so without reverting to the insurgency. startup into a huge success. SOIs are This essentially is a win-win situation: Iraqi citizens that have volunteered to it keeps citizens gainfully employed; defend their neighborhoods from terrorist reduces the chances of these same activity. As a BDE IO officer, one of individuals conducting attacks against your main responsibilities is to build the Iraqi or Coalition forces; and enables commanders SOI program awareness, SOIs to defend their own neighborhoods in his or her OE. In the past six months where no Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are [as of mid-2008], military/civilian present. This program has proven to be cooperation within local communities an excellent enabler for influencing the has drastically enhanced the landscape Iraqi people. Notably, the pan-Arab of TF Marnes battlespace. Statistically media reported countless good news speaking, attacks dropped to their lowest stories daily, illustrating the courage levels since June 2005 throughout much and commitment of the law-abiding of Iraq. Improvised Explosive Devices populace.

Managing SOI activity ammunition caches. Not only do SOIs assists CF in maintaining contribute to prosecuting the campaign, a g o o d p l a t f o r m a n d they are also increasing ISF manpower. perception within the Some SOIs transition into ISF based communities. T h e on their training, skill set, and aptitude. perception of one local Regardless of how well individuals sheik or SOI group having perform as SOIs, the TF Marne goal is more control or privileges for SOIs to join the ISF. than another could easily Iraqi Security Forces cause friction among the populace. SOI members The ISF have embedded Military have an obligation to Transition Teams, Special Police perform their duties, obey Transition Teams, and Police Transition Iraqi Security Forces on patrol. their tribal leaders, and Teams that effectively disseminate (Defense Link) cooperate with CF. There PSYOP products, themes and messages, are no guarantees that a and conduct routine face-to-face Additional professional elements at SOI member will not turn against the CF engagements. Teams of US soldiers battalion level include a uniform policy, and support terrorist activities. However, (7-9 men) assist in training, offensive to clearly identify SOIs as friendly, with a source of income, good working operations, and logistical matters to especially during night operations. They relationships, and multiple intelligence expound the capability of each particular are armed; authorized to carry assault sources, SOIs have assisted the Coalition ISF element. Recruiting drives are rifles, though crew-serve and anti-aircraft in successfully rooting out the enemy. ongoing to increase the numbers of weapons are strictly prohibited. (In fact, Securing their communities is an SOI security work-force qualified individuals. the majority of weapons obtained by SOIs mechanism in the security evolutionit TF Marne has over 60,000 ISF including are via discoveries of enemy weapons demonstrates initiative, progress, and Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, Border caches.) Most importantly, SOIs are Iraqis taking charge. The most important Transition Teams (BTTs), and National contractually obligated to defend their aspect is, the more they do, the less we Police operating within its OE. Although communities. This is a stepping stone do in terms of manning checkpoints, this may appear to be a large number, to long-term employment into the ISF, patrolling, and conducting operations in based on the large scale of terrain, the which stimulates self-assurance in order to create stability and security for command needs more ISF to broaden individuals, local sheiks, Iraqi military Iraq. In some cases these citizens are the spectrum of combat multipliers on leadership, provincial leaders, and local capable of supporting key operations the battlefield, and effectively contribute government figures. Additionally, SOIs as well as gathering and reporting to fighting terrorists. have opportunities to earn up to US information on local extremist networks. Countering Malign Foreign $10,000 reward money for reporting tips The SOI members often function as Influences on the location of IEDs, weapons and guides or scouts during ISF/CF mounted ammunition caches, and targeted High and dismounted patrols. They provide Foreign influence was one of TF Value Individuals (HVIs). information, but do not engage as Marnes toughest IO challenges. We The Multi-National Corps-Iraq has combatants unless attackedand are established a cap for TF Marne of 32,000 not utilized by CF as a SOIs. This prevents accelerated growth maneuver force. Some other in areas not regularly patrolled by US responsibilities include soldiers. A major Coalition concern manning checkpoints, over having so many SOI members in securing infrastructure, the MND-C OE is the possibility of and conducting random flipping, or turning against ISF/CF. stop-and-search procedures Fratricide is also a risk; recognition of on suspicious individuals friendly versus enemy is important. and vehicles. To date Thus, supervision of SOI personnel is [mid 2008], SOI members important. Each of the four maneuver assisted TF Marne in BDEs averages 9,000 SOI members. a c q u i r i n g a c t i o n a b l e CF routinely monitor and dialogue with information, which yielded SOIs to gather information, provide 7 HVIs, the detention assistance, and ensure all security of 521 individuals, and Iranian citizens transporting imported goods at activities are synchronized. finding of 728 weapons and Zurbatiya Point of Entry. (TF Marne)

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countered malign foreign influences daily basis. The Georgian BDE searched officers to better influence LNs to support by disseminating PSYOP products, over 700 vehicles and over 2,200 CF objectives. Persuading people is all strategically placing billboards, personnel at the checkpoints dailyno about meeting basic needsif we want broadcasting well-articulated radio small task even for this well-equipped them to support US and host-nation messages, and publishing detailed news force. TF Marne aggressively worked strategic objectives. Its not what the articles in multiple Iraqi newspapers. to combat bypassing of checkpoints US military wants to provide, its the As a proactive IO officer, you want to through recently implemented and tangible items people desire that make make sure you send the right message temporary snap TCPs. Conducted the difference. Iraqis want fresh water and through various mediums of radio, randomly, these checkpoints prevented to drink, electricity at their residence, satellite television, and print products. additional smuggling via other routes. and functional sewage systems. It is Messages nested with higher headquarters Combined with effective compliance difficult to address complex projects provide reinforcement of themes and messages, Coalition Forces achieved if deficiencies exist in basic services. CMO is paramount to community messages. These efforts will help desired influence effects. improvement in Iraq. Your Civil Affairs persuade the target audience to comply Civil Military Operations Officer must be go getter, but you with any instructions, or influence them to support your objectives. When Civil Military Operations establish, can also help energize the CA folks, developing a plan, always consider the maintain, influence, or exploit relations and assist them in developing creative average Iraqi citizens point of view: between military forces, governmental ways to make significant impacts in the lives of Iraqi citizens. The Government you have to ask whats in it for of Iraq plays a major role in me. This facilitates both parties these projects, thus repairing becoming winners. One area of water pumps, electrical grids, foreign influence showed how and providing humanitarian the TF used both informational assistance (HA) must be and traditional resources to help a joint effort. Coordinating stem foreign influences. IO efforts with continuous There were plenty of reports HA helps maintain positive involving the smuggling of perceptions, especially during weapons from foreign countries. times of distress or emergency, For this reason its called the setting up a framework for smuggling paradox. The Wasit strong community relations. Province bordering Iran is very Again, the local forces play a dynamic, particularly because significant role in providing in the cities, politicians have security and interacting with the the influence; and in the desert communities. Mudhehr Fayadh Baresh, a 72 year-old tribal areas, tribes have the influence. Medical services are always commissioner and SOI leader, explains how he Security checkpoints along higha major contribution. TF Marne successfully foiled the plans of a would-be suicide vest traffic areas throughout Wasit senior leaders established several bomber during checkpoint operations. intend to prevent smuggling of priority CMO projects, to include (US Army) weapons, IED materials, and refurbishment of ten clinics. other accelerants heading into Baghdad. a n d n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l c i v i l i a n Iraqi doctors and staff are funded by the The 1st Georgian Brigade, with assistance organizations and authorities, and the Iraqi Minister of Interior. Establishing from the US Army 214th Fires Brigade, civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, operational health clinics with the led the effort. Another variable in this or hostile operational area in order assistance of qualified Iraqi doctors operation is having Russian-Arabic to facilitate military operations, to and medical staff and providing proper linguists working on the checkpoints. consolidate and achieve operational medical care for all citizens affects Additionally, BTTs are on station at the United States objectives. (Field Manual immediate results in the communities. Point of Entry monitoring for suspicious 3-13 Information Operations: Doctrine, Lastly, always remember to address activity at the border. While they work Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, an education and work training program. hard to prevent smuggling of accelerants Nov 2003) This not only provides basic skills and While engaged in information employment, but provides opportunities into Iraq, unfortunately, BTTs are not on station 24/7. Traffic from Iran into Iraq warfare, IO planners can leverage for small business owners and market is immense; Iran provides Iraq a large numerous assets to help the Task Force suppliers while jump starting local amount of produce, furniture, office gain irreversible momentum. CMO economies. Such actions can form a solid supplies and other expendables on a projects provide alternate ways for IO basis for long-standing relationships.

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Commanding General Prioritization Starfish The Commanding General used a fable to describe his priority programs: A woman found a boy on the beach tossing starfish back into the sea. When told he could not save them all, the boy replied I can save this one. Identifying starfish programs made a difference in many communities among the local populace, as TF Marne IO officers in all sections capitalized on these projects in a variety of ways. Combined with other non-lethal assets, including the Governance and Economics Cell, the TFs positive influences contributed to strengthening stability throughout the region. The Iraqi Media Section coordinated local television coverage of community events, publicizing the success of CF, ISF, SOI, and local provincial officials all working together. The PSYOP section developed flyers and handbills to disseminate illustrations of progress made all over Iraq. BDE IO representatives employed COMCAM to capture still images for historical documentation, photo books, and posters. Two TF Marne starfish examples especially highlight our successes: Hawr Rajab, and the Iskandariyah Industrial Complex (IIC). CF transformed Hawr Rajab into a safe, thriving and secure community. TF Marne worked to provide LNs with micro-grants, to develop businesses such as veterinary clinics, food markets, and shops. The Hawr Rajab starfish program also included school renovation: supplying computers with Internet access, science laboratories, office furnishings, and a library. Further, CF initiated a womens movement to raise health awareness. The citizens of Hawr Rajab actively embraced their community, and now openly support CF objectives. Similarly, the Iskandariyah Industrial Complex project produced magnificent results. The citizens have sufficient electricity, renovated schools, paved roads, and improved sewage systems

in this community. The IIC starfish program also established a 1,000 student vocational-technological center. As an economic engine, the IIC produces buses and caravans as well as providing an Army vehicle repair facility. The IIC became a key focus area for job opportunities, education, and revenue. The improved security situation in MND-C undoubtedly played a role in stability, as well as creating employment opportunities in Iskandariyah. All this is a result of coordinated efforts among all non-lethal TF capabilitiesensuring we had the right people at the right place and at the right time. Psychological Operations PSYOP is defined as operations planned to convey selected information

Iraqi worker repairs a school in Iskandariyah. (US Army) and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. (Field Manual 3-13) When properly employed, it can lower the morale and reduce the efficiency of enemy forces and create dissension within their ranks. It can also help separate local national support from insurgent activities. Sphere of influence engagements are pivotal in steering mayors, city councilmen, and governors in the right direction toward political success and harmony in Iraq. As the greatest influencing capability within the CENTCOM theater,

PSYOP assets served to highlight many political successes. PSYOP units aired various television commercials, placed billboards, and broadcast radio messages to spread news of progress. Along with traditional methods like disseminating flyers, these actions provide LNs with accurate and timely local community information. Throughout the entire deployment, TF Marne leveraged PSYOP extensively to meet the commanders goals and objectives. By doctrine, the division staff has one PSYOP officer, and one PSYOP Noncommissioned Officer in the rank of Master Sergeant. Their main responsibility is to advise the Commanding General on how best to influence a foreign audience to achieve a desired endstate. Within TF Marne, each BDE has an attached Tactical PSYOP Detachment (TPD), to create themes and messages, talking points, print products, loud-speaker broadcasts, and conducts faceto-face engagementsas well as gathering atmospherics. During this specific deployment, brigade level print capability dramatically improved with the arrival of risograph printers and cutters, which provide quicker production in response to crisis situations. Ideally, to depict progress made in the fight against terrorism, BDE IO officers utilize PSYOP for the exploitation of killed or captured HVIs. It is important to recognize that BDEs are capable of conducting limited PSYOP, and these products at this level must be approved by the BDE commander. The division PSYOP representatives maintain visibility of all these actions, to ensure proper synchronization and approval at all higher echelons (division and corps levels). BDE leadership must develop and understand the working relationships between BDE IO officers and TPD commanders. The TPD commander is the PSYOP subject matter expert and brings a wealth of knowledge to assist

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the BDE IO officer in coordinating all IO/PSYOP activity. Getting these two are on the same sheet of music greatly increase communications across the BDE staff. Thus, there are plenty of good reasons to understand and utilize the PSYOP chain of command, and make proper usage of resources at the BDE level. Combat Camera COMCAM is the acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of military operations. The COMCAM mission is to provide the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified Combatant Commands with a directed imagery capability to support operational and planning requirements during worldwide crises, contingencies, exercises, and wartime operations. COMCAM is another combat multiplier, and when properly used, it can be very effective. It is ideal for capturing still and video imagery on high payoff events. Each BDE IO officer managed one COMCAM team consisting of two individuals. TF Marne COMCAM teams were heavily involved in all types of operations, capturing significant amounts of usable, footage beneficial for numerous TF products and for media use. FOX News aired COMCAM-derived video on Iranian-made rockets within hours of a large cache discovery. Combat Camera teams also facilitated the documentation of CMO projects such as humanitarian aide, medical operations, and school openings among others. TF Marne even used COMCAM photos to create a coffee table book containing photos of Iraqi citizens, ISF, and US Forces working together to make a difference in improving living conditionsand making progress in Iraq. As LNs view this book and see images of sincerity, hard work, and dedication of all involved, its easy to see its powerful influencing effect. This product was also designed to help reduce IEDs on the battlefield and potentially save lives. As part of a greater influence campaign, such products can deter a would-be suicide bomber, and help turn him back into a law-abiding

citizen. COMCAM teams also capture still imagery on significant events such as detainee releases, ISF graduations, and joint operations. Capturing these events also illustrates ISF in the lead. This brings up another truism of the IO mission: in most cases, in the eyes of the public, an event never happened unless there is a photo or video. Conclusion IO supports all Lines of Operations including Governance, Economics, Security, Transition, and Rule of Law. IO officers at all levels must educate the key leaders within their organization: the commander, deputy commander, executive officer, and operations officer. Such a knowledge base provides the means to incorporate IO as a combat multiplier. Despite numerous operational challenges, IO can achieve desired effects in transforming insurgent safe havens into efficient, secure, and productive communities. Successful security gains in Iraq during 2007-2008 opened a large window of opportunity, and IO was a major component in achieving irreversible momentum. Capacity

building is the way ahead, with IO assisting in all aspects of informing the local populace via radio, newspapers, satellite television, and word-of-mouth. The Coalition must methodically and continually formulate those critical mission objectives, as well as matching assetslethal and non-lethalagainst those objectives. As a BDE IO officer, you can easily find yourself in charge of a significant effort, such as the Sons of Iraq program. Always be consistent and follow through with agreements either verbal or contractional to maintain good standings with tribal or government leaders. Manage the expectations of your host nation audience, and dont make promises your commander cant keep. Last, but certainly not least, is continuously informing the populous. Based on information collected over the past 15 months, IO planners are better prepared to face the challenges in Iraq. Irreversible momentum is a direct result of all non-lethal activities. Undoubtedly, increased non-lethal planning and execution efforts will reap larger rewards, helping stabilize Iraq for many years to come.

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Social Networking Services: The New Influence Frontier


By James M. Efaw, Major, USA Editorial Abstract: With the advent of Web 2.0 and persuasive applications within Social Networking Services such as Facebook, there exists a huge untapped potential for influence operations. Additionally, there exists millions of Muslims, often living in non-Muslim countries or housed in our U.S. universities, which comprise a silent majority who are against terrorism. This paper ties together new technology and the Muslim majority and suggests a tool through which we can influence Muslims and encourage them to take a more active involvement against terrorism. [Editors note: portions of this article appeared in the US Army Strategic Commands IO Newsletter.] n a recent speech at the Washington Institute, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, James Glassman, outlined goals and the way forward for Winning the War of Ideas. This article highlights portions of Undersecretary Glassmans speech, and offers a method and a tool to move this plan forward. Additionally, it provides corroborating data on why and how the tool will work. In the text of Glassmans speech he states: Here is our ultimate goal: A world in which the use of violence to achieve political, religious, or social objectives is no longer considered acceptable; efforts to radicalize and recruit new members are no longer successful; and the perpetrators of violent extremism are condemned and isolated. He goes on to offer several ways to achieve this goal. We achieve our desired goal by offering, often in cooperation with the private sector and using the best technology including Web 2.0 social networking techniques, a full range of productive alternatives to violent extremism. The tool proposed here meets this intent: persuasive interactive applications (Web apps), offered to the millions of people around the globe utilizing social networking services. For the purposes of discussion, I refer specifically to the social networking platform, Facebook, as the leader in user-generated interactive applications. However, user created and distributed applications will soon cross over to the thousands of social networking sites such as MySpace, Oracle, Plaxo, Viadea, XING and more. The world continues to move towards increasingly decentralized organizations, that move freely and with little structure. As a result, when bureaucratic institutions try to keep up or defeat a decentralized organization, they are often doomed to failure. As the Tofflers explain in Revolutionary Wealth: Terrorist organizations are designed to run rings around bureaucracies. Comprising tiny, loosely networked cells whose members know the identity of one or two other people, most can make decisions quickly, are trained to hit, run and vanishor blow themselves up. Compared with the Department of Homeland Security, Al-Qaeda is flat as a pancake. And its members dont belong to civil service unions. (p. 232) However, with one decentralized organization such as those within online social networkingcombating a decentralized enemy groupthe War of Ideas is on level ground. Daniel Kimmage of the New York Times would disagree; he feels we are not on level ground, but that in the Western world the advantage has shifted to usparticularly if we take advantage of our strengths in the area of social networking. In a 26 June 2008 article, he writes: When it comes to user-generated content and interactivity, Al Qaeda is now behind the curve. And the United States can help to keep it there by encouraging the growth of freer, more empowered online communities, especially in the Arab-Islamic world. If Web 1.0 was about creating the snazziest official Web resources and Web 2.0 is about letting users run wild with self-created content and interactivity, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are stuck in 1.0. Kimmage continues: Try to imagine Osama bin Laden managing his Facebook account, and you can see why full-scale social networking might not be Al Qaedas next frontier. Its also an indication of how a more interactive, empowered online community, particularly in the Arab-Islamic world, may prove to be Al Qaedas Achilles heel. Anonymity and accessibility, the hallmarks of Web 1.0, provided an ideal platform for Al Qaedas radical demagoguery. Social networking, the emerging hallmark of Web 2.0, can unite a fragmented silent majority and help it to find its voice in the face of thuggish opponents, whether they are repressive rulers or extremist Islamic movements. This ability to bring together the silent majority to find a voice is exactly what Undersecretary Glassman refers to when he states: We seek to build countermovements by empowering groups and individuals opposed to violent extremism--movements (using both electronic and physical means) that bring people together with similar, constructive interests, such as mothers opposed to violence (built on the MADD, or Mothers Against Drunk Driving, model), believers in democratic Islam, even electronic gaming. The user-generated applications in networks such as Facebook go beyond simple social networks however. As BJ Fogg, Stanford professor, author and teacher of the course The Psychology of Facebook states, Facebook allows ordinary people to create apps and distribute them through social networks online. (p. 2) However the applications for social networking services are not simply fun games and information: they

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quo bias, social comparison, compliance, ingratiation, spotlight effect, path of least resistance, simple choices, incentives, and cooperation. This ability to nudge utilizing user-generated applications within social networking services is central to what BJ Fogg terms Mass Interpersonal Persuasion (MIP). MIP ties together everything discussed thus far, and offers even more. In Tag Cloud. (Markus Angermeier, Wikimedia) Foggs, paper Mass Interpersonal Persuasion: An Early View of a New Phenomenon, he explains MIP are designed to influence and persuade. Fogg notes the creator of the experience has six components working together intends to make an impact on peoples in harmony: Persuasive Experience, lives. For example, a political party Automated Structure, Social Distribution, could design an experience to win Rapid Cycle, Huge Social Graph and support for their candidate by asking Measured Impact. people to watch a video online and then to add their name to a public petition. (p. 4) Does this fit in with Glassmans concept? Yes. Our role is as a facilitator of choice. Mainly behind the scenes, we help build networks and movements -- put tools in the hands of young people to make their own choices, rather than dictating those choices. Again, in the words of the National Security Strategy: Freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen. Glassmans expression Facilitator of Choice resonates with Thaler and Sunsteins recent book Nudge, they refer to choice architects who have the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make decisions. A choice architect steers peoples choices while still allowing the people total freedom to choose. However, in the context of this freedom to choose, a choice architect can give the user a nudge, which Thaler and Sunstein explain is anything that alters peoples behavior in a predictable way. Nudging through choice architecture is exactly what Facebook applications do. These applications use a wide variety of very effective social psychology influence and persuasion tactics including, but not limited to: anchoring, availability, feedback, representativeness, status The Persuasive Experience

The Persuasive Experience involves the use of persuasive applications discussed earlier and Fogg defines it as An experience that is created to change attitudes, behaviors, or both. (p. 4) Automated Structure is also key for two reasons. First, the persuasive application is always there in the social networking service. The system will convey the persuasive experience at the same time, every time, repeatedly. Second, the Automated Structure makes it easy for the user to accept and distribute persuasive applications (humans are proven to be cognitively lazy). However, as Fogg states, If a task seems simple to uslike clicking a mouse once or twicewe are likely to do the task right away. (p. 6) This is exactly Facebooks persuasive application designone mouse click lets the user accept the application, and a second click allows the user to distribute to friends. This leads directly to Social Distribution. Once a user has accepted a persuasive application, that friend can then easily invite other friends to join. Why would someone Personal Digital Assistants are ubiquitous. download and/or pass on an (Royal Irish Regiment, MOD UK) application in Facebook? The

answer lies in the inherent trust and credibility that the site offers. No one can see another persons Facebook page, unless that person gives them permission by inviting them to be a friend. As a result, the social networks are made up of people the user has hand-selected and implicitly trusts. Al Qaeda has figured this out on a limited scope. They have a small, but powerful, password-protected social networking-type site. A 24 June 2008 Washington Post article explains the Al Fajr Media Center linked dozens of webmasters around the world in a heavily decentralized network. This network receives and distributes propaganda from extremist groups around the world. The nature of the network lends itself to high reliability, consistency and authenticity amongst contributors and users. The basic principles hold true on a larger scale within the walls of a high-trust environment of social networks such as Facebook: growth can be exponential and quick. It is not unlike the effect described in old shampoo commercial: and she tells two friends, and so on, and so on and so on. Fogg refers to such quick growth as Rapid Cycle, and the exponential growth as Huge Social Graph. Because of the simplicity of accepting and distributing persuasive applications within Facebook, an application can spread rapidly. When it starts to spread rapidly, other users notice and want to join in (social comparison), which as Fogg observes: momentum sweeps many people into a movement who may otherwise not get involved. (p. 7) Huge Social Graph is what Fogg refers to as a network of millions of people

connected to one another. (p. 8) In the Al Fajr Media Center network example above, there is a social networkbut it is very limited in its scope. Facebook has over sixty million users, MySpace nearly 120 million users and Yahoo (which is not yet ready to connect their social networks) has over 250 million users. Fogg predicts Persuasive experiences of the future will almost certainly be able to jump from one social graph to another. For example, a movement supporting Burmese monks may start in Facebook, but then be ported to other social networks such as Bebo and Hi5. (p. 8) Finally, MIP has Measured Impact. In influence operations, effectiveness is generally one of the hardest components to measure. However, most platforms such as Facebook have built-in measurements. Right now any Facebook user can right now see how many people have downloaded what application, how many people have used it on a given day and how many of your friends have the application. This Measured Impact allows social comparison, helping build the momentum discussed previously. Additionally, the Measure Impact allows persuasive application creators to finetune the persuasive experience, based on feedback they receive. A key to our success in this area is to first develop an appropriately powerful persuasive application that will resonate with the target audience, and second to get the application launched and picked up within the desired social network. Then, we watch as it takes off. Some may not want to release this control, but that is the beauty and power of decentralization versus bureaucracy. Some may not want to put these applications in the hands of amateurs to propagate. However, the applications gain credibility by doing exactly that. As Glassman states, It is the fact that the battle is going on within Muslim society that makes our role so complicated and that requires that we ourselves not do much of the fighting. The most credible voices in this war of ideas are Muslim. These applications are a tool to put those voices into the credible mouths.

Glassman goes on to list five focal points of the programthree of which we can incorporate into this initiative: Muslim society, especially involving young people, at the grassroots; Middle East elites, who involve themselves in ideology and religious doctrine; and private sector expertise. Starting with the latter element first, private sector expertise could be any of the social networking sites that allow usergenerated applications. However, the real expertise needed lies in the realm of designing and launching the persuasive applications, in order to achieve the

Soldier exploits social networking tools. (US Army) desired effect and to the desired target audience. Technically, many private sector companies with experience in persuasion and influenceas well as some computer savvycould contribute. However, BJ Fogg and his Stanford Peace Innovations (SPI) is a natural fit for this union. As their website (http:// peace.stanford.edu/) states, At Stanford, our goal is to help people use new technology to invent peace. (Of course, to keep abreast of the progress of this innovation, one can join their Facebook Group.) It is noteworthy that the leader of SPI has consulted for Facebook, runs a Persuasive Technology Lab, and teaches

courses at Stanford involving persuasion, Facebook, psychology and peace. This initiative could definitely reach Muslim youth and the Middle East elites. While it is common knowledge that Internet penetration is weak in the Middle East, people often overlook the large Muslim populations that live in areas of high Internet penetration. As Toffler and Toffler state: Today fully a third of all the worlds Muslims live as ethno-cultural minorities in non-Muslim countries, increasingly distanced from Islams geographical center. They include a floating, on the move population of middle-class Muslims intellectuals, businesspeople, engineers and professors who may work and live in a sequence of different countries as they pursue the job market. Oliver Roy of the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences in Paris contends that world Islam will be increasingly influenced in terms of ideas, politics, lifestyle, culture, identity by what he calls Islams deterritorialized millions, largely based in Europe. We already have a starting point for launching this initiative, as an informal network already exists. Glassman proposes an idea that dovetails nicely. He recommends a far more robust alumni networkencouraging Internet-based social networking among the one million alumni participants in educational and cultural exchange programs. If they wish to help, these alumni will be credible voices, pushing back against violent extremism and offering alternatives. A simple search would quickly identify existing alumni already on sites such as Facebook, and we could employ a variety of techniques to encourage current participants in our education and cultural exchange programs. However, I would guess most of current exchange students already are already on Facebook. Additionally, a number of Muslims in US universities which are not part of any official programs could also form a core of Glassmans network. If this program takes off, it is likely that more will happen than the target audience signing petitions or coalescing into an online vocal majority. Research on

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foot-in-the-door persuasion techniques document that when a person agrees to a small request, such as downloading an application or signing a petition, they are then more willing to agree to a larger requests at a later date. Research shows that this phenomenon even works over the Internet. One could easily imagine a scenario in which a Muslim spokesperson or leader makes a small act of commitment, such as signing a petition and forwarding it to friends within the trusted confines of his social network. As a result, he is more willing to make a public statement and stand or engage in a counter-propaganda like Dr. Fadl, as Mr. Glassman cites in his speech. Additionally, one could imagine a time in the future, when we are not the ones creating the applications and launching them into user groupsbut users in the groups we have encouraged to form are developing and distributing the persuasive applications themselves. A definite advantage of the user-populated applications is just that: they are usergenerated. The 14 July 2008 edition of Newsweek relays: A YouTube spokesperson stated that 10 hours of video are uploaded onto YouTube every minute. This is the equivalent of 57,000 full-length movies every week. This translates into dollars

and work the company does not have to generate. The FunnyOrDie site CEO estimated their 10,000 hours of video would translate to about US $8 billion if produced at the inexpensive industry rate. So not only is the program efficient and persuasiveit is cost effective. Several different agencies and organizations already have systems in place to serve as a launch place. However, rather than list them here, I will distribute this article, and let our own informal, slow-moving social network churn until the article gets into the proper hands. An Approach Certainly, there are many ways to approach this opportunity: one would be as follows: 1. Identify the target area of influence (TAI) (for example, Muslims that are anti-terrorism). 2. Begin liaison with private industry to develop persuasive application in the target area, or identify a small team to train on development of persuasive applications. 3. Identify alumni of US State Department cultural and educational programs, as well as current enrollees to would form the initial Target Audience in the TAI.

4. Conduct a search to see which members of the Target Audience are part of online social networking services. 5. Determine the method of launching persuasive application to the Target Audience. 6. Monitor progress of the application for Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness, and adjust persuasive applications as necessary. 7. Over time, based on the monitoring of the Target Audience participation in the persuasive applications, approach active individuals to take on a more public and involved rolesuch as speaking out (or whatever the desired action). Regardless of whether readers follow the seven steps outlined above, or some other variation of a program, members of the influence community must get involved such initiatives now. Persuasive application within social networking services has exponentially more potential than websites, blogging, instant messaging, or any other Web initiative in which the influence community may, or may not, be involved. Social networking services are an integral part of millions of peoples daily lives, and the propagation and use will only continue to grow. What I propose here is not the wave of the future or a passing fad. It is now, and it here to stay.

The Long War: Peace Accords With the Militants and US/NATO Airstrikes in Pakistan
By Fasihuddin Editorial Abstract: The author provides a Pakistani perspective on a variety of counterinsurgency efforts in the Northwest Frontier Provinces. He explores perceptions through the filter of regional and international media accounts, noting how Pakistani government leaders and the general population see apparent contradictions in Coalition/NATO actions, versus what they hear via official Western policy messages.

espite being a strong ally in the ongoing Long War on Terror, Pakistan never enjoyed the position of a trusted buddy. US-Pak relations remain tense most of the time, no matter how often either country issues statements of mutual trust and friendship. This tug of war continues, with intermittent and desultory overtures of friendship and alliance. This past summer is typical example of this friend-cum-suspected scenario. US leaders made the same statement as author Daniel Markey at the very introduction of his widely publicized report: Should another 9/11 type attack take place in the United States, it will likely have its origins in this region. (Council on Foreign Relations: Securing Pakistans Tribal Belt, July 2008). Similarly, CIA Director Michael Hayden notes the Security situation along the border presents clear danger to Afghanistan, Pakistan, to the West in general and US in particular (New York Times, 20 April 2008). The US National Intelligence Estimate describes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistans tribal belt, as a safe-haven for Al-Qaeda. The US administration never hid its intention to attack any high value target inside Pakistanprovided they have actionable-intelligence. On the other hand, US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson says US has no intention to carry out a military operation inside the tribal areas of Pakistan. In August 2007, US Vice President Dick Cheney put it the other way around: I dont expect Pakistan to invite US troops over to tribal areas to fight Al-Qaeda. Its obviously a sovereign state. Similarly, in a July 2008 meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, President Bush reiterated that the US has to respect Pakistans sovereignty.

Ironically, this was the day US/NATO forces reportedly killed six civilians in a missile attack in South Waziristan. A retaliatory statement from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Tariq Majid appeared in the news, noting Pakistan will respond accordingly to future such attacks. Interestingly, important Pakistani national newspapers like The News and Daily Dawn carried all the three items on front page, showing an obvious difference between words and actions. Every now and then one sees dozens of such carrot and stick or threats-cumrewards type of statements from the US and NATO, whose notices, seldom appreciate Pakistans role, and often express concern over peace accords with the militantsand their allegedly unstoppable cross border attacks. They have sovereign right to make agreements but we have a right to answer if those agreements put our troops and our mission under a threat. It is no real solution if trouble on one side of the border is transferred to the other side. (NATO Spokesman Mark Laity, in Kabul, 25 May 2008). There is not, nor is there going to be, an incursion of NATO into Pakistan. There is no planning for, no mandate for such an incursion. However, NATO has the right to fire back in selfdefence in Pakistan (NATO spokesman James Appaturi, Brussels, July 2008). If NATO forces are shot from the other side of the border, there is always the right to self-defence but you will not see NATO forces crossing into Pakistan territoryonly blaming Pakistan wont solve problem. It is necessary to involve Pakistan in the process. (NATO Chief Jeap de Hoop Scheffer, Kabul, 25 July 2008). One cannot expect such confusing and threatening-cumpersuading statements will help facilitate

a viable and meaningful dialogue on both sides. Rather, this further aggravates the already confounded relations of halffriend/half-foe partners. Besides these official US statements expressing worries about Pakistan, there are similar reports by research institutes and scholars. Carnegie Endowment reports carried by Foreign Policy journal (Sep-Oct 2008) are taken with a bit of reservation by academic circles in Pakistan, on account of being reportedly politically engineered. Yet the present Terrorism Index is of interest to many around the world. Despite the fact that 70% of the respondents believe the US is not winning the war on terror, 51% think Pakistan is most likely to become the next Al- Qaeda stronghold. Amazingly, instead of looking for the causes of the defeat in the War on Terror, the report identifies Pakistan as Al-Qaedas next resort. More interesting is the fact that despite 70% of respondents who think that the US is not winning the war on terror, 70% think the world is becoming more dangerousas compared to 91% of respondents a year ago. This decrease of 21% indicates that with the loss in the War on Terror, the world has become less safe in 2008 than it was in 2007. Pakistans Role in the Long War Pakistan joined the allied forces in combating global terrorism soon after 9/11, and contrary to popular voices, every successive government adopted and continued the same policies which Pakistan opted for in 2001. Since then, Pakistan deployed more than 110,000 forces in its tribal areas, as well as some settled districts like Hangu and Swat. Further, Pakistan established about 1,100 check posts along Pak-Afghan border, and carried out more than a hundred military operations. In all

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these counter-militancy and counterinsurgency actions, Pakistan lost more than 1200 security forces, arrested and killed hundreds of militants, and despite its competency constraints, actively responded to the do more US policy. As a repercussion of military operations in the FATA, law-enforcement agencies and government functionaries were attacked with deadly weapons, bomb blasts and suicide bombings in the urban areas of Pakistan. In a recent security report, the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) calculated 1442 terrorist attacks, with a total death toll of 3448, and 5353 people injured in 2007. Though lesser than the actual numbers, these figures are still higher than the usual official statistics. The National Police Bureau/ Government of Pakistan National Public Safety Commission reports total bomb blasts in the country as 185 in 2005, and 308 in 2006. (Figure 1). This is the data for the whole country. If we compare it to the statistics compiled by the office of the Additional Inspector General of Police, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) it clearly indicates a higher crime trend in the last three years. (Figure 2). These are the official figures for only one province (total 24 districts, i.e; the NWFP), and do not include any figures for the tribal areas. Being close to the offices responsible for compilation and analysis of such data, this writer believes this is still a much lesser number than the actual fatalities. The figures for the casualties and deaths of the militants are not included, which are otherwise generally inflated by mediafor so many reasons. These unfortunate games of figures have made things difficult for impartial researchers and observers. However, this bleak, worst case picture pertains only to human losses. Additionally, one can easily imagine the social, economic, political and psychological cost and other collateral damage to law enforcement agencies (LEAs), effects on the underdeveloped communities, and of course the whole nation. No empirical and verified research on the losses is yet available. However, stories of economic deprivation, social dislocation, political

Figure 1. chaos, poor disaster management and psychological depression across the country are horrible and dejecting. For example, more than 100,000 people from Swat and 200,000 people (including women and children) were displaced from Bajaur during recent military operations. Many worries await Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in other parts of the country, where Pakistan has no sound rehabilitation system. Peace Accords with the Militants Pakistan has received US $10 billion in aid during the WOT. It is still a moot point whether this was enough assistance for the Long War, and how far it trickled down to the general public, and other LEAs in urban areas. The general perception is that the story is disappointing on both points. Not the commitment: but the paucity of aid; the conceptual ambivalence; the dearth of political will; the hostile international environment; and the absence of a well-thought counter-terror strategy compelled the government to enter into some mutually acceptable agreements with the militants. Pakistani leaders presumed this initiative was necessary to marginalize hard core militants, segregate foreign Al-Qaeda fighters, politically engage the trial people, and provide large-scale development and reconstruction of their muchneglected areas. The Government of Pakistan retained the right of selective use of force in all such agreements, yet the arrangement brought only a temporary halt to ongoing military operations in the tribal areas (as well as in some settled districts). This respite, both for the local militants (Taliban) and the government, gave the general public a sigh of relief, restoring political and social life to areas with minimal economic activities. People across the country welcomed all such initiatives. Prisoners from both sides were released, and promises made not to attack each others installations, officials and buildings. For the time being, people recognized and admitted government authority. However, due to a bad track record, mutual accusation for absence of honesty of intention on both sides, plus the absence of any third party (powerful guarantor), the jubilation on all peace settlements with the militants was short-lived. These actions turned out to be a volatile, ephemeral and abortive exercise, in much less time than most people expected. These peace deals were never accepted or welcomed by US/NATO forces on the other side of the borderthey took them with a pinch of salt. The US, NATO, and the UK issued strong statements against the intentions of Pakistani authorities, and even tried to malign the national security agencies for connivance and tacit support for the militants. Thus far, this was never substantiated with authentic references. Had it not been for such resentment and premature criticism of the peace accords, would the WOT would have been successful in dissociating the local community from

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Agreement Date

Name of Tribal Agency/District Shakai, South Waziristan

Major Party No. I Govt of Pakistan (Corps Commander Peshawar)

Major Party No. II

Basic Agreement Compensation to tribes, stoppage of MO, and registration of foreigners. No attack on Govt. forces. No sheltering foreign militants. No targeting govt officials/installations. Absolved from past cases against them, but dealt with according to law if found involved in antistate activities. Govt. would release all those arrest during operation. Restoration of tribal benefits removed of check post Cordial relations and release of TNSM Chief, Sufi Muhammad. LI member would not challenge govt writ. Govt. would not interfere in tribal customs. In case of violation LI would pay a fine. Ongoing operation would end 10 July 2008. All arrested persons released.

Successful/ Broken? Unsuccessful with death of Nek Muhammad

27 Mar 2004

Commander Nek Muhammad

2 Feb 2005

South Waziristan Agency

Govt. of Pakistan

Commander Baitullah Mehsud

Still intact

5 Sep 2006

North Waziristan Agency

Political Agent NWA (Rep of Govt)

Utmanzai tribe on the behest of militants Tehrik-i-Nifaza-i-Shariat-iMuhammadi (TNSM) [Movement for Restoration of Islamic Law) Afridi Malik Din Khel tribe on the behest of Lashkar-e-Islami

Ended 15 July 2007

20 April 2008

Swat

Govt. of NWFP

Still intact

9 July 2008

Khyber Agency

Govt of Pakistan

Unknown

Table 1. Important peace accords with militants/Taliban in tribal areas/districts. (Author) the hardliners, extremists and Al-Qaeda Taliban? NATO/US airstrikes on the occasion of a successful agreement was another big reason for these failures. Significantly, the peace accords were basically enshrined in the socio-cultural context of the tribal community, thus acceptable to them. Before dealing with the tribal community, we have to understand their tribal mindset, their culture and their way of doing business. We can read between the lines to find common salient features of successful peace deals, to easily identify how effective they would be if implemented wholeheartedly and with fairness, equity, and if guaranteed by a powerful third partymaybe from the local noncombatant population or some powerful Islamic country. This writer has gathered a number of these agreements, (Table 1). The salient features common to all these accords provides insight into the agreements: - No cross-border movement for militant activity in neighboring Afghanistan - Government guarantee not to undertake any ground or air operations against the warriors - Administration bound to resolve the issues through local customs and traditions and Jirga (Consultative body of elders) - Army will remove checkpoints in the regions and tribal Khasaddar and Levy force will take over - Foreigners will have to leave Pakistan and/or live peacefully - No attack on LEAs and State property - Prisoners arrested during operations be released, no arrest again - Govt compensation for loss of life and property of innocent tribesmen - Withdrawal of criminal cases against tribesmen - Return of vehicles and weapons - Govt to stop militants who cross border to attack US forces in Afghanistan. US-NATO Airstrikes and Missile Attacks According to Daniel Markeys earlier quoted report, Pakistan constitutes one of the most important and difficult challenges facing US foreign policy. What is at stake is considerable by any measures. Pakistan is a strategic friend of the United States, but one that often appears unable or unwilling to address a number of vexing security concerns. In Securing Pakistans Tribal Belt Markey has identified a number of policy choices for US vis-vis Pakistan and its role in the WOT. Unfortunately, much of Markeys report depends on website content, and lacks a first hand knowledge of the psyche, emotions and long history of the people in this particular area. His suggestion for US counterterror attacks within Pakistan (whether Predator [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] strikes, limited ground incursions or other means) to eliminate the worst terrorists and militants whenever possible and in such cases to isolate Pakistan and reduce its access to dangerous technologies and resources is typical of a US foreign policy attitude towards Pakistan. Such an approach has never attained a place of respect in the eyes of Pakistans considerable (170 million) population. It is always because of these unfriendly suggestions that the US media is so influenced, and thus carries hostile, prejudiced and instigating stories. Though published in the name of freedom of speech, these stories cause wrong messages with unfriendly implications. As noted earlier, there are numerous statements and reports urging US/NATO forces to enter into Pakistan in hot pursuit of Al-Qaedas high value targetswhich otherwise never proved fruitful. Instead, innocent people and even Pakistans security forces are killed and injured. Pakistans usual rhetoric and official statement would go like this: foreign troops shall not be allowed to operate inside Pakistan (Prime Minister Gillani and President

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Musharraf, July 2008). Yet who asks this question? War is not fought with prior permission from the enemy. The peace negotiations and settlements have been seriously criticized on account of being a technique for providing breathing space for Al-Qaeda and Taliban to regroup, reunite, refuel, reorganize and rethink fighting strategies. At times, it becomes difficult to appreciate the insurgencies and militancy are a problem inside Pakistans tribal belt and in few of its urban areas. The worries are felt mostly by US/NATO forces far away in Afghanistan. Whereas the local militants or insurgents have their specific local agendas, which though not acceptable to the government, are not linked with the troops in Helmand or Kabul. This is how US/NATO decision makers are augmenting the situation in an unnecessary dramatic series of chain reactions. Some analysts call this a US overdoing or over-reacting policy. This doesnt mean the militancy inside Pakistans territories has no effect on the other side of the border. Of course there is a link, but we should not reinforce a weak connection by unwarranted and illogical instigative incursions. No one denies the presence of foreign militants in the tribal belt, but are the periodic airstrikes successful as a results-oriented approach for this much-trumpeted hot pursuit? Moreover, if the air raids are carried out inside Pakistani territories to chase and hit the militants, then the Taliban infiltration must be from Afghanistan into Pakistan and not vice versa. Before these attacks, even the media carried disturbing news like The Problem is Pakistan (Morton Abramowitz, Newsweek) recalling the old war in Afghanistan with the comment that the single biggest reason for the Soviets failure was Pakistan. The comparison between the causalities of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq was made with the conclusion that Pakistan was contributing to Afghanistans instability by failing to prevent militants from crossing into Afghanistan. Cross border attacks on US troops in eastern Afghanistan have gone up 40% in recent

months. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates attributes the increase to cease-fire accords between Pakistani authorities and Islamic militants, under which Islamabad agreed to pull its military out of areas controlled by the radicals in exchange for their promise not to attack government institutions. The deals meant that the pressure was taken off the militants who are now free to be able to cross the border and create problems for us, said Gates. (Time, 21 July 2008) NATO/US airstrikes from across the border have become routine, not exceptional. Its difficult to find a newspaper which doesnt carry a report on violation of Pakistans territorial borders by US drones and NATO aircraft. Exact statistics for all such transgressions, intended for intelligence gathering or actual attacks, are not compiled by our local offices, nor available to this author. However, the most sensational and overt attacks are recorded by local agencies and the writer. Table 2 features some notable attacks. No one has regained lost opportunities for peace agreements, nor regained or replaced these attacks with the military power show. Rather, the US/NATO attacks have caused greater damage to the WOT, and brought an exceedingly bad name to NATO forces whose jurisdiction and authority is limited to Afghanistan, and not beyond its borders. We have observed severe criticism of US policies in every corner of the country. Public resentment against the War on Terror showed a manifold rise, and increased Taliban infiltration
Date Name of Tribal Agency/ District Mohmand Agency Place

(Talibanization) due to the tribal characteristics of revenge and bravery ensued. [See The Impact of Collateral Damage on the Taliban Insurgency, IO Sphere, Fall 2008]. Undoubtedly, Al-Qaeda must capitalize on public antiUS sentiments. Suicide attacks became the norm in the wake of Coalition cross border attacks, in an extremist bid to keep the government from supporting US policies. Such suicide bombings have a telling impact on Pakistans internal security arrangement. Islamic political parties who lost the February 2008 general elections are gaining ground again, on the pretext of indifference showed by the secular forces towards US/ NATO strikes. Moreover, these periodic and now successive airstrikes have badly inhibited development and reconstruction processes in the tribal belt, as well as peace negotiations for non-committed communities disengagement. The only overt justification for these NATO/US raids given so far by Western circles is the hot pursuit of Al-Qaeda leaders. With every such raid, the Coalition claims success in hunting down names. Senior analyst and renowned journalist Rhimullah Yousafzai comments on the first US ground forces operation on Pakistani soil on September 4, 2008: The US Special Forces raid in South Waziristan was without doubt due to the faulty intelligence but the Americans are not in the habit of admitting their mistake or apologizing for killing innocent people. And, in dealing with Pakistan, the US
Killed Wounded Other Damage

June 10, 2008

Goraparri Post Teh: Safi

12 Freindly, 8 enemy

18

2 trucks

Aug 13,2008

South Waziristan Agency

Angoor Adda Shangoona Musa Mir Khel

16

23

September 3, 2008

South Waziristan Agency

Angoor Adda

20 Friendly

September 8 2008

North Waziristan Agency

Madrassah Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani at Danday Darpa Khel village Miranshah

13 Friendly, 12 enemy

Table 2. Representative Press reports of NATO/US Airstrikes on Pakistan Territory (Author)

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has consistently justified its unilateral attacks in FATA by simply claiming that someone important in the Al-Qaeda hierarchy was the target. It is another matter that all instances of actionable intelligence until now have proved wrong or inadequate in getting some high-value target as Zawahiri. (The News Daily, Islamabad, 14 Sep 2008) Current Situation Its time for a complete policy transformation, and a more enlightened approach. We have to understand the limitations of each group committed to the cause of this civilizational transformation through awareness, education, civic amenities, alternative dispute resolution, employment, political freedom, womens emancipation, health service delivery, and substitute crops, etc. The escalation in the US/NATO attacks in the first week of September 2008 generated a strong public reaction in Pakistan, manifested in protest and condemnation resolutions passed by the NWFP Provincial Assembly, National Assembly and the Senate of Pakistan. The language of the resolutions is of extreme anger and resentment, using words like outrageous, instigative and uncalled for incursions. The Upper House (Senate) Resolution No. 10-46/2008-Q, the Lower House (National Assembly) Resolution No. F.28(1/2008-L) and the NWFP Assembly Resolution No. 125, all came on 4 Sep 2008 in response to the first on ground operations and airstrikes by Coalition/ ISAF troops on the village of Zulahi, near Angoor Adda in South Waziristan. The language of all of these resolutions is the same: The attack has resulted in loss of precious lives including women and children. [The attack] is a gross violation of Pakistans sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also undermines the basic norms of International law and contradicts the very basis of cooperation between Pakistani security forces and Coalition/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Any incursion inside our territory and resulting loss of innocent lives is unacceptable. This matter may be taken up strongly with member countries of

the ISAF. These resolutions, while reiterating Pakistans resolve to combat all forms and manifestations of terrorism that constitute and threat to the vital interests of Pakistan, also recommend that the government should convey in clear terms to the ISAF forces that such violation of our sovereignty is bound to force fundamental review of our foreign policy. Owing to the public demand for protection of Pakistans borders and as a national duty of the Pakistani Forces, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani announced on 10 Sep 2008 no external force is allowed to conduct operations inside Pakistan; the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country will be defended at all cost. He categorically clarified there is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border. He further advised the Coalition should display strategic patience, avoid unilateral approaches and reiterated that the right to conduct operations against militants inside own territory is solely the responsibility of the respective armed forces. The COASs statement was carried as a lead story on front pages, and mostly with his photograph. However, some newspapers carried another statement alongside that of the COAS, which came from US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, saying, The US military faced with rising insurgent violence in Afghanistan and will revise its strategy for the region to include militant safe havens in neighboring Pakistan and that he was looking at a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region that would cover both side of the PakAfghan border. On the following day (9/11) the leading news, carrying a photo of the Director General ISPR Major General Athar Abbas, was that from now onward Pakistan Army was ordered to retaliate against any action by foreign troops inside the country. Ironically, the Pak-Army spokesmans statement was again put together on the same page with a photo of President Bush, quoting

from a New York Times article: US President George W. Bush has secretly approved order allowing US forces to conduct ground operations in Pakistan without that governments prior approval as the situation in the tribal area is not tolerable. Notwithstanding the rhetoric, allegations, counter allegations and verbosity of these statements, US/NATO airstrikes continued on this same day. The COASs announcement to defend the countrys sovereignty at any cost had significant government and public response. The Prime Minister, one of the Chief Ministers, and religious and opposition leaders regarded the COAS statement as the true voice of the public and their representation and an encouraging step. This is significant: to realize whose voice is the public representation, and who has the ultimate power in deciding vital strategic issues. More notable is whether the effect generated was part of a witting design or notbut it had impact across national and international audiences, maybe unwittingly. Nevertheless, it reinforces the idea that the general masses of Pakistan welcome a brave, courageous leader rather than an indecisive Prime Minister, no matter how many popular votes he gained in the elections. Former President Musharrafs initial popularity was not due to his uniform, but his seven point agenda of development and action against culprit elements of societythe lack of fulfillment initiated his downfall, and his exit. Cultural Context The problems of Pakistani society lie within its social-psychological context. Anyone who could fight the menace of feudalism and corruption would be the true Mandela of the nation, and a second founder of the country. People welcome bold, straightforward statements and policies, but when not fulfilled to expectations, they lose respect for the leader and his party. This is what happened with most of the military rulers of the country. Modern examples of this problem continue. Local newspapers carried a Washington Post story (12 Sep

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2008) that present US attacks, up to six miles inside Pakistans territory, was granted by the Pakistans COAS in his meeting with Admiral Mike Mullen in Aug 2008. The Pakistan Army was quick to dispel and negate all such reports, and renewed its commitment to defend the country at any cost. However, the greatest setback came from the Prime Minister (interestingly with the same photo of the COAS three days prior), saying, Pakistan cant wage war with the US and the issue of Pakistans territorial integrity will be taken at international level through diplomacy. The situation gave rise to further confusion and deep resentment from opposition parties. The general public cannot make up its mind about the clear-cut demarcation of roles and responsibilities of various national institutes, as the media is replete with assumptions, speculations, stories and analyses. Nowadays the US/NATO periodic attacks have now become a declared policy of the US, amid speculation of NATO reservation on its authority beyond Afghans borders. Some analysts think President Bush has become impatient to have some phenomenal success in Afghanistan before leaving office, in order to satisfy the US masses, especially about No.1 and No.2, the reported CIA codification for Bin-Laden and AlZawahiri, whose whereabouts are still unknown despite billions of dollars from the US taxpayers. Afghanistan President Hamid Karzais impatience is similar to President Bushs, as Karzai too faces new elections in 2009. History Repeats It does not require detailed analysis to predict the ultimate outcome of incessant US/NATO incursions upon Pakistan territory. If we ignore Pakistans nuclear and missile capabilities and its huge army, even then Pakistan is a country of 170 million people, including the fierce tribal fighters who will at once turn into holy warriors (mujahideen) from their current status of being dubbed as militants and miscreants. This will be a replay of Islam versus the Soviets, the outcome of which is very much evident on todays map of the

world. Two statements characterize the problem: 1) There is American presence in the area, but we cant just send in troops. If we did, we could have another Vietnam, and the United States cant afford that right now (US Commissioner John Lehman, Daily Times Feb 28, 2003Quoted in Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Amir Rana & Rohan Gunaratna, 2007) 2) In committing the alliance to sustained ground combat operations in Afghanistan NATO has bet its future. If NATO were to fail, alliance cohesion will be at grave risk. A moribund or unraveled NATO would have a profoundly negative geostrategic impact. (General James Jones, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Quoted in Descent into Chaos, Ahmed Rashid, Penguin Books, 2008). Conclusions In the wake of domestic criticism and excessive strikes by coalition forces, the new President of Pakistan Mr. Asif Ali Zardari visited the United Kingdom, appearing in news photos with Prime Minister Gordon Brown bearing the caption: Asif finds UK on its side and sees no more US raids. The encouraging news accompanied the arrival of Admiral Michael Mullen to Pakistan on 16 Sep

2008, to meet Pakistani political and military leadership. The US Embassy in Islamabad noted in an official statement, the US is committed to respect Pakistans sovereignty and to develop further USPak cooperation and coordination on the critical issues that challenge the security and well-being of the people of both countries. Unfortunately, Admiral Mullens statement didnt create any credible assurance in the minds of the government or general public, as it came at nearly the same time as another attack on Pakistani territory which reportedly killed seven people. The corresponding news headline: US Drone Attack Pokes Fun at Mullens Assurance. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Shah Mehmood Quraishi, described the Mullens statement and the subsequent attack as indicative of an institutional disconnect on part of the US, pointing towards a possible divergence of opinions between the State Department and Pentagon. However, the War on Terror has become Long and is not going to end very soon. Issues of sovereignty, policy, and cultural understanding must be addressed. It is still too early to predict what exactly the Long War will bring to the people of the US, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the community at large.

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Modeling Broadcasting Infrastructure


By Daniel K. Flatla Editorial Abstract: Mr. Flatla describes the creation of a prototype geographic information system which models the television and radio broadcast system infrastructure and broadcast areas of Open Source Center sources. The project reviews the social and interactive processes of media to learn about the spatial relationships between objects such as stations, towers, transmitters, and owners within the broadcasting system. ompared to Al Qaeda, the United States has been successful in its military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The US projects power and money to rebuild these nations, but lacks engagement on what World War II era analysts called The Fourth Front (Graves, 1941), or what President Eisenhower called the struggle for the minds and wills of men. (Bowie & Immerman, 1998) Both intelligence and the news reporting describe the impact of Al Qaedas As Sahab Media Center within Muslim countries, and their ability to recruit new supporters. At the same time the US is having difficulty beginning a successful strategic communication strategy to counter As Sahabs influence. It is the fourth front that encompasses social processes of media and information which influence understanding, feelings, and values. Understanding the effects of media on various culturesas social and spatial processesis critical for the United States to understand and to engage this fourth front. 1.0 The Problem I believe the geospatial framework is essential to understanding and acting upon media ecology from an intelligence perspective. Finding Usama [bin Laden] may well be important but the key to the problem is really understanding how the message is delivered and how and why it affects populations, small and large, and where these populations are located. In order to drain the swamp you not only have to know where the swamp is but what are the sources of its swampiness. (Senior OSC Editor, Oct 2007) Understanding social and cultural change is a challenging task for all aspects of government, and the Open

Source Center (OSC) is no different. The mission of the Open Source Center is to monitor and analyze publicly available information. They specifically analyze international media such as print, broadcast, geographic information, and other forms of public communication. The OSC provides support to senior policy makers and the US Intelligence Community regarding current events as well as providing detailed research. As the client in this project, they requested

Transmitter tower, Kirkuk, Iraq. (Defense Link) a prototype enterprise geospatial information systems (GIS) design to specifically to enable OSC staff to model the infrastructure and phenomena of television and radio broadcast systems. OSC partners want to understand the effects of media. For instance, an open source analyst is researching a businessman turned politician in Iraq. The analyst finds information about the politician and his family, who are known to own a television station and a radio station in a city in Kurdistan. The analyst wants to know the impact of the mans media ownership on the surrounding population. Did it affect voting habits, purchasing

habits, womens rights, or civil order in the politicians media sphere? Currently, OSC can manually place the pieces of this puzzle together in the form of textual reports, stringing together hundreds of information sources. This results in analysts printing out and stacking reports on their desks, forcing them to perform a paper management exercise to link content, in order to identify key concepts and relationships in their research. The problem for those studying media environments anywhere is a matter of storage, retrieval, and updating of local events and sources of informationnot a matter of content. Analysts require a means to locate and discover spatial and social relationships. A typical consumer of open source intelligence can spend four to six hours per day culling through overwhelming volumes of information, consisting of news, rumors, and other reports. Users have the challenge of connecting their sources, influencers, and events of the day, to maintain situational awareness to support their superiors decision making process. The US Government applied network storage to information acquisition problems years ago, with systems designed to manage text documents. Today the problem is a matter of discovering the so what users are trying to get from government information systems. With even larger databases of event reporting in cultural spaces coming online, and a larger push to collect human terrain data, information overload may cause our analysis to grind to a snails pace. Time and resources required to meet this future outlook dont make a typical users job any easier. This project focused on developing a prototype GIS architecture around

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ESRIs [originally Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc.] geodatabase technology. The project explored methodologies which support media researchers and analysts in understanding international media and culture, through creation of a geodatabase to model television and radio infrastructure. The project took into account various organizations media monitoring activities and data to model media sources in Iraq, to deliver a prototype geodatabase for global access to the OSC and its partners. Tools such as the Department of Commerces Communication Systems Planning Tool (CSPT) were used to model the electromagnetic propagation of transmissions areas of these systems to support visualization and analysis. The project architecture supports an enterprise-wide need by focusing on common features and attributes that describe the terrestrial television and radio environment. It creates a number of basic analytic models and tools to calculate values of media penetration within a country or market. Although the analytic output is quantitative and describes the patterns of media and cultures, it is by no means indicative of the processes of media and society that are occurring in the study areas. The projects basic analytic components assist with the discovery of spatial patterns that can help inform researchers dealing with advanced, complex social, cultural, and psychological processes that factor into studying media environments. The project studied the spatial characteristics and the relationships of media infrastructure to create a data model the utilizing ESRI ArcSDE geodatabase technology. The model focused on storing the location of radio and television stations, along with their related transmitters and towers, plus tables of transmitters, owners, managers, and alternative names. The primary reason for using ArcSDE was to emphasize the interconnectedness of the infrastructure, through relationships connecting features and tables to one another. ArcGIS technology allows for specific behavior such as relationships

Figure 1. Geography of media. The social aspects of media, production, distribution, and consumption, occur in space. (Author) to be stored in the geodatabase. The infrastructure behaves in way best suited for an object-relational database management system such as ArcSDE and Microsoft SQL Server. Also, such technologies show how common commercial hardware and software can be applied to any final solutions derived from this study. 2.0 Geography of Media All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffectedunaltered. The medium is the massage. Any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without knowledge of the way media works as environment. (McLuhan, Fiore, & Agel, 2001, p. 26) The overall OSC effort attempts to re-establish abilities that originated with the Princeton Learning Center (PLC) and The Radio Project of the 1930s-40s: studying international media as a whole, especially focusing on places of production, distribution, and consumption. While the geography of media spaces has not been well researched (Couldry, 2001; Strate, 1999), previous media studies encompassed multiple disciplineslike sociology, psychology, and anthropologyto engage the subject in a critical, audiencefocused manner. Yet within academia, these multiple disciplines remain segregated, with only a handful of researchers having managed to approach their studies with cross-disciplinary theories (Couldry & McCarthy, 2004; Livingstone). Only recently have media researchers considered the places, and began to include spatial considerations they may have previously overlooked. Couldry & McCarthy describe five levels in their introduction to Mediaspace: the representation of media space; the flow of data and how media space is reconfigured; the specific places at the ends of spectrum of media space (production and consumption spaces); the effects and complexity of geographic scale; and finally how media is understood at various scales (Figure 1). Understanding the geography of media contributes to representing media at different scales, applying a level of complexity not normally addressed in most listenership or audience studies. The relationships between source and receiver contribute to the flow of information, and directly to their spatial effects. Many studies note Toblers First Law of Geography (TFL): Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things. (Tobler, 1970, p. 236) This could certainly apply to media research. Researchers often describe social processes spatially, without knowing the effects of geography on media. For example, there is the separation between producer and consumer, where production places like studios are separate from the consumers locale. Workplaces or personal service providers like barber shops are other examples of where the

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Figure 2. Lazarsfelds Two Step Flow theory. (Author) media evokes the spatial aspect of the social process (Ossman, 2004). In these places, personal, cultural, and historical factors apply to discussions about consumed media, which either amplify or dampen the effect at the local level of social space. This effect was modeled by Lazarsfeld (1944) with a Two Step Flow theory (Figure 2), where the mass media is first received by opinion leaders, and secondly individuals in proximal social contact are influenced by the opinion leader. The social factors of influence then act according to geographic, social, cultural, and historical factors within the group of individuals. The Two Step Flow Model focuses on social aspects, but is dependent upon proximity to media and interpersonal relationships rather than accepting previous assumptions that media had a direct effect on those it touched (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Applying TFL to the model, influence decays over distancesocial, geographic, or temporal. Several models referenced in communication studies (Gerbner, 1956; Maletzke, 1963; Schramm, 1954) imply that geographic processes occur in communications. One is Berlos S-M-C-R Model (Berlo, 1960). It categorized elements of a medium such as the source (S), message (M), channel (C), and receiver (R) in a linear fashion and focus on the interpersonal relationship of communication. The Osgood & Schramm Model (1954) is a modified circular model, it captures the cyclic nature of communication where there is a processing role within each

receiver/transmitter and the application of feedback at multiple stages. Schramm (1954) also created a Field of Experience model (Figure 3), positing that the overlap of an individuals experience with others contributes to the understanding between groups of people. This overlap makes it easier to communicate successfully with others, emphasizing a connection through likeness. Schramms experience model exhibits elements of TFL, where again receivers closer in proximity are more related than receivers further awayor with less similarity in social space. Application of the Field of Experience Model may further describe the social processes occurring at the second influence step in Lazarsfelds model, where experience and proximity affect medias amplified social process. Influence or ideologies are often primarily associated with the study of the media, limiting the approach to studying what people do with the medium and the message. Individual perception of media and identity is an overlooked factor

behavioral, or something completely differentadding to medias complex effects (Corner et al., 1998; Couldry, 2001; Katz, 1959; Livingstone, 1997; McLuhan, 1964). Using GIS to map patterns and processes could help to further the study of media effects as the social processes occur spatially, but may not ever be the definitive answer to fully understanding media effects. 2.1 Mapping the Media The study which closely compares to this project was conducted by a team of researchers from the University of Calgary, The Carter Center, and the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) (Cole, 2005; Dowding, Hansen, Sun, ReMartinez, & Waters, 2006; McConnell, Hansen, & Waters, 2005; Waters, Hansen, Gao, Sun, & Palacios, 2006). In 2003, The Mapping the Media in the Americas (MMA) project began mapping access and ownership in the Americas. Their intent was to provide insight for change

Figure 3. Schramms Field of Experience Model (1954). in media research, and considered a possible area of further research (Corner, Schlesinger, & Silverstone, 1998). These processes of media creation, sharing, and consumption are self-selecting because of identity and geography. An individual determines what media, and with whom, they are going to produce, share, or consume, based on their experience and place in the world. Use of behavior as an approach to media study implies application of sociological, anthropological, and socio-psychological theories to explain an individual or groups rationale for producing, sharing, or consuming media. Nonetheless, many media researchers accept external factors may be at workwhether ideological, into political campaign financing and political use of media. The MMA utilized partnerships with non-governmental agencies and the media within its study areas to collect international data, build a GIS, and to provide an Internet mapping site. The Carter Center and FOCAL conducted the data collection abroad, meeting with media sources, government agencies, and journalists to collect media ownership data. This consisted not only of who owned radio stations, but the locations of who owned a radio. The University of Calgary, built and utilized the GIS, processed and analyzed the data, and generated maps. They also designed an Internet mapping site for the MMA

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project, ultimately meeting the projects intent of providing greater transparency into political financing of media during elections. The MMAs methods and analyses consisted of locating media sources and potential receivers, and comparing them to election outcomes. They modeled the range of station broadcast signals to determine potential listenership in an area, then performed geographically weighted regression (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 2002) on election results. This allowed MMA to account for regional differences, and determine where political parties did well (or not). Geographically weighted regression also let them estimate numbers of radio owners throughout the country, which the researchers determined as successful in predicting election outcomes (Dowding et al., 2006).

broadcast areas of Iraq sources with signal transmission information. At the time, OSC did not have the tools to model radio frequency propagation; 1941 appeared to be the last time OSC mapped any extent or direction of media. Using OSCs geography blog, Why Geography Matters, the geographers posted a question to the greater Intelligence Community asking what tools were available to model radio frequency propagation in a GIS. The US Army and the National Security Agency (NSA), responded regarding a tool called the Communication Systems Planning Tool (CSPT), developed by the Institute for Telecommunication Sciences within the Department of Commerces National Te l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and Information Administration. OSC partnered with both groups and forwarded the Iraqi media sources shapefile 2.2 Partnership and a to be modeled (Flatla & Beginning Blinde, 2007). Because the In 2006, OSC media transmitter shapefile had analysts and geographers incomplete technical started their media data about transmitter mapping effort. The attributes, the NSA and geographers acted on the Army both used default Figure 4. Uncertainty of transmitter placement. suggestions from a branch parameters for the CSPT Note the stations placed in the river. (Author) chief s 2006 internal tool. They generated the email, recommending the two groups do something together. would appear randomly distributed 180 broadcast ranges in ESRI GRID The geographers wrote a proposal to through the citybut they are not. The raster format, which OSC included in locate OSC media sources, and with original data creation process introduced the project. The default values created help from media analysts, picked Iraq spatial errors that, at large scales, display broadcast ranges approximately the size as prototype area. The OSC used their significant inaccuracies which analysts of a large metropolitan area at a scale of sources and those of the BBC Monitoring could misconstrued as accurate (Figure 1:2,000,000a typical ratio for the type Service, to include the World Radio 4). Nevertheless, the fact that OSC of stations OSC is attempting to model and Television Handbook, to populate could plot source locations in a GIS was (Figure 5). These default values, mixed a table of attributes about the available a tremendous step toward integrating with real values, are approximations; sources in Iraq. This initial product different OSC aspects, and helped they had to be declared as such. For the consisted of over 30 attributes and over reinvigorate collection and analysis size of the area involved, any analysis 400 stationsmany duplicatesand processes. By working together, the two would include metropolitan-sized study the aggregated data were difficult to pull OSC groups demonstrated that media areas or smaller scale areas. Similar together, due to the varying methods the analysis has a geographic component, analysis conducted over Western areas, sources used to describe the information. and that OSCs corps of geographers like the United States or Western Europe, There were no coordinates for the could do more for the Center than just could be conducted at larger scales, but in the case of Iraq the error at larger locations of broadcast towers, only manage a map library. During this first phase, OSC scales skewed local analysis because of addresses for studios and the name of the location where the broadcast tower geographers also thought to map the coarseness and lack of data. Hence,

might be. A join between the location attribute of the transmission sources table and a populated places GIS file provided the probable point location for the transmitter data. While creating the Iraq data, the OSC team placed station locations as accurately as they could. This process introduced errors into the data because locations were not in the exact locations of the real stations. When users zoomed into the data, the depiction began displaying errors, due to the production method of placing features by hand. For instance, if one zoomed into Baghdad, transmitters created for the project

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a country-wide range display overlaid on tribal, ethnicity, and population density data demonstrated detailed distribution views in OSC interest areas. Following the demo, senior OSC managers asked how to integrate the project into OSCs daily workflow, and how it would help OSC. Managers are wary of additional strains placed on their analysts to use new software and new tools. For one, analysts already conducted qualitative source assessments by producing media guides. The earlier media mapping project offered a different approach to creating media guides, and helped diversify the types of analysis OSC conducts. Understanding the extent and reach of media in their locales extends analysts understanding of the source and media. Visualizing the media and its effects extends analyzing content for nuanced statements directed towards groups or individuals that act in a local capacity. This added context develops an analysts knowledge of an areas culture and geography, and aids in determining the changes occurring in a given location. Both aspects multiply the organizations knowledge and understanding of media and societies, which contributes to the overall purpose of intelligence and geographyto understand people. 2.3 Socializing the Project Previous work attempted to interface with potential partners by using various ways to describe and showcase the project. From a GIS perspective, an ArcIMS site was a Web map of media in Iraq. The mapping Website on the Intelligence Communitys unclassified network, Intelink-U, proved to be of little use to partners who work on distributed secure networks. The Website did not offer much interaction with the data, but helped to distribute data to some ArcGIS Desktop users for viewing. The Web mapping site did garner support from OSCs overseas bureaus which collect media information. Another project website was created on Intellipedia, the Intelligence Communitys enterprise wiki, to share methods and data. The Intellipedia portal and pages are some of the ICs most

Figure 5. Generated broadcast ranges for OSC by NSA. (OSC) popular, but this platform only offers current information about the project: shapefiles and KML file for Google Earth; tables and images have been uploaded for users to download and use. The wiki pages are an important part of the project for communicating results, and have been a primary information sharing forum. Blogging added another increased level of transparency to the project. The GIS blog has an important relationship with the Army Information Operations and public diplomacy communities, who actively read and participate. Project direction, methods, theory, and results are posted; as are related datasets, information about new media sources, and related technologies. This active participation has helped to coordinate user needs, and to legitimize the need of the project. The blog has been one of the more popular elements of the project, offering users and project team members a dialog with partners throughout the Intelligence Community. Yet, one finds that most partners are only interested in obtaining data and not sharing datayet they love to access the Intellipedia page and blog on the secure networks. All of these interfaces are good for establishing presence, but the project still lacks persistence within the OSC and Intelligence Community enterprise. 2.4 Goals and Objectives This project created a prototype GIS focused on a geodatabase, to model the infrastructure of television and radio broadcasting systems to support US Government media analysis, public diplomacy, and civil affairs efforts. This prototyping effort also focused on expanding OSC business and research areas to integrate different disciplines geographically disbursed into a framework workflow process. These new workflow processes are intended to leverage the various skills of OSC and its partners, to contribute to an overall effort to locate and analyze television and radio media. Project objectives also focused on using and expanding a multi-discipline approach to studying media and its infrastructure. The project combined methodology from media and cultural studies, anthropology, sociology, communications studies, and geography the use of GIS to model the infrastructure and phenomena of television and radio. By using a multi-discipline approach, analysts can study phenomena as complex as television and radio media to a much better degree. Finally, this prototype is intended as a catalyst to improve analysis, geographic literacy, and media literacy in the US Intelligence Community.

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Figure 6. The system will use a mapping program to access map data, to create a map (Author) According to Larry Strate, President of the Media Ecology Association, the geography of media has not been well studied (personal communication, October 6, 2007). Nick Couldry at the London School of Economics (2001), and Lisa Parks in the Film and Media Studies department at the University of California at Santa Barbara (personal communication, May 14, 2008) also note a lack of knowledge in this area. Parks has a book forthcoming on this subject, but notes she is lacking a methodology and resources to map media infrastructure in order to complete her work. Notably, the same collaborative processes that enable worldwide user participation in a critical USG mission may also support academic research on the subject. 2.5 Project Scope The scope of the project focused on development of a prototype GIS architecture, including a basic analytic component, to provide users the ability to search for features geographically or by their attributes. The project limited itself to implementing desktop GIS and Web-based mapping tools to perform the basic analysis and query functions, as well as the editing of features in the geodatabase. Access to its geodatabase via Open Geospatial Consortium Web service standards supported inter-agency collaboration. The projects intended timeframe was within the nine month academic year, it takes to complete the Master of Science in GIS program at the University of Redlands [California]. Project resources were also constrained to hardware and software provided by the University of Redlands, the client, and ESRI. The study area was limited to the television and radio media infrastructure within the country of Iraq, due to its availability from OSCs previous work. Limitations did not allow for content analysis, nor the typical analysis of media content conducted by OSC and its partners. The project scope was constrained to modeling the media infrastructure of Iraq, with data provided by the client, and not to discover or collect any data. The basic overlay analysis included limited information from country-level population density, tribal and ethnographic data sources. While the project could have included more complex analysis, additional resources would have been required to collect more precise geodemographic data. 3.0 System Description To meet the needs of OSC and its partners, the project prototype design focused on providing users with the capabilities to contribute and manage spatial, technical, and organizational data about the infrastructure of radio and television sources they monitored

around the world. The system was designed to perform queries of the data, to enable users to work collaboratively, the goal being the creation of radio frequency propagation models to support the analysis of media environments and populations. The same data was also intended to be available to advanced users and other enterprise tools via Web services. For users who were less familiar with desktop GIS, the system was designed to include database editing via Web mapping applications. These decisions were based on the roles of open source analysts, public affairs officers, and others who could potentially contribute to the projects geodatabase. The system included commercial offthe-shelf technology and third-party GIS applications in the prototype architecture, giving all users the ability to create maps and communicate via formats like KML for Google Earth (Figure 6). 3.1 Requirements Analysis The project team interviewed the client and their partner organizations to understand workflows and processes needed to map media sources. Their answers, along with doctrine and processes from the clients partners, formed the basis for prototype system requirements. Derived needs were broken down into two categories: functional and nonfunctional requirements. The functional requirements outlined the capabilities the project prototype

Figure 7. Project architecture. (Author)

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needed to address in the projects design Further, documents and manuals from and implementation. Nonfunctional both the State Department and the DOD requirements did not necessarily support referenced the need to use knowledge functionality, but addressed aesthetic management systems to address their and specific needs like scalability and needs, as well as the clients, to support software types. their many Interagency partners. The clients geographers and 3.2 System Design & open source officers responded to Architecture interview questions via e-mail. They often explained their jobs and roles, but As the heart of the system, the also provided questions they and their geodatabase modeled the concepts partners often asked during their source of television and radio infrastructure analyses activities. Such questions (Figure 7). The logical design utilized ranged from basic look-up tasks, to information about media infrastructure questions about spatial analysis, as well as nonspatial questions. Many asked and previous work done by OSC, about basic queries, often about where leading to a data model that captured a station was located. More complex spatial analysis questions addressed the broadcast areas and the underlying demographics of the affected population. For example, one analyst asked What is the geodemographic makeup of listeners within the broadcast range of a specific radio station? Other client questions included nonspatial questions about station features, such as the language in which it broadcast or who owned or operated the media outlet. Similar questions or requests for data were described as information needs in the doctrine The intricacies of broadcast infrastructure. and field manuals of the clients (Defense Link) partners; these needs drove the clients collection and analysis of its the behavior and relationships within the sources. The US State Departments system. The design of the geodatabase model for implementing public essentially brought the prototype system diplomacy campaigns includes multiple to life. The physical geodatabase needs to identify media sources and their powered the rest of the project with its potential audiences and to measure the hardware, software, data, and network effects of their outreach (GAO, 2006). connections. The remaining elements From a military standpoint, the US of the system revolved around the Army addressed specific data needs for geodatabase, where other applications, conducting missions including combat, user roles and workflows were based on information operations, public affairs, what analysts could do with it. intelligence, counterinsurgency, and 4.0 Project Operations reconstruction operations. The military The client collected data for review, doctrine cites similar needs to collect, manage, and disseminate information deconstruction, reassembly, which was about media infrastructure, information then used to fill the prototype. The about programming and ownership of the project demonstrated migration from media, and the makeup of the affected shapefiles to geodatabases, and the population of those media (Army, geographic relationships were reviewed 2006a, 2006b, 2008; DOD, 2006). and modeled within the geodatabase. The

division of features and attributes into separate feature classes, with the addition of relationship classes, introduced the natural relationships between the objects connected as part of television and radio broadcasting infrastructure. The data model and the geodatabase provided a place for the client to start exploring how it can model other media infrastructure, such as satellite and cable television. The geodatabase and data model can now be referenced to expand the clients ability to understand its media sources and the populations it monitors. Creativity and necessity helped create the prototype applications that enable the client to interact with the data and the platform. These objects combined to construct a proof of concept, such that the client may consider future implementation of these technologies and processes. The geodatabase and platform attempted to demonstrate the collaborative nature of GIS as well. The project implemented technology with as many capabilities to access and share data with the client and its partners as it could. Web Mapping Service, KML service, and the proprietary ESRI service contributed to the dissemination of information and the inclusion of users who work with desktop and Webbased applications. The technology provides room for the creative nature of intelligence analysts to mix and match data from different sources, applying a wealth of different toolsand as many methods to discover information as the user can discover. The proof of concept shows one could learn media infrastructure and geographic relationships, not only for television and radio media, but also for the sociocultural behavior and technology that make up a communication system. These concepts can be applied to satellite, wireless systems, and the Internetwith a little further research. The objects in a given communications system can be modeled in a GIS, and updated with enough frequency to keep up with data support analysis needs.

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The systems design and architecture bore a resemblance to other GIS systems that implement similar technology. The System Design Strategies (Peters, 2007) research provided a number of recommendations and introduced the project to multiple GIS implementation strategies. The project applied these very concepts to meet the clients GIS needs for data from multiple sources, and collaborative access. The decision to implement the ArcGIS suite, and provide data services for users of different GIS platforms like Quantum GIS or Google Earth, proved a great example to the client of how OSC could support a large number of users and partners worldwide with geospatial data and analysis. All users with access to the geodatabase and its services can read the data and conduct their own analysis, or create their own maps for their individual needs. There is certainly the potential for more complex applications utilizing the projects data and services, but this discussion is beyond the scope of this project. A comprehensive work breakdown structure would have extended the length of the project and would have been unnecessary for its size and scope. 5.0 Summary This effort resulted in the design of a system architecture that included workflows around a geodatabase to store a media infrastructure model and associated data. The project design was prototyped using university and client resources such as servers, software, and data. ArcGIS desktop users could access a geodatabase using a direct connection protocol or an Internet protocol feature. The knowledge take-away from the project is that mediatelevision, radio, satellite, and other forms of communicationcan be modeled in an enterprise GIS to support a wide variety of users within the clients organization and its partners. The objects and the relationships that make up a system of media are apparent in the real world, and the relationships, although complex, can be identified and modeled. Further research into a

medium of interest is needed, to establish objects, actors, and relationships, as well as social relationships and factors which act on the landscape. Prototyping the beginning of a new age of media analysis can motivate OSC to implement follow-on and complementary projects, to transform itself and the open source intelligence community, providing deeper analysis to their partners while continuing to provide traditional services. The potential growth fulfills the task set by the Director of National Intelligence and the United States Congress. Other potential users of the analysis and data include US embassies, military organizations, and OSCs international partners like the BBC Monitoring Service. The global distribution of these users maximizes the need to understand local media. By leveraging this network, users can be significant to a project like this, providing near-real time changes to a global project with access to local media sources. Knowing the geographic extent

of media can help relate information and knowledge through various geographic search techniques, and even spatial analysis of data that was once thought to be non-spatial. This vision is achievable, but OSC has to start somewhereand mapping their media sources is the way. Finally, a note for the client and those in government who wish to implement GIS platforms for the enterprise: The technology is available, but the culture is not. Projects such as this prototype do not power themselves with electricity, servers, and software alone. Users are the driving force behind this prototype and all other systems, especially when communication between users is required in processes that collect, analyze, and share intelligence. An understanding of how the relations work in a system are what makes geography and GIS an important part of OSCs, and the Intelligence Communitys, toolbox, which can make an impact on the fourth front.

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Working Together Downrange


By John J. Garcia, Major, USA Editorial Abstract: MAJ Garcia provides a recent account of applied influence operations at the tactical and operational levels. He describes working-level successes in Iraq, emphasizing the importance of cooperation and synchronization between elements across the Brigade Combat Team. any at the Corps level and different. During OIF 06-08 the higher have the perception BCT had a visit from a PA Officer that Information Operations (IO) in a sister service, who worked and Public Affairs (PA) working for a higher organization. When together is strictly verboten. The I introduced myself as the BCT public affairs charter is to inform the S7, he immediately stated that he American public, while Information should not be seen talking to me, Operations is focused on influencing for it would ruin his credibly with foreign audiences. Yet due to the mainstream media. In some cases surge of the Information Age and this concern is valid, but with ever-changing counterinsurgency current manning at the BCT level (COIN) environment, IO and PA and the information environment, lines need to merge and speak with the lines of IO and PAO merge. Figure 1. Logical Lines of Operation (1st BCT) one voice. These agencies need to be When the 1st Brigade Combat Fortunately, information synchronized to prevent information operations doctrine outlined in Field Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, fratricide, and desynchronize the BCT Manual 3-13 is changing to reflect the prepared to deploy in support of Commanders Campaign Plan objectives rapid changes in the COIN information Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08, the which focuses on all lines of operations environment. The current focus is on the BCT Commander made the decision to and communicationsthis being the integration of five capabilities, centered align the staff along the logical lines of overarching LOO. on: Military Deception; Operations operations (LOOs) in accordance with A good example of how effective Security; Psychological Operations, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Under the Communications LOO can be in the Computer Network Operations; and the Communications LOO, the BCT S7 COIN environment was an April 2007 Electronic Warfareand supporting was the lead agent. The agencies aligned incident in Tarmiyah, Iraq, (20 miles north elements: Physical Destruction; under the COMMS LOO were: IO, of Baghdad). At the time, Tarmiyah was Information Assurance; Physical PAO, Electronic Warfare, Psychological considered an Al Qaeda safe haven. As Security; Counterintelligence; Counter- Operations and Combat Camera. many people know, Al Qaeda is against Deception; and Counter-Propaganda. Under this new staff configuration, women getting an education. In order Information operations officers in the the IO officer would be charged with to prevent young girls from attending current COIN campaigns deal strictly synchronizing these agencies in order classes, Al Qaeda rigged a girls school with PSYOP, EW, MILDEC, and to set the conditions for the other lines with explosivesafter Coalition forces OPSEC, in addition to related principles of operations to be successfuland had paid US $650,000 to refurbish this such as Public Affairs and Civil Military ensure the BCT was able to influence same facility. Al Qaedas plans were to Operations. the populace to support coalition and detonate improvised explosive devcies Government of Iraq (GOI) (IED) when school was in session, actions (Figure 1). potentially killing over 200 young girls. Aligning the agencies When Coalition Forces discovered the as listed above has been plot, the BCT immediately issued a press controversial at echelons release while simultaneously issuing above the BCT level. tailored talking points to the soldiers Some people will argue to engage key leaders, and broadcast that IO and PAO need to PSYOP speaker truck messages stating remain separate due to the facts of this situation. As a result, perception that IO (PSYOP the messages resonated, and many Iraqi and Military Deception), people in the town were outraged. Both in some cases, does not initial and follow-on press releases 1CD Soldier hands out Newspapers to the people of tell the entire truth. Plus, were briefed by Multinational Forcethe target audiences are Iraq (MNF-I) to the international press Saba al Bor Iraq (1 BCT, US Army)

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synchronized message to the public while achieving maximum effect. The vignette below demonstrates how the BCT shaped the information environment prior to the event, to achieve its Communications Objective of Reducing the Populaces support to violent activities and political elements that threaten Iraqs future. These Iraqi Army Soldiers mentored by CF hand out schools supplies to children on the first day of school. themes were developed months before as part of (1 BCT, US Army) the 1st Cavalry Divisions corps. The story generated a great deal Campaign Plan. The BCT of international attention, and appeared used the themes and messages listed on in nearly all international news agencies the top right hand corner of the vignette to include pan-Arab stations such as Al on a consistent basis to drive the wedge Jazerra. In the United States the story between the populace and AQI. The lines picked up by nearly all the major news displayed indicate radio and television networks to include CNNs Wolf Blitzer, commercials running on Baghdad and Prime Time News with ABC. The television and radio which reinforced message was clear from the beginning: the IO Objectives, themes and messages Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was trying to the BCT disseminated on a consistent impose their strict values on the people basis. From the MNF-I headquarters to of the town by denying girls the right the soldiers on the ground, all agencies to an education, and the extremists in this vignette were on message. The would stop at nothing to demonstrate press release issued at MNF-I level was their agendawhich included killing based off the facts the unit submitted up innocent girls. to MND-B, while simultaneously the The example in Figure 2 best MND-B G7 reinforced the message by demonstrates how IO and PA working providing the facts to local radio stations together can exploit events to get a and the local paper, Baghdad Now. The

Figure 2. Huda Girls School Vignette

IO Objectives also formed a guide by which the public affairs would focus their stories. The results of this synchronized event were negative 2nd and 3rd order effects for Al Qaeda in Tarmiyah. Based on atmospherics following the foiled attack, many people were upset, and Al Qaeda lost influence in the town, due to this and similar events. Tarmiyah tribal leaders now have turned to Coalition Forces for assistance in ridding Al Qaeda from their area. An equally important reason for speaking with one synchronized voice is the information environment is so mature: Iraqis are not naive enough to ignore Western media websites and television outlets. An estimated 90% of Iraqis in Baghdad watch television, and of those 90%, over 95% of those watch some form of news. One can easily support this figure by taking a helicopter ride over Baghdad, and observing the enormous quantities of satellite dishes on almost every house or apartment building. Figure 3 further demonstrates the importance of a single synchronized voice, as well as extreme importance of the communication LOO: there are various inputs information cycle inputs, and all originate at the Brigade level. To verify if our messages were getting out into the information domain, the BCT had several methods for measuring dissemination. Public Affairs can measure which markets selected their press releases, and how many people viewed their products by using the Digital Video Imagery and Distribution System (DVIDS). This system provides file stories and video for any media outlet to use, anywhere in the media environment. Another easy means for measuring if your messages are getting out into the public is receiving Google Alerts. The Google browser filter can be setup to select key words or phrases, and alert you when key words are mentioned in the media. This is a great system to monitor progress of your press releases. The model demonstrates how all agencies can track inputs through to the outputs, and the distribution methods used, allowing BCTs to assess where they need to go in the future to have a

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Figure 3. Public Affairs information Cycle. (1st Cavalry Division, US Army) desired effect. In practice, the BCT used a variety of methods to reach multiple target audiences. We felt is was critical to tell our story to all the Iraqi people, while simultaneously informing them of AQI atrocities, and noting progress being made by the local government and Iraqi Security Forces. Before the BCT started its train up for Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08 at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana, the S7 cell developed a mnemonic to assist soldiers and leaders in memorizing the commanders key tasks for the entire operation: the mnemonic SSS-T-P, meaning SAFE, SECURE, STABLE, TOGETHER, PROFESSIONAL with our Iraqi counterparts and all brigade soldiers conducting themselves in a proper manner at all times. The mnemonic was integrated into all brigade talking points, and it was especially designed to be used in any situation. On numerous occasions during media or bilateral engagements, commanders would use SSS-T-P in some fashion to highlight the events in their operation environment. Soldiers also enforced this expression with their actions, and it resonated with the Iraqi populace. On one occasion during an Iraqi Sheik Reconciliation conference, with over 300 influential sheiks in attendance, the keynote speak used SSS-T-P for his message to the other sheiks. Of course, the Sheik Conference was broadcast on all the Baghdad news

Mr. Calabi visits the city of Saba al Bor to believer key messages on Reconciliation efforts to the people of the area (1 BCT, US Army)

agencies. The widespread use of this key expression again demonstrates why it is critical to synchronize message all along all the LOOswith all the target audiences. As the Army and Joint Forces continue to evolve and shape the Information Operations career field, IO and PAO will work together more closely than ever. The new definition of an IO officers responsibility places synchronization of all the information effects clearly on his or her shoulders.

It is critical that information operations and Public Affairs be nested at the brigade level, to ensure synchronization of overall IO objectives and themes and messagesbecause anything the soldier on the ground says or does effects the information environment. In the past, many people wanted to keep the information disciplines separate. Here in the mature information environment, with all lines of operation operating at amazing speeds, we canand mustbe synchronized.

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The View from the Army IO Proponent: Colonel David Haught Interview
Interviewed by John Whisenhunt, Editor Editorial Abstract: COL Haught spoke with IO Sphere during a 2008 JIOWC visit. He shares his views on growing the future generations of dedicated Army IO professionals, describing recent trends in IO education, published guidance, and lessons learned. IOS: Your organization has helped capture many of the successes stories in the War of Ideas against extremists. What organizations or groups do you feel are doing the best in this fight? Who provides the best model? DH: Something weve come to understand is that there isnt any single model that holds up to every operational environment. Not only will requirements continue to change in the future, theyll look different from one area of operations to another, from each commanders unique operational environment to another. Whats more, the optimal organization for disrupting or usurping an adversarys decision cycle looks very different from one focused on developing and enabling collaborative actors to solve or head off their own problems. The clear take-away from Chapter 7 of [US Army] Field Manual 3-0, Operations, is that each new situation will require different combinations of informational activity as integral rather than adjunct to the operation. What weve tried to do is to adapt the construct, the way we organize to integrate informational activity into the operation, to do two things: first, to gain more flexibility for the commander; and second, to really emphasize the commanders centralitythe point where actions, words, and images come together in a coherent operational design and plan. IOS: As IO folks, were big proponents of interagency teaming, but critics say the IO business is still too complex since the US Government has many departments who sometimes seem at odds. What approaches seem to work best in the interagency and intergovernmental communities? organizational roles in resolving the problem, there wont be much teaming. IOS: This influence business is always looking for folks who combine creativity and technical experience. Its tough to find a soldier who can do it all. How can we recruit more people with a broad appreciation for both sides of the brain? DH: The difference is not between creative, meaning people-oriented and cognitive experience, and technical, meaning computer and electronicsoriented experience. The reality is all fields of endeavor require both technical proficiency of a body of knowledge and creativity in achieving and applying that proficiency. Weve come to realize everybody has technical requirements, whether those involve organizing public communication or executing command and control warfare, for instance. Both these skill sets are skills our 21st Century warriors need, but they are different different expertise if you will. The Army has come to realize what commanders need are folks who have deep subject matter expertise and proficiency in areas of like techniques. The training requirement is to develop personnel who truly master the technical requirements of particular mission areas; the education requirement is to develop leaders who master the art and science of each. Thats led, among other things, to recently standing up the US Army Computer and Electronic Warfare Proponent (USACEWP) to develop true experts in that field while, at the same time, the US Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP) continues to produce worldclass information engagement experts. Trying to develop any single officer with

COL David Haught Director, US Army Information Operations Proponent (US Army) DH: As FM 3-0 makes clear, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national communities are integral to full spectrum operations. First, its important we appreciate the unique cultures that characterize these communities and the organizations that represent them. Second, personal engagements with these counterparts are critical. You simply cant expect them to come to you. Get out, engage. Professional but personal relationships go a long way in helping to build bridges across organizational and cultural lines. We have to remember engagement is not just us, the US Army or the military, transmitting our message. We have to think in terms of a comprehensive approach to the mission more than military and more than whole of government. Balancing advocacy and inquiry is really whats important. Regardless of how youve organized, if you dont share an understanding of the problem, and of your respective

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the technical proficiency and masters of the art and science of the divergent technical requirements is probably not going to provide us the best expertise in either area. IOS: The Army has taken the lead in developing a career path for certifying IO professionals. How would you characterize the progress of the FA30 specialty? Do you see any notable changes in life cycle management of IO career officers? DH: Let me return to this notion of deep expertise in each mission area. As we studied requirements, lessons learned, experiences, history, and what experts say about the future world well live and operate in, we asked: what is it that commanders (and their units) will have to do? After all, shouldnt that answer drive the sort of career force the Army builds? The answer, we found, is that commanders will have to tackle three basic operational challenges in any type military operation; i.e., three overarching tasks theyll have to successfully accomplish regardless of the specific mission theyve been assigned. These are: one, to maintain the trust and confidence of home and allied publics while gaining the confidence and support of local publics and actors; two, to win the psychological contest of wills with adversaries or potential adversaries; and three, to win the contest for use of information technology and the electromagnetic spectrum. All the tools in the commanders kit bag conceivably can be applied to each of the three challenges. But, when he reaches into that kit bag, he will want someone who really understands the tool. One of the things the Army has realized, as I said earlier, is that trying to develop any single officer to be able to bring deep expertise to bear in multiple mission areas, multiple areas of technical expertise, is probably unwise and certainly impractical. So, were committed to developing a pool of personnel with deep expertise in what FM 3-0 calls Information Engagement and another pool of officers with a

similarly deep expertise in CyberElectronic Warfare. For the latter, the Army has already established a new functional area for Electronic Warfare (FA 29) and preliminary work has begun in identifying requirements for a Cyber Career Field. For the information engagement piece, what you can think of as the tactical and operational application of Strategic Communication, weve focused the FA 30 qualification course on preparing officers to be the S- or G-7s of their formations, that is to say, the Information Engagement Officer. Of course, the Army has a requirement to provide officers for joint assignments and we understand the joint community views things a little differently than we do, at least for now. So, the Army will send personnel to the Joint Information Operations Planners Course [see page 38 of this issue] prior to their joint assignment. Let me add this thought: the Services provide different kind of experts. From the Navy and the Air Force, the J39 gets deep expertise and experience in cyber-electronic aspects. From the Army, the J39 soon will also be able to draw on the ranks of FA 29s and Cyber Career Field. But, what they get from the Army alone are deep subject matter experts in the art and science of human communication and interaction the engagement and collaboration side of military operations. As you know, the Army is currently the only service with a career field dedicated to this aspect of full spectrum operations. These experts also get more than twenty instructional days in the FA 30 Qualification Course focused on learning and applying the IO capabilities per the Joint constructs. In other words, we work on the premise that officers with deep subject matter expertise in Information Engagement also must understand all the other capabilities in the commanders arsenal in order to help him establish a stable environment that sets the conditions for a lasting, if relevant, peace. IOS: As the Army IO proponent, you are charged with increasing understanding and awareness of all of the IO functional areas. Can you describe some of your teams successes in

broadening Service and Joint community understanding of this business? DH: Certainly the publication of doctrine, most recently chapter 7 of FM 3-0, is the bedrock for creating a basis for common understanding and action for achieving the full potential of information as an integral part of full spectrum operations. But, were also engaged in professional dialogue across the globe, participating in symposia, workshops, and other venues where we share the US Army perspective, listen to and learn from the perspectives of others, and help to create an improved shared understanding of the role information plays in operations. For example, in a variety of venues we have shared our understanding of how IO concepts and doctrine have developed historically from the old notion of Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM), through the Command and Control Warfare--centered IO construct with which we began this war, to the current balanced approach that gives equal weight to the constructive use of informational activity: engagement, collaboration, communication, and cooperation. We believe weve mapped out the source of some of the confusion associated with these mission areas and a way through that confusion which pays attention to both the enduring requirement to disrupt, degrade and so on, an enemys decision cyclewhile protecting our own. These sessions have been very well received in a variety of venues with sister services and allied forces. Our sister services, whose officers are going to be deployed to missions such as supporting ground component forces or serving on provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq or Afghanistan, have begun sending officers to the Armys FA 30 Qualification Course. Several allied nations also have expressed interest to send officers to our course. Again, what the Army brings to this and future fights are experts in affecting an adversarys decision cycle and other experts to capitalize on the constructive power of engaging, communicating, and collaborating with the various actors and publics.

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About the US Army Information Operations Proponent: Mission: Develop the capabilities and capacity across Army DOTMLPF that leverage the power of information to achieve mission success across the full range of military operations. Vision: An Army with capabilities, capacity, and cultural bias for leveraging the power of information in operations to advance national security objectives. Key Tasks: * Promote the transformation of the Army culture to capitalize on the power of information in full spectrum operations * Promote concepts and doctrine that capitalizes on information as an element of, and elemental to, combat power (Doctrine) * Build force structure to establish relevant capability and capacity in the modular force (Organizations) * Develop subject matter experts and competency across the Army (Training, Leadership and Education) * Man the force ICW HRC -- FA 30 Personnel Proponency (Personnel) * Implement material and facility solutions (Material, Facilities)

IOS: Your organization sponsors an annual writing IO contest, and our journal has been pleased to publish several of the winners papers. Is some of their thinking making its way into DOTMLPF [doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities]? DH: Absolutely. Part of the mission of our Combined Arms Center (CAC) is to collect and analyze the experiences, reflection, and analytic thinking of a wide and relevant group of sources. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) remains the focus for that effort, but everyone at CAC has a share in the mission. We are no different. The Proponent leverages the work of CALL, the Counterinsurgency Center, and others, as webeing mindful of the past and current best practicesthink about advancing doctrine and future capabilities across the Army domains of DOTMLPF. We also participate in high-level experiments and exercises in the Army and with our Joint partners to glean additional insights that inform programs across DOTMLPF. The annual Division Warfighter Exercises, OMNI FUSION, and UNIFIED QUEST the Armys Title 10 wargameare invaluable venues for us. So, too, are the annual PHOENIX CHALLENGE DoD-sponsored conferences focusing on IO challenges and solutions, the 30

World-Wide IO Conference, and other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and international venues. Were also blessed with the opportunity to capitalize on the contacts our leaders, staff, and faculty have developed over the years with current and former commanders and S-/G-/J-7s whose thoughts and personal experiences provide important insight into our programs. The work turned in for the writing contest is read and discussed in detail by everyone in the Proponent and it all goes into the synthesis we try to bring to our work as a whole and to each of our initiatives. IOS: A lot of folks are coming back from repeated trips downrange, and were getting a lot of first person accounts of applying IO in the real world, which your organization is helping share with the IO community. But doesnt it often come down to something as simple as what is our intent? DH: Our leaders and our units have done a magnificent job of learning and adapting to changing operational environments. Our role as a proponent is to build capability to support whatever it is that commanders need to do in all types of operations and theaters of operations. What weve learned over these past seven years of combat experience and what is foreseeable for years to come, is that we need to emphasize and build capabilities

in three areas: 1) earn the trust and confidence of relevant and friendly publics; 2) win the centuries-long contest of wills with adversaries and potential adversaries; and, 3) win the contest for IT and the electromagnetic spectrum. These three overarching competencies will serve a commander well in all types of operations and theaters. In a sense its how commanders arrange all the tools in their kitbag in their unique operational environmentat times they may need to push much harder on one side or another depending on the scale of the operation. Thats the art and science of our business. IOS: In a time where were being stretched to the limit, in both people and resources, how is the Coalition still pulling off some impressive success? DH: Thats certainly a testament to our leadership across DOD and, most importantly, the tremendous service and sacrifice of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, DOD Civilians, Contractors, and their families. Were in the people business, and our people have the most to do with that success. Its an amazing team. IOS: Lets talk about the makeup of some the Army IO team. The services have taken different tracks in building

Winter 2009

IO specialists. You mentioned earlier you plan to have quite a few students from other services and Allied countries going through the FA 30 courses. How do you see that evolving? DH: We have a very strong ABCA [American, British, Canadian, Australian] IO community. We had an especially good recent conference over in the UK, and I met with all the coalition reps at the 2008 Worldwide IO Conference. Their defense establishments view IO somewhat differently than we do, but in many respects is the views are very similar. The UK and the US share the same strong emphasis on engagement, and focusing on populations at the local level, and thats encouraging. But, lets not discount the technical side of IO, because were going to need that allied capability going back to that balloon analogy of just how much is enough. We will be learning from each other, all the services, interagency, interagency, and coalition partners. IOS: You mentioned earlier about IO practitioners needing a range of abilities. Yet our focus seems to still be in two camps, either technicallyfocused or influencefocusedgoing down one track or another. The Army also has an EW Proponent, so how do those communities get along? DH: Doctrine is changing just as those relationships change. The Army certainly needs to build that E W c a p a b i l i t y, a s demonstrated in the current campaigns [primarily countering improvised explosive devices]. But, we can take advantage of the relationship between the technical side and the human cognitive side - even if were not

yet sure what that relationship looks like. Thats why were hosting a number of these upcoming symposia, to explore what that environment looks like, and how we can best understand it. Well be working a lot with the ARCIC [Army Capabilities and Integration Center] in 2009 to conduct some in-depth analysis, to look for gaps in our DOTMLPF domain, and I think well begin to understand what that relationship is. I think were going to see a lot of good input from both communities, and as you put it earlier, from both sides of the brain. IOS: As a proponent, youre charged with bringing a positive message, but you sound like you mean it. DH: The future of these mission areas and their corresponding career fields is bright! The Army has recognized

how important they are. FM 3-0, the Armys capstone operations doctrine published in Feb 2008, establishes information as an element of combat powerthat is huge! It is recognition of what weve learned, that is, we have to be as skilled in the art and science of using constructive power as we are in the use of destructive force to accomplish the mission and promote conditions that lead to a state of persistent security. Thats true today and its our vision of the foreseeable future. The men and women that comprise this still-nascent mission area are truly the warriors of the 21st Century. IOS: That is certainly a great way to wrap up our time here. Sir, thank you for taking time to visit. DH: My pleasure; glad we had the opportunity to talk.

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Operations Security in an Age of Radical Transparency


By Dennis M. Murphy

e often hearken back to the Cold War as a simpler time not because of the danger it portended, but because of the nature of the threat. That bipolar world defined a clear enemy with an order of battle that could be templated and processes and methodologies that could be studied. It was a two dimensional world of good and bad. Operations security (OPSEC), defined as select(ing) and execut(ing) measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation, was equally cut and dry. But, oh how the world has changed. Not only is the adversary often an amorphous entity, he also both understands and exploits a new environment that empowers him with information as an asymmetric weapon of choice. Those factors certainly complicate the military operating environment of today, but the waters are muddied further when non-combatants can willingly, or unwittingly, impact operations through ready access to realtime media means. Further complicating matters is a generation of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who expect to use new media to communicate freely, at the click of a mouse, to a potentially global audience. The result is a situation that significantly increases the complexity of OPSEC, demanding commanders emphasis to mitigate risk and protect friendly operations while still allowing the ability to effectively fight and win the war of ideas. The answer lies by focusing on OPSEC within the current military planning process and increased attention to educating soldiers to enhance and protect military operations. The Information Environment: A Two Edged Sword

The current information environment has leveled the playing field for not only nation states, but non-state actors, multinational corporations and even individuals to affect strategic outcomes with minimal information infrastructure and little capital expenditure. Even a

cursory look at advances in technology confirms what most people recognize as a result of their daily routine. The ability to access, collect, and transmit information is clearly decentralized to the lowest level (the individual). Anyone with a camera cell phone and personal digital device with Internet capability understands this. The technology is increasingly smaller, faster and cheaper. Consequently, the ability to control and verify information is much more limited than in the recent past. Nor will it get any easier. And, while Internet penetration in some of the most contentious parts of the world is certainly limited, it is growing exponentially. Africa has only a 4.7% Internet penetration based on population, but the use of the Internet grew 883% there from 2000 to 2007. Dramatic growth rates are similarly occurring in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Technological advances such as the use of television white space for wireless Internet usage and the $100 laptop project provide just a sampling of innovation that will place the World Wide Web in the hands of the underdeveloped world; the same world where future United States conflicts might occur. This is not to ignore the impact of cell phone telephony. The cell phone as a means of mobile technology, is increasingly available worldwide and deserves discussion as a potentially potent capability to affect national security and military issues; arguably even more so than the Internet. So, increasingly, anyone in the world can become an iReporter uploading their photos and stories to the Web with the ability to reach a worldwide audience. This same explosion of information technology that has enabled individuals around the world is certainly embraced and exploited by junior soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. The Pew Internet and American Life Project shows a dramatic increase in the number of U.S. adults online beginning in 1995. Considering the age of most

enlistees and junior officers, it seems safe to say that they have grown up with the Internet as an integral part of their lives. Consequently, soldiers expect to use new media to communicate today. This includes the use of social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook among others, as well as active participation in Web logs (blogs). This same propensity to see the use of information technology as an immutable given of daily human intercourse has had interesting second order effects. Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that many young people have lost the distinction between the public and private domains, posting entries to new media sites that result in both personal and professional scrutiny and dilemmas. Access to immediate information in the hands of the many, along with a cultural attitude by military members regarding its use, presents new and important challenges to the warfighting commander. In this era of radical transparency, where absolute control may be impossible, military leaders must effectivelyand activelymanage OPSEC. OPSEC and Strategic Communication: Mitigating Risk while Exploiting Information In the past OPSEC involved controlling soldiers; today it applies to anyone with access to new media in the military operating environment. Contractors, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the local indigenous population (among others) with cell phones can report real time information on military operations immediately to any number of sources. While this is readily evident in counterinsurgency operations, it is increasing relevant across the spectrum of military operations given the proliferation of new media means. Therefore, it is essential to consider OPSEC in the military planning process in order to mitigate the risk posed by the

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ubiquity of new media. Risk assessment is an integral part of joint planning. It begins during mission analysis and continues through course of action development, wargaming, and course of action comparison and selection, where risk mitigation is specifically considered. Given the significant risks posed by non-combatants with Internet or cell phone capability the chances of real time public release of friendly actions and vulnerabilities are considerable and easily subject to enemy exploitation. Consequently, risk and actions to mitigate it must be considered throughout the planning process with an increasing and special emphasis on OPSEC. Savvy commanders, aware of the challenges posed by the information environment may choose to mitigate the OPSEC risk through the use of tactical deception, but this comes with potentially significant second and third order effects to other warfighting capabilities. DOD defines strategic communication as: Focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other element of national power. Parsing the definition to its essential parts, strategic communication is the integration of actions, images and words to send a message in order to affect perceptions, attitudes and ultimately behaviors. So, while deception can certainly aid in the security of an operation, it can also negate the credibility of any future messages the command wishes to send in an effort to persuade or influence the indigenous population in particular. The strategic communication effort is about trust and credibility and is critical to swaying a fence sitting population to friendly presence, especially in a counterinsurgency. Maintaining OPSEC within the purview of the military unit would seemingly be an easier task, perhaps no

different than in the past. But, once again, it should be viewed with an eye toward the impact on strategic communication. Blogs and social networking sites provide a forum to tell the militarys story, often by the most credible sources: the soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines themselves. These first hand stories become extremely important in todays information environment as a means to counter and provide an alternative to the negative reporting often found in the mainstream media. But risk aversion with an eye toward OPSEC often stymies the effort. Past military policies in Iraq have been restrictive and often discouraged blogging rather than encouraging it. In May 2008, Army Lieutenant Matthew Gallaghers blog Kaboom was taken down by his leadership after he recounted an anonymous exchange between himself and his commander without first seeking approval prior to posting. The site had received tens of thousands of page views about the day-to-day life of an Army platoon in the war zone prior to its demise. MySpace and Facebook, as previously noted, receive plenty of press about their transparency and the adverse effect of personal disclosure in the wrong hands. And so both blogs and social networks present operations security issues for commanders, rightly concerned about maintaining the secrecy of military operations, capabilities and vulnerabilities. A risk mitigation process must be established then, that can allow soldiers to tell the good news stories, while protecting OPSEC. Army Lieutenant General Bill C a l d w e l l (interestingly using a blog as his medium of choice) offers some advice in this regard. He proffers that commanders should encourage soldiers to tell their

stories; empower them by underwriting honest mistakes, specifically noting that leaders need to assume risk here; educate them on potential strategic implications of engagement (to include OPSEC) and; equip them to engage the new media. Conclusion The rapid evolution of the information environment ensures that future military operations will be increasingly complex. Our adversaries have shown both a significant ability and propensity to exploit information using new media means as an asymmetric weapon of choice. Additionally, non-combatants wield information as power as cell phone and Internet access proliferate. The U.S. military must fight back against this. But there are both challenges and opportunities in doing so. First, the commander, no longer in complete control of OPSEC, must place increasing emphasis on risk mitigation within the military planning process to protect against the release of friendly actions and vulnerabilities, and he must do so considering the second order effects on strategic communication. Second, as he has always done in the past, he must educate his soldiers, now specifically about the OPSEC considerations of new media, while empowering them to fight the war of ideas. This balance of risk mitigation to both protect OPSEC while leveraging information is essential to exploiting success in the current and future military operating environment.

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Being a Bad Influence: 1944 or 2009?


By The Office of Strategic Services Editors Note: The following is an extract from an OSS manual, describing workplace sabotage methods. It may serve as insight into our adversaries methods, and as a semi-humorous warning to us. General Interference with Organizations and Production Organizations and Conferences (1) Insist on doing everything through channels. Never permit short-cuts to be taken in order to expedite decisions. (2) Make speeches. Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Illustrate your points by long anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences. Never hesitate to make a few appropriate patriotic comments. (3) When possible, refer all matters to committees, for further study and consideration. Attempt to make the committees as large as possible never less than five. (4) Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible. (5) Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions. (6) Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to re-open the question of the advisability of that decision. (7) Advocate caution. Be reasonable and urge your fellow-conferees to be reasonable and avoid haste which might result in embarrassments or difficulties later on. (8) Be worried about the propriety of any decision raise the question of whether such action as is contemplated lies within the jurisdiction of the group or whether it might conflict with the policy of some higher echelon. Managers and Supervisors (1) Demand written orders. (2) Misunderstand orders. Ask endless questions or engage in long correspondence about such orders. Quibble over them when you can. (3) Do everything possible to delay the delivery of orders. Even though parts of an order may be ready beforehand, dont deliver it until it is completely ready. (4) Dont order new working materials until your current stocks have been virtually exhausted, so that the slightest delay in filling your order will mean a shutdown. (5) Order high-quality materials which are hard to get. If you dont get them argue about it. Warn that inferior materials will mean inferior work. (6) In making work assignments, always sign out the unimportant jobs first. See that the important jobs are assigned to inefficient workers of poor machines. (7) Insist on perfect work in relatively unimportant products; send back for refinishing those which have the least flaw. Approve other defective parts whose flaws are not visible to the naked eye. (8) Make mistakes in routing so that parts and materials will be sent to the wrong place in the plant. (9) When training new workers, give incomplete or misleading instructions. (10) To lower morale and with it, production, be pleasant to inefficient workers; give them undeserved promotions. Discriminate against efficient workers; complain unjustly about their work. (11) Hold conferences when there is more critical work to be done. (12) Multiply paper work in plausible ways. Start duplicate files. (13) Multiply the procedures and clearances involved in issuing instructions, pay checks, and so on. See that three people have to approve everything where one would do. (14) Apply all regulations to the last letter. Office Workers (1) Make mistakes in quantities of material when you are copying orders. Confuse similar names. Use wrong addresses. (2) Prolong correspondence with government bureaus. (3) Misfile essential documents. (4) In making carbon copies, make one too few, so that an extra copying job will have to be done. (5) Tell important callers the boss is busy or talking on another telephone. (6) Hold up mail until the next collection. (7) Spread disturbing rumors that sound like inside dope. Employees (1) Work slowly. Think out ways to increase the number of movements necessary on your job: use a light hammer instead of a heavy one, try to make a small wrench do when a big one is necessary, use little force where considerable force is needed. (2) Contrive as many interruptions to your work as you can: when changing the material on which you are working, as you would on a lathe or punch, take needless time to do it. If you are cutting, shaping or doing other measured work, measure dimensions twice as often as you need to. When you go to the lavatory, spend a longer time there than is necessary. Forget tools so that you will have to go back after them. (3) Even if you understand the language, pretend not to understand instructions in a foreign tongue. (4) Pretend that instructions are hard to understand, and ask to have them repeated more than once. Or pretend that you are particularly anxious to do your work, and pester the foreman with unnecessary questions. (5) Do your work poorly and blame it on bad tools, machinery, or equipment. Complain that these things are preventing you from doing your job right. (6) Never pass on your skill and experience to a new or less skillful worker.

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Winter 2009

Countering Internet Extremism


By Mr. Timothy L. Thomas Editorial Abstract: The author examines the modern informational environment, and introduces the concept of contemporary extremist work as a type of living influence laboratory. He focuses on a specific Web-based counter-ideology example, then presents a methodology to address specific cyber audiences. Introduction Unless the US crafts a strategy that stymies long-term ideological radicalization among large numbers of Muslim youth, Americas long war against terrorism is likely to be just that. Several issues of seemingly benign importance eventually emerged as significant activities when the US and its coalition partners went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 and 2001. One of those issues was extremists use of the Internetthat transnational communication device. Warning signs of this emerging capability and its influence on events were observed earlier during the Chechen-Russian conflict in the 1990s and in early 2000. Chechen use of the Web enabled them to win over public opinion in the early stages of the conflict, and secure an information warfare victory. Extremists use of the Internet has developed rapidly since the ChechenRussian conflict. Now they are more creative, and more importantly, more persuasive in their methods to recruit members, gain financial support, and provide proof of success. The extremists task has been made easier since coalition forces are stationed in countries where their understanding of culture and the means of spreading information is less informed. Extremists, on the other hand, tap into both culture and media methods. Extremists have demonstrated their military capabilities online (their use of video to demonstrate the effectiveness of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and sniper attacks against coalition forces come to mind) and in their use of clerics and imams to justify their actions to the Arab world. Internet videos, postings on You Tube, recruiting on My Space, and other such methods have been effective. Recruiters even hand out CDs and DVDs of key speeches and events, at low or no cost, further supporting this cognitive movement. The coalition response to these measures has been constant but sporadic in the types of organizations involved. First, there is the usual list of players with information operations expertise that have been involved since the beginning: the 1st IO Command, psychological operations groups, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, the National Security Agency, DIA and CIA analysts, US think tanks such as RAND, and many others. Second, there has been a constant effort by non-government and government agencies to relook the problem of extremist organizations for decades now. A host of new measures and efforts have joined this group since 1989: In 1989 Ben Venzke developed IntelCenter, which has monitored Al Qaeda and other terrorist movement worldwide both before and after 9/11 In 1998 the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) was founded. It monitors and analyzes various trends, to include terrorism, in the Middle East press. It has an Islamist Website Monitoring project In 1999 the job of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was created (occupied by Charlotte Beers, Margaret Tutwiler, and Karen Hughes, three very powerful but marginally effective undersecretaries, from October 2001-November 2007) to develop a State Department effort to put out the US message to the Arab world, mostly via TV and radio stations In 2002 Rita Katz and Josh Devon formed the Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) intelligence group, to follow terrorist activities In 2003 the US Army developed Counterterrorism Center at West Point, to follow extremist thought by looking at the books terrorists put online In 2004-2005 the Defense Department hired contractors such as the Lincoln Group to find stringers to write proWestern stories In 2005-2006, DoD conceived and developed Human Terrain Teams, tasked to interact with the population, to better understand the culture and traditions of the area In 2006 an Internet Radicalization Task Force was created at the Homeland Security Policy Institute, to develop a report on how to de-radicalize the Web; the report was delivered to Congress Specific websites were developed to combat terrorist use of the Internet such as info@stopterroristmedia.org US government elements developed a strategic communications plan. Some of these groups have been more successful than others. Some merely monitor the situation while others make recommendations to counter extremist use of the Internet. The difficulty in successfully neutering extremist use of the Internet is evident from our daily experiences. For example, in spite of all of these resourcesplus all of the money the west has thrown into information (read Internet) securityan individual known as Irhabi 007, sitting in a room in London in front of a monitor, still operated successfully and was effective until the time of his capture. The advantages of using the Internet (anonymity, use of cut -outs, masking of server use, movement from personal computer to cyber caf, etc.) enable extremists to make it very difficult to find them. This article will examine briefly the environment in which extremists now operate (ideological and technical), Winter 2009

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outline what issues we must counter, and summarize/review efforts to date to counter, neuter, or cauterize extremists use of the Internet by coalition forces and governments worldwide. Progress is being made, but it is uncertain if the restrictions on Western democracies in particular (legal, moral, etc.) and the difficulties in countering Internet advantages will ever be able to fully contain online extremism.

available as freeware, or via software packages such as Windows, Movie Maker, and Adobe Acrobat. All can be downloaded at will or purchased at minimal cost. Such applications do not require the expense of a college course to access them, just access to the Web. The systems that run the extremists experiments were created by others, and provided free of charge. Extremists not only share our networks but easily exploit them. It The Environment would be fair to state that extremists go Information technologies enable by the law of we can use your systems, extremists to achieve many goals that you cant use ours, as witnessed by would have been unimaginable in the extremists use of Yahoos free online 1970s. These technologies have been newsgroups (to distribute communiqus), used to initiate IEDs, to communicate MySpace, and YouTube among many (via cell phones or on the Internet), to others. Stateless information labs bypass employ high-tech deception operations, censorship and regulations as well as to filter news and information for the traditional cultural norms of restraint, people of the Middle East, and to and do what they can to prevent influence Western opinion. Such non-sympathizers from accessing flexibility allows development their net niche. of new uses as required. Yet the Third, just as plants need influence aspect of information fertile soil, the environment technologies merits the greatest must possess a rich and adaptive attention. ideological atmosphere. Without Several elements of the this, it is impossible to fertilize environment have changed the cognitive aspects of their dramatically since the 1970s, and target audience. Instigators create strongly support an extremists this atmosphere by developing influence of cognitive activities. specific images and messages in First, information laboratories their information labs, offering (computers) inhabit our work their slanted and prejudiced Persuasion helps counter extremism. (Defense Link) place, homes, and relaxation perceptions of reality to selected stops (coffee shops, etc.). It is here vitally important in developing both the target audiences. Sophisticated tools that extremists influence operations technological support and know-how/ mentioned above make this job easier. take place. A lab used to be a place message appropriate for each target. Content filters ensure only certain in a scientific research organization Information labs in the right hands viewpoints are available on some sites. or a university where one went to provide sustenance to the cause, offer Cognitive activities are sprinkled with test theories and make discoveries meaning to ones existence, provide warnings about the dangers of other using Bunsen burners and microscopes. proof of success, and offer personal thoughts or ideologies to ones soul Entire buildings were assembled to examples of heroism and martyrdom. and afterlife. Al Qaeda and other run simulations. The modern day These experimental workshops are the insurgent groups offer specific and information lab consists of a desk or combustion chambers that spawn interest unique ideologies that fit selected organic laptop. Experiments can be run on real in events, and motivate supporters to social movements. life situations (via virtual environments extraordinary actions. This is a persuasive Fourth, the environment is like SIMS and Second Life) and perform form of effects-based operations of the organized differently than in the past. much of the work that simulation labs mind. The formation of radical media brigades used to do. Images can be manipulated Second, there is minimal or no indicates creation of a new combat according to the creators wish or to fit cost involved in using tools to shape space, wherein the rules of civilized a product. Information labs move the the environment. In the past, tools news organizations do not apply. For individual from being just a TV, radio, used in laboratories were expensive. that reason, the propaganda videos and or newspapers information consumer, to Now information laboratory tools are photos are often of a shocking nature being producers, users, and interpreters (through interactions such as blogs) of information that shapes or socializes the followers world views. Theories are tested and discoveries made that have real world consequences, which may or may not be in line with the common good. Access to these devices empowers an extremists active operations. One can even use the computer monitor to watch Al Qaeda TV right at home. The labs can explain why, how, when, and even where to fight in an open or anonymous manner. These labs serve as cyber mobilizers for people of like thought, but they cyber mobilize fence sitters as well. This is performed through personal messages or mass circulation Internet journals or papers. The lab is an environment where cultural knowledge of the target audience is

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in regard to beheading, throat slitting, and other online slaughter techniques. This new combat space is a cognitive battle space without laws, rules, and regulationsoperating via manipulation, filters, and fear. Further, this environment is a transnational communication and influence network. It empowers anyone with an opinion on anything to post their thoughts, and may be read by one individual or by millions. Revered authority figures such as religious leaders can lead followers to specific websites or postings. However, anonymous postings can also have tremendous impact on entire groups of people, if presented properly (that is, with a message that strikes a nerve in a specific cultural setting). Chatrooms or bulletin boards host the bulk of such postings. This experimental lab in your living room has other uses as well. It can intimidate or taunt rivals with the click of a mouse, persuade fence-sitters to accept a cause based on the evidence presented, allow access to some information but deny access to other sources, and allow for the social networking of criminals and other extremists. These virtual transnational labs have eliminated much of the need for physical training camps (due to the spread of online training material) and thus inhibit law enforcement agencies from detecting where, and in what form, extremist groups operate. What Must Be Countered? To counter terrorist use of the Web, it helps to understand the logic that informs an extremists use of technology. One could literally examine hundreds of books and speeches. Since the purpose of this work is examining ways to counter an extremists Internet use of the Internet rather than counter-ideology as a whole, well look at only one example. The work of ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri (also known as Mustafa Abd alQadir Mustafa Husayn, Umar Abd al-Hakim, and Mustafa Setmariam Nassar), is representative of this ideology. Al-Suri believes jihad must be comprehensive and utilize military, political, media, civil, and ideological 16

tools. First, media resources can be used to establish resistance blockades that keep the enemy (Western countries) from corrupting Islamic institutions, o rg a n i z a t i o n s , a n d i d e a s w h i l e radicalizing Muslim masses. Second, in addition to the main platforms of the Internet and satellite TV, al-Suri recommends sending written statements that call on Muslims to join the Global Islamic Resistance; to publish works on military and training curricula (e-mail contact lists, CD-ROMs, DVDs, etc.); to translate works into other languages; and to disseminate scholarly writing that supports the spirit of resistance, including opinions regarding the enemies of jihad.

Al Qaeda on the Web. (Alneda.com) Obviously analysts should conduct an in-depth study of al-Suris rhetoric and ideological reasoning instead of the short, truncated list offered here. With regard to technical issues, Jarret Brachman, Director of Research at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy, West Point New York, listed twelve key aspects of a terrorists use of technology: 1. Extremist posts of insurgent job openings on the Web 2. Extremist posts of motivational imagery that cyber mobilizes insurgents or wanna-be insurgents 3. Extremist downloads of scripted talking points about religious justifications for waging jihad 4. Breaking news posted from a jihadist point of view 5. Extremist posts of links to attack videos

6. Al Qaeda friendly news cast calls that criticize Arab governments collaborating with Jews and Christians and discuss goals of the jihadi movement or establishment of the Voice of the Caliphate. 7. Mobile Internet services offering selected news content via cell phones. 8. Extremist links to several Al Qaeda magazines containing instructions on communications, tactics, and explosives 9. Extremists links to instructions on jihadi websites on how to use software packages and encryption devices and video editing 10. Computer programmer launches of stand alone Web browsing software that allows searches only on particular sites. These efforts to bound jihadi ideological space by intellectually separating them from other areas of cyberspace allows them to become more dogmatic and isolated 11. Extremist protocol offers on how to safely use the Internet. These countermeasures help identify how other governments penetrate their use of software chat programs (such as Microsoft Messenger and PalTalk) and advise readers not to use Saudi Arabian e-mail addresses but rather use anonymous Hotmail and Yahoo accounts. 12. Extremist posts on how to use video games to reach the young, and instill in them the hope of reaching extremist goals such as a global Islamic caliphate. The more realistic the game, the less dissonance players feel between the game and the world around them. Video games harmonize reality with the need to catalyze awareness of the Muslim requirement to resist. To be successful, Coalition members must find ways to counter these uses. Further, we must find ways to counter jihadi-themed books, recruitment, and propaganda materials that can be downloaded via cell phone. Another good extremist technology reference comes from author Remy Mauduit, editor of the US Air Forces Air & Space Power Journal French edition. Mauduit spent five years in Winter 2009

an insurgency and guerrilla leadership position during the 1954-1962 Algerian War, and published a book on insurgency and counterinsurgency based upon his hands-on experience. In 2008 he wrote on the effects-based information battle in the Muslim world, including issues that Westerners must learn to countersuch as the seemingly benign Islamic rhetoric that serves as a cover for nationalist, antiimperialist, and reformist objectives. Such messages include denunciations of the injustices, corruption, and tyranny that have characterized the reigning oligarchies in the Islamic world. Methods To Counter Or Neuter Extremists Use Of The Internet There is no shortage of ideas on how to counter or neuter an extremists use of the Internet. Of course, none can be designed to totally eliminate such use. Yet several sources offered below provide differing perspectives on how to counter extremist Internet use. A 2008 New York Times article indirectly offers some methods. Writers Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker discussed weaknesses of insurgent movements, and while not presented as counteractions, these are easily derived: 1. Muting Al Qaeda messages (ways to do so were not offered) 2. Turning jihadi movements own weaknesses against the movement 3. Illuminating Al Qaeda errors 4. Planting bogus e-mail messages and website postings to sow confusion, dissent, and distrust among militant organizations 5. Amplifying the speeches and writings of prominent Islamic clerics who renounce terrorist violence; persuading Muslims not to support terrorists through messages such as that from Abdul-Aziz el-Sherif, who wrote a book renouncing violent jihad on legal and religious grounds 6. Identifying territory that terrorists hold dear, to include emotional territory such as a terrorists reputation or credibility with Muslims, and damaging that territory 7. Identifying and manipulating or destroying terrorist terrain, which at the moment is the Web

8. Using captured computer hard drives to learn how to develop counter-messages to extremists plans or speeches 9. Releasing seized videotapes showing terrorist brainwashing sessions with children (extremist camps for children, hate cartoons, etc.) and training sessions with children teaching them to kidnap or kill 10. Releasing letters that demonstrate poor morale within their organization 11. Looking at a militants culture, family associations, or religion to determine what dishonors them and undermines their rhetoric on the Web 12. Taking away extremists popular or theological legitimacy for actions such as the moral legitimacy of using weapons of mass destruction 13. Persuading extremist support networks to stop offering assistance to extremists and holding these support networks accountable if they do not 14. Perfecting technical systems that identify the source of unconventional weapons or their components. A March 2008 effort, attributed only to US authorities, was implied from a post to the Islamist website http:// www.al-farooq.net/ (currently hosted by SoftLayer Technologies Inc., Dallas, Texas, USA). In a message posted 27 February, administrators claimed US authorities had contacted both the website administrator and its US host to pressure them to remove jihadi content, saying that if they do not, the site will be shut down. Actually, this can be a very effective way to keep server operators from allowing someone to use their network. Earlier, in February 2008, Colleen Graffy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, US State Department, was quoted by author Bud Goodall as asserting that the main problem with US public diplomacy is getting the word out. Successes in the public diplomacy world from Graffys view include nine elements: a European Union news alert system, a rapid response unit, a streamlined approval process for ambassadors media appearance requests, new media hubs in Brussels, Dubai, and London, a new

TV studio, a European liaison position, a pre-active approach to media, a TV adviser position, and a Senior Adviser on Muslim engagement. In spite of this rather broad range of options offered by Graffy, Goodall finds the Deputys remarks out of touch with US strategic communication needs. His take on the problem is that it is more important to use active engagement through a pragmatic complexity model than to merely get visual, or get the message out. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former CIA case officer, is recognized for his work on extremist mindsets, and potential ways to influence them. In March/April 2008 he wrote that in the past mobilization occurred by face-to-face networks that caused a small number of people to become extremists. Today, online radicalization substitutes for face-to-face radicalization, allowing extremists to get support and validation. Sageman notes these virtual marketplaces of extremist ideas are the invisible hand that is organizing extremist activities worldwide. The leader of this violent social movementattracting younger members and now womenis not a person, but the collective discourse appearing on half a dozen influential forums. Each network acts according to its own understanding, however, and Al Qaeda Central cannot impose discipline on these third-wave wannabes, mostly because it does not know who they are. Thus their collective actions do not amount to much. Sageman believes these people thrive only at the abstract fantasy level, making them vulnerable to whatever may diminish their appeal among the young. Thus Sageman sees real opportunity for countering these movements if we construct the correct message, particularly if these separate groups cannot coalesce into a physical movement. Sageman concludes that a leaderless social movement is at the mercy of its participants. The main threat to the movements existence is that its appeal is self-limiting. What appeals to one generation may not appeal to the next. Extremists and their messages must be demilitarized (deny young men the glory

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of fighting uniformed soldiers of the sole remaining superpower) and reduced to the image of common criminals stripped of glory; extremism is about death and destruction, not fame. Counterextremism voices must encourage opportunity and reject violence. It is necessary to show young people they can address hopes, dreams, and grievances, without violence. Remy Mauduit, noted above, recommended that the Department of Defense establish a permanent Islamic Information Center to assess, develop, disseminate, and coordinate information to the international Muslim public. Long term objectives would be to promote democracy, good governance, freedom, and human rights in the Muslim world. Short-range objectives would be letting the Muslim world know that the US continues to help it through repetitive broadcasting of the various humanitarian missions it organizes and runs. Themes to use and target audiences are: Supporting civil-society institutions Supporting both secularists and moderate Islamists Discrediting extremist ideology Delegitimizing individuals and positions associated with extremists by challenging their interpretation of Islam and promoting divisions among extremists by encouraging journalists to investigate issues of corruption, hypocrisy, and immorality in extremist and terrorist circles. Focusing on young people, Muslim minorities in the West, women, and the pious traditionalist populations, educating Muslims and non-Muslims alike on critical questions related to the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Finally in February 2008, journalist Sharon Weinberger wrote that the gravest strategic lapse of the US government has been its anemicif not selfdestructiveeffort to create and exploit divisions within and among jihadi groups, discredit their ideology, promote alternative Islamic voices, and isolate Islamic extremists. Weinberger seems to highlight the very themes that Maudit recommended. She states the US has

failed to effectively counter portrayals of America as an aggressive, predatory force that poses a threat to Islam. The US government should stand up an independent agency to plan and orchestrate a coherent, national-level strategic communication strategy. All of this assumes, she notes, that the US government can compete with the global information market. Frank Cilluffo, Chairman of the Homeland Security Institutes Radicalization of the Internet project, discussed his commissions findings in IO Sphere journal [Summer 2007, p. 14.] He noted that there are several ways to neuter terrorist use of the Web. His ideas were both more general, and yet in line with many recommendations that were to appear in 2008: 1. Understand the narrative and context of an extremist, why it resonates 2. Use all resourcesno agency owns the mission 3. Defeat networks with networks, not a supercomputer 4. Use all elements of statecraft, not just the military 5. Remove terrorist masterminds 6. Offer opportunity to those who could be seduced by a terrorist message 7. Allow former jihadists to come forward and denounce terrorism 8. Substitute a new concept for the term GWOT (which to Cilluffo is as bad as the term crusader since it allows extremists to feel like warriors). Terminology matters 9. Require Islamic scholars to offer a counter dialogue 10. Find how to prevent someone from going from a sympathizer, to an activist, to indiscriminate violence. Discrediting extremism through religion is one option 11. Drive wedges between and among extremist and terrorist organizations (isolate planners from organizations, organizations from one another, and from society at large). Also in 2007, Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson, writing in Joint Force Quarterly, noted several US Government efforts to counter

or delegitimize extremist use of the Internet. First, the State Department maintains a website in a number of languages devoted to countering false stories that appear in extremist sources, and countering disinformation that may end up in mainstream media. Second, military units conduct operational level influence operations for a long period of time. Lachow and Richardson discussed the utility of viewing the War of Ideas as equal in importance to military and law enforcement aspects of the fight. Finally, they recommended trying to find specific language with which to label Salafist extremists, such as irhabists (terrorist) conducting hirabah (unholy war) instead of muhjahideen conducting jihad; they recommended promoting the views of well-respected Muslim clerics who counter terrorist claims. Lachow and Richardson support attempts to undermine Internet-based terrorist influence operations and counters to a terrorists operational use of the Net. Conclusions The consensus of experts appears to be that the use of secular or moderate religious figures or scholars have the most potential to effectively counter extremist Internet use. Such efforts could help to stifle some of the issues that extremists magnify in the Internet environment (death and destruction, Koranic verses of motivation). Getting secular or moderate figures online can help counter an insurgents recruiting ability, and search for financial donations. Notably, several religious figures have recently been highlighted as contributing to this effort. Writing from prison in November 2007, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif published the book On Rationalizations on Jihad in Egypt and the World. Al-Sharif was a former aide to Al Qaeda second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. His counterextremism piece states it is religiously unlawful to use violence to overthrow Islamic governments. Another important figure, Sheikh Abd Al-Aziz bin Abdallah Aal Al-Sheikh, highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia, issued a October 2007 fatwah [Islamic legal pronouncement] prohibiting Saudi youth from engaging

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Winter 2009

in jihad abroad. Also in autumn 2007, Saudi cleric Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, wrote an open letter condemning Usama bin Laden. All of these individuals have had a strong impact on countering extremist recruitment and spread of their propaganda online. Limiting the manner in which the Internet can shape opinions, through offering other information or sources that are deemed offensive to an insurgents cause, can certainly help the Coalition effort. Advanced societies have developed the virtual transnational communication network that insurgents can use at no or limited cost, and we must offset their efforts if the US hopes to succeed in the ongoing War of Ideas. Today, terrorists are toying with the use of the virtual environment created by Linden Lab and known as Second Life (SL) [see Exploring Second Life, Cory Ondrejka Interview, IO Sphere Fall 2007, p. 25]. A terrorist envisions SL as a means to communicate, launder money, or recruit individuals. There are measures in place to thwart this effort. First, Ken Driefach, Linden Labs Deputy General Counsel, states that there are systems in place to monitor avatar activities and identify gaming behavior that may support a terrorist cause. Second, SL users can help counter terrorist use of the virtual gaming environment by monitoring information and communications exchanged among players and their activities. Finally, undercover operations could be initiated to provide information on groups with jihadist tendencies. Since the most often discussed solution to challenge insurgents is the use of clerics or imams to issue decrees, perhaps this option would also work in SLs virtual mosques? The Second Life case shows a small sample of other law enforcement issues. First, there are technological challenges. Insurgents skip from server to server, use anonymity as a friend, hide in chatrooms, move from one neutral computer source to another, and enter friendly systems at will to recruit or look for financial support. Second, Western nations must contend with extremist ideology that rejects anything other than their way of living and thinking.

To counter an extremists use of the Internet, the Coalition needs to develop and execute the correct combination of constraining, monitoring, and deceiving extremists. Identifying which servers extremist groups use allows Coalition members to shut down those servers, and force (or even guide) an extremist to a new host. This constrains an extremists activities, making it much more difficult to connect with their online user base and communicate new plans and activities. Monitoring allows one to get an inside look at how plans are developing. Insurgents use of the Internet can also simply be shut down. Both of these options might involve deception, but the best use of deception is simply infiltrating a group and pretending to be someone you arent. What about limiting content? If extremists are not provided material or video footage, they lose a major mobilizing factor. Simply making things more painful for extremists by disrupting communications should have a countering effect on their Internet activities. Most significant of all, an extremist recommends ways to limit the ability of insurgents to communicate. Abu Yahaya al-Libi offered tips for better prosecuting the war of ideas against Al Qaeda. He noted that to defeat Al Qaeda, it was necessary to follow six steps: Focus on amplifying cases of exJihadists who have willingly renounced the use of armed action and recanted their previously held ideological commitments

Amplify Al Qaedas mistakes, fabricate other mistakes, and ensure that any extremist group is used, not just Al Qaeda. Using other groups to serve propaganda purposes is known as widening the circle Governments prompting of mainstream Muslim clerics to issue fatwas (religious rulings) that incriminate the movement and their actions Strengthening and backing Islamic movements far removed from the fight, particularly those with a democratic approach Aggressively neutralizing or discrediting the guiding thinkers of the jihadist movement Spinning the minor disagreements among leaders or radical organizations as being major doctrinal and methodological disputes. Al-Libi thus indicates the best way to influence an extremist movement is to strangle it by tying it up in knots. It is unclear why he would develop such options for countering an insurgents use of the Internetbravado is one possibility. Another possibility is that he was merely regurgitating all that was written in 2007 about methods to counter insurgent Internet access and use. Governments should force Al Qaeda into a series of compromising positions from a variety of angles so that it hangs itself over the long term. Hopefully the US Strategic Communication plan, and the organizations it will spawn in this new year, will be able to implement this strategy in an innovative manner.

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