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Fast Conditional Syllogism Aff

I affirm the resolution, RESOLVED: Justice requires the recognition of animal rights. Animal rights contains an infinite number of varying definitions and interpretations. Some define it as an animals right not to be hunted; others as a movement which frees all animals; still others as the claim that animals have moral capacities. I define animal rights as the rights of animals to be treated as equally valuable to humans. This constitutes the fairest definition: First, because Im affirming a broadest scope of the resolution the argument that animals have equal value to that of humans offers multiple ways to arrive at that conclusion. Second, my definition allows the most ground for negative clash because Im not limiting my scope of affirmation to one or two types of animal rights or violations. Third, my definition blends and synthesizes a still unresolved conflict about what animal rights really means. The resolution poses a statement of fact for verification or denial. Traditional value and criterion case structures cannot meaningfully answer a question of truth. A criterion by its nature evaluates competing advocacies as a sieve for the importance of arguments and impact analysis. (Because the resolution is a statement of fact it asks the judge yes or no, rather than which of the two, to the necessity of animal rights, we must evaluate the resolution as an objective test of my advocacy, rather than a competition for net benefits and comparative advantages.) Value criteria necessarily limit debate because they arbitrarily exclude the consideration of arguments which dont relate to them. In resolutions such as this where a comparison does not appear necessary, theres no reason to preclude relevant or persuasive arguments merely because they bear no relation to an arbitrary filter we choose at the beginning of the round. Observation 1: The Negative advocacy of a value in this round promotes institutional coercion. Pierre Schlag, professor of Law @ U of Colorado, April 1991, Normativity and the Politics of Form
This vacation typically ends up badly with the law student finding himself in a small cool cubicle with a window, a couple of diplomas, and one potted plant, and a very bad view. From that cubicle, law begins to seem far less genteel, far less intellectualized, and, most of all, far less respectful of its own inner normative text than it did in law school. In that cubicle (and in tens of

arguments, causes of action, defenses, and the like will undergo an almost magical metamorphosis. They will be recast as the rhetorical moves that allow lawyers, clients, and courts, to get more of what it is they want. In legal practice, the noble values immanent in positive law will lose much of their moral sheen. They will be recognized for what they effectively are: part of the arsenal of rhetorical levers by which institutional authorities can be instrumentally summoned to visit coercion on selectively named parties.
thousands like it), the student-become-lawyer will learn and learn quickly that law is a power game. In that cubicle, doctrine,

Schlag explains the implications in Laying Down the Law


Laying Down the Law: Mysticism, Fetishism, and the American Legal Mind

Values are constituted by being severed from their generative history. Values are a technocratic aggregation of feel-good signs linked together in happy-talk jurisprudence that is almost completely removed from any act of valuation or any generative history. They are simply the simulation of moral concern or ethical commitment. Once emancipated from their

generative history values tend to become the ethical equivalent of currency endlessly recyclable, ready for appropriation by any force, ready to underwrite any end. Observation 2: I offer a simple syllogism. Syllogisms contain premises which, if comprised logically, prove a statement true. First, syllogisms best address the resolutional question because they do not preclude the consideration of any relevant argument. Second, syllogisms are an Aristotelian invention, in the same way that we follow Aristotles claim-warrantimpact calculus for arguments. Third, because most philosophers rely on syllogistic reasoning, it makes sense to resolve this ethical question of rights in this way. Samuel E. Damren further explains: Hypothetical and mixed syllogisms are made up of "conditional" propositions in which the relationship between two factors (p, q) is one of "implication:" if p, then q. As with the ambiguities in the meaning of "and" and "or," implication encompasses at least four different types of relationships. n98 [*84] Logical: If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal. Definitional: If Mr.
Black is a bachelor, then Mr. Black is unmarried. Causal: If blue litmus paper is placed in acid, then the litmus paper will turn red. Decisional: If Mr. Smith parks overtime, then Mr. Smith

A hypothetical syllogism follows the form: If p then q, If q then r, therefore If p then r[.] n100 This is valid in form no matter what type of conditional statements are utilized in the propositions. Where hypothetical syllogisms appear in a legal argument, a "causal" relationship between the elements under analysis is generally
commits a parking offense n99 assumed; whereas, where conditional propositions appear in legal documents in the form of "conditions precedent" or "conditions subsequent," or in statutory or common law as qualifications,

A Florida Supreme Court opinion provides an example of a hypothetical syllogism that utilizes both "causal" and "decisional" implication in its premises. Relying on Wigmore, [T]he court found (1) that where a witness to a transaction (in this case a deed) has an interest in the transaction he is "more likely to speak falsely," and (2) that a person who is "more likely to speak falsely" should be disqualified as a witness, and then (3) concluding that a person who is interested in the transaction should be disqualified as a witness to the deed. n101
the decisional or definitional forms of implication generally apply.

The implication is that syllogistic reasoning guarantees a logical evaluation of a proposition of truth. Observation 3: My stance is that the Aff doesnt have to defend government role-playing due to several impacts. The Neg cedes the political sphere by asking: "what should the government do?" This focus on mega-spheres of action eclipses questions of what we would do if we were simply ourselves. This kills political activism- inculcating a spectator mentality and preventing change. Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg. 10- 11) our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not
Yet only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually

we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the
organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers, For

of 'what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a
style prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this

'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we share 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence.
backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.

And, surrendering ourselves to the state and abdicating personal responsibility makes extinction inevitable. Beres, 94 (Louis Rene, Professor of International Law in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University, Spring, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law,
Lexis)

By surrendering ourselves to States and to traditional views of self-determination, we encourage not immortality but premature and predictable extinction. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. Although the corrosive calculus of geopolitics has now made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations all over the planet turn increasingly to States for security. It is the dreadful ingenuity of States that makes possible death in the billions, but it is in the expressions of that ingenuity that people seek safety. Indeed, as the threat of nuclear annihilation looms even after the Cold War, n71 the citizens of conflicting States reaffirm their segmented loyalties, moved by the persistent unreason that is, after all, the most indelible badge of modern humankind. Observation 4: The openness of my framework is a leap of faith guided by ethics which prevents the abuse of conversational encounters. Roland Bleiker and Martin Leet explain:
Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 737)

The most typical objection to such an open-ended approach to ethics is, of course, the accusation that it inevitably leads into a relativist void from whence it becomes impossible to separate good and evil: that only a categorical approach to ethics can save us in a time of moral need. But our most difficult ethical decisions must usually be taken precisely at a time when subliminal events have shaken the very foundations of our principles, at moments when the boundaries between good and evil need to be revisited and redrawn. Falling back into old intellectual habits, whether they are codified or not, will not give us any answers, at least not those we need to deal with the issues in an innovative, sensitive and fair way. Finding ethical solutions at such times of dearth requires a leap of faith into the unknown. Sre n K i e r k e g a a rd already knew that the results of such a leap can never be known, that the ensuing decisions are, by nature, terrible.63 No foundation can ever guarantee to save us from a fall. No pre - e s t a b l i s h e d principles can give us certainty that we are on the right path. Nothing, in short, can absolve us from the terrible burden of decisionmaking. But we are most likely to face the ensuing challenges successfully when equipped with an aesthetic and ethical sensibility that the conscious alone cannot provide. It is at such moments of need that the lessons learned from the sublime and the subliminal can become most useful as long as we have
discovered ways of embracing the sense of wonder and enchantment they engender.

A syllogism makes the round easier to adjudicate because syllogisms establish self-contained truths. If P, then Q; if Q, then R; therefore if P then R remains true no matter what A, F, G, T or Z have to say. In other words, the round can be evaluated solely on the merits of my advocacy. If my syllogism holds, the resolution is true irrespective of anything else presented in the round; if not, the resolution should be rejected. Observation 5: The Affirmative doesnt have to defend specific rights. The resolution doesnt imply that the Aff has a burden to specify. Any other interpretation of the resolution is bad for several reasons: 1. It explodes Neg ground. 2. There are an infinite amount of rights in existence. 3. The Neg would double-bind the Aff with Extra-Topicality. Contention 1: My major premise is that animals are intelligent. Gaiy L. Francione, Professor of Law and Nicholas B. Katzenbach Scholar of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University School of Law and co-director of the Rutgers University Animal Rights Law Center, RUTGERS LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1996, pp. 411-412.
In Animal Liberation, Singer argues that in assessing the consequences of human actions--including those actions affecting animals--it is necessary to take the interests of animals seriously.

Any adverse effects on animal interests must be weighed as part of the consequences of human actions. Humans fail to do this, Singer argues, because of a species bias, or speciesism, that has resulted in the systematic devaluation of animal interests. Singer claims that speciesism is no more morally defensible than racism, sexism or other forms of discrimination that arbitrarily exclude humans from the scope of moral concern. When people seek to justify the horrific way in which animals are treated, they invariably point to supposed animal defects, such as the inability of animals to use human language or to reason as intricately as humans. But there are severely retarded humans who cannot speak or reason (or, at least, can do so no better than many nonhumans), and most of us would be appalled at the thought of using such humans in experiments, or for food or clothing. Singer maintains that the only way to justify our present level of animal exploitation is to maintain that species differences alone justify that exploitation. That is no different, Singer argues, from saying that
differences in race alone or sex alone justify differential treatment.

In addition to my major premise, Jeremy Bentham writes:


Under the Gentoo and Mahometan religions, the interests of the rest of the animal creation seem to have met with some attention. Why have they not universally, with as much as those of human creatures, allowance made for the difference in point of sensibility? Because the laws that are have been the work of mutual fear; a sentiment which the less rational animals have not had the same means as man has of turning to account. Why ought they not? No reason can be given. If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to eat such of them as we like to eat: we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted anticipations of future misery which we have. The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of nature. If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to kill such as molest us: we should be the worse for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead. But is there any reason why we should be suffered to torment them? Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should not be suffered to torment them? Yes, several. See B. I. tit. [Cruelty to animals]. The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.* It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate.

a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they
What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But talk? but, Can they suffer?

Contention 2: My minor premise is that intelligence is the cut-off point for rights. Steinbock, Bonnie, Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New YorkAlbany. Speciesism and the Idea of Equality. Philosophy Vol. 53, No. 204 (1978).

We do not think that those with greater capacities ought to have their interests weighed more heavily than those with lesser capacities, and this, he thinks, shows that differences in such capacities are irrelevant to equality. But it does not show this at all. Kevin Donaghy argues (rightly, I think) that what entitles us human beings to a privileged position in the moral community is a certain minimal level of intelligence, which is a prerequisite for morally relevant capacities. The fact that we would reject a hierarchical society based on degree of
intelligence does not show that a minimal level of intelligence cannot be used as a cut-off point, justifying giving greater consideration to the interests of those entities which meet this standard.

And, animals and humans share moral prerequisites for rights. Henry Cohen, book review editor, FEDERAL LAWYER, November/December, 1996, p. 46. Why should we deem animals to have moral rights? Simply, for exactly the same reason we deem people to have rights: because each has inherent value, for himself or herself, and not, like property, value merely as a means to others ends. All but the most primitive species of animals are, like people, sentient creatures who feel pain the same as we do, and who possess beliefs, desires, memories, perceptions, and intentions in ways similar to us. If we have rights on the basis of attributes like these, then animals too should be deemed to have rights -- rights that may not be sacrificed or violated merely for human benefit.
But lets back up a bit.

In a conditional or a categorical syllogism, the combination of my major and minor premises inevitably leads us to the claim that animals are more intelligent than some humans who only get their rights from intelligence. The conclusion is that animals should receive rights. Due to Steinbocks analysis (that intelligence is the cut-off point for rights), we can see that the best way for humans to avoid contradiction is to grant animals equal rights. Contention 3: The only other way for the Negative to avoid this contradiction is to adopt an advocacy of speciesism, claiming that the only reason for the denial of animal rights is that animals are nonhuman. However, we must reject speciesism or lose any chance of achieving peace and justice. Michael Fox, DVM, PhD, Vice President of the US Humane Society, Board of Directors member for the Center for Respect for Life and the Environment, author of over forty books, VOICES ON THE THRESHOLD OF TOMORROW, 1993, edited by Georg and Linda Feurstein, page 349. Gandhi said that the greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way in which its animals are treated. The spiritual insight of St. Francis of Assissi made him call all creatures our brothers and sisters, and he called for a true democracy that embraced all of creation in respect and reverence. But today animals are treated as mere commodities by a consumer society that is today consuming the world. As Albert Schweitzer advised, without a reverence for all life, we will never enjoy world peace. The fate of the animals will be ours also. Compassion is a boundless ethic, and if we exclude animals or certain species from this circle of ethical concern and responsibility, we are guilty of a chauvinism that animal rightists rightly term speciesism. Politically, it is nothing less than biological fascism.
Half a century ago Mahatma

Contention 4: The Negative is racist. If you remember the Francione evidence I read in my major premise of the syllogism, youll recall that Francione equates speciesism with racism as well as other forms of discrimination. Robert Miles and Malcom Brown write:
Miles and Brown 2003. Robert Miles is the Director of Study Abroad and Professor of Sociology and International Studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Malcolm Brown is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Exeter. Racism, page 14, Psychology Press. http://books.google.com/books? hl=en&lr=&id=Q5xNQr0uiXUC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=racism+unjust&ots=1HvGubXfni&sig=1ZKnycvUpA9r79DLA1hoY-hEeVQ#v=snippet&q=socially%20unjust&f=false

racism is wrong because it is unjust, out of harmony with the moral law. Without doubt, this is the most normative statement in Kings letter. In response to criticisms that participants in the civil rights movement had broken the law (as a result of which King was himself in the Birmingham Jail), King (2000: 70) argues that there are two types of laws, just and unjust, and that the unjust law should not be considered to be a law. How does one distinguish between them? He responds with the following argument:
Finally,

An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal. Thus, animal rights proves illusory as a term of comparison and distinction because each animal has value equal to that of a human. Because animals are intelligent, and intelligence is the cut-off point for rights, animal rights exist and are an essential component of justice.