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A Guide to BMP4
Steven Jones
This guide covers the changes introduced through the latest industry BMP4: Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy.
Work has been ongoing to create the latest incarnation of industry Best Management Practice (BMP4), providing Suggested Planning and Operational Practices for Ship Operators, and Masters of Ships Transiting the High Risk Area. The Industry partners who have come together to produce the BMPs are also financially sponsoring the publication of 50,000 hard copies of BMP 4 so that they can be distributed to Industry on a free-of-charge basis. Additionally this year, a DVD has been produced by Steamship Mutual and endorsed by many association signatories. This will also be distributed on a free of charge basis. The challenge for the Industry is to ensure the widest possible distribution and use of BMP4 and ensuring onboard implementation Naval Authorities now report on a monthly basis, the names of vessels which have failed to fully implement BMP, and organisations are being pushed to raise an internal investigation to verify compliance of their members.

August 2011

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New Issues Highlighted and Identified within BMP4


The guidelines now explicitly cover a wider geographical area, with the Somali Basin added to the Coast of Somalia and Arabian Sea areas. Prior to the introduction to BMP4 there is a new section which focuses on The three Fundamental Requirements of BMP. In essence these consist of:

Register at MSCHOA - In addition to the usual bounding areas,


the Straits of Hormuz are now included

Report to UKMTO UKMTO acts as the primary point of contact


for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces in the region and it is the primary point of contact during an attack. For this reason UKMTO should be made aware that the vessel is transiting the High Risk Area most basic measures likely to be effective at reducing the risk of piracy attack. If pirates are unable to board a ship they cannot hijack it.

Implement Ship Protection Measures (SPMs) - These are the

BMP4 stresses some basics on how to avoid being a victim of piracy: Do not be alone - Report, use IRTC, Keep AIS On Do not be detected - Use Nav. lights only, Follow NAVWARNS Do not be surprised - be vigilant Do not be vulnerable - SPMs Do not be boarded - Speed and manoeuvres Do not be controlled - Drills, Citadels, access control
What follows is an assessment of the additional areas, issues and sections within BMP4. Maritime security personnel are encouraged to use this in-conjunction with the new BMPs, so they can see what additional measures they need to adopt and of the current and latest best management practice.

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Section 1: Introduction
The guidance provides a slightly expanded explanation of Somali piracy, stating that Somali pirates have to

date sought to hijack a vessel, her cargo and crew and hold them until a ransom demand is paid.
It also covers the intended scope of the BMPs and the fact that the aim is to assist ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in the High Risk Area. It stresses that the guidelines are based on not just experience, but also on evidence and data collected by naval forces. BMP3 stated that The extent to which the guidance given in this booklet is followed is always to be at the discretion of the Ship Operator and Master. In BMP4 this statement had been deleted. BMP4 also remind us that not all measures

discussed in this booklet may be applicable for every ship type.


The guidance has been expanded to cover the cyclical nature of pirate activity stressing that level of pirate activity varies within the High Risk Area due to changing weather conditions and activity by Naval/Military Forces. It is stated that pirate activity generally reduces in areas affected by the South West monsoon, and increased in the period following the monsoon. The guidance also reminds us that the onset of the North East monsoon generally has lesser effect on piracy activity. There is a reminder that when piracy activity is reduced

in one area of the High Risk Area, it is likely to increase elsewhere (e.g. Kenya and Tanzania. the Gulf of

Aden and Bab-al-Mandeb have experienced an increase in pirate activity during the South West Monsoon.) There has been an addition to the High Risk Area for piracy, where pirate activity and/or attacks have taken place. For the purposes of BMP4, the High Risk Area is an area

Section 2: Somali Pirate Activity the High Risk Area


BMP4 addresses the shifting dynamic of pirate operations, and recognises the effect of the increased use of Motherships, and the extension to pirate attack ranges these vessels have offered.

bounded by Suez and the Straits of Hormuz to the North, 10S and 78E.

Perhaps reflecting this widening area, the BMPs state that vessels should be prepared to alter course at short notice to avoid pirate activity when information is provided by NAV WARNINGS and/or Naval/Military Forces.

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Section 3: Risk Assessment


The section on Risk Assessment looks at the identification of measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery. In BMP4 the factors to be considered in the Risk Assessment cover:

Section 4: Typical Pirate Attacks


A typical pirate attack now states that two small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats/skiffs will be used. The fact that pirates apparently preferred boarding from the port quarter has been deleted also. BMP4 states that the pirates often approach from either

Crew safety - Assessing access control versus


safety, especially in the event of shipboard emergencies.

quarter or the stern.

Location of a safe muster point or Citadel.

Ballistic protection for crew on the bridge Freeboard - Pirates will likely try to board at the
lowest point above the waterline. Usually vessels with a freeboard greater than 8 metres are less likely to be boarded. However, freeboard may provide little or no protection if other access points are provided. attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate tactics and techniques may develop to enable them to board faster moving ships. (skiffs), it is often more difficult to operate the skiffs if the sea state is 3 or above.

The skiffs are frequently fitted with two outboard engines or a larger single 60hp engine. Significant new section on Pirate Action Groups and the various boat configurations - assessing skiffs, whalers and motherships. Examination of weapons used, and the fact that pirates use RPGs to intimidate vessels into stopping.

Speed - To date, there have been no reported

Sea Speed.

The guidance stresses the importance of maintaining Full

Slightly enhanced view of the pirate tools used to board these now include in addition to ladders, ropes and long hooked poles with knotted climbing rope are also used. While night-time attacks are still less common, the guidance now states that attacks have occurred on clear moonlit nights. The majority of pirate attacks have been repelled by ships crew who have planned and trained and applied BMPs.

Sea State - Pirates attack from small craft

A statement that pirate activity increases in the wake of a release is no longer included in BMP4. The importance is stressed of the Risk Assessment being ship and voyage specific, and not generic.

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Section 6: Company Planning


Reporting is stressed in this section too, and a Vessel Movement Registration Form should be submitted to MSCHOA and details are provided on how to do this. The latest information should be obtained from the MSCHOA and NATO shipping centre websites. The company planning checklist stresses the importance of reviewing the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and the implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP) as required by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to ensure than an SSP is in place and that discussions have taken place with the Ship Security Officer (SSO). The monitoring of piracy related websites is supplemented with instructions to monitor all NAV WARNINGS - SAT C should not only be monitored but acted upon.

Section 5: BMP Reporting Procedures


An essential part of BMP that applies to all ships is liaison with Naval/Military forces. The two key Naval organisations to contact are: The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) whose reporting process is to incorporate: 1. Initial Report 2. Daily Reports 3. Final Report (upon departure from the high risk area or arrival in port). The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) which is the planning and coordination centre for EU Naval forces (EUNAVFOR). The EUNAVFOR operational area does not extend East of 65E.

Planning is given greater emphasis with the guidance stressing that great care should be taken in voyage planning. The company should offer the Ships Master guidance with regard to the recommended routing through the High Risk Area. Self Protection measures are now, VERY strongly recommended. Crew training now specifically mentions citadel drills where utilised. The crew training sessions should be conducted pretransit, and debriefing sessions post-transit. This section now stresses that the UKMTO is unable to respond as an SSAS designated recipient when a vessel is outside the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area

It is important that vessels and their operators complete both the UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Forms

and register with MSCHOA.

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Section 7: Ship Masters Planning


The Master should ensure that these BMP measures are in place prior to entry into the High Risk Area:
Greater emphasis placed on the briefing of crew and of the conducting of drills. Masters should also consider testing of SPMs, testing of the security of all access points and a thorough review of the SSP. Masters are advised to prepare an Emergency Communication Plan, this will include all emergency contact numbers and prepared messages. The ships AIS policy is reviewed. The recommendation is now to keep AIS on - though this is left to the Masters discretion. This section once again stresses the importance of reporting to MSCHOA and UKMTO.

No maintenance should be performed on essential equipment in the Engine Room.


There is an enhanced policy for daily vessel reporting to UKMTO via email at 0800 GMT. Masters are encouraged to carefully review all warnings and information. There is a reminder that voyage routing changes may be necessary. Advice on the use of the IRTC has been amended, and the instructions on which area of the IRTC to use dependent on direction of transit has been removed. Ships are reminded that they may have to make adjustments to passage plans to conform to MSCHOA advice on group transits. There is a new section on the use of National Convoys as some countries offer independent convoy escorts through the IRTC. Advice on vessels avoiding entering Yemeni Territorial waters remains, however it is now thought to be very difficult for naval vessels to enter the waters, as opposed to not possible in the past. Much of the BMP3 Section 8 Voyage Planning aspects have been brought into the Masters Planning section.

During transit through the High Risk Area:


There is a new section on maintenance and engineering work in the High Risk Area. Any work outside of the accommodation is to be strictly controlled and access points limited and controlled.

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Section 8: Ship Protection Measures


Section 8 has now been completely changed, with the emphasis away from pre-transit planning, and now focusing on SPMs. The SPMs are the most basic level which will likely be effective. The advice rests on the premise that If pirates

Flying glass is a major issue when the bridge is attacked - as such the use of security glass film often called Blast Resistant Film is encouraged. BMP4 states that fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates may be used for the side and rear bridge windows and the bridge wing door windows. The use of sand bags on bridge wings is also encouraged. In order to protect from RPG shells the guidance states that the sides and rear of the bridge, and the bridge wings, may be protected with a double layer of Chain Link Fence which has been shown to reduce the effect of an RPG round. Proprietary anti-RPG screens are also available.

are unable to board a ship they cannot hijack it. Watchkeeping & Enhanced Vigilance

There is advice that vessels should consider a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximise alertness of the lookouts. The use of anti-glare binoculars is encouraged. The use of well constructed dummies remains however the unequivocal view is that, A proper lookout

is the single most effective method of self protection


where early warning of a suspicious approach or attack is assured, and where defences can be readily deployed.

Enhanced Bridge Protection

The bridge is usually the focus for any pirate attack. BMP4 states that Kevlar jackets and helmets (preferably in non-military colours) should be available for the bridge team.

Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation & Machinery Spaces It is very important to control access routes to deter or
delay pirates who have managed to board a vessel. If pirates do gain access to the upper deck of a vessel they will be tenacious in their efforts to access the accommodation section and in particular the bridge. It is strongly recommended that significant effort is expended prior to entry to the High Risk Area to deny the pirates access to the accommodation and the bridge, should they overcome the vessels ship protection measures and be able to board the vessel. All doors and hatches providing access should be secured, and BMP4 now adds the word properly to the guidance, and this is done in order to afford the ship the maximum protection possible.

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Water Spray & Foam Monitors
Water cannons receive new coverage, and steam is now cited as an effective deterrent, as are water spray rails. The use of foam is covered, and it is stressed that any supplies used must be in addition to the ships Fire Fighting Equipment (FFE) stock. Where possible no maintenance should be carried out on the vessels sea water systems whilst on passage in the High Risk Area. It is also stressed that in order to utilise all pumps, additional power may be required and therefore these systems should also be ready for immediate use.

to ensure that the results achieved by the equipment provide effective coverage of vulnerable areas.

Practice, observation and drills will be required in order

BMP4 stresses that pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars to windows will prevent this even if they manage to shatter the window.

The use of alarms and sound signals is covered, and if approached, continuous sounding of the vessels foghorn/ whistle distracts the pirates and lets them know they have been seen.

Alarms

Manoeuvring Practice

Physical Barriers

Physical barriers have been discussed in earlier incarnations of BMP. In the latest guidance there is further advice, in that such barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain access to vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an attacking pirate. Any razor wire should be secured so pirates cannot pull off the razor wire with, for instance, the hook of their boarding ladder. Consideration should also be given to securing the razor wire with a wire strop to prevent it being dislodged. BMP4 goes into great detail about the types and quality of razor wire which is recommended. Anti climb paint is no longer considered an effective measure. If electric fences are to be used, then a full risk assessment is to be carried out.

There is a new emphasis placed on the use of manoeuvring practice. Practicing prior to entry into the High Risk Area will be very beneficial and will ensure familiarity with the ships handling characteristics and how to effect anti-piracy manoeuvres whilst maintaining the best possible speed.

It is stressed that waiting until the ship is attacked before practicing is too late!

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BMP4 perhaps reflecting this fact has deleted a series of measures to enhance a safe-haven. There is a detailed examination of the criteria that any Naval/Military forces will apply before considering a boarding operation to release the crew from a Citadel. The criteria include: 100% of the crew must be secured in the Citadel. The crew of the ship must have self contained, independent reliable 2-way communications (sole reliance on VHF communications is not sufficient) The pirates must be denied access to ship propulsion

BMP4 goes into some detail about the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and the use of Upper Deck Lighting. However it is stressed that navigation lights should not be switched off at night.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) & Upper Deck Lighting

It is important to remember that the use of a Citadel, even where the criteria are applied, cannot guarantee a Naval/Military response. This is now explicit within the BMPs.

There is a section on the importance of denying pirates the use of ships tools or equipment. The BMPs also stress the importance of protecting ships equipment such as gas bottles or flammable liquids/materials - using sand bags or Kevlar blankets.

Ships Tools & Equipment

Private Maritime Security Contractors

There is now a section dedicated to the use of private maritime security contractors - both armed and unarmed. BMP4 states,

Safe Muster Points/Citadels A Safe Muster Point is a short-term safe haven, which
will provide ballistic protection should the pirates commence firing with small arms weaponry or RPGs.

Citadels get a lot of coverage in BMP4 - If citadels are to be employed, they should be complementary to, rather than a replacement for, all other Ship Protection Measures set out in BMP4.
It is stressed that establishing a Citadel maybe beyond the capability of a ships staff alone, and requires external technical advice and support. The details of the construction and operation of Citadels are beyond the scope of this booklet. A detailed document containing guidance and advice is included on the MSCHOA website.

use of unarmed Private Maritime Security Contractors is a matter for individual Ship Operators following their own voyage risk assessment. The deployment onboard is subject to the national laws of the Flag State. The use of experienced and competent unarmed Private Maritime Security Contractors can be a valuable addition to BMP.

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Armed Private Maritime Security Contractors There is an additional examination on the use of armed

Section 9: Pirate Attack


This section examines the correct response of a vessel being approached and then coming under attack. If a vessel suspects that it is coming under a pirate attack, there are specific actions that are recommended to be taken during the approach stage, and the attack stage. It should be noted that the pirates generally do not use weapons until they are within two cables of a vessel. Therefore any period up to this stage can be considered as approach and gives a vessel valuable time in which to activate her defences, and make it clear to pirates that they have been spotted and the vessel is prepared and will resist.

Private Maritime Security Contractors.

The use, or not, of armed Private Maritime Security Contractors onboard merchant vessels is a matter for individual ship operators to decide following their own voyage risk assessment and approval of respective Flag States. Subject to risk analysis, careful planning and agreements, the provision of Military Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) deployed to protect vulnerable shipping is the recommended option when considering armed guards.This advice does not constitute a recommendation nor endorsement of the general use of armed Private Maritime Security Contractors. Some key elements of the BMP4 include the following advice: If armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to be used they must be as an additional layer of protection and not as an alternative to BMP. If armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are present on board a merchant vessel, this fact should be included in reports to UKMTO and MSCHOA. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) have produced guidance in the form of an IMO Circular for ship operators and Masters and for Flag States on the use of Private Maritime Security Contractors in the High Risk Area. The current IMO guidance on the use of armed Private Maritime Security Contractor is included on the MSCHOA website (www.mschoa.org).

Approach Stage

When being approached, if not already at full speed, increase to maximum. Steer a straight course to maintain a

maximum speed.

The communication plan at this time is vital, and in addition to previous advice BMP4 also states that once established, the vessel should maintain communication with UKMTO. The advice also states that attacks should be reported to UKMTO even if the vessel is part of a national convoy so other merchant ships can be warned. The issue of ballistic protection is a key element of the new guidance, and when under attack it is stressed that all crew except those required on the bridge to muster at the Safe Muster Point or Citadel if constructed, so that the crew are given as much ballistic protection as possible should the pirates get close enough to use weapons. When discussing the manoeuvres used to keep clear of pirates, the latest advice no longer contains explicit mention of the use of bow and stern wash to restrict incoming pirates. When the attack comes in, the advice is to ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins, are fully secured. In addition to the emergency alarms and announcement for the benefit of the vessels crew, sound the ships whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it .

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Attack Stage
There is now a new Attack stage covered and advice is given on the conduct. At this phase it is important to reconfirm that all ships personnel are in a position of safety. As the pirates close on the vessel, Masters should commence small alterations of helm whilst maintaining a speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the vessel in preparation for a boarding attempt. These manoeuvres will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs. It is stressed that substantial amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a vessels speed.

Section 10: If the Pirates take Control


The BMP4 guidance If the Pirates take Control is to, try to remain calm. Before the pirates gain access to the bridge BMP4 states the importance of informing UKMTO. Ensure that the SSAS has been activated and the AIS is switched on. As with earlier BMPs it is stressed that no resistance should be offered to the pirates once they reach the bridge. BMP4 now expressly states that pirates are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under the influence of drugs (khat). In BMP3 there was a list of the things not to do - such as do not use firearms, do not make sudden movements, and do not use flares or pyrotechnics. These have now been deleted. If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated the main engine should be stopped and all way taken off the vessel if possible, (and if navigationally safe to do so). All remaining crew members should proceed to the designated Safe Muster Point with their hands visible. BMP4 also stresses that any CCTV should be kept running.

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Section 11: In the event of Military Action


BMP4 follows that of previous guidelines, however where Naval/Military forces take action onboard the ship there is new advice. All personnel should keep low to the deck and cover their head with both hands with hands visible. On no account should personnel make movements which could be misinterpreted as being aggressive. The BMP guidance states that personnel should not use flash photography, they should be prepared to be challenged on their identity, they should cooperate fully during any Naval/Military action, while remaining aware that English is not the working language of all Naval/ Military forces in the region. It is stressed that Naval/Military forces will endeavour to respond rapidly to ongoing acts of piracy, however because of the very large distances across the High Risk Area a Naval/Military response may not be possible.

Section 12: Post Incident Reporting


Following any piracy attack or suspicious activity it is vital that a detailed report of the event is reported to UKMTO and MSCHOA. BMP4 now reminds us that it is considered helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB. It is also stressed that any report contains descriptions and distinguishing features of any suspicious vessels that were observed. The Post Incident Reporting emphasis is supplemented by a new section on Prosecution of Pirates Assisting Law Enforcement Authorities. Law enforcement authorities will routinely request permission to conduct post-release crew debriefs and to collect evidence for ongoing and future investigations and prosecutions following captivity. A thorough investigation is critical to ensure that potential physical evidence, including electronic evidence, is not tainted or destroyed or potential witnesses overlooked. The company and crew are advised that the quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows. A significant part of this section now features information on INTERPOL as well as reporting processes. BMP4 states that INTERPOL is an international police organisation with 188 member countries which facilitates cross border police cooperation to combat international crime. INTERPOL recognise that seafarers as the victims of piracy must be dealt with in a sympathetic and professional manner, and can assist in taking the appropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. INTERPOL has a Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) which supports any of the 188 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in four languages English, French, Spanish and Arabic and is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. It is recommended ship operators contact INTERPOL within 3 days of a hijacking of their vessel.

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INTERPOL may be consulted to discuss the recommended best practices and protocols for the preservation of evidence or other physical clues that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation of the incident. The 24 hour telephone contact details for the CCC and INTERPOLs Maritime Task Force website are: CCC 24 hour telephone helpline: +33 (0) 4 72 44 76 76 INTERPOLs Maritime Task Force website: www.interpol.int

Annexes
Annex A - List of useful contact details Annex B - UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Forms. The reporting forms have been changed and updated. Annex C - Piracy Definitions. This annex sets out some common definitions and guidelines for reporting piracy attacks and suspicious activity. This listing is not exhaustive and is provided as guidance only. Annex D - Follow up report Annex E - MSCHOA Vessel Movement Registration Form. This has been revised and is especially interesting as it contains a significant overview of the anti-piracy measures actually in place on vessels. The new form has the following additions: Entry point to High Risk Area (HRA) ETA to HRA Exit Point from HRA ETD from HRA Do you intend to transit the IRTC? Annex F - Provides guidance for vessels engaged in fishing Annex G - Contains specific advice for leisure craft, including yachts. In view of escalating pirate attacks in the High Risk Area, the advice is NOT to enter this area. Annex H - Supporting Organisations, Naval/Military/Law Enforcement orgsanisations

The full BMP4 document can be downloaded from the SAMI website: http://seasecurity.org/images/uploads/pdfs/SAMI_ BMP4.pdf

Section 13: Updating Best Management Practices


The Industry Organisations engaged in producing BMP4 will endeavour to meet regularly and ensure updates are issued as necessary, based upon operational experience and lessons learned. The latest advice may be found on the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre and MARLO websites. Additionally the UKMTO may be contacted at any time for updated advice.

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Supporting Organisations
BIMCO - www.bimco.org Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) - www.cruising.org The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) - www.marisec.org The International Group of P&I Clubs - www.igpandi.org The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) - www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre International Maritime Employers Committee (IMEC) - www.imec.org.uk INTERCARGO - www.intercargo.org InterManager - www.intermanager.org INTERTANKO - www.intertanko.com The International Shipping Federation (ISF) - www.marisec.org The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) - www.itfseafarers.org The International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA) - www.ipta.org.uk The Joint Hull Committee and The Joint War Committee The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) - www.ocimf.org SIGTTO (The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators) www.sigtto.org The Mission to Seafarers - www.missiontoseafarers.org The World Shipping Council - www.worldshipping.org Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/cmf_command.html EUNAVFOR - www.eunavfor.eu INTERPOL - www.interpol.int The US Navy Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) - www.cusnc.navy.mil/marlo The Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) - www.mschoa.org NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) - http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/default.aspx Operation Ocean Shield http://www.shipping.nato.int/operations/OS/Pages/default.aspx The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) http://www.mschoa.org/Links/Pages/UKMTO.aspx

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