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Edited by

Julia Boll

War: Interdisciplinary Investigations

Papers Presented at the 4th Global Conference War, Virtual War and Human Security
Wednesday 2nd May Saturday 5th May 2007 Budapest, Hungary

Edited by Julia Boll

Oxford, United Kingdom

Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Nancy Billias

Advisory Board Dr Alejandro Cervantes-Carson Professor Margaret Chatterjee Dr Wayne Cristaudo Mira Crouch Dr Phil Fitzsimmons Dr Jones Irwin Professor Asa Kasher Owen Kelly Martin McGoldrick Revd Stephen Morris Professor John Parry Professor Peter Twohig Professor S Ram Vemuri Revd Dr Kenneth Wilson, O.B.E

Volume 49 A volume in the Probing the Boundaries project War, Virtual War and Human Security

Published by the Inter-Disciplinary Press Oxford, United Kingdom First Edition 2008

8 Inter-Disciplinary Press 2008

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

ISBN: 978-1-904710-48-6

Contents

Introduction PART I Case Studies Black Soldiers: Military Force and Slavery in the Early Modern Atlantic World. Victor Enthoven Moving to the West: Mass Displacement and State-Society Relations in Wartime China, 1937-1945 Lu Liu Breaking Silences and Telling Stories: Renegotiating the Meaning of the Border War in Post-Apartheid South Africa Gary Baines The Madness of Coalitions Thomas M. Kane PART II The Mediation and Mediatisation of War The Language of War: George W. Bushs Discursive Practises in Securitising the Western Value System in the War on Terror Janicke Stramer The Immediacy of Narrated Combat: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Public Spectacle Jason T. McEntee Experiencing War the Video Game Way Sue Scheibler Representations of British Soldierly Identity in Print Media and Soldiers own Photographic Accounts K. Neil Jenkings, Trish Winter and Rachel Woodward PART III Writing about War Ethical Crossings in War Writing: Michael Ondaatjes Anils Ghost and the Sri Lankan Civil War Elke Rosochacki Mobility and Transformation: Engaging the Enemy in Larry Heinemanns Pacos Story David Boulting The Unlisted Character: Representing War on Stage Julia Boll

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PART IV

Protection: Transitory, Illusory or Reality? Is the War on Terror Real? Should it be? Avery Plaw Rights and Duties of the Individual to Disobey Manifestly Illegal Orders under International Law Hitomi Takemura International Security and the Paradox of Proximity in the Coverage of War Using Convergent ICTs Lucas Walsh

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PART V

Ethics, Morality and Philosophy of War Torture and the Ticking Bomb: a Case Study of Fantasy in the so-called War on Terror Bob Brecher The Mechanics of Judgment on the Topic of War Kimana Zulueta-Fuelscher The Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications for the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation of Outer Space Arjen Vermeer Questioning Just War Thinking Tarik Kochi

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PART VI

Prohibition, Interventions and Alternatives Reconstructing War as a Pathology of Under-Development and the Imperative for Western Humanitarian Intervention Julien Barbara The Killers and the Dead: An Exploration of the Viability of and Alternatives to Lethal Warfare Seth B. Scott Reflecting on Human Security , or: About the Inherent Human Nature of National Security Efstathios T. Fakiolas Teaching Nonviolence Helen Fox

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Introduction
War was and still is the most irresistible and picturesque news. Susan Sontag

From May 2nd 5th 2007, Budapest played host to an international inter- and multidisciplinary conference which should lead its participants into long and heated debates and which should become a forum for innovative and enlightening new research into the nature, purpose and experience of war and its impacts on human kind. Participants of the Fourth Global Conference on War, Virtual War and Human Security came from such diverse fields as military history, legal studies, philosophy, literature and film studies, sociology, and these different backgrounds proved vital for the passionate discussions and the interdisciplinary influences participants received and spread during the conference. This volume aims at providing an overview of themes discussed and papers given at the conference. The papers collected here examine and evaluate war as a multi-layered phenomenon, approaching the historical, legal, social, human, linguistic, economic and political contexts of conflicts, exploring the representation and interpretation of the experience of warfare in art, journalism, literature and multimedia and proposing strategies for alternatives. The first part comprises four case studies. Victor Enthoven investigates military force and slavery in the Early Modern Atlantic World, proving that the European Atlantic empires could not have survived without the mobilisation of enslaved black soldiers. Lu Liu discusses mass displacement and state-society relations in China during World War II, portraying civilian evacuation and the resettlement of refugee migrants. Gary Baines explores memories of soldiers in South Africas Border War and how the war is being renegotiated in post-apartheid South Africa, considering the representation of war and the right to representation. Thomas M. Kane analyses NGO coalitions such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines with regard to their effectiveness and the obstacles they might encounter. The second part, Mediation and Mediatisation of War, assembles articles that explore the relationship between war and its linguistic and medial representation. Janicke Stramer exposes the discursive rhetoric and practices in the US-American language of war under George W. Bush, particularly in their aspiration to discern an alleged threat against a Western value system. Jason T. McEntees article traces a shift in the availability of war narratives in relation to the operation Iraqi Freedom, noting an

Introduction

______________________________________________________________ immediate multi-medial response which might result in a web of fact and fiction difficult to be unravelled. Sue Scheibler depicts the representation of war in recent video games which enable players to experience war through sound, image, story and game play, investigating the strategies of authenticating the experience of the game. K. Neil Jenkings, Trish Winter and Rachel Woodward discuss the mediation of war and military activities via photographic representations of military identity in British newspapers and personal collections of service and ex-service personnel, exploring the disjunctures and connections between photographs used in print media and those held in private collections. The third part is concerned with literary and dramatic representation of war. Elke Rosochacki analyses Michael Ondaatjes novel Anils Ghost and its representation of ethical complexities and ambiguities in the Sri Lankan civil war, exploring Giorgio Agambens ethical imperative to bear testimony to extreme events as undertaken by writer and characters alike. David Boulting considers Larry Heinemanns novel Pacos Story and its depiction of a Vietnam veteran haunted by the war. Julia Boll discusses the representation of the alleged new wars on the contemporary stage as depicted in the two plays Far Away by Caryl Churchill and Midwinter by Zinnie Harris. The fourth part consists of three articles discussing the nature of and cultural imagination attached to protection. Avery Plaw examines whether the war on terror should be treated as a law-enforcement operation, a conventional international war or a new form of war to which a new set of rules should be applied. Hitomi Takemura explores the individuals human rights and duties to disobey illegal orders in the case of a controversial war, as protected by international law. Lucas Walsh portrays the transformation of international relations by convergent information and communications technologies with regard to the democratisation and control of mass media, showing how the real and the unreal blur into each other in the wake of the theatricalisation of war. The fifth part considers the ethics, morality and philosophy of war. Bob Brecher attempts to expose the ticking bomb scenario, which is used as an excuse to employ torture, as a fantasy, arguing that moral right or wrong seem to depend on consequences and that torture can be made out as the bottom line in the war on terror. Zimana Kulueta-Fuelscher analyses the mechanics of judgement on the topic of war, discussing the concept and connotations of war that lead to justifications of acts of war, claiming that there is no such thing as war, but several concepts and actions that are labelled thus. Arjen Vermeer investigates whether and to what extent force application by space weapon systems in space is regulated under existing international law. Tarik Kochi questions the tradition of just war thinking,

Introduction

______________________________________________________________ arguing that it ignores the relationship between right and violence underlying its own line of thought. The sixth part finally attempts to offer prohibitions, interventions and alternatives. With a special regard to the case of Australia and its recent concept of an Arc of Instability in relation to its policy on immigrants, Julien Barbara discusses the imperative of Western humanitarian intervention based on a notion of alleged new wars and its link to the discourse of underdevelopment. Seth B. Scott explores the viability of and alternatives to lethal warfare, introducing a number of future technologies which may eliminate death from the practice of war. Efstathios T. Fakiolas proposes an alternative approach to national security, centring on the security of the individual human being in conjunction with rather than separated from the security of the a-human or non-human state. Closing the volume with an exceptional outlook into future education, Helen Fox gives an overview on the methods of teaching non-violence to undergraduate students and the inherent need to acquaint students with effective alternative solutions.

Part I Case Studies

Black Soldiers: Military Force and Slavery in the Early Modern Atlantic World Victor Enthoven
Abstract The Atlantic World was a violent place; not least because slavery was an inseparable part of that world. From the early 1500s, people of African descent, both free and unfree, were used in one military capacity or another. Both groups, slaves and free people of colour, would each perform different military tasks. The European Atlantic empires could not have survived without these black soldiers. This chapter examines the military roles played by Blacks in the New World and West Africa. In the Americas, slaves were used in three different military capacities: 1) they were used for building and maintaining the forts and large defence works; 2) during military expeditions slaves would be used as auxiliary troops; 3) because of a chronic shortage of European soldiers, overseas governments were, rather reluctantly, forced to arm slaves and use them as regular soldiers. In the overseas settlements new ethnic and cultural groups emerged. All over the Atlantic these so-called Creoles had their own companies in the civic militias. They, too, were active in bush patrols hunting down runaway slaves. Furthermore, during the Napoleonic wars, the British established a dozen or so professional West Indies regiments comprising free people of colour. Key words war, soldiers, ethnicity, maroons, empiricism, Blacks, free people of colour, creolisation *****

1.

Introduction In January 2007, an Iraqi general launched the idea of using Kurdish troops against the Shiite-dominated slum of Sadr City, stronghold of the Al Mahdi militia. Sadr City accounts for roughly two-thirds of the population of Baghdad and about 15 percent of the population of Iraq. Yet it has been a nogo zone for both the Iraq and U.S. armies for the past few years. He explained that it is rather unlikely to expect the New Iraqi Army, consisting

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_____________________________________________________________ predominantly of Shiites, to take on their brethren. In his opinion, Sunni Kurdish troops had to take on the Shiite militias.1 Ethnicity and conflict is, of course, nothing new. Multi-ethnic countries can have, for instance, a multi-ethnic army. An example of this in the Middle East were the Lebanese Armed Forces until 1976.2 Another facet of ethnic military force, however, is to use one ethnic group against another, as in the Iraqi example. An historic example is the concept of ethnic soldiering. In many areas of the world, including the Americas, the initial establishment and long-term survival of European colonial enclaves often depended on the military assistance of the indigenous population against native groups, rebellious slaves, or colonial rivals. This phenomenon has been termed ethnic soldiering. Neil Whitehead has elaborated on this topic, looking at the military role played by Amerindians in Venezuela, the Guyanas, and the Antilles. He noted that the allied Amerindians acted as a kind of buffer between the white colonists and the black slaves and maroons, the runaway Blacks who lived more or less independently in the forests.3 This paper deals with ethnicity, too, but will examine the military roles played by Blacks and men of African descent, both free and unfree, in the overseas settlements in the New World and West Africa. The ambitions of this paper are rather modest. No provocative questions are raised, no controversial statements are challenged. The aim is to present an overview of the different aspects of the military use and functions of enslaved and free Africans and free people of colour, so typical of the Atlantic World, and to illustrate how suppressed Blacks played a role in maintaining the inequality in the overseas settlements, too. This may be, at first sight, a rather contradictory situation. The aim is to illustrate how strange, complex and intriguing the Atlantic World was: there was not only the simple dichotomy between black and white, but also the process of creolisation, including the process of forming new ethnical groups with different identities and how different ethnic groups used the military for their own benefit.4 Ethnicity and the military in the Atlantic World is a many-facetted story. 2. The Atlantic World The early Modern Atlantic World was characterised by inequality; not least because slavery was an inseparable part of it. However, there was not only the dichotomy between free and unfree people, but colour mattered, too. A persons ethnic roots determined his or her place in society. This inequality made the Atlantic World an inherently violent place. All kinds of violence were applied to maintain the inequality; not least military force.5 From the early 1500s, people of African descent, both free and unfree, were used in one military capacity or another. The so-called black

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_____________________________________________________________ conquistadores, for instance, played a visible role in the conquest of the New World.6 For the European colonists and planters who settled in the New World, in general, there were two threats: one external, the other internal. First, there was always the possibility that one of the other colonial powers would attack the colony. During the Early Modern Era most overseas settlements and colonies were to change flags, some only once, but several many times over.7 To counter this external, overseas threat, forts and castles were built along the coasts and shores. These strongholds were garrisoned by more or less professional European soldiers.8 In times of war, the civic militias of colonists would assist them. The early overseas ventures and settlements in particular were organised as a sort of military operation.9 The internal threat existed in two varieties: in North America in particular, the indigenous population, the Amerindians, posed a constant menace to the European settlers.10 They posed a particular threat at the frontier, that meeting place, or zone, of peoples in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined.11 After the frontier zone was more or less ethnically cleansed, peace returned. In the areas dominated by slavery, the Caribbean and Latin America, the internal threat to the European settlers came particularly from the enslaved Africans. Slave resistance itself took two main forms: slave uprisings and revolts, which were doomed to failure, or running away, leading to them becoming maroons. Both forms had to be suppressed by the military. With the exception of the Haitian Revolution, all other slave uprisings ended in failure.12 Marooning, running away from slave society, however, was a completely different story. Life in the outback or wilderness was difficult and harsh, but at least it was a free life, and the colonial authorities were unable to suppress the maroons by military means. In the end, the only solution for the Europeans was to make peace with them.13 The intriguing contradiction in the Atlantic World, actually throughout the entire colonial world, was that the suppressors, the colonial authorities, used the suppressed - in our case the enslaved and free Africans, but in other cases the indigenous people, too - to maintain the unequal social order. Of course, the free people of colour and the free Blacks were considered second-rate human beings, and sometimes not human at all. On the other hand, however, for many suppressed peoples the military was the road to emancipation and/or freedom, too. 3. Slavery and Race: The Negro The dishonour and degradation associated with enslavement inevitably gave rise to contempt for the people who were enslaved and their heirs. Though the particulars differ, slaves throughout history have been

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_____________________________________________________________ stigmatised as inferior, uncivilised, bestial. In the Atlantic World, the people of African descent came to be regarded as a distinct race of people, fashioned by nature for hard labour. This process took time. Initially, European colonists justified the enslavement of Africans chiefly in terms of religion and culture. Africans were described as heathenish and savage. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, such rationalisation had been supplanted by an explicit theory of race, in which black peoples inferiority was assumed to be innate, a product not of their circumstances or condition, but of their physical nature. To quote an anonymous writer in 1773: Slave keeping was a custom that casts the most indelible odium on a whole people, causing some [...] to infer that they are a different race, formed by the Creator for brutal service, to drudge for us with their brethren of the stalls.14 The consequence of this racial dimension was that the words for addressing people of African descent, Black or Negro, had a double meaning. At the same time they meant both slave and a person of African descent. So, these two aspects are intertwined and inseparable.15 To give an example, in Suriname (Dutch Guiana) in March 1757, a patrol was hunting down a group of slaves who had revolted and fled the plantation, and were hiding in the swamps. This so-called bush commando consisted of one captain of the civic militia, P. Labadie, 21 white militiamen, armed civilians, and 25 Negroes, including 15 armed Negroes. It is not clear, however, whether the 15 armed black men were slaves or free Blacks, or even free people of colour.16 As the Atlantic World, including the military, is drenched with ethnicity, I will make a distinction between the military role played by slaves on the one hand and the free people of colour and the free Blacks on the other hand. To understand the complex military Atlantic World, both groups have to be addressed separately. In 2006, for instance, Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan published the collection Arming Slaves: from Classical Times to the Modern Age. More than half of the contributions, eight out of thirteen, deal with the Atlantic World. For two reasons, the scope of this book is too limited for the reader to understand the military role played by the people of African descent in the Atlantic World. Firstly, being an armed slave is only one of three military functions carried out by slaves. Secondly, other African groups than slaves were also in the military and had often their own units.17

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_____________________________________________________________ I will start with the different military roles played by slaves, then I will outline how essential for the free people of colour their military role was for their emancipation. 4. Military Slaves In general, slaves in the Atlantic World performed three different military roles: they were used as labourers to build and maintain the defence works, they acted as auxiliary troops and they were armed soldiers. All three different military roles will be illustrated in the following section. A. As labourers building forts and castles Both in the Americas and in West Africa, European colonisers built defences, sometimes only temporary, but often permanent. In many cases, slaves were used for building and maintaining these constructions. A well-researched example of this is Cuba, and the fortress El Moro in particular. During the Seven Years War (1756-1763) in North America, better known as the French and Indian War, British expeditionary forces laid siege to Havana and its formidable fortress El Moro in 1762. After a two-month siege the garrison surrendered. A year later, British forces withdrew from Cuba and the city was returned to Spanish control. Now the city and its defences could be rebuilt.18 The rebuilding and extension of Havanas land defences presented the Spanish Crown with a task for which its earlier practices proved inadequate. Crown representatives in Havana were forced to recruit and employ an unprecedented number of royal slaves to repair and construct fortifications. The asiento system, which had given merchant companies monopoly rights to import slaves into the Spanish empire, had to be abandoned. Now private contractors were also granted the right to import slaves. During 1764 and 1765 private slave traders and the Royal Company of Havana imported over 8,000 slaves. Of these 8,000 slaves, more than half (4,359) were purchased by the Crown for work on the fortifications. The most intense phase of the fortification construction spanned the years from 1764 through 1769. By early 1765, the total workforce employed at the three main sites of fortification work around Havana numbered from 2,110 to 2,355 workers. Only the very small number of 44 free workers of colour participated in the fort projects. As a result of its military construction needs, the Crown had become the largest slave owner on the island.19 B. Auxiliary Troops During overseas military operations, slaves were used as auxiliary troops in many different ways. During the aforementioned siege of Havana in 1762, the British had purchased almost 400 slaves in Martinique and Antigua, with

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_____________________________________________________________ 100 more hired from Saint Christopher, along with 36 slaves and 50 free coloured people from Jamaica. Added to the 200 Blacks that accompanied the initial landing there were a total of some 600 Blacks as auxiliaries with the expedition at the time of the original assault.20 Such large-scale military operations were rather the exception. Maroons, however, were an inherent threat to many overseas societies. In most slavedominated colonies, bush commandos were sent out on a regular basis to hunt down runaway slaves. These patrols could be rather limited, a dozen or so civic militiamen, or large operations conducted by hundreds of professional soldiers. In both cases, the Europeans were assisted by black bearers in the train and often black scouts and informants supported the operations. The war against the maroons in Suriname in particular has been thoroughly researched by Wim Hoogbergen. On 12 September 1771, a military commando of 50 European soldiers and some bearers under reserve officer candidate L.A. Sebulo left the military post s-lands Welvaren in an attempt to find the maroon village of Boekoe. After four days, some scouts who had climbed a tree sighted a large village, on elevated ground in the middle of a large swamp. After a short fight the village was taken. The soldiers found only a dozen or so women and children in the settlement; it became apparent that all warriors were absent. Later it became clear they were raiding a plantation at the same time. On 22 September, Sebula arrived in the capital Paramaribo with the prisoners. In early November, a patrol was sent to Boekoe to destroy the fortifications around the village, something which Sebulo had failed to do. After a five-day march the commando was attacked by 70 armed maroons. The fighting lasted throughout the afternoon and well into the night. By the next morning, two soldiers had died and ten were wounded, while the patrol had lost 26 slaves, mainly bearers. Three of the missing slaves are known to have joined the maroons. In late November 1771, another patrol, which comprised of 73 soldiers and 81 bearers, entered the forest. They made contact with the maroons on several occasions. They chased after them, but after a while they arrived at an impassable swamp, on the other side of which they discerned the stronghold of Boekoe. The next day, a fierce exchange of fire took place. After their ammunition was depleted, the patrol returned to base. They had lost seven soldiers, two men were reported missing and four were wounded, and many slaves had deserted.21 These examples are illustrative of the situation. The maroons were almost impossible to defeat by military means. The Europeans in particular lacked the necessary knowledge of the terrain. In the end, after an encounter

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_____________________________________________________________ with the maroons, several bearers would have fled the patrol and in some cases would have joined the maroons. In Suriname, the most famous slave hunter was a slave named Quassie of New Timotibo. He was born in West Africa in 1692. As a child he was sold as a slave to a plantation owner in Suriname. Probably in 1727 he participated, probably as a bearer, in his first slave-hunting patrol. By 1743, still a slave, he was acting as a patrol leader in search of runaway slaves in the vicinity of Paramaribo. By that time, a bond of trust had developed between him and the governor of the colony, Jan Jacob Mauricius, and his owner, the owner of the New Timotibo plantation, hired Quassie out to the government as a professional slave hunter. As a scout and an informant he participated in many large bush commandos. Later he was in charge of smaller commandos of Amerindians hunting down runaway slaves. Eventually, for services rendered, he was manumitted.22 C. Armed Slaves Arming slaves as soldiers is a counterintuitive idea, it even may seem selfcontradictory, an oxymoron. In many societies they were seen as the enemy, and why would their masters ever dream of supplying such inherent enemies with arms? Aside from security, there was often a bitterly controversial conflict between the interests of individual slave owners and the military needs of a government that might deprive such owners of their property. Yet in many societies throughout the Atlantic World, slave holders and colonial authorities entrusted slaves with the use of deadly force. The arming of slaves took a wide variety of forms, from the hasty provision of weapons to specialised training for battle. And it could occur more or less routinely, from the arming of slaves in moments of crisis to the systematic employment of slave soldiers in permanent regiments. For the slaves, on the other hand, military duties offered a welcome escape from the misery of plantation labour or even the allure of a promise of freedom. For slaves who had already spent significant time in the New World, there was also the motive to defend ones home, family, and even paternalistic whites.23 Slaves in arms had an important role in European expansion in the Americas, particularly for the Spanish, for whom enslaved Africans provided some of the muscle for the Spanish conquest of the Indies in the sixteenth century. In Brazil, too, over the course of three centuries, the arming of slaves was common. In March 1817, for instance, a rebellion broke out in Recife. The rebels initially drew extensive support from local dignitaries, including sugar planters, and the movement is generally interpreted as a rejection of the centralisation of power in Rio de Janeiro. The arming of slaves during this rebellion took place on several levels. A number of sugar planters marched to Recife at the head of groups of armed slaves and other

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_____________________________________________________________ dependents. Smaller slave owners also armed their slaves at the start of the revolt, while one of their leaders drafted their slaves to police the city. Some of the armed slaves were highly enthusiastic supporters of the rebellion, including one who bore a sword, following his master and declaring himself ready to serve the fatherland, adding that he looked forward to decapitating white soldiers.24 That many, if not most of the weapons in slaves hands were wielded in defence of slave owners interests testifies to the many facets of slavery. Slavery cannot be reduced to a simple model of repressive owners and resistant slaves, but rather was characterised by much more complex, negotiated social relationships. 5. Free People of Colour and Free Blacks Over time, the colonial powers were confronted with two problems. First, who was responsible and should pay for the defence of the colony; the owners in the metropolis or the colonists? This was a never-ending debate, often resulting in an ineffective military organisation and/or defence works in disrepair. In the case of Suriname, for instance, the directors in Amsterdam were generally more interested in defending the colony against an external threat, while the planters had more interest in suppressing the internal menace of the maroons, who threatened their plantations. In the end the States General, the highest executive body of the Dutch Republic, but not the owner of the colony, were forced to send troops taken from the regular army, to take part in suppressing the maroons. This was, however, not as simple as it looks.25 The second problem facing the colonial powers was sending enough soldiers to defend the overseas settlements. In countries where the Crown was the owner of the colony, the most simple option for defending their overseas possessions was to send units of the regular army overseas for garrison duty. Both the British and Spanish governments used this method. Regiments were stationed overseas for longer periods of time. This system, however, had a significant downside. Being billeted overseas generally meant few duties and large amounts of leisure time. Often the regiments had to look after themselves, and musketry and close-order drills were most often set aside in favour of non-military chores. Over time, their fighting power deteriorated. In many cases, the garrisons had become domesticated settlements, instead of fierce fighting machines.26 A measure to interrupt the process of domestication of overseas garrisons was to rotate regiments between the metropolis and the colonies. The Spaniards experimented with a rotation system for a while, but this proved to be too expensive. To have one regiment stationed overseas, the army lost three regiments for active duty back home: one was in garrison,

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_____________________________________________________________ one was in transit and one had to be trained and re-equipped. The rotation system proved to be too heavy a burden for the imperial army.27 The Dutch case was completely different, however. The Dutch colonies were not owned by the Crown. As a Republic, the Dutch were not subjects of a hereditary king, but they were free citizens, and in their case the overseas possessions were privately owned by several chartered joined stock companies, such as the Dutch West India Company. These private enterprises did not possess regular armies. They hired individuals as soldiers for a tenure overseas. These individuals were not professional soldiers and had no military training, with the exception of the officers. After arriving overseas in the main settlement the recruits would receive some basic military training and drills, but all in all their military skills were less than impressive. Colonial officials complained constantly about the quality of the recruits and the depleted garrisons.28 The high death rate amongst the military was mainly caused by the substandard physical and mental state of the soldiers. There are many observations on the poor health of the recruits: many were old and grey, some were deaf, blind or even paralysed, and many were alcoholics. In 1735, of a group of 35 soldiers destined for Suriname, none were considered fit.29 Especially for the tropics, European soldiers were generally rather unfit for overseas duty and they were not very effective either. In the tropics, Europeans were vulnerable to diseases. Several regions were particular notorious for their high death rates, such as West Africa. They were known as a white mens grave. European soldiers died of all kinds of diseases. The British, for instance, lost over 100,000 men in the West Indies between 1793 and 1815, twice the size of the standing British Army of the time. Shortly after they had arrived in the Caribbean, the European soldiers started to perish and drop like flies, and most units were unfit for front-line duties after six months.30 Especially in the tropical plantation colonies, European soldiers were less than effective in the difficult and harsh environment. The settlers stayed close to the towns and plantations and the planters hardly ever ventured into the wilderness. Their knowledge of the terrain, even in the vicinity of the plantations, was very limited. The slaves, however, regularly went into the forest to hunt, fish and gather food. And of course the local knowledge of the maroons who lived in the forest was excellent. They knew how to move easily and swiftly through the wilderness. On many an occasion a bush commando was already defeated by the difficult terrain even before they had confronted the maroons. John Gabriel Stedman, a professional soldier in the service of the Dutch army serving for five years in Suriname, described vividly how difficult their patrols were. Often for days on end, they

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_____________________________________________________________ had to wade through the swamps holding their firearms above their heads. It was an unequal struggle.31 Despite the many difficulties in manning the overseas garrisons, the colonial authorities were rather reluctant to use Creoles, both white and coloured, for the defence of the colonies. The Creoles were deemed too unreliable. The fear of recruiting and arming people from oppressed population groups is as old as colonial or imperial armies. Giving guns to Africans, be they slave or free, or even white Creoles in the New World or in Africa was opposed in particular by the metropolitan authorities. They were afraid that the Creoles wanted to become independent, or at least citizens with equal rights. In the end, however, the colonial authorities were forced, although reluctantly, to use more and more Creole troops, in one form or another. During the eighteenth century the colonial military started to creolise. More and more black and white Creoles were used. Here, I will look at four different kinds of units: special forces, the civic militia, the garrison, and the regular army. A. Special forces To counter the problem of the ineffective European soldiers and civic militia, unable to contain the problems posed by the maroons, a special force of manumitted slaves was established in Suriname. After the failed attacks on the village of Boekoe in 1771 and early 1772, the planters realised that they would never beat the maroons if they continued in this fashion. During a special meeting of the Court of Police on 7 June 1772, the planters therefore decided to purchase about 300 slaves and convert them into soldiers. The planters would pay for these warriors. Two weeks later, the first contingent of 116 slaves for the Neeger Vrijcorps (Black Rangers), or Redimusu as they were called in the Creole language after their red berets, was recruited. A few weeks later they were reinforced by another 180 freed slaves, which completed the Corps. In July, a combined attack on Boekoe by European soldiers and Black Rangers was planned. The Europeans would approach the village from the west. On the day of the attack it rained cats and dogs. The water in the swamp came up to the patrols shoulders. The European patrol suddenly came under fire. The bearers got rid of their loads and fled. The soldiers tried to return fire from the water, but all their powder was soaked. Fifteen soldiers were killed and the survivors retreated in silence. Unaware of the defeat of the other patrol, the Black Rangers continued their approach from the east. For several days they followed a hidden maroon path, eventually finding themselves right behind the village. The next day the maroons discovered them and eleven Rangers were taken prisoner. Despite the fact that they had sworn not to kill any Negroes, the

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_____________________________________________________________ maroons executed ten Rangers. The surviving one, after having been tortured, was released to tell his masters to conclude peace with them. In early September, when the dry season had arrived and water levels in the swamps had dropped, a new attack was planned. A group of 173 Black Rangers would approach Boekoe from the west, while from the east a combined commando of both Rangers and Europeans would advance. After several days of skirmishes the Rangers took the village, at last. During the next decades these patterns were to be repeated. European troops were unable to defeat the maroons. Only the Black Rangers, in conjunction with allied Amerindian warriors, were able to drive the maroons further and further to the outback of the wilderness, diminishing the number of maroon attacks on plantations. Eventually, halfway through the nineteenth century, a kind of peaceful coexistence was reached between the maroons and the planters. The maroons were never defeated by military means.32 B. Civic Militia Over time, new ethnic groups emerged in the New World: In New Spain, for instance, they were called mulatos (Afro-Spaniard), pardos (Afro-Indians) and morrenos (pure Blacks). In colonial society they were free, but racially stigmatised people. In the Spanish empire, that was also the case for the White Creoles in particular, people of European descent, born and raised overseas. In Cuba, for instance, at first the White Creoles had very limited opportunities to become officers in the regular Spanish army and the Spanish aristocracy was completely off limits for them. During the eighteenth century, they used the civic militia to establish a military career and eventually to become a part of the gentry and even the aristocracy. The Crown, for its part, encouraged this process in order to acquire a large and effective local military force for defending the island. Eventually, militia troops from Cuba were even used for an attack on Florida in the 1780s.33 During the eighteenth century, in many Atlantic colonies there was an increasing demand for more soldiers. Rather reluctantly, separate Black Creole companies were established everywhere. As free-coloured militias developed institutionally, this helped this stigmatised people in their process of emancipation. Free-coloured soldiers either moved up into the lower ranks of white society through their military privileges, or military privileges erased racial distinction for the militiamen, creating a racially/socially neutered population.34

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_____________________________________________________________ C. The Garrison Overseas, not only did the civic militias creolise, the garrisons in the forts became darker, too. This was certainly the case with the small Dutch garrison in West Africa. The Dutch West India Company (WIC) owned a dozen or so forts and factories along the Gold Coast, in present-day Ghana. The main centre was the castle Elmina, taken from the Portuguese in the 1630s. During the eighteenth century, the Dutch garrison in Africa consisted of some 200 soldiers. The number of Euro-Africans grew from 71 out of 213 soldiers in 1760 to 148 out of 151 soldiers in 1809. So, by 1809 the Dutch garrison on the Coast was almost completely creolised. The authorities in the Dutch Republic were not very enthusiastic about this development, but on the other hand they were unable to send enough men to West Africa to man the garrison. To maintain some sort of military organisation, the governor of Elmina was forced to hire more and more of these so-called Tapoeyers. During the Portuguese and Dutch presence in Elmina, this new ethnic group of Euro-Africans called Tapoeyers emerged. They were the descendents of a white father and a black mother. The Akan village of Elmina had a matriarchal social structure: the abusua. Although males were connected to their mothers abusua, their main social structure was their fathers asafo: a kind of civic militia. Each quarter of the town of Elmina had its own asafo. Female Tapoeyers belonged to their mothers abusua. Male Tapoeyers, however, because their fathers were European, did not belong to an asafo, although there were exceptions to this rule. To become a soldier in the service of the Company was for them one of the few opportunities to earn some sort of income. So, in that respect the creolisation of the garrison was a double-edged sword, it benefited the Company, which was in need of soldiers, and for the male Tapoeyers, the garrison acted as kind of substitute asafo.35 D. The Regular Army As already mentioned above, during the Napoleonic wars the British lost 100,000 men in the West Indies, twice the size of the standing British Army. Shortly after they had started their offensive against the French West Indian possessions in 1793, it became apparent that the British Army was unable to provide enough regiments for this overseas theatre. Already in 1795, the British started to raise local West Indian regiments, first only from the British colonies, later also in the occupied French and Dutch settlements. By November 1798, a total of twelve West Indian regiments had been raised. The privates were black Creoles, while the officers and NCOs were white, both European and Creole. The 8,500 men of West Indian Regiments formed an integral part of the British Army. After the war, in 1815/6, most regiments were decommissioned.36

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_____________________________________________________________ Conclusion The Atlantic World was a violent place, based on inequality between the different ethnic groups. Slavery and ethnicity was intertwined. One characteristic of that world was that the oppressed slaves, free Blacks and free people of colour played different military roles, often maintaining the unequal social order of overseas societies. Some of the oppressed helped to oppress other oppressed persons. I started this chapter with the present situation in Iraq. It appears that the ethnic differences between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds are becoming increasingly evident. Recently, concrete walls were erected in Baghdad to separate one ethnic quarter from the other. Furthermore, there is concern that the ethnic-sectarian nature of the burgeoning insurgency is undermining U.S. and Iraqi efforts to create a unified Iraqi security force. Early this year, an Iraqi general opted to use Sunni Kurdish troops against the Shiite dominated slum of Sadr City.37 Looking only at the ethnic dimension of the conflict, one could perhaps say that the present war in Iraq is the first colonial conflict of the twenty-first century. 6.

Notes
Koerden moeten Al-Sadr verslaan. NRC Handelsblad, 11 January 2007, pp. 5. 22 P Koekenbier, Multi-Ethnic Armies: Lebanese Lessons & Iraqi Implications. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Middle East Series no. 03/31, June 2005. 3 N L Whitehead, Carib Ethnic Soldiering in Venezuela, the Guianas, and the Antilles, 1492-1820. Ethnohistory, vol. 37, 1990, pp. 357-385; N L Whitehead, Native Peoples confront Colonial Regimes in North-Eastern South America, c. 1500-1900. in The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, Volume III: South America, part 2, F Salomon and S B Schwartz (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 382-442. 4 A Van Stipriaan Lucius, Creolisering. Vragen van een basketbalplein, antwoorden van een watergodin, Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam, 2000. 5 J Smolenski, The Ordering of Authority in the Colonial Americas, in New World Orders: Violence, Sanction, and Authority in the Colonial Americas, J Smolenski and Th J Humphrey (eds.), University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2005, pp. 1-16. 6 M Restall, Black Conquistadores: Armed Africans in Early Spanish America. The Americas, vol. 57, 2000, pp. 171-205. 7 P Butel, The Atlantic, Routledge, London and New York, 1999.
1

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_____________________________________________________________ For the British Atlantic see: R N Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies. Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1998; M N McConnell, Army & Empire. British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 1758-1775, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2004. 9 See for instance: W L Shea, The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1983, pp. 5-25. 10 A Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1998; G Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness. The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 2003; D J Weber, Brbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2005. 11 For a discussion on frontiers and borderlands, see: The American Historical Review, vol. 104, 1999, pp. 814-841 and pp. 1222-1225. 12 There is as yet no overview of slave revolts, but there are many studies on individual revolts, see for instance: E Viotti da Casta, Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood. The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. Recently several studies have been published on the Haitian Revolution, see for instance: D B Gaspar and D P Geggus (eds.), A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997; D P Geggus (ed.), The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World, University of South Carolina Press, Colombia, 2001; L Dubois, Revolution & Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2004. 13 R Price (ed.), Maroon Societies. Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, third edition; W Hoogbergen, The Boni Maroon Wars of Suriname, Brill, Leiden, 1990. 14 Providence Gazette, 4 December 1773. 15 Slavery and Injustice: Report of the Brown University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice, Brown University, Providence, 2006, available on the website of Brown University, May 2007, URL: http://www.brown.edu/Research/Slavery_Justice. 16 H van den Bouwhuijsen, R de Bruin and G Horeweg, Opstand in Tempati, 1757-1760, Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie, Utrecht, 1988. 17 Ch L Brown and Ph D Morgan (eds), Arming Slaves from Classical Times to Modern Age, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006. 18 D Syrett, The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762, Navy Records Society, London, 1970.
8

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_____________________________________________________________ E P Jennings, War as the Forcing House of Change: State Slavery in Late-Eighteenth-Century Cuba. The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 62, 2005, no. 3. 20 D E Walker, Colony versus Crown: Raising Black Troops for the Siege on Havana, 1762. The Journal of Caribbean History, vol. 3, 1999, pp. 7483. 21 Hoogbergen, The Boni Maroon Wars, pp. 70-75. 22 F Dragtenstein, Trouw aan de blanken Quassie van Nieuw Timotibo, twist en strijd in de achttiende eeuw in Suriname, KIT Publishers, Amsterdam, 2004. 23 D B Davis, Introduction, in Arming Slaves from Classical times to Modern Age, Ch L Brown and Ph D Morgan (eds.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006, pp. 1-13. 24 H Kraay, Arming Slaves in Brazil from the Seventeenth Century to the Nineteenth Century, in Arming Slaves from Classical times to Modern Age, Ch L Brown and Ph D Morgan (eds.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006, pp. 146-179. 25 G W van der Meiden, Betwist bestuur. Een eeuw strijd om de macht in Suriname, 1651-1753, De Bataafsche Leeuw, Amsterdam, 1987; Hoogbergen, The Boni Maroon Wars. 26 McConnell, Army & Empire, pp. 145-151; S Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 27 A J Kuethe, Cuba, 1753-1815: Crown, Military, and Society, University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1986. 28 For Curaao see: Nationaal Archief, The Hague (NA), Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 570 f. 598, letter from J. van Collen, 13 January 1711; ibid, 571 f. 695, letter from Van Beuningen, 21 July 1714; ibid, 314: J. van Collen to Heren X, 10 January 1735; ibid, 315: letter from J. van Collen, 23 July 1736; ibid, 1146 f. 54, Van Beeck to Zeeland chamber, 26 July 1701; ibid, 573 f. 285, letter of 20 November 1717. For Essequibo and Demerara see: J A J de Villiers, Storm van sGravensande zijn werk en zijn leven, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1920, pp. 182, 27 December 1757; pp. 287, 8 December 1766; pp. 389, 29 August 1772. For Suriname see: NA, Archief van de Sociteit van Suriname 222, 6 July 1697; R F Dragtenstein, De ondraaglijke stoutheid der wegloopers. Marronage en koloniaal beleid in Suriname, 1667-1768, CLACS, Utrecht, 2002, pp. 32; W Hoogbergen, De Boni-oorlogen, 1757-1860. Marronage en guerilla in Oost-Suriname, Center for Caribbean Studies, Utrecht, 1985, pp. 23.
19

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_____________________________________________________________ NA, NWIC 566 f. 297, letter from N. van Beeck, 21 June 1701; ibid, 567 f. 4, letter from N. van Beeck, 30 June 1702; Hoogbergen, De Boni-oorlogen, pp. 23; M J Lohnstein, De werving voor de militie in Suriname in de 18e eeuw. Oso. Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse taalkunde, letterkunde en geschiedenis, vol. 6, 1987, pp. 73 and pp. 77-8. 30 M Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Sea Power: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, pp. 100, table 4.1. 31 R Price and S Price (eds.), Stedmans Surinam. Life in an EighteenthCentury Slave Society. An Abridged, Modernized Edition of Narrative of a Five-year Expedition against the Revolting Negroes of Suriname by John Gabriel Stedman, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992. 32 S W de Groot, Rebellie der Zwarte Jagers. De nasleep van de Bonioorlogen, 1788-1809. De Gids, vol. 123, 1970, pp. 291-304; Hoogbergen, The Boni Maroon Wars, pp. 76-81; S W de Groot, Het Korps Zwarte Jagers in Suriname: collaboratie en opstand I en II. Oso. Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse taalkunde, letterkunde en geschiedenis, vol. 7, 1988, pp. 147160 and vol. 8, 1989, pp. 6-20. 33 Kuethe, Cuba, 1753-1815. 34 B Quarles, The Colonial Militia and Negro Manpower. The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 45, 1959, pp. 643-652; J W Shy, A New Look at Colonial Militia. The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 20, 1963, pp. 175-185; A J Kuethe, The Status of the Free Pardo in the Disciplined Militia of New Grenada. The Journal of Negro History, vol. 56, 1971, pp. 105-117; G R Andrews, The Afro-Argentine Officers of Buenos Aires, 1800-1860. The Journal of Negro History, vol. 64, 1979, pp. 85-100; B Vinson, Free Coloured Voices: Issues of Representation and Racial Identity in the Colonial Mexican Militia. The Journal of Negro History, vol. 80, 1995, pp. 170-182; B Vinson, Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The FreeColoured Militia in Colonial Mexico, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2001; J J Vrij, Kleur en status in vroegmodern Suriname. De schutterij van Paramaribo als case study. Oso. Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse taalkunde, letterkunde en geschiedenis, vol. 24, 2005, pp. 20-38. 35 This paragraph is based on: N Evers, Krijgsvolk in Elmina, 1700-1815. Asafo, Compagniegarnizoen en Tapoeyerkwartier, forthcoming. I would like to thank Natalie Evers for providing me with this information. 36 R N Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats. The British West India Regiments, 1795-1815, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979; R Chartrand and P Chappell, British Forces in the West Indies, 1793-181, Osprey, London, 1996); Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies.
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_____________________________________________________________
37

Ethnic Divide Deepens in New Iraq. The Christian Science Monitor, 8 March 2004; J M Sharp, Iraqs New Security Forces: the Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences. CRS Report for Congress, 25 March 2005; C Roelants, Bagdad wordt een betonnen doolhof. Nieuwe muren bezegelen bezegelen sektarische zuiveringen in de Iraakse hoofdstad. NRCHandelsblad, 28 April 2007.

Bibliography
-, Providence Gazette, 4 December 1773 -, The American Historical Review, vol. 104, 1999, pp. 814-841 and pp. 1222-1225 -, Ethnic Divide Deepens in New Iraq. The Christian Science Monitor, 8 March 2004 -, Slavery and Injustice: Report of the Brown University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice, Brown University, Providence, 2006, available on the website of Brown University, May 2007, URL: http://www.brown.edu/Research/Slavery_Justice. -, Koerden moeten Al-Sadr verslaan. NRC Handelsblad, 11 January 2007, pp. 5 Andrews, G R, The Afro-Argentine Officers of Buenos Aires, 1800-1860. The Journal of Negro History, vol. 64, 1979, pp. 85-100 Bouwhuijsen, H van den, R de Bruin and G Horeweg, Opstand in Tempati, 1757-1760, Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie, Utrecht, 1988 Brown, Ch L and Ph D Morgan (eds.), Arming Slaves from Classical Times to Modern Age, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006 Brumwell, S, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 17551763, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Buckley, R N, Slaves in Red Coats. The British West India Regiments, 17951815, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979 Buckley, R N, The British Army in the West Indies. Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age, University Press of Florida, Gainville, 1998 Butel, P, The Atlantic, Routledge, London and New York, 1999 Chartrand, R and P Chappell, British Forces in the West Indies, 1793-181, Osprey, London, 1996 Chet, G, Conquering the American Wilderness. The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 2003

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_____________________________________________________________ Davis, D B, Introduction, in Arming Slaves from Classical times to Modern Age, Ch L Brown and Ph D Morgan (eds.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006, pp. 1-13 Dragtenstein, R F, De ondraaglijke stoutheid der wegloopers. Marronage en koloniaal beleid in Suriname, 1667-1768, CLACS, Utrecht, 2002 Dragtenstein, R F, Trouw aan de blanken Quassie van Nieuw Timotibo, twist en strijd in de achttiende eeuw in Suriname, KIT Publishers, Amsterdam, 2004 Dubois, L, Revolution & Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2004 Duffy, M, Soldiers, Sugar and Sea Power: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987 Evers, N, Krijgsvolk in Elmina, 1700-1815. Asafo, Compagniegarnizoen en Tapoeyerkwartier, forthcoming Gaspar, D B and D P Geggus (eds.), A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997 Geggus, D P (ed.), The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World, University of South Carolina Press, Colombia, 2001 Groot, S W de, Rebellie der Zwarte Jagers. De nasleep van de Bonioorlogen, 1788-1809. De Gids, vol. 123, 1970, pp. 291-304 Groot, S W de, Het Korps Zwarte Jagers in Suriname: collaboratie en opstand I en II. Oso. Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse taalkunde, letterkunde en geschiedenis, vol. 7, 1988, pp. 147-160 and vol. 8, 1989, pp. 6-20 Hoogbergen, W, De Boni-oorlogen, 1757-1860. Marronage en guerilla in Oost-Suriname, Center for Caribbean Studies, Utrecht, 1985 Hoogbergen, W, The Boni Maroon Wars of Suriname, Brill, Leiden, 1990 Jennings, E P, War as the Forcing House of Change: State Slavery in Late-Eighteenth-Century Cuba. The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 62, 2005, no. 3 Koekenbier, P, Multi-Ethnic Armies: Lebanese Lessons & Iraqi Implications. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Middle East Series no. 03/31, June 2005 Kraay, H, Arming Slaves in Brazil from the Seventeenth Century to the Nineteenth Century, in Arming Slaves from Classical times to Modern Age, Ch L Brown and Ph D Morgan (eds.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006, pp. 146-179 Kuethe, A J, The Status of the Free Pardo in the Disciplined Militia of New Grenada. The Journal of Negro History, vol. 56, 1971, pp. 105-117 Kuethe, A J, Cuba, 1753-1815: Crown, Military, and Society, University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1986

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_____________________________________________________________ Lohnstein, M J, De werving voor de militie in Suriname in de 18e eeuw. Oso. Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse taalkunde, letterkunde en geschiedenis, vol. 6, 1987, pp. 73 and pp. 77-8 McConnell, M N, Army & Empire. British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 1758-1775, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2004 Meiden, G W van der, Betwist bestuur. Een eeuw strijd om de macht in Suriname, 1651-1753, De Bataafsche Leeuw, Amsterdam, 1987 Price, R (ed.), Maroon Societies. Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, third edition Price R and S Price (eds.), Stedmans Surinam. Life in an Eighteenth-Century Slave Society. An Abridged, Modernized Edition of Narrative of a Fiveyear Expedition against the Revolting Negroes of Suriname by John Gabriel Stedman, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992 Quarles, B The Colonial Militia and Negro Manpower. The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 45, 1959, pp. 643-652 Restall, M, Black Conquistadores: Armed Africans in Early Spanish America. The Americas, vol. 57, 2000, pp. 171-205 Roelants, C, Bagdad wordt een betonnen doolhof. Nieuwe muren bezegelen bezegelen sektarische zuiveringen in de Iraakse hoofdstad. NRCHandelsblad, 28 April 2007. Sharp, J M, Iraqs New Security Forces: the Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences. CRS Report for Congress, 25 March 2005 Shea, W L, The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1983 Shy, J W, A New Look at Colonial Militia. The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 20, 1963, pp. 175-185 Smolenski, J, The Ordering of Authority in the Colonial Americas, in New World Orders: Violence, Sanction, and Authority in the Colonial Americas, J Smolenski and Th J Humphrey (eds.), University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2005, pp. 1-16 Starkey, A, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1998 Stipriaan Lucius, A van, Creolisering. Vragen van een basketbalplein, antwoorden van een watergodin, Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam, 2000 Syrett, D, The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762, Navy Records Society, London, 1970 Villiers, J A J de, Storm van s-Gravensande zijn werk en zijn leven, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1920 Vinson, B, Free Coloured Voices: Issues of Representation and Racial Identity in the Colonial Mexican Militia. The Journal of Negro History, vol. 80, 1995, pp. 170-182

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_____________________________________________________________ Vinson, B, Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free-Coloured Militia in Colonial Mexico, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2001 Viotti da Casta, E, Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood. The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994 Vrij, J J, Kleur en status in vroegmodern Suriname. De schutterij van Paramaribo als case study. Oso. Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse taalkunde, letterkunde en geschiedenis, vol. 24, 2005, pp. 20-38 Walker, D E, Colony versus Crown: Raising Black Troops for the Siege on Havana, 1762. The Journal of Caribbean History, vol. 3, 1999, pp. 7483 Weber, D J, Brbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2005 Whitehead, N L, Carib Ethnic Soldiering in Venezuela, the Guianas, and the Antilles, 1492-1820. Ethnohistory, vol. 37, 1990, pp. 357-385 Whitehead, N L, Native Peoples confront Colonial Regimes in NorthEastern South America, c. 1500-1900. in The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, Volume III: South America, part 2, F Salomon and S B Schwartz (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 382-442 Victor Enthoven is historian and associate professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Royal Netherlands Naval College.

Moving to the West: Mass Displacement and State-Society Relations in Wartime China, 1937-1945 Lu Liu
Abstract The Chinese theatre of World War II was by far one of the worst instances of holocaust in the human history. After the east coast of China fell into Japanese occupation, the Nationalist government announced a decision of a wholesale relocation of the Chinese state to the western interior. Millions of Chinese citizens responded to the call of evacuation. Images of civilian refugees packing trains and steamers, clogging paths and roadways, and clutching their belongings as they march raggedly to the western interior of the country are common representations of the total war. The organization of the civilian evacuation and the resettlement of refugee migrants had not only taken a central place in the wartime mass mobilization, but imposed great burdens as well to state, society, and local communities. My paper examines both official strategies and communal responses to the drastic rise of refugees. Toward the end of the 1930s, public scrutiny of the refugee problem gave rise to a strong reform movement that led to the reorganization of the cause of welfare and the establishment of a national relief infrastructure. The provision of refugee relief reshaped boundaries between state and society. Key Words Refugees, Civil Society, Localism, Welfare State, State-Society Relations, State-building *****

Beginning July 1937, Japan initiated a new series of invasion first along the east coast and into central China, then in 1938 pushed its military advance farther westwards. The Guomindang (GMD) Nationalist government, under the command of Chiang Kaishek, was forced to relocate the national capital to a mountainous city deep inside the western interior. Therefore it is no surprise that contemporary observers, both domestic and foreign, had criticized the Nationalists indifference to the dire needs of wartime refugees and viewed it as a collapsed, corrupt, and inefficient government unable to rejuvenate or rescue its people from the sufferings of war.1 Yet, contrary to this stereotypical understanding on the role of the GMD government, the refugee crisis and civilian exodus from east coast to the interior impelled the

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______________________________________________________________ GMD to reorganize the infrastructure of social welfare by the spring of 1938. As a result, it established a discrete institution to supervise the civilian evacuation. At the height of the mass exodus between 1938 and 1940, the new institution provided refugees with both emergency relief such as food, lodging, travel stipends, and statutory measures of access to medical services and job placement. This paper will thus examine the transformation of ideology and practices of the wartime state in the area of social welfare. It first reviews the efforts of disaster relief since the late 19th century to the immediate aftermath of the onset of war, then focuses on the perceived refugee crisis which stirred up public anxieties with regard to the chaos, and insufficiency of the existing relief measures. These perceptions on refugeedom contributed to a contemporary consensus over the necessity of a reform on social welfare. Such constructed knowledge of the refugee problem impelled the wartime government more engaged with a centralized provision of relief. Finally, the paper will survey the services and facilities that the GMD extended to mass evacuees en route to the interior. By the end of the war, the GMD government had displaced the private sector of voluntarism. The Rise of a Refugee Problem Welfare systems reflect the dominant cultural and political characteristics of their societies.2 Since the Taiping Rebellion of the mid-19th century, due to the limited state resources available for local development, local elites were expected to contribute to the supply of services and resources in the public good at private expense, the notion of liturgy. Welfare had become the traditional domain of local elites in the form of philanthropy, especially in the area of disaster relief. The subsequence of this, as much of the scholarship on gentry studies has pointed out, led to a trend of elite ascendancy and a decline of state control over local society. The tradition of voluntarism under the nominal supervision of the government had continued into the early years of Republican China. As soon as the Shanghai campaign (August 13 - November 12, 1937) broke out, Pan Gongzhan, head of the Social Bureau of the Municipal government, called on local civic organizations for cooperation, which combined their forces roughly into two agencies, the International Relief Committee and the Union of All Shanghai Voluntary Agencies (the Union). The latter became the largest relief entity by incorporating charities, professional unions, and native-place associations.3 Semi-official in character due to its incorporation of a number of political elite, though, native-place associations quickly took charge of the relief practices on a daily basis. In her study on Shanghais native-place associations, historian Bryna Goodman argues that such social, economic, and political organizations along lines of regional identity, many of which grew out of the 1.

Lu Liu

29

______________________________________________________________ trade guilds in the late 19th century, had shaped the development of urban cities. Undergoing historical vicissitudes from the imperial dynasty to the republic, Goodman concludes, native-place associations remained resilient and prominent in the realm of society on the eve of the war.4 To help the war effort, students, housewives, the newly unemployed workers, as well as members of other walks, volunteered to offer their services. The Union organized these human resources into 11 divisions so as to cover a wide range of relief functions, including those of fund raising, sheltering, rescue militias, education and food supply, medical care and hygiene, shipping refugees home and burial services, to name a few.5 The prominence of the Unions work can be seen from the following statistical figures: One month into the war, nearly 100,000 refugees had found shelter inside foreign concessions, from which number one-tenth was escorted to their hometowns. In addition, the Union established 126 refugee stations and two civilian hospitals. With emptied public housing, the daily consumption needs of refugees reached 400 dan of rice and 4,000 kilogram of pickles. These expenses, which cost the Union Ch$160,000 by late September, were mostly met with private donations.6 The outbreak of total war generated mass refugees of an unprecedented level. Despite the achievements of civic organizations, the plight of the refugees stirred up wide social attentions that news media quickly articulated a discussion on the refugee problem. Inside the urban cities, despite the generous donations of money and supplies, social workers were plagued by shortages in food, living space, and money. Journalists kept reporting that the sum of the current relief measures hardly assuaged the hardships of refugeedom. For the refugees lying inside and outside the concessions, everywhere was an outlook of miseries: It became a regular scene when refugees sat or reclined on some quilts against the wall, leaning beside doorsteps of shops like a big pile of trash. Food supply could hardly meet the demand. Cries of hungry children were audible from time to time. Refugees at large suffered from diarrhoea and beriberi as a result of poor nutrition. Death became an imminent threat. According to news report, nearly 200 refugees per day died of hunger or malaria.7 Hungry, dirty, and sick, the refugees looked like live ghosts in the eyes of their compatriots. Contemporary literature also carried graphic reports on the desperate plight of the refugees on relocation. For those willing to move the interior, the limitation on the access to transportation became further acute. The evacuation of civilians, besides that of military armies and equipment, placed an intolerable burden on the communications system. To the voluntary organizations, the number of refugees was the appalling thing: [T]heir number! They overran everything; they were everywhere. 8 Railway networks nationwide faced severe challenges: There was never enough train

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______________________________________________________________ for the use of relocation. Lines were frequently subject to traffic jams. The management of railway system was unsystematic. The sheer size of refugeedom, the lack of a unified organization, and the plight of evacuation all contributed to a common understanding: Wartime China was experiencing an inevitable and serious refugee problem. Population displacement had all the makings of a major social crisis. The educated society felt impelled to initiate a critical examination of social services provided by voluntary institutions. It was now time for a drastic change of the landscape of social welfare. Debating National Welfare System Given the continuing loss of territories and the abandoning of national capital by the end of 1937, public attention to the sharp increase of refugees nationwide became more and more heated. To contemporary writers, wartime relief was more than a cause of charity. First of all, philanthropy alone could not suffice to pay the bills of relief. Local charitable sources began to run dry one month into the war. The decreasing sources of civic organizations continued into the 1940s, a trend with no return. Moreover, the unprecedented social needs generated by total war pushed the relief system beyond traditional practices. The repatriation of refugees to their ancestral hometowns had been a traditional relief strategy. However, it was inappropriate under the current conditions of total war: This method is useless and those refugees continue to be the burden for the Chinese nation.9 Social critics identified the evacuation of civilian refugees to the interior as the solution to the refugee problem. In their delineation, the state should incorporate all the existing voluntary organizations and make adjustments to the existing relief activities. It should formulate strict regulations and comprehensive planning. Most importantly, the new system should evacuate civilians of all war-afflicted areas to safe zones.10 Wartime relief thus needs to be a national cause. Social workers in general agreed that the state should form clear planning to adjust the distribution of vehicles and steamers, and to reduce or exempt the civilian from ticket charges.11 At the very least, they hoped, the state would prohibit the unregulated inflation of transportation expenses and limit the number of tickets an individual could reserve at one time. Most importantly, they argued, the government should devise a comprehensive plan to establish rest hostels in every port city and communication centre for the convenience of all the passing evacuees.12 In short, the relocation of the refugees required deeper involvement of the state into social relief. Centralization of social welfare was lauded. The existence of the refugee problem and the relocation of mass civilians demanded a further involvement of the wartime state and a centralized management of natural and human resources. Acting on such a sentiment, voluntary organizations readily gave up their traditional domain of 2.

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______________________________________________________________ social welfare and willingly handed over the leadership of the welfare cause to the state. It was under such public expectations that the GMD government initiated the construction of a national infrastructure for the convenience of civilian relocation to the Great Rear. Building a National Relief Network On April 23, 1938, the Nationalist government formed the Development and Relief Commission to supersede prior government relief bodies. From spring 1938 to early 1940s, the Development and Relief Commission (DRC) had gradually grown into a gigantic welfare complex. It incorporated the old voluntary organizations. Moreover, it replaced them as the major benefactor of mass refugees with the former playing an indispensable yet supporting role. The following pages will examine the DRCs institutional composition and its infrastructure for wartime relief and relocation. The sharp increase of refugees nationwide and the relief needs generated by total war had a profound impact on the finances of the wartime state. The annual spending on social welfare kept rising from roughly Ch$ 1,500,000 in 1938 to Ch$ 283,277,000 in 1944, which means a nearly 189fold increase in welfare expenditure. 13 Such a sharp rise of budget demonstrated that the wartime state had been not only taxing more of its citizens, but also employing more social policy clerks and providing more welfare services. One of the chief outcomes of this expansion of expenditures and programs was inevitably increased bureaucracy of the welfare agency DRC. On December 15, 1937, the Executive Yuan drafted a plan to form a wartime services corps for the purpose of relief and relocation. In regards to the composition of its operatives, all the government functionaries who were currently unemployed were eligible for membership application. 14 The motion stirred up an immediate response from the former government staff. In five months, the corps had already recruited 1,218 operatives (to fill a designated quota of 1,500 openings).15 Later, the Executive Yuan ultimately authorized the Services Corps and its relief stations to recruit additional assistants as needed directly from local areas.16 On the basis of such a bureaucratic body, the DRC gradually developed its gigantic infrastructure for the convenience of civilian relocation. In spring 1938, the DRC divided all the war-affected regions into eight relief zones. Encompassing those counties affected by military battles, each of the relief zones was organized according to the parameters of discrete military battles, rather than on the basis of the original administrative divisions.17 Under the overarching structure of relief zones, a national transit network passed through the demarcated regions and linked coastal China 3.

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______________________________________________________________ section by section to free China. Mass refugees counted on the network for directions, daily necessities, and monetary subsidy. The transit network was a hierarchical system: Below the headquarters in Hankou was a string of 34 general stations extending from the east coast to the western hinterland. The general stations were either provincial capitals, or commercial and communications centres within a province.18 Between general stations were a series of relief stations, linked every 30 kilometres by sub-stations and, between sub-stations, every 15 kilometres by rest hostels. Scattered along regular travel routes, refugees would easily locate sub-stations at county seats and find rest hostels in smaller towns or villages. 19 Similar to the delineation of relief zones, the selection of relief stations adjusted frequently to military developments. When the Pacific war broke out in the end of 1941, the DRC had in total formed 38 general stations and 1059 sub-stations and rest hostels.20 4. Conclusion The plight of mass refugees fully exposed the weakness of traditional relief practices and advanced a wide-ranging discussion of the relief agenda. Rather than passive recipients of welfare, the refugees were now expected to be active participants in the wartime production and the nationalist struggle against Japanese imperialism. Recognizing the constraints of voluntary associations, the Nationalist government undertook a reform of the welfare cause with the founding of the Development and Relief Commission and the establishment of its nationwide relief/transit network. More important, war shaped the relationship between state and society. The reform accelerated the shift of authority relations in the realm of welfare. As a result, the relief cause experienced a process of centralization through which the wartime state became the primary benefactor for social welfare. The overarching role of statutory welfare is best illustrated from the following statistics: From late 1937 to the end of 1940, the period of high tide civilian relocation, 26 million refugees had received help from various institutions. Among them, nearly 70 percent was supported by the DRC transit system. 21 Voluntary organizations as the traditional authority in the landscape of welfare turned out to play a supplementary role. It is out of the needs of refugee relief and relocation that a welfare state started to emerge in wartime China.

Notes
1

Nicholas Clifford, A Truthful Impression of the Country: British and American Travel Writing in China, 1880-1949 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

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______________________________________________________________ Geoffrey Finlayson, Citizen, State, and Social Welfare in Britain 1830-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 1. 3 Ba-yi-san kangzhan shiliao xuanbian [Selected documents on the Shanghai campaign] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, 1986), 446-447. 4 Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 277-291. 5 Ba-yi-san kangzhan shiliao xuanbian, 447. 6 Ibid., 435-436, 473, 469. 7 Ibid., 92. 8 Han Suyin, Destination Chungking (Penguin Books, 1959), 128. 9 Ba-yi-san kangzhan shiliao xuanbian, 404. 10 Li Gongpu, Jiuji nanmin gongzuo jihua dagang [Outline of relief work plans], Kangzhan sanrikan 2 (23 August 1937), 11. 11 Heli de ancha nanmin wenti [To distribute and place refugees rationally], Shenbao (Hankou), 27 March 1938. 12 Zhang Zhongshi, Congsu gaishan houfang de jiaotong [To improve communications with the interior quickly], Kangzhan sanrikan 35 (9 January 1938), 6. 13 The overall annual budgeted expenditures rose from Ch$ 856,413,000 in 1938 to Ch$ 74,001,432,000 in 1944. 1937-1944 niandu guojia suichu zong yusuan [Annual budgeted expenditures 1937 - 1944], DAZLHB, ser. 5, pt. 2, Caizheng jingji, vol. 1, 312-313. 14 Xingzhengyuan feichang shiqi fuwutuan banfa [The methods on the formation of the Wartime Service Corps of the Executive Yuan], 15 December 1937, National Historical Archives, Guomin zhengfu dang, 326 juan, 428-431. 15 Feichang shiqi fuwutuan faling [Regulatory decrees on the Wartime Services Corps], 5 September 1938, National Historical Archives, Guomin zhengfu dang, 326 juan, 564-565. 16 Ge zongzhan bianzu jiuji gongzuo fuyidui zanxing banfa [The draft on the recruitment of relief teams by all general stations], Second Historical Archives, Zhenji weiyuanhui, 117 quanzong, 12 juan (May 1939). 17 Nanmin shusongwang jihua dagang [The outline of the DRC transit network], Second Historical Archives, Zhenji weiyuanhui, 116 quanzong, 597 juan (1938). 18 Second Historical Archives, Zhenji weiyuanhui, 117 quanzong, 4 juan (August 1938). 19 Geming wenxian, vol. 96, 455-456. 20 On the adjustment of the DRC transit network, see Second Historical Archives, Zhenji weiyuanhui, 117 quanzong, 4 juan (November 1938);
2

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______________________________________________________________ Revision of the management parameters of general stations, Second Historical Archives, Zhenji weiyuanhui, 118 quanzong, 5 juan (1 May 1939); and, Geming wenxian, vol. 96, 77; vol. 97, 389, 401, 411, 432. 21 Statistics on wartime refugees, Second Historical Archives, Shehuibu, 11 quanzong, 696 juan (July 1938 - December 1940).

Bibliography
Kangzhan sanrikan (Resistance). Hankou, 1937-1938. Shenbao (Shanghai daily). Hankou: 1938. Ba-yi-san kangzhan shiliao xuanbian (Selected documents on the Shanghai campaign). Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, 1986. Clifford, Nicholas. 2001. A Truthful Impression of the Country: British and American Travel Writing in China, 1880-1949. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Finlayson, Geoffrey. 1994. Citizen, State, and Social Welfare in Britain 18301990. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Geming wenxian (Documents on the Nationalist revolution). Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi shiliao bianzuan weiyuanhui. Goodman, Bryna. 1995. Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937. Berkeley: University of California Press. Han, Suyin. 1959. Destination Chungking. Penguin Books. Zhonghua minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian (DAZLHB) (Collection of documents on the Republic of China). Nanjing: Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan, 1997. Lu Liu reads at the University of Tennessee, USA.

Breaking Silences and Telling Stories: Renegotiating the Meaning of the Border War in Post-Apartheid South Africa Gary Baines
Abstract For some fifteen years scant attention has been paid to South Africas Border War and the memories of soldiers who fought therein. Forgotten by the apartheid state, ex-combatants have been marginalized in the new political dispensation. But the recent controversy over the exclusion of the names of SADF soldiers from the Freedom Park memorial wall and the involvement of ex-combatants in acts of violence has received media coverage. The spate of publications and the existence of internet sites that host personal accounts of the war also suggest that there is significant public interest in these matters. This paper seeks to explain why the silences existed in the first place and why soldiers are breaking ranks and telling their stories now. Key words South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Border War, silences, stories, trauma, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, victimhood, complicity *****

More than fifteen years have passed since: South Africa withdrew its armed forces from Angola and agreed to a negotiated settlement based on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 435 for Namibia, the Cold War ended, and the liberation movements suspended the armed struggle against the apartheid regime. This chain of events brought an end to the late Cold War conflicts in southern Africa that had caused extensive death and destruction and ruptured the regions stability. Yet scant attention has been paid to the convergence of these events and how they contributed to the political transition in South Africa.1 Especially neglected has been the bearing of events in the region on the countrys domestic changes and vice versa. For instance, the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) devoted a single chapter of its seven-volume report to events beyond South Africas borders.2 Researchers were commissioned by the TRC and legal teams to investigate these events, but scholars have not followed their lead in any systematic way whatsoever. The records of the apartheid regime have not readily yielded their secrets to scholars in part because large volumes of top secret files were destroyed by the old regime, but also because access to the military archives involves a lengthy procedure of

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______________________________________________________________ declassification.3 It is with good reason that Peter Vale has expressed concern about the silences in the historiography of South Africas role in the Cold War.4 If scholars have paid scant attention to the Border War in recent years, does this imply that the subject is taboo? Does academic silence necessarily mean that the subject is out of bounds to society at large? Is it like a shameful family secret that South Africans have been loath to acknowledge, even privately? Has South Africas quest for reconciliation meant society has placed a premium on former adversaries forgiving and forgetting the past? Has the peaceful political transition invalidated the memory of the war waged by the apartheid regime as far as former South African Defence Force (SADF) conscripts are concerned? There are those who believe that the Border War is best forgotten as the country focuses on building a new future. But the experiences and memories of ex-combatants, and the legacy of an often brutal conflict cannot simply be wished away. Soldiers stories need to be told and the demons of both individuals and the nation exorcised. So it is worth noting that ex-combatants have of late begun to explore their place in post-apartheid South Africa by revisiting their military (hi)stories. They are breaking ranks and telling their stories. And this paper seeks to understand why this is so. Opening and Closing Ranks The Border War was waged away from the public eye. The SADF learned the (mistaken) lesson of Vietnam from the United States forces that unrestricted media coverage of war could be demoralizing and selfdefeating.5 Censorship and disinformation served to create a conspiracy of silence. Thus there was a black out of coverage by local media of Operation Savannah in 1975 when SADF forces briefly occupied parts of central Angola.6 That local media were kept in the dark whilst the story was broken by their international counterparts occasioned acute embarrassment for the former. The SADF attempted to win over the local media by inviting carefully vetted (photo)journalists and military correspondents to accompany units in the field. These public relations exercises might have convinced the correspondents who duly reported that the SADFs prowess and superior training ensured victory (provided that it was linked to a political settlement). Thus the mainstream media the Afrikaans and English press, as well as the South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) that monopolised the airwaves and television from 1976 lent their support to the boys on the border. In fact, the real battle for hearts and minds was for the loyalty of the conscripts for the SADF was largely a citizen force. However, the Nationalist Party (NP) government and the SADF did not take the soldiers or their families into their confidence. The authorities disclosed information about military matters only on a need to know basis.

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______________________________________________________________ They repeatedly refused to disclose the nature and exact number of the armed forces (often self-inflicted) casualties.7 Reports released to and published by the media were often contrived versions of what had actually caused the deaths of servicemen.8 This was compounded by the SADFs reluctance to disclose the circumstances of individual soldiers deaths to their next of kin.9 Even the troops themselves were seldom informed about strategic objectives of military operations in which they were involved. For instance, troops were not briefed beforehand that they were bound for Angola, and officers were instructed not to divulge the enemys logistical and numerical superiority to their own troops at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.10 Not only clandestine operations carried out by the SADFs elite reconnaissance forces warrant the appellation the Silent War.11 For the undeclared war was generally conducted amidst considerable secrecy and an oppressive silence. Secrets can reveal much about society and governance as they are more about a kind of information than a kind of concealment.12 SADF national servicemen were sworn to secrecy by having to sign declarations in terms of the Defence Act not to divulge information pertaining to military operations.13 This bound veterans of the Border War to refrain from telling the stories even to friends and family (although they undoubtedly swapped tales with one another and shared their memories of their experiences). For some ex-SADF soldiers the camaraderie of cyberspace has largely replaced bonding/drinking sessions in pubs and reunions of veterans associations. In fact, the reach and scope of the informal networks (often via email listservs or websites hosted outside of the country) serve as a kind of virtual veterans association. These veterans who have served in the old SADF, belonged to a specific unit, or performed border duty, have established a network of sites to exchange memories and, in some cases, provide platforms for advice on matters like PTSD.14 They constitute cyber-communities in which hyperlinks, multiple postings, and cross-citation facilitate communication between individuals who hold similar views. Certain Web authors and their readers share membership of a virtual community and provide social support for one another. Why should former SADF national servicemen have gravitated to the internet in order to share their stories and experiences? Do they see themselves as contesting their invisibility in post-apartheid South Africa occasioned by their forgotten war and what Sasha Gear calls the silence of stigmatized knowledge?15 Have SADF veterans ventured into the apparently neutral terrain of cyberspace to tell stories that might be deemed politically incorrect in the new South Africa? Jodi Dean argues that there is no longer a consensus reality according to which contested questions of fact can be resolved. She suggests that, instead, there are multiple contending realities which keep contested issues from being decided. In other words, Dean reckons that there has been dissolution of the boundary between the margins

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______________________________________________________________ and the mainstream. 16 This implies that groups sidelined in the realm of realpolitik are able to challenge the consensus established by hegemonic groups. However, Michael Barkun believes that while the boundary has become more permeable it still exists and that virtual communities remain on the fringes of the power brokering of interest groups and political elites.17 They have created internet sites that mostly disclaim political affiliations, although a few advertise their (invariably right-wing) political orientations and reminisce nostalgically about their time in the army. They have arguably found the (cyber)space to make their voices heard in post-apartheid South Africa. The apartheid regimes officially-imposed amnesia led some exsoldiers to find alternative forms of remembering such as writing fiction. A few veterans with literary pretensions told their stories in thinly-disguised fictionalized autobiographical works, especially in short stories, through the medium of Afrikaans. Much of this grensliteratuur was introspective and self-reflexive,18 and the protagonists were often misfits, outcasts and even anti-heroes. The most sensational text to appear during the transition was Mark Behrs Die Reuk van Appels (1993) which was translated as The Smell of Apples (1995). The timing of the authors well-publicized acknowledgment that he acted as a spy for the security forces while a student at the University of Stellenbosch during the 1980s was no coincidence. Indeed, this revelation probably ensured that his story of a white Afrikaner boy dutifully following his father into the army and becoming involved in combat in Angola was read as autobiographical. The text of Behrs confessional narrative functions as an act of exculpation on his part.19 But we should heed Michiel Heyns cautionary note that the ambivalence of confessional fiction [is] often accommodating, and not confronting the culpability of the author.20 For confessing complicity is not the same as admitting culpability. Since the political transition, there have appeared a number of publications in English penned by former SADF conscripts that relate experiences of the Border War or simply relate stories about aspects of military service. It would appear that the passage of time for reflection has given soldier-authors the space to make sense of their experiences and construct narratives thereof. A number have undoubtedly sought to achieve healing and reintegration into society through their writings. For them writing has become cathartic, a way of dealing with their traumas and exorcising the demons of the past. These confessional texts often admit complicity in maintaining the apartheid system but more often articulate a sense of being betrayed by the generals and politicians.21 The most popular text has proved to be a collection of reminiscences published under the inappropriate title An Unpopular War.22 Many of these stories trade in nostalgia for the old order while some, somewhat contradictorily, hint at guilt about the narrators

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______________________________________________________________ conduct while in uniform. But the overwhelming impression is that these exsoldiers see themselves as having simply performed their duties as national servicemen. Unlike the conscripts, former SADF generals do not engage in selfrecrimination. For instance, Jannie Geldenhuys, the chief of the army and then the SADF between 1985 and 1990, published A Generals Story.23 This is no mea culpa. Indeed, it showed a complete lack of atonement and remorse. Geldenhuys insisted on his own professional integrity and defended the neutrality of the SADF, maintaining that its function had not been to support a particular political party but rather to ensure the security of all the citizens of the state. Magnus Malans more recently published memoir, too, is an evasive and self-serving justification of his role in the SADF and of the military in upholding apartheid.24 But the generals showed their true political stripes (should that be stars?) when they refused to testify before the TRC and feigned ignorance of war crimes sanctioned by the government. They displayed a singular lack of willingness to take responsibility for their acts of commission and omission.25 When the generals closed ranks so as to look after their own interests they ignored the interests of plight of their foot soldiers. Transition, the TRC and Trauma SADF veterans acute sense of betrayal was partly attributable to the outcome of the war and negotiated settlement that, undoubtedly, devalued the experiences of SADF national servicemen. The silence imposed by the apartheid state was compounded by the veterans own wish to forget. Official invisibility intensified individual amnesia. Under such circumstances, veterans tended to repress their traumatic memories so as not to admit recollections too painful to recall. The marginalization of ex-combatants can be seen not only in difficulties faced by veterans of notorious SADF units such as 32 Battalion,26 but also in societys failure to acknowledge the hardships that regular soldiers who were not necessarily involved in heinous acts faced in coming to terms with their experiences. Even the TRC left the experiences of ordinary soldiers largely invisible - not merely forgotten but wished away as a report of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) avers.27 SADF veterans of the Border War are unlikely to heal their (psychological) wounds until such time as they receive therapy. They were seldom afforded any opportunity to come to terms with their frequently traumatic and life-transforming experiences. One account relates how soldiers involved in some of the fiercest fighting in Angola in 1988 were rounded up before the uitklaar (demobilization) parade and given a pep talk by their commanding officer, offered a perfunctory prayer by the military chaplain, and a superficial collective counselling session by a clinical

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______________________________________________________________ psychologist.28 There was no debriefing whatsoever and the soldiers were sent home to resume their lives in civvie street. If the old order was not inclined to recognize the distresses of its foot soldiers, then at least the TRC accorded them space to do so. However, SADF conscripts were still wary and suspicious of the TRC despite its assurance that the testimonies given during its hearings were neither an attempt to look for perpetrators, nor a process that will lead to the awarding of victim status.29 Karen Whitty explains their reluctance to testify in the following terms: Bound by a sense of honour to their fellow troops, and the patriarchy still espoused by white South Africa, few men have come forward and spoken about their experiences, however barbaric and mundane, in South Africa's border wars.30 Some reported that the lack of public knowledge about the war created suspicion of their stories, while others were summarily dismissed as sympathy seekers or outright liars by former SADF generals and their apologists.31 Thus ex-soldiers felt betrayed when the very powers that they were convinced would protect them and provide security left them in the lurch. Not surprisingly, most veterans embraced silence and solitude. If trauma involves a betrayal of trust and the abuse of relations of power,32 for the conscript it entailed the likelihood of being held accountable for deeds committed in the name of the apartheid state. Tony Epriles novel The Persistence of Memory, addresses the manner in which the memories of ordinary soldiers come back to haunt them. Eprile has his narratorprotagonist (an inept soldier and something of an anti-hero), Paul Sweetbread, testify before the TRC as a rebuttal witness to former SADF Captain (now Major) Lyddie who claims amnesty for atrocities committed after a ceasefire had effectively terminated South Africas occupation of Namibia. Lyddie had implicated Sweetbread in a calculated massacre of PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia) combatants returning home from across the border following the announcement of the ceasefire. Lyddies self defence amounted to offering stock answers and abjuring responsibility for his actions: War is war. It is not a picnic. When elephants fight, the grass and trees suffer. He claimed to regret any loss of life but insisted that his job was to defend his country and his people. We all believed in what we were doing, he says pointedly, Thats why we gave the best years of our lives to the army.33 The story serves to illustrate the dilemma faced by conscripts if they fingered their superior officers in atrocities in which they themselves were implicated. They were not about to admit culpability when their superior officers and politicians washed their hands of any responsibility for the atrocities committed in the name of the apartheid state.

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______________________________________________________________ For their part, the generals sought to exculpate themselves of any wrongdoing before the TRC. They remained steadfastly convinced that the TRC was biased against the SADF and predisposed to finding it guilty of ignoring the rules of engagement in South Africas conflicts. The TRC deplored the intransigence of the SADF hierarchy and its reticence to supply documents or acknowledge its responsibility for flaunting the international communitys rules for the conduct of war. It opined that this attitude hindered the healing of the nations traumas. In its concern about the casualties of war, the TRC acknowledged in its report the need to raise public awareness about the reality and effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and to encourage former conscripts and soldiers who participated in the conflict to share their pain and reflect on their experiences.34 Aside from proposing projects aimed at rehabilitating and rebuilding the lives of ex-combatants, the TRC envisaged that they could possibly be help[ed] to tell and write their stories.35 Some have begun to do so although not necessarily as a result of the TRCs suggestion. Rather, they obviously believe that the time is right for a re-evaluation of their roles in South Africas past conflicts and that recounting their experiences will effectively valorise their yearning for acknowledgment of the sacrifices they made for their country. Conversely, they wish to rid themselves of the shame of being regarded as vanquished soldiers. And they have also sought reaffirmation of their place in post-apartheid society by belatedly recasting themselves as victims rather than oppressors. This quest by white South Africans for reaffirmation of their contribution to the new South Africa is suggested by the recent controversy over the Freedom Park memorial wall. Rather than embrace the SADF memorial at Fort Klapperkop built to honour all those who had lost their lives in defence of the Republic of South Africa,36 veterans would probably regard it as a symbol of the futile sacrifices made to sustain the apartheid regime. Despite its superficial resemblance to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in Washington D.C., unlike the American site it does not serve as a place of remembrance or mourning for friends and families of the deceased. Indeed, the Fort Klapperkop memorial is barely known to ex-servicemens organization, let alone the general public. Thus a forum for veterans of the Border War has sought to have the names of those killed fighting for their country included in the roll of honour compiled for the Sikhumbuto memorial wall in Freedom Park which was erected as a tribute to those who died in the struggle for liberation from white minority rule. The veterans also objected to the fact that the memorial wall is to include the names of Cuban soldiers who died in Angola fighting the SADF. At the time of writing, their request for fair treatment had been rejected by Wally Serote, the CEO of the Freedom Park Trust, on the grounds that the SADF soldiers were fighting to preserve apartheid and not freedom and humanity.37 This snub was regarded by the

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______________________________________________________________ former conscripts as further testimony that their neglect by the NP government would continue under the African National Congress (ANC) government. They would remain marginalized in the new South Africa. 3. Conclusion White South Africans, and especially those involved in the conflicts that accompanied the dismantling of the apartheid edifice, are engaged in a process of re-evaluating the meaning of their experiences and memories. The confessional narratives of former SADF conscripts suggest as much. The appeal by ex-SADF soldiers to have the names of their comrades included on the Freedom Park wall of remembrance also points thereto. SADF veterans have sought to equate their role in the Border War with that of freedom fighters who fought in the ranks of the liberation movements. The ANC government has rejected this equation as it undermines claims that it fought a legitimate and internationally-sanctioned armed struggle against an illegal regime. Yet neither the SADF generals nor the leaders of the ANCs armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) were fully forthcoming in their submissions to the TRC. Neither side was prepared to accept that they should be held accountable for their actions or accept the need for full disclosure. Consequently, the legacy of the conflict and the unfinished business of the transition still casts a shadow over post-apartheid South Africa.

Notes
Even a major project such as the multi-volumed South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) entitled The Road to Democracy in South Africa focuses primarily on the national liberation struggle rather than the regional and global dimensions of the conflict. Exceptions to this tendency include Chris Alden, Apartheids Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996 and Adrian Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, Cape Town: TRC, 1998, ch.2 The State outside South Africa between 1960 and 1990. 3 Ironically, it is access to American and Cuban records that has afforded a better understanding of why and how South Africas white minority regime waged war in the context of the changing dynamics of the Cold War. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002/Alberton: Galago, 2003 and Moscows Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975-1988, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 3-51 makes extensive use of uch material.
1

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______________________________________________________________ Peter Vale, Pivot, Puppet or Periphery: The Cold War and South Africa, Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Conference, Portland, Oregon, Feb-March, 2003. 5 G.N. Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case Study of News Manipulation and Suppression, MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1980. The myth perpetuated by the US military was that media, especially television, coverage of the Vietnam War caused the tide of public opinion to turn against the intervention and that this, in turn, caused the politicians to scale down and eventually withdraw American forces thus effectively admitting defeat. For a critique of this perception, see Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: the Media and Vietnam, Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1986. 6 Robin Hallett, The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-76, African Affairs, vol. 77, July 1978, pp. 347-68. Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, pp. 223-57. 7 With good reason, the SADF has been called the worlds most accidentprone army by Tony Eprile, The Persistence of Memory, Cape Town: Double Storey Books, 2004, p. 171. 8 J. H. Thompson, An Unpopular War: Voices of South African National Servicemen, Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006, p. 149. 9 Willem Steenkamp, South Africas Border War 1966-1989, Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989, p. 29. 10 Clive Holt, At Thy Call We Did Not Falter, Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, pp. 122, 137; Mark Behr, The Smell of Apples, London: Abacus, 1998, p. 82. 11 Peter Stiff, The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969-1994, Alberton: Galago, 1999. 12 Gary Minkley and Martin Legassick, Not Telling: Secrets, Lies and History, History and Theory, vol. 39, no. 4, December 2000, p. 8. 13 Section 118(4) of the Defence Act of 1967 rendered it an offence for a person to disclose any secret or confidential information relating to the defence of the country which came to his/her knowledge by reason of his membership of the SADF or employment in the public service. See Kathy Satchwell, The power to defend: an analysis of various aspects of the Defence Act in War in Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, Jacklyn Cock & Laurie Nathan (eds), Cape Town: David Philip, 1984, p. 48. 14 See, for instance, Army Talk at http://moo.sun.ac.za/mailman/listinfo/armytalk/ which hosted a chatline utilised mainly by ex- Citizen Force SADF members (i.e. conscripts). But it is likely that such sites are also accessed by military buffs, as well as veterans of South Africas and other recent wars. These sites
4

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______________________________________________________________ are obviously male domains. Recently, this site seems to have been shut down or relocated, and its mailing list discontinued. 15 Sasha Gear, The road back: Psycho-social strains of transition for South Africas ex-combatants in Baines & Vale, Beyond the Border War. 16 Jodi Dean, Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 8-9. 17 Michael Barkun, A culture of conspiracy: apocalyptic visions in contemporary America, Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 2003, pp. 185-6. 18 Hendrik van Coller, Border/Frontier Literature in Space and boundaries in literature: Proceedings of the 12th Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, Roger Bauer, Douwes Fokkema & Michael de Graat, eds. Munich: Ludicium, 1990, pp. 254-9. 19 Rita Bernard, The Smell of Apples, Moby Dick, and Apartheid Ideology. Modern Fiction Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2000, p. 210. 20 Cited in Henriette Roos, Die Afrikaanse Prosa 1998 2003,in Perspektief en profiel Deel 3, ed. H.P. van Coller, Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2006, p. 98. 21 Others include the short stories collected in Barry Fowler, ed, Pro Patria. Halifax: Sentinel Projects, 1995; Anthony Feinstein, In Conflict, Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1998; and Rick Andrew, Buried in the Sky, Johannesburg: Penguin, 2001; Holt, At Thy Call We Did Not Falter. 22 The Border War was not unpopular amongst the majority of the white populace nor conscripts while it was being waged. The moral ambiguity conferred on the war has happened retrospectively with these groups. Even those who once supported the war do not now think it was worth fighting. Coincidentally, Thompsons An Unpopular War is now in its sixth reprint in almost as many months. 23 Jannie Geldenhuys, A Generals Story: From an Era of War and Peace Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995. Originally published in Afrikaans as Di wat wen: 'n generaal se storie uit 'n era van oorlog en vrede, 1993. 24 Magnus Malan, My lewe saam met die SA Weermag, Pretoria: Protea Bookhuis, 2006. 25 A clique of former SADF generals did make a submission to the TRC. It was co-ordinated by General Dirk Marais, former Deputy Chief of the Army, under the title: The Military in a Political Arena: the SADF and the TRC. See Hamann, Days of the Generals, p. 130. 26 In the particular case of 32 Battalion, these difficulties include deprivation, an uncertain future as a refugee community shuttled from camp to camp within some of the most desolate areas of the country, unsympathetic treatment by the ANC government, and easy prey to mercenary recruiters. A brief summary of their conditions can be found at

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______________________________________________________________ http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=198866&area=/insight/insig ht__national/ 27 Sasha Gear, Wishing Us Away: Challenges facing ex-combatants in the new South Africa, Johannesburg: CSVR, 2002, viewed on 14 June 2006, http://www.wits.ac.za/csvr/papers/papvtp8e.htm. 28 Barry Fowler, Grensnvegter? South African army psychologist, Halifax: Sentinel Projects, 1996, pp. 123-7 outlines the SADFs model debriefing session. Holt, At Thy Call, pp. 116-20 reproduces it and at p. 122 relates how it worked in practice. 29 TRC Report, vol. 4, pp. 221. 30 Karen Whitty, Review of Clive Holt, At Thy Call We Did Not Falter, Viewed on 22 August 2005, http://www.iafrica.com/pls/procs/SEARCH.ARCHIVE?p_content_id=47480 1&p_site_id=2. 31 For instance the testimony of conscript Kevin Hall has been carefully scrutinised and rebutted by Hilton Hamann, Days of the Generals, Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2001, pp. 221-3 and Magnus Malan, My lewe saam met die SA Weermag, Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2006, pp. 474-6. 32 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 4.
33
34

Eprile, The Persistence of Memory, 252.

TRC Report, vol. 4, p. 221. 35 TRC Report, vol. 4, p. 242. 36 Paratus Special Supplement, July 1979 vol. 30. no. 7. 37 Pretoria News, 17 January 2007 (Include us, says ex-SADF members).

Bibliography
Addison, G.N. Censorship of the Press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case Study of News Manipulation and Suppression. MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1980. Alden, C. Apartheids Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996. Andrew, R. Buried in the Sky. Johannesburg: Penguin, 2001. Baines, G. and Vale, P (eds). Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africas Late-Cold War Conflicts. Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 2007. Barkun, M. A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 2003. Behr, M. The Smell of Apples. London: Abacus, 1995.

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______________________________________________________________ Bernard, R. The Smell of Apples, Moby Dick, and Apartheid Ideology. Modern Fiction Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2000, pp. 207-26. Dean, J. Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. Edkins, J. Trauma and the Memory of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Eprile, T. The Persistence of Memory. Cape Town: Double Storey Books, 2004. Feinstein, A. In Conflict. Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1998. Fowler, B. Grensnvegter? South African army psychologist. Halifax: Sentinel Projects, 1996. Fowler, B. (ed). Pro Patria. Halifax: Sentinel Projects, 1995. Gavshon, A. Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981. Gear, S. Wishing Us Away: Challenges facing ex-combatants in the new South Africa. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2002. Gear, S. The road back: Psycho-social strains of transition for South Africas ex-combatants in Baines & Vale, Beyond the Border War. Geldenhuys, J. A Generals Story: From an Era of War and Peace. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995. Gleijeses, P. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Gleijeses, P. Moscows Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975-1988. Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 3-51. Guelke, A. Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Hallett, R. The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-76. African Affairs, vol. 77, July 1978, pp. 347-68. Hallin, D. The Uncensored War: the Media and Vietnam. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1986. Hamann, H. Days of the Generals. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2001. Holt, C. At Thy Call We Did Not Falter. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006. Malan, M. My lewe saam met die SA Weermag. Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2006. Minkley, G. & Legassick, M. Not Telling: Secrets, Lies and History. History and Theory, vol. 39, no. 4, December 2000. Satchwell, K. The power to defend: an analysis of various aspects of the Defence Act in War in Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, Jacklyn Cock & Laurie Nathan (eds), Cape Town: David Philip, 1984.

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______________________________________________________________ South African Democracy Education Trust. The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 1: 1960-1970. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004. South African Democracy Education Trust. The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2: 1970-1980. Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 2006. South Africa. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2. Cape Town: TRC, 1998. Steenkamp, W. South Africas Border War 1966-1989. Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989. Stiff, P. The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969-1994. Alberton: Galago, 1999. Thompson, J.H. (ed). An Unpopular War: Voices of South African National Servicemen. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006. Vale, P. Pivot, Puppet or Periphery: The Cold War and South Africa, Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Conference, Portland, Oregon, Feb-March, 2003. Van Coller, H. Border/Frontier Literature in Space and Boundaries in Literature: Proceedings of the 12th Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, Roger Bauer, Douwes Fokkema & Michael de Graat (eds), Munich: Ludicium, 1990, pp. 254-9. Gary Baines is an Associate Professor at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. His research and teaching interests include the representation of war, memory and trauma.

The Madness of Coalitions1 Thomas M. Kane


Abstract In 1997, a coalition of non-governmental organizations convinced state governments to negotiate the Ottawa Convention banning land mines. The NGOs success at achieving an apparently laudable goal inspired the hope that such groups would constitute a potent and benevolent new force in international affairs. Since then, however, a range of critics have accused NGOs of being less benign than they appear. This paper examines one obstacle NGO coalitions face in their attempt to promote wise policy effectively. Since these coalitions are, by definition, composed of different groups with different methods, different political leanings and different perceptions of issues, it is difficult for such coalitions to unite around any proposal that deviates from so-called common wisdom. It is equally difficult for moderate members of such coalitions to avoid lending tacit support to more extreme minorities. This study illustrates these points with a brief case study of the activist groups that opposed Americas participation in the Vietnam War. The author goes on to explore ways in which twenty-first NGOs have encountered these obstacles and attempted to overcome them, drawing on the NGOs published literature supplemented by interview data. Key Words NGOs, coalitions, landmines, cluster munitions, prejudice, groupthink, antiAmericanism, Vietnam, HRW, Amnesty

1.

Introduction I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than our governments. Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days, governments had better get out of the way and let them have it.

-Dwight D. Eisenhower2 In the 1990s and 2000s, the various groups known collectively as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have achieved recognition for successfully intervening in matters of war and peace.3 Even as Eisenhower might have predicted, these groups have achieved tangible results where state governments and traditional international organizations proved irresolute.

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______________________________________________________________ NGOs achieved a particularly noteworthy success in 1997, when a coalition of NGOs known as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines convinced state governments to sign the anti-landmine treaty known as the Ottawa Convention. In 2003, a similar alliance of NGOs took up the cause of banning cluster munitions and in 2006, the Norwegian government responded to its appeals by agreeing to host an international conference aimed at producing an analogous pact. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) press release noted that the NGOs had succeeded at producing a conference where state governments acting through the UN Convention on Conventional Weapons had failed.4 This paper examines an obstacle NGOs face in their attempt to promote ethical and effective policy. One of the distinctive features of NGO coalitions is that they unite large numbers of different organizations, each formed for different purposes, representing people from different backgrounds, espousing different political agendas and accustomed to working through different methods. The Cluster Munition Coalition consists of 100 NGOs based in at least 30 different countries.5 The International Campaign to Ban Landmines represented 55 nationalities and over 1,000 distinct groups.6 Such groups appear likely to find it difficult to unite around any proposal that deviates from so-called common wisdom. Common wisdom is seldom wise. Even less often is it fair. To the contrary, the phrase is a near-synonym for prejudice, with all that implies. Irving Janis work on groupthink suggests that the pressure to conform to group expectations can impel decisionmakers to unite behind poorlyconceived policies. 7 Such classic works of psychology and sociology as Stanley Milgrims Obedience to Authority, Philip Zimbardos Stanford prison experiment and Theodor Adorno et. als The Authoritarian Personality testify to the fact that similar pressures can persuade individuals to participate in atrocities. 8 This paper assesses the risk that NGO coalitions will experience comparable group dynamics. The next section illustrates the ethical and practical difficulties such coalitions may face with a brief case study of the activist groups that opposed Americas participation in the Vietnam War. A third section notes that critics of twenty-first century NGOs do indeed see Vietnam-era problems re-emerging. Nevertheless, a review of published writings and previously unpublished commentary from NGO members suggests that contemporary NGOs recognize the potential problems of coalition activism, and take measures to mitigate them. Whether these measures will remain adequate as NGOs take on a broader range of issues remains to be seen.

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______________________________________________________________ 2. All In A Good Cause The Questionable Precedents of the 1960s and 1970s Although twenty-first century NGOs are growing increasingly influential on a broad range of issues, political lobbying by activist groups is nothing new. The collection of groups that opposed Americas participation in the Vietnam War, for instance, paralleled contemporary NGO coalitions in organization, in its focus on a specific policy issue, and in its attempt to bypass the sclerotic processes of traditional institutions. By examining areas in which the antiwar movement of the Vietnam War period resembled more recent activist coalitions, one can identify situations that have the potential to recur. The experiences of 1965-1975 suggest that activist alliances have difficulty formulating coherent positions. Less often but perhaps more disturbingly, such alliances can facilitate the activities of numerically small groups advocating causes and methods which most alliance members would repudiate. Contemporary NGOs not only participate in the debates over landmines, cluster munitions and the small arms trade, they helped to start these debates in the first place. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) credits six specific groups Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, the Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation - with putting landmines on the global political agenda.9 In the words of ICBL activist and Nobel Prize winner Jody Williams, [the NGO community] did not wait for anyone to appoint them leaders on the issue they saw that a critical problem had to be addressed and they took it up.10 In much the same fashion, a collection of small organizations began the movement against US support of the Republic of Vietnam at a time when relatively few American troops were in Southeast Asia and relatively few American people objected to their governments policy on the issue. Three months before the fateful White House meeting at which American president Lyndon Johnson and his advisors discussed the possibility of reinforcing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with significant US ground forces, groups such as Wayne State Universitys University Committee on the Problems of War and Peace, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, the Students for a Democratic Society and the Institute for Policy Studies sponsored rallies against the war. 11 Over the following months, the number of groups opposing Americas Vietnam policy proliferated.12 Just as the groups opposed to landmines recognized the importance of, in their own phrase, coordination when they formed the ICBL, the activists of the 1960s formed a National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCCEWVN).13 An extended analysis of the Johnson Administrations decision to commit US forces to combat in Vietnam lies beyond the scope of this paper, but the

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______________________________________________________________ author considers it fair to state that, given the complexities of the issues involved and the diversity of opinions upon them, the challenge of uniting the groups that made up the NCCEWVN behind a promising alternative policy was formidable. Historian Robert D. Schulzinger suggests that this proved to be the case: The NCCEWVN organized international days of protest on October 15-16, during which over one hundred thousand people attended rallies across the United States. Speakers were militant and demanded the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. Signs read SUPPORT THE TROOPS, BRING THEM HOME, and END THE WAR IN VIETNAM NOW. From the beginning, however, factionalism bedevilled efforts of the NCCEWVN to create a unified opposition position to the war. When the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] raised the possibility of a nationwide student strike to take place in conjunction with the October 15-16 demonstrations, the NCCEWVN opposed. Most members of the NCCEWVN steering committee believed that the SDS was proposing this without real consideration as to whether or not strikes were ever a realistic consideration. The NCCEWVN also refused to participate in what turned out to be a highly successful March on Washington sponsored by SANE (the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy) on November 28, 1965. This march was the largest antiwar gathering in the nations capital since the Second World War. Speakers such as Senators Ernest Greuning and Wayne Morse and the prominent paediatrician Benjamin Spock called for negotiated settlements to end the war in Vietnam. SANE discouraged signs calling for the victory of the NLF [National Liberation Front, the organization commonly referred to as the Viet Cong] and refused to allow speeches by radical pacifists such as David Dellinger. The NCCEWVN refused to endorse the march, however, on the grounds that SANE had traditionally excluded groups affiliated with the American Communist Party and the Trotskyist Young Socialist Alliance.14 Over the following years, the antiwar movement attracted broader public support. For new recruits, Schulzinger notes, the doctrinal disputes among the various protest groups hardly mattered.

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______________________________________________________________ People went to these [antiwar] rallies for a variety of reasons: to hear speakers, to show support for the few hundred young men who burned their draft cards, to join a festival of music and art, or just to show that they did not like what the war did to the United States. 15 All the antiwar leaders, regardless of their factional backgrounds, benefited from the influx of uncritical supporters. Schulzinger draws on the papers of the Student Mobilizing Committee of the Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam to note that [o]rganizers of the protests considered the demonstrations huge successes because they gave visibility to the everwidening base of the antiwar movement and produced cover for many new groups and persons to enter the political struggle against this war.16 These new groups included the KGB, which formed a partnership with the Japanese antiwar group known as Peace to Vietnam.17 Peace to Vietnam disseminated propaganda, delivered American military deserters to the Soviet Union and established links with European antiwar groups. 18 Meanwhile, the more radical groups within the American movement found the newcomers to the antiwar cause receptive to their ideas. Although the fresh recruits typically lacked clear positions on specific issues, public opinion polls performed by Daniel Yankelovich Inc. and cited by the US Governments Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence indicated that they shared a general sense of disaffection.19 The polls indicated that 40% of American university students fell into the disaffected category.20 Half of this group, the Commission staff noted, feel that the United States is a sick society, and two thirds approved of what the Commission staff described as disruptive tactics.21 As early as 1966, the Trotskyist members of the NCCEWVN had rejected efforts to work through the American political system as a waste of time.22 [S]ince a majority of the public did not yet oppose the war, Schulzinger summarizes, more radical members of the NCCEWVN believed that the best way to channel public opinion away from the war was to make it impossible for the government to conduct business as usual.23 The Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence estimated that two percent of the disaffected students were immediately ready to act on such propositions, with another four to five percent open to persuasion.24 Although the remainder of the disaffected group was unlikely to participate in violence unless provoked by some incident, it was likely to offer violent protesters its passive support.25 The Commission describes the consequences, focusing on American university life in the second half of the 1960s:

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______________________________________________________________ Students became more militant and their tactics more disruptive. Recruiters for Dow Chemical and the military services were first picketed, then obstructed, and finally driven from the campus. Protests outside of buildings escalated to lockouts, then sit-ins, then seizures. Here and there the turbulence became violent and the police were called in. Then in the spring of 1968, fierce and bloody riots broke out at Columbia University . . . Since then, the pace has quickened. San Francisco State College set a new pattern of disruption and violence: the first prolonged student strike, bombings, sabotage and a campus kept open only by daily patrols of police Last spring, when it almost seemed that matters could hardly become worse, Harvard University cool, sophisticated Harvard which always seemed to do everything right became the scene of a bloody bust. Some 400 club-swinging policemen emptied University Hall of several hundred student protesters in a matter of minutes. It was quick, efficient and very violent. Almost before the television crews could find lodgings in Cambridge, a group of black students at Cornell seized a building and smuggled in arms and ammunition to defend themselves. The photographs showing them leaving the building, rifles in hand, and bandoliers across their chests, shocked a nation that by now had thought itself unable to be shocked.26 Had the Commission staffers written their report a year later, they might have gone on to discuss the antiwar riots in Kent Ohio. These began, Shulzinger records when a mob of about four hundred rampaged through the downtown area, smashing store windows.27 As the evening went on, the mob tripled in size, and as the confrontation continued over the course of several days, Ohios governor deployed the National Guard to keep order.28 On 4 May, two thousand protesters advanced on National Guard troops as ten thousand more looked on.29 The National Guard opened fire, killing four and wounding nine. Although the Commission chose to focus on campus unrest, the antiwar movement and its violent element made themselves felt far beyond the universities. Between 1969 and 1970, President Richard Nixon recalls, there were 1,800 demonstrations, 7,500 arrests, 247 arsons, 462 injuries two-thirds of them to police and 8 deaths.30 In roughly the same period, there were over 40,000 bombings, attempted bombings or bomb threats,

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______________________________________________________________ most of which were war related. These caused $21 million of property damage, hundreds of injuries and 43 deaths.31 When one returns to the larger question of how the antiwar movement influenced Americas Vietnam policy, the evidence is ambiguous. Historian Barbara Tischler, who personally believes that the antiwar movement offered the best answer to the quagmire of Vietnam in the slogan Out Now, muses on this issue: The question remains of whether the antiwar movement actually changed American society or if it even stopped the war. Abbie Hoffman declared the movement never represented a majority of the American people, but that those who put their lives and careers on the line to end the war made it difficult for the United States to continue with business as usual. Historian Thomas Powers agrees . . .32 Tischler goes on to quote Powers at length, citing his position that the antiwar movement was not alone responsible for the shift in Americas Vietnam policy, but that if there had been no opposition, the shift would not have happened when or the way it did.33 Those familiar with the timing and manner with which the United States ended its relationship with the Republic of Vietnam might well respond that Powers conclusion speaks poorly of the antiwar movement. If there had ever been a moment at which Out Now was a morally and strategically appropriate policy, one at which over ten years of firepower-intensive warfare had already taken their toll, at which the Republic of Vietnam had finally shown tentative progress toward achieving just and publicly-accepted government, at which a global economic crisis had undercut this governments ability to defend itself and at which this government faced invasion by the conventional forces of its northern neighbour was surely not it. The scenes of US embassy staff escaping by helicopter while their Vietnamese allies remained behind to face internment in re-education camps do no credit to any Westerner who shares even partial responsibility. 3. The Return of Grown-Ups? The internal politics of the 1965 antiwar coalition allowed advocates of simplistic policies and explicitly Marxist ideologies to exclude groups such as SANE, which took a more thoughtful and apparently liberal approach. This infighting took place at a time in which a substantial number of the antiwar movements supporters held a vague but potentially violent bias against America and its society. Opponents of contemporary NGO activities perceive similar patterns of oversimplification and bias today.

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______________________________________________________________ Nevertheless, the most prominent members of the landmine and cluster munition coalitions aim for and generally achieve a more rational level of debate than their Vietnam War era counterparts. The issues involved in banning landmines, for instance, are undoubtedly simpler than the issues involved in Americas decision to intervene in Vietnam. To those who have seen children maimed by such weapons years after the armed forces that originally planted the mines have ceased fighting, the issues must seem simple indeed. Therefore, it is not surprising that Article I of the Ottawa Treaty is sweeping and unequivocal. This article commits signatories never under any circumstances to use . . . develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines.34 American president William Clinton, hardly the most militaristic of Americas recent commanders in chief, declared that he could not in good conscience add Americas name to that treaty. 35 His reasons were simple as well. American soldiers did not plant the landmines maiming children in the 1990s. American soldiers do, however, rely on landmines to protect children, adult civilians, allied military personnel and themselves, most notably in Korea. American army officer John F. Troxell presents the tactical details of this argument in his 2000 article Landmines: Why the Korea Exception Should Be The Rule.36 Opponents of the Ottawa Convention go on to allege, in the words of a majority report from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee: The [Ottawa] Convention served unique political purposes, rather than humanitarian needs. It was negotiated in a forum with large numbers of NGOs protesting aspects of the US negotiating position and otherwise criticizing the United States as being part of the land mine problem. Additionally, a number of small countries such as the Seychelles, funded and emboldened by the various activist organizations, repeatedly sought to embarrass the United States. It was, in short, an environment where serious consideration of national security issues could not occur. 37 The case that armed forces may have legitimate reasons to use land mines is substantial. Those who wish may read Troxells article and judge for themselves. There is also a plausible case that twenty-first century NGOs are predisposed to scepticism toward the west in general and the United States in particular. Reed Brody, Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch and Board Member of Human Rights International, does not hesitate to generalize that America has a problem with human rights, and is, as a nation, a

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______________________________________________________________ challenge to attempts to implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.38 Brody cites Americas response to the Ottawa Convention as a case in point.39 Although Brody initially published this piece in the journal Human Rights Tribune, the NGO Third World Network (TWN) reproduces it on its website, indicating that Brodys sentiments found a favourable response with that groups members as well. Those who work with NGO members commonly cite anecdotes of similar attitudes. More formal studies confirm that donor pressure compromises the objectivity of NGOs lobbying on environmental and economic development issues.40 Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that similar influences affect organizations that specialize in military matters. Nevertheless, even if the Senate Foreign Relations Committees allegations are accurate, formal statements from groups such as Human Rights Watch typically argue in terms of specific claims. When HRWs Stephen Goose described Americas 2004 decision to continue using socalled smart landmines as a gigantic step backward, for instance, he went on to explain how, in his view, it contradicted earlier directives by earlier American presidents.41 Goose also provided an internet link to a position paper detailing HRWs argument that smart mines threaten civilians. Those who hold alternative positions may dispute the accuracy of his claims, but this in itself suggests that these NGOs have both the will and the ability to keep the debate at relatively rational level. The fact that HRW is a small organization that attempts to influence policy by appealing directly to policymakers may help it maintain its reasonable tone. This strategy gives HRW an incentive to seek respect from an elite audience that may not yet have made up its mind on the issues. Conversely, this strategy gives HRW relatively few incentives to whip up mass support through demagoguery. HRW executive director Kenneth Roth detailed his organizations reasons for avoiding sweeping and, in his words, rhetorical argument in the pages of Human Rights Quarterly.42 That said, Amnesty International and Oxfam, which do seek mass support, also present complex arguments based on specific claims.43 NGO members do indeed find it more difficult to maintain this level of sophistication when they form coalitions. HRW, for instance, initially took a qualified view of cluster munitions. Although this organization favored a moratorium on the use of these weapons, it did not originally support their total abolition.44 Other NGOS, however, took a stronger position, and when the HRW-founded Cluster Munition Coalition announced the opening of the first international conference on the issue, the first line of its press release referred to the event as a historic initiative to ban cluster munitions.45 A senior HRW researcher offers his own experiences with such processes:

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______________________________________________________________ [T]there is no coordination inter-NGO. It is TRULY like herding cats. I saw this in Iraq when I first got to Nasiriyah. We pulled in, went to the US militarys Humanitarian Operations Center where the daily NGO briefing for the area was on. There was Amnesty, HRW, Danish Church Aid, Refugees International, Irish Bread for Peace, you name it and we all were doing the same thing. At least the Irish actually provided a service! There is also A LOT of cross-pollination. I am sure that half of our staff used to work at Amnesty, and vice-versa. So everyone knows everyone. You talk to your peers sometimes. Often you do not for fear of letting them know of a nugget you have that they might not be aware of. Sad. We do sometimes come together though. When we were doing the torture research we teamed with HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (yes, it confuses me too) and the ACLU to put out a report. It does happen. But often you disagree and end up either going your own way or you create a group like the Cluster Coalition to carry some semblance of a united torch forward.46 Those inclined to investigate the membership of NGO coalitions will have little difficulty finding the more dignified groups matched with relatively colourful counterparts. Pax Christi, which clarifies its positions on weighty issues by presenting complete transcripts of papal addresses, joins forces with People and Planet, which stages symbolic tug-of-war matches to protest the unethical practices of the oil industry, arm[s] its members with ironing boards for marches against the controversial department store Primark and offers visitors to its website the opportunity to [b]e part of a photo stunt.47 The Foreign Policy Centre, which offers visitors to its website a selection of editorials and analysis pieces harvested from serious broadsheet newspapers also publishes pictures of its supporters in proximity to banners bearing the ragged A of anarchism.48 Nevertheless, the twenty-first century NGO campaigns to restrict warfare appear to be a case of a political movement in which the moderates dominate the scene. 4. Conclusion Like their counterparts in the antiwar movement of the 1960s and 1970s, twenty-first century NGOs must simplify and perhaps compromise their positions in order to find sufficient common ground to build coalitions. Nevertheless, the twenty-first century NGO movements to limit warfare have largely avoided the destructive tendencies of the earlier antiwar protesters.

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______________________________________________________________ Part of this is undoubtedly due to broad cultural changes, but the persistence of violent extremists in the animal rights movement and the anti-globalisation movement suggests that the coalitions against landmines and cluster munitions owe their successes to something more than the greater maturity of the current generation. Key figures within such organizations as Human Rights Watch have deliberately adopted a strategy of reasoned engagement with policymakers, and this strategy appears to have worked. The strategy has itself attracted criticism. David Chandler, writing in Political Studies, asks whether this process by which NGO experts directly lobby political elites reduces the role of the general public in decisionmaking, to the detriment of democracy.49 Meanwhile, many NGO activists have noted that this approach limits them to lobbying on a relatively narrow range of issues.50 These activists wish to confront practices that, in their view, violate the broader economic, social and cultural rights of various peoples around the world. Kenneth Roth, while sympathizing with their concerns, notes that HRWs method works best with issues in which analysts can document clear examples of how specific actions cause specific and wellrecognized injustices.51 Whether NGOs can expand their agenda while continuing to argue successfully in rational terms remains to be seen.

Notes
The author thanks Marc Garlasco of Human Rights Watch and Colonel Tony Pfaff of the US Army for their cooperation. Further thanks to Gary Blackburn, for his valuable suggestions. The author also thanks the University of Hulls Institute for Applied Ethics for its generous financial support. 2 D. Eisenhower, in The Quotations Page, viewed on 26 February 2007, http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Dwight_D._Eisenhower. 3 J. Troxell, Landmines: Why the Korea Exception Should Be the Rule, in Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 88. 4 Anonymous, Cluster Munitions: Governments to Discuss New Treaty Oslo Conference Plans to Limit Weapon Threatening Civilians, Human Rights Watch Press Release, Oslo, February 2007. 5 Cluster Munitions, 2007. 6 Troxell, 2000, p. 88. 7 I. Janis, Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascos, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1972, passim. 88 T. Adorno, E. Frankel-Brunswik and D. Levinson, The Authoritarian Personality (Studies in Prejudice), W.W. Norton, New York, 1993, passim;
1

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______________________________________________________________ S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority, Harper and Row, New York, 1969, passim. 9 Anonymous, How Did It All Start, viewed on 7 March 2007, http://www.icbl.org/tools/faq/campaign/start. 10 How Did It All Start. 11 R. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam 19411975, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 154; B. Tischler, The Antiwar Movement in M. Young and R. Buzanco (eds.), A Companion To The Vietnam War, Blackwell, Malden MA, 2002, p. 387. 12 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 232. 13 How Did It All Start; Schulzinger, 1997, p. 232. 14 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 232. 15 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 237. 16 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 238. 17 Anonymous, KGB report to the Central Committee on cooperation with Japanese peace groups during the Vietnam War in 1968, February 24, 1968 in D. Loenker and R. Bachman (eds.), Revelations from the Russian Archives: Documents in English Translation, Library of Congress: Washington DC, 1997, p. 699. 18 KGB report, 1968, p. 699. 19 J. Campbell, J. Sahid, D. Stang, Law and Order Reconsidered: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1969, p. 215. 20 Campbell, Sahid and Stang, 1969, p. 215. 21 Campbell, Sahid and Stang, 1969, pp. 215-6. 22 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 232. 23 Schulzinger, 1997, pp. 232-3. 24 Campbell, Sahid and Stang, 1969, pp. 215-6. 25 Campbell, Sahid and Stang, 1969, p. 216. 26 Campbell, Sahid and Stang, 1969, pp. 213-4. 27 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 287. 28 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 287. 29 Schulzinger, 1997, p. 287. 30 R. Nixon, Real Peace/No More Vietnams, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990, p. 237. 31 Nixon, 1990, p. 237. 32 Tischler, 2002, p. 400. 33 Tischler, 2002, p. 400. 34 Anonymous, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,

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______________________________________________________________ last updated 29-11-2004, viewed http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english.


35 36

on

14

March

2007,

Troxell, 2000, p. 91. Troxell, 2000, passim. 37 Troxell, 2000, p. 89. 38 R. Brody, Americas Problem with Human Rights, May 1999, viewed on 14 March 2007, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/1893-cn.htm. 39 Brody, 1999. 40 R. Rohrschneider and R. Dalton, A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation Among Environmental Groups, in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 2, May 2002, pp. 529-30; W. Fisher, Doing Good? The Politics and Anti-politics of NGO Practices, in Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26, 1997, pp. 454-5. 41 S. Goose, U.S.: Bush Administration Abandons Landmine Ban: Reversal Means US Can Use Mines Indefinitely, Anywhere, (Washington, Feb. 27, 2004) viewed on 16 March 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/27/usint7684.htm. 42 K. Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.1, February 2004, pp. 63-73. 43 Anonymous, Shattered Lives: the case for tough international arms control, viewed on 16 March 2007, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/s hattered_eng_summ.pdf. 44 M. Garlasco, personal correspondence with Dr. Thomas M. Kane, 14 December, 2006. 45 Cluster Munitions, 2007. 46 Garlasco, 14 December, 2007. 47 Anonymous, Security and Disarmament, viewed 16 March 2007 http://www.paxchristi.org.uk/SecurityDisarmament.HTML; Anonymous, News and Reports, viewed 16 March 2007, http://www.paxchristi.org.uk/press.HTML; Anonymous, People and Planet, viewed 16-03-2007, http://peopleandplanet.org. 48 Anonymous, untitled, http://fpc.org.uk/articles/274 viewed 16 March 2007. 49 D. Chandler, New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the Critique of State Sovereignty, in Political Studies, Vol. 51, No. 2, June 2003, p. 336. 50 L. Rubenstein, How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Reply to Kenneth Roth, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 845-865; A.

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______________________________________________________________ Yamin, The Future in the Mirror: Incorporating Strategies for the Defense and Promotion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into the Mainstream Human Rights Agenda, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, November 2005, pp. 1200-1244. 51 Roth, 2004, 67-8.

Bibliography
Adorno, T., E. Frankel-Brunswik and D. Levinson, The Authoritarian Personality (Studies in Prejudice). W.W. Norton, New York, 1993. Anonymous. Cluster Munitions: Governments to Discuss New Treaty Oslo Conference Plans to Limit Weapon Threatening Civilians. Human Rights Watch Press Release, Oslo, February 2007. Anonymous. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, last updated 29-11-2004, viewed on 14 March 2007, http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english. Anonymous. How Did It All Start, viewed on 7 March 2007, http://www.icbl.org/tools/faq/campaign/start. Anonymous. KGB report to the Central Committee on cooperation with Japanese peace groups during the Vietnam War in 1968. February 24, 1968. D. Loenker and R. Bachman (eds.), Revelations from the Russian Archives: Documents in English Translation, Library of Congress: Washington DC, 1997, p. 699-700. Anonymous, News and Reports, viewed 16 March 2007, http://www.paxchristi.org.uk/press.HTML. Anonymous, People and Planet, viewed 16 March 2007, http://peopleandplanet.org. Anonymous, Security and Disarmament, viewed 16 March 2007 http://www.paxchristi.org.uk/SecurityDisarmament.HTML. Anonymous. Shattered Lives: the case for tough international arms control, viewed on 16 March 2007, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/s hattered_eng_summ.pdf. Anonymous. Untitled. http://fpc.org.uk/articles/274 viewed 16 March 2007 Brody, R., Americas Problem with Human Rights, May 1999, viewed on 14 March 2007, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/1893-cn.htm. Campbell, J. J. Sahid, D. Stang, Law and Order Reconsidered: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1969

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______________________________________________________________ Chandler, D., New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the Critique of State Sovereignty. Political Studies, Vol. 51, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 332-49. Eisenhower, D. The Quotations Page, viewed on 26 February 2007, http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Dwight_D._Eisenhower. Fisher, W. Doing Good? The Politics and Anti-politics of NGO Practices. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26, 1997, pp. 439-64. Garlasco, M., personal correspondence with Dr. Thomas M. Kane, 14 December, 2006. Goose, S., U.S.: Bush Administration Abandons Landmine Ban: Reversal Means US Can Use Mines Indefinitely, Anywhere, (Washington, Feb. 27, 2004) viewed on 16 March 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/27/usint7684.htm. Janis, I. Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascos. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1972. Milgram, S., Obedience to Authority. Harper and Row, New York, 1969. Nixon, R. Real Peace/No More Vietnams. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990. Rohrschneider, R. and R. Dalton, A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation Among Environmental Groups. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 2, May 2002, pp. 510-33. Roth, K., Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.1, February 2004, pp. 63-73. Rubenstein, L., How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Reply to Kenneth Roth. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 845865 Schulzinger, R. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam 1941-1975. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997 Tischler, B., The Antiwar Movement. M. Young and R. Buzanco (eds.), A Companion To The Vietnam War, Blackwell, Malden MA, 2002, pp. 384402. Troxell, J., Landmines: Why the Korea Exception Should Be the Rule. Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 88. Yamin, A., The Future in the Mirror: Incorporating Strategies for the Defense and Promotion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into the Mainstream Human Rights Agenda. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, November 2005, pp. 1200-1244.

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______________________________________________________________ Dr. Thomas M. Kane directs the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull. His research focuses on grand strategy, and his most recent book is Theoretical Roots of American Foreign Policy: Machiavelli and American Unilateralism (Routledge, 2006).

Part II The Mediation and Mediatisation of War

The Language of War: George W. Bushs discursive Practices in Securitizing the Western Value System in the War on Terror Janicke Stramer
Abstract Western value system is a broad term, which includes issues such as; democracy, freedom, libertarian values (economically and politically), and free speech. The American version of freedom is ambiguous and far from self-evident and straightforward. What is particular about President George W. Bushs rhetoric during the War on Terror is that it has a strong religious element. This paper will examine Bushs securitizing speech act in defence of the Western value system, in order to assess the discursive practices in Americas language of war under George W. Bush. To do so, I will use the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, in order to explore the processes of securitization used by the Bush administration in the War on Terror and how religious rhetoric has had an enormous influence on the securitization of the Western value system. I choose to use the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, as a framework for understanding the processes through which particular issues are securitized in order to discern how Bush is viewing the threat against the Western value system. Key Words U.S. foreign policy, religious rhetoric, war, security studies *****

1.

Introduction The Western value system is a broad term, which includes issues such as; democracy, freedom, libertarian values (economically and politically), and free speech. The American version of freedom is ambiguous and far from self-evident and straightforward. Although a very popular term in presidential rhetoric, it is more implied than really explained. What is particular about President George W. Bushs rhetoric on Western values post 9/11 is that it has a strong religious element. Bush manages to tie together elements of the Western value system, represented as democracy, liberty, and freedom, with security and religion. Moreover, he sanctifies America by stating that Americas strength and resolve is to advance freedom which is Gods gift to the world, hence America is doing Gods work. The U.S. government has, apparently, decided that the best security is exporting and

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______________________________________________________________ implementing the Western Value system in the Middle East. This paper will examine Bushs securitizing speech act in defence of the Western value system, in order to assess the discursive practices in Americas language of war under George W. Bush. In order to do so I will be using the Copenhagen School theory as laid out in Barry Buzan, Ole Wver, and Jaap de Wilde in their book Security: A New Framework for Analysis.1 One of the Copenhagen schools main critiques of traditional or critical security studies is that it only focuses on the military sector. Therefore, the Copenhagen School divides securitization into five possible sectors; military, environmental, societal, economic, and political. It argues that securitization does not only take place in the military sector and has tried to open the field of security studies by creating a framework from which to explore other threats and the securitizing processes. Although Bushs securitization carries certain elements of threats to societal security or American identity, it is not solely articulated as a societal security threat as distinguished by the Copenhagen School.2 It is mainly in the military sector that securitization took place, although I will demonstrate that the military and societal sectors overlap in Bushs securitizing speech act. According to Buzan et al. there are three main units of importance in the securitizing speech act: referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. The audience of any speech act plays an important role, without them there would be no reason for the speech act in the first place. They are the ones that need convincing of the existential threat and urgency of action. In order to successfully securitize Buzan et al. claim that three facilitating conditions (or the so-called felicity conditions) must be fulfilled. The first one is the use of security grammar, the second one is social capital; the securitizing actor must hold a position of authority that allows to securitize on that subject. The final condition is the external or historical condition, such as tanks on the border, or verbal threat from the enemy. It can also carry a historical value, in that a country has a history of attacks from that enemy. Another distinguishing feature is its negative view on securitization as a foreign policy tool, as it argues that issues should rather be desecuritised i.e. bringing them back into the political sphere for open debate. If we define the Western value system as freedom, justice, and libertarian values as embedded with in the democratic system, then it would be interesting to examine whether these values are referred to in Bushs securitizing speech act. Another distinguishing feature of Bushs securitization is his use of religious rhetoric, which will also be examined in this paper. 2. Bushs Language of War Bushs language of war has contained notions of Calvinism, i.e. of Gods involvement in world events. Which again refers to the struggle

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______________________________________________________________ between the good represented by Western values and evil represented by terrorism and later extended to various rogue states, mainly Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. One example is Bushs speech to Congress on September 20, 2001 just shortly after 9/11, in which he said that [f]reedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.3 Deborah Caldwell argues that what is implied in this speech is that since God is not neutral then God will intervene on the world stage to mediate between good and evil.4 Naturally, in Bushs interpretation, taken from his Evangelist faith, America represents the good and was the victim of evil. Therefore, God is on Americas side. Here freedom and justice are clearly identified as specifically Western, and Christian. Another example of this would be this passage from Bushs second inauguration speech in which he stated that [h]istory has an ebb and flow of justice, but history also has a visible direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty.5 The Author of Liberty refers to God and the idea of God setting the direction of history is a reference to Calvinist and Puritan thought. This statement also demonstrates the evolution of Bushs rhetoric towards the Calvinist theology of God dictating events on earth. The use of Christian biblical rhetoric has been a facilitating condition in Bushs speech act. This is demonstrated in the important role that the term evil has played in defining the U.S. in relation to terrorism. It also fulfils the Copenhagen Schools internal condition of security grammar with its good versus evil rhetoric. One example of this specific use with regards to terrorism was a press briefing at the White House just a few days after 9/11. In his brief statement Bush referred to evil or evildoers nine times.6 Bushs use of the words evil and evildoers, create an excellent example of the complexity of Bushs religious rhetoric. Evil may not always be recognized as a religious term, which can be misleading in the analysis of his rhetoric. It is a word that can refer to a wide variety of situations and themes.7 However, the term evil is very much a part of the religious register and Bush often mentions evil in the biblical sense, such as human evil or evil in general, which are religious references, because evil in the biblical sense is related to the never ending struggle of good versus evil and light versus darkness. Good is represented by the Western value system and evil represented by terrorism and rogue states, conveniently dividing the world into a bi-polar system. Therefore, I argue that when Bush speaks of evil with regards to terrorism, he is naming the terrorists in the worst possible light seen from a religious perspective.8 When transferring the term evil from having used it to describe the al-Qaida terrorist network to a new actor, namely Hussein, Bush is transferring with this term the meaning that it had when he used it to describe the terrorists. The use of this kind of religious rhetoric was a facilitating condition in staging an existential threat to the U.S. and the Western value system by Hussein and al-Qaida. According to

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______________________________________________________________ Douglas Kellner in, From 9/11 To Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy.9 Another problem is that Bush and Osama bin Laden both use the same ways of analyzing their opponent. They both invoke God and good versus evil, from each of their perspective. The result is that sometimes Bush comes close to crossing the line between President and Preacher. 10 This is seen in his frequent use of old gospel hymns to explain current events. Here Reinhold Niebuhrs theory of Christian Realism could be a useful lens, as the only Realist theory that seriously considers the importance of religion in politics. He believed that no political system and no political leader can be said to represent absolute evil or absolute right.11 By this he did not mean to say that politicians such as Bush cannot make judgments based on what they believe is right, but that they have to remember that their position is not absolutely morally clear, there will always be another ethical or moral choice. In this view, no one person has the authority to make their interpretation of freedom, justice, and liberty the right one. In that perspective it is problematic that Bush is adding God to this extension of American power in the world, because it suggests that the success of American military and foreign policy is connected to a religiously inspired mission, and even that his presidency may be a divine appointment for this purpose.12 Niebuhr would have warned against this kind of exclusive religious language. One of the main pillars of Christian Realism is the ability to see the evil in oneself and the evil in the historical process with which one identifies. Bushs use of the term evil is exclusively directed at the other the terrorists and thereby ignoring the possible evil in the self, in this case the U.S. This became evident when Bush in early October 2005 spoke of the terrorist acts and stated that: [n]o act of ours invited the rage of the killers.13 The term killers is here referring to the al-Qaida terrorist network and Bush is declaring that there can be found no fault on behalf of the U.S. in this conflict. This is ignorant of the self-criticism that Niebuhr requires. The linking of Hussein and bin-Laden by ways of the good versus evil juxtaposition was used continuously by Bush in his language of war. A good example of Bushs securitizing speech act in linking Hussein and binLaden and therefore the war in Iraq with the War on Terror, was seen in the following interview: When asked by a reporter: Mr. President, do you believe that Saddam Hussein is a bigger threat to the United States than al Qaeda? Bush answered: the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddams madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world. . . . The war on terror, you cant distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you

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______________________________________________________________ talk about the war on terror. And so its a comparison that is -- I cant make because I cant distinguish between the two, because theyre both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive.14 This demonstrates the external facilitating condition in Bushs securitizing speech act, because according to Bush, if action is not taken now, an attack by Hussein and al Qaeda is imminent. The history of 9/11 supports this hypothesis. This comment contains several elements of securitization in linking evil with terrorism and Hussein. Bush is basically saying that al Qaeda and Hussein are one and the same. Afterwards he added [a]nd we will continue to fight terror. Its our obligation, our duty. History has called us into action. What Bush is suggesting is that the destiny of the U.S. and the involvement of God in history called the U.S. to action against evil. He is borrowing rhetoric from the Cold War and the idea of defending the free world. He also extends the security issue from being just about homeland security to being a security issue in defence of world peace, which legitimizes it internationally. During the fall of 2002, Bush continuously warned the American people that Iraq has longstanding ties to terrorist groups, which are capable of and willing to deliver weapons of mass death.15 On one occasion Bush made this statement: Countering Iraqs threat is also a central commitment on the war on terror. We know Saddam Hussein has longstanding and ongoing ties to international terrorists. . . . We must confront both terror cells and terror states, because they are different faces of the same evil.16 This is an excellent example of Bushs use of the term evil to put Hussein and terror states in the same category as bin Laden and terror cells, as well as emphasizing the necessity of taking extreme military measures to keep America and the world secure. Bush makes a strong statement when claiming that we know Saddam Hussein has longstanding and ongoing ties to international terrorists, as it rules out that it could be an estimation or a guess. Rather, he is presenting it as fact and this kind of subtle word choice is very important in analyzing the degree of securitization used by Bush in his language of war. This quote also clarifies that his use of non-specific terminology such as terror cells is used to indicate al Qaeda and the term terror states is used to indicate Iraq. One of the most effective persuasion strategies in politics is to repeat short catchy statements that are easy to understand. Bush seems to be using this technique, by repeatedly categorizing Hussein and bin Laden as the same evil, making it simple for everyone to understand his message. The term evil became a key facilitating

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______________________________________________________________ condition in Bushs securitization of the Western value system, as it helped take attention away from the question of whether or not a military threat was imminent and put focus on societal security in terms of identity and the ideological struggle between the Western value system embedded in democratic ideals and Islamic Radicalism and its theocratic ideals. However, Bush does not have monopoly over the only true kind of democracy. Even within the West there are different kinds of democracy; such as a Constitutional Monarchies and Republics. However, in whichever form, for the West only a democracy is an acceptable form of political system and for the Islamists only a theocracy is an acceptable form of political system. Therein lays the ideological dilemma. Whereas Bush does not speak of religion as being the cause of the terrorism directed at the U.S., he instead argues that the bin Laden terrorists fear Western freedom and democracy, as if their hatred was motivated by rejection of positive Western values.17 In other words, Bush uses religion positively by emphasizing that God is with people of faith, while at the same time trying not to alienate Muslims by referring to Islam as bad. It is interesting to note that he most often refers to the terrorists as evildoers or speaks of their ideology without mentioning Islam, but rather as an ideology of hatred. Bush also makes an effort to separate Islamic Radicalism from mainstream Islam. He has several times spent time in speeches to break down the difference between the ideology behind Islamic Radicalism and the religion of Islam. This demonstrates the careful deliberation behind every word in order to not turn this conflict into an open war between Christianity and Islam. Conclusion As the analysis has shown the language of war during the Bush administration has had a religious element to it. This is especially demonstrated in his grammar of security, which has borrowed heavily from the bible and other religious sources. There have been frequent references to Western values such as freedom and liberty, in order to draw a line between rogue regimes/terrorist groups and Western freedom loving democracies. The Copenhagen school has been a very useful tool in examining Bush language of war, because it has a framework that focuses on the speech act as a discursive practice by way of facilitating conditions to successfully securitize Bush managed to successfully securitize, or at least successfully enough to gather support for the invasion of Iraq. He fulfilled the three facilitating conditions for successful speech act as laid out by the Copenhagen School. The first one is the use of security grammar as demonstrated contained both traditional security grammar and religious security grammar. The second one, social capital, was fulfilled by Bushs position as Commander-in-Chief which authorized him to securitize the Western value system in the War on 3.

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______________________________________________________________ Terror. And finally, the external condition was fulfilled by the historical attack of 9/11 which made his argumentation that another attack by terrorist in cooperation with Hussein was a probable risk plausible. The analysis has also demonstrated an overlap of the military and societal sectors in Bush securitizing speech act. Using the Copenhagen school as my lens has been useful in uncovering certain linguistic dynamics that clarify how different security issues were prioritized and how they were so, using language. This is an often ignored part of security analysis, in the traditional sense, and yet language has so much power and influence over end-policy, because although it is hard to measure, language moves people to act whether the public or government. For this case study the result of the securitizing move was already a fact, Iraq was included in the War on Terror as another step on the way to exporting democracy and freedom in the Middle East. My argument is that in looking at the securitizing speech act, as in this case, and identifying how security issues are securitized, meaning what kind of rhetoric is used in the speech act, can actually help us more quickly identify emerging threats in the future. Let us not forget that similar rhetoric was used during the Cold War. Already now we are beginning to see how similar rhetoric is being used in a new securitizing process against Iran. Freedom means different things to different people. The issue is not whether we believe in freedom, most people do. The issue may just lie in the fact that the West is too convinced that it has the formula for the only true kind of freedom. If we could only install a western style democracy, then we would live in an orderly world. We might have to rethink this strategy. So far it has only spurred on the anti-Western sentiment among Muslims and done little to resolve the issues.

Notes
Barry Buzan, Ole Wver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998. 2 By this I mean that Bush is not directly stating that the security issue is one of identity, he merely suggests the ideological conflict. His main point of exit is military threat fought with military means 3 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001, accessed May 10, 2005, White House News Releases. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109208.html. 4 Deborah Caldwell, An Evolving Faith: Does the president believe he has a divine mandate, Beliefnet, February 7, 2003, accessed May 25, 2005, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/121/story_12112_1.html.
1

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______________________________________________________________ George Bush, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005. The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58745&st=&st1= (May 10, 2005). 6 George W. Bush, Remarks upon arrival at the White House, White House News Releases, September 16, 2001, May 31, 2005 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html. 7 Sometimes Bush has been talking about the evil in other areas such as evils of drugs and so on. 8 In Judaism and Christianity, evil refers to those aspects of human behaviour that are contrary to the Ten Commandments. Evil is thus directly correlated to disobedience: the Commandments are a guideline for what not to do. In the forms of malice and selfishness, evil represents the socially weakening and destructive behaviors that lead directly to a fruitless life and death. On a more abstract level, Evil refers to the lack of faith in God, the end result of which is separation from Him. Wikipedia Online, s.v. Evil, accessed December 23, 2005, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil. 9 Douglas Kellner, From 9/11 To Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2003, 61. 10 Ibid., 72. 11 Reinhold Niebuhr, Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, New York, 1960. 12 Jim Wallis, Dangerous Religion, Sojourners Magazine 32, Iss.5, 2003, Proquest, via http://proquest.umi.com. 13 George W. Bush, President Bush, Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism, White House News Releases, September 25, 2002, accessed June 7 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html. 14 Ibid. 15 George W. Bush, Radio Address: Iraqi Regime Danger to America is Grave and Growing, White House News Releases, October 5, 2002, accessed June 7 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021005.html. 16 George W. Bush, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution, White House News Releases, October 2, 2002, accessed June 7 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-7.html. 17 Kellner, 63.
5

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______________________________________________________________ Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89, 2003, pp. 293-319. Taylor and Francis, via taylorandfrancis.metapress.com Bush, George W., Remarks upon arrival at the White House. September 16, 2001, accessed May 31, 2005, White House News Releases, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html. Bush, George W. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. September 20, 2001, accessed May 10, 2005, White House News Releases. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109208.html. Bush, George W., State of the Union Address. January 29, 2002, accessed June 7, 2005, White House News Releases, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. Bush, George W., President Bush, Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism. September 25, 2002, accessed June 7, 2005, White House News Releases , http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html. Carnes, Tony and C. Stream. Bushs defining moment Christianity Today 45, Iss. 14; 2001, pp. 38, Proquest, via http://proquest.umi.com. Deborah Caldwell. An Evolving Faith: Does the president believe he has a divine mandate, February, 7, 2003, accessed May 25, 2005, Beliefnet. http://www.beliefnet.com/story/121/story_12112_1.html. Daalder, Ivo and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., c2003. Dunn,Charles W., ed. Faith, Freedom, and the Future: Religion in American Political Culture. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003. Hedges, Chris. War, Love, and the Divine, 4 February 2005, accessed May 25, 2005, Beliefnet, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/114/story_11400_1.html. Neff, Barbara C. Bush and God-talk. National Catholic Reporter 39, Iss. 16, 2003, pp. 4, Proquest, via http://proquest.umi.com. Mann, James, The Rise of the Vulcans:The History of Bushs War Cabinet. Viking Books, New York, 2004. Pagels, Elaine and Rev. Dr. C. Welton Gaddy. President or Preacher: Audio News Conference on the Presidents Irresponsible Use of Religious Language, February 11, 2003, accessed May 25, 2005, http://www.religionandpluralism.org/ANC_transcript_President_or_Preac her.htm. Sullivan, Amy. The Politics of Piety. Sojourners Magazine 33, Iss.11, 2004, pp. 20, Proquest, via http://proquest.umi.com. Wallis, Jim, Dangerous Religion. Sojourners Magazine 32, Iss.5, 2003, pp. 20, Proquest, via http://proquest.umi.com.

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______________________________________________________________ Woodward, Bob, Bush at War. Simon & Schuster, New York, c2002. Wver,Ole and Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, Boulder, Colorado, 1998. Wver, Ole Securitization and Desecuritization. On Security,ed Ronnie D. Lipschutz, on-line edition Columbia University Press, Chapter 3, New York,1998. Wver, Ole and Carsten Bagge Laustsen In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization. Millenium: Journal of International Security Studies, vol. 29 no. 3, 2000, 705-739. Janicke Stramer, M.A. The American Graduate School of International Relations and Diplomacy in Paris, France.

The Immediacy of Narrated Combat: Operation Iraqi Freedom as Public Spectacle Jason T. McEntee
Abstract From the Vietnam War (VW) to Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we have seen a dramatic shift in the ways we see combat - countless, and often dubious, images certainly impact how we interpret our warriors actions. OIF presents an interesting shift in the immediate availability of numerous fiction and non-fiction narratives often stemming from the accounts of the soldiers themselves. I refer to this shift as the immediacy of narrated combat. OIF, unlike Vietnam and ODS, has seen an almost immediate response in terms of the narratives we see and read, including movies, television programs, CD-ROM compilations, video games, numerous videos brought back with, and blogs posted by, our men and women serving in, and subsequently returning from, Iraq, and literary non-fiction accounts of combat. The immediacy of narrated combat suggests that we have become a nation of voyeurs privy to representations of combat that, in a historical sense, were known only to the warrior and then revealed to the population at large after elongated periods of time. The ability to see the events of OIF in an immediate fashion becomes problematic for an audience that has little time to sort out fact from fiction. Key Words Operation Iraqi Freedom; narrated combat; war/combat media representation. *****

On the Kuma\War web-site, one sees the tagline Kuma Reality Games - TV for a Generation Raised on Games; however, a somewhat contradictory, though nonetheless ironic, rebuffing of reality appears on its Legal information page: Kuma games are works of fiction. Any Kuma game that is based on real-world events is only representational and not an accurate depiction of real-world events. You should not rely on the accuracy of any Kuma game for any purpose, and under no circumstances should you seek to imitate any game experience in real life.1 Yet, despite this interesting discrepancy in the use of the term - or, rather, the idea of - realism, Kuma Reality Games maintains its painstaking recreation of actual Operation Iraqi Freedom missions, which one can join and play in chronological order,

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______________________________________________________________ starting with the raid on Baghdad (and the death of Uday and Qusay Hussein), the capture of Saddam, combat in such cities as Sadr, and, more recently, such scenarios as the Abu Ghraib Mission as well as other hypothetical Iraq missions and the now somewhat appropriate Iran Hostage Rescue Mission. Now, some four years after the onset of the war in Iraq, where we have the April 2nd, 2007, edition of Newsweek magazine featuring a cover story about letters home from now-deceased American soldiers in Iraq. Several actual letters - scanned into the text - are shown in the magazine. What does one do if he or she undertakes a mission on Kuma\War and shortly thereafter encounters and reads the Newsweek article? Does a connection take place? Would one feel guilty taking pleasure in reliving an event that cost soldiers their lives? Or does a disconnect occur, prompting one to feel as though he or she is honouring the dead by learning more about the combat experience? Each of the letters contained in the article are in fact death letters - written by the doomed warrior and sent home in the event of his death. Most of them contain the phrase If youre reading this, then you already know the bad news, which is common for letters written in combat. Couple this with an April 2nd, 2007, ABC News story that discussed how new drugs can effectively erase traumatic memories, and how they - along with therapy - would be especially useful for PTSD-suffering soldiers who have returned from Iraq.2 But would seeing the death letters or the game re-ignite the traumatic memories? In addition, lets consider that since 2003, only a few months after the start of the war, soldiers have been blogging their combat experiences in exquisite detail, though some have received reprimands and cease-and-desist orders, while more recently, the military has prohibited soldiers from accessing and posting on popular sites such as YouTube and MySpace due to supposed Internet bandwidth problems, but in reality because of operations security.3 Theoretically, and often realistically, soldiers can be in bloody combat mere hours before finding a computer and, almost immediately after their experience, publish their version of it on-line for mass consumption. Reading soldier blogs has become a popular endeavour on the home front, and the demand for blogs has produced mass-marketed books containing previously posted transmissions from Iraq. Despite the Kuma\War game as well as myriad soldier blogs stemming from Iraq - both of which keep us in close temporal proximity to the war and its warriors, some of whom might return home and wish to erase these memories should we be surprised that Newsweek would celebrate the Voices of the Fallen in its Special Issue? These questions are of course rhetorical in nature. But they remain nonetheless troubling. As we know, news sources such as Newsweek serve as extensions of corporate entities (MSN and MSNBC, in this case) that are subservient to the bottom line of producing revenue. Whether we like it or

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______________________________________________________________ not, and I would hope not, sensationalized stories of death - regardless of the means - are cash cows for news magazines as well as newsproducing/reporting entities in general, even if the story comes across as a thoughtful homage to the deceaseds legacy. Of course, war narratives ranging from The Iliad to the photographic essays of the American Civil War to the 20th centurys sad legacy of world wars privilege death, even more so than heroism, rendering death, as a public viewing or reading experience, one of the if not the - dominant themes in the war narrative. This reality does not negate the fact that personal correspondence from men and women in combat, especially death letters, are painfully private in the sense that when a stranger such as myself reads them in Newsweek, he or she may feel a quite typical and completely understandable sense of guilt or shame in voyeuristically reading the last words of a person who probably did not mean for them to be made into a public spectacle. Moreover, when the media circus surrounding Anna Nicole Smiths recent death reminds us of the frustrating reality of death-as-public-spectacle, how do we place in context - and take seriously - a news story about soldiers deaths that receives a fraction of the time and attention of a celebritys demise? I refer to this change in how we receive information about Operation Iraqi Freedom as the immediacy of narrated combat: Whereas we saw riveting VW footage broadcast into living rooms, we did not receive an immediate bombardment of information, much as we are now. Aside from Bernard Falls Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu (1969) and Don Oberdorfers Tet (1971), several years passed before seriousminded non-fiction literary texts, such as Philip Caputos A Rumour of War and Michael Herrs Dispatches (both 1977), would address the war and capture the publics attention. Not surprisingly, Robin Moores The Green Berets (1965) and the John Wayne movie version (1968), passed off as nonfiction at the time, were successful in terms of reaching audiences (the movie less so). Now challenged as shaky non-fiction at best, Moores and Waynes accounts serve as reminders of Americas early optimism about the war, while documentaries such as The Anderson Platoon (1966), Vietnam: In the Year of the Pig (1969), and Hearts and Minds (1974) serve as stark counterpoints to Moore and Wayne. A few history texts would emerge while the war still raged, including Felix Greens Vietnam! Vietnam! In Photographs and Text (1966), David Halberstams The Best and Brightest (1969), and Frances Fitzgeralds Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam (1972). Fiction narratives in print form (Daniel Fords Incident at Muc Wa [1967]) appeared while the war still raged, but fictional movies did not, as Fords book was made into the movie Go Tell the Spartans in 1978. In contrast, ODS, seen in millions of living rooms, ended almost as

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______________________________________________________________ abruptly as it started, providing little time for narratives to emerge while combat raged. Those who chose to watch the war likely have formed their mostly positive opinions of it from CNN and other network coverage that chose to show images of American dominance and victory with few images of carnage and destructiona point that the movie Three Kings examines in trenchant detail in 1998 seven years after the wars conclusion. These viewers not only have missed incredible amounts of information in print format, including both American and Iraqi casualty statistics, Gulf War Syndrome cases and implications, and media manipulation cases often condoned or pushed by the Bush Administration but also they have in essence failed in their roles as discerning citizens. In addition to massive amounts of eye-opening news and journalistic essays as well as full-fledged book-length studies of studies about the war, citizens have access to myriad fiction and non-fiction literary narratives, some of which came out in close proximity to the wars conclusion.4 Rhonda Cornums story, She Went to War, appeared in 1993 and was highly fictionalized in the movie Courage Under Fire (1996). Anthony Swoffords Jarhead, released in 2003, was made into a movie in 2005. David O. Russells Three Kings (1998) provided audiences with a fictional account of the Gulf War that that upheld Swoffords non-fictional, highly cynical account of the war. All of these narratives, and many others not as popular provide alternative perspectives to the overwhelming, Vietnam Syndrome-ending victory in ODS. However, immediate access to myriad forms of war information, especially through blogs, has influenced the ways we ultimately form our attitudes about Operation Iraqi Freedom. Good-old-fashioned embedded reporters, such as Evan Wright of Rolling Stone and Katherine Skiba of The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, still provide excellent, detailed accounts of combat action, as their published accounts indicate.5 Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, blogs have challenged the medias role in war correspondence. Warrior blogs are mostly public (some require passwords), and they in many ways accomplish the same duplicitous watchdog/purveyor tasks once held by the media. Those who publish blogs want to be read. They can uphold or expose the militarys (and, subsequently, much of mainstream newss) truths and fabrications while they also, at times simultaneously, promote the positive ethos of the American warrior as, for example, patriot or rebel; protector of freedom or enslaver; as liberator or incarcerator. And, of course, lets not forget that they can be completely fictitious manufactured stories to enrapture an audience. Army warrior Colby Buzzell, an Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran, was among the first to begin posting blogs while in country; his book, My War: Killing Time in Iraq (2005) is a collection of his blog (http://cbftw.blogspot.com/) posts from 2003, with additional text to serve as background to the posts. In short, as an anonymous soldier going by cbftw

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______________________________________________________________ (Colby Buzzell Fuck the War), he becomes, as the book jacket boasts, the embedded reporter the Army couldnt control, despite its best, and often hilarious, efforts to do so. After he gains a great deal of attention stateside, Buzzell comes under house arrest while his superiors try to determine if he has compromised the militarys endeavours in any way. However, once the press starts asking questions about Buzzell, Buzzell is immediately released and begins his First Amendment campaign by conducting an interview with NPR. Though its difficult to say that his is the first blog appearing from our men and women in Iraq, his blog has served as a model for other warriors who began posting blogs as well. As long as the warriors dont compromise the militarys operations (and as long as they dont go too far in their criticism of the warriors plights - some is acceptable), they are free to post. As a result, we have Matthew Blackfive Burdens book, The Blog of War: Front-line Dispatches from Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan (2006). Burden began his milblog Blackfive on June 18th, 2003, and his book is a collection of posts not only to that site but also from various other blogs that he has chosen. The collection serves as a fascinating companion to Buzzells work and its fuck it tone because it possesses a much heavier patriotic tone, allowing one to get differing perspectives of warrior attitudes.6 With its myriad warrior blogs challenging the somewhat antiquated idea of sensational news stories, OIF presents an interesting shift in the immediate availability, for mass consumption, of non-fiction (and fiction) narratives that often stem from the accounts of the soldiers themselves. Unlike they were in Vietnam and especially Desert Storm, news media resources, which serve the dual roles of watchdogs for scandals and chroniclers of combat (they often rely on the militarys official news releases for and responses to combat), are no longer the dominant means of generating information about a wars events in a timely manner. American coverage of the Vietnam War, we might recall, started off as overtly patriotic until 1968 (Tet), when public opinion became deeply divided about the war and its presentation on television changed to reflect that attitude. Desert Storm reporters were given access to official military briefings as well as expert analysis of these briefings, but their access to soldiers was limited so as to prevent another Vietnam-type shift in public opinion. One can make a cogent argument - as many intellectuals have - that the images emerging from Desert Storm were carefully chosen so as to keep public support for the war from wavering.7 However, in addition to the blogs I have mentioned, OIF has seen an immediate response in terms of the fiction and non-fiction narratives we can see and read: the Canadian-made American Soldiers (2005; supposedly based on real events occurring throughout one day in Iraq; sample quote: I thought this war was over); documentaries such as Gunner Palace (2005); Progressive Managements massive CD-ROM compilation the 21st Century

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______________________________________________________________ Guide to Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003 - contains thousands of pages of public documents, news articles, and images from OIF as current as 2006; 20 dollars, and Amazon account, and weeks time gets one an archive of information that previously would have taken years to amass); video games such as Kuma|War; numerous videos (some affectionately known as war porn) brought back with or made upon returning home (enter Operation Iraqi Freedom on You Tube); numerous graphic novels and comics such as Combat Zone: True Tales of GIs in Iraq (2005), Pride of Baghdad and WarFix (both 2006); literary non-fiction accounts of combat such as Wrights (which is soon-to-be a seven-part HBO mini-series in 2008), Buzzells, Kayla Williams Love My Rifle More than You (2005), and the now infamously propagandistic narrative of Jessica Lynch, I am a Soldier, Too (2003), which appeared as television movie mere days before the book came out (Saving Jessica Lynch); numerous advertisements for the branches of the military, often utilizing a video-game type approach, entice potential warriors with narratives of success and heroism; even the late Pat Tillman, who left the NFLs Arizona Cardinals to fight in Iraq, possesses a personal narrative of heroic-death-proved-death-by-friendly-fire, and this narrative has been played out as a sad reminder of how manufacturing heroes comes at the expense of honour amongst comrades and privacy for family. Lynch and Tillman served immediate purposes in generating support for the war - as American heroes, they helped drum up war support that swelled early in the campaign and has waned in its later stages. Fiction television and movie narratives abound, too. Perhaps most striking is the FX Networks drama series Over There (2005), not because its an especially compelling or noteworthy narrative but because a cable television network pulled it off. (A major network wouldnt touch the war in this way even if it had a slam dunk on its hands.) With The Marine (2006; Iraqi Freedom stateside fantasy) and Home of the Brave (2006; Samuel Jackson coming-home melodrama), along with the documentaries Ghosts of Abu Ghraib and No End in Sight (both 2007), Why We Fight (2005); Big Storm: The Lyndie England Story (2006), Gunner Palace (2004), and Control Room (2004) leading the way, more movies about the four-year current war are in the hopper, by far exceeding the amount of movies, fictional or otherwise, released during the entire ten-plus year duration of the Vietnam War. Dramas abound, including Stop Loss (soldier refuses to return to combat), Grace is Gone (mans wife dies in combat), The Return (a veterans story), Absent Hearts (students with parents in the war), and The Hurt Locker (Kathryn Bigelow directs; story about bomb-disposal unit in Iraq). One comedy, currently in release, Delta Farce (2007), will make reference to Iraq despite its action taking place in Mexico. Even current horror movies have worked war anxiety into their diegeses, with The Texas Chainsaw Massacre: The Beginning (2006) using Vietnam references as a substitute for Iraq and

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______________________________________________________________ The Hills Have Eyes 2 (2007) using both its ill-prepared National Guard warriors and New Mexico desert setting as comments on Iraq. From the Vietnam War (VW) to Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Americans (and the world population at large) have seen a dramatic shift in viewing combat, as I have attempted to document in this brief discussion. In addition to the examples herein, we see OIF through countless, and often alarming and somewhat dubious, journalistic images such as those from Abu Ghraib as well as the felling of Saddams statue, which is examined as yet another American publicity stunt in the Al-Jazeera-exploring documentary Control Room. Bushs infamous landing upon and Mission Accomplished speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier on May 1st, 2003, have been chronicled as staged (and in retrospect, completely wrong on so many levels, including Bushs dubious flying record and the fact that we are still at war four years later); yet the American public has not shown mass outrage about this, not have news entities chosen to run with the story.8 These narratives and images, as have those of Lynch and Tillman, have impacted how we interpret our warriors actions. Similarly, the triumphant journalistic images of ODS warfare unfolded on the television, serving as an indicator that this war, as George Bush proclaimed, would allow the United States to finally overcome the Vietnam Syndrome. Viewers of ODS combat footage and news stories did not see, as they did with stage two, post-1968 Vietnam War combat footage and news stories, horrific images of combat carnage involving American soldiers in a lost war. Of course, American casualties were low in ODS, but they did exist, just not for consumption by the general American viewing population. By the time the expedient war was over, casualty rates on all sides would become afterthoughts. But now that OIF has dragged on into its fourth full year, we see a Vietnam-like shift in attitude. Public opinion has begun to turn against the war as seen in last falls elections as well as in public opinion polls and through reactions to soldier casualties as well as scandals involving US soldiers such as Abu Ghraib or murder/abuse of innocent Iraqi citizens. The immediate positives that we received have actually worked against those in power that promoted them. As we saw a near-immediate victory in ODS, now we see our once-positive narratives giving way to more realistic and often negative accounts of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cover of the recent Newsweek indicates that popular news magazines have quickly seized upon the publics shift in war attitude. The immediacy of narrated combat as I have attempted to define and use it here allows us to gauge how Americans, along with the world at large, are being bombarded with war information that appears in various formats and genres and often showcases wide-ranging attitudes about the war in Iraq. The immediacy of narrated combat suggests that we can be seen as, that we

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______________________________________________________________ are indeed exposed as, a nation of voyeurs privy to representations of combat that, in a historical sense starting with WWII and, excluding the second half of the Vietnam War, were known only to the warrior and then carefully sanitized and revealed to the population at large after elongated periods of time. The warriors personal narrative, in his or her own words unsanitized by media, became public later, if it came at all. Is the ability to see so many versions of OIF problematic in that we have little time to reflect on events before new events replace them, or have we finally plunged into what Orwell prophesied so long ago - war without end, broadcast for public consumption, and prompting both exhilaration and fear from viewers who absorb the spectacle of combat? After all, and despite individual feelings about the war and its conclusion, its much easier to fathom a withdrawal from Vietnam when no massive Communist attacks had occurred in the United States. If we withdraw from the current war in Iraq, we are told, we leave ourselves open to new, and undoubtedly much worse, terrorist attacks on American soil. Narrated combat has become more important than ever, but some troubling questions remain, chief among which is: Important for whom? An entirely new form of combat is emerging in an immediate sense - a free-for-all blitzkrieg of war information whose implications will dictate how the United States and its leaders as well as its warriors shape, look at, and ultimately take part in the art of war.

Notes
Kuma\Reality Games, Kuma LLC, viewed on April 4th, 2007, <www.kumawar.com>. One also can fight in Afghanistan as well as Korea and Vietnam. In the overview of the Sadr City mission, one reads: In May of 2004, Kuma released its first mission based in Sadr City while 1st Cavalry soldiers were engaged in a bloody, two-day battle throughout the region...Join the fight in Sadr City. 2 R Goldman, Erasing the Pain of the Past, in ABC News, 20 March 2007, viewed on 2 April 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=2964509&page=1>. 3 See R Weller (AP), Defense Dept. Blocking MySpace, YouTube, in Yahoo! News, 14 May 2007, viewed on 14 May 2007, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070514/ap_en_ot/military_sites_blocked_5> and P Carter, Literary Battle Fatigue, in Slate, 9 May 2007, viewed on 9 May 2007, <http://slate.com/id/2965916?nav=tap3>. 4 For example, see Doug Kellners The Persian Gulf TV War, Westview Press, 1992, and Phil Taylors War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War, Manchester UP, 1992.
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______________________________________________________________ Generation Kill, Putnam, 2004, and Sister in a Band of Brothers: Embedded with the 101st Airborne in Iraq, UP of Kansas, 2005, respectively. 6 It must be said, moreover, that both Buzzells and Burdens blogs are still up and running, and that in the case of Burdens book, one can easily enter blog names in a Google search and have immediate access to that soldiers blog. In addition, blog publishing has become a mini-phenomenon in that we have alternative collections appearing. For example, see Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog from Iraq, The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2006, a collection of Riverbends posts from the heart of war-torn Iraq. Riverbend is a computer programmer who lives in Baghdad. Her blog first appeared in 2003. 7 See From Realism to Virtual Reality by H. Bruce Franklin and Images of Vietnam and the Persian Gulf by Daniel C. Hallin. In S Jeffords and L Rabinovitz (eds), Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War, Rutgers UP, 1994. 8 For a great account of this, see Frank Richs The Greatest Story Ever Sold, The Penguin Press, 2006.
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Bibliography
P Carter, Literary Battle Fatigue, Slate, 2007, 9 May 2007, <http://slate.com/id/2965916?nav=tap3>. Franklin, H B, From Realism to Virtual Reality, in S Jeffords and L Rabinovitz (eds), Seeing through the media: the Persian Gulf War, Rutgers UP, New Brunswick (NJ), 1994. Goldman, R, Erasing the Pain of the Past, ABC News, 2007, 20 March 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=2964509&page=1>. Hallin, D C, Images of Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, in S Jeffords and L Rabinovitz (eds), Seeing through the media: the Persian Gulf War, Rutgers UP, New Brunswick (NJ), 1994. Kellner, D, The Persian Gulf TV war, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992. Kuma LLC, Kuma\reality games, 2007, 4 April 2007, <www.kumawar.com>. Rich, F, The greatest story ever sold, The Penguin Press, New York, 2006. Riverbend, Baghdad burning: girl blog from Iraq, The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, New York, 2006. Skiba, K, Sister in a band of brothers: embedded with the 101st Airborne in Iraq, UP of Kansas, Manhattan, 2005. Taylor, P, War and the media: propaganda and persuasion in the Gulf War, Manchester UP, Manchester, 1992.

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______________________________________________________________ Weller, R (AP), Defense Dept. Blocking MySpace, YouTube, Yahoo! News, 2007, 14 May 2007 < http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070514/ap_en_ot/military_sites_blocked>. Wright, E, Generation kill: devil dogs, iceman, Captain America, and the new face of American war, G.P. Putnams Sons, New York, 2004. Jason T. McEntee is an Assistant Professor of English at South Dakota State University, where he serves as the Coordinator of Professional Writing and teaches courses in the Global Studies Department. His research/teaching interests are in war literature and film (specifically the Vietnam War).

Experiencing War the Video Game Way Sue Scheibler


Abstract World War II themed video games are an ever-growing and everexpanding part of the multi-billion dollar video game industry. Found on every platform, the majority of these are first-person shooters celebrated for their realism and authenticity, that is, their ability to create what is generally referred to as an authentic, slice-you-in-the-gut depiction of war with raw power and convincing detail. The best of these games marshal sound and image in a way that plunges the player into a variety of combat missions, all linked to historical battles, in worlds and with weapons that celebrate historical authenticity. While much has been made of the militarys involvement in and utilization of video games for recruitment and training, this paper will focus on the games themselves as ways in which players experience war through sound, image, story, and game play. Of primary interest is the way that many of these games use documentary footage in order not only to authenticate the experience of the game but also to contextualize the events and the violence that fuel the players gaming experience. Key Words video games; Call of Duty; Kuma War; Americas Army; first person shooters *****

Speaking of the game Call of Duty 2, Vince Zampella, one of the game developers, said [t]hat intensity of war. The feeling of Oh my god, this is real. People actually went through this. The emotion, the intensity thats what were capturing.1 World War II themed video games are an evergrowing and ever-expanding part of the multi-billion dollar video game industry. Found on every platform (console, computer, and arcade) as well as on-line gaming, they cover a variety of genres, including God-games, real time strategy, third and first-person shooter games, flight and/or driving simulation, and combat simulation. Many of these games can be played in either single or multi-player mode, and many are among the most popular of massive multi-player on-line games. A few, such as Americas Army, have been created by the US Department of Defense (funded by US tax dollars) as a recruitment tool. Others, including products of the Institute for Creative

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______________________________________________________________ Technology, an off-spring of the marriage between Hollywood and the military, are designed to train soldiers to perform in a post 9/11 world. While these include combat simulation, especially of the house-to-house search variety, they also have as an aim the training in leadership as well as in cultural sensitivity of soldiers. Kuma War, an on-line subscription based series of news-based missions that launched in Feb, 2004, features games constructed out of current events, including the most recent battles underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Using retired military as advisors as well as feedback from soldiers currently serving on the front-line, these games offer the player an opportunity to play out battles and skirmishes within weeks if not days of their real-word occurrence. Most of these include actual war footage, satellite imaging, and background information, often presented in an evening news-like video that explains the real event on which the game is based. While much has been made of the militarys involvement in and utilization of video games for recruitment and training, this paper will focus on off-the shelf games designed by the game industry, with the aid of military experts, to provide players the experience of war through sound, image, story, and game play. Or, as the Medal of Honor games advertise, you dont play, you volunteer. I will be focusing our attention on first-person shooters as these tend to be the most popular war-themed games. I am especially interested in World War II themed games, especially the very successful Medal of Honor and Call of Duty series. First person shooters are celebrated for their realism and authenticity; that is, their ability to create what is generally referred to in the press as an authentic, slice-you-in-the-gut depiction of war with raw power and convincing detail. The best of these games marshal sound and image in a way that plunges the player into a variety of combat missions, all linked to historical battles, in worlds and with weapons that celebrate historical authenticity. Of primary interest is the way that many of these games use documentary footage in order not only to authenticate the experience of the game but also to contextualize the events and the violence that fuel the players gaming experience. If it can be said that these games are guilty of turning the reality of war into the experience of playing at war, then it can also be said that the games work very hard to provide a means for locating or re-locating, for pinning down, as it were, the gamers experience back into the real world events, if not the reality of war itself, primarily through the use of documentary images and the adrenaline pumping experience of playing the game. Since games made their appearance on University based mainframe computers in the late 60s and early 70s, they have evolved into highly complex systems, driven by increasingly sophisticated graphic and physics engines capable of reproducing realistic 3-D worlds in which players can manoeuvre their avatars through a richly detailed and densely imagined

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______________________________________________________________ environment while attempting a variety of feats. The first games offered text based adventures, maze-based puzzles, or action games utilizing simple graphics, usually in the form of simple geometric shapes representing either invading aliens; tanks, rocket ships, and/or battleships; sports related objects such as tennis balls; or blocky humanoid figures that could be aliens, robots, soldiers, wrestlers, or a variety of sports players. Three decades later, games offer the same sort of challenges as these first games - evading and destroying enemy combatants, monsters, and/or aliens; creating a virtual society, kingdom, corporation or universe; solving puzzles; negotiating mazes; finding hidden weapons, books, jewels, tools, money, and healthenhancing items; keeping a squad or group alive through real-time strategic planning; and, above all, killing and being killed, learning, in the process of dying, the skills necessary to progress a little bit further once health and life have been restored. But now the immersive experience is intensified through photorealistic graphics, dramatic sound design, music, and interactive environments, all designed to create a flow experience, aided in great part by increasingly cinematic elements. In addition, historically based war-themed games have at their disposal a variety of means by which to intensify the authenticity and realism of the experience, including weapons and ammunition; planes, ships, and submarines; real battles and missions; and first person accounts that locate and shape the definition and development of the character/player. The game industry often uses the term cinematic as a marketing tool, indicating better visuals and a more engaging story. First person shooters and role-playing games especially rely on cinematic point of view structures, sound effects, snappy dialogue, music, and camera to create a seamlessly unfolding realistic world. Immersion in this world is intensified through identification with an avatar through which the player moves, accomplishes tasks, and, more often than not, is wounded, dies, and rises from the dead to play again. While game play is still the driving force of games, developers and designers take great care to provide the avatar with a history and personality, ensuring that it is both an extension of the self as well as a character through which the player experiences his or her self. Since I am and am not the character I am playing, I am offered a precise role before I can begin the action. In the case of the Medal of Honor and Call of Duty games, the player/character is carefully established through a variety of means, including the games booklet, strategy guides, and on-line material as well as the direct address offered through the cut-scenes that introduce each level. Since these games offer the experience of fighting war through the eyes and actions of Allied soldiers, players may be offered the opportunity to see the war through the viewpoint of an American, British, or Soviet soldier, depending on the theatre of war as well as the mission/battle at hand. For example, in Call of Duty, the player, at various times, plays Pvt. Martin of the

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______________________________________________________________ US 101st Airborne Division, Sgt. Jack Evans of the British 6th Airborne Division and Special Operations Executive, and Sgt. Alexei Ivanovich Voronin of the 13th Guards Rifle Division. While Call of Duty provides a variety of viewpoints from level to level or mission to mission, the first few Medal of Honor games are played through the eyes of a single character who progresses through a variety of historically based battles across the theatres of war in Europe and/or the Pacific. In the first game, the player takes on the role of Lt. Jimmy Patterson, who has been recruited by the OSS to engage in a variety of covert actions in France, Germany, Norway, and Austria during the later days of the war. In Medal of Honor: Rising Sun, the player awakens as soldier Joe Griffin, who has been sleeping soundly aboard the USS California in Pearl Harbour. After surviving the attack, he engages in a series of missions throughout the Pacific, including the Philippines, Guadalcanal, Singapore, and Burma, including the Bridge over the River Kwai. Throughout the games, non-player characters may also interact with the player/character, providing more information and back story through direct address. Cut-scenes may provide dialogue segments that help locate the player/character in the story world while intensifying the sense of realism. In the games under consideration, non-player characters may function as allies who lay down covering fire or offer other assistance and who must be kept alive if the mission is to be a success. In 3rd person games, where we see the avatar, our identifications are shaped in ways very similar to that of films through performance (often voiced by well-known actors), action, dialogue, and music. First person games intensify the players identification and immersion in the game by creating the sense that he or she embodies or is embodied by the character. These games remove all of the body except the arm and hand holding the weapon or other objects. The body, replaced by a health meter, seemingly exists off-screen and by extension in the body of the player him- or her-self. The use of 1st person point of view structures solidifies the sense of being the character, an experience much intensified when non-player characters address the player/character directly, looking him or her in the eye, whacking him or her with a weapon, or aim a gun, throw a grenade, shoot, or blow up the character. Wounds affect ones strength, vision, hearing, agility, and ability to move, while fatal wounds may cause the screen to turn red, then black. If games use cinematic and narrative devices to create character and create a seemingly seamless world, then the use of cut-scenes intensify their filmic qualities. In war games, these cut-scenes function more fully to provide a level of historical authenticity to the game-play. In the early days of arcade games, there was no need for character or story, just action that could be engaged for the limited time one could purchase and extend through accomplished game play. Cinematic sequences played in continuous loops

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______________________________________________________________ whenever the game was not engaged in order to entice players; of course, the seductive visuals were cinematic and therefore of much greater quality than those of the game itself. As games moved from the arcades and into homes via consoles and computers, the dependence on TV commercials led the industry to develop pre-rendered CG sequences used for spots as well as for release on the internet and on CD ROM game samplers. At the same time, better graphics engines, the investment of filmmakers and studios in game development (for example, the involvement of Stephen Spielberg and John Landis with the Medal of Honor games), the increasingly important relationship between movies and games (for example, Saving Private Ryan with Medal of Honor: Frontline), a greater sophistication on the part of players, and a demand for more authenticity as well as the need to appeal to a larger demographic, including women, led to the incorporation of introductory movies into games. Used to set mood and atmosphere, excite interest, provide backstory, and establish goals, these introductory movies, many running for as long as 20 minutes, have become increasingly more cinematic, demanding big budgets, and are often scored by well-known composers and recorded by major orchestras such as the London Philharmonic, while featuring the voice talents of well-known actors. Many games feature end movies that wrap up the games narrative, providing closure as well as end-titles and credits. Games designed to extend the life of a movie may use sequences from the film, while others may feature original footage shot specifically for the game. End or victory movies are even reviewed by game reviewers and recognized at the various gaming conventions and award presentations. For example, the beginning of Medal of Honor: Frontline uses cut-scenes modelled after Spielbergs Saving Private Ryan, situating the player/character on the boat, then the water, and finally the beach at Normandy, all filtered through the cinematic stylings of the movie. In fact, the initial game objectives mirror those of the film, asking that the player/character fight his way up the beach, take out the guns, and storm the bunkers from which the German soldiers are shooting, just as the Tom Hanks character must do. Many of war games use documentary and newsreel images to deepen and widen the sense of historicity and authenticity, either as cutscenes that introduce each level or mission, or as supplemental material, often in the form of rewards for finding particular objects within the game or completing the levels. Cut-scenes at the beginning of each level establish goals, provide hints as to where to go as well as where to find crucial objects and assistance, and actions to take while situating the player/character within the events of World War II. For example, Medal of Honor: European Assault opens with a montage of newspaper headlines about the war, and the characters voice over, situating the games overall story as beginning prior to the Battle of the Bulge. This introduction is followed by documentary

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______________________________________________________________ images of soldiers setting up guns in the snow. The voice over begins with a first person account, his aged tone signifying his veteran status as he talks the cold, the never-ending snow, the pain and the waiting. While the images remain the same documentary footage, the voice over changes from the I of the veteran to the I of the character, young and recognizable from the previous cut-scene. This I now provides more information about the number of American and British soldiers, the importance of the mission, and other facts that serve to move the player/character from the historical events as history, past-tense, into the historically authentic experience of war as game, present-tense. The documentary footage and voice over fade into a game engine driven cut-scene, from the player/characters point of view, of his comrades in arms, settled behind a wall, discussing the mission objectives and the danger. From here, the cut-scene leads seamlessly into the first person point of view, hand with gun, and health meter indicating that game play has begun. Cinematics can also be offered as rewards within a game itself, either for completing a level in general or completing it with a particular score or for finding hidden objects, often called Easter eggs, within the game itself. For example, while completing each mission in Medal of Honor: Rising Sun, the player is able to locate film cans, which are unlocked when the mission has been completed. These film cans, when opened, provide a series of documentary, first person accounts by British and US soldiers and sailors who fought through the battles that form the players experience. Watching these short films helps locate the player in history while providing a more realistic portrait of war, as the veterans remember the hardship, losses, and suffering they encountered. Medal of Honor: European Assault adds first person accounts from Russian soldiers, some of whom survived the siege of Stalingrad. In sum, like other action adventure games, especially those classified as third or first person shooters, war games gain much of their effectiveness as game experience through their realism and authenticity. A sense of the real, of really being in battle or involved in covert operations, is created through the visual design of the environment, the use of sound, as well as the way the game engine works to create an artificially intelligent enemy and situations that create the sense of tension, waiting, uncertainty, fear, and exhilaration that gamers associate with war. Of course, this association depends more on cinematic representations of war than on actual experiences. Authenticity is largely created through the weapons available in the game, as well as the historical context created through various cut-scenes that establish each mission and its series of goals and objectives. The sense of historical accuracy and authenticity is enhanced through the use of documentary images within the game as well as through supplemental material available in strategy guides as well as on-line. As long as a player

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______________________________________________________________ doesnt use cheat codes, he or she should feel something akin to what is imagined to be the sense of vulnerability as well as exhilaration experienced by soldiers in real combat situations. Or so the game designers would have us believe. And what about those players who think about it as a game to be beat, not as a virtual war sensation to be experienced? What strategies are used to bring some awareness of the pain, suffering, loss, and cost of war? Game designers use the strategy of documentary images as well as a musical score (often released separately as CDs) that privileges melancholy choral music to create a sense of sadness and loss that floats over and above the game experience. In order to intensify the immersive experience and the immediacy of game play, combat based war games use documentary footage to create a sense of context and a sense of having-been-there as a hook on which to hang the feeling that I am there now. Of course, when all is said and done, as Bo Kampmann Walther points out, the as-if is readily forgotten, though still preconditioned, once we start to murder by numbers.2

Notes
Staff, Gamespot Q & A, gamespot.com, posted June 26, 2003, http://www.gamespot.com/pc/action/callofduty/preview_6030683.html 2 B.K. Walther, Playing and Gaming Reflections and Classifications, Game Studies, Volume 3, issue 1, May 2003, http://www.gamestudies.org
1

Bibliography
Americas Army. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. last updated 26 April, 2007, viewed on 26 April, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/America%27s_Army Asaravala, A., When War Games Meet Video Games. Oct. 20, 2004, viewed on 6 November 2004, http://www.wired.com Galloway, A.R., Social Realism in Gaming. http://www.gamestudies.org Huntemann, N., Militarism and Video Games: An Interview with Nina Huntemann. Media Education Foundation, 2003, viewed on 26 April, 2007, www.mediaed.org Kuma War Screenshots. Kumawar.org, viewed on April 28, 1007 http://actionvault.ign.com/features/media/kumawarscr.shtml Lenoir, T., All But War is Simulation: The Military-Entertainment Complex. Fall, 2000, viewed on November 6, 2004, http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/TimLenoir/MilitaryEntertainment Moody, R.N., War-themed game pushes troops cultural awareness. April 28, 2007; viewed on April 28, 2007, http://usatoday.com

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______________________________________________________________ Morris, S., First Person ShootersA Game Apparatus. Screenplay: cinema/videogames/interfaces, G. King and T. Krzywinska (eds.), Wallflower Press, London and New York, 2002. Sieberg, D., War games: Military training goes high-tech. 11/22/2001, viewed on November 6, 2004, http://cnn.technology Turse, N., Bringing the War Home: The New Military-IndustrialEntertainment Complex at War and Play. Friday, October 17, 2003, viewed on November 6, 2004, http://www.commondreams.org Walther, B. K., Playing and Gaming Reflections and Classifications. Game Studies, Volume 3, issue 1, May 2003, viewed on April 27, 2007, http://www.gamestudies.org The War on Terror, Available in Stores Now: Actual Military Events Youve seen on the news, now Play it. Kuma War.org, viewed on April 28, 2007, http://www.kumagames.com Wargaming. Wikipedia, April 28, 2007, viewed on April 28, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wargaming Sue Scheibler is Associate Professor, School of Film and Television, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California

Representations of British Soldierly Identity in Print Media and Soldiers own Photographic Accounts K. Neil Jenkings, Trish Winter and Rachel Woodward
Abstract War and military activities are multi-layered social phenomena mediated for public understanding and consumption by the press and other forms of mass media. The medium of text is important, but it is the photographic image that can define in the publics consciousness their understanding of the armed forces and the personnel who staff them. These photographic representations are the subject of this paper that reports an UK Economic and Social Research Council funded study into representations of military identity in: a) British newspapers and b) the photographic representations held in personal collections of service and ex-service personnel. This paper examines print media photographic images and their use in and alongside newspaper texts. It also reports on the photographs from individuals own collections and how these representations of military life and accounts of military identity reveal a much more diverse set of images and experiences of military life and identity than the more abstract and iconic representations found in newspapers. It is suggested that the abstract, iconic, heroic and demonic stereotypes of military identity, and personnel they are attached too, mask the rich and diverse identities that soldiers have of themselves and their colleagues. Key Words Identity, representations, military, photographs *****

This paper is about the disjunctures and connections between photographs of soldiers used in British print media, and soldiers own photographs of themselves. Our analysis sets photographic images of soldiers and military activities printed in newspapers against the photographs from individuals own collections, and explores how the latter, as representations of military life and accounts of military identity, reveal a much more diverse set of images and experiences of military life and identity than the more abstract and iconic representations found in newspapers. We suggest that the abstract, iconic, heroic and demonic figures of the soldier found in print media images of military personnel stand at odds with the rich and diverse identities that soldiers have of themselves and their colleagues, which are contained within personal photographs. We suggest that this disjuncture between media and

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______________________________________________________________ personal representations has wider consequences than just the accuracy or otherwise of the depictions of military activities that print media images convey. One concerns the gulf between the anticipated and realised experiences of young soldiers, and a second relates to the function of print media photographs in facilitating the conditions under which the deployment and sacrifice of military personnel in the name of wider state military objectives is made possible. The selection and coding of photographic images This paper draws on materials collected for an ESRC-funded research project which examined the representation and negotiation of the identity of the contemporary British soldier in photographic images from print media and from soldiers own collections. Two distinct types of data were collected for this project. The first set of data consists of a collection of photographs published in British newspapers, their web-based versions, and on the BBCs web pages, photographs which showed images of the British military. Images were collected across the major broadsheet and tabloid daily newspapers over a sixmonth period, from January to June 2006. The collection of data was driven by the search for photographic images; our focus was less on the narratives driving the stories in which the images were embedded, or in the political intentionalities of the different media outlets in which the images were placed, although of course these are significant elements for analysis in their own right. Rather, for the purposes of this project, we were interested in what the photographs were of, in the crudest sense, in terms of what, exactly, was being portrayed, and in the photographs as quotations (in the sense used by Berger, to which we return below) taken by photographers and framed by picture editors and sub-editors in the context of the printed page or web-page. In total, over 900 images were selected and scanned into a database. Once collated, the photographs were coded according to a frame devised to assign each image to one or more categories, a total of over 50 codes not including sub-categories. The biggest category, numerically, was that of deceased soldiers, unsurprising given that the period of data collection included the period of engagement of British forces in armed activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is notable that whilst every military fatality was reported, the nature and extent of that coverage in terms of photographic representations diminished over time. The stories that accompany these photographs speak of the sacrifice and heroism of the deceased. These stories would frequently be followed a few days later by photographs of uniformed pall-bearers and military funerals again with emphasis on sacrifice and heroism, and framed to emphasise the tragic nature of the event. It is worth pointing out that whilst images of dead soldiers abound, there are very few of those injured. The next major group was of military equipment, the greatest number being of tanks, then 1.

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______________________________________________________________ aeroplanes and helicopters, with relatively few of ships or submarines (reflecting the land war nature of the current conflicts). With aeroplanes it was usually not possible to make out individuals as they were often in flight, whereas helicopters were often shown with embarking or disembarking troops, and tanks and personnel carriers would often have personnel visible. The next major group was of soldiers on patrol, either in motion on foot or static whilst taking covered positions. The photographs of military equipment and of military personnel in action were primarily taken by embedded photographers accompanying soldiers on foot patrol or whilst travelling or embarking / disembarking from their transport. In contrast, those of deceased soldiers are frequently cropped from pictures taken by military unit photographers at formal passing-out parades and similar events, group or individual and posed in uniform as a personal photograph, rather than captured as a news event by a news photographer. The second set of data consisted of photos from the personal collections of serving and former soldiers (British Army and Royal Marines) and an explanatory commentary on them. Sixteen interviews with soldiers were conducted between September and November 2006, with the aim of generating data around the performance of soldiering and the construction and articulation of military identity. The photographs were used both as a counterpoint to the print media images in order to establish the connections and divides between public and private photographic representations of the figure of the soldier, and as a focus for the wider discussion of identity during the interview. Each interviewee was invited to select up to ten images from his or her collection, and with each image to discuss its content, its personal significance and role or function, and its life as a material object. The interviews, lasting between under one and over two-and-a-half hours, were recorded and transcribed in full. The photographs selected for discussion by interviewees depicted a great variety of activities and came in a range of formats. These, too, have been coded according to the themes suggested by the body of data as a whole. Significant codes include the passing out parade the moment when an individual becomes officially a trained soldier or Royal Marine, photographs taken to capture (or later interpreted as capturing) a sense of place (for example, a barracks room, in one case a vomit-stained toilet), photographs illustrating comradeship and friendship (on and off-duty), and so on. Our intention here is not to dwell on an analysis of the codes, but rather to highlight for discussion the points of intersection between the photographs selected by interviewees and the photographs published in news media formats. Our first observation concerns the movement of photographs between public and private arenas. In the great majority of cases, interviewees photographs tended not to be of the type that appeared in print media forms. This is not to say, however, that there is no correspondence between private and public media representations of the figure of the soldier. Many of the print media images were drawn from private / internal military events (formal

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______________________________________________________________ photographs of individuals and groups in full dress uniform, action photographs taken by unit photographers for publicity purposes, personal or family snapshots circulated to news media outlets as part of the recording of military fatalities). In turn, many of the photographs from private collections were taken from print media stories, from local and national newspapers where the image of the interviewee as a soldier had been used to illustrate a story, or copies of press photographs in which the interviewee was situated. Examples include an official photograph of Lord Mountbattens funeral in 1979 and coverage of unit exercises in Germany. This movement of images between public and private arenas is interesting because it underscores the point that the social life of a photograph is not in any simple way determined by its maker. As commentators on photography continue to emphasise, the context in which a photographic image is placed is that which determines its meaning. 1,2,3, Bergers notion of quotation is useful here. For the interviewees photographs, the surface meaning in all cases did not convey, or often even hint at, the story that interviewees gave in discussion about the image. Even where ostensibly the quotation (the image) was shared between print media and private collection, its meaning was starkly different in both cases; the oral accounts of quotations were very different to the newspaper texts. Whilst there were numerically relatively few instances where personal photographs echoed print media images, and vice versa, the instances where this does occur are informative because an analysis of their different meanings underscores so well a range of wider arguments about the meaning and function of the photographic image. One image type, two meanings An example to illustrate this issue around the significance of context comes from a comparison between photographs showing, in terms of the content of the image, essentially similar activities; the British soldier engaged in training and support activities with a foreign military. The first two images which can only be described due to copyright permissions, are taken from The Sun, a British mass-market tabloid newspaper, and published on its web pages on 15th September 2006, with the headline Army: The allies are scared showing British soldiers training with both irregular and Afghan army soldiers. The first of the two images, which does not have a tag line, shows a British soldier on a training exercise in Afghanistan in bright daylight talking to two Afghan soldiers/militia. The British soldier is in a half body shot on the left cradling his rifle and in a half turn apparently pointing at something in the direction of the photographer and dressed in desert camouflage with a helmet on and goggles attached to the helmet. The two Afghan soldiers are also in half shot and standing alongside, one in the centre of the picture with sun glasses on and his hands in his pockets and facing the camera, the other to the right side on facing the British soldier Both of these are wearing British DPM camouflage jackets. 2.

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______________________________________________________________ The one facing the camera is wearing a black woollen hat while the one to the right wears a green beret and also has four chevrons visible on his jacket epaulet. The mid ground is of featureless sandy coloured hard desert showing a 4x4 road vehicle. Also visible is a open topped Land Rover with a mounted gun at which a soldier stands and there is also a soldier at the side of the vehicle. In addition to these are two Afghan soldiers in the kneeling shooting position mid way between the soldiers in the foreground and the vehicles in the far mid-ground they are side-on to the photographer and facing to the right. The second image accompanying the first is of a bareheaded British Soldier in desert camouflage crouched in front of a arcing line of eight Afghan soldiers who are also crouched and holding various radio equipment with aerials sticking out of their packs in various directions. All the crouching Afghans are in British DPM camouflaged uniform wearing steel helmets. Although in a line the soldiers have their heads turned facing various directions and appear to be in a light-hearted frame of mind in a break during radio training everyone appears to be smiling and some are holding clear plastic water bottles. Standing behind the line of soldiers is another Afghan soldier wearing a beret an apparently directing people outside the frame of the picture. This picture has a tag line which states Afghans are not warriors the are not warriors being an unattributed quote. These photos are similar to a one selected from a personal collection shows the interviewee (fig. 1.), and shows the interviewee a Royal Marines Commando, standing next to a Kurdish militiaman. It was taken in 1991 during this Marines posting to Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Here the Royal Marine is wearing a helmet and cradling his rifle and the Peshmurgha Kurd has a police armband on and has two holstered pistols. It is not exactly the same as either of the two from the newspaper, but is a similar shot of the collaboration of allies.

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______________________________________________________________ Figure 1 Royal Marines Photograph

The two photographs in The Sun (September 15th 2006) were presented under the title of an article entitled Army: The allies are scared in which it is reported that British soldiers who are training Afghan soldiers have supposedly called them cowards in a leaked dossier. This is an unattributed quote, but is followed by similar quotes from a corporal, a staff sergeant and a captain. Although they are not named, all are quoted making disparaging comments about the Afghan soldiers who are meant to be their allies. For example the corporal is quoted as stating that Most are cowards under fire. The point of the story appears to be that the poor standard of soldiers in the Afghan Army will mean that British troops will be required to remain longer than intended. This tone is in contrast to the comments of the

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______________________________________________________________ interviewee about his photograph; the following is an extract from the interviewee talking about his photograph: N: Cause if someone came to look at it from outside, without any understanding of the background to it, it would be... I: Yeah it is some blokes sitting next to each other. I mean, he might be dead now, I dont know what happened. You know, lots of things have happened in Iraq since then, and he was the same age as me, so he is nearly 40 now. N: It shows photographs can do lots of things, independent of what is in the photograph. Reflection of, memory of, this time, remembering what happened. I: And also when you are over there, you ask yourself lots of questions like, why are we here? Also when we left, they became a little bit of, I think the Politics behind it all, I wasnt aware that, [when] I was over there, and we didnt hear the news like you do now. When they found out we were leaving, they were very fearful of what was going to happen, and once we pulled out of the safe haven, obviously they expected the Iraqi Republican Guard to come back. Which makes me wonder, what happened to the safe haven, I know they had jets flying over, its not the same as having blokes on the ground. I often think, I wonder what happened to him when we pulled out. That goes back to the subject to that I would like to find out really, cause I am sure if I went back to that town, and started brandishing the photograph around, he would possibly, and also for me own thought of, how things have changed really. It continues to ask me lots of questions when I look at it. N: That is the sort of questions that you wouldnt have asked at the time. I: And obviously there is a lot of history between the photograph being taken and the present day really. That in itself creates a photo, to create unanswered questions. And I was still quite young there, I think I was only about 24 or something like that, 23 or 24. But yah, so who knows. That was the reason why I used that as the last one, and then I literally, spent a bit of time out there and then came back, and then handed my kit in and left. I saw some tragic things when we were out there. There was a lot of, I saw a truck load of guys get killed in a, Guerrillas, the Peshmurgha

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______________________________________________________________ Guerrillas coming down a mountain in an open top, the old dumper trucks, the rubble trucks, they used to use them to travel in, and it came down a mountain, and the breaks went on it. We were at the bottom of the mountain, we literally just watched it come down the mountain, and bouncing people out of it. Picking up the pieces afterwards, which werent particularly pleasant. Then there was a, obviously the kids were suffering, but to a lesser degree, depending on where you were. There was a petrol tanker exploded as well, on this main road, cause this was the main re-supply route back to Turkey. And the guy got burned to death in a petrol tanker explosion. Well there is nothing you could do, just sat there watching the poor bugger die really. Those are the sort of things that you look at and deal with, but you dont really take time until you get older, and you start reflecting on it. It was probably, from my own personal problems, when I left the forces and coupled with my services with the Police Forces, it does create a lot of baggage for you, mental baggage really, and it is how you put it into context, and lay a life really. What life experiences are, is how well or badly you can cope with it. N: How you become, what youve become is how you deal with those experiences. I: That is right, and photographs are a good way of remembering things I think arent they, because you wont forget certain things, but it is just your little window of memories. Clearly, the texts that accompany these ostensibly similar images are radically different. The first offers a dismissal of the efficiency and professionalism of the Afghan Army, and a suggestion that these deficiencies in ability and motivation may have deleterious consequences for British troops. The second offers a personal interpretation of the image, and a reflection on its significance with regard to the relationship between the two figures portrayed. Furthermore, the modes of construction of the texts are utterly disparate. We have no way of knowing, in the case of the first image, whether the reported quotes from soldiers, that are positioned to accompany and explain the image, are those of the soldiers pictured. Indeed, since the photographs came from a press photo agency and not from a Sun in-house photographer, we can be confident that the soldiers in the photograph have nothing to do with the comments reported in the leaked dossier. Furthermore, the reported comments of soldiers are certainly not in direct response to the photographs indeed we are

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______________________________________________________________ unable to even say which came first, the photographs or the interviews, or even if they are from the same time or place. In the case of the second image, we know that the photograph and the text are related to the same people, and we know that the time frame between the two events is in the order of years and in different locations. There is of course much else to be said that space does not allow us here. Our core observation, though, is about the functions that these two images/texts serve. What is each photograph doing, and what is the power of the interpretative frame offered up by the text? John Bergers observation about the photograph as quotation is useful here: Photographs quote from appearances. The taking-out of the quotation produces a discontinuity, which is reflected in the ambiguity of the photographs meaning. All photographed events are ambiguous, except those whose personal relation to the event is such that their own lives supply the missing continuity. Usually, in public the ambiguity of photographs is hidden in the use of words which explain, less or more truthfully, the pictured events. 4 (Berger 1982, p.128) This observation neatly encapsulates the two types of photographs in our data set: photographs published in newspapers accompanying a written text (and vice versa); and photographs that belong to service personnel who can both describe the quotation the photograph has made, explain the history of the photograph and provide information that fills some of the discontinuity (although we should add that the degree to which they can do this for each photograph differs between photographs, and may indeed differ in each telling). That we are dealing with here is not necessarily two completely different types of photographic quotation, but two different types of account which attend to the abyss between the moment recorded and the present moment of looking at a photograph,5 crudely, the journalistic account and the personal. At the same time what the photograph shows goes with any story one chooses to invent6 and this is true for both types of account. Yet No invented story, no explanation offered will be quite as present as the banal appearances preserved in [the] photograph.7 This is in large part due to the realism of the photograph, but this realism still leaves an ambiguity which is not always obvious, for as soon as photographs are used with words, they produce together an effect of certainty, even of dogmatic assertion.8 This is the power of the photograph, in that it acts as irrefutable as evidence of any event but is weak in meaning9 as to what it is evidence of. Given the ambiguity of the photograph as a quotation, in that its meaning cannot be assumed as given, in the absence of an interpretative account

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______________________________________________________________ it falls to the viewer to create a coherence for the photographic quotation. Thus the seen, the revealed, is the child of both appearances and the search.10 Berger elaborates: Another way of making this relation clearer would be to say that appearances in themselves are oracular. Like oracles they go beyond, they insinuate further than the discrete phenomena they present, and yet their insinuations are rarely sufficient to make any more comprehensive reading indisputable. The precise meaning of an oracular statement depends upon the quest or the need of the one who listens to it.11 Berger equates the oracular statement as akin to an idea which, may or may not become conscious, and which emerges from the recognition of some past experience. In a particularly expressive photograph a dialectic occurs which preserves the particularity of the event recorded, and it chooses an instant when the correspondences of those particular appearances articulate a general idea.12 The reason for attending to Berger at length is that this recognition of a general idea, or universal, has to be squared with the oracular, in that each viewer is searching for something, and that what they might see as their universal is dependent upon what they are searching for, or what they have the life expectancies and experience to see. This is particularly pertinent when we consider the context in which these photographs sit. As Campbell has argued, the task in analytic work of this kind is less to interpret the iconography of images, but rather to ask what images do in circulation, their function within a wider context as ciphers that prompt an affective response.13 We would suggest that the disjuncture between interpretations has real consequences through the ways in which public portrayals of military life and military activities may fail utterly to square with the lived experience of soldierly life. This is pertinent because of the power of the visual in shaping wider public understandings of military activity. For potential recruits, we need to consider not just whether their reading of visual imagery is in any way an accurate one, but also whether they have the capacity, the life experience, to read the photographs and ask oracular questions of it. If they do not have the life experiences they have to rely upon their previous exposure to similar news reports. However because of the idealised and sanitised reporting (both in the photographs published and the explanatory texts surrounding them) their possible readings are limited. Furthermore, we want to flag up the consequences of this reality disjuncture the difference between the media representation through accounts from the photographic quotation and the text, and experiences of the everyday

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______________________________________________________________ reality of being a soldier. This is not just an issue for the public when they receive the soldiers accounts of their actual experiences, but for the soldiers themselves and military capability in general. The increase in the numbers of soldiers going Absent Without Leave, coupled with manning problems around the retention of trained personnel is significant here as noted by the National Audit Office in 2006.14 Whilst not solely a consequence of public portrayals, we would argue that the role of print media representations cannot be dismissed, because of the disjuncture between public representations of military action and adventure and the absence within such representations of a lived experience that is, variously, mundane and frightening, stressful and injurious, and frequently fatal.

Notes
1. J Berger, Another Way of Telling, Readers and Writers, London, 1982. 2. D Campbell, Geopolitics and Visuality: Sighting the Dafur Conflict. Political Geography vol 26, 2007, pp. 357-382. 3. S Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, London, Hamish Hamilton, 2002. 4. Berger, p.128. 5. Ibid., p. 87. 6. Ibid., p. 87. 7. Ibid., p. 87. 8. Ibid., p. 87. 9. Ibid., p. 91. 10. Ibid., p. 92. 11. Ibid., p. 118. 12. Ibid., p. 118. 13. Campbell, 2007. 14. National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence. Recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces, National Audit Office, 2006, last viewed 16th May 2007, http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/05-06/05061633-I.pdf

Bibliography
Berger, J., Another Way of Telling, Readers and Writers, London, 1982. Campbell, D., Geopolitics and Visuality: Sighting the Dafur Conflict. Political Geography vol 26, 2007, pp. 357-382. National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence, Recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces, National Audit Office, 2006, last viewed 16th May 2007, http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/05-06/05061633-I.pdf Sontag, S., Regarding the Pain of Others, London, Hamish Hamilton, 2002.

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Representations of British Soldierly Identity in Print Media

______________________________________________________________ K. Neil Jenkings(1), Trish Winter(2) and Rachel Woodward(1) 1 Newcastle University, UK. 2 University of Sunderland, UK. ESRC Project Title: Negotiating identity and representation in the mediated Armed Forces. Reference number RES-000-23-0992. Further information available at http://photoarmy.ncl.ac.uk/

Part III Writing about War

Ethical Crossings in War Writing: Michael Ondaatjes Anils Ghost and the Sri Lankan Civil War Elke Rosochacki
Abstract This paper offers a reading of Michael Ondaatjes novel Anils Ghost in which the ethical crossings that are entailed in operations of both beneficence and destruction conducted by parties at war with one another is examined. Ondaatje novel is set during the Sri Lankan civil war which may be described as a conflict typical of the globalization era. As identified by Zygmunt Bauman and Achille Mbembe amongst others, wars of the present time can no longer be understood through the earlier typologies of just or unjust wars, nor can they be organized into binary affairs in which victims and perpetrators are clearly distinguishable. Ondaatjes novel exposes the ethical complexity and ambiguity that mark human relations during a time of war and as such it poses a significant challenge to the global ideology of justice and the universal human rights discourse upheld by institutions of the west such as the United Nations. According to Giorgio Agamben the ethical imperative to bear testimony to extreme events such as war or genocide can paradoxically only be undertaken from an ethically compromised position or gray zone. It is just such an ethical gray zone, occupied by writer and independent observer alike, that Ondaatje exposes in Anils Ghost and that is the subject of this exposition. Key Words Ethics, war writing, globalization, testimony, United Nations, Agamben, Primo Levi, Ondaatje, Anils Ghost. *****

At the turn of the previous century Joseph Conrad said in the preface to his political novel Under Western Eyes that truth alone is the justification of any fiction which makes the least claim to the quality of art or may hope to take its place in the culture of men and women of its time.1 What kind of truth, one may ask, does a novel like Anils Ghost offer the people of Sri Lanka whose experiences in the still ongoing civil war are the written into this work? By extension, what kind of truth may be gleaned from this novel by men and women now, who seek to understand the nature of war as it has unfolded in the present era of globalization? That Anils Ghost does not deliver truth in terms of an empirical account of Sri Lankas protracted internecine war has been noted by several critics.

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______________________________________________________________ The reader is not furnished with any hard facts about the conflict, there are no clear demarcations between the warring groups, political objectives are never mentioned and no attempt is made to adjudicate between just or unjust causes. Within the altogether more complicated world morally2 the Sri Lankan archaeologist in the novel explains, we all have blood on our clothes.3 Every side was killing and hiding the evidence. Every side. There is no hope of affixing blame. And no one can tell who the victims are.4 The reality of the Sri Lankan war, the novel suggests, cannot be organized into any tidy binaries in which victims and perpetrators are clearly distinguishable. It was a Hundred Years War with modern weaponry, and backers in the sidelines in safe countries, war sponsored by gun- and drug-runners. It became evident that political enemies were secretly joined in financial arms deals. The reason for war was war.5 The reasons for war thus collapsed in the above tautology signal to novels resistance to political solutions to the disaster of war. This is underscored by the failure of Anils UN sponsored mission to pin down political truth, or in other words, to identify victims and perpetrators, by means of her positivist forensic investigation. The war tribunal set up to placate trading partners in the west is equally discredited and along with this, the notion that the ends of justice are met by meting out blame and retribution. What the novel offers as insight or truth is therefore not given in terms of the juridical or the empirical. Its concern is rather what it calls the archaeological surround of fact6 or, in theoretical terms, the ontological conditions that underlie what can be asserted about a given state of affairs in the world. In particular, the novel seeks to uncover the ethical relations that women and men are cast into during the time of war and along with this what defines the ethical within the specific, historically determined conditions that prevail in a war of the globalization era. No longer waged between sovereign states, such wars are according to Zygmunt Bauman best described as hit-and-run affairs7 conducted by smaller mobile military outfits or war machines that operate regionally as independent economic units sustained by transnational trade in arms exchanged for local resources. Their power is entrenched by exercising the right to kill and to let live over the local civilian population, turning such geographical enclaves ruled over by war machines into privileged spaces of war and death.8 By deploying the notion of biopower as developed by Michel Foucault and more recently by Giorgio Agamben, the Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe provides a detailed analysis of the workings of

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______________________________________________________________ biopolitical power in contemporary wars in the study entitled Necropolitics. In Anils Ghost such war machines, as described by Mbembe are seen to operate not only as the agents of destruction but also as agents of humanitarian beneficence. By thus undoing the conventional distinctions between rights and wrongs, the novel exposes the complex and ambivalent workings that are entailed in the exercise of biopower and locates these variously destructive and beneficent corporeal transactions within the realm of the ethical. This is possible if ethics is not thought of in the traditional sense as a set of abstract moral precepts, but is understood in the Levinasian terms as the embodied relation between human subjects in the face to face encounter. By placing ethics alongside the operations of biopower, both instantiated by actions that range between the destruction and preservation of human bodies, the novel is able to forge a conceptual inroad into the dilemma of war outside the conventional realm of morality. That the categories of moral life applicable to a non threatened life world are rendered obsolete under the extreme conditions of war is repeatedly affirmed by the novel and most expressly articulated by the Dr Gamini, who like others along with him are cast headlong into the visceral reality of war and who reject out of hand the armchair rebels with their ideas of justice9 and the talk of ownership, or even personal rights 10 espoused by the side line observers astride on the high horses of western individualism. Similarly, Giorgio Agamben notes the falling away of ordinary moral life and the emergence of a new ethical element in the accounts written by survivors of the Nazi death camps. Primo Levi calls it a gray zone which may be described as a situation in which the long chain of conjunction between victim and executioner11 comes loose, where the oppressed becomes the oppressor and the executioner in turn appears as victim. A gray incessant alchemy in which good and evil and, along with them, all the metal of traditional ethics reach their point of fusion.12 Not only are the participants of war and those directly affected by the work of its destruction implicated in the ethical disaster of war, the novel suggests, but also those who occupy the position of observer, independent investigator, reporter or even the fictional writer. However, in a further twist of the ethical relations at work in this situation, the imperative to bear testimony to the inordinate human suffering experienced in the face of death and injury that unfold as the chief consequence of war can paradoxically only be undertaken from an ethically compromised position or gray zone. Such an ethical gray zone, undermining or complicating the position of writer and independent observer alike is occupied in the novel by the figure Anil, the UN forensic investigator whose long-distance gaze13 of the Sri Lankan crisis is implicitly shared by Michael Ondaatje. Both are expatriate Sri Lankans who visit the country with the express intention of observing and writing about the war. In order to uncover the shifty grounds on which this

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______________________________________________________________ enterprise rests, the novel shows, first, that the objectivity and independence that scientific procedure in service of a western notion of justice lays claim to is highly spurious by making it clear that western states have material interests in peripheral wars and that the human rights discourse is not infrequently deployed as the ideological front of western expansionism or becomes inadvertently implicated in its project. The upshot of this is that no outsider, foreign investigator, forensic specialist or human rights worker, and Anil is the chief proponent of all these, can pass judgement on matters relating to the war in Sri Lanka on the grounds of their independence. Ondaatje evidently does not exclude himself from the moral culpability the west is prompted to acknowledge here, regarding wars outside its own territory. This is expressed by way of the following meta-fictional commentary: American movies, English books remember how they all end? asked Gamini that night. The American or Englishman gets on a plane and leaves. Thats it. The camera leaves with him. He looks out of the window at Mombasa or Vietnam or Jakarta, someplace now he can look at through the clouds. The tired hero. A couple of words to the girl beside him. Hes going home. So the war to all purposes is over. Thats enough reality for the West. Its probably the history of the last two hundred years of Western political writing. Go home. Write a book. Hit the circuit. 14 Anils story plays out to the predictable end of an already outworn script as she sticks to the part she has so passionately taken on. As her project is sunk by the reality of the Sri Lankan war, and her own life is in danger, she, like others before her, gets on the plane and leaves. In an interview with Maya Yaggi, Ondaatje admits that I didnt want to have that kind of ending.15 But just as Ondaatje cannot write Anil out of such a plot, he cannot easily escape the ethical dilemma she necessarily faces as human rights activist. Locked into the history of the last two hundred years of Western political writing, Ondaatje too, will Go home. Write a book. Hit the circuit. His literary success and the material rewards to be had from his project will, in effect, have been gained by disclosing and aestheticizing the suffering of others whose life world he has only encountered in passing and not has not experienced in person. A similar insight is offered by the war reporter Bernard-Henri Levi when he observes that it is not the names of the war victims that will be writ large in his news report, but that it will be his own name on top of the newspaper page, and, when the time comes, on the cover of the book he will extract from all that16 thus making good on

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______________________________________________________________ Hegels claim that History is made less by those who make it than by those who tell about it.17 The second point raised by the novel regarding the ethical compromise entailed in the position of the outside investigator or writer arises out of the discrepancy between the considerable material well being of those living in the west and the raw struggle for survival of the Sri Lankans. By witnessing the disaster of war and then leaving the victims to their inescapable and harsh fate the outside observer is enacting what is tantamount to a desertion of sorts. In Levinasian terms it is an abandoning of the other to her death. Bernard-Henri Levi writes that war reporters like himself, humanitarians and the Blue Berets know that the instant they leave the war zone, despite all risks they may have taken, and whatever return may be planned ( by parachute, yes, but with exit guaranteed) marks the the limit of [their] fraternity.18 In an altercation between Sarath and Anil something of this argument is played out. You know, Id believe your arguments more if you lived here, he said. You cant just slip in, make a discovery and leave. You want me to censor myself. [Anil replies] I want you to understand the archaeological surround of a fact. Or youll be like one of those journalists who file reports about flies and scabs while staying at the Galle Face Hotel. That false empathy and blame.19 Ondaatje does indeed censor [him]self by means of such metafictional commentary in a way Anil evidently feels she should but does not. The writers self reflexive gesture does, then, go some way towards dismantling the moral high ground assumed in the last two hundred years of Western political writing but does not provide a complete safeguard against the literary tourism he may be charged with here. In an interview with Maya Yaggi, Ondaatje concedes, that its a real problem. I am sure I am as guilty as anyone.20 Ondaatje is, however, not alone in his predicament as it is one that encumbers the now ubiquitous world traveller or tourist who, according to Bauman, embodies a particular mode of being in the present era of globalization. The contemporary tourist, Bauman writes, lives his extraterritoriality as a privilege, as independence, as the right to be free, free to choose; as a licence to restructure the world.21 That Ondaatje has claimed such privileges, rights and an independence of a kind, which makes him as guilty as anyone, is placed squarely in the open here and need no longer be considered a sticking point as such. Of greater interest here are the questions implicitly raised about the nature of authorship and the ethics of writing entailed in this situation. On a pragmatic level, it would appear that such

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______________________________________________________________ extra-territoriality as Ondaatje has made claim to is indeed a necessary condition that makes the actual production and publication of a novel like Anils Ghost possible in the first place. On a philosophical level, such extraterritoriality is necessitated by more complex workings which may be understood within the framework of biopower and which disclose, on closer examination, an entirely different set of ethical dynamics regarding the role of the author in such a situation. Agamben traces such a dynamic in the writings of Primo Levi who, as survivor of a death camp, was able to return to the outside world to tell of what he had witnessed on the inside. The fact of his return does however, Levi writes, detract from his status as a true witness. He explains as follows: We who were favoured by fate tried, with more or less wisdom, to recount not only our fate, but also that of the others, indeed the drowned; but this was a discourse on behalf of third parties, the story of things seen close at hand, but not experienced personally. The destruction brought to an end, the job completed, was not told by anyone, just as no one ever returned to describe his own death. Even if they had paper and pen, the drowned could not have testified because their death had begun before that of their body. Weeks and months before being snuffed out, they had already lost the ability to observe, to remember, to compare and express themselves. We speak in their stead, by proxy.22 The act of witnessing and delivering testimony, indeed any act of writing about an extreme manifestation of destructive biopower as was seen in the Nazi death camps and is to be seen again, albeit in mutated form, in the mass destruction of human life in contemporary wars, is caught in a moral double bind which seems to undermine the only position from which speaking of such events is possible at all. This is so because such testimonies can only be, as Levi writes, a discourse on behalf of a third party. The responsibility of testimony thus rests, ironically, on those who are not the true witnesses, namely the survivors or the returnees, the literary tourist or journalist, the war photographer and foreign correspondent, the ones in short, favoured by fate or a favourable passport and whose exit from the war zone or death camp is guaranteed. The privilege of survival, escape, independence or extraterritoriality is in turn paid for by carrying the responsibility of speaking for those who saw the Gorgon and have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute.23 According to Agamben, such are the workings of biopower, namely to produce by means of inflicting severe bodily suffering and mass death, the absolute separation of the living being

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______________________________________________________________ and the speaking being, zoe and bios.24 The imperative to fill the space left open by the mute or forever silenced true witness must then be heeded by an outsider, an extraterritorial, who delivers testimony on behalf of others. Testimony is thus always an act of an author, writes Agamben, it always implies an essential duality in which an insufficiency or an incapacity is completed or made valid.25 It may thus be argued that the imperative to deliver testimony founds the very the notion of authorship itself. The aesthetic practice of writing is thus, in effect, grounded in the ethical imperative of being for the other in Levinasian terms. Authoring is then not an act of creation out of nothing, but a setting into being according to the original meaning of the word augere as Agamben points out. In Heideggers terms such a form of writing is a disclosure or an unconcealment of that into which human being as historical is already cast.26 Agamben elaborates as follows: Every creator is always a co-creator, every author a coauthor. The act of the auctor completes the act of an incapable person, giving strength or proof to what in itself lacks it and granting life to what could not live alone. It can conversely be said that the imperfect act or incapacity precedes an auctors act and that the imperfect act completes and gives meaning to the word of the auctor-witness. An authors act that claims to be valid on its own is nonsense, just as the survivors testimony has truth and reason for being only if it is completed by the one who cannot bear witness.27 This, one may argue, is the nature of the writing in Anils Ghost: it is a testimony that bears witness to events that are impossible to witness. Ondaatjes speaking on behalf of others who have suffered such events in person may therefore be understood as an active response to the ethical demand of being for the other. That such a form of witnessing, which is aimed at bringing into the open experiences that strain the ordinary capacity of language, unfolds as an aesthetic event is also recognized by Agamben. Poets witnesses found language as what remains, as what actually survives the possibility, or impossibility, of speaking.28 The extensive list of acknowledgements that appends Anils Ghost point to the fact that Ondaatjes text has indeed been assembled from diverse fragments of lived experiences and accounts collected from various sources directly related to the ongoing war in Sri Lanka. This makes it possible to say that Anils Ghost offers an exemplary form of testimony to the extreme suffering inflicted on the people of Sri Lanka during the civil war. Furthermore, the meta-fictional inscriptions carried by the novel disclose an awareness of its paradoxical incapacity to speak and the ethical compromise upon which the enterprise of

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______________________________________________________________ this writing rests. Thus laying bare the twisted trajectories29 of its project, the novel cannot untangle the ambivalences and irreconcilable contradictions that mark its position and which place it squarely within the crisis of postmodern thought which, according to Bauman, finds itself caught in uncertainties and equivocations despite or because of the expanded horizon of its new found wisdom.

Notes
Conrad, J. (1910) Under Western Eyes. Introduction by John Ford. London: Penguin Books, 1985, p.50. 2 Ondaatje, M. Anils Ghost. London: Picador, 2000, p. 11. 3 ibid., p.48. 4 ibid., p. 17. 5 ibid., p. 43. 6 ibid., p. 44. 7 Mbembe, A. Necropolitics. Trans. Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15.1, 2003, p.30. 8 ibid., p. 33. 9 Ondaatje, M. Anils Ghost. London: Picador, 2000, p. 132. 10 ibid., p. 119. 11 Levi, P. The Drowned and the Saved. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Random House, 1989, p. 60. 12 Agamben, G. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller- Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 2002, p. 21. 13 Ondaatje, M. Anils Ghost. London: Picador, 2000, p. 11. 14 ibid., p. 285-286. 15 Jaggi, M. Michael Ondaatje in Conversation with Maya Jaggi. Wasafiri 32 (2000), p. 123. 16 Levy, Bernard-Henri. War, Evil and the End of History. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. London: Melville House Publishing, 2004, p. 276. 17 ibid., p. 291. 18 ibid., p. 173. 19 Ondaatje, M. Anils Ghost. London: Picador, 2000, p. 44. 20 Jaggi, M. Michael Ondaatje in Conversation with Maya Jaggi. Wasafiri 32 (2000), p. 253. 21 Bauman, Z. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 241. 22 Levi, P. The Drowned and the Saved. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Random House, 1989, p. 33.34. 23 Agamben, G. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller- Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 2002, p. 33.
1

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______________________________________________________________ ibid., p. 156. ibid., p. 150. 26 Heidegger, M. The Origin of the Work of Art. Continental Aesthetics: An Anthology: Romanticism to Postmodernism. Ed. Richard Kearney and David Russmussen. Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 206. 27 Agamben, G. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller- Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 2002, p. 150. 28 Ibid., p. 161. 29 Bauman, Z. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 245.
25 24

Bibliography
Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller- Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 2002. Bauman, Zygmunt. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Conrad, Joseph. (1910) Under Western Eyes. Introduction by John Ford. London: Penguin Books, 1985. Heidegger, Martin. The Origin of the Work of Art. Continental Aesthetics: An Anthology: Romanticism to Postmodernism. Ed. Richard Kearney and David Russmussen. Blackwell Publishing, 2001. 182-211. Jaggi, Maya. Michael Ondaatje in Conversation with Maya Jaggi. Wasafiri 32 (2000): 5-11. Levi, Primo. The Drowned and the Saved. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Random House, 1989. Levinas, Emmanuel. Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings. Ed. A.T. Peperzak, S. Critchley and R. Bernasconi. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. - - -. The Levinas Reader. Ed. Sean Hand. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1989. 129-143. Levy, Bernard-Henri. War, Evil and the End of History. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. London: Melville House Publishing, 2004. Mbembe, Achille. Necropolitics. Trans. Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15.1 (2003): 11-40. Ondaatje, Michael. Pale Flags: Reflections on Writing Anils Ghost. Wasafiri 24 (2004): 61-62. - - -. Anils Ghost. London: Picador, 2000. Elke Rosochacki teaches at the Department of English, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Mobility and Transformation: Engaging the Enemy in Larry Heinemanns Pacos Story David Boulting
Abstract: The paper explores enemy images and sites of conflict in Larry Heinemanns 1986 Vietnam War novel, Pacos Story. It analyses the novels construction of a complex hierarchy of enemies and threats facing both the American combat infantryman in Vietnam and the returning veteran in America. The paper briefly interrogates the representation of the Vietnamese enemy in the novel, emphasising the role of race and gender constructs in the formation of this enemy image. However, since Pacos Story repeatedly returns to themes of internecine conflict, friendly fire, and hostility (or perceived hostility) between Vietnam veterans and the American communities to which they returned in the sixties and seventies, the analysis of American enemies forms the focus of the paper. Heinemanns novel, it is argued, functions both as an indictment of the ideological manipulation of the figure of the Vietnam veteran in a range of discourses and, via its intensely gender-conscious account of war and (American) atrocity in Vietnam, a critique of the pathological masculinity inscribed in American culture and society. Key Words: Vietnam veterans, representation, gender, homosocial bonding, misogyny, enmity, empathy *****

This paper interrogates the figure of the enemy in Vietnam veteran Larry Heinemanns Pacos Story, and the multiple sites of threat and conflict the narrative gradually reveals. Heinemanns 1986 novel, principally set in small-town America in the 1970s, repeatedly returns to themes of interior and internecine conflict, friendly fire and the returning veterans rejection (or perceived rejection) in American communities. Since Heinemann is ultimately more interested in hostilities in peacetime America than during the war in Vietnam, my attentions here are concentrated on American enemies and conflicts. The category of enemy is so populous and so prone to mercurial shifts and inversions in Pacos Story that I have chosen to focus here on three salient areas of interest: first, depictions of the conventional, Vietnamese enemy; second, enmity and conflict between veterans and American communities; and, third, the overarching issue of gender and enmity in the novel.

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______________________________________________________________ Vietnam veteran Paco Sullivan, wandering westward in search of work and what the novels narrator calls a livable peace,1 is a walking map of Americas war in Vietnam. The names and symbols and elevation lines crinkled and curlicued and squeezed together2 of a French colonial map described on the novels third page have their counterpart in the dozens of swirled-up and curled-round3 scars that cover Pacos body, described elsewhere in the novel as a mosaic,4 or as resembling Braille.5 Pacos scars are the novels central motif, charged with polysemic potential through the authors recurring efforts to associate them with signifying practices and representational codes: maps, mosaics, Braille. Paco only rarely recounts the event that so marked him physically and psychically that he needs a hickory cane to walk and heavy doses of alcohol and painkillers to rest. His story is told instead by an omniscient and unnamed narrator who habitually addresses the reader as James. Through the narrators repeated use of the first person plural and his rich and dissonant mixing of registers, vernaculars and vocabularies, Heinemann suggests a kind of composite speaker comprising the competing voices and discourses of Pacos dead comrades: a ghost narrator. The apocalyptic event that has literally left its mark on Paco is the (fictional) Fire Base Harriette massacre. When Pacos company is almost over-run by a North Vietnamese Army unit, the company commander calls in every available round of air and artillery support only for this friendly fire to immolate American defenders and Vietnamese attackers alike. Paco alone (and only barely) survives this cataclysm, as Ishmael is left at the end of Melvilles Moby Dick: sole witness, both guardian and ward of the Pequods story. The massacre functions as a metonymic distillation of the war and its power to inscribe trauma on those whose come into contact with it. That inscription, in the form of the myriad scars that cover Pacos body, is echoed elsewhere in the narrative in the huge, red mark6 impressed upon the body of a captured female sniper as she is raped by the men in Pacos company, and in the detailed description of a dragon tattoo sported by the rapes instigator, Gallagher. The gang rape and murder of this Vietcong prisoner constitutes, with the Harriette massacre and the events of the novels final chapter, one of three pivotal moments about which the narrative is structured. The girl is the only Vietnamese enemy in the novel to be described in detail and inevitably she takes on a special symbolic weight. We are told that she has the hard, wiry body of a sharecropper,7 of someone who has worked hard and often gone hungry. That this peasant girl has been able to kill two of Pacos company clearly gestures towards the overwhelming of First World, male America by Third World, female Vietnam. The beating, rape and murder of the sniper, while sufficiently detailed and explicit to stand as a realistic example of American atrocity, also suggest, via the conventional

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______________________________________________________________ designation of both nature and nation as feminine, the destruction wrought in Vietnam by American weapons and defoliants. Alpha Companys vengeful atrocity constitutes a futile attempt (there will be others like her) to refeminise the enemy fighter and to re-assert their active male dominance. But there are other sites of gendered conflict and threat at work in the scene, other enemies to be engaged or evaded. Traditional cultural and genre-conventional notions of the honourable brotherhood of soldiery are first established and then fatally undermined in Pacos Story: the ghosts of his dead comrades are a constant presence in the text, either as the narrating voice or, intradiegetically, infiltrating Pacos life in nightmares and unwelcome memories. They are, at best, an ambiguous source of guilt and nostalgic longing. The complex and problematic nature of the homosocial bond in the combat zone is most starkly demonstrated in the pivotal act of rape and execution that occurs within the confines of this same brotherhood and is made possible by a tacit exchange of consent among the rapists. The absence of dissent among them and the measured and impassive way in which the atrocity is carried out (uncomfortably resonating other tasks elsewhere in the narrative, including Pacos menial work in a small-town diner) imply that the rape has been enabled not only by the brutalising milieu of the war but by the more permanent and firmly established conditions of male hegemony in American gender politics, popular sexism and racism, and the systematic commodification and exploitative representation of women with which these men have been conditioned both in American society and throughout their military training and socialisation (the novels complex gender politics here echoing Gustav Hasfords 1979 novel The Short-Timers, the basis for the 1987 Stanley Kubrick film Full Metal Jacket). Turning to representations of the (male) Vietnam veteran and his location in American culture and society, we find a second category of enemies and a new site of conflict emerging in Pacos Story. In American popular culture, representations of the Vietnam vet have ossified around a set of conventions that are now firmly embedded in the popular imagination. From his earliest appearances in films like 1965s Motor Psycho through to the arrival of Rambo in the early eighties, Hollywoods vision of the Vietnam veteran is dominated by troubled and violent individuals, so damaged by the war as to be doomed to relive it - and sometimes re-enact it - on American soil. Contaminated and alienated by his war, the Vietnam veteran is often nothing less than American Vietcong: simultaneously alien and indigenous, a spectral and volatile presence capable of visiting sudden and terrible violence where before there had been calm and order. The Reaganite eighties saw a reactionary re-imagining of the Vietnam War and its veterans, who were - broadly - rehabilitated from hair-trigger psychotics and dead-eyed sociopaths to the sanctified victims of a mass sellout perpetrated by gutless Washington politicos and bureaucrats. The

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______________________________________________________________ political currency and malleability of the Vietnam veteran has since been repeatedly demonstrated in American politics. As H. Bruce Franklin shows in his 1992 study MIA or Mythmaking in America, the myth of American POWs secretly held in Southeast Asian prison camps constitutes just one of a number of cynical and highly-effective examples of this exploitation. Pacos Story was thus published at a time when the images of Vietnam veterans circulating in mass culture had polarised into a stark binary opposition: the image of the psychotic veteran bringing the war home like some virulent tropical disease; and the heroic and victimised veteran sold out by his government and spat upon by anti-war protestors - the latter charge almost certainly a myth, as Jerry Lembcke argues in his book, The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam (1998). Pacos Story is an indictment of the ideological exploitation of the iconic figure of the Vietnam veteran in American culture, a practice that is referenced in the authors description of Pacos scars in terms of maps, mosaics and Braille: transforming him into a text to be read, or perhaps over-written. Pacos reception in small-town America in the late seventies is characterised by a fear and suspicion entirely consonant with the cultural constructions of the Vietnam veteran then in circulation. The townsfolk of Boone are powerfully curious about Paco, who becomes something of a public spectacle,8 though most are careful to keep their distance. Paco is marked by his all-too-visible association with the war; his cane, his limp, the lexicon of his scars, serve as stimuli in his reflexive rejection by most of those he encounters. Once these signifiers have been coupled to the signified of Americas tarnished war in Vietnam, and thence to the rampaging Vietnam veteran trope so prevalent in its aftermath, Pacos abjection is complete. Heinemann works hard to ensure that Paco occupies a similar status in the readers mind as he does in the collective anxieties of the townspeople: the more we learn of his violent past, and the more we sense his barely-contained frustrations at his treatment in Boone, the more we come to anticipate of him a brutal atavism. Just as the hostilities in Vietnam are rendered in microcosm in the novel in the encounter between Pacos company and a female enemy, those on the home front are distilled in the interactions between Paco and his landlords niece. Cathys exhibitionistic and voyeuristic games with Paco are a synecdochic rendering of his relations with the other townspeople since they are characterised by an oscillating fascination with and horror of Paco, and they consist in the operations of the gaze, in the realms of fantasy and projection, rather than in actual interaction. When, in the novels final chapter, Paco comes to suspect Cathy of trespassing in his room, he responds in kind. This invasion, like the rape of the sniper, constitutes a futile attempt to re-assert male dominance, to put Cathy in her place and again functions as a reconfiguration and dramatisation of First World, male Americas

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______________________________________________________________ invasion of and defeat by Third World, female Vietnam. The sequence is broken by an extended narrative flashback describing Pacos skill as a boobytrap specialist and his killing at close quarters of a Vietnamese man who disturbed him in the act of booby-trapping a trail. The intimate and sexuallycharged language in which the killing is related acts in combination with other reference points in the narrative, particularly the gang rape, to encourage the reader to anticipate a calamitous encounter between man and woman, the veterans re-enactment of foreign atrocity on home ground that countless films and television shows have conditioned the reader to expect. However, the narratives (anti-)climax ultimately refuses the anticipated violent reversion to type of the Vietnam vet. And just as the readers expectations now rebound, so Pacos own distorted image is flung back at him as he invades Cathys (unoccupied) room. Finding her diary, Paco reads an account of her fascination and then revulsion toward him; it is, we are told, as if hes met his wraith.9 Paco the booby-trap expert himself walks into a mechanical ambush.10 Reading Cathys monstrous imaging of him as indicative of the whole towns, he packs and leaves. Heinemanns guerrilla attack on the practice of projecting cultural fantasies and anxieties onto the figure of the Vietnam vet is finally accomplished by means of this narrative booby trap: the weight of the readers anticipation of violence triggers an encounter with the prejudice and stereotyping that underlie it. Even a brief over-view of the representation in Pacos Story of the Vietnamese enemy and the Vietnam veteran as a potential enemy within in post-Vietnam America reveals the central, if not defining, role played by gender. Looking briefly beyond Pacos Story, the central importance of gender and sexuality in Vietnam War narrative has been widely remarked by the academy. So dominant and pervasive is this role that Susan Jeffords has argued: [G]ender is not simply another of the many oppositions that mark Vietnam representation. It is the difference on which these narratives and images depend While friends may be uncertain, enemies unidentifiable, and goals unclear, the line between the masculine and the feminine is presented in Vietnam representation as firm and unwavering.11 For Jeffords, gender is what Vietnam narrative is about [it] is the matrix through which Vietnam is read, interpreted, and reframed in dominant American culture.12 While fundamentally agreeing that gender is a defining feature of Vietnam War narratives, I would argue that feminist and post-feminist readings have tended to side-step negative treatments of normative and martial masculinity in these texts, understandably focusing on depictions of

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______________________________________________________________ oppression and violence towards women or considering the ways in which male bonding validates and empowers men. The prevalence and intensity of a murderous misogyny in the Vietnam War narrative clearly demanded scholarly attention, but that attention has sometimes served to displace an engagement with the constricting and self-destructive aspects of the homosocial bond, hypermasculinity and homophobia; or the violence wrought on the male psyche in the combat zone or in basic training. In sharp contrast to Jeffords claim that the line between the masculine and the feminine is presented in Vietnam representation as firm and unwavering, I contend that the masculine in Pacos Story (and, indeed, in certain other texts including Gustav Hasfords The Short-Timers) is not merely under threat from the feminine, but has been hopelessly invaded and eroded by it. The massive explosive force that wipes out Pacos unit at Harriette and leaves him critically injured also effects a less immediately apparent disintegration and reconfiguration in the narrative: from active alpha male in Vietnam, Paco is reduced to crippled outsider in America. Having killed and raped in Vietnam with apparent impunity, Paco the veteran must live either with constant pain or drug-induced stupor. Largely passive, silent and forced to undertake low-paid menial work, Paco feels like a piece of meat on the slab13: marked out by his physical difference and exploited and patronised because this appearance is read, among other things, as an index of physical inferiority. Clearly, Paco is thus feminised, linked to gendered codes of behaviour and experience and to forms of prejudice and abuse commonly associated with women, especially working class women - an idea underscored by the fact that Pacos job sees him almost literally chained to the kitchen sink in Boones diner, where he works with his belt buckle hooked over the lip of the tub.14 Furthermore, Pacos remark concerning meat on the slab is prefigured by a strikingly similar entry in Cathys diary eight pages earlier: All those guys staring at me . Makes me feel like a piece of meat. When I walk across the campus what is it they imagine under the ski jacket and sweater ?15 At the same instant that the shrapnel and debris entered Pacos body at Harriette, a less apparent penetration was also effected, the previously alien realm of the feminine has breached the citadel of the narcissistic masculine ego. Paco the soldier - rapist and man-hunter - shows no inclination to show clemency and exhibits no flicker of empathy or remorse, no slightest sign of the hated feminine within. This Paco inhabits a world in which women are enemies, commodities, receptacles for male lust and aggression. At Harriette, however, Paco is so immersed in pain and loss that this remote and unfeeling self becomes unsustainable. Paco the injured veteran, helpless in a hospital bed or struggling to subsist in Americas backwaters, is also often at the mercy of others. The soldier without empathy or the capacity for mercy ironically finds himself pursued westwards across America from one

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______________________________________________________________ settlement to the next, by these same negativities, repeatedly stymied by imaginative and communicative failures. Near the end of the novel, Paco seems momentarily to see through Cathys eyes, looking back from the vantage point where Cathy usually stands in the doorway, staring at him when he comes into the hotel from work.16 The account of the gang rape also includes a sudden and violent perspectival shift in which the reader is compelled to witness the attack from the victims point of view. Crucially, however, in each case the shift is only momentary, it lacks the sustained intellectual and emotional engagement that would be necessary to develop it into something more than a phenomenon in the minds eye. Neither Paco nor the ghost narrator can see enough of the world through enemy eyes to redeem their own fractured humanity. In conclusion, if enmity and conflict proliferate in Pacos Story then we should not forget that their exploration in the narrative serves ultimately as a call to empathy. Heinemann invites us to make the perspectival shifts that none of his characters are ultimately capable of, to attempt the impossible, to breach what another Vietnam veteran writer, Tim OBrien, has called the implacable otherness of others,17 and seek imaginatively to span the unbridgeable voids - biological, cultural or experiential - that separate us not only from our enemies but from those closest to us. In an interview with Barry Silesky in 1993, Larry Heinemann remarked: The men of our generation have a lot to talk about. That isnt to say the women dont - but this is really a man thing.18 This suggests that we should read Pacos Story above all as an open letter to the men of America and his narrators habit of fraternally addressing the reader as James assumes a new significance in this light.19 Heinemann has seen the awful destructiveness inherent in and dependent upon mens inscription of a warlike and woman-hating masculinity on the male self, a masculinity commonly characterised by aggression rather than interaction, by enmity rather than empathy. Like Gallaghers tattoo of a vast, phallic, snarling dragon, it is the inscription of a destructive and, in some measure, a self-inflicted fiction. The writing of this violent text facilitates a second and more explicitly violent inscription like that impressed upon Pacos body or that of the girl-sniper ground into the rubble20 by Paco and his comrades.

Notes
1 2

L. Heinemann, Pacos Story, Faber and Faber, London, 1989, p. 174. ibid., p. 5. 3 ibid., p. 174. 4 ibid., p. 136 and p. 199.

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______________________________________________________________
5 6

ibid., p. 101. ibid., p. 181. 7 ibid., p. 179. 8 ibid., p. 151. 9 ibid., p. 209. 10 ibid., p. 192. 11 S. Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989, p. 53. 12 ibid., p. 53 13 Heinemann, op. cit., p. 209. 14 ibid., p. 131. 15 ibid., p. 201. 16 ibid., 189. 17 T. OBrien, In the Lake of the Woods, Flamingo, London, 1995, p. 103n. 18 B. Silesky, Larry Heinemann: A Conversation. Another Chicago Magazine, vol. 25, 1993, pp. 186-187. 19 Similarly, Louis K. Greiff speculates: [p]erhaps by telling Pacos story to James, both narrator and author, like Paco himself, are reaching out to a brother or to a collective brotherhood of male American readers in pursuit of closure and cure to heal the divisions between the American men who fought the war and those who opposed it. L. K. Greiff, In the Name of the Brother: Larry Heinemanns Pacos Story and Male America. Critique, vol. 41, no. 4, 2000, p. 387. 20 Heinemann, op. cit., p. 180.

Bibliography
Franklin, H. B., M.I.A., or Mythmaking in America. Lawrence Hill, New York, 1992. Greiff, L. K., In the Name of the Brother: Larry Heinemanns Pacos Story and Male America. Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, vol. 41, no. 4, 2000, pp. 381-388. Heinemann, L., Pacos Story. 1986. Faber and Faber, London, 1989. Jeffords, S., The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989. Lembcke, J., The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam. New York University Press, New York, 1998. OBrien, T. In the Lake of the Woods. 1994. Flamingo, London, 1995. Silesky, B., Larry Heinemann: A Conversation. Another Chicago Magazine, vol. 25, 1993, pp. 179-196.

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______________________________________________________________ David Boulting is a part-time lecturer in American Studies at the University of Salford (UK). He is currently completing a doctoral thesis titled Garden of Evil: Images of the Enemy in American War Literature 1962-1990.

The Unlisted Character: Representing War on Stage Julia Boll


Abstract This essay discusses the theatrical representation of both the individual and war in a time of disintegrating national states and the dramatisation of destruction versus survival as the driving forces on stage. Springing from the discussion about new wars in the age of globalisation, it is demonstrated here how these new wars also bring forth new plays about war, illustrated by Caryl Churchills Far Away (2000) and Zinnie Harriss Midwinter (2004). Both works incorporate the experience of a continuous state of war and terror into the dramatic text. Their characters struggle for survival in the midst of nameless wars controlling their lives, confronted with random enmities and absurd frontlines. The surreal and apocalyptic visions presented in both works mirror the experiences of those who have lived through war: it seems to happen far from reality, far away. The essay examines the possible connections between the results of political and sociological research and the artistic representation of war and warlike conflicts on stage. Leading away from the more common theatrical antagonisms between the dramatic characters, the new war plays show their protagonists in confrontation with an unlisted character: the war machine. Key Words war play, contemporary drama, representation of war, Far Away, Midwinter, Caryl Churchill, Zinnie Harris, new wars *****

War, it seems, is no longer the exceptional state, but the primary organising principle of society, thus apparently returning to Heraclitus observation that war is the father of all things.1 In a study on empire and global war it has been suggested that instead of progressing into a peaceful future, we have slipped back in time into the nightmare of a perpetual and indeterminate state of war.2 It is thus of particular interest to examine how the performing arts, which have always been sensitive and receptive to societys currents and fears, react to the present circumstances. This essay examines how the observations and in the field of political science at times quite disputed new theories of contemporary war-scholars are mirrored by the representation of war and conflict on the contemporary British stage.

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______________________________________________________________ The two plays to be compared show people who threaten to lose their integrity in the traumatising situation of civil war. They imply that war, especially civil war, does not always happen far away, but could very well break out in the midst of our homelands. The focal point is not heroes, but survivors, whatever survival might mean for the individual. In the past decade, a number of scholars in international political relations have discussed the possibility of a new form of war, the so-called new wars, a term prominently used in this context by Mary Kaldor. She makes out disintegration of states as the context of these wars, which are fought by networks of state and non-state actors, where battles are rare and where most violence is directed against civilians as a consequence of counter-insurgency tactics or ethnic cleansing, characterised by the breakdown of distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, legitimate violence and criminality.3 It is the aim of this essay to demonstrate how these new wars also produce new plays about war. Tragedy, argues the German playwright Rolf Hochhuth, was not born out of the spirit of music,4 but originates from politics and war. The first drama known, but not handed down to us, had been provoked by war, by a political catastrophe: Phrynichus The Capture of Miletus (ca. 492 BC), which re-enacted for the state of Athens the fall of a flourishing Ionian metropolis, the murder of the men, and the barbarian evacuation of the women and children.5 The first written record of Western theatre tradition can be found in Aeschylus The Persians (ca. 472 BC) which treats the Persians defeat in the Battle of Salamis.6 The status of war as a subject for drama, however, has changed. While William Shakespeares Henry V (1599)7 has long been regarded as the benchmark war play in British theatre, Shakespeare, did not write a single play on contemporary conflict. The wars depicted in his work either concern foreign nations, or they lie in the past often both. Succeeding playwrights have largely followed his example.8 Throughout the centuries, many plays have used war as a backdrop, but it rarely constitutes subject matter. But there are exceptions. In 2000, Caryl Churchills play Far Away confronts the British audiences with the possibility of war in their home country, followed by Zinnie Harris, who in Midwinter (2004) explores the fragile peace after civil war Total War: Caryl Churchill, Far Away (2000) Caryl Churchills allegorically encoded Far Away had its world premiere at the Royal Court Theatre Upstairs in London on November 24, 2000. In shortly under one hour, one of the most significant British political playwrights conjured a grotesque dystopia on an Orwellian scale. The drama is divided into three acts. In the first, young Joan accidentally witnesses violent assaults outside of her aunt Harpers 1.

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______________________________________________________________ farmhouse: people are loaded into a truck, there is blood on the floor, and someone is being hit. Harper convinces her niece that in fact something revolutionary and good is happening on the farm. In the second act, the now older Joan works in a hat factory. She and her colleague Todd design elaborate hats, whose purpose is revealed in the middle of the act: prisoners exhibit the hats during a bizarre death march on the way to their execution. The third act is again set in Harpers house. As Joan is sleeping, Harper and Todd, who is now married to Joan, talk about the global war, in which not only all peoples but also the animals and even the elements are involved. Joan wakes up and reports of her dangerous journey to Harpers house in the middle of a war that has long lost all dimensions. Far Away returns to the widening gap between peoples daily lives and the political sphere that Churchill had dramatised in her 1997 play This Is a Chair.9 While the latter showed a society eerily disconnected from political realities and blatantly self-indulgent, Far Away documents the slow escalation of underground guerrilla action via official state barbarism to a world at war, tying in the acceptance of violence in a closed society. The exact social and political circumstances, however, are only hinted at and never fully explained. For the members of the audience, it is therefore as impossible to position themselves within this intricate framework of alliances and antagonisms as it is for the characters, who are caught helplessly within a despotic system, the ideology, power centre, and international relations of which remain ambiguous and unstructured: Harper: The cats have come in on the side of the French. [] Todd: But were not exactly on the other side from the French. Its not as if theyre the Moroccans and the ants. Harper: Its not as if theyre the Canadians, the Venezuelans and the mosquitoes. Todd: Its not as if theyre the engineers, the chefs, the children under five, the musicians.10 In the characters imagination, new groups are constantly formed and dissolved again, but their interconnectedness remains indistinct and opaque, consequently leading to paranoia and isolation.11 The randomness of enmities and absurdity of frontlines demonstrates what contemporary paranoia is made of: a statement of particular importance in a world which one year after the dramas premire, in September 2001, became engaged in a global war on terror and thus in the original sense on fright.12 The dialogue between Todd and Harper encapsulates the rhetorical process that enables the cultural construction of the fear of everything strange; the manner in which a demonised, dehumanised, or otherwise threatening ethnically defined other

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______________________________________________________________ is forged through narratives, myths and the deliberate planting of rumours. Once such ethnically focussed fear is in place, state the sociologists Brubaker and Laitin in their discussion of ethnic and nationalist violence, ethnic violence no longer seems random or meaningless but all too horrifyingly meaningful.13 The characters lose control of their lives in these chaotic circumstances, having long lost track of what the conflict is about and where they themselves stand: Joan: [] everyones moving and no one knows why [] But I didnt know whose side the river was on, it might help me swim or it might drown me.14 Far Away does not show any explicit violence on stage; it is only implicit diffuse even. What exactly Joan has seen in her aunt Harpers house never becomes clear;15 what kinds of repression the state exercises against its citizen is only hinted at;16 even Todds descriptions of his deeds in the war are brief and in any case remain so surreal that a haunting, violent atmosphere is transmitted, but the shock is a second-hand experience for the spectator.17 The only scene depicting an unfiltered occurrence, without transformation by a characters narrative, is Act 2, Scene 3, the prisoners death march: Next day. A procession of ragged, beaten, chained prisoners, each wearing a hat, on their way to execution. The finished hats are even more enormous and preposterous than in the previous scene.18 Churchill herself stresses the importance of this scene by placing the following request into the list of characters: The Parade (Scene 2.5): five is too few and twenty better than ten. A hundred?19 This scene, standing in for all death marches and other processions of victims, conjures associations of prisoners being transported to the concentration and extermination camps in Hitlers Third Reich, the expelled Armenians march in the Middle East, streams of refugees fleeing the war-torn former Yugoslavia, the train of prisoners on their way to Pol Pots Killing Fields, the Rwandan exodus.20 Refugees, prisoners, asylum-seekers, slaves or forced labourers are all possible interpretations; and due to the restrained wording of the stage direction, a production may also choose to reference a more contemporary event. The prisoners in the Dublin production in 2004, for example, wore the orange-coloured overalls of American detainees, mostly known to the international public from footage from the American detention camp in Guantnamo Bay on Cuba.21 The monstrous and frightening images, with the prisoners wearing elaborately designed hats that, in a grotesque way, are

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______________________________________________________________ reminiscent of fashion shows or the crowd at horse races, counteract the friendly chatter between Todd and Joan during the second act. Neither watches the parade, but it is obvious from Joans casual remark, It seems so sad to burn them with the bodies,22 that both know of their hats significance. However, they both react indifferently to these horrible circumstances. They are proud of their work, but do not comprehend that they personally contribute to the regimes atrocities.23 Refusing to allow a clear-cut interpretation or any specificity of location within the recipients reality, the drama may be read as an allegory. It uncovers social structures that benefit the development of violence and war. Harpers willingness and ability to deceive herself and her niece and to convince both of them that the manhandling of others will ultimately lead to good is mirrored in Joans readiness to stoically accept and ignore the drawbacks in the hat factory and the bigger grievances within her country. Her silence is also an image of the average citizens confusion, who bemusedly turn away from international happenings just as Joan does not watch the parades and the executions, allowing herself to ignore their existence.24 The play comes full circle in the last scene, as the action returns to Harpers house and the bellicose results of the events described in the beginning are shown. Joans life as a fellow traveller and her silence are broken only with her decision to tear free from societys constraints and to dare the step towards freedom, when she recognises that it is impossible to maintain a simple alliance, or even to separate the dangerous from the absurd. Peacekeeping: Zinnie Harris, Midwinter (2004) As if it was a continuation of Churchills play, Zinnie Harris Midwinter (2004) is set during the fragile peace between one outbreak of fighting and the next in an endless war. It was first performed by the Royal Shakespeare Company in Stratford-upon-Avon, on October 5, 2004. Deliberately avoiding any specification of time or place, the play opens with middle-aged Maud feeding on a dead horse. She is approached by Leonard and his grandson Sirin, who have been lured to her by the smell of the meat. Maud strikes a deal with Leonard: she will keep Sirin alive with the meat, but in return, Leonard will give him to Maud as a replacement for her dead son. That same night, the soldier Grenville returns from the war. Maud presents Sirin to him as their child and learns that all soldiers have returned carrying a mysterious parasite that will ultimately result in blindness. Leonard comes to visit Sirin and reveals that he knows Maud: she has taken on the identity of her twin sister Magda who has drowned years ago. Grenville, realising that he is with the wrong twin and Sirin is not actually his son, assaults the boy. As Grenville goes completely blind, Maud kills him with the ointment for his eyes. In the last scene, Sirin and Maud are playing 2.

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______________________________________________________________ outside the house when Leonard arrives with the news that the war has started again even without the soldiers that have become blind. Refusing to acknowledge this, Maud decides that her house is a peaceful zone where war does not exist. In the thirteen scenes, sides and causes for the war are not even mentioned; a nameless major conflict controls the characters lives, who we first see starved and craving for food as they meet over the carcass of the dead horse one has found and defends fervently against the others. Hunger and sickness are constant themes in Harris play, depicting the exhausted and starved regions predicted in analyses of the specific economy of the new wars and their long-term impact on the exhausted and devastated regions they affect:25 Leonard: We smelled the meat. Maud: Dont move. Leonard takes a step forward. Leonard: Couldnt smell anything else for miles. Half the city will be following us. [] A noise in the bushes makes them both start. Maud holds up the stone again. Maud: Who is there? Leonard: Itll be half the town. Theyll have smelled it, I told you. [] Maud (to the bushes) Dont move. Im armed. Leonard: It wont make a difference. They are starving. Theyll storm you.26 Throughout the first few scenes, the audience witnesses the creeping dehumanisation of people who have lived through deprivation. Yet, as in Churchills play, there are only a few actual signs of war: Grenville brings back his war medals for his son to play with,27 and at night, Maud finds a soldiers hat with a distinctive bullet hole in the river.28 Each characters focus is on regaining normality, on forgetting the horrors of war that seem to dance behind Grenvilles eyes whenever they are closed, memories he tries to ignore and that yet follow him into his post-war life.29 When fishing with Sirin, he makes careful attempts at being normal again; only just holding back when he catches himself recounting what the river was to him during the war: possibly a mass grave, echoing the countless occasions during civil wars when bodies drifted down local waterways.30

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______________________________________________________________ Grenville: The point isnt to catch fish anyway. That isnt why people come fishing. Youll understand that in time. They go fishing because it is what they do. Because it is a normal father-and-son-thing to do, because they are seen to be normal if they do it. Because everyone thinks, ah yes, fathers and sons, that is what they do. [] Ive never seen a fish here, certainly not in winter, and I have practically lived in it for ten years. Ive seen just about everything else. Things I wouldnt want you to see. Things I wouldnt ever want you to see. Its funny, isnt it? Within days it just looks like a river again. But further upstream, where we were, you couldnt see the water for31 Harris explains she wanted to demonstrate how people have to reforge their identity after a war in order to leave it behind. The deep hatred and the prejudices often found in people with a background of war are very difficult to shift.32 Maud, who is trying to create a domestic set-up, has to sacrifice a lot to maintain it. By assuming her sisters identity and taking her childhood friends son as her own, she has formed a new identity and found a way to allow peace to happen. Grenville, on the other hand, ultimately fails at reclaiming his civilian life, because he has turned back into a soldier, as Maud observes with alarm.33 In the character of a soldier unable to leave the war behind, bringing it with him in the form of a parasite that is literally eating him from the inside and rendering him blind towards a new perspective, veterans are here depicted as carrying the seed of war inside themselves, not only in the form of shell-shock, but also as a possible male urge to (self-)destruction. Midwinter ends with a new war fought without soldiers, hinting at the findings of some new-war theorists: that war is fought for wars sake: Megalothymia is such a powerful part of the soul that even if a just cause is won, men may begin to struggle against it simply for the sake of struggle.34 It can thus be said that war genuinely becomes a character, as it fights for and by itself, resuming Hobbes thesis that war will ultimately always turn against the state, as the state is against war, and thus aims at rendering the war machine obsolete.35 In the last scene, the main character of Midwinter simply refuses to acknowledge the re-entry into the cycle of violence by eliminating the elements of war from her life:

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______________________________________________________________ Maud: In this house, whatever happens out there, in this house [] Peacetime. Thats all I know. Pause. Its peacetime here, you understand. There is no more of this, not here. Not just as Sirin is learning to talk. No, not now. We are in a different land to out there. Theyre in one season, but we are in another. You understand? In the four walls of the garden Leonard: I dont even understand it. Maud: So dont mention it. Its gone. [] That is it. Its over, do you understand me? There is no war. Leonard: Even as? Maud: Peacetime.36 War truly has transformed the identities of the characters. Once they have internalised the state of constant conflict, there is no critical vantage point from which to judge the politics and circumstances of the conflict; the plays social reality is not mediated for the audience because it is too real for the characters, who do not experience warfare as something extraordinary. This may be one of the main differences between contemporary plays and earlier plays that depicted war: there is no recognisable conflict. Any war is also the defining force for the shaping of the characters, to which an external description of their surrounding horror does not matter when they are struggling to survive. They only react to the act of war and thus may have also internalised the mechanics of the new wars they are confronted with, the fragmentation, the changing loyalties and the decentralisation. The characters are probably less shocked by the signs of the raging conflict that surrounds them than the audience is, as the characters can only react to the new events in their lives. The surreal and apocalyptic visions of these plays combine the experiences of those who have lived through war it seems to happen far from reality, far away. Churchills main character Joan has adapted herself to the ways of propaganda as an adult, even though she was still questioning them as a young girl, while Midwinters Sirin, as a child, has become so accustomed to the constant drifting, the search for food and other means of survival that he behaves like an animal when presented with food and water: he will not stop feeding as long as there is nourishment. Grenvilles war trauma has manifested itself in the form of his parasite fighting him from the inside. But of all the characters in the two plays discussed here, Maud most literally internalises the war in Midwinter. Unable to overcome the loss and deprivation, she ravenously consumes a dead horse, reminiscent of the four horsemen of the apocalypse:

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______________________________________________________________ pestilence, war, famine and death,37 thus making war a part of herself, and alluding to the generation of a trauma in the Freudian sense. The plays show how the disturbing experience of war may be represented on stage and mediated to an audience that, for the most part, does not have its own war experience. By locating the civil war in an undefined reality that we perceive nevertheless as uncannily familiar, these plays force a western audience to confront the possibility of war in their midst, and to question the idea of it only happening in uncivilised third-world countries. The roots of violence and conflict are always to be found in peacetime society even in Western Europe, as these examples demonstrate. Due to its immediacy, theatre might be the appropriate form to communicate the state of war. It is particularly able to react to current events and may use the theatrical space for a public act of mourning for war. At the same time, these new plays about war depict destruction versus survival as the driving forces on stage, between which the protagonists are involuntarily and almost helplessly caught. The most influential and unpredictable character is missing from the list preceding the play text. It is the actual antagonist confronting the characters: the war machine.

Notes
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Multitude, Hamish Hamilton, London, 2005, p. 7. Heraclitus fragment no. 53: War is both father and king of all, some he has shown forth as gods and others as men, some he has made slaves and others free. (From: W. Harris, Heraclitus. The Complete Fragments. Translation and Commentary and The Greek Text, accessed 23.03.2007, http://community.middlebury.edu/~harris/Philosophy/heraclitus.pdf 2 Hardt & Negri 2005, p. 7. 3 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 3. The term new wars was coined by Kaldor in the same study (p. 6). Earlier studies had already done research into similar areas, such as M. v. Creveld, The Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York, 1991, R. D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy. Atlantic Monthly: A Magazine of Literature, Art and Politics, 273 (2), 1994, pp. 44-76, K. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). The interest in establishing a new category with its own typology and the ensuing publication grew rapidly, so that Henderson and Singer in their critique of various of these approaches speak of new war theorists (E. A. Henderson, & D. J. Singer, New Wars and Rumours of New Wars. International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations. 28 (2), 2002, pp. 165-190, p. 165).
1

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______________________________________________________________ See F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragdie aus dem Geiste der Musik, E.W. Fritzsch, Leipzig, 1872. Nietzsche argues drama and thus tragedy had come from Dionysian musical festivities. While I do not intend to argue against the Dionysian roots of the genre and form of drama, one cannot dispute a possible thematic origin from the experience of war. 5 R. Hochhuth., Die Geburt der Tragdie aus dem Krieg. Frankfurter PoetikVorlesungen. Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 2001, p. 12-14. 6 J. Law, D. Pickering & R. Helfer (eds), The Penguin Dictionary of Theatre. London et al, Penguin Books, 2001, p. 462. 7 Date of first performance. First quarto: 1600, first folio 1623. 8 Schnierer observes the main portion of English literary approach to war consisted of war poetry, not plays. (P. P. Schnierer, The Theatre of War: English Drama and the Bosnian Conflict in Drama and Reality. Papers given on the occasion of the third annual conference of the German Society of Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English, B. Reitz (ed), Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 1995, pp. 101-110, p. 102) 9 E. Aston, Caryl Churchill, Northcote House Publishers Ltd, Horndon House, Horndon, Tavistock, Devon, 2001 [1997], p. 116. 10 C. Churchill, Far Away, Theatre Communication Group, New York, 2000, pp. 35-36 11 For a list of frontlines in Far Away see the whole third act, Churchill 2001, pp. 34-44. 12 C. Quint, Terror of the Contemporary Sublime: Regional Responses to the Challenges of Internationalism and Globalization in the Drama of Caryl Churchill and David Edgar. in Global Challenges and Regional Responses in Contemporary Drama in English. Papers given on the occasion of the eleventh annual conference of the German Society for Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English, J. Achilles, I. Bergmann & B. Dwes (eds), Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2003, p.178-179; also Prado Prez 2002, p. 103. 13 R. Brubaker & D. D. Laitin, Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, pp. 423-452, p. 376-378. 14 Churchill 2001, pp. 43-44. 15 Churchill 2001, pp. 12-21. 16 Churchill 2001, p. 23, p. 37. 17 Churchill 2001, pp. 40-41. 18 Churchill 2001, pp. 30. Italics as in the original to denote a stage direction. 19 Churchill 2001, pp. 8. 20 J. R. Prado Prez, Issues of Representation and Political Discourse in Caryl Churchills Latest Work. in (Dis)Continuities. Trends and Traditions in Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English. Papers given on the
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______________________________________________________________ occasion of the tenth annual conference of the German Society for Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English, M. Rubik & E. MettingerSchartmann, (eds), Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2002, p. 98, p. 101. 21 H. Meany, Far Away. The Guardian, 06.07.2004, accessed 21.06.2005, www.guardian.co.uk/arts/reviews/story/0,,1254681,00.html. Detainees in American prisons wear the orange overalls when being transferred etc. The June 2001 production of Far Away in Berlin showed 60 handcuffed prisoners whose eyes were sealed shut with black duct tape (see U. Kahles review in Theater Heute 06, 2001, p. 15). In hindsight, this seems eerily anticipatory: similar pictures were transmitted only one year later from Afghanistan, showing the seizing of alleged Taliban fighters by US-American troops. 22 Churchill 2001, p. 31. 23 Quint 2003, p. 180. 24 Prado Prez 2002, p. 99. 25 H. Mnkler, The New Wars, Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, 2005, p. 74-98 and S. M. Murshed, Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction. Journal of Peace Research 39 (4), special issue on Civil War in Developing Countries. (July) 2002, pp. 387-393. Kaplan predicts that [f]uture wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity. These wars will be subnational, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens physically. This is how many states will ultimately die. As state power fades and with it the states ability to help weaker groups within society, not to mention other states peoples and cultures around the world will be thrown back upon their own strengths and weaknesses, with fewer equalizing mechanisms to protect them. (Kaplan 1994, p. 62). 26 Z. Harris, Midwinter, Faber and Faber, London, 2004, pp. 3-10. 27 Harris 2004, p. 49. 28 Harris 2004, p. 54-55. 29 Harris 2004, p. 42. 30 See for example Pruniers study of the Rwandan genocide 1994: Some rivers, such as the Kagera, were filled with bodies and this in the end seriously polluted Lake Victoria where 40,000 bodies were eventually picked up and buried on the Ugandan shore. (G. Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis 19591994. History of a Genocide, Hurst & Company, London, 1995, p. 255). 31 Harris 2004, pp. 34. 32 Harris in Burnett 2004 (A. Burnett, War baby. For Zinnie Harris, having a baby brought home the reality. The Sunday Herald, Oct. 3, 2004, accessed on 17.03.2007, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20041003/ai_n1259173 9).

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______________________________________________________________
33 34

Harris 2004, p. 64. Curtis 2006, p. 63. 35 As taken up and widely discussed by G. Deleuze, & F. Guattari, Nomadology. The War Machine, Semiotext(e), New York, 1986, p. 11. 36 Harris 2004, pp. 76-77. 37 See New Testament, Revelation of St. John, chapter VI, 1-8.

Bibliography
Plays: Churchill, C., Far Away, Theatre Communication Group, New York, 2000. Harris, Z., Midwinter, Faber and Faber, London, 2004. Secondary Sources: Aston, E., Caryl Churchill, Northcote House Publishers Ltd, Horndon House, Horndon, Tavistock, Devon, 2001 [1997]. Billington, M., Surreal Shocks from Caryl Churchill. The Guardian, 02.12.2000. accessed 21.06.2005, www.guardian.co.uk/reviews/story/0,,405829,00.html Brubaker, R. & Laitin, D. D. Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, pp. 423-452. Burnett, A., War baby. For Zinnie Harris, having a baby brought home the reality. The Sunday Herald, Oct. 3, 2004, accessed on 17.03.2007, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20041003/ai_n1259173 9 Creveld, M. v., The Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York, 1991. Curtis, N., War and Social Theory. World, Value and Identity, PalgraveMacmillan, Houndmills, 2006. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., Nomadology. The War Machine, Semiotext(e), New York, 1986. Hardt, M. & Negri, A., Multitude, Hamish Hamilton, London, 2005. Harris, W., Heraclitus. The Complete Fragments. Translation and Commentary and The Greek Text. http://community.middlebury.edu/~harris/Philosophy/heraclitus.pdf accessed 23.03.2007) Henderson, E. A. & Singer, D. J., New Wars and Rumours of New Wars. International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations. 28 (2), 2002: 165-190. Hochhuth, R., Die Geburt der Tragdie aus dem Krieg. Frankfurter PoetikVorlesungen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 2001.

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______________________________________________________________ Holsti, K., The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. Kaldor, M., New and Old Wars, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999. Kaldor, M., Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror. Lecture given to the Cold War Studies Centre, London School of Economics, Feb. 2nd, 2005, accessed 22.03.2007, http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/PublicLectures/PL_Old%20 Wars%20Cold%20War%20New%20Wars%20and%20War%20on%20Te rror1.pdf Kaplan, R. D., The Coming Anarchy. Atlantic Monthly: A Magazine of Literature, Art and Politics, 273 (2), 1994, pp. 44-76. Law, J., Pickering, D. & Helfer, R. (eds), The Penguin Dictionary of Theatre, London et al, Penguin Books, 2001. Meany, H., Far Away. The Guardian, 06.07.2004, accessed 21.06.2005, www.guardian.co.uk/arts/reviews/story/0,,1254681,00.html Mnkler, H., The New Wars, Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, 2005. Murshed, S. M., Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction. Journal of Peace Research 39 (4), special issue on Civil War in Developing Countries. (July) 2002, pp. 387-393. Nietzsche, F., Die Geburt der Tragdie aus dem Geiste der Musik, E.W. Fritzsch, Leipzig, 1872. Prado Prez, J. R., Issues of Representation and Political Discourse in Caryl Churchills Latest Work. in (Dis)Continuities. Trends and Traditions in Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English. Papers given on the occasion of the tenth annual conference of the German Society for Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English, M. Rubik & E. MettingerSchartmann, (eds), Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2002. Prunier, G., The Rwandan Crisis 1959-1994. History of a Genocide, Hurst & Company, London, 1995. Quint, C., Terror of the Contemporary Sublime: Regional Responses to the Challenges of Internationalism and Globalization in the Drama of Caryl Churchill and David Edgar. in Global Challenges and Regional Responses in Contemporary Drama in English. Papers given on the occasion of the eleventh annual conference of the German Society for Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English, J. Achilles, I. Bergmann & B. Dwes (eds), Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2003. Schnierer, P. P., The Theatre of War: English Drama and the Bosnian Conflict in Drama and Reality. Papers given on the occasion of the third annual conference of the German Society of Contemporary Theatre and Drama in English, B. Reitz (ed), Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 1995, pp. 101-110.

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______________________________________________________________ Julia Boll holds a Magister Artium from the University of Bremen, Germany. She is a PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, where she writes her thesis on contemporary drama.

Part IV Protection: Transitory, Illusory or Reality?

Is the War on Terror Real? Should it be? Avery Plaw


Abstract Should the war on terror be conducted as a vast law-enforcement operation, or as a conventional international war subject to existing humanitarian law, or as a new kind of war to be prosecuted according to a new and evolving set of rules? On legal, political and moral grounds this essay argues for the middle course: the war on terror should be recognized and conducted as a real war fully subject to existing international conventions and customs of armed conflict. Key Words war on terror, counterterrorism, humanitarian law, armed conflict, law enforcement. *****

Is the War on Terror currently being waged by the United States and other states, including Israel, a war in the sense of triggering the laws of armed conflict (i.e., humanitarian law)? Or is the expression War on Terror better understood, as Human Rights Watch Director Kenneth Roth and others have suggested, as intended metaphorically, as a mere hortatory device, a metaphor similar to the war on drugs or Lyndon Johnsons war on poverty.1 Or is it, as Condoleeza Rice put in commenting on an American targeted killing in Yemen, a new kind of war [to] be fought on different battlefields, and according to new rules?2 The question of the legal status of the War on Terror is not mere hairsplitting. It has very serious implications for the way that the campaign against terrorism is being conducted. As Roth notes, for example, the rules that bind governments are much looser during wartime than in times of peace.3 For one thing, in a legal condition of war humanitarian law accepts that one of the legitimate objects of warfare is to disable enemy combatants (and in many cases this necessarily involves killing), as Christopher Greenwood aptly puts it in the Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts.4 On the other hand, if the war on terrorism is only a rhetorical war, as Roth suggests, then deliberate killing of terrorists (as in, for example, American and Israeli targeted killings) would be

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_________________________________________________________________ a violation of the human right to life guaranteed under article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) as well as in many domestic legal codes; in short, it would be murder. There are at least three basic positions on the legal status of the current War on Terror that have been widely articulated and defended. In the first place, the traditional response to terrorism has been that it is a crime subject to normal law enforcement. Some commentators, like Mr. Roth, argue that no fundamental legal change has occurred, and assert that talk of war really signals a commitment to be rigorous about law enforcement in the same way that the war on poverty expressed an intent to rigorously confront the social problems connected with economic deprivation. A second widely articulated view (and the one that will be defended in this paper) holds that the War on Terror is a real war that invokes the laws of armed conflict in their conventional form. A third position is that the War on Terror is a real war in the legal sense, but also a new kind of war that needs to be fought under new rules that will be developed as it unfolds.5 American and Israeli policy makers have tended to vacillate between positions two and three, sometimes framing the War on Terror in the traditional language of war, and sometimes arguing that a War on Terror is different from other wars and permits them to employ policies that would not apply to other conflicts Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, has defended the United States interrogation and rendition of prisoners in the War on Terror by arguing that it is vital for us to use any means at our disposal to, basically, achieve our objective, regardless of Geneva Convention protections for POWs.6 The then White House Counsel (now Attorney General) Alberto Gonzalez confirmed that the Bush Administrations position in relation to the War on Terror is that the Geneva and other international conventions do not apply to American interrogations of prisoners overseas. This paper argues that there is a convincing legal and normative case for rejecting the first, traditional, position in favour of the second, conventional war, perspective. However, the same arguments that make the move to the second position compelling undermine the case for the third position. In essence, then, this paper argues on legal, moral and political grounds that the War on Terror should be viewed as a war in the traditional sense and should be conducted according to the existing law of war (allowing for gradual conventional and customary adjustment to the new condition of asymmetrical armed conflict). It begins with an examination of the legal case for applying humanitarian law to the war on terror, and then turns (briefly) to questions of politics and morality.

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_________________________________________________________________ I. The American and Israeli positions that they are literally at war with terrorist groups is not without some initial plausibility. On the American side, for example, both al-Qaeda and the United States government appear to regard themselves at war with one another. Bin Laden has, in his own words, has declared jihad against the US government continuously since 1996.7 On the other hand, on the morning of September 12, 2001, a little before noon, President Bush responded with a declaration of his own: the deliberate and deadly attacks that were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war.8 With this statement President Bush launched what he has termed a global war on terrorism.9 In the Presidents description on September 29th, 2001, Our war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. The war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.10 Similarly, Israel and the armed Palestinian resistance organizations which it (and many other states) designate as terrorist groups consider themselves at war with one another or, as it has more typically been put in recent years, in a state of armed conflict. The Palestinian organizations, such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Hamas, consider themselves engaged in legitimate armed struggle (or a jihad) against an illegal foreign (Israeli) occupation. (e.g., Article 7, Hamas Convenant (1988)). Moreover, they characteristically explain their use of atypical military tactics such as suicide bombing by reference to what Fathi Shaqaqi called the unequal balance of power. In Hamas leader Sayeed Siyams words, since we do not own Apache helicopters ourselves, so we use our own methods.11 On the other side of the conflict, Israel has recognized a state of armed conflict with the Palestinian resistance organizations since early in the second intifada. In the words of Colonel Daniel Reisner, the Head of the International Law Branch of the IDF Legal Division, in a press conference on the 15th of November, 2000, The current situation, the fact that now a large percentage of the attacks involve live weapons, that we are facing a Palestinian authority, that we are facing a Palestinian Security Service which in part is taking participation in hostilities, has brought us to the conclusion that we are no longer in the realm of peace. We are definitely in the realm of armed conflict.12

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_________________________________________________________________ Moreover, the Israeli governments reassessment of the legal situation in the territories has been consistently reflected in public defence of its policies. For example, as Michael Gross observes, where before 2000 Israel defended its policy of targeted killing as a justified form of law enforcement, the subsequent intensification of the conflict led Israeli officials to relinquish the claim to law enforcement and [to] argue instead that assassinations are an acceptable means of armed conflict.13 So again, both sides see themselves as engaged in armed conflict. However, the validity of the claims raised at least by the American and Israeli governments do not turn on politics or perceptions. They are rather legal claims. The Americans and Israelis claim to be in a legal situation of armed conflict, and therefore that the body of law which has primary application is international humanitarian law rather than human rights law (or domestic criminal law). The question then is not how the different sides portray their use of armed force, but whether the resulting violence meets the legal definition of armed conflict.14 A great deal hangs on this legal question. For example, as noted above, if the American and Israeli claims to be in a legal state of armed conflict with terrorist groups are correct then they would have a recognized right under international humanitarian law to deliberately seek out and kill their enemies. If not, however, such killing would be murder. The key question, then, is whether the American and Israeli claims are legally compelling. The US and Israeli governments claims are controversial but ultimately plausible. Their arguments are controversial because the application of humanitarian law has traditionally been limited to situations of war, and war was traditionally defined as armed conflict between the forces of two sovereign states: for example, in a frequently quoted 1905 definition, Lawrence Oppenheim held that, war is a contention of two or more states through their armed forces, for the purposes of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases.15 This narrow conception of war, and consequent narrow understanding of the application of humanitarian law, held sway throughout the first half of the century. In the latter half of the century, however, the ambit of humanitarian law broadened considerably. As Greenwood notes, for example, whereas the older humanitarian treaties applied only to a war, today humanitarian law is applicable in any international armed conflict, even if the parties to that conflict have not declared war and do not recognize that they are in a state of war.16

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_________________________________________________________________ Moreover, the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 addresses armed conflict in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, foreign occupation and against racist regimes, (Article 1.4), while the Second Additional Protocol addresses non-international armed conflict. Both of these latter cases involve states fighting armed non-governmental organizations rather than other states. The key question in relation to the War on Terror is whether the legal definition of armed conflict is now broad enough to encompass a low-intensity, asymmetric conflict between a state (or coalition of states) and an elusive international terrorist organization (or group of similar organizations), and therefore whether humanitarian law should have primary application in relation to states use of armed force against such terrorist organizations. II. Some leading commentators have expressed doubt about the application of humanitarian law to the War on Terror. While Helen Duffy, for example, in her 2005 The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law rejects Ken Roths suggestion that the War on Terror is simply a rhetorical device, she also raises doubts about whether it can meet the criteria for the contemporary definition of armed conflict.17 For one thing, in order to trigger the laws of armed conflict, a conflict must involve at least two clearly identifiable parties with recognizable armed forces engaged in the conflict. Duffy, however, doubts that terrorist organizations and their armed forces can be identified and distinguished with adequate clarity. She asks, for example, how one can define and identify with sufficient clarity the relationship between disparate individuals and their membership, support, or sympathy for al-Qaeda?18 In other words, how can we be certain who does and who does not qualify as an enemy combatant? The difficulty in clearly specifying al-Qaeda as an identifiable and distinct party to a conflict leads Duffy to conclude that asserting that an armed conflict can be waged with an entity such as al-Qaeda may not be an accurate assessment of the law as it stood at the time of the September 11th attacks, or indeed as it stands in the first few years thereafter.19 Nonetheless, she recognizes that the law has been moving toward recognizing armed conflicts with nongovernmental organizations, and that September 11th has now sown the seeds of debate as to whether it may be, or should be, possible for an armed conflict to arise between states and entities such as al-Qaeda. Noting some arguments in favour of such recognition, she remarks that this is an area deserving of further analysis where legal development could unfold.20

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_________________________________________________________________ Other leading legal commentators, however, contend that the War on Terror clearly fits within the contemporary understanding of international armed conflict and is primarily subject to international humanitarian law. In particular, they stress that terrorist acts such as those of September 11th constitute armed attacks that trigger a states right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, including the legitimate use of armed force, and hence invoke international humanitarian law. Yoram Dinstein, for example, in the fourth edition of his War, Aggression and Self-Defense (2005), writes, The simple proposition that forcible action taken against a state may constitute an armed attack, even if the perpetrators are non-state actors [e.g., a terrorist group] operating from a foreign state was categorically upheld in previous editions of the present book. All lingering doubts on this issue have been dispelled as a result of the response of the international community to the shocking events of 11 September 2001.21 Dinstein cites three international responses in particular, each of which recognizes an American right of self-defense which, as he notes, is only legal under the UN Charter in response to an armed attack and triggers the application of international humanitarian law. First, he notes UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, passed in the wake of September 11th, which both affirm the right of individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter in the context of the horrifying terrorist attacks.22 Second, Dinstein notes that NATO voted to invoke, for the first time, Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty (1949), providing that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies shall be considered an attack against them all.23 He stresses that armed attack is employed with specific reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter and the right of self-defense. Finally, Dinstein notes that in September 2001 the members of the Organization of American States similarly declared that These terrorist attacks against the United States are attacks against all American States, again with specific reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter as well as Article 3 of the Rio Treaty and the right of self-defense. Dinsteins evidence from the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks illustrates a clear willingness on the part of states to recognize a right of self-defense against attacks by international terrorists, and hence a corresponding right to employ armed force in self-defense under the auspices of international humanitarian law. The states and organizations he cites were not deterred from

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_________________________________________________________________ authorizing the use of force against al-Qaeda because of any doubts concerning whether the entire membership of the organization could be precisely and uncontentiously established, as Duffy feared. The fact that there may have been some marginal cases of peripheral participation in al-Qaeda activities was not seen as a serious obstacle to recognition that terrorist organizations exist and may present a substantial threat to states and that the membership and active participation of many individuals can be established beyond reasonable doubt. In using force to prevent further attacks by terrorist organizations, attacked states, and in some cases their allies, enter into an armed conflict with terrorist aggressors like al-Qaeda subject to humanitarian law. Duffys point that there may be some ambiguity surrounding the combatant status of some alleged members of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda does warrant care and selectivity in applying military force, and possibly judicial review of the procedures by which dangerous terrorists are identified and of how the means to neutralize them are chosen, but it provides no compelling reason to doubt that states can find themselves in armed conflict with terrorist groups. Moreover, the UNs recognition that armed conflict can arise between states and armed organizations employing terror was not solely a response to the horror of the September 11th attacks. The possibility of such conflict was already fairly clearly recognized in relation to a different level of conflict that is, in relation to non-international armed conflict. It already seems implicit, for example, in the definition of armed conflict offered by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state.24 The key point here for present purposes is that the legal definition of armed conflict, and hence the ambit of humanitarian law, includes protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups. This might well be interpreted to cover, for example, the campaign of terror waged by armed Palestinian organizations like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad against Israel as part of the second intifada resulting in 1084 fatalities (525 from suicide bombings) and 7484 injuries between September 2000 and the end of 2005.25 In this context it is worth noting that the September 11th attacks were similarly not wholly isolated incidents, but part of a larger pattern of attacks on

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_________________________________________________________________ American installations and citizens that included the attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000 (17 fatalities and 40 injuries) and on the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on October 7, 1998 (235 dead and over 2000 injured). In both the American and Israeli cases, the governments have responded with military campaigns and targeting policies that have taken literally thousands of lives. Both cases appear to meet the standard of protracted violence between armed organizations and governments, and therefore to meet the ICTYs definition of armed conflict (albeit of a non-international character). Indeed, they almost met an even earlier standard for international armed conflict. The idea that terrorist acts could rise to the status of armed attacks had emerged a decade earlier although still constrained by the principle of state involvement. In the case of Nicaragua v. United States (1986), the International Court of Justice, in Christopher Greenwoods words, Set a [new] threshold by ruling that terrorist or irregular operations would constitute an armed attack if the scale and effects of such an operation were such that it would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.26 Terrorist attacks against the United States and Israel would appear to meet any plausible interpretation of the magnitude of attack criteria established by the ICJ. The al-Qaeda attacks on September 11th, for example, produced 2976 fatalities, more than enough to qualify as a frontier incident. However, terrorist attacks against the United States and Israel fail to meet a second component of the ICJs criteria for an armed attack. In Nicaragua v. United States the International Court of Justice was addressing charges brought by Nicaragua of American aggression against Nicaragua through its support and funding of (and even participation in) the activities of contra rebels. Nicaraguas claim was that the United States had committed an armed attack through the actions of the contras. The court upheld this claim, finding both that the contra actions constituted an armed attack and that the United States bore responsibility for them. The ICJ, however, limited its ruling to cases where a foreign state supported the terrorist action. Nonetheless, the principle at least that a terrorist action could constitute an armed attack triggering humanitarian law was clearly established. It is these evolving historical precedents that Helen Duffy seems to have in mind when she writes of the slow movement of international law towards

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_________________________________________________________________ recognizing protracted violence between states and terrorist organizations as armed conflicts subject to humanitarian law. But the most powerful rejoinders to her insistence that the law has not yet passed this critical threshold comes neither from the pattern of change nor from the declarations of international organizations in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, as emphasized by Dinstein, but in the carefully considered and argued decisions of the respected supreme courts of both the United States and Israel years after the initial shock of the September 11th attacks, and in the reaction of the international community to Israels war with Lebanons Hizbullah movement last summer. The Israeli Supreme court has unambiguously accepted in a series of decisions the notion that a state of armed conflict exists, and has existed from the start of the first intifada, between the Israeli state and Palestinian terrorist organizations. In its recent decision in The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. the Government of Israel, Aharon Barake giving the courts consensus position wrote as follows: The [Courts] general, principled starting point is that between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the first intifada. The Supreme Court has discussed the existence of that conflict in a series of judgments.... In one case I wrote: Since late September 2000, severe combat has been taking place in the areas of Judea and Samaria. It is not police activity. It is an armed conflict. (HCJ 7015/02) This approach is in line with the definition of armed conflict in the international literature. Humanitarian law is the lex specialis which applies in the case of armed conflict.27 As Judge Barak notes, the Israeli Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this state of armed conflict, predating September 11th in a long series of decisions. This pattern of decisions forms an important legal precedent for recognizing that a state of armed conflict can exist between states and terrorist organizations. The US Supreme Court has also weighed in on this question and indicated that it regards the War on Terrorism as a genuine armed conflict subject to international humanitarian law. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., decided on June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the claim of an alleged enemy combatant that he was not subject to trial by military commission because, among other things, the trial would violate his

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_________________________________________________________________ rights under international humanitarian law. Specifically, the Court conclude[d] that the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.28 There can be no doubt then that the Court considers the United States to be in a War on Terror, subject to international humanitarian law, in which al-Qaeda is at least one of the enemy parties. Indeed, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas goes so far as to specifically treat Osama bin Ladens 1996 declaration of Jihad against Americans [and not the September 11th, 2001 attack] as the inception of the war. The majority, however, do not question the governments position that the war commenced with the events of September 11, 2001. They focus on the September 11th, 2001 attacks that the government characterizes as the relevant acts of war, and on the measure that authorized the Presidents deployment of military force [ie, Congresss authorization of the use of military force by the President (AUMF)].29 In focusing on the AUMF, and the invocation of the Presidents war powers, as officially initiating a condition of armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Supreme Court appears also to have accurately reflected the intention of Congress. The AUMF explicitly went beyond authorizing war with states sponsoring terror, or permitting terrorists to operate on their territory, to include both organizations and persons involved in the September 11th attacks. Specifically, Congress authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organization or persons he determines planned, authorized or aided the September 11th terrorist attacks. The Supreme Court merely added that regardless of whether this legitimate exercise of force in self-defense were to be directed against a sponsoring nation, a terrorist group or an individual, it remained fully subject to the law of armed conflict. These supreme court decisions set important precedents not only in domestic law but also in international law. The single most important source of international law, however, is not jurisprudential or even conventional, but customary. Customary international law is jus cogens that is, peremptory, of universal jurisdiction and justiciability. Indeed, international conventions and legal decisions are in large (although not exclusive) part intended to describe and formalize the customary practice of states. So what states do, and the reason they give for what they do, are of tremendous importance in interpreting the current state of international law. It is for this reason that the cases that Dinstein cites, in which sovereign states and international organizations representing large numbers of states indicate an acceptance of an American right to retaliate militarily against al-Qaeda, are especially important.

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_________________________________________________________________ Despite the clear pattern that Dinstein illustrates of approval for the use of military force (subject to humanitarian law) against a terrorist organization, however, it remained possible to treat it as an isolated and exceptional case, precipitated by reaction to the unprecedented scale and ferocity of the September 11th attack. Commentators like Duffy could then still reasonably hold that although there was movement in international humanitarian law towards the recognition that a legitimate state of war could arise between a state and a terrorist group, the body of evidence had still not crossed the critical threshold into generally applicable law. This strategy for neutralizing the influence of the post-September 11th precedents relies on the presumption that the pattern of approval for the large-scale use of military force in response to a terrorist attack, whether explicit or implicit, will not be repeated. It was, however, repeated last summer. A conflict developed in July that seemed to confirm that the views articulated by the courts concerning the possibility of a legal state of armed conflict between a state and a terrorist organization are widely shared by both states and international organizations. This wide consensus effectively puts to rest lingering doubts concerning the applicability of humanitarian law to such conflicts. The event in question is the 2006 War in Lebanon between Israeli government forces and Hizbullah fighters, and the international communitys reaction to it. The war was precipitated by a Hizbullah incursion across the Israeli-Lebanese border on July 12th resulting in the killing of three soldiers and the kidnapping of two others. The Israeli government reacted by sending IDF units over the border in an attempt to rescue the kidnapped soldiers. The operation failed to free the soldiers but it did result in the deaths of five more Israeli soldiers. The Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, then declared that the Hizbullah attack was an act of war and launched a full scale military campaign, beginning with extensive air strikes across Lebanon and leading to a major ground campaign in the South.30 The fighting continued until a UN ceasefire went into effect on August 14th. There can be no doubt that Israels war was with Hizbullah. Israeli leaders continually stressed that they were fighting a war with Hizbullah, not with Lebanon. For example, on July 16th the Israeli Cabinet issued the following statement:

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_________________________________________________________________
Israel is not fighting Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian- and Iranian-sponsored terrorist enclaves of murder.31

Israels operations were directed specifically against suspected Hizbullah operatives (although arguably with insufficient precision), and deliberately sought to avoid confrontation with the Lebanese army which equally sought to avoid engagement with the Israelis. Hizbullah, for its part, flung defiance at the Israeli government, daring Israel to launch a ground assault against its forces in Southern Lebanon, and launching over 4000 missiles into the Northern part of Israel. The final list of fatalities included somewhere between 250 and 600 Hizbullah fighters, 119 Israeli soldiers, along with somewhere between 850 and 1191 Lebanese civilians and no members of the Lebanese Army.32 It was clear to all observers, then, that the fight was between Israel and Hizbullah with unfortunate Lebanese civilians too often trapped in between. What is critical for present purposes is that there was widespread support in the international community for Israels right to defend itself by pursuing a military campaign against Hizbullah under the laws of war, and while the international community became increasingly critical of the manner in which Israel prosecuted the armed conflict, its criticism was almost entirely framed in terms of humanitarian law. In an address to the UN Security Council on July 30th, for example, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan affirmed that no one disputes Israels right to defend itself but noted that there was growing concern about its manner of doing so, and in particular about what appeared to be grave breaches of humanitarian law. Finally, he recalled that the UN High Commissioner for human rights had reminded both sides that they may be held accountable for any breaches of international humanitarian law.33 At the national level, most countries focused their criticisms exclusively on what India called Israels disproportionate and excessive use of force and what Turkey called bombing civilians that is, on its failure to fully comply with humanitarian principles of proportionality and discrimination.34 Similarly, NGOs such as Amnesty International complained that Israels widespread attacks against public civilian infrastructure was deliberate and an integral part of the military strategy, rather than collateral damage, and called upon Israel to uphold the humanitarian principle of proportionality.35 In essence, the international community accepted that a country attacked by a terrorist organization had a right to go to war with that organization provided that it complied with the humanitarian principles of

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_________________________________________________________________ armed conflict. The war in Lebanon then not only established an additional precedent of armed conflict between a state and a terrorist organization, but indicated a growing international consensus that terrorist organizations could take actions that warrant a military response and that that military response should be subject to the law of armed conflict. In combination with the precedents cited above then, this event strongly suggests that the legal threshold for recognizing the applicability of humanitarian law to armed conflicts between states and terrorist organizations has now been passed. In summary then, while the question of whether a War on Terror can qualify as an armed conflict in the legal sense cannot be described as definitively settled, both Israel and the United States maintain that it can and does, and their case seems to be plausible and getting stronger. Not only can they point to a clear pattern of legal development towards recognition and some strongly supportive expert opinions before 2001, but also to a transitional event in the September 11th attacks, and then to clear precedents from states and international institutions in the wake of that event, confirmed in relation to more recent armed conflicts. Most importantly, they can point to strong support in judgments of their own supreme courts (and Congress). Obviously, these courts are important interpreters of American and Israeli law. They are also, however, respected and influential sources of precedent for the larger international legal community, and it may well be that the judgments rendered by the courts will effectively resolve the controversy over the legal status of the War on Terror. After all, even Helen Duffy, who raised doubts in 2005 over whether the law could be said to have made the transition to recognizing armed conflict against an organization such as a terrorist group (or groups), was prepared to acknowledge that this perspective, while not perhaps reflecting current law, signals a possible direction for future legal development.36 III. If, however, there is a strong legal case for recognizing that the war on terror triggers the application of humanitarian law, there is an equally strong legal case for denying that it should be conducted according to new and evolving rules, as exemplified in the American policy towards prisoners, which include secret detention, aggressive interrogation and extraordinary rendition all in defiance of the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, the very qualities which lend strength to the legal case for the recognition of a state of war militate against allowing special exceptions or new rules in regard to state conduct.

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_________________________________________________________________ The first key point in support of the legal designation of armed conflict was the strong support of many states and leading international organizations. The situation is the opposite, however, with regards to claims for exemption from the existing laws of war, such as the US claim that its treatments of prisoners is not subject to international conventions including the Geneva Conventions. These claims are widely rejected both by other states and international organizations. What is even more striking is that both the American and Israeli courts, which are the second source of support for the claim that the laws of war apply to the War on Terror, have insisted that international conventions, including the Geneva conventions, apply fully to detainees in the war on terror. Indeed, the US Supreme Court decided against the US Government in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in part on the specific ground US policies violated the Geneva Convention. The third ground of the legal case was the July-August 2006 war in Lebanon, and the international communitys reaction to it. Specifically, the bulk of the international community was willing to accept that Israel was within its rights (under article 51 of the Charter) to conduct a military campaign specifically against Hizbullah (rather than against Lebanon) under the laws of armed conflict. This behaviour reflected a general shift in customs of states in regard to their willingness to recognize the possibility of a legal state of international armed conflict arising between a state and a non-state organization such as a terrorist group. On the other hand, many states and international organizations became virulent in their criticism of Israel for what they perceived to be violations of the laws of armed conflict, particularly in terms of the way that Israel responded to Hizbullah operatives hiding among civilian populations or using civilians as shields. Specifically, Israel was criticized for responding too aggressively and therefore visiting disproportionate harm on civilians. All of this behaviour, however, reconfirms the international communitys commitment to the full applicability of the entirety of international humanitarian law to armed conflicts between states and international organizations even when the illegal behaviour of terrorists (such as failing to distinguish themselves visibly from civilians) imposes serious difficulties for the prosecution of military campaigns against them. Each of the three key precedents then that strengthen the case for recognizing the war on terror as a legal armed conflict subject to humanitarian law militate against the legality of claims to exemption from those laws or that the war on terror may legally be fought according to new laws appropriate to a new kind of warfare. In the final analysis from a legal perspective there is little to be said either for the first widely held position that the war on terror is merely a

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_________________________________________________________________ hortatory device and that the struggle with terrorism must be conducted wholly within a law enforcement paradigm, or for the third familiar perspective which held not only that the War on Terror is a real war, but that it is a new kind of war to be fought according to new rules (which the belligerent states would evolve over time). Rather, the balance of evidence clearly indicated that international law currently recognizes the War on Terror as a real war that is subject to humanitarian law, but on the other hand recognizes no general exemptions from the rules as to its conduct. This conclusion does not exclude the possibility that some of the existing law may have to be adjusted to properly address an armed conflict between states and terrorist groups, but it suggests that adjustments must be agreed upon by the international community before they can be legally applied to actual conflicts. In addition to arguing that this legal conclusion is clear, this essay concludes by arguing that it is fortuitous for legal clarity and restraint are just what is most needed today in the prosecution of the war on terror. IV. Even if there is a compelling case that the War on Terror has come to be legally recognized as a real war, a normative question can still be raised over whether this is a desirable development, or whether it ought perhaps to be resisted and, if possible, eventually reversed. This question has both political and moral dimensions. I will conclude this essay by arguing that the War on Terror is best approached as an armed conflict constrained by existing humanitarian law. In very general terms, it has been widely and persuasively argued that a law-enforcement model is inadequate to confront and deter international terrorist organizations, particularly in an international context that includes a range of failed and rogue states unable or unwilling to enforce domestic laws against terrorist activities within their jurisdictions. On the other hand, allowing states to make up the rules of international warfare as they go invites abuse and atrocity as illustrated for example in the Church and Pike Committees revelations concerning of the conduct of American covert special operations in the 1960s and 1970s including not only the Phoenix Program in Vietnam (involving the execution of tens of thousands of supposed VC spies in the South) but repeated schemes to assassinate foreign leaders including Lumumba, Diem and Castro. More specifically, however, in terms of the situation as it stands today, legitimacy and international support for the war effort have been seriously compromised by policies that have strayed beyond the bounds of the laws of war including American programs of detainment, torture and rendition and

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_________________________________________________________________ aggressive Israeli counterterrorism tactics that have imposed disproportionate harm on civilians (such as the July 22nd, 2002 targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh resulting in the deaths of fifteen civilians including nine children). A clear public declaration to abide by the laws of war and demonstrated commitment to uphold this pledge might contribute significantly to arresting or reversing declining international support. Moreover, American and Israeli actions outside the law of war have lent a degree of legitimacy to terrorist organizations. If the states purportedly fighting terrorism regularly violate the law, how can they credibly condemn terrorists for doing the same thing? This legitimizing effect is most evident in parts of the world that sympathize with terrorist organizations announced objectives (such as freeing Palestine or forcing American influence out of the Middle East), if not necessarily their means. Lending growing legitimacy in these regions to terrorist organizations threatens to contribute to the nurture of a new, larger and more extreme generation of terrorists, and hence to the increasing impossibility of a successful outcome to the War on Terror. This war is clearly not a contest solely of armed forces, but also a competition for hearts and minds, and little could be more detrimental to that struggle than to allow the distinction between terrorism and counterterrorism to become blurred. The United States and Israel need to mobilize international law to clearly distinguish their policies from those of terrorists, and to do that they need to be able to point to clear, well-established, broadly supported rules and distinctions they need existing humanitarian law. On the other hand, the credibility and authority of international law has taken a terrible beating in the last six years, particularly at the hands of the United States, the worlds superpower. In particular, in its policy on detainees and its invasion of Iraq, the United States has publicly flouted international law, and correspondingly diminished the force of that law in dealing with cases like Irans nuclear program. There is an enormous need today for a re-commitment on the part of important states, and particularly the United States, to compliance with the provisions of international law. A public declaration of commitment to humanitarian law in prosecuting the War on Terror followed by sustained fulfilment of that pledge would be an important step in the right direction. Finally, from a moral perspective, what is at stake? Considering the issues raised it hardly seems fit to belabour the question: secret detainment, rendition, torture and disproportionate killing of civilians, are categorically illegal in part for obvious moral reasons, both deontological and consequential. On the one hand, they all violate the most widely recognized and accepted moral duty to others to treat them as ends rather than means to ones own ends. On the other

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_________________________________________________________________ hand, permitting such policies, particularly in secret, invites abuses and even atrocities as many people feel has already been amply demonstrated at Abu Ghraib. And having facilitated the conditions for immoral action, we all bear complicity for the consequence. Some weapons, Benjamin Constant observed, are too heavy for human hands. We share a moral responsibility to insure that they are not made available, either to terrorists intent on their use (by failing to confront and deter them) or to powerful states in conducting a War on Terror (by exempting them from the constraint of the law). Not only on a legal basis then, but also from a normative perspective, whether emphasizing international politics and the health and stability of the international order, or from a moral perspective stressing individual and collective agency in the performance of rights and wrongs, the answer is the same. The war on terror should be recognized and conducted as a real war, and correspondingly must be constrained within the existing law of war.

Notes
K. Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, Foreign Affairs 83:1, 2004, p. 2-3. 2 A. Dworkin, the Yemen Strike: The War on Terror Goes Global, Crimes of War Project, http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:P4zicFT62mcJ:www.crimesofwar.org/onne ws/newsyemen.html+rice+war+on+terror+new+new+rules&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=s, accessed June 5, 2007. 3 Roth, p. 2-3. * 4 C. Greenwood (2000), Historical Development and Legal Basis, in Dieter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 19-20. 5 E. Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, Chicago Journal of International Law, Volume 5, 2004, p. 423. 6 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of Americas Extraordinary Rendition Program, New Yorker, February 14, 2005, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6, accessed June 24, 2007. 7 B. Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden, New York: Verso, 2005, p. 46-47, 23-30, 41-2, 48, 52, 61, 69-70.
1

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_________________________________________________________________ G.W. Bush, President Meets with National Security Team, White House, September 12, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html, accessed February 6, 2007. 9 G.W. Bush, President Discusses Global War on Terror, White House Press Secretary, September 5, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html, accessed February 7, 2007. 10 G.W. Bush, Radio Address of the President to the Nation, White House Press Secretary, September 29, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html, accessed February 6, 2007. 11 R. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random House, 2005, p. 31-3. 12 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Briefing by Colonel Daniel Reisner, Head of the International Law Branch of the IDF Legal Division, November 15, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2000/11/Press%20Briefin g%20by%20Colonel%20Daniel%20Reisner-%20Head%20of, accessed February 1, 2007. 13 M. Gross, Fighting by Other Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israels Assassination Policy, Political Studies 51, 2004, p. 354. 14 H. Duffy, The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 218-9. 15 M. OConnell, International Law and the Use of Force, New York: Foundation Press, 2005, p. 3. 16 Greenwood, p. 10. 17 Duffy, p. 250-1. 18 Duffy, p. 252. 19 Duffy 2005, p. 254. 20 Duffy 2005p. 252-4. 21 Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 206-7. 22 Dinstein 2005, p. 207. 23 Dinstein 2005, p. 207. 24 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, 1995,
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_________________________________________________________________ http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm, accessed February 14, 2007. 25 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, December 31, 2005, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/palestinian_terror_e.pdf, accessed on January 22, 2007. 26 Greenwood, p. 2. 27 Israeli High Court of Justice, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 7609/04, 2006, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf, accessed January 7, 2007. 28 Supreme Court of the United States (2006), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct.2749, 2004, p. 2, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf, accessed February 11, 2007. 29 Supreme Court of the United States, Opinion of the Court, p. 35fn. 30 C. Urquhart, and C. McGreal (2006), Israelis Invade Lebanon after Soldiers are Seized, Guardian, July 12, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1818696,00.html, May 27, 2007. 31 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hizbullah Attacks Northern Israel and Israels Response, 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon+Hizbullah/Hizbullah+attack+in+northern+Israel+and+Israels+response+12-Jul2006.htm, accessed May 27, 2007. 32 for example, Amnesty International, Israel/Lebanon Deliberate Destruction or Collateral Damage? Israeli Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure, MDE 18/007/2007, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde180072006, accessed May 27, 2007. 33 UN News Centre, Security Council Must Condemn Israeli Attack, Demand Cessation of Hostilities, Annan Says, 30 July 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19345&Cr=Leban&cr1 accessed June 8, 2007. 34 Kuwait News Agency, World Efforts Continue to Stop Escalating Israeli Violence in Middle East, July 14, 2006, http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=886234, accessed May 28, 2007; CNN Turk (2006), Erdogan: Israilin Derdi Nedir?

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_________________________________________________________________ http://www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=1&haberI D=201873, accessed May 28, 2007. 35 Amnesty 2006. 36 Duffy, p. 252.

Bibliography
Amnesty International. Israel/Lebanon Deliberate Destruction or Collateral Damage? Israeli Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure. MDE 18/007/2007, 2006, retrieved May 27, 2007. <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde180072006>. Bush, George W. President Meets with National Security Team, White House, September 12, 2001, retrieved February 6, 2007, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html>. Bush, George W. President Discusses Global War on Terror, White House Press Secretary, September 5, 2006, retrieved February, 7, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html>. Bush, George W. Radio Address of the President to the Nation. White House Press Secretary, September 29, 2001, retrieved February 6, 2007, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html>. CNN Turk (2006), Erdogan: Israilin Derdi Nedir? Retrieved May 28, 2007, <http://www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=1&ha berID=201873>. Dinstein, Yoram. War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Duffy, Helen. The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Dworkin, Anthony. The Yemen Strike: The War on Terror Goes Global. Crimes of War Project, retrieved June 5, 2007, <http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:P4zicFT62mcJ:www.crimesofwar.org/ onnews/newsyemen.html+rice+war+on+terror+new+new+rules&hl=en&ct=c lnk&cd=9&gl=s>. Gross, Michael. Fighting by Other Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israels Assassination Policy. Political Studies 51:2 (2004): 350-368. Israeli High Court of Justice. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 7609/04, 2006, retrieved January 7, 2007,

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_________________________________________________________________ <http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Press Briefing by Colonel Daniel Reisner, Head of the International Law Branch of the IDF Legal Division. November 15, 2000, retrieved February 1, 2007, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2000/11/Press%20Br iefing%20by%20Colonel%20Daniel%20Reisner-%20Head%20of>. Greenwood, Christopher. Historical Development and Legal Basis, in Dieter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, December 31, 2005, retrieved on January 22, 2007, <http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/palestinian_terror_e.pdf>. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Tadic Interlocutory Appeal. Retrieved February 14, 2007, <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm>. Kuwait News Agency. World Efforts Continue to Stop Escalating Israeli Violence in Middle East. July 14, 2006, retrieved June 24, 2007, <http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=886234>. Lawrence, Bruce (ed.). Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden. New York: Verso, 2005. Mayer, Jane. Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of Americas Extraordinary Rendition Program. New Yorker, February 14, 2005, retrieved June 24, 2007, <http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6>. OConnell, Mary-Ellen. International Law and the Use of Force. New York: Foundation Press, 2005. Pape, Robert. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House, 2005. Posner, Eric. Terrorism and the Laws of War, Chicago Journal of International Law, 5:2 (2004): 423-434. Roth, Ken. The Law of War in the War on Terror. Foreign Affairs 83;1 (2004): 2-7. Supreme Court of the United States. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct.2749, 2004, retrieved February 11, 2007, <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf>.

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_________________________________________________________________ UN News Centre. Security Council Must Condemn Israeli Attack, Demand Cessation of Hostilities, Annan Says. 30 July 2006, retrieved June 8, 2007, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19345&Cr=Leban&cr1>. Urquhart, Conal and C. McGreal (2006), Israelis Invade Lebanon after Soldiers are Seized. Guardian, July 12, 2006, retrieved May 27, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1818696,00.html>. Author Avery Plaw reads at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth.

Rights and Duties of Individuals to Disobey Manifestly Illegal Orders under International Law Hitomi Takemura
Abstract This paper provides an overview of the individuals human rights and duties to disobey flagrantly illegal orders under international law in case of a controversial war. Today it is incumbent upon not only the State but also the individual to both uphold and implement international human rights and humanitarian law. After the mass atrocities of World War II, the international community has put a great effort into protecting and ensuring human rights, partly through the development of an international human rights law. In this sense, individuals have become both the holder of rights and the bearer of duties within the framework of public international law. In situations where countries participate in illegal actions, contravening international humanitarian law, or in an illegal conflict contrary to public international law, to what extent must the individual disobey these illegal actions or the illegal conflict per se? The answer to this question requires an examination into several facets within public international law, namely international criminal, humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. This paper mainly examines the duty of the individual to disobey flagrantly illegal orders in accordance with customary international humanitarian law and international criminal law. Key Words Conscientious objector, the right to conscientious objection, international human rights law, international criminal law, the duty to disobey manifestly illegal orders, jus ad bellum, jus in bello. ***** 1. International law and the status of individuals Can individuals be held directly responsible for a violation of international law? As far as international criminal law and the notion of individual criminal responsibility are concerned, the answer to the question is nowadays undoubtedly affirmative. Today it is incumbent not only upon the State but also the individual to both uphold and implement international human rights and international humanitarian law. Pursuant to the mass atrocities of World War II, the international community has put a great deal of effort into protecting and ensuring human rights, partly through the development of international human rights law. In this sense, individuals

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______________________________________________________________ have become both the holder of rights and the bearer of duties within the framework of international law. Although the question of the subjectivity of the individual in international law has remained a grey area in international law due to the comparative primacy nature of the subjectivity of States, individuals have become more and more important objects of international law. Individuals rights and duties in international law Despite the fact that the individual now is recognised as one of the important actors of international law, the issue of the extent of their accountability to international norms seems to be debatable. In situations where countries participate in illegal actions, contravening international humanitarian law, or in an illegal conflict contrary to public international law, to what extent must the individual disobey these illegal actions or the illegal conflict per se? In more general terms, to what extent does the individual owe a direct duty to the international community in international law? Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that: Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.i It is not clear from the plain reading of this article whether the Declaration intends to equate the duty of the individual to the international community with that owed to his or her national State. Coupled with the recognition of the status of the individual as a bearer of legal rights and duties, the duties of the individual to the international community, as perceived after World War II, have been gradually recognised on a global scale. Therefore [a]mong the first duties of the individual should be the duty to use his strength to maintain international peace and security.ii 3. Law The Defence of Superior Orders under International Criminal 2.

The defence of superior orders is claimed by a subordinate who commits a violation of international humanitarian law by following an order of his or her superior(s). Today, the defence of superior orders is not absolute and is allowed only under certain circumstances.iii For the defence of superior orders, the so-called manifest illegality test normally limits its application in spheres of domestic jurisprudence as is the case of article 33 of the relatively recently adopted Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The manifest illegality test is the principle which allows the defence of superior orders unless the order was not manifestly unlawful.iv In addition to the manifest illegality test itself, article 33 of the Rome Statute sets conditions on its applicability. For instance, the existence of legal obligation to obey orders by the Government or the superior in question (article

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______________________________________________________________ 33(1)(a)) and the ignorance of the unlawfulness by the subordinate, are additional cumulative conditions. The seriousness of the subject-matter jurisdiction (ratione materiae) and the seniority of the personal jurisdiction of an international criminal (military) tribunal sometimes contribute to the absolute denial of the defence of superior orders. For instance, since the International Military Tribunal (Nrnberg Tribunal) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) were supposed to exclusively deal with just a handful of the highest ranking figures responsible for the atrocities they have the absolute denial of this defence in their Charters. In a similar vein, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is supposed to deal with only the most serious violations of international humanitarian law, therefore the a priori judgment is made that the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity are always manifestly unlawful. The manifest illegality test ultimately demands reasonable preconsideration from the individual when he or she follows an order from his or her superior. In reality, however, the feasibility of such a pre-consideration may be seriously circumscribed due to the environment surrounding those who must obey orders. For example, the intense atmosphere of a battlefield, the discipline of troopsv or police presence may prevent individuals from imperturbable judgment. Any law should not impose individuals to observe a norm which is practically unreasonable. The system of conscientious objection may serve soldiers, reservists, and National Guards to defend their judgments on each war and each order given. Of course, the defence of superior orders and the notion of the conscientious objection are two different concepts. Yet the duty to disobey manifestly illegal orders may be legally fulfilled by means of the system of conscientious objection. The corollary of denying the superior orders defence in the context of manifest illegality may not only be denying a legitimate defence when soldiers are prosecuted, but also demanding soldiers to abstain from obeying manifestly illegal orders altogether. The duty to refuse to obey the manifestly illegal order is clearly established by the then President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Erdemovi case.vi Such an emerging duty apparently derived from Nuremberg Principles and the international protection of human rights is now embodied in one of the customary international rules enumerated by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). The study on customary international humanitarian law by the ICRC states, under its rule 154, that [e]very combatant has a duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order,vii while rule 155 proscribes the defence of superior orders when the subordinate knew that the act ordered was unlawful or should have known because of the manifestly unlawful nature of the act ordered.viii

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______________________________________________________________ Despite this duty of the individual to uphold international humanitarian law, it is not clear how he or she can fulfil this duty within his or her own nation by means of claiming conscientious objector status. Such a duty of the individual under international criminal law and international humanitarian law would be efficiently performed if the international community recognised and supported the right to conscientious objection in the normative body of international human rights law. 4. The Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service under International Human Rights Law Conscientious objection is an age-old issue in history.ix In modern history, conscientious objection is regarded as old as the history of conscription. The wane of conscription in European countries is proportional to the rise of conscientious objectors. While the supervising bodies of international and regional human rights law witnessed numerous individual cases of conscientious objection, there is no international human rights treaty clearly setting out the right of the individual to conscientious objection. Consequently the right to conscientious objection under international law has remained somewhat obscure. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) is the first regional, therefore to some extent international, human rights instrument explicitly recognizing the right to conscientious objection as a part of the right to freedom of conscience.x The Charter was adopted by the European Union in December 2000, and was incorporated in the draft Constitutional Treaty. It is an authoritative statement of general principle of European human rights law, although it has been without any binding effect due to the prolonged and uncertain ratification procedures of some Member States of the European Union. The Commentary written by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, set up by the European Commission wrote that: The right to conscientious objection to military service, which is recognised in Article 10 (2) of the EU Charter, has no equivalent in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) but it is increasingly accepted in international human rights law. According to the official explanations of the Charter, Article 10 (2) reflects national constitutional traditions and developments in domestic law.xi In the international sphere, neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) nor the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contain equivalent explicit provisions on the right to conscientious objection. However, both the ICCPR and the ECHR mention conscientious objectors in the context of prohibition of forced labour in articles 8(3)(c)(ii) and 4(3)(b) respectively. Article 8(3)(c)(ii) of the ICCPR indicates that the wording forced or compulsory labour shall not include [a]ny service of a

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______________________________________________________________ military character and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognised, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors. The ECHR embraces an equivalent wording in article 4(3)(b). The wording of where conscientious objection is recognised led to an a contrario interpretation by the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights that the ECHR does not require member States to recognise a right to conscientious objection.xii The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is a supervisory body of the ICCPR, also has hesitated to recognise the right to conscientious objection in a similar vein. However, the United Nations Committee of Human Rights explicitly recognised the right to conscientious objection in General Comment No. 22 in 1993.xiii In respect of decisions on individual complaints, the United Nations Human Rights Committees approach toward the right to conscientious objection is ahead of the European Court of Human Rights in this regard. Although it is stated in obiter dictum, the Committee held in 1991 that article 18 of the Covenant certainly protects the right to hold, express and disseminate opinions and convictions, including conscientious objection to military activities and expenditures.xiv Although the European Court of Human Rights has not clearly stated the right to conscientious objection under the ECHR yet, it is getting increasingly more attentive to the discriminatory effects and the punitive length of alternative service for military conscientious objectors. Therefore, it can be concluded that the treatment of conscientious objectors has gradually become an international concern. Possible Bases of Conscientious Objection In the context of human rights, freedom of thought, conscience and religion form the principal grounds for conscientious objection. Among reasons for conscientious objection, religious belief is the most commonly accepted basis for an exemption on the grounds of conscientious objection.xv The United Nations Human Rights Committee admitted in the General Comment No. 22 that the right to conscientious objection can be derived from article 18 which recognises the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.xvi However, the General Comment permits this right, derived from article 18, in a limited situation, holding that: inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest ones religion or belief.xvii The right to life, the right to liberty, the freedom of association, the freedom of expression, the right to be free from forced or compulsory labour and the right to peace arguably may add legitimacy to the right to conscientious objection other than the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, mentioned earlier.xviii However, it is not clear to what extent these rights may support the right to conscientious objection, especially when an 5.

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______________________________________________________________ individual claims the right to conscientious objection in an international forum after exhausting domestic remedies. Above the aforementioned rights, freedom of conscience and the freedom of peace may be relevant to absolute conscientious objectors, classified as such because they are opposed to all military actions. There is another category of conscientious objectors, namely selective conscientious objectors, an acronym of absolute conscientious objector. Selective conscientious objectors are opposed to certain military actions. The jus ad bellum (laws concerning the legality of the conflict itself) violation and the jus in bello (laws regulating means of warfare) violation are thought to be relevant to selective conscientious objection. In this context, it should be noted that the international community once supported selective conscientious objection by means of a General Assembly resolution. In its resolution 33/165, the General Assembly recognised that: the right of all persons to refuse service in military or police forces which are used to enforce apartheid.xix The jus in bello based claim of conscientious objection is likely to fail due to practical difficulties of presenting evidence of jus in bello before obeying an order. In the context of asylum seekers, real risk of participating illegal acts (Norway) or likelihood to be closely involved in actions offending the basic rules of human conduct (the United Kingdom) has to be proved in order to claim a status of refugee as a conscientious objector.xx The jus ad bellum violation- or the jus ad bellum duty-based claim also faces serious difficulties for conscientious objectors. This is so, firstly because an illegality of a jus ad bellum violation is normally more debatable and obscure than a jus in bello violation. Secondly, even though a soldier claims the possibility to be prosecuted for fighting in an illegal war on the basis of international criminal law precedents such as the Nuremberg Principles, such a claim is likely to be denied on the basis of the element of the crime of aggression. The crime of aggression is now regarded as a leadership crime and its elements are considered to require the involvement at the policymaking stage and the status of leadership. Thirdly, a municipal judiciary often hesitates to adjudicate an illegality of a conflict that an executive has previously decided to go on. Moreover, a court martial will never be likely to admit the unlawfulness of the conflict. Another difficulty in relation to the jus ad bellum and jus in bello basis may be that the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is sometimes very obscure. This may be all the more the case with foot-soldiers. After all, despite the clear existence of the individuals duty to observe international humanitarian law including both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, in actuality, it may be very unlikely for a conscientious objector to claim his or her status successfully on the sole basis of duties under international humanitarian law before domestic courts. The international

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______________________________________________________________ community also does not have the capacity and the resources to adjudicate claims of apparent illegality of a use of force and a means of warfare. Besides the aforementioned practical difficulties, the normative uncertainty is that it is not clear why the individual would need to invoke the right to conscientious objection for acts that he/she not only already has a right, but a duty to disobey.xxi Conclusion No international law norm currently in force explicitly guarantees the right to conscientious objection. However, this fact does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that international law does not recognise this right at all. On the contrary, facing the rise of the number of conscientious objectors, the international community is more vigilant than ever about this issue. One should not belittle the system of conscientious objection in relation to the promotion of peace. As is the sole case of apartheid, the international recognition of conscientious objection may contribute to prevent the possible future violation of international law. The co-existence of both the duty of disobeying manifestly illegal orders under international law and the right of conscientious objection to military service may sound illogical but these two should not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive. The system of conscientious objection may sometimes be the only resort to soldiers facing manifestly illegal orders under international law. The United Nations Human Rights Commission encouraged States, as part of post-conflict peace-building, to consider granting, and effectively implementing, amnesties and restitution of rights, in law and practice, for those who have refused to undertake military service on grounds of conscientious objection in its resolution 2004/35 in April 2004.xxii The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out that disrespect for human rights results in outraging the conscience of mankind.xxiii It also stipulates that all human beings are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.xxiv Respect for the individuals right to conscientious objection to military service by both States and the international community may provide the cornerstone of peace and stability in situations which outrage the conscience of mankind, such as serious violation of international humanitarian law. The right to conscientious objection in international law is still in the process of being clarified. Moreover, the recognition of selective conscientious objection in domestic societies is still relatively rare.xxv This leads to the conclusion that the international community should not hesitate to send a clearer message in order to advocate the individuals right to conscientious objection to military service in the situation of continuing manifestly unlawful violation of international law. 6.

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Notes
Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNGA Res 217A (III) (10 December 1948) UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (adopted by 48 votes to none; 8 abstentions). ii E A Daes, The Individuals Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Freedom of the Individual under Law, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2, 1983, p. 53. para. 234. iii Especially before the ICTY (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and the ICTR (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), the defence of superior orders does not relieve the accused of criminal responsibility under their Statutes, article 7(4) and article 6(4) respectively. See Erdemovi Case (Judgment) ICTYT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) paras. 16-19. iv See article 33(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 999. v Such as a heavy punishment for a crime of desertion or absence without leave in a military manual. See Uniform Code of Military Manual, articles 85 and 86. vi Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Erdemovi Case, (Appelas Judgment) ICTY-96-22-A (7 October 1997) para. 15. vii See J M Henckaerts, Study on customary international humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross, vol.87, no. 857, March 2005, p. 211. viii Ibid. ix M. Q. Sibley & P. E. Jacob, Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940- 1947, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1952, p. 1. If one looks at the issue of disobedience to law in general, one may trace back the ancient Greek. Sophocles described Antigone as an objector to the laws of the State. See W. G. Kellog The Conscientious Objector, Boni and Liveright, New York, 1919 p. 3. x See article 10 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) paragraph 2, The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right. Official Journal of the European Communities, C/364/1, 2000/C 364/01 (18 December 2000). xi The EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of the European Union (June 2006) p. 106. xii Ibid., p. 113.
i

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______________________________________________________________ Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (1993) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. xiv JP v. Canada, Communication No. 446/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/446/1991 (7 November 1991) para. 4.1. xv M. Lippman, The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an International Human Right. California Western International Law Journal, vol. 21, 1990, p. 37. xvi Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993). Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994) para. 11. xvii Ibid. xviii E. N. Marcus, Note, Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right. Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 38, 1998, pp. 517-524; D. C. Decker & L. Fresa The Status of Conscientious Objection under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 33, 2001, p. 380. xix UNGA Res. 33/165 (20 December 1978) 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 154, UN Doc. A/33/45, para. 1 (1978). xx C. M. Bailliet, Assessing Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello Within the Refugee Status Determination Process: Contemplations on Conscientious Objectors Seeking Asylum. Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, vol. 20, 2006, p. 365. xxi N. Lubell, Selecting Conscientious Objection in International Law: Refusing to Participate in a Specific Armed Conflict Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 20, no. 4, 2002, p. 419. xxii The Human Rights Commission, 2004/35 (19 April 2004) para. 4. Adopted without a vote. See chap. XI.- E/2004/23 E/CN.4/2004/127. See also <http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDLEGAL/415be85e4.pdf> (last visited, 3 April 2007). xxiii Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNGA Res 217A (III) (10 December 1948) UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (adopted by 48 votes to none; 8 abstentions). Its second preambular paragraph stipulates that: disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind. xxiv Ibid., Article 1. xxv The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights Including the Question of Conscientious Objection to
xiii

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______________________________________________________________ Military Service Analytical Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Best Practices in relation to Conscientious Objection to Military Service, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/51, (27 February 2006) para. 31, p. 10.

Bibliography
Bailliet, C. M., Assessing Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello Within the Refugee Status Determination Process: Contemplations on Conscientious Objectors Seeking Asylum. Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, vol. 20, 2006, pp. 337-384. Daes, E. A., The Individuals Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Freedom of the Individual under Law. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2, 1983, p. 53. Decker, D. C. & Fresa, L., The Status of Conscientious Objection under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 33, 2001, pp. 379-418. Henckaerts, J. M., Study on customary international humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross, vol.87, no. 857, March 2005, pp. 175-212. Kellog. W. G., The Conscientious Objector. Boni and Liveright, New York, 1919. Lippman, M., The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an International Human Right. California Western International Law Journal, vol. 21, 1990, pp. 31-60. Lubell, N., Selecting Conscientious Objection in International Law: Refusing to Participate in a Specific Armed Conflict Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 20, no. 4, 2002, pp. 407-422. Marcus, E. N., Note, Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right. Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 38, 1998, pp. 507-545. Sibley, M. Q., & Jacob, P. E., Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940- 1947. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1952. Hitomi Takemura is a PhD candidate of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway. The theme of this paper is part of a PhD thesis in progress.

International Security and the Paradox of Proximity in the Coverage of War Using Convergent ICTs Lucas Walsh
Abstract This paper reflects on the ways that convergent information and communications technologies (ICTs), such as the Internet, are transforming international relations by facilitating a de-centring of conventional political relations. The use of convergent ICTs by state and non-state actors produce a number of paradoxes of proximity as political relations are transformed. Four paradoxes are explored: the democratisation and control of mass media; the paradox of passive intervention; the blurring of the real with the unreal through a theatricalisation of war; and the promotion of insecurity to securitise state objectives. It is argued that while on one level these technologies democratise the politics of war by liberating access to, and production of, information about war; on another level the state co-opts ICTs to facilitate mass mobilisation for war. Key Words Convergent media, deterritorialisation, information and communication technology, international relations, securitisation, state, web 2.0 ***** Introduction In as much as mass communications media were central to the development of the modern nation-state during the nineteenth and twentiethcentury; contemporary information and communications technologies (ICTs), such as the Internet and mobile ubiquitous media (such as mobile phones), now play a pivotal role in the global development of nation-states in the twenty-first century. This role is characterised by ambiguities and tensions, most notably between the globalising impact of ICTs in making the world smaller and the fragmentation of knowledge and multiplication of channels for communication between people and communities throughout the globe. Individuals, activists and subversive groups are exploiting recent user-driven developments in the web, such as blogs and wikis, as well as increasing connectivity through wireless media, such as portable computing and mobile telephony. The use of convergent ICTs by state and non-state actors produce a number of paradoxes of proximity as political relations are transformed.1 This paper explores four paradoxes arising from the intensification of speed and manipulation of information dissemination and communications: the 1.

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______________________________________________________________ democratisation and control of mass media; the paradox of passive intervention; the blurring of the real with the unreal through a theatricalisation of war; and the promotion of insecurity to securitise state objectives. These paradoxes highlight how on one level these technologies democratise the politics of war by liberating access to, and production of, information about war, while on another level states co-opt ICTs to facilitate new forms of mass mobilisation for war. ICTs promote grassroots political activity and a de-centring of political relations on the one hand, while at the same time providing states and other key actors with the means to mobilise, obfuscate and distance populations from international responsibilities. What emerges from this dynamic of convergent media and international relations is a complex set of political relationships and conditions. Paradox 1: The democratisation versus control of mass media Technological developments such as mobile ubiquitous media, Semantic Web and Web 2.0 have enabled a diversification of political activities, from citizen journalism to terrorist vodcasting. ICTs, such as mobile phones, are increasingly used in the service of new, accelerated forms of political mobilisation, such as the smart mob.2 Using Short Message Services (SMS) to initiate rapid political assemblage and viral-like communications, mobile phones were, for example, used in marshalling protesters and gangs via SMS during the political crisis in East Timor of 2006, and more insidiously, the 2005 riots of Paris, France and Cronulla, Australia. Mass media has traditionally played a key role in war as a propaganda tool controlled by states; however, in the contemporary context, war coverage through electronic media such as the Internet is associated with the democratisation of access to and provision of information about war. Examples of this include the podcast images of the 2005 London bombings and the leaked photos of tortured inmates in Abu Ghraib in 2004 and 2006. Other malevolent interests have also benefited from the same modes of technology, such as insurgents (e.g. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), terrorists and transnational criminals.3 One US analyst suggests that the influence of terrorists is now extraordinarily global, extremely dynamic, extremely fast. They are running at internet time. We had an interesting study comparing the terrorist website [sic], mostly in Middle Eastern countries, versus 80 websites in US government. We looked at their technical sophistication, looked at their modern media richness or their modern interaction thats embedded in the website, and the Middle Eastern website, those terrorists who 2.

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______________________________________________________________ were hiding and restrained by resources, they were as good if not better than the US government.4 Web 2.0 applications, such as wikis and blogs, are viewed as empowering by enabling individuals and groups to engage politics and participate in sharing of information in key areas such as news coverage in new ways. These applications and communication tools extend the scope for online collaboration, social networking and sharing among users.5 These technological applications of the Internet enable individuals and groups to shift the loci of power away from state/militaristic discourses. On one level, the coverage of war in cyberspace is increasingly more diffuse and decentred as a result. This is most visible in the difference between the coverage of the first Iraq incursion, as compared to coverage of the 2003 invasion by the Western Alliance. Where coverage of the 1990-91 incursion was tightly controlled by the US military and disseminated through few media outlets (namely, CNN), the range of sources and access to information about the more recent military conflict in Iraq has multiplied. Independent news gathering, such as Reporters Without Frontiers, bloggers such as Salam Pax6, and podcasting by individuals of events such as the London bombings on 7 July 2005 are good examples. More subversive examples include cultural jamming and hacktivism. Hacktivists gained particular notoriety during the 1990s following various activities throughout the world, ranging from attacks on the Chinese government and NATOs action in Kosovo. At the far end of this spectrum is wireless terrorism. AlQaedas successful use of the Internet as a basis for mobilising Arab opposition to Western imperialism in the Middle East, including the deliberate use of visual terrorism (e.g. the design of terrorist events as publicity stunts, such as the 2004 video footage showing the beheading of US contractor Nick Berg in Iraq) emphasises the new organising powers afforded to resistance groups by cyberspace. But in other, more conventional ways, states also continue to use media to mobilise mass support for war, such as through control of official sources and access to war zones. An influential and powerful (but fabricated) mobiliser in the US push to war was reportage in 1990 of a 15-year-old Kuwaiti girls testimony before US Congress, during which she claimed that invading Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait had removed babies from hospital incubators. That states see the use of these participatory technologies as threats is evident in the Chinese governments attempts to use data stored by Yahoo to silence political dissent7 as well as in its efforts to censor the web by collaborating with Google to suppress political dissent.8

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______________________________________________________________ Paradox 2: The paradox of passive intervention War coverage seems, on one level, to draw people into the action of events using jingoistic tropes or evocative imagery, such as the Butcher of Bagdad, while also strategically using the language of military neutralisation to dehumanise war and its consequences.9 As Edward Said observed, before the media go abroadthey are effective in representing strange and threatening foreign cultures for the home audience, rarely with more success in creating an appetite for hostility and violence against these cultural Others than during the Gulf crisis and war of 1990-91.10 Televised images of the conflict projected by CNN were sterile and centred on the (apparently) surgical precision of modern technological warfare, the language of reportage sanitised by jargon such as friendly fire and collateral damage. The use of these kinds of linguistic and semantic discourses is now a familiar technique used by states across all forms of media, such as the US, to distance Western spectators of war from its often inhumane and bloody consequences. In recent years, these discourses have expanded in vocabulary to include phrases such as the war on terror to portray an image of an enemy that is omniscient, evasive and hidden at the same time. Alongside linguistic techniques is the use of evocative visual imagery, such as the toppling of Saddam Husseins statue during the liberation of Baghdad. For the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the language of intelligence and satellite surveillance was pivotal to Western justifications for military intervention, such as Colin Powells famous multimedia presentation to the UN Security Council, in which the US Secretary of State presented influential graphic satellite evidence of Iraqs alleged development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).11 On the domestic front, news coverage of war becomes a spectator sport offered to the public as entertainment to be consumed at a safe distance (e.g. at home). A passive sense of engagement is fostered whereby Western citizens become mobilised through a feeling of responsibility for the distant Other. Spectators feel engaged with war while being distanced from its consequences, or their complicity in it (however tacit). For the audience to remain seated in their living rooms was a necessary component of the Western alliances efforts to protect its commercial interests in Kuwait during the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. This strategy remains an important part of Western interventions in the Middle East. 4. Paradox 3: The theatricalisation of war: Blurring of the real with the unreal In recent years, there has been in an increase in the subtlety, diffusion and integration of entertainment into the ways that states such as the US, Australia and the UK have justified and mounted military incursions 3.

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______________________________________________________________ abroad. One unsettling bi-product of the convergence of ICTs is the infusion of information with entertainment. The electronic convergence of news, reality television, fiction and other forms of human and computer-mediated interaction produce a social and political disorientation and de-realisation. Virilio refers to a virtual theatricalisation of the real world.12 The heroic reportage of embedded BBC journalist John Simpson and the fabricated drama of US soldier Jessica Lynch are examples of this theatricalisation. As tragic as the 2002 kidnap and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan was, one cannot help but hear an echo of Adornos critique of [T]he total obliteration of the war by information, propaganda, commentaries, with cameramen in the first tanks and war reporters dying heroic deaths, the mishmash of an enlightened manipulation of public opinion and oblivious activity [in which] Men are reduced to walk-on parts in a monster documentary film.13 Pearls murderer, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, supposedly said that: for those who would like to confirm, there are pictures of me on the Internet holding his head.14 The globalisation of convergent mass media is transforming peoples sense of space and distance, inaugurating a global technological time characterised by new cultural forms, social networks and instantaneity. In his seminal work, Castells observes that in an information society, people increasingly interact according to a variable geometry. Mediated by shifting electronic networks, human life and interaction is characterised by increasing fluidity. As spatial reference points and other conventional boundaries erode, the meaning of each locale escapes its history, culture or institutions, to be constantly redefined by an abstract network of information strategies and decisions.15 By eroding conventional boundaries of time and space,16 Virilio argues that ICTs promote a shift from the geopolitical to the temporal. He suggests that instantaneous globalised information flows affect a collapse of territorial distance that compromises state sovereignty.17 The acceleration of instantaneous information and communication flows facilitated by technology produces an overwhelming loss of orientation.18 With acceleration, Virilio writes, there is no more here and there, only the mental confusion of near and far, present and future, real and unreal - a mix of history, stories, and the hallucinatory utopia of communication technologies.19 With the convergence of news and entertainment media, the viewer is visually bombarded by a disorienting array of choice between news, fiction, infotainment and edutainment delivered instantaneously. From the televised countdown, to the Iraq invasion on US prime time to George

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______________________________________________________________ W. Bushs staged announcement of Mission Accomplished aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2003,20 Western states exploit this theatricalisation to conduct warfare on domestic fronts. Paradox 4: Securitising through insecurity States can benefit from the cumulative effect of speed, de-realisation and other impacts of globalised information flows by fostering an ongoing sense of disorientation based on fear, urgency and seeming omniscience (e.g. that the War on Terror is everywhere). The US, for example, has cultivated this ever-present fear of the possibility for absolute destruction as a basis for perpetual mobilisation.21 The linguistic and semantic techniques of media manipulation described above are deployed by states to mobilise opinion and support; notably, through what international relations scholars refer to as the securitisation of potentially threatening international issues. Securitisation is a discursive strategy used by policy makers, governments and states to construct a given issue as a security threat to mobilise responsive action.22 For example, by framing its response to the 9/11 attacks as a War on Terror, the Bush Administration was then able to open up a global front on a war that may never be won. US president George W. Bush warned that: States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger... the price of indifference would be catastrophic... Our war on terror may not be finished on our watch yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch.23 Cast as a campaign that may not be finished on our watch, the War on Terror is thus used as a justification for US intervention in perpetuity; that is, a pure war. Through Western humanitarian intervention and state-building, the reality of invasion and bloodshed was submerged both literally, in the language of liberation evoked by the US in the invasion of Afghanistan, and metaphorically, in the (staged) toppling of Saddam Husseins statue in Iraq. In this context, President Bush was also able to transform the chaos in Iraq to an exercise in freedom and democracybuilding. Recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied on securitisation techniques as a basis for ongoing intervention. US, British and Australian governments have asked increasingly anxious publics for continued support on the grounds that abandonment of intervention could inadvertently encourage these two failed states to become safe holds for resurgent al-Qaeda, Taliban and other international terrorist networks. In 5.

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______________________________________________________________ 2007 the Australian government committed more troops to Afghanistan on this basis.24 The constructed need to attack terrorists at home and abroad enabled the 2003 invasion of Iraq without UN Security Council approval and the trampling of previously unassailable domestic and international human rights conventions; leading most notoriously to the illegal internments of terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay and the incidents of torture in Abu Grahib. Conclusion In 2007, the Thai government banned the video-sharing website YouTube for being insulting to the king, making it inaccessible from within Thailand.25 This very conventional response underestimates the mercurial, border-defying and viral-like nature of political and social communication on the web. With the shift towards user-generated, participatory and collaborative online applications, more people enjoy unparalleled opportunities for obtaining diverse information and expressing contrary political opinions through ICTs. An important characteristic of media convergence is the capacity of these media to enable a diffusion of control over who can make news and an acceleration of the news cycle. Interactive technologies, such as the Internet, mobile technologies, and interactive television, offer new possibilities for engagement in news-making by individuals and laypersons. Non-state actors, ranging from terrorists to independent reporters, have been adept at utilising these ICTs to challenge Western state orthodoxies. Nevertheless, Western states both benefit and are constrained by the use of convergent mass media in pursuit of economic and geo-political goals. While convergent media ICTs potentially allow for a democratisation of war coverage through the proliferation of anti-state views and alternative perspectives, the blurring of information and entertainment within contemporary coverage of war also affects a kind of social, political and ontological disorientation. Western states have, in particular, used these media in their efforts to securitise external threats as part of broader interventionist foreign policy. Western states have, in pursuit of new militaristic forays in Iraq, Afghanistan and other failed states, used the media to construct a War on Terror in which their populations are on permanent war alert. States securitise new security threats, such as WMD or other form of terrorism, to exploit the speed and de-territorialising effects of convergent ICTs. States have an interest in portraying an enemy that is fluid and ill-defined to mobilise fear that war could happen anywhere at any time, and against which ever enemy is deemed appropriate or necessary. 6.

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Notes
This paper draws from a journal article that I co-authored with Dr Julien Barbara in the Journal of Computer Mediated Communications, 12(1), article 10, 2006, entitled: International Security and New War Coverage in Cyberspace. The author is grateful to Dr Barbara for his ongoing discussions and contributions to this paper. 2 H. Rheingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, Cambridge, Basic Books, 2002. 3 M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, Volume I: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, (Second Edition), Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 2000. 4 Australian Broadcast Commission, How terrorists use the internet, The Science Show, ABC Radio National Broadcast, 31 March 2007, radio transcript retrieved 9 April 2007 <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/scienceshow/stories/2007/1885902.htm> 5 A. C. Halavais, Weblogs and Collaborative Web Publishing as Learning Spaces, in J. Weiss, J. Nolan, J. Hunsinger, P. Trifonas, International Handbook of Virtual Learning Environments, Springer International Handbooks of Education, Vol. 14, Netherlands, Springer, 2006: p. 1215. 6 S. Pax, Where is Raed? Blog retrieved 20 February 2006, <http://dear_raed.blogspot.com/> 7 CNN, Yahoo gave China key data, CNN.com, retrieved 17 February 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/02/09/china.yahoo.ap/> 8 BBC, Google censors itself for China, BBC News, 25 January 2006, retrieved 17 February 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4645596.stm> 9 L. Walsh and J. Barbara Speed, International Security and New War Coverage in Cyberspace. Journal of Computer Mediated Communications, 12(1), article 10, 2006, retrieved 9 April 2007, <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue1/walsh.html> 10 E. Said, Culture and Imperialism, London, Vintage, 1994: p. 353. 11 C. Powell, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council, 6 February 2003, retrieved 20 February 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html> 12 P. Virilio, The Art of the Motor, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995, p. 33. 13 T. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life, London, New Left Books, 1974: p. 55.
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______________________________________________________________ E. MacAskill, Al-Qaida [sic] suspect says he beheaded Pearl, The Guardian, 16 March 2007, retrieved 19 March 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,2035455,00.html> 15 M. Castells, High Technology, Space & Society, London, Sage, 1985: p. 15, 23 16 P. Virilio, The Overexposed City, Zone, No 1/2, 1987: p. 19. 17 Virilio, The Overexposed City, ibid. 18 P. Virilio, Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm!, CTheory, 27 August 1995 (trans. Patrice Riemens), retrieved 17 February 1996, <http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=72> 19 Virilio, The Art of the Motor, p. 35 20 CNN, White House pressed on mission accomplished sign, CNN.com, 29 October 2003, retrieved 17 February 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/mission.accomplished/> 21 P. Virilio and S. Lotringer, Pure War, New York, Autonomedia, 1997. 22 M. McDonald, Constructing Security: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001, International Relations, 19(3), 2005: pp. 297-320. 23 G. Bush, Address of the President of the Nation, 18 December 2005, retrieved 4 February 2006, http://thinkprogress.org/2005/12/18/embargoed-speech/ 24 ABC, More troops heading to Afghanistan, ABC News Online, 10 April 2007. Retrieved 11 May 2007 from http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200704/s1893214.htm 25 BBC, Thailand blocks access to YouTube, BBC News, 4 April 2007. Retrieved 10 April 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6528303.stm>
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Bibliography
Adorno, T. Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life. London, New Left Books, 1974. Australian Broadcast Commission (ABC), How terrorists use the internet. In The Science Show, ABC Radio National Broadcast, 31 March 2007. Transcript retrieved 9 April 2007 from http://www.abc.net.au/rn/scienceshow/stories/2007/1885902.htm Australian Broadcast Commission (ABC), More troops heading to Afghanistan, ABC News Online, 10 April 2007. Retrieved 11 May 2007 from http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200704/s1893214.htm

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______________________________________________________________ BBC. Google censors itself for China. BBC News. 25 January 2006. Retrieved 17 February 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4645596.stm> BBC, Thailand blocks access to YouTube, BBC News, 4 April 2007. Retrieved 10 April 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/6528303.stm> Bush, G. Address of the President of the Nation. 18 December 2005. Retrieved 4 February 2006, <http://thinkprogress.org/2005/12/18/embargoed-speech/> Castells, M. High Technology, Space & Society. London, Sage, 1985. Castells, M. The Rise of the Network Society, Volume I: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, (Second Edition). Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 2000. CNN, White House pressed on mission accomplished sign. CNN.com, Wednesday, October 29, 2003. Retrieved 17 February 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/mission.accomplished/ > CNN, Yahoo gave China key data. CNN.com. Retrieved 17 February 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/02/09/china.yahoo.ap/> Davis, I. Talis, Web 2.0 and All That. Retrieved 28 December 2006, from Internet Alchemy blog, 4 July 2005, <http://iandavis.com/blog/2005/07/talis-web-20-and-all-that> MacAskill, E. Al-Qaida [sic] suspect says he beheaded Pearl, The Guardian, 16 March 2007, retrieved 19 March 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,2035455,00.html McDonald, M. Constructing Security: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001. International Relations. 19(3), 2005: pp. 297-320. OReilly, T. What Is Web 2.0? Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software, 30 September 2005. Retrieved 2 January 2007, <http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-isweb-20.html> Pax, S. Where is Raed? Blog retrieved 20 February 2006, <http://dear_raed.blogspot.com/> Powell, C. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council. 6 February 2003. Retrieved 20 February 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html> Rheingold, H. Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, Cambridge, Basic Books, 2002. Said, E. Culture and Imperialism. London, Vintage, 1994.

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______________________________________________________________ Shannon, V. A more revolutionary Web. In International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2006. Retrieved 22 July 2006, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/23/business/web.php> Spivack, N. Defining Microcontent. Nova Spivacks weblog, 10 December 2003. Retrieved 2 January 2007, <http://novaspivack.typepad.com/nova_spivacks_weblog/2003/12/definin g_microc.html> Virilio, P. The Overexposed City. Zone No 1/2. 1987. Virilio, P. The Art of the Motor. (Trans Julie Rose) Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995. Virilio, P. Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm! CTheory, 27 August 1995 (trans. Patrice Riemens) Retrieved 17 February 1996, <http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=72> Virilio, P. Red Alert in Cyberspace! The Information Technology, War and Peace Project. 1999. Retrieved 7 June 2004, <http://www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/vy2k/red-alert.cfm> Virilio, P. & Lotringer, S. Pure War. New York, Autonomedia, 1997. Walsh, L. and Barbara, J. Speed, International Security and New War Coverage in Cyberspace. Journal of Computer Mediated Communications, 12(1), article 10, 2006, retrieved 3 October 2008, <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue1/walsh.html> W3C. World Wide Web Consortium. Retrieved 12 March 2007, <http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/> Author Dr Lucas Walsh is a Research Fellow within the Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. Areas of research include the intersections of technology with political communication, international relations and education.

Part V Ethics, Morality and Philosophy of War

Torture and the Ticking Bomb: a Case Study of Fantasy in the so-called War on Terror Bob Brecher
Abstract The fantasy of the ticking bomb scenario needs to be exposed as such. I argue, first, that its time and effectiveness constraints run against each other; that the likelihood of accurate information is very far from certain; and that the necessity which the circumstances are said to press upon the relevant authorities can only ever be retrospective. Second, I argue that what we would do is beside the point: all we could do is to employ, for use in just such cases, professional torturers. Key words Dershowitz, ticking bomb, torture *****

First, fantasy is a central component in the so-called war on terror: from Sadaam Husseins non-existent weapons of mass destruction, to the British governments advice to universities on how to combat Islamic extremism, fantasy is the key element in feeding the required public fear. Second, torture is the bottom line for civilized values; so the prohibition on torture has to go. So, third, the ticking bomb scenario is wheeled in to justify torture. 1. Dershowitzs Version. Dershowitz has always challenged (my) students with hypothetical and real-life problems requiring them to choose among evils. The classic hypothetical case involves the train engineer whose brakes become inoperative. There is no way he can stop his speeding vehicle of death. Either he can do nothing, in which case he will plow into a busload of schoolchildren, or he can swerve onto another track, where he sees a drunk lying on the rails. (Neither decision will endanger him or his passengers.) There is no third choice. What should he do?1

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______________________________________________________________ We have to choose; the only question is what should guide that choice. The number of people involved; who those people are; both; or what? Even leaving it to chance is a decision. However you decide, someone is going to suffer. And so with torture to prevent catastrophe: there are some extraordinary cases where interrogational torture is the least bad option; and, since torture is here to stay, its better to drop the hypocritical pretence that it is something we dont do and legalise its use in relevant cases - at least itd be regulated and limited. But the ticking bomb scenario is a deceptive fantasy. When unpacked, the argument falls apart. Its time and effectiveness constraints run against each other (section 2); the likelihood of accurate information is very far from certain (section 3), so that the necessity which the circumstances are said to press upon the authorities can only ever be retrospective (section 4). Second, what we would do is beside the point: all we could do is to employ, for use in just such cases, professional torturers (section 5). Time and Effectiveness Field Manual 34-52, the rulebook of American military interrogators, prohibits the use of coercive techniques because they produce low quality intelligence.2 Dershowitz, however, argues that It is precisely because torture sometimes does work and can prevent major disasters that it still exists in many parts of the world and has been totally eliminated from none.3 So what about the specific circumstances of a ticking bomb? Such evidence as we have is inevitably anecdotal and contradictory. For instance, I have personally been told that members of the Israeli security forces have claimed that a bomb was found and defused as a result of torturing the person who had planted it.4 On the other hand, such claims are also denied. But its striking that Dershowitzs own examples, of Egypt and Jordan, to whom of course the U.S. government sometimes renders terrorist suspects,5 are not remotely of the ticking bomb variety. Furthermore, his examples of Abu Nidal and the 1993 World Trade Center attacks in his explicit defence of the claim that torture sometimes works, even if it does not always work,6 are blatantly irrelevant: Jordan apparently broke the most notorious terrorist of the 1980s, Abu Nidal, by threatening his mother. Philippine police reportedly helped crack the 1993 World Trade Center bombings by torturing a suspect (my emphasis).7 The first case is obviously not one where physically torturing a terrorist, or a suspect, worked; it was when his mother was threatened that Abu Nidal broke, and thats quite another matter. Nor was there any ticking bomb waiting to be defused in either case. Odder still is this: There are numerous instances in which torture has produced selfproving, truthful information that was necessary to prevent harm to civilians. The Washington Post has recounted a case from 1995 2.

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______________________________________________________________ in which Philippine authorities tortured a terrorist into disclosing information that may have foiled plots to assassinate the pope and to crash eleven commercial airliners carrying approximately four thousand passengers into the Pacific ocean, as well as a plan to fly a private Cessna filled with explosives into CIA headquarters. For sixty-seven days, intelligence agents beat the suspect .8 Sixty-seven days? So what on earth has this report to do with any ticking bomb, or with any imminent catastrophe ? So much for Dershowitzs empirical evidence. Still, as the only evidence available about real ticking bomb cases is anecdotal, perhaps all we can really do is speculate. So, accepting for the moment that the captive really does know where the bomb is, whats their likely strategy? Remember that its only interrogational torture thats permitted. The captives position, then - as Dershowitz recognizes - is that the torturee will know that there are limits to the torture being inflicted.9 First, they know that unless they reveal where the bomb is, they will be (non-lethally) tortured. Second, they know that the torture will cease immediately they give the information required. Third, they know that, since the torture will cease immediately the bomb explodes (and remember its imminent), the time for which they have to endure the torture is comparatively short. Their tactic is obvious: lie; deny knowing where the bomb is, or try to persuade the interrogators that someone else knows where it is. Well, lets assume, perhaps reasonably, that such a tactic would not last very long; or that the captive would calculate that it wasnt worth trying, since they knew that the interrogators knew that they knew where the bomb was: the interrogators had, after all, persuaded the relevant authorities to issue a torture warrant on the basis of the evidence of such knowledge. What now? The critical issue here is time. And one pretty obvious way of buying time in these circumstances is simply to lie about the whereabouts of the bomb, and in as complicated a way as possible, hoping that by the time their lie was discovered, the bomb would be that much closer to going off - and the torture, remember, therefore that much closer to stopping. So why not lie repeatedly? And thats to say nothing of lying out of desperation (hence the Field Manual). And note that the torture would have to stop while the authorities checked the captives story - however cynical one might be inclined to be about interrogators actually behaving in such a gentlemanly way, or about observers insisting on this condition (which takes us back to lying deliberately). The less time there is, the more likely lying, whether deliberately or desperately, would work. So the more urgent the situation - and thus the more justified the torture and the warrant authorising it - the smaller the chance of stopping the bomb going off.

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______________________________________________________________ So what were being invited to weigh is not the torture of one person against the death and maiming of hundreds, or even thousands, of innocent civilians. Rather, its the torture of one person against the possibility of the death and maiming of hundreds, or even thousands, of innocent civilians. How high is that possibility? We dont know. (Ill come back to this.) But what we do know is this. If you agree with the utilitarian approach on which the argument is based, then, the higher you think the possibility is of death and mutilation, the more heavily you will take it to weigh on the side of torture; and the lower you think it is, the less heavily you will take it to weigh. So unless you do know what the possibility is, at least roughly, you cant be in a position to judge its weight against torture. Your position therefore has to be that torture is justified by even the possibility of catastrophe - not by its certainty. Furthermore, if there really is good reason to suppose that there is a bomb about to go off very soon then, as Levinson points out, anyone who believes that torture is acceptable with a warrant would, I suspect, waive the requirement when time is truly of the essence.10 Nor is that all. To the extent that time really was pressing, then it seems all too likely that a genuinely stringent process of scrutiny would slow the process down to the point of ineffectiveness. it would take time to compile evidence, and time for judges to sift through it (and even) [I]f authority to issue warrants was reserved to a small set of highly qualified judges, it might well be difficult to obtain rapid access to (them).11 Or to put it rather more bluntly: these are classic cases of emergency or exigent circumstances in which the police generally do not have time to obtain warrants.12 The more deeply a conscientious judge inquires as to whether or not the matter really is sufficiently urgent, the more time will turn out to have been wasted if it does turn out to be urgent. On the other hand, the louder the ticking, so to speak, the less time for a judge to consider the matter. Under these inevitable counter-pressures, it is a reasonable expectation that judges default position would be to issue a warrant lest it turn out that they be accused of having blood on their hands. 3. Knowledge and Necessity Jonathan Allen sets out the situation regarding knowledge succinctly: we would have to know: (a) that we are holding the right person; (b) that the person being tortured really does possess the information we need; (c) that acquiring the information the captured terrorist possesses would be very likely to put us in a position to avert a disaster, and that his accomplices havent

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______________________________________________________________ already adopted a contingency plan he knows nothing about; (d) that the information we obtain through torture is reliable.13 Even Levinson, who reluctantly semi-endorses Dershowitzs proposal - since we are staring into an abyss, and no one can escape the necessity of a response14 - notes that there is no known example of this actually occurring, in the sense of having someone in custody who knew of a bomb likely to go off within the hour.15 And all Dershowitz offers is the unreferenced claim that in Israel There is little doubt that some acts of terrorism - which would have killed many civilians - were prevented. There is also little doubt that the cost of saving these lives - measured in terms of basic human rights - was extraordinarily high.16 Nor is he alone. Others who countenance torture in extremis are even more vague. Walzer, for example, writes of authorising the torture of a captured rebel leader who knows or probably knows the location of a number of bombs 17 (my emphasis): how easy it is to slide from knowledge to suspicion. Again, the empirical question of how likely it is that a given captive has the requisite knowledge remains uncertain. We have to speculate. Any bomb-planter will have taken care to leave as little time as possible between planting the bomb and its going off. Unless they had already been under surveillance, therefore, their being taken into custody in the interval between planting and explosion must be extraordinarily unlikely; and of course, if they had been under surveillance, then those conducting the surveillance would be very likely to know where the bomb was or who the person was who knew where it was. To put it succinctly: we cannot usually be certain of guilt if we do not have all the information. If we did have it, we would not be tempted to resort to torture.18 In the United States, as Scarry points out, In the two and a half years since September 11, 2001, five thousand foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists have been detained without access to counsel, only three of whom have ever eventually been charged with terrorism-related acts; two of those three have been acquitted.19 Or consider Ziad Mustafa AlZaghal, whom six persons accused of being an active member of an Islamic military organization and of whom the legal representative of the Israeli security forces stated that he was a man who if he talks under interrogation, can prevent bombings: after five months of detention without charges or trial, he was released, having not been accused of any offense.20 So how likely is it that in the ticking bomb scenario the authorities should come to be blessed with the near-omnisicence they lack elsewhere? 4. Necessity That takes us to the issue of necessity. The whole point of the fantasy is to engender a sense of necessity: the terrorist who knows where

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______________________________________________________________ the bomb is has to be tortured in order to prevent the death and maiming of thousands of innocent people. But what sort of necessity is this? How do we know that the torture is necessary, that the disaster is imminent and unavoidable other than through the use of torture? It could be said in reply that of course empirical knowledge can never be certain, and that necessity here is to be understood in the ordinary, everyday, sense, and not in some philosophical sense. Fair enough: but precisely because certainty is unavailable, what we are actually being invited to accept is that interrogational torture is morally justifiable because it might avoid a catastrophe. The issue here is the possibility of having the knowledge that time is sufficiently short to make the case a matter of necessity. If its not known that time is (sufficiently) short, then it cant be known that the case is a matter of necessity. So how does the interrogator know that time is (sufficiently) short? It is logically possible that the detainee has told them but of course the knowledge that the interrogators knowing this leads to torture would make this even less likely than it already is: can you seriously imagine a prisoners admitting that there is a bomb set to go off at a particular time but then adamantly refusing to say where it is, knowing that they will be tortured to make them give that information?21 I suppose someone else might have told them that there is a ticking bomb, that they themselves do not know where it is, but that they do know that this other person knows where it is. But then how do the interrogators, or the authorities charged with issuing or withholding a torture warrant, know that that information is reliable? It is inordinately unlikely, to say the least, that they could have the knowledge that is a logical condition of invoking necessity. To argue, then, that the ticking bomb scenario is one where torture is necessary is misleading. It is only in the everyday, non-philosophical, sense that we can, in the real world, say in advance that something or other is necessary. But in that case all we really mean, is that - for example - taking an umbrella when its raining is one way of not getting wet. You could take a mac; or you could stay at home. You could also choose to get wet. The necessity of torture in any particular instance cant be known in advance. Thats why the ticking bomb scenario remains radically underspecified. Probability is all there can be. So how strong a probability would be required to generate a torture warrant? If the standard were set too high - say 99% - then the whole practical point of legalising interrogational torture would disappear. Fair enough: Dershowitz himself insists that no legal sanctions or processes are 100% effective. Perhaps, then, a 90% likelihood would be sufficient. But in that case, why not 89%? After all, the circumstances of the ticking bomb are so extreme as to justify what even the advocates of torture agree is a last resort. The more convincing the urgency, the lower it makes sense to set the

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______________________________________________________________ threshold of torture. So why not 51%? Or less? It follows that there has to be some risk, and very probably an increasingly considerable one, of torturing the wrong person, or of torturing a person when torture might not have been necessary after all. No wonder that the best evidence Dershowitz can cite is that the Israeli security services claimed that, as a result of the Supreme Courts decision, at least one preventable act of terrorism had been allowed to take place, one that killed several people when a bus was bombed (my emphasis). In fairness, he clearly recognises the shortcoming: Whether this claim is true, false, or somewhere in between is difficult to assess,22 he says. But yet again, what he does not recognise is the impact that that admission should have on his argument. The best that can be claimed is that it may be necessary - thats all. Substitute this more cautious phrase in a ticking bomb scenario and any initial plausibility disappears. 5. Who Tortures? Heres Anthony Quinton, back in 1971, when the British armys interrogation techniques in the north of Ireland were eliciting comment: I do not see on what basis anyone could argue that the prohibition of torture is an absolute moral principle. Consider a man caught planting a bomb in a large hospital, which no one dare touch for fear of setting it off. It was this kind of extreme situation I had in mind when I said earlier that I thought torture could be justifiable.23 Oddly, Quinton himself sees the obvious problem, but fails to see that it rules out just the sort of example he puts forward. He rightly points out that any but the most sparing recourse to [torture] will nourish a guild of professional torturers, a persisting danger to society much greater, even if more longdrawn-out, then anything their employment is likely to prevent; and that If a society does not professionalise torture, then the limits of its efficiency make its application in any particular extreme situation that much more dubious. The inevitable limits of its efficiency, however, do not make its application much more dubious (my emphasis):24 they rule such application out, simply because the ticking bomb scenario requires just that efficiency which the amateur torturer could not bring to it. The train driver is a train driver, not a trained torturer. Nor are Dershowitzs students. Nor is Dershowitz or other lawyers or philosophers. Nor are you. Nor am I. The ready acceptance of the ticking bomb scenario without distinguishing between what you or I might do in that imagined case, what you or I could do in an actual case and what someone would be expected to

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______________________________________________________________ do in an actual case has been disastrous. Its irresponsible use by philosophers engaged in thought experiments to test moral theory has in fact had a profound effect even on those who offer a detailed critique of other aspects of this sort of argument. Perhaps Michael Walzers is the most galling example. In a recent interview, conducted in 2003, he quite reasonably objects to Dershowitzs use of his (Walzers) treatment of the problem of dirty hands to justify torture warrants because extreme cases make bad law, yet immediately goes on to accept the case itself, apparently without noticing exactly what he is committing himself to: [Yes], I would do whatever was necessary to extract information in the ticking bomb case - that is, I would make the same argument after 9/11 that I made 30 years before. But I do not want to generalise from cases like that; I dont want to rewrite the rule against torture to incorporate this exception.25 Or has Walzer recently undertaken torture training? You or I can imaginatively put ourselves in the position of Dershowitzs train driver, at least to the extent of knowing how to operate the controls so as to swerve onto another track. But we cannot put ourselves in the position of a torturer, and for two reasons. First, there is the sort and the precision of the skills required; second, and far more importantly, there is the question of the depths to which the acquisition and practice of such skills requires the torturer to sink. One need only read Ronald Crelinstens discussion of how torturers are recruited and trained, for instance,26 to realise the absurdity of asking the question, What would you do in a ticking bomb case? Even if you were there when the person you knew to know where the bomb was, you would not know what to do. So I have to say that if you were an advocate of the use of torture in such cases, you might have been expected to take into account such basic factual considerations. The train driver example and the ticking bomb scenario are radically different cases. The ticking bomb scenario requires us not to imagine what we would do, but to imagine what we would require someone else - a professional torturer - to do on our behalf; and not, furthermore, as an act of supererogation or altruism, but as the practice of their profession. 6. What the Ticking Bomb Fantasy Conceals. Not only is the alleged necessity of the case spurious; its consequentialism blithely ignores the most important consequence of all - the impact of the institutionalised practice of torture on any society adopting it. The institutionalisation of the profession of torturer is a necessary condition of the examples even getting off the ground.

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______________________________________________________________ 7. Conclusion Basing public policy on individuals likely visceral responses to fantasy is the last resort of those whom power has utterly corrupted. Here as elsewhere, the so-called realists fantasy is a fundamentally dishonest one.

Notes
A Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002, p. 132. 2 D Rose, Guantnamo: Americas War on Human Rights, Faber & Faber, London, 2004, p. 95. 3 Dershowitz, p .138. 4 Dershowitzs claim, incidentally, that There is little doubt that some acts of terrorism -- which would have killed many civilians -- were prevented (p. 140) is unreferenced. 5 Dershowitz, p.138. 6 Dershowitz, p. 137. 7 Dershowitz, p. 249, n. 11. 8 Dershowitz, p. 137. 9 Dershowitz, p. 249, n. 11. 10 S Levinson, The debate on torture, Dissent, Summer 2003, unpaginated, n. 1; available at www.dissentmagazine.org. 11 J Allen, Warrant to torture? A critique of Dershowitz and Levinson, ACDIS Occasional Paper (2005), Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, p. 13: available at www.acdis.uiuc.edu. 12 K Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal/Kingston, 2003, p. 101-102; quoted in M Plaxton, Torture warrants, hypocrisy, and supererogation: justifying bright-line rules as if consequences mattered, paper delivered to The Barbarisation of Warfare conference, University of Wolverhampton, 27-28 June, 2005, p. 8. 13 Allen, p. 9. See also C Tindale, Tragic choices: reaffirming absolutes in the torture debate, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19, 2005, pp. 209-222, p. 216. 14 Levinson, unpaginated. 15 Levinson, n. 1. 16 Dershowitz, p. 140. 17 M Walzer, Political action: the problem of dirty hands, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1973, 160-180, p. 167. Reprinted in S Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (2004), 61-75.
1

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______________________________________________________________
18 19

R Trigg, Morality Matters, Blackwell, Oxford, 2004, p. 64. E Scarry, Five errors in the reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in Levinson, (ed.), pp. 281-299, p. 284. 20 A Pachecco , The Case Against Torture in Israel: A Compilation of Petitions, Briefs and Other Documents Submitted to the Israeli High Court of Justice, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, Jerusalem, sec. F, para. 11a. Cf. 11b, 11c.: available at www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/publications.asp?menu=7&submenu=2. 21 Consider the gratuitously silly fantasy of having captured one of the terrorists who admits to having planted the bomb, but who smugly refuses to reveal its location - G Jones, On the permissibility of torture, Journal of Medical Ethics, 6, 1980, pp. 11-15, p.13. Even Anthony Quinton, usually a careful thinker, invites us to Consider a man caught planting a bomb in a large hospital, which no one dare touch for fear of setting it off. - Views, The Listener, 2 December, 1971, pp. 757-758, p. 758, n. 5. But the knowledge which is a necessary condition of the necessity of torture precludes the relevance of the example: how likely is it that no one - not even the bomb disposal unit -- dare touch the bomb? And if it really were the case that only this man can defuse the bomb, then it is not for information that he would be tortured, but rather to force him to defuse the bomb; and that is quite a different matter. 22 Dershowitz, p. 150. 23 Quinton p. 758. 24 Ibid. 25 M Walzer, Michael, The United States in the world just wars and just societies: an interview with Michael Walzer, Imprints 7, 4, 2003: available at http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plcdib/imprints/michaelwalzerinterview.html). 26 R Crelinsten, In their own words: the world of the torturer, in R Crelinsten, and A Schmid, (eds.), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 65-97.

Bibliography
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______________________________________________________________ Dershowitz, A, Why Terrorism Works, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002, Jones, G, On the permissibility of torture, Journal of Medical Ethics, 6, 1980, pp. 11-15. Levinson, S, The debate on torture, Dissent, Summer 2003, retrieved 7 July 2005, <www.dissentmagazine.org>. Levinson, S (ed.), Torture: A Collection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. Pachecco, A, The Case Against Torture in Israel: A Compilation of Petitions, Briefs and Other Documents Submitted to the Israeli High Court of Justice, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, Jerusalem, 1999, retrieved 9 September 2005, <www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/publications.asp?menu=7&submenu=2>. Plaxton, M, Torture warrants, hypocrisy, and supererogation: justifying bright-line rules as if consequences mattered, paper delivered to The Barbarisation of Warfare conference, University of Wolverhampton, 2728 June, 2005. Quinton, A, Views, The Listener, 2 December, 1971, pp. 757-758. Roach, K, September 11: Consequences for Canada, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal/Kingston, 2003. Rose, D, Guantnamo: Americas War on Human Rights, Faber & Faber, London, 2004. Scarry, E, Five errors in the reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in S Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 281-299. Tindale, C, Tragic choices: reaffirming absolutes in the torture debate, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19, 2005, pp. 209-222. Trigg, R, Morality Matters, Blackwell, Oxford, 2004. Walzer, M, Political action: the problem of dirty hands, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1973, 160-180. Reprinted in S Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (2004), 61-75. Bob Brecher is Reader in Moral Philosophy at the University of Brighton, UK, and Director of its Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE).

The Mechanics of Judgment on the Topic of War Kimana Zulueta-Fuelscher


Abstract First of all, is the concept of war a stable concept, which keeps its meaning despite its very different connotations, or is it only a conceptual structure that changes with the argument? Has anything substantial changed since the end of the Cold War, or, later than this date, since September 11, 2001? And, most important, who judges these changes and based on what, is there any structure of judgment that leads human beings thinking about war? There are two possible conclusions of this article, one procedural and the other one consequential. The first one dealing with when policy makers use a certain kind of justification, when they judge the circumstances in a specific way, to convince or persuade the public of their policies. And the second one, closely related to the first, will be dealing with the possible and probable consequences of them using certain types of justifications, who is the subject judging this extreme and who judges the judge. Partly the response to this last question lies in the term responsibility, but also prudence and practical reason. Living under uncertainty and still having to take decisions is the risk we confront in our daily lives. The good management of this inescapable situation lies most of the time if not on luck, on those three faculties. Key Words Preventive/pre-emptive war, imminence, justification, responsibility, prudence *****

defense,

attack,

judgment,

On September 11, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld told President Bush on the phone, over a secure line, that what they were seeing on their screens was not a criminal action. It was war.1 The question that jumped into my mind was: is there is any common meaning to the word war, despite its very different connotations, in modern warfare? Has anything substantial changed since the end of the Cold War or, later than this, since September 11, 2001? These are the main questions I will try to answer along this essay. The reader, though, should not expect any kind of definite description or conceptualization. No principles are going to be enumerated to catalogue and differentiate war from other possible conflicts. No explanation is going to follow to permit us see the turning point to our actual concept of war. What one can expect, however, is a better picture of the indeterminacy of the concept of war, how some of

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______________________________________________________________ our political actors may use these porous limits to manipulate peoples common understanding and what our response may be. A German philosopher, named Gadamer, said once that the human being is a creature with a great capacity of imagination, and that this imagination permitted him to invent war.2 This is not to say that war is only the result of a human decision and no innate human faculty. The way I understand his statement is that war is an invention every time it resumes, even if the overall structure of actions remains similar. Context, circumstances, actors and victims change; possibilities of resolution also vary; judgments and justifications differ. The way in which we characterize war, by trying to put all these different elements into a box, is just the expression of our will to maintain control. This way, after determining the kind of war we are dealing with, rules set the apparent line between what is considered to be just or unjust in any situation.3 Surely, war is not only the fruit of an interpretation, but its perception changes with each argumentation. Words actually determine to a certain extent the way we go about such a phenomenon. Words bring about certain consequences, depending on how they describe what anyone perceives.4 Not to overextend this essay, I will tackle only those cases, whose justifications are more controvertible than, for instance the war of defense against another state.5 Wars that are interesting to me, are wars waged by a state against any kind of collective subject (be it a state or non-state actor) which is or may be a threat to the former, difficult cases in terms of justification. David Luban enumerates them as pre-emptive war, humanitarian intervention and preventive war.6 In some occasions the second type (humanitarian intervention) can be used as a justification of any of the other two: it may be argued that it is in the interest of a state to intervene in another state on behalf of some group, to impede the spread of the conflict into neighbouring countries, which directly or indirectly may affect our own state security.7 To concentrate on the first and the third type, pre-emptive and preventive war, these are the kinds of war differentiated by their relative legitimacy. Pre-emptive war is understood as another type of defensive war, where the threat is very imminent and the attack is expectable in a rather short period of time. The six-days war launched by Israel against Egypt and other Arab states may be an example. Preventive war is, according to the model, more indeterminate: the imminence is looser and the attack is only supposable in the future. Iraq is lately considered of this kind.8 These both types of war exemplify nowadays the rupture of limits in the concept of war. After September 11, 2001, the United States Administration changed their National Security Strategy officially towards pre-emptive war as a mean for successfully dealing with threats coming from so called rogue states and terrorists related to them.9 The war in Afghanistan was approved as a legitimate war by the majority of states in the international community.

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______________________________________________________________ Iraq, though, was a different case. Evidence for the justification of the war was not so clear, and more than anything based on the unknown.10 This may be comprised by the following indeterminate suppositions, we have already heard so many times: the existence of a program of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the existence of relations between Saddams regime and the terrorist network Al-Qaida, not to speak of Iraqs intervention in the September 11 massacre.11 What was obvious to anyone was the cruelty of Saddams regime with Iraqs own population, but this only reason did not seem to justify a grand scale attack on Iraq to depose the head of the state. His human rights violations laid back in time, and expectable would have been a judicial, not a military response to them. Therefore, the administration played with the mere possibility of the aforementioned reasons for the attack. In the case Saddam would have had a program of WMD and/or proven relations to Al-Qaida the war in Iraq would have been probably justified by the international community, even if only a posteriori. We only have to remember Jacques Chiracs words, saying France would back the war if these evidences would indeed be found.12 Instead, what was found was totally the opposite. No program of WMD had been working and no relations between Al-Qaida and Saddams regime were encountered. The imminence of the threat seemed to vanish, and with it the justification of the war as a preemptive war. The important point about the imminence of the attack, though, was its indeterminacy. The administration played only with the possibility of this imminence, as a threat not surmountable in the case of its immediacy.13 One had to act not according to time, but according to possibility, to uncertainty. This way, the difference in time between pre-emptive and preventive war disappeared, and instead some unknown state of possibility appeared.14 If no reaction came about in relation to this possible threat, there were two possible outcomes. First, there might not have happened anything, so the menace would have been fake. Second, the attack might have occurred, or might have been very close to happening, being already too late to react. In the second place, everything could be lost in the split of a second. If a reaction came about, even without knowing exactly what the stake was, at least one would make sure, nothing could happen to ones people. This was the option taken by the Bush Administration. Whether they had known or not for sure what was at stake is out of the question here. Their argumentation went on the possibility of a worse September 11, and at the time nobody seemed ready to take such a hit.15 The criterion to differentiate between pre-emptive and preventive war switched from a temporal to a merely probabilistic one.16 Now, the usage of the terminology is very important in this case. Calling a war pre-emptive, instead of preventive, and basing the statement on a different variable than the one that usually differentiates both kinds of war, is a very intelligent thing

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______________________________________________________________ to do, if you want to wage the war AND you want the international community (apart from your own public opinion) to approve your actions. More than this, they underlined the argument of the indeterminacy of the possibility, basing it on common sense. I understand common sense to be determined by experience and history, being the latter recently very violent in peoples minds.17 Common sense said better to be careful in relation to unpredictable actors like terrorists or rogue states, than get hit because of good intentions. These actors actually permitted to draw a continuous line between pre-emptive and preventive war. By playing out of the commonly state approved rules, they allowed states fighting them also to make exceptions in how to understand the law.18 They were the ones who permitted the contextualization of the war. Both, pre-emptive and preventive war, comprise different levels of war: a traditional kind of state against state, and an asymmetrical type, where special-forces, intelligence, military and non-military groups are used to fight, in a more or less disguised way. Mary Kaldor talks about new wars, where the limits between war, organized crime and human rights violations vanish, and where the oppositions public vs. private, state vs. non-state, and formal vs. informal, do not work anymore.19 These new wars are waged by terrorists and insurgents, from Palestine to Iraq, but not only, just because states also have to accommodate to these new forms of war. As the laws only change very slowly, and as it is not at all evident that such a change should actually come about, a traditional war has to play the role of covering up these other strategies used. Does this mean that, from the states perspective, the way of waging war has changed? No. Apart from technological improvements the people are still the same human beings in different times. The only thing changing is the argumentation in relation to the war and the specific contexts and numbers, not the fight, which will always exist, in one way or the other. The structure remains the same. Now, the question is, are there any consequences to breaking the limits, to vanish the differences, to make the point of the necessity of a war without a previous attack? One of the possible answers lies on the term responsibility. Responsibility could be defined, very loosely, as some kind of repairing reaction to the consequences of ones actions.20 In the case of the pre-emptive/preventive war there comes into place the calculus of the possible consequences, added to the real consequences. Starting with the decision to act, in a certain context and circumstances, the consequences of these actions can be various. Some of them may have been more or less certainly estimated. Some of them may have come as a surprise.21 The line connecting certain estimation and surprise, as two extremes, is very thin; so thin indeed as the difference between pre-emptive and preventive war, according to the possibility of an attack. If we base the war on a relatively justified fear, the legitimacy of these justifications may make the

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______________________________________________________________ consequences more or less excusable. Of course there are consequences that could have been foreseen and could have never been pardoned, even considering the straight necessity for war (i.e. Abu Ghraib). However, if Saddam had counted with a program of WMD and with proven relations to any terrorist network, the spread of the insurgency and the impossibility to administer the country would have been seen as an unwanted but probably inevitable effect of the war, which of course had to be dealt with in the near future. But this has not been the case. None of the aforementioned justifications came out to be true. The game played by the United States Administration was fake. None of those possibilities, as argued, was real, but all were the consequence of some misreading of evidences or intentional deception.22 However, the consequences of this mistake may, judged a posteriori, never remain unpunished. The bigger the risk of playing with uncertainty, the bigger the responsibility one has to take for ones actions. This responsibility may appear in a rather indirect fashion, through getting out-voted from ones position. But, the greater ones honour, the more obvious the repairing reaction has to be, either by trying to fix what one ruined, or getting out of the post as soon as possible to give someone else the opportunity to do any better. Bush statement that he takes all the responsibility for the mistakes committed in Iraq and his strategy of sending more troops to this country may be understood as a contradiction, but, on the other hand, it may also be seen as a consequence of feeling accountable, if anyone believes that this is the way to stabilize the country at the moment. The story, though, does not end here. Responsibility is not a single party issue. History has brought about the possibility of a pre-emptive war. More than this, it has supported the blur of limits between pre-emptive and preventive war, and therefore the possibility of manipulation of public opinion. But it is not only the policy maker the one who takes responsibility for this. Or rather, it is not only the administration that has to be taken accountable for the consequences. In democracy, also the electorate has something to say.23 The electorate comprises all eligible citizens, but also indirect manipulators, like media or NGOs, which may or may not have the same interests or perspectives as the administration does. Basically anyone who defends publicly a vision of truth has got some responsibility to share. The public defense of ones own perspective is a judgment on someone elses actions. This judgment, be it expressed only in words or by actions, also has some consequences, and for these the subject has to show some accountability. In democracy, more than in any other political system, war is not free. Be it justified and later on legitimized, or not, the interpretation of an uncertain world and ones reactions to it, do have some results. Intentions are never on the clear side of the picture. And war decisions, more than ever, are

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______________________________________________________________ based on interpretations of intentions of the different subjects involved.24 Those intentions are the decisive point towards inventing an adjective for war, be it terrorism, pre-emptive war, war against terror, imperialist or preventive war, just to mention a few. Those interpreted (or invented) intentions will only by chance or by absolute knowledge be akin to reality.25 That is our tragedy. Since we may not believe in our capability to achieve absolute knowledge, our reliance on chance may position us on the right way as well as deepen our confusion. However, sometimes we have to suppose or believe in our perspective, or at least make our public believe in it, and therefore defend a certain chain of intentions that lead us to a specific type of a war. As we live in an ever more internationally regularized world, we have to make it appear as if this war is legitimate. To this end, we put the most diverse kind of adjectives after the noun war, i.e. preventive war as opposed to pre-emptive war.26 But on the other hand, as in reality consequences may mean death, these justifications have to be based on facts. These facts, which are the reflection of the supposed intentions, may only come out ex post, and so the only fully justified judgment may be the one pronounced a posteriori. This conclusion may leave us with a rather bitter-sweet taste. Does all this mean that we are not able to pronounce judgments until everything clears up? Until the appearance of a death toll where the numbers, as the quantification of the consequences, make us feel secure? Does it mean that any judgment posed a priori without facts backing it, is not legitimate? Not exactly. What it means is that for any interpretation with consequences in the real world, be it a political decision making or the criticism of it, there has to be some collective or individual subject taking responsibility, in the case the consequences fall out of the expected outcome. However, I am afraid no institutionalization of responsibility may play the big role restraining the seemingly inevitable irresponsibility which may come out of acting in a risky environment, but only education in prudence and in the good use of intuition. Both of these solutions may seem weak in the short run. No immediate solutions may be possible apart from judicial constrain. Life is uncertain. But in the long run it may be a step forward.

Notes
This is war, Rumsfeld told Bush, The Washington Times, February 23, 2004, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040223-012306-4708r.htm 2 R Koselleck and H G Gadamer, Historia y hermenutica, Paids, Barcelona, 1997, p. 109
1

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______________________________________________________________ See P S Temes, The just war: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in our Time, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2003, p. 29, and M Walzer, Reflexiones sobre la guerra. Paids: Barcelona, 2004, p. 16, in comparison. 4 On the responsibility of language as action, see S Hampshire, Thought and Action, Chatto and Windus, London, 1959, p. 137-8. 5 M Walzer, Guerras justas e injustas. Paids, Barcelona, 2001a, pp. 101102. 6 D Luban, Preventive War. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 32, no. 3, 2004, p. 213. 7 F R Tesn, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, J. L. Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane, (eds), Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 95. See also M Walzer, Guerras justas e injustas, pp. 132-3, 149, 155. 8 D Luban, Preventive War, p. 214. See also, K W Kemp, Just-War Theory: A Reconceptualization, p. 11, http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/kwkemp/Kosova/Reconceptualization.pdf, and M Walzer, Guerras justas e injustas, pp. 126-30. 9 National Security Strategy of the USA, White House, 9/2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 10 See C Powell, Adress to the UN Security Council, White House, 02/05/2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302051.html, and compare with Powell regrets UN speech on Iraq WMDs, ABC News Online, 09/09/2005. 11 See G W Bush, Presidents Radio Address, White House, 03/19/2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050319.html, President Bush outlines Iraqi threat, 10/07/2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html, President Pleased with U.N. vote, 11/08/2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021108-1.html, President Signs National Defense Authorization Act, 12/02/2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021202-8.html, President Discusses Iraq in Radio Address, 03/15/2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030315.html, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 03/25/2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303253.html, State of the Unin Address, 01/28/2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. 12 World braces for Iraq war, CNN world news, March 18, 2003 http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/18/sprj.irq.int.reaction/index. html.
3

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______________________________________________________________
13

See S J Zentner, S. J, Friends, Enemies and the War in Iraq: A View from the Founding, en Zentner Article Formatted.doc, 7/12/2004. And also A H Cordesman, J C Wilson, R Takeyh & G Kemp, Symposium: War with Iraq: A Cost-Benefit Analysis (December 2002), Series of Capitol Hill Conferences, 9th October, 2002. Middle East Policy, Vol. IX, No. 4, p. 13. 14 See D Luban, Preventive War, pp. 230-1. 15 See G W Bush, State of the Unin Address, White House, 01/28/2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html, and I H Daalder & J M Lindsay, America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Wiley, New Jersey, 2003, pp. 156-7, 158, 159. 16 According to Daalder y Lindsay, America Unbound (p. 118), a distinguished characteristic of Bush revolution in foreign policy is his will to attack before being attacked. G W Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation, White House, 03/17/2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html. See also D Luban, Preventive War and G W Bush, President George Bush Discusses Iraq in National Press Conference, White House, 03/06/2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html. 17 See for this issue, H-G Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tbingen, 1960/1990, [27/28], p. 36, and P J Steinberger, The concept of political judgment, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pp. 231-32. 18 See W H Taft & T F Buchwald, `Preemption, Iraq, and International Law. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 557-563, and J Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 563576, and R Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, p. 581. 19 M Kaldor, Las nuevas guerras. Violencia organizada en la era global, Tusquets, Barcelona, 2001, pp. 15, 16, 17. 20 See C Thiebaut, Conceptos fundamentales de filosofa, Alianza, Madrid, 2000, p. 96, and J Schwartlnder, (1974). Verantwortung, in Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe (Vol. 6), H Krings H-M Baumgartner (eds), Ksel, Mnchen, 1974, pp. 1577-8, and G H Von Wright, Explicacin y comprensin, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1979, p. 115, and I Berlin, Four essays on liberty, Oxford Univ. Press, 1969, p. xxii-xxiii. 21 See S Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 68, and E Vollrath, Die Rekonstruktion der politischen Urteilskraft, Klett, Stuttgart, 1977, p. 129.

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______________________________________________________________ About the difference between fakeness and lie, see J P Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq. Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, No. 1, Marzo, 2004, p. 28. 23 R Beiner, Political judgment, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 112. 24 See and compare, J R Searle, Intencionalidad, Un ensayo en la filosofa de la mente, Tecnos, Madrid, 1992 (Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge, 1983), p. 113, and S Hampshire, Morality and Pessimism, in Public and Private Morality, S Hampshire (ed), Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978, p. 40. 25 R Beiner, Interpretive essay, in Lectures on Kants political philosophy, H Arendt, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982, p. 143. 26 See Bush speeches, i.e. George W. Bush, President Holds Press Conference, White House, 10/28/2003.
22

Bibliography
Beiner, R., Political judgment. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1983. Beiner, R., Intepretive essay, in ARENDT, H., Lectures on Kants political philosophy. Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982. Berlin, I., Four essays on liberty. Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. Bush, G. W., Speeches. White House, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases. Cordesman, A. H., Wilson, J. C., Takeyh, R., Kemp, G., Symposium: War with Iraq: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. Series of Capitol Hill Conferences, 9th October, 2002. Middle East Policy, Vol. IX, No. 4, December 2002. Daalder, I. H. Y Lindsay, J. M., America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Wiley, New Jersey, 2003. Ferrara, A., Justice and Judgment. Sage Publications, Oxford, 1999. Gadamer, H.-G., Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tbingen, 1960. Hampshire, S., Morality and Pessimism, in HAMPSHIRE, S. (ed), Public and Private Morality. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978, pp. 1-21. Hampshire, S., Thought and action. Chatto and Windus, London, 1959. Ignatieff, M., The burden, in The New York Times, January 5, 2003. Kaldor, M., New and Old Wars: organized violence in a global era. Stanford University Press, 2001. Kemp, K. W., Just-War Theory: A Reconceptualization, http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/kwkemp/Kosova/Reconceptualization.pdf. Koselleck, R. & Gadamer, H.-G., Historia y hermenutica. Paids, Barcelona, 1997.

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______________________________________________________________ Luban, D., Preventive War, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 32, no. 3, 2004, pp. 207-248. Mnkler, H., Die neuen Kriege. Rowohlt, Hamburg, 2002. National Security Strategy of the USA. White House, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. Pfiffner, J. P., Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq. Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 25-46. Powell, C., Adress to the UN Security Council. White House, February 5, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302051.html. Powell, C., Powell regrets UN speech on Iraq WMDs, ABC News Online, 09/09/2005. Rorty, R., Contingency, irony and solidarity. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1989 Rumsfeld, R., This is war, Rumsfeld told Bush. The Washington Times, February 23, 2004, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040223012306-4708r.htm. Schwartlnder, J., Verantwortung, in Krings, H. & Baumgartner, H.-M., Wild Ch. (eds), Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe (Vol. 6). Ksel, Mnchen, 1974. Searle, J. R., Intencionalidad. Un ensayo en la filosofa de la mente. Tecnos, Madrid, 1992. (Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge, 1983). Steinberger, P. J., The concept of political judgment. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993. Taft, W. H. & Buchwald, T. F., Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 557-563. Temes, Peter S., The just war: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in our Time. Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2003. Tesn, F.R., The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in Holzgrefe, J. L., Keohane, R. O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge UP, 2003. Thiebaut, C., Conceptos fundamentales de filosofa. Alianza, Madrid, 2000. Vollrath, E., Die Rekonstruktion der politischen Urteilskraft. Klett, Stuttgart, 1977. von Wright, G. H., Explicacin y comprensin. Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1979. Walzer, Michael, Reflexiones sobre la guerra. Piados, Barcelona, 2004.

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______________________________________________________________ Walzer, M., Guerras justas e injustas. Paids, Barcelona, 2001. (Just and unjust wars. A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations. Basic Books, New York, 1977). Wedgwood, R., The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 576-585. World braces for Iraq. CNN World News, March 18, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/18/sprj.irq.int.reaction/ind ex.html. Yoo, J., International Law and the War in Iraq, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 563-576. Zentner, S. J. Friends, Enemies and the War in Iraq: A View from the Founding, in Zentner Article Formated.doc, 7/12/2004. Kimana Zulueta-Fuelscher has Phd in political science and international relations, University Autnoma of Madrid, Spain, and is currently working as a researcher for a European think tank located in Madrid, FRIDE.

The Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications for the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation of Outer Space Arjen Vermeer
Abstract Military use of outer space has been part and parcel of national security strategies ever since the space age began. Recent developments in technology and military doctrine have shown an increased interest by States in the deployment of killer satellites in space. Thus, an assessment thereof under international law seems pertinent. The arms control provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty reserve only celestial bodies to be used for peaceful purposes, thereby demilitarising them completely. Conversely, the Treaty does not limit military activities in the space between celestial bodies, the outer void space, except for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the application of general international law. Yet, force application by space weaponry challenges the regime governing the use of force in international relations, the jus ad bellum. The concept of force needs to be revisited, and the significant impact differentiated regimes of outer void space and celestial bodies have on the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence will be assessed. Lastly, a possible jus in bello spatiale will be examined. The analysis focuses on the application of the general principles and the environmental protection regime existing under the current regulation of means and methods of warfare. Additionally, targeting issues under the law of armed conflict are evaluated in view of the characteristics of space assets. Military activity in space will only increase in wars to come. This will profoundly test existing norms of international law. Hence, a framework is offered of the norms applicable in the fourth dimension of warfare. Key words militarisation and weaponisation of space, outer space treaty, use of force, right of self-defence, ballistic missile defence, law of armed conflict, means and methods of warfare, targeting, environmental protection ***** 1. Introduction The ascent into space of man-made objects made it possible to use space as a medium for military purposes. Space militarization can be

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______________________________________________________________ described as any activity in space which is executed by a man-made object that is incorporated de jure or de facto in the military organization of a State.1 Satellites, for instance, may perform a number of tasks for military purposes, including communications, weather information, navigation (e.g. GPS and missile guidance), and remote sensing. Space weaponisation denotes the introduction of operational weapons systems in outer space.2 Some examples of dedicated space weapons include Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEWs) and Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). The concept of Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEWs) is simple: a kill is being executed through high velocity impact (hit-to-kill). Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) include a broad variety of technologies such as lasers, particle beams and signal interference technologies like high-powered microwaves or high power radio frequencies. Electromagnetic and Radiation Weapons (ERWs) operate through the emission and/or creation of electromagnetic pulse or radiation. The device that brings about both consequences at once is a nuclear weapon. Lastly, Explosive Proximity Weapons (EPWs), also referred to as space mines, explode upon contact or in proximity. Despite the technological development, political realities have prevailed to the extent that all space faring States, but the US3, are very cautious to include space capabilities in their national military doctrines as viable means to secure their national interest. Nevertheless, the weaponisation of space by those and other nations looms just as large.4 This paper will focus on whether and to what extent force application by space weapon systems in space is regulated under existing international law, in particular the Outer Space Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations and the law of armed conflict. Obligations Arising from Article IV Outer Space Treaty This year, 2007, we will be commemorating the 50th anniversary of the space age which began with the launching of the Sputnik I on October 4, 1957 and the 40th anniversary of the first treaty to regulate space activities comprehensively, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST).5 Article IV OST, consisting of two paragraphs, has significant bearing on military activities in space.6 Article IV(1): Weapons of Mass Destruction The first paragraph prohibits to put nuclear and any other weapon of mass destruction in orbit or in outer space. However, the treaty leaves crucial terms undefined, such as outer space and orbit. It is generally understood that outer space comprises celestial bodies, including the Moon,7 and all space in between, the so-called outer void space8 and orbit means at least one full orbit around the Earth in order to exclude from the A. 2.

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______________________________________________________________ scope of the provision ICBMs (carrying nuclear warheads) passing through space.9 Further, the object of the prohibition is objects carrying weapons of mass destruction, not the weapons per se. It would be a misreading and against the spirit of the OST, however, to cling to such a strict reading. Moreover, it is submitted that, at least for the purposes of the OST, nuclear weapons that do not have the characteristics of a WMD and a fortiori nuclear material not intended to be used as a weapon are excluded from the prohibition.10 Thus, space weapons that use nuclear energy, like some DEWs, but that do not possess the characteristics in effect or design as WMD fall outside the scope of Article IV(1). Article IV(2): The Peaceful Purposes Debate Article IV(2) is concerned with the demilitarisation of the Moon and other celestial bodies only.11 It is important to keep in mind that in 1967 neither the US nor the Soviet Union attempted to bring about a complete demilitarisation of the whole of outer space comparable to the regime established by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.12 The omission of any reference to outer space sensu lato is therefore a deliberate one.13 Nevertheless, Article IV(2) bears significant resemblance with the Antarctic Treaty and, arguably, has the same effect of establishing a regime of complete demilitarisation, albeit spatially limited to celestial bodies.14 The main debate, however, focuses on the interpretation of the term peaceful in the context of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. It is argued that the interpretation of peaceful meaning non-aggressive, as supported by the US15, is erroneous. Replacing peaceful by nonaggressive in Article IV(2) would a contrario mean - if one accepts the limited spatial application of Article IV(2) - that outer void space may be used for aggressive purposes.16 This conclusion cannot be warranted, particularly as Article III OST makes the UN Charter and its provisions on the prohibition of the use of force applicable to outer space. In other words, it would make Article IV(2) redundant. On the other hand, the interpretation of peaceful meaning nonmilitary is a more likely one, because in this context it should be seen distinct from terms like offensive or aggressive and defensive or nonaggressive. According to the customary rules of treaty interpretation, treaty terms shall be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.17 First of all, the ordinary meaning of peaceful implies a non-military nature.18 Secondly, in the context of the OST, there are several references to peaceful purposes hinting at a non-military point of view.19 Thirdly, other treaties with a similar nature can be referred to for interpretation purposes, as the practice of the ICJ has shown.20 There are a number of treaties that, according to their object and B.

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______________________________________________________________ purpose, point to peaceful as non-military.21 Admittedly, none of these treaties provides a definition of peaceful. Yet, there is no indication that the parties intended to attach a special meaning to it in the sense of Article 31(4) of the VCLT. Hence, the ordinary meaning of peaceful, i.e. non-military, should also be applied to Article IV(2). Military Space Activities in Outer Void Space The US and the USSR only accepted Article IV as it stands to gain maximum freedom to protect their national interest. The Outer Space Treaty regulates military activities in differentiated regimes; one addresses the Moon and other celestial bodies (Article IV(2)), and the other the outer void space (Article III).22 Therefore, the use of force in outer void space should be judged by general international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and the law of armed conflict. The Threat or Use of Force in Outer Space The cornerstone provision on the regulation of the use of force between States is the well-known Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force in international relations.23 Article 2(4) is declaratory of customary international law24 and even considered to be jus cogens25, thus binding upon all States in all their international relations, including those in outer space. However, Article II of the OST excludes appropriation in outer space sensu lato and, thus, negates the possibility of the use of force against the territorial integrity.26 Without an associated terrestrial attack, the political independence of a State is threatened neither.27 Hence, all uses of force in outer space are necessarily subject to any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. It is generally accepted that force denotes armed force.28 However, signal interference weapons, for instance, are not considered to apply force in the classical sense, i.e. with kinetic weapons.29 To make Article 2(4) applicable, Brownlie argues that new types of force application devices would be covered if the agencies concerned are commonly referred to as weapons and forms of warfare and if these weapons are employed for the destruction of life and property.30 Thus, a re-interpretation of the notion force along these lines seems justified. 4. Chapter VII of the UN Charter The only generally accepted exceptions to the non-use of force are a Security Council authorisation and forcible measures taken in the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. The United Nations system provides the Security Council coercive tools under Chapter VII of the Charter. Though the Drafters of the Charter may not have been concerned with the inclusion of 3. C.

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______________________________________________________________ space limitations in the Charter, its application to outer space cannot be disregarded. Prior to applying these means, however, the Security Council has to determine a situation pursuant to Article 39 UN Charter, most likely a threat to the peace. This could involve either a threat to mankind (e.g. WMD, space debris, or theoretically even weaponisation) or a threat to another States national security (threat or use of force against a States space assets). Interestingly, Article 41 UN Charter provides for the possibility to interrupt telegraphic, radio and other means of communication.31 This could include space-based assets, like communication and GPS satellites. Lacking any reference to space or space forces, Article 42 would not bar military measures to be taken from or in outer space automatically. Even if such a literal approach were adopted, there is nothing to assume that the SC could not change this interpretation by subsequent practice.32 To a certain extent this has already been achieved with regard to military space activities.33 Moreover, the technological advances in space are undeniably of great asset to UN peacekeeping missions.34 Space assets may thus not only be called upon to support Earth-based measures, but force application in or from outer space may come within the purview of the envisaged actions as well. Self-Defence Article 51 UN Charter does not conclusively define the right of selfdefence, it mainly sets out the conditions under which measures in selfdefence are lawful.35 Basically, it requires an armed attack and prescribes a temporary response until the SC steps in. Besides, it calls for States to report immediately to the SC once measures are taken. Furthermore, customary international law places two additional constraints upon the lawful exercise of the right, namely necessity and proportionality.36 The application of the right of self-defence to outer space seems undisputed today.37 Self-Defence in Outer void Space Undoubtedly, the right of self-defence is activated once an attack takes place against a military space asset wherever it may be located.38 However, there is considerable controversy as to whether the individual right of self-defence extends to the protection of civil assets owned by either own nationals or third States nationals outside the territory where they are registered.39 Due to the obliged registration of space assets - military or civil in a particular State, these assets may profit from diplomatic protection by that State of registry.40 Support can, thus, be found for the claim that the protection of any State registered asset falls within the ambit of protection afforded by the right of self-defence.41 A. 5.

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______________________________________________________________ B. Self-Defence On Celestial Bodies The issues related to the interpretation of peaceful purposes can be put in the context of the place of self-defence in the regulation of a demilitarised zone in general, and of celestial bodies in particular. A nonaggressive approach argues in favour of military installations on celestial bodies for the purpose of self-defence.42 This argument cannot be accepted. The demilitarisation of celestial bodies can be seen as a collective act precisely tailored to prevent threats to the peace. Celestial bodies are res communis denoted for that purpose as demilitarised zones. This regime cannot be derogated from, not even in wartime, as State practice demonstrates.43 Hence, it is submitted that Article IV OST precludes any offensive and defensive military activity on celestial bodies. Ballistic Missile Defence A ballistic missile defence system is seeking defence of the State through i.a. military deployment in outer space aiming at tracking and intercepting incoming missiles. Ballistic missile defence can be characterized as a magnified effort of the generally accepted concept of interceptive selfdefence.44 The issue involved does not so much concern the orbiting of those components - this is a legal activity when they comply with Article IV OST in particular -, but some of these components would undoubtedly claim some sort of protection, identification or exclusion zone around them. Any space asset that comes within such a zone risks being targeted. The question then is, does the assumingly permanent nature of the associated keep out zones of these assets run counter to international law? On the high seas, States have arguably acquiesced in the declaration of such zones, at least for the duration of a conflict.45 Interestingly, the claim that such a deployment of assets would contradict the principle that outer space cannot be occupied appears to lose ground46, but State practice is inconclusive, at best. Yet, a strong argument can be presented that any interference due to such a zone - be it in peace- or wartime - would be contrary to the freedom of navigation in space.47 Thus, it seems that permanent keep out zones fall outside the legal paradigm and limit current initiatives for unilateral deployment of a BMD when assets used for BMD make use of keep out zones in peacetime. The Law of Armed Conflict in Outer Space The use of force is not only judged by the regime governing the legality of the resort to armed force, the jus ad bellum, but also by the law applicable in armed conflict, the jus in bello.48 Over time, a few but significant principles have been accepted as applicable to any type of armed conflict: military necessity, humanity, proportionality and discrimination. Yet, it cannot be held beforehand that the corpus of the LOAC applies in toto to armed conflict in outer void space because of the unique environment it 5. C.

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______________________________________________________________ presents.49 Moreover, one should take into account that the OST assists significantly in shaping a minimum order and may therefore not be suspended or terminated.50 Though, fortunately, hostilities have not arisen at this point in time in space, it can, however, not be excluded that one day outer space will be the fourth dimension of warfare and, consequently, may attain its own corpus of jus in bello spatiale, a law of armed conflict in space. This paper will reflect on two important applications of the aforementioned principles: the protection of the space environment and the law of targeting in space. Means of Warfare: Protecting the Space Environment The concern of the law of armed conflict for the protection of the environment can be appreciated in two ways: firstly, the LOAC deals with the effect of warfare on the environment; secondly, the LOAC deals with the use of the environment as a means of warfare.51 Article 35(3) and Article 55 form the direct protection regime of the environment afforded by the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I). It is safe to assume that both provisions belong to the body of customary law.52 The place of Article 55(1) in the section on the protection of the civilian population on land may suggest its application being confined to land warfare. However, Article 35(3) is not so limited and, hence, the protection extends to all types of warfare, including space warfare.53 Both articles mention the natural environment, but nowhere in AP I is this term defined. To make a similar provision applicable to all orbits around celestial bodies, it should be argued that in the event that future generations may inhabit, at least be present on or in orbit around celestial bodies, those bodies and orbits should also be covered by the regime protecting the space environment. Though such an interpretation may arguably be justified,54 it problematically demonstrates the exclusion of the remainder of outer space, in which (unmanned) assets may still be active such as space mines. Ultimately, one should not be surprised if a proposal finds its way to the negotiation table to declare the protection of the environment applicable to the whole of outer space. The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) is concerned with the deliberate manipulation of the natural process.55 Importantly, the convention is limited only to military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques (Article I). The treaty is made explicitly applicable to outer space.56 Nevertheless, the treatys utility in the context of space weapons is doubtful, as current space weapon technology is not focusing on deliberately manipulating the natural process.57 Be that as it may, force application in space will leave its traces during and (long) after armed conflict in the form of space debris. The production of debris in space is not only an environmental issue but, 6.

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______________________________________________________________ moreover, space debris can have the same effect as a weapon.58 It would take an enormous, but necessary effort of belligerents to limit the production of space debris to minimize environmental damage and to prevent damage to non-belligerent space assets. A future LOAC in space should mirror this appropriately. Targeting Issues For the most widely accepted definition of a military objective today, one has to consider Article 52(2) AP I.59 This article intends to give effect to the principle of distinction contained in Article 48 AP I between civilian objects and military objectives. Article 52(2) sets out a two-pronged test in order to qualify an object as a military objective. First, a military objective must by its nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action. Concerning the nature of a military object, this is established when the object is integrated in the military structure. Objects by location often refer to either a construction located at a strategic point or a designated area as a whole. Interestingly, the latter option could include an orbit.60 Regarding purpose and use, these criteria commonly indicate a dual-use object. Secondly, the objectives total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, must offer a definite military advantage. Then the question arises whether a civil satellite or civil spaceship which provides information for military purposes to or performs military functions for one or both belligerent parties can be considered a military objective?61 The question relates to dual-use objects, i.e. objects being used both - either simultaneously or alternatively - for military as for civil purposes. Interestingly, certain means of communication, which do not exclude satellites, were proposed to fall under Article 52(3), where it is stated that in case of doubt a civil object is presumed to be so used. However, they failed to be included precisely because of their more likely military use in wartime.62 Hence, the general rule of Article 52(2) should apply that in case on object has a military purpose or use it constitutes a legitimate target, notwithstanding its registration as a civil space asset. Furthermore, there are a number of proportionality issues which makes targeting a legal labyrinth. These issues are further complicated, it seems, by multi-ownership and neutrality issues. However, all that the law requires (Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(a)(ii) AP I) is to weigh the concrete and direct anticipated military advantage against the anticipated loss of civilian lives; the latter must not be excessive in relation to the former.63 The foreseeable long-term or reverberating effects - except environmental concerns - are, even if identifiable, not considered part of the current legal restraints on targeting but seem to worry States nonetheless.64 This can be explained by todays technologically advanced societies, which rely more and more on 7.

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______________________________________________________________ sophisticated and (civil-military) integrated systems, networks and infrastructure.65 Yet, these systems often use satellites which, in turn, are the likely objectives of space weapons. Attacking these satellites may damage large segments of modern day societies (including humanitarian assistance) depending on satellite data and communications. 8. Conclusion Technological developments and States interest in the weaponisation of space call for a legal appraisal. The OST regulates only partly the non-weaponisation of space through its prohibition of WMD and the non-militarisation norm only applies to celestial bodies. The OST leaves it to other norms to fill the gaps but determines through its differentiated regimes the framework in which other sources regulate the use of force. Moreover, space weaponry itself poses a challenge to existing norms. The prohibition on the use of force requires an acknowledgment of this challenge. Such an approach is necessary if the absolute character of the prohibition is to be retained. Another implication of force application in space will be a lawful extension of the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the right of self-defence is affected by the division of regimes in the OST. It simply does not override just any other legal regime, like those for celestial bodies. A law of armed conflict in space or jus in bello spatiale is, however, unlikely to emerge in the near future; the law of armed conflict is inherently shaped after a conflict rather than before. Yet, the issues identified take a central place in shaping such a regime. This work has highlighted a number of issues likely to be encountered by law-makers and policymakers involved in this emerging field. Overall, it has attempted to demonstrate that a world order would be better served by rethinking existing norms and apply them in the space medium in accordance with the fundamental principles underlying them. It can only be hoped that States, organisations and individuals alike will actively search for ways to address these issues because space warfare is not science fiction, it is reality.

Notes
Joachim F. von Bentzien, Die militrische Nutzung des Weltraums in Friedens- und Kriegszeiten aus rechtlicher Sicht, vol. 35, Zeitung fr Luftund Weltraumrecht (1986), pp. 319-344, at 324 2 Cf. Ivan A. Vlasic, Space Law and the Military Applications of Space Technology, in: Nandasiri Jasentuliyana (ed.), Perspectives on International
1

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______________________________________________________________ Law, London: Kluwer Law International (1995), pp. 556, pp. 385-410, at 386, footnote 6. 3 In order to [] enhance the national security, the Unites States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities. [] Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there. [] Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation.National Science and Technology Council, National Space Policy, October 6, 2006, at http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf (lastly accessed April 6, 2006). It followed a recommendation made by a 2001 congressional commission, chaired by later to be Secretary of State Donald: [W]e know from history that every medium-air, land and sea-has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities. Report of the Commission to Access United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, at 100 at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html (lastly accessed April 6, 2006). 4 Theresa Hitchens, Developments in Military Space: Movement toward space weapons?, at http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/space-weapons.pdf (lastly accessed April 4, 2006). See also John W. Heath, The Vanishing Horizon: Will the Asymmetric Battlefield Make Space-Based Weapons a Reality?, 45 Proceedings of the Forty-fifth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 206 (2003) 5 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS. 205, entered into force, October 10, 1967. 6 Article IV OST reads: 1.States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 2.The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

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______________________________________________________________ The Moon has always been treated as a celestial body in the framework of the UN. In resolutions and agreements subsequent to GA Resolution 1884(XVIII) explicit reference was made to the Moon and other celestial bodies (emphasis added). Cf. OST, Article IV(2). See Carl Q. Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space, New York: Pergamon Press (1982), at 22. In the case of Article IV(1) of the OST this exclusion should be attributed to poor drafting. See also infra section 2A. 8 The term outer void space was introduced by Cheng, see Bin Cheng, Introducing a New Term to Space Law: Outer Void Space, 11 Korean Journal of Air and Space Law 321 (1999). Outer space in the sense of Article IV(1) of the OST is, thus, outer space sensu lato. 9 Luigi Condorelli, and Zidane Mriboute, Some Remarks on the State of International Law Concerning Military Activities in Outer Space, 6 It.YIL 3 (1985), at 20-25. 10 Cf. Article 5 of the 1967 Treaty For The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 634 UNTS 326, entered into force April 22, 1968. These characteristics do not only include the destructive impact, but also the indiscriminate nature and long-lasting effects. See Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror Freeing the World from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, 2006, at http://www.wmdcommission.org (lastly accessed April 9, 2007), at 17, 32 and 42. 11 Even though in the second sentence of Article IV(2) there is only a reference to celestial bodies, it has been submitted that the Moon is a celestial body. No claim can thus be made that the Moon is excluded from the application of the second sentence. Contrary, see Rex J. Zedalis and Catherine L. Wade, Anti-Satellite weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 8 California Western ILJ 454 (1978), at 461 12 This became apparent when both superpowers rejected a proposal to that effect, see UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1493 and UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2.SR.66 of August 1, 1966. 13 Christol, supra note 7, at 21-22 and R. Lakshanan, Prohibition of Weaponisation of Outer Space, 28 Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 68 (1985), at 73 14 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 402 UNTS 71, entered into force June 23, 1961, Article I reads: 1.Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon. 2.The present
7

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______________________________________________________________ Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose. 15 Initially, both the US and the Soviet Union aimed at a complete demilitarisation of outer space. Daniel Goedhuis, An Evaluation of the Leading Principles of the Treaty of Outer Space of 27th January 1967, 15 NILR 17 (1968), at 23. However, the availability, use and potential of satellite systems prompted the US already in 1958 to change its interpretation of peaceful from non-military to non-aggressive. See Christopher M. Petras, The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial Space Systems Reexamining Self-Defense in Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. Air L.&Com. 1213 (2002), at 1253. 16 Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in: Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva; UNIDIR, Geneva, New York: Taylor & Francis (1991), at 44-45 even concludes that [i]f peaceful means non-aggressive, then it follows logically and absurdly that all nuclear and chemical weapons are also peaceful, as long as they are not used for aggressive purposes. 17 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 1969, 679, Article 31(1). Article 31 VCLT reflects customary law, see ICJ Reports 1999, Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment, 1999, 4, para. 18 18 Oxford English Dictionary, New York: Oxford University Press (1984) 19 Following Article 31(2) VCLT, see OST, preambular paragraphs 2 and 4, Articles IX and XI 20 See ICJ Rep. 1980, Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between WHO and Egypt case, at 73, paras. 4547 21 1956 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 276 UNTS 3, entered into force October 26, 1956; 1959 Antarctic Treaty; 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty; 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161, entered into force March 5, 1970; 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention; 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The object and purpose of those treaty provisions referring to peaceful purposes are similar to that of the Article IV OST, namely of an arms control or disarmament nature. See also infra note 50. The notable exception is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3, entered into force

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______________________________________________________________ November 16, 1994, which refers to peaceful purposes in its Article 88, but is generally considered to denote non-aggressive. 22 Bin Cheng, Properly Speaking, Only Celestial Bodies Have Been Reserved for Use Exclusively for Peaceful (Non-Military) Purposes, but Not Outer Void Space, in: Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Essays in Honour of Professor L.C. Green on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday, 75 International Law Studies 81, Newport: Naval War College (2000), at 81-117 and Gennady Zhukov and Yuri Kolosov, International Space Law, New York: Praeger Publishers (1984), at 224. 23 Article 2(4) UN Charter reads: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 24 See generally, Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in: Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002), at 112-136 25 See for example ICJ Reports 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 27 June 1986, at 14 (Nicaragua case), para. 83. Note that the Court did not acknowledge this status but underlined the support thereof. 26 It has, however, been argued that territorial integrity may, in addition to land mass, be interpreted to include human and natural resources in space. See Robert L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 Akron L.Rev. 649 (1979), at 660 27 Ian Brownlie, The Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Outer Space, 40 BYIL 1 (1964), at 8. In the same sense, see Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice, 37, BYIL 269 (1961), at 283 28 Support for this interpretation can be found i.a. in preambular paragraph 7 of the UN Charter and UN Doc. GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of October, 24, 1970 Declaration On Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations And Cooperation Among States In Accordance With The Charter Of The United Nations. 29 Cf. Wulf von Kries, Die militrische Nutzung des Weltraums, in: KarlHeiz Bckstiegel and Marietta Benk (eds.), Handbuch des Weltraumrechts, Kln: Carl Heymanns Verlag (1991), at 337-338 30 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1963), at 362. Furthermore, he argues that it would be in accordance with general principles of law to include intended and direct

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______________________________________________________________ consequences in the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. See Brownlie, supra note 27, at 25. Consider, for example, the manoeuvring of a satellite so as to block a solar panel of another satellite thereby cutting off the electricity and thus causing (fatal) damage. Example mentioned in Benk, Marietta, The Problem of Space Debris: A Valid Case Against the Use of Aggressive Military Systems in Outer Space? in: Marietta Benk and Kai-Uwe Schrogl (eds.), Space Law: Current Problems and Perspectives for Future Regulation, Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing (2005), at 167 31 Article 41 UN Charter reads: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 32 Ricky J. Lee, The Jus ad Bellum in Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space, 29 J. of Space Law 93 (2003), at 110, in particular footnote 32 33 Practice has established that the phrase all necessary means utilized in certain SC Resolutions encompasses the use of force, but, naturally, also auxiliary activities to apply force. Given the significant use of space-based assets, the first Gulf War may serve here as an example. 34 Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and Peaceful Purposes, 60, J. Air L.&Com. 237 (1994-1995), at 309. Obviously this is not only restricted to UN SC authorized missions but also those pursuant to UN Doc. A/Res/377(V) of 3 November 1950, Uniting for Peace type of action and regional arrangements under Articles 51-53 of the UN Charter. 35 Article 51 UN Charter reads: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain international peace and security. 36 Nicaragua case, para. 176; ICJ Report 1996, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, at 226 (Nuclear Weapons case), para. 226; and, ICJ Reports 2003, Oil Platforms (Islamic

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______________________________________________________________ Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 6 November 2003, para. 76 37 See Morgan, supra note 34, at 307-308; Natalino Ronzitti, Problemi Giuridici Sollevati dale Iniziative in Materia de Disarmo Spaziale, in: Francesco Francioni e Fausto Pocar (eds.), Il Regime Internazionale dello Spazio, Milano: Dott. A. Giuffr Editore (1993), at 79-87; Elizabeth S. Waldrop, Weaponization of Outer Space: US National Policy, XXIX AASL 1 (2004), at 18-21; Louis Haeck, Aspects Juridiques de Certaines Utilisations Militaires de lEspace, XXI AASL 65 (1996), at 92-97; For early recognition of this right in outer space, see Cooper, John Cobb, SelfDefense in Outer Space and the United Nations, in: Ivan A. Vlasic (ed.), Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays by John Cobb Cooper 19461966, Montreal: McGill University Press (1968), at 412-422 and Brownlie, supra note 27. Nevertheless, there seemed to be some confusion at the beginning of the space age, see M. Chandrasekharan, The Space Treaty, 7 Indian JIL 61 1(967), who denies the application of the right of self-defence to outer space. 38 A.V. Lowe, Self-Defence at Sea, in: W.E. Butler (ed.), The Non-Use of Force in International Law, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1989), at 188 asserts that the extension of the right of self defense to cover warships is arguably necessary for the practical survival of the right to defend the State itself. 39 That collective self-defence would permit such action seems clear from the text of Article 51 itself. See Haeck, supra note 37, at 84. 40 See Article VIII OST. The 1975 Registration Convention requires every man-made space object to be registered by the launching State. Cf. ICJ Rep. 1955, Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), p. 4, at 24 in which the Court held that a State assumes the defense of its citizens by means of protection as against other States. See also A. Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization, Amsterdam/New York: North-Holland, (1986), at 74 note 84; and, Brownlie, supra note 27, at 4. By analogy with the high seas, see Lowe, supra note 38 and Brownlie, supra note 3025, at 305. This may be complicated by the fact that space assets may be registered in one State but may be owned by an entity in another State. 41 See e.g. Harry H. Almond, Military Activities in Outer Space The Emerging Law, 23 Proceedings of the Twenty-third Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 149 (1981), at 150 and Haeck, idem, at 89, note 88 and accompanying text

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______________________________________________________________ See e.g. Almond, supra note 41, at 150 and Harry H. Almond, Demilitarization and Arms Control: Antarctica, 17 Case Western JIL 229 (1985), at 250 43 See infra section 6 44 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001), at 172 45 See generally Christopher Michaelsen, Maritime Exclusion Zones In Times Of Armed Conflict At Sea: Legal Controversies Still Unresolved, 8 JCSL 363 (2003) and W.J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone: Device in the Law of Naval Warfare, 24 Can.YIL 91 (1986). 46 It has been argued that if such a defence must be build, it should be done cooperatively. See Detlev Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law, Geneva: UNIDIR (2006), at 126-127 and Thomas Graham Jr., Space Weapons and the Risk of Incidental Nuclear War, 35 Arms Control Today 12 (2005) 47 Article I OST. See Bentzien, supra note 1, at 322-323 48 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books, 3rd ed. (2000), at 129. The jus in bello is also called international humanitarian law, the law of war or the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 49 The outcome of the previous sections necessitate again the distinction between celestial bodies on the on hand and outer void space on the other. 50 It is submitted that the OST as the Magna Charta of space law continues to apply in armed conflict between two or more belligerents because, firstly, States are under the obligation to allow non-belligerent States access in space. see Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, The Outer Space Treaty and enhancing space security, in: UNIDIR, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security-Conference Report, 30-31 March 2006, Geneva: UNIDIR Publications (2006), at 113-123. Secondly, the OST provisions, especially Article IV, are overriding norms in the sense that by their nature they are specifically designed to apply during armed conflict as they serve to minimize the risk of and damage in armed conflict. See R.J. Mathews and
T.L.H. McCormack, The Influence of Humanitarian Principles in the Negotiation of Arms Control Treaties, 81 IRRC 331 (1999), at 334-335.
42

Besides, as the OST also embodies, arguably, peremptory norms, which indicates its continuous application. See Lee, supra note 32 51 ICRC Commentary, online at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (lastly accessed April 2, 2007), Article 35, para. 1450. See also Peter J. Richards, and Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict, 28 Stetson L.Rev. 1047 (1999), at 1049.

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______________________________________________________________ In favour, see Michel Bourbonnire, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Ius in Bello Satellitis, 9 JCSL 43 (2004) and L. Henkaerts, & L. Doswald-Beck, ICRC Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005), CIHL Rules 44-45. Against, Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under The Law Of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2004), at 185 who cites the authority of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case to argue that these provisions have not yet crystallized as customary international law. 53 See Dinstein, idem, at 184 54 Note that a direct reference to the stability of the ecosystem on Earth was rejected; nonetheless, the definitions mentioned in the text above appear to pursue precisely this purpose, as opposed to the characterization of the environment as a human environment. See ICRC Commentary, supra note 51, Article 35, para. 1451 55 Article I ENMOD Convention 56 Article II, idem 57 Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International (1999), at 114. Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 AFLR 1 (2000), at 58 asserts: So long as space weapons do not change the outer space environment through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes, the treaty is not likely to serve as a bar to the deployment or use of space weapons. 58 Marietta Benk, The Problem of Space Debris: A Valid Case Against the Use of Aggressive Military Systems in Outer Space? in: Benk and Schrogl, supra note 30, at 167 59 Article 52(2) reflects customary law: CIHL, supra note 52,Rules 40-45 60 Michel Bourbonnire, National Security Law in Outer Space: The Interface of Exploration and Security, 70 J. Air L.&Com. 3 (2005), at 59-60 61 About the lawful military use of satellites, see Morgan, supra note 34. On the International Space Station, see Christopher Petras, Space Force Alpha, Military Use of the International Space Station and the Concept of Peaceful Purposes, 53 AFLR 135 (2002). The answer to this question pertains equally to multi-owner space assets, see Ramey, supra note 57, at 144-150. 62 ICRC Commentary, supra note 51, Article 52, note 3. These communication means included the installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance.
52

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______________________________________________________________
63 64

CIHL, supra note 52, Rule 14 See Article 57 AP I. For examples of State practice, see Henry Shuet and David Wippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 Cornell ILJ 559 (2002), at 565-566 65 Marco Sassli, Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law, Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, June 27-29, 2003, at 7 at http://www.ihlresearch.org (lastly accessed April 3, 2007) Author Arjen Vermeer is a doctoral candidate (Faculty of Law, University of Geneva, Switzerland), MAS in IHL (UCIHL, Graduate Institute of International Studies & University of Geneva), LL.M and MA (Leiden University, The Netherlands).

Questioning Just War Thinking Tarik Kochi


Abstract Under the shadow of the so-called war on terror this paper questions the manner in which a broad and ambiguous notion of just war appears to dominate much of contemporary thinking and opinion about war and terror. The paper asks whether a number of differing manifestations within the just war tradition really do take the problem of war seriously, or, of whether, shying away from central questions lying at the heart of the problem of war many accounts of just war only really treat war as nothing more than a game Key Words war; just war; terror; Michael Walzer; right; ordering; legitimacy *****

1. For many the war on terror is a just war. The conflict is described as representing a legitimate moral struggle in the defence of freedom, human rights and the values of modern, Western liberal civilisation against those (i.e. the terrorists) who desire to destroy this. For many it is a war in which the Western values of freedom, human rights and democracy are pitched against the forces of evil. US President, George W. Bushs response to the bombings in the USA in 2001 framed the war on terror within a broad moral sense of representing a just war in defence of freedom and civilisation. He argued: This is not, however, just Americas fight. And what is at stake is not just Americas freedom. This is the worlds fight. This is civilizations fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.1 Continued statements of many prominent Western political leaders have echoed this broad and ambiguous, moral, just war language. Yet, there are many others however who are highly sceptical of a grand, moral just war language and argue that it operates as a mere rhetorical and propaganda device which hides the interests of political, economic and social power. One manner of coming to terms with the competing claims over the justness of the war on terror is to turn towards an intellectual tradition known as the just war tradition. At first glance this tradition might offer some

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______________________________________________________________ assistance in addressing the ambiguity of the moral concepts and language bound up with competing justifications and condemnations of war. In recent history one of the popularisers of just war theory is Michael Walzer.2 Walzer argues for the contemporary importance of the notion of just war and his work has been highly influential in reviving this tradition of thought against legal positivism and reason of state theories. For Walzer, just war theory involves a set of moral arguments about the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular acts of war and the manner in which they are conducted. Just war theory is normally seen to involve two elements: the question of the right of war, and the question of rightful conduct within war. Here I will focus only on the former albeit noting its fundamental connection with the latter. Walzers version of just war theory makes the assumption that there exists something called a common morality and that the content of this common morality is human rights. Judgments about the rightness or wrongness of going to war are to be based upon an assessment of how the use of violence relates to the common morality of human rights. Walzers just war theory operates then in two senses. In one sense, the theory operates negatively or critically, in that wars normally legitimated by political, economic and power interests, and even those justified by positive law or notions of utility, may be condemned as unjust because they threaten a common morality of human rights. In another sense, the theory operates positively, in that it offers a ground for legitimating war in the name of protecting and safeguarding the rights of individuals who are threatened by some form of violence or coercion. Walzer sets out a number of arguments under which the positive sense of just war is limited and restricted and generally the notion is usually limited to instances of self-defence. However Walzer also outlines other broader possibilities of the use of force as being just in the context of, a perceived immediate threat, the necessity of humanitarian intervention, and, in situations of extreme emergency, that each allow exceptions from the more restrictive aspect of his theory. It is at the point of these exceptions to a restrictive just war theory and their opening onto a more proactive use of the intellectual discipline of just war theory to legitimate sometimes aggressive acts of international violence, that is of concern and which brings a popular just war theory like that of Walzers into question. Because Walzers account of just war draws upon a broad and ambiguous conception of a common morality to ground the legitimisation of violence, arguments for or against the justness of war begin to look very similar to that of a general and ambiguous moral language used by contemporary politicians who claim to be acting in the name of a common morality, yet might well be motivated by other interests. The point where someone like the moral theorists supposedly genuine adherence to a socalled common morality begins, and the canny politicians adoption of a

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______________________________________________________________ moral rhetoric ends, becomes increasingly difficult to determine. In effect a popular just war theory like Walzers just becomes another untrustworthy voice in a sea of voices that use a moral language to justify the killing of other people. More significantly, a just war theory that grounds the legitimisation of violence predominantly upon a notion of human rights is theoretically inadequate. Such a theory presupposes but fails to account for the multiple and different ways in which decisions about the legitimacy of violence are already ordered within social and political life, before the decision to go to war is made. Just war theory generally fails, not because it cant produce an attractive moral argument, but, because it ignores fundamental relationships between right and violence that underlie daily life. We can call this set of relationships the ordering of killing, violence, or the ordering of war. 2. A stronger theoretical approach to thinking about what just war means is to consider how the legitimacy of violence and killing is ordered and organised by differing notions of right within social-material life and, of how this is presupposed and implicitly relied upon by moral decisionmaking. One way of unpacking how this occurs generally, and even within just war theory as an intellectual tradition, is to look briefly at two prominent Christian thinkers, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. In City of God (426) Augustine responds to the initial prohibition of killing contained within the Decalogue and the Christian Gospels and in this sense engages with an early Christian tendency towards non-violence and pacifism, specifically, the commandment Thou shalt not kill.3 For Augustine, the commandment against killing is not absolute. Rather, he argues that divine authority itself has made certain exceptions to the rule that it is not lawful to kill men. For Augustine, he who is commanded by God to kill, such as the commandment by God to Abraham that he kill his son, is excepted from the prohibition upon killing. Further, those who wage wars under public authority, or maintain peace and civil order against crime and civil war, may kill and use violence without acting in contradiction of the injunction Thou shalt not kill. Furthermore, for Augustine, and for the majority of Christians, the killing of plants and animals is exempted from this general prohibition. Elements of Augustines account were inherited and developed by Aquinas and organised around the notions of authority, just cause and intention. In the Summa Theologiae (1266-1273) Aquinas, in response to the question of whether war is always sinful, argues: There are three conditions for a just war. First the ruler under whom the war is to be fought must have the authority

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______________________________________________________________ to do so. A private person does not have the right to make war since he can pursue his rights by appealing to his superior. In addition a private person does not have the right to mobilize [convocare] the people as must be done in war. But since the responsibility for the commonwealth has been entrusted to rulers it is their responsibility to defend the city or kingdom or province subject to them. Secondly, a just cause is required so that those against whom the war is waged deserve such a response because of some offence on their part The third condition that is required on the part of those making the war is a right intention, to achieve some good or avoid some evil 4 The accounts presented by Augustine and Aquinas move much closer towards taking the problem of war seriously. One way they might be seen to do this is through their positioning of the act of war within a broader question of killing. By relating the question of war to a religious prohibition on killing and then setting out the exceptions to this prohibition the line of thinking developed by Augustine and Aquinas opens onto a set of issues which mediate the relationship between war and right. Part of the responsibility of taking war seriously involves drawing out and examining these issues with the intention of obtaining a thicker, more concrete picture of how the rightness of war is formulated. In the accounts given by Augustine and Aquinas a number of issues, or lines of mediation, might be identified. By invoking the authority of God and a divine law or divine justice, the rightness of war is linked to a notion of transcendent authority. In this respect the relation between war and right, and the claim that a particular act of war is just, is mediated through a third transcendent aspect which is partly understood in terms of the infinite and unknowable operation of Gods justice, and, which is partly understood through the interpretation of religious texts and religious law. In another respect, the relation between war and right is mediated by the role and status of the public authority of the empire or the city. This authority which keeps the peace and punishes crime holds a particular legitimacy over violence and killing which is not necessarily held by private citizens. Further, in Aquinas the relation between war and right is mediated by a (particular Aristotelian) notion of the common good of the city or political community. In determining what constitutes an act of just war the notion of the common good might be seen at times to conflict with divine justice or the legitimacy of the public authority. Particularly in the situation of conflicts between elements of the Church and different monarchs or magistrates, or between the monarch and citizens who view the monarch as a

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______________________________________________________________ tyrant and thus its law as unjust, the question of what is a just war and, of who makes such a determination, is not unproblematic. In yet another respect, the Christian notion of subjective intention further complicates the relationship between war and right. Within this notion an idea is introduced that a war is not just because it furthers the interest, glory or the common good of a city, but, that the justness of war is linked to the motivations of rulers. 3. What can be seen within this older just war tradition are a variety of differing grounds that are drawn upon to justify killing and violence. The limitation of this older tradition is that these differing grounds are not explicitly recognised or drawn into central focus in the moment of religiousmoral decision-making about the legitimacy of a particular act of war. Any contemporary approach to the question of the justness or rightness of a particular war - that is, one which takes the problem of war seriously - must grasp the differing grounds upon which killing and violence is legitimised within Western thinking and show how these differing grounds reside within and are ordered in terms of value within every moral decision over the rightness or justness of an act of war. It is not enough to claim that a war is justified in the name of a socalled common morality, or even in the name of human rights. Every such claim already contains within it forms of the ordering of violence which are hidden by a grand moral language. What are these different ordered relationships between notions of right and acts of killing and violence? Well in Western social and political life there are many of which here I will name a few. Some different orders of war include: the notion that it is right to kill plants and animals; the notion that a monarch or city official has a certain, limited monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence for the purpose of protecting of maintaining peace and civil order and in protecting the populace from outside threat; the notion that there is a right of public officials to punish criminals; the notion that there is a right of a political community to protect itself and to use violence at times to realise its conception of the good life; the notion that violence is legitimated for the purpose of fulfilling the some form of divine will; the notion that violence might be legitimised by the futural promise of international law; the notion that violence may be drawn upon to protect and realise human freedom and human dignity both at individual and social levels; the notion that forms of institutional and social violence may have legitimacy as a consequence of particular forms of economic organisation; the idea that using violence in the present is justified by a notion of historical progress. This list is not exhaustive, but it is enough to outline a number of different modes of thinking that reside within our historical and

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______________________________________________________________ contemporary conceptions of when it is right to use violence and kill. These differing justifications are in constant conflict and its is their moments of conflict and contradiction that make up the underlying content of a notion of just war. Why a just war thinking, such as Walzers, should be questioned is because it fails to give an account of how a moral decision about the justness of a particular act of war already assumes that certain questions about the legitimisation of violence have already been decided i.e. the killing of animals, or the monopoly on the legitimacy of violence held by the sovereign. If just war theory was properly a moral theory it would consider all of these orders of violence as open questions, and as ones which impact upon all moral decision-making. However, just war theory only pretends to be a moral theory, in reality it is merely a form of window dressing, a language of sorry comfort and apology which stands upon the back of different orders of killing so that it might appear righteous when speaking about others.

Notes
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed on 1-3-07). 2 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed. New York, Basic Books, 1992; M. Walzer, Arguing About War, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004. 3 Augustine, City of God against the Pagans, R. W. Dyson, tr. ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 33; I, 21. 4 Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1266-1273 in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, P. Sigmund, tr. ed. New York, Norton & Co., 1988, pp. 70-71.
1

Bibliography
Augustine, City of God against the Pagans, R. W. Dyson, tr. ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 33; I, 21. Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1266-1273 in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, P. Sigmund, tr. ed. New York, Norton & Co., 1988, pp. 7071. Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed. New York, Basic Books, 1992. Walzer, M., Arguing About War, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004. Tarik Kochi, School of Law, Queens University Belfast, Northern Ireland.

Part VI Prohibition, Interventions and Alternatives

Reconstructing War as a Pathology of Under-Development and the Imperative for Western Humanitarian Intervention Julien Barbara
Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, war has been increasingly presented by Western policy-makers, academics and the media as being new. Contemporary wars are said to be new wars because they have shifted from an inter-state phenomenon to a more primal and atavistic form of civil or intra-state conflict with deep ethnic, economic and criminal roots. This chapter considers how Western states have benefited from the reconstruction of contemporary war as new and the implications of this for global order. The paper begins with an assessment of the new war literature and asks if contemporary wars are in fact new. Questioning claims of newness, it considers why the image of new war has proven to be a powerful explanation of contemporary conflict in the eyes of Western publics. It argues that the significance of the concept of new war lies in its association with a broader discourse of under-development. It then considers how Western states might benefit from the construction of war in this way. An analysis of the new war construction of the South Pacific as an Arc of Instability within Australian policy circles is used to illustrate how Western states engage with the new war debate. Key Words Conflict, War, New War, State-Building, Development, Human Security *****

Introduction. Since the end of the Cold War, violent conflict has been increasingly presented by policy-makers, academics, the media and Western states as being new.1 Contemporary wars are said to be new wars because they have changed in nature from an inter-state phenomenon to a more primal and atavistic form of civil or intra-state conflict, leading to humanitarian disasters and international anarchy. This chapter considers the international relations consequences of the reconstruction of contemporary war as something new. It begins with a brief review of the concept of new war and asks if contemporary wars are in fact new. Noting that contemporary war retains important continuities with earlier or old conflicts, it asks why the image of new war has proven so powerful an explanation of contemporary conflict

1.

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______________________________________________________________ in the eyes of Western publics. It concludes that the significance of the concept of new war lies in its association with a much broader discourse of under-development and how (predominantly Western) states have engaged with it to frame the conduct of their international relations. According to this discourse, new wars are the consequence of much deeper governance and developmental challenges facing post-colonial developing states. The incapacity of these states to deal with these developmental challenges requires Western states to intervene on their behalf. In this context, this chapter considers how Western states might benefit from the construction of war as new. It argues that the concept of new war has been persuasive in Western minds because the shifting image of contemporary war links powerfully with a diverse range of international security and development concerns in ways that provide a mobilising basis for Western engagement. The image of contemporary war as a pathology of under-development serves to quarantine conflict to the developing world. This construction of war has helped distance Western states from culpability for distant conflicts, while investing them with new imperatives for international intervention to resolve humanitarian disasters and re-establish international order. New wars have thus provided an important basis for Western states to legitimately pursue a diverse rage of self-interested international security and developmental objectives, including through controversial forms of international intervention such as humanitarian warfare and state-building. The image of new warfare has thus had profound implications for how Western states engage in international politics more broadly. An analysis of the new war construction of the South Pacific as an Arc of Instability by Australian policy-makers and commentators is used to illustrate how the representation of contemporary war in this way has been used by Western states in support of the pursuit of quite traditional foreign policy objectives. New War as a pathology of under-development It is fashionable in Western circles to talk about contemporary war as a new phenomenon. Underpinning this concept of new war is the idea that the post-Cold War period has witnessed a paradigm shift in the nature of violent conflict. According to this view, traditional, Clauswitzian, total or inter-state warfare, such as that which occurred during World War II, has been eclipsed by new, post-national forms of war, such as the Balkans wars in the 1990s and African conflicts such as in the Congo and Rwanda. According to Kaldor, one of the major proponents of new war theory, new wars are distinguishable from old forms of war on account of their different ethics, rationalities, goals, methods, logistics and financing.2 Most significantly, new wars are said to be intra-state in nature, such that the great majority of conflicts fought in the post-Cold War period have been 2.

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______________________________________________________________ internal or civil rather than inter-state. In reviewing the new war literature, Jung notes the trend following World War II whereby, [a]ccording to different surveys, the predominance of classical warfare between states has been almost completely replaced by various types of intra-state wars.3 The intra-state nature of contemporary war reflects the fact that new Wars are predominantly ethnicised and religious or identity-based conflicts, such as those fought in the Balkans. As such, they differ from the old ideological and nationalistic conflicts such as World War II and the proxy wars fought between the United States and USSR during the Cold War. New Wars are paradoxically localised and globalised. They are fought by a variety of protagonists including, importantly, non-state actors such as warlords, private military corporations and terrorist groups. These protagonists benefit from globalised and privatised supply chains, including globalised financial and product markets that make weapons and combat systems readily available. They also often benefit from the activities of globalised diasporic communities. These supply chains make war affordable for local groups as a political strategy, allowing them to wage perpetual wars against states and vastly complicating the prospects for peace. New wars are said to be increasingly unethical and irrational and thus less amenable to peace-building efforts. They are fought increasingly for economic rather than political reasons and thus tend to be driven by selfinterested profit motives.4 For example, control of valuable material resources such as conflict diamonds has been an important factor in driving and sustaining new wars in Africa. The profit motive underpinning many new wars is said to reflect a new and disturbing rationality in contemporary war as non-state protagonists seek to prolong violent conflict so they can continue to prosper from it. Profiting from chaos and disorder, new war protagonists are said to lack an ethics of just warfare. Human rights atrocities have become an important new war tool used to deliberately terrorise subject communities and create a propitious environment for the conduct of profit-making criminal activities. New war conflicts, such as those in the Balkans and Somalia for example, have thus been characterised by significant human rights violations and massive humanitarian disasters. Lacking the geo-political rationality of old, state-based wars, new wars are said to be less amenable to peacebuilding efforts, with the prospect of perpetual warfare and anarchy posing a significant threat to global order. New wars have also been associated with a broader discourse of under-development that identifies contemporary violent conflict as a cause and consequence of much deeper governance and developmental crises facing the developing world.5 New wars are said to correlate strongly with processes of state fragility and failure that have intensified in the post-Cold War period. According to the US-Government-commissioned State Failure Task Force, state incapacity (in the developing world) is a major factor

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______________________________________________________________ leading to new warfare.6 When states are weak and unable or unwilling to provide for the human security needs of their citizens, political tensions fuelled by poverty and economic inequality will intensify, manifesting ultimately in forms of violent conflict. According to this state failure discourse, new wars are the symptoms of much deeper governance and under-development crises facing the developing world, as in Somalia, Solomon Islands and Afghanistan. The image of contemporary war as something new has been deeply unsettling for Western societies. The association of new wars with state failure has underpinned an image of increasing global disorder and international anarchy as post-colonial states in the developing world threaten to slip into a violent and unpredictable pre-modernity. The association of new wars with processes of state failure has activated the security interests of developed states who have become increasingly concerned about the inability of weak or failed states to police security risks emanating from within their territorial borders. For example, weak states plagued by new wars are said to provide safe havens for trans-national terrorist groups, such as Afghanistan that has become an Al-Qaeda base. Western states are concerned that new war conflicts, if left unabated, will contaminate neighbouring states and precipitate regional governance crises. Western concerns about the global security risks posed by new wars and failed states have underpinned Western demands for new forms of international action to engage and resolve new wars and re-build failed states.7 Are new wars new? The image of new war may be compelling but according to Newman it is also questionable.8 He argues that the distinction between contemporary forms of conflict and wars of earlier times is exaggerated and in some instances does not stand up to scrutiny, especially when drawing on historical material.9 In particular, he argues, it is problematic to assert a general departure/change from the past as a lineal evolution in the nature of war.10 On any number of grounds the newness of contemporary war can be questioned. Many new wars are not distinctively new at all. The image of post-Cold War international anarchy is overstated, with the incidence of civil wars and inter-state wars declining after a brief rise in the early 1990s.11 Chandler notes that [o]f the 35 wars taking place in the mid-1990s only eight broke out in or after 1989, the other 27 began during the Cold War and were exacerbated by it.12 The distinction between inter and intra-state forms of war is complex and not clear cut. During the Cold War, the superpowers waged proxy wars across the developing world, including by sponsoring nonstate insurgent groups such as US support for the Mujahadeen in Soviet occupied Afghanistan. War has always had an economic dimension, best 3.

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______________________________________________________________ illustrated in the mercantilist wars conducted by the European powers as they sought to build New World empires. The privatisation of violent conflict has a long history, with private armies and mercenaries dating back to ancient times. Warfare has always been associated with processes of state formation and fragmentation. Indeed, the need to organise for war was an important factor driving the formation of European nation-states over many centuries.13 Twentieth century state-based warfare has been particularly disastrous in a humanitarian sense as states organised industrial forms of genocide. According to the Human Security Centre, [n]otwithstanding the horrors of Rwanda, Srebrenica and elsewhere, the number of genocides and politicides plummeted by 80% between the 1988 highpoint and 2001.14 It goes without saying that the humanitarian costs of state-based wars, such as World War II, were horrific. Contemporary war thus displays much continuity with wars of the past. It is cruelly ironic that the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 began as a very traditional state-based war of aggression that has subsequently morphed into a sectarian new war conflict that has precipitated state failure and exacerbated regional and global security risks. More persuasive in terms of claims to newness are the increasingly apparent links between under-development, violent conflict and state failure. State failure and collapse does appear to have exacerbated in the post-Cold War period, marking a significant reversal from post-colonial processes of state formation that followed World War II. The withdrawal of superpower sponsorship of economically marginal states following the end of the Cold War has precipitated a process of state failure and collapse across the developing world. International development agencies such as the World Bank estimate there to be around 50 fragile states based on various developmental criteria.15 Concerns about the relationship between state failure, under-development and violent conflict have resulted in major policy interest in the security-development nexus amongst leading international security and development organisations such as the United Nations and World Bank. It is in this context that the international community has shown an unprecedented willingness to intervene, militarily and economically, to support fragile and failed states, to restore security and stability through various forms of humanitarian intervention and state building. Francois and Sud, for example, observe that 13 states have received international postconflict assistance since 1989, seven being low-income states.16 Perhaps what is most new about contemporary war from a Western perspective is how Western citizens have come to relate to violent conflict. The success of the European Union in guaranteeing peace between European nation-states has fed a broader perception in Western states that war is now redundant as a political tactic. From this perspective, it is inconceivable that Western states would ever need to resort to violent means to resolve political tensions between each other. A leading EU

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______________________________________________________________ diplomat, Robert Cooper, for example, has described the EU as a postnational form of political organisation in which the use of violent conflict to resolve international disputes is totally discredited and illegitimate, in favour of a more civilised application of international law.17 New wars have been quarantined as a developing world plight. New war coverage in cyberspace has reinforced the image of war as a pathology of underdevelopment, leading to a paradox of proximity and distance that makes war increasingly visible to Western citizens but simultaneously distant from them, not only in a geographical sense but also in terms of an understanding of the forces behind contemporary war and how Western states relate to them.18 New forms of convergent media have contributed to an image of contemporary warfare as new and ubiquitous despite the actual decline in conflicts. Jung, reviewing the new war literature in 2005, cites Mnklers characterisation of contemporary war as having lost the contours which defined the classical conception of war whereby the distinction between battlefield, front and homeland has been lost.19 The CNN effect has allowed for real time coverage of otherwise obscure wars from the distant corners of the globe.20 Constructing a humanitarian crisis If such wars are not so new, why has the concept of new warfare received such attention in Western circles as a description of contemporary war? I believe the concept of new war has proven persuasive because the image of international disorder and global anarchy that has accompanied the new war debate has provided a powerful basis for the politicisation and securitisation of important international issues (e.g. human rights, transnational terrorism, economic globalisation) in ways beneficial to Western states and powerful non-state actors such as private corporations and civil society groups. New wars have become a major focus for human rights advocates in the post-Cold War period. The image of new warfare has increased the moral urgency behind current human rights debates. Human rights and humanitarian NGOs argue that new wars, which are both a major source of human rights violations and a major cause of humanitarian disasters, provide compelling evidence for the need to recast international law to better protect human rights and for states to pursue ethical foreign policies.21 By evoking the urgent humanitarian imperative to prevent new wars, human rights advocates have demanded Western states undertake increasingly radical forms of international intervention. For example, in 1999, the founder of the Nobel Peace Prize winning NGO Mdicins Sans Frontirs, Bernard Kouchner, set out the moral but highly controversial imperative for humanitarian warfare to prevent new wars: 4.

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______________________________________________________________ Now it is necessary to take the further step of using the right to intervention as a preventative measure to stop wars before they start and to stop murderers before they kill We knew what was likely to happen in Somalia, BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo long before they exploded into war. But we didnt act. If these experiences have taught us anything, it is that the time for a decisive evolution in international consciousness has arrived.22 New wars have also become an important focus for Western-driven economic development priorities in the context of economic globalisation. With the closing of the security-development nexus in the 1990s underdevelopment has been increasingly recognised as an important explanatory factor behind the increasing incidence of new wars. Understood as a consequence of under-development, new wars are advanced as powerful evidence for the need to get development right in order to immunise states and the international system from violent conflict. Proponents of the Washington Consensus have used new war explanations of contemporary war to justify the controversial export of neo-liberal developmental frameworks to the developing world.23 Neo-liberal advocates argue that the triumph of capitalism and the end of history24 following the Cold War have resolved the debate between capitalism and socialism and focused international attention on the importance of economic development and its role in under-writing international security and stability. By blaming inefficient and corrupt developing states for their own economic demise through the responsibilisation of under-development, neo-liberal proponents have been able to justify market-oriented development models that bypass the state as a developmental remedy. New war explanations of violent conflict have therefore provided a compelling justification for Western state efforts to extend the reach of Western-based economic governance institutions such as the IMF and World Trade Organisation to the developing world. Ironically, the use of new wars to justify neo-liberal developmental approaches overlooks the important role played by unfettered economic globalisation in creating centrifugal economic forces that weaken post-colonial developing states, exacerbate economic inequality and support the globalised supply chains that have been important in sustaining new wars. New wars have become an important focus for Western states seeking to engage emerging non-state security risks such as trans-national terrorism. The 9/11 attacks of course strengthened Western resolve to engage these risks but it has proven difficult for them to fight what remain amorphous, de-territorialised security risks. Terrorism, for example, presents both a physical and existential threat to Western societies, but the War on Terrorism lacks a geographical front where physical war can be waged.

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______________________________________________________________ When linked to a state failure discourse, new wars provide Western states with an actual front on which to wage existential war, regardless of the actual links between particular terrorist threats and fragile states. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued in 2002 that [t]he greatest threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing states than by borders between strong and aggressive ones as weak/failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the worlds most dangerous weapons.25 New wars have become particularly important in the context of postCold War debates about the relevance of existing international security institutions such as the United Nations and the need to reform the international system to better accommodate the new security and development complexities of the twenty-first century. As civil or intra-state affairs, new wars are said to pose particular challenges to the state-based United Nations security framework established after World War II. Critics of the UN system contend that the United Nations, based on the principles of state sovereignty, state equality and non-intervention, is poorly equipped to engage the intra-state security risks that will characterise the twenty-first century. The effort of the UN system to adapt to the policy imperatives created by new wars has driven important shifts in international political and legal norms. For example, in responding to new war conflicts the UN has sought to codify a general responsibility to protect human rights for states. States have also been asked by the UN to undertake new forms of international intervention to protect human security in developing states, such as the post-conflict state building that occurred under UN auspices in East Timor.26 The humanitarian imperative for Western states to respond to new wars has thus controversially legitimised new forms of international hierarchy. It has resurrected in new guises quite traditional forms of colonial domination such as international trusteeships that contravene the post-War principle of the equality of states that is central to the UN system.27 The questioning of hitherto sacrosanct international legal principles of equality of sovereign states and non-intervention, in the context of new wars and their corresponding humanitarian imperatives, has presented powerful (Western) states with new opportunities to legitimise what would have been unimaginable forms of international action even a decade ago, such as the U.S.-led occupation of Afghanistan. 5. Responding to new wars in the Arc of Instability This section considers how the concept of new warfare has underpinned important shifts in Australias regional engagement with the South Pacific over the last decade. Australian policy-makers and academics have come to describe the various states bordering Australias north and north-eastern

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______________________________________________________________ shores (stretching from Indonesia through to Fiji) as forming an Arc of Instability.28 These states are said to be inherently unstable because of their perceived proneness to new war forms of violent conflict as a result of the profound developmental and security challenges they face. Worsening political crises across the South Pacific region have led policy makers and commentators to talk about the Africanisation of the Pacific and a deepseated, systemic governance crisis across the region.29 Such crises have included a series of coups in Fiji, a secessionist civil war in the PNG province of Bougainville and a low-intensity civil war in Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands conflict a civil conflict arising from ethnic and economic tensions in the context of under-development and state fragility has provided a classic example of new warfare on Australias very doorstep.30 For Australian foreign policy-makers, the Solomon Islands conflict quickly came to symbolise the broader regional crisis and how the various South Pacific pathologies of under-development would ultimately manifest if Australia did not do more to engage them. In this sense, the concept of the Arc of Instability was linked with the new war discourse, with the South Pacific portrayed as a region struggling to come to terms with globalisation and modernity and susceptible to atavistic conflicts. Through the concept of the Arc of Instability, Australian policymakers have effectively imported the new war/pathology of underdevelopment discourse into Australian foreign policy circles. From the late 1990s foreign policy elites began to demand a changed Australian foreign policy approach to the region to promote security and restore governance. The prospect of a region plagued by sporadic but perpetual new warfare and state failure was used to activate Australian security interests in the region. Deeming orthodox development approaches increasingly ineffectual, policy elites began to advocate more interventionary forms of policy engagement. An Australian Government-supported policy think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), was particularly influential in securitising state failure in the South Pacific and making the case for Australia to lead a regional state-building mission to Solomon Islands.31 ASPI warned that unless Australia addressed the crisis in Solomon Islands by a more innovative form of engagement Solomon Islands would become a Petri dish for a range of transnational security risks. Intervention in Solomon Islands was justified as, amongst other things, being necessary to prevent it from becoming a haven for terrorists.32 As an explanatory concept the Arc of Instability is of questionable utility. While the region faces its fair share of challenges, it is wrong to portray the entire region as being on the brink of collapse. Each political crisis has unique antecedents (compare the Solomon Islands conflict with the Fiji coups), not all Pacific states are failing (Samoa, New Caledonia, Vanuatu), and it is wrong to portray the entire region as a developmental

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______________________________________________________________ disaster. Greener-Barcham and Barcham note, for example, the sociological improbability of any Pacific island state becoming a regional base for transnational terrorists.33 But by framing regional problems in the context of an overwhelming underdevelopment and new war discourse, Australian policy makers have enjoyed considerable latitude to legitimately reposition the form of Australias engagement with the South Pacific. In the postcolonial period, Australia has been an important player in the South Pacific (it is, for example, a major donor) whose regional approach was framed by an acute awareness of the sovereign sensitivities of Pacific island states. Through the pathology of under-development discourse, Australian policy makers have resurrected historical regional claims of having special responsibilities to the region, in terms of guaranteeing regional order and supporting development.34 For example, in 2004, Prime Minister Howard explained Australias new regional approach thus: [A]ustralia has entered a new phase in its regional role in the Pacific confident to lead, confident in what we offer, and confident we are seen as partners for progress. There was a time not so long ago when sensitivities about alleged neo-colonialism perhaps caused Australia to err on the side of passivity in our approach. Those days are behind us as we work constructively with others to address the challenges faced by our immediate neighbourhood.35 Since the early 2000s, Australia has significantly stepped up its engagement with the South Pacific, exemplified by the Australian Governments decision in July 2003 to lead and bankroll a regional statebuilding mission to Solomon Islands.36 The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has involved regional troops and police (predominantly Australian) intervening at the request of the Solomon Islands Government to restore peace and regional bureaucrats (predominantly Australians) working to rebuild state institutions in the fragile Melanesian state. Prior to 2003, the Australian Government had rejected Solomon Islands Government requests for Australian intervention. As late as January 2003, Australian Foreign Minister Downer dismissed the idea of Australian intervention in Solomon Islands as a folly in the extreme that would not work no matter how it was dressed up.37 The decision to establish RAMSI marked a significant shift in Australian policy, and indicated the growing saliency of the pathology of underdevelopment discourse as a frame for it. In mid-2003, Australian Prime Minister Howard justified the RAMSIs deployment in terms of the very important signal it would send to other countries in the region that help is available if it is sought and Australias desire to help all the peoples of the Pacific to have

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______________________________________________________________ conditions of law and order and hope and peace and stability for their future generations.38 In September 2003, when addressing the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Downer noted unapologetically a more interventionary Australian approach to the region, declaring that it [i]s no longer open to us to ignore the failed states and that [o]ld shibboleths such as excessive homage to sovereignty even at the expense of the preservation of humanity and human values should not constrain us.39 Australias more robust approach to the region has also been reflected in its efforts to reform key regional governance institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum, and in the recalibration of Australian bilateral aid to reflect Canberras new strategic priorities.40 For example, Australia has sought to negotiate an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement with Papua New Guinea linking bilateral aid to progress with justice and good governance reforms. Australias more robust approach to the region has been controversial. Australias role in RAMSI has seen it heavily criticised as neo-colonial by some regional leaders, most notably from the Solomon Islands own Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare (who was elected after RAMSIs arrival), who has maintained a combative relationship with Australia as RAMSI leader and worked to weaken Australias influence in the Mission. But within Australia the image of the Arc of Instability has helped legitimise in the eyes of the Australian public Australias interventionary role in the region. It has activated what Fry calls the perennial idea of Australias special responsibility to the South Pacific including its obligation to provide humanitarian support to its struggling neighbours.41 There are very real and persistent security and developmental challenges in the South Pacific that need creative forms of international engagement. But what is particularly interesting about the Arc of Instability frame through which Australia has sought to re-orient its engagement with the region is how it has legitimised controversial forms of intervention. The image of the Arc of Instability has allowed the Australian Government to legitimately re-assert longstanding self interests in the region while obfuscating a more critical analysis of Australias own role in promoting regional instability. These self interests include: responding to increased inter-state competition in the region especially from China and Taiwan; demanding a greater return on its considerable aid investment in the region; and asserting a greater regional leadership role. By evoking the new war discourse and the notion of a special Australian responsibility to the region, the Australian Government has been able to counter domestic and regional criticism that Australia has abused its influence in the region, such as with its controversial Pacific Solution.42

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______________________________________________________________ 6. Conclusion The reconstruction of contemporary war as something new, and its conflation with a broader pathology of under-development discourse, has had important implications for how Western states engage with war and conduct their international relations. Despite the conceptual questionability of the new war paradigm, the concept has proven politically persuasive because it offers a powerful and mobilising explanation for shifts in the post-Cold War international order (at least from a Western perspective). The construction of contemporary war as a pathology of under-development has facilitated the pursuit of a broad agenda for international intervention to recast the international system to protect human rights and better meet the emerging international security needs of the twenty-first century. As the example of Australias re-engagement with the South Pacific indicates, new wars have provided a fertile site for Western states to legitimately pursue quite traditional foreign policy goals.

Notes
M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1999. 2 Kaldor, ibid., p.6 3 D. Jung, New Wars, Old Warriors and Transnational Crime: Reflections on the Transformation of War, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, vol. 40, no. 4, 2005, p.424. 4 M. Berdal and D.M. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 2000. 5 D. Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building, Pluto Press, London, 2006. 6 State Failure Task Force, State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings, Science Applications International Task Force, McLean, VA, 2000. 7 D. Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, Pluto Press, London, 2006. 8 E. Newman, The New Wars Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed, Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 2, 2004, pp. 173-189. 9 Newman, ibid., p.173. 10 Newman, ibid., p.180 11 Newman, ibid., p.180 12 Chandler, Empire in Denial, 2006, op. cit., p.58. 13 C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975.
1

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______________________________________________________________ Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p.1. 15 M. Francois and I. Sud, Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States, Development Policy Review, vol. 24, no. 2, 2006, p.150. 16 Franois and Sud, ibid, p.150. 17 R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, Atlantic Books, London, 2003. 18 L. Walsh and J. Barbara, Speed, International Security and New War Coverage in Cyberspace, Journal of Computer Mediated Communications, vol. 12, no. 1, article 10, 2006. 19 H. Mnkler, Die neuen Kriege. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2002 cited in D. Jung, 2005, op. cit, p.425. 20 L. Walsh and J. Barbara, op. cit. 21 Chandler, Empire in Denial, 2006, pp.53-88. 22 B. Kouchner, Perspective on World Politics: Establish a Right to Intervene Against War, Los Angeles Times, 18 October, 1999, cited in Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond, 2006, pp.188-9. 23 P. Bilgin and A.D. Mortan, Historicising Representations of Failed States: Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences?, Third World Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1, 2002, pp. 55-80. 24 F. Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 1992. 25 C. Rice, The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security, Washington Post, 11 December, 2002. 26 Chandler, Empire in Denial, 2006, op cit. 27 W. Bain, The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Equality, International Relations, vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp.5977. 28 The concept of the Arc of Instability was originally coined to encapsulate the geo-political consequences for Australia of a weak Indonesian state. The image gained saliency within Australia policy circles following the collapse of the Soeharto regime, the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the Indonesian economy, and the consequences of East Timorese independence on the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state. 29 J. Fraenkel, The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of the Africanisation of the South Pacific Thesis, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol. 42, no.1, March, 2004, pp. 1-34. 30 D. McDougall, Intervention in Solomon Islands, The Round Table, 93, April, 2004, pp.213-223. 31 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Our Failing Neighbour, Canberra, ASPI, June, 2003.
14

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______________________________________________________________
32

B.K. Greener-Barcham and M. Barcham, Terrorism in the South Pacific? Thinking Critically about approaches to Security in the Region, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.1 no. 60, March, 2006, pp.67-82. 33 Greener-Barcham and Barcham, ibid. 34 Fry, G., Whose Oceania? Contending Visions of Community in Pacific Region-Building in Pacific Futures, M. Powles (ed.), Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Pandanus Books, 2006, p.208. 35 J. Howard, Transcript of the Prime Ministers address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Sydney, 18 June, 2004, retrieved 3 March 2006 <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2004/speech921.cfm> 36 S. Dinnen, Lending a Fist? Australias New Interventionism in the Southwest Pacific, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Discussion Paper 2004/5, Canberra: ANU RSPAS, 2004. 37 A, Downer, Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September, 2003. 38 J. Howard, Transcript of address at the Solomon Islands Task Force Farewell, RAAF Base Townsville 24 July 2003, retrieved 4 December 2006 <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2003/speech387.cfm> 39 A. Downer, op. cit. 40 Dinnen, op. cit., p.1. 41 Fry, G., op cit, 2006, p.208. 42 The Pacific Solution was the name given to the Australian Governments decision to establish offshore detention centres in Nauru and PNG in which to detain asylum seekers who arrived illegally by boat on Australias northern coasts while their application for refugee status was processed in Australia. Nauru and PNG received significant aid for agreeing to host the centres. The decision was criticised both within Australia and in the region for taking advantage of weak Pacific microstates dependent on Australian aid: see, for example, Senate of Australia (2004), A Certain Maritime Incident, Select Committee for an Inquiry into a Certain Maritime Incident, Canberra.

Bibliography
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Our Failing Neighbour. Canberra, ASPI, June, 2003. Bain, W., The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Equality. International Relations, vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp. 59-77.

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______________________________________________________________ Berdal, M. and Malone, D.M. (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 2000. Bilgin, P. and Mortan, A.D., Historicising Representations of Failed States: Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences? Third World Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1, 2002, pp. 55-80. Chandler, D., From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention. Pluto Press, London, 2006. Chandler, D., Empire in Denial. Pluto Press, London, 2006. Cooper, R., The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century. Atlantic Books, London, 2003. Dinnen, S., Lending a Fist? Australias New Interventionism in the Southwest Pacific. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Discussion Paper 2004/5, ANU RSPAS, Canberra, 2004. Downer, A., Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September, 2003, retrieved 23 January 2006, <http://www.foreignminister.gov .au/ speeches/2003/030924_general_assembly_ny.html> Fraenkel, J., The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of the Africanisation of the South Pacific Thesis. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. vol. 42, no. 1, March, 2004, pp. 1-34. Franois, M. and Sud, I., Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States. Development Policy Review, vol. 24, no. 2, 2006, pp. 141-160. Fry, G. Whose Oceania? Contending Visions of Community in Pacific Region-Building. in M Powles (ed.)., Pacific Futures, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Pandanus Books, Australian National University, Canberra, 2006. Fukayama, F., The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, New York, 1992. Greener-Barcham, B.K. and Barcham, M., Terrorism in the South Pacific? Thinking Critically about Approaches to Security in the Region. Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 60, no.1, March, 2006, pp. 67-82. Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century. Oxford University Press, New York, 2005. Jung, D., New Wars, Old Warriors and Transnational Crime: Reflections on the Transformation of War. Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, vol. 40, no. 4, 2005, pp. 423434. Kaldor, M., New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1999.

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______________________________________________________________ Kouchner, B., Perspective on World Politics: Establish a Right to Intervene Against War. Los Angeles Times, 18 October, 1999. Howard, J., Prime Ministers address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Sydney, 18 June, 2004, retrieved 3 March 2006, <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2004/speech921.cfm>. Howard, J., Transcript of address at the Solomon Islands Task Force Farewell. RAAF Base Townsville, 24 July, 2003, retrieved 4 December 2006, <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2003/ speech387.cfm > McDougall, D., Intervention in Solomon Islands. The Round Table, 93, April, 2004, pp. 213-223. H. Mnkler, Die neuen Kriege. Rowohlt, Reinbek, 2002. Newman, E., The New Wars Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed. Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 2, 2004, pp.173-189. Rice, C., The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security. Washington Post, 11 December, 2002. Senate of Australia, A Certain Maritime Incident. Select Committee for an Inquiry into a Certain Maritime Incident, Canberra, 2004. State Failure Task Force, State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings. Science Applications International Task Force, McLean, VA, 2000. Tilly, C. (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975. Walsh, L. and Barbara, J., Speed, International Security and New War Coverage in Cyberspace. Journal of Computer Mediated Communications, vol. 12, no. 1, article 10, 2006. Dr Julien Barbara is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia.

The Killers and the Dead An Exploration of the Viability of and Alternatives to Lethal Warfare Seth B. Scott
Abstract In this paper I propose a re-evaluation of lethal warfare in favour of approaches using non-lethal weapons and practices. Further I examine the apparent universal societal acceptance of death as the primary tool of warfare. This paper explores the relationship between war and death and ultimately attempts to answer the question: can war be fought without death? I begin with the premise that conflict is inevitable but that death in conflict is unnatural. Of all competitive entities governments, corporations, team sports, unions only governments retain the right to lethal warfare. Why does humankind make this exception and what can we do to change this? I propose a gradual paradigm shift away from deadly conflict. In our time, this can be accomplished by supplying the military with alternatives. For the military, I demonstrate present and future technologies which may eliminate death from the practice of war. These technologies include weapons acting on the physiognomy of man and denial of access weapons. I will show the benefits of integrating non-lethal weaponry into existing warfare tactics. Key Words non-lethal warfare, deadly conflict, non-lethal weapons *****

1.

Introduction Carl Von Clausewitz wrote that war has three main objects: a) To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy b) To take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and c) To gain public opinion. 1

Of particular interest is item A. Note that he did not write kill, nor does he advocate the destruction of people or towns. Rather, he accurately pinpoints the destruction of armed power, in other words, the power of the enemy to resist.

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Historically speaking, once the military has become engaged, killing is the object of war. One of the ways militaries measure progress is by the number of enemy dead. When killing enemy combatants is not enough, they turn to killing the civilian population, as the Americans did in the firebombing of Japan in WWII. Yet, for all this killing, there has rarely been a war that ended when there was no one left to kill. Clearly it is not killing that ends a war, but, as Clausewitz pointed out, the simple destruction of the enemys ability to fight back, for which killing is only one method. If war does not require killing, why does the notion of a bloodless war seem so strange? This is not an argument against war. War is a form of conflict, and conflict is inevitable. Consider the amount of inherent conflict in nature the spines of a cactus, the poison of ivy, the teeth, claws, and stingers that adorn so many flora and fauna alike. Killing in warfare is often attributed to human nature; however, in the animal kingdom, battles between members of the same species rarely end in death.3 If we assume that killing is natural, then we must admit that we are in control of our killing instinct , deciding when and where to use it. 2. The Killers In order to prove the validity of non-lethal warfare, we must first discredit the utility of death. One cannot imagine a war without death. No matter what the nationality or language, war is synonymous with death. Anything less is merely a contest. Historically, the technology has not existed to produce any other result than death. With the invention of projectile weapons such as the bow and arrow or the rifle, the kinetic force of weapons designed to fight from a distance conspired against the weaker organs of the human body. Killing has traditionally served to accomplish several goals including incapacitating leadership, clearing an area of occupants, and self defense. If we find the means to accomplish these goals without killing, then killing will be unnecessary. Humankind has moved away from killing as a form of dispute resolution. At one time, the Church had the right to kill. At another, corporations, such as the East India Company, maintained armies to protect their interests through the implementation of death. Over time, the right of these organizations to kill on their own behalf has become criminalized. The very idea of Wal-Mart engaged in military actions against Target, or the Church of Latter Day Saints storming the Vatican seems patently absurd. Five hundred years ago this type of aggression was common. Today, even an accumulation of weapons among these factions would trigger legal action.

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______________________________________________________________ Only one group retains the sanctioned authority to conduct lethal warfare the governments of recognized states. Yet, as this century has progressed, even this right has been brought into question. An aggressor state invading a neighbouring country will often find swift retribution not from their enemies but from distant foreign nations. A state interested in accumulating certain weapons, such as nuclear or biological, will feel the eyes of the world upon them. With the introduction of the Geneva Convention, security councils for NATO and the UN, and the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, we see a policing action on a global scale against sovereign governments and national leaders who do not follow globally accepted conduct. What we see, then, is the gradual but definitive move away from the legal right to lethal warfare, and what one can deduce is the eventual abandonment and outright legal prevention of all lethal conduct on the part of any organization, including nation-states. If we conclude that lethal warfare nears its evolutional extinction, and that conflict remains inevitable, what are our alternatives, and what means have we at our disposal for transition? Non-Lethal Weapons From January to March of 1995, the US 1 Marine Expeditionary Force evacuated 6,200 UN peacekeepers from Mogadishu, Somalia. The intent was to enter and leave a hostile civilian area without an escalation of local violence. Remarkably, this operation deliberately employed non-lethal weapons as the first means of defense. These weapons included pepper sprays, sticky foam, flash-bang grenades, 40mm beanbags, 12 gauge rubber pellets, and other readily available crowd-control weapons. These weapons were not intended to replace lethal weapons if the situation required it. The operation succeeded without a single coalition casualty. Many of the nonlethal weapons were not used, but this was the first full-scale combat application of non-lethal weapons. Within military circles, the action raised an awareness of their viability. 5 While there are numerous tactical non-lethal weapons such as those used in Operation United Shield (primarily used for policing, crowd control, and area defense), these weapons would find little use in traditional combat roles. For the purposes of this paper, we are more interested in non-lethal offensive weapons which rival the effectiveness of traditional weaponry in stopping or repelling enemy forces. The following weapons, in brief, are at the core of this new warfare: Active Denial: The Department of Defense recently sent into field operations a microwave array designed to deter and dispel personnel. The system emits millimetre waves, penetrating only 1/64th of an inch of skin, causing an intense burning sensation. Affected combatants naturally recoil 3.

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from the 55C degree heat, much like the involuntary reaction after touching a stove, yet the beam does not, in fact, burn skin. It simply triggers the nerve endings into reacting. It is effective through clothing and on any exposed skin. Phase: One of the most exciting developments comes in the form of a patent by HSV Technology. An ultraviolet laser beam creates a conductive line in the air which allows an electrical current to travel along the beam. Upon striking the target, this current causes paralysis without loss of consciousness by contracting the muscles through a process known as muscular tetanization. Effective up to 200 meters, invisible to the eye, and capable of sweeping multiple targets, it nevertheless causes no damage to the skin or retina.6 Sonic: This weapon emits low frequency sound waves which cause internal reactions such as the instantaneous releasing of the bowels and severe stomach and intestinal pain. Unlike the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) used for area denial in shipping, this device is not audible, causes no damage to the ear, and has no permanent biological effects. EMP: Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons create an electromagnetic wave which overloads and destroys electronic circuitry without affecting human or infrastructure targets. As a weapon against civilian population centres and against cyber-warfare, it serves most effectively in our increasingly wired battlefields.7 These are only a few of the weapons under development by the DoD and private agencies. The purpose of mentioning these weapons is not to demonstrate that we currently have the ability to replace lethal weapons. At this stage of development, and in their limited numbers, they cannot. Rather I wish to point out progress already made with limited funding in this field, indicating the rather amazing technology that already exists in hope that it will stimulate ideas and funding for future work. Non-lethal weapons are not kinetic. Unlike virtually every other weapon created by man with the exception of fire, non-lethal weapons do not rely on propulsion or impact to affect their target. Instead, these weapons intelligently manipulate the human bodys natural reaction to stimuli. Non-lethal weapons discriminate between targets. Whereas kinetic weapons will destroy tissue as easily as concrete or glass, these weapons focus energy on a deliberately specific target. These weapons are therefore radically different in concept than traditional weaponry. They pursue the task of defeating an enemys armed power alone. Increasingly, nations find themselves in wars which do not easily distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, civilians and soldiers. One of the reasons the military spearheads non-lethal weapons development is to provide multiple force options in combat situations. A

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______________________________________________________________ civilian child holding a weapon, for example, poses an immediate threat to troops, regardless of the childs intentions. Traditionally, a soldier would shoot first to protect himself. This action holds consequences both mortal (for the victim) and psychological (for the shooter). Non-lethal weapons offer the opportunity for both parties to survive contact. Non-lethal weapons used in civilian populations help to achieve Clausewitzs third aim - that of gaining public opinion. By not accidentally (or on purpose) killing innocent civilians, one prevents invoking the cumulative wrath of increasingly dissatisfied, frightened, angry civilian populations. The death of civilian and even combat populations perpetuates conflict through a reciprocal sense of retribution. To remove death from the equation would diminish the immediacy of tension among warring factions. Critiques There are three common critiques to these and other non-lethal weapons. First, human rights activists have resisted their implementation due to the ease with which less scrupulous nations have used them as devices of torture. This argument is not only counterproductive but blatantly ignorant. Any object, including parts of the human body, can be used as an instrument of torture. Attempts to limit the development and distribution of non-lethal weapons will only lead to the perpetuation of lethal weaponry and straightforward killing. Second, critics contend that non-lethal weapons can be transformed into lethal weapons. Again, this concern is mitigated by the nearly unlimited ability to kill without these weapons. Non-lethal weapons transcend each of these arguments through their design intent. That intent is to minimize the action of humans killing humans. The intent to disable, capture, but most importantly to preserve human life has only begun to emerge and should be cultivated and encouraged. The third critique asks if these weapons are designed for the type of wars we fight. Military theorists no longer expect mass military movements upon which high-tech weapons would be effect. Aside from large, industrialized nations such as China and the US, the primary form of warfare in our time is Fourth Generation Warfare, that of small factions whose only intent is to obliterate, even through genocide, those who oppose them. Nonlethal weapons are most useful in these cases. Put in the hands of UN peacekeepers or occupying forces, non-lethal weapons will serve to defuse hostile situations. Further still, those forces buy their weapons from larger ones. If the market is increasingly flooded with non-lethal weaponry, it will change the way even these smaller wars are fought. 4.

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The Living What makes non-lethal weapons worth discussing is that their recent development represents not just a technological advance but a holistic revolution in our attitudes toward war and death. Complicating the matter is our own historical and societal outlook on war. War and death are so inextricably linked in our collective consciousness that we, ourselves, hinder non-lethal development. How do we remove death from war when it is the cornerstone of our civilization? How do we reconcile our notions of honour and valour in battle if we no longer pay the ultimate price? How do we approach war if the goal is no longer total annihilation? The most important action all disciplines can partake in, from psychologists to soldiers, scientists to teachers, politicians to laymen, is to begin asking these and many other questions. The problem lies not in that we do not possess the answers. The problem is far worse. We do not yet know the full extent of the questions we must ask in order to reach a future without killing. We stand on the threshold of a new and exciting shift in conflict. By redirecting our attention from weapons that kill to weapons that do not, without changing our objectives or methods, we will forever alter the concept and practice of war In essence, non-lethal weapons may introduce society to a respect for human life through war. 5.

Notes
1. C Von Clausewitz, Principles of War, Dover Publications, New York, 2003, p. 45. 2. R Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007, p. 8. 3. D Grossman, On Killing, Back Bay Books, New York, 1996, p. 6. 4. A Codevilla & P Seabury, War: Ends and Means, 2nd Ed., Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 56. 5. F Lorenz, Non Lethal Force: The Slippery Slope to War?, Parameters, Autumn 1996, pp. 52-62 6. J Herr, US Patent #5,675,103, 1997, Viewed February 8, 2007, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsrchnum.htm&Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&p =1&r=1&l=50&f=G&d=PALL&s1=5675103.PN.&OS=PN/5675103&RS=P N/5675103 7. Global Security.org, Viewed January 5, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/non-lethal.htm

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______________________________________________________________ 8. W Bynner, The Way of Life According to Lao Tzu, Perigee, New York, 1986, 31. 9. K Ichikawa, The Burmese Harp, 1956, Viewed March 19, 2007.

Bibliography
A Codevilla & P Seabury, War: Ends and Means, 2nd Ed., Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 2006. C Von Clausewitz, On War, Penguin Classics, New York, 1982. C Von Clausewitz, Principles of War, Dover Publications, New York, 2003. D Grossman, On Killing, Back Bay Books, New York, 1996. F Lorenz, Non Lethal Force: The Slippery Slope to War?, Parameters, Autumn 1996. Global Security.org, Viewed January 5, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/non-lethal.htm J Herr, US Patent #5,675,103, 1997, Viewed February 8, 2007, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsrchnum.htm&Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF &p=1&r=1&l=50&f=G&d=PALL&s1=5675103.PN.&OS=PN/5675103 &RS=PN/5675103 K Ichikawa, The Burmese Harp, 1956, Viewed March 19, 2007. R Bunker, Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organization, Parameters, Summer 1997. R Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007. T Hammes, The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith, St. Paul, 2004. W Bynner, The Way of Life According to Lao Tzu, Perigee, New York, 1986. Seth Scott is an Independent Scholar living and working in New York.

Reflecting on National Security as Human Security, or: About the Inherent Human Nature of National Security1 Efstathios T. Fakiolas
Abstract The human security literature helps refocus our attention on human beings. But it is one thing to emphasise the human dimension of security and it is another to elevate human security into the rank of a distinct form of security. A question arises: are national security and the state a-human in their origins, nature and orientation? If the answer is yes, then is the state an entity that takes on a semblance of self-sufficiency beyond and out of the sphere of human beings collective action? Again, it is one thing to assert that the state has in many cases proved unable to protect its people and advance human security and it is another to argue that the state is inherently a-social or, alternatively, does not instantiate in human interaction and consciousness. The paper challenges the prevailing view held in the human security literature, though scarcely openly spoken out, that the state is separate from society and human beings. National and human security are related in that their common denominator is human beings in their collective form. The paper seeks to offer an alternative problematique, not to present definite conclusions, thereby laying the foundations for a new approach to human security. Key words National security, consciousness

state,

human

security,

human

interaction

and

***** Introduction Human security presents itself as a key paradigm shift in security studies, which goes beyond the traditional, state-centric national security drawing attention to human lives and human freedom from fear and want.2 Human and national security are usually viewed as competing perspectives, when the matter comes to the crunch. At time of crisis and conflict-like emergency, protecting states matters more, and humans needs and interests hold the second rank. However, these two perspectives are not irrelevant, inasmuch as human security demands of the state to serve and support the people from which it draws its legitimacy.3 It is obvious that the concept of human security sheds light to a neglected dimension of security. Nonetheless, it lacks a clear definitional, 1.

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______________________________________________________________ theoretical and security practice grounding. One effect is that the human security rationale is currently being used as a justification by the great Western powers both to systematically intervene in other states internal affairs and wage liberal wars, such as that in Iraq in 2003, in the name of human values.4 Another effect is that human security seems to assume, though one must read between the lines to discover it, that the state is separate from society and human beings. But the state is held to represent not only the government but also social forces co-existing as social relations in society within a territorially delimited space. In world and domestic politics, indeed, the state comes out as a national polity, which denotes a state-society complex politically and territorially bounded together on grounds of common respect of people involved for a constitution, popular sovereignty and citizen rights. Overall, the human security literature helps refocus our attention on human beings. It is, however, one thing to emphasise the human aspect of security, and it is another to elevate human security into the rank of a distinct form of security, and thereby to monopolize, as human security scholars do, human beings as the referent object of security. A question immediately arises: is national security and the state ahuman or non-human in their origins and nature? If the answer is yes, then the state is an entity that, apart from incrementally attaining a certain degree of relative autonomy, takes on and retains a semblance of self-sufficiency outside and away from the humans collective action? Again, it is one thing to assert that the state has in many cases proved unable or indifferent to protect its people and advance human security, and it is another to argue that the state is inherently a-social or, put it alternatively, does not originate and instantiate in human interaction and consciousness. To rectify this deficit, one might restore humans as the only effective agents of historical change. Establishing the social ontology of human agency is, therefore, the main objective of this paper. But before I proceed with it, what are the main assumption and the rationale behind this ontology? 2. The assumption and the rationale I start out from the assumption that if objective is meant to be about anything other than the inter-subjectively or socially constructed material product of social interaction and consciousness, then one might subscribe to the view that the material reality of the social world exists prior to and apart from the historical development of humans. The logic I suggest finds explicit expression in Karl Marxs dictum that people make their life and history but not as they please. They make them under circumstances inherited from the past.

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______________________________________________________________ Human beings are the one and only driving force behind the historical process thanks to their unique collective human action, even though their freedom is not unrestrained. They are the sole collective agents in the social material world who possess emergent power. This is structurally embedded within particular historical limits prefigured by social material conditions of the past and the present. But now, I turn to set out my understanding of the social ontology of human agency. 3. The social ontology of human agency Human history, intertwined as it is with the emergence of the human world, might be asserted to set out from the existence of living human individuals; which represents the first real historical fact of human life.5 That is so because human beings must be in a position to live before they are able to make history.6 Only nature, therefore, exists prior to people and history. Yet, between the two latter what markedly makes the difference lies in the fact that historical process and development originates in the genesis and physical subsistence of humans, who of all organic objects of nature are the sole creatures that combine passions with reason. Humans, alternatively, are biological beings that are made up of a natural material body, logic, feelings and perceptions, for they are living, real physical subjects.7 In particular, unless nature is preceded, active individuals could hardly be afforded the means to carry out their existential, physical human functions, be these procreating, feeding, heating, clothing, and habitation. Through this vital activity, they fulfil the need to preserve their physical existence. At the same time, however, the realization of this activity results in its objectification. This implies that human beings make their physical human activity itself an object of their will and consciousness.8 And this, in turn, entails that thought and being are indeed distinct, but at the same time they together form a unity.9 It is this natural base, with roots in the physical world and the conscious and sensuous human activity, practice, that sets the stage for the way in which human agents begin to employ and reproduce the actual means of subsistence they find in existence. By thus doing to satisfy sheer physical human needs, they give shape and substance to their first historical act, that is, the creation and reproduction of their actual material life.10 Real living subjects, in effect, become actually sensuous only thanks to their conscious existential doings. The latter are initiated as a result of the enduring concern and reasoned efforts of active individuals to survive and humanly make progress over time. Thereby, the humans action is indigenous to their being. Still, it can scarcely be detached or isolated from their will and consciousness. Instead, each is part and parcel of the other. In this respect then, people and their inherent, conscious physical activity are exclusively constructive of the human world.

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______________________________________________________________ Equally important, the material is something more than simple natural conditions.11 In addition to nature itself and its natural forces and resources, it involves humans, their conscious physical activity and the actual, tangible products of this activity.12 The gist of the matter is that these human material products embody in themselves as objects human will and consciousness, generated as it is by the natural material necessity of survival. That is why human constructions while appearing as though they are purely material nonetheless are objectified, inasmuch as they make the ideational an essential component part of their being.13 Put it another way, active subjects being driven by the necessity of survival are prompted to act, in order to craft out of the physical means of subsistence objects that give real sensuous form to existential human functions and their ingrained mental processes and products. In this sense, the material represents all those natural and human tangible elements or entities that substantiate or objectify the humans want, contemplation and action to remain alive. Human life and history is the objectified product of the realised conscious human activity and, thereby, intrinsically material. From this angle, on a first level of analysis, human agency might be conceived of as a sum of individual subjects that, within the process of their historical development and on the back of nature, are engaged in natural action constructing the material reality of the human world. This human material world becomes object only in relation to living active human beings. It is made by them through their physical activity, which along with its inbuilt human will and consciousness produces and, concurrently, is produced by the material conditions of this world. It follows from this that precisely because the subjective is constituted by a blend of human passions and reason14 that is embedded via human action within the material, the objective by no means has a plainly material shape and substance. In fact, it reflects the synthesis of the material and the ideational. Objective reality so, or objectivity, is the totality of human agency and its objectified human material constructions. In this respect, it corresponds to the whole objectified product of the realised conscious human activity evolving out of the constant interplay of material conditions and ideas in the course of history.15 Humans as natural beings nevertheless are straight of social substance; their nature is communal. Why? It is so because living subjects create and produce their communal nature by their natural action. Far from being abstract or mere reflection, their social being originates in their individual need and egoism. In other words, it is produced directly by the effect of their being.16 Essentially, the individual is the social being to the extent that the relationship of man to himself first becomes objective and real to him through his relationship to other men.17 This explicitly means that producing and sustaining the human material life, both of ones own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, is as much a physical as a social

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______________________________________________________________ relationship. The social pertains to the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what matter and to what end.18 And those individuals awareness of the necessity of associating with other individuals living around them is nothing more than the beginning of the consciousness that they are living in society, or human society or social humanity.19 It is arguably understandable that an affiliate state of human beings is, in addition to the first-born, original material basis of nature, a necessary prerequisite for their existence and evolution within the historical process. Human agents, even as separate particular individuals, become really explicit and make effectual sense only as society thanks, as already mentioned, to their conscious physical human activity, it being a combination of action and consciousness. A human, in that regard, is relationship. Humans acquire actual physical relevance as human relations in society through their human activity among themselves.20 This implies that real physical subjects exist solely in relation to each other in the form of relevant ensembles of human relations that are instantiated in their conscious physical human activity. That is, they themselves inter-act and become object as inter-subjects or groups of subjects by virtue of their intrinsic sociality; resided as it is in the natural material necessity of survival, and manifested as it is by the fact that they are engaged in and, simultaneously, are driven by collective human action and consciousness. In a sense, rather than creating a society, human beings and their inbuilt conscious human interaction are the society itself. Society thus is understood as the sum of ensembles of human relations founded in the historically developed interaction and consciousness of human beings, organized as they are in forms of collective human forces within and across a territorially confined space.21 By way and in terms of society then, within the historical process, these inter-active collective human forces, coined as social forces with their intrinsic social interaction, are exceptionally both the bearers of society and constitutive of the material reality of the human world of their particular space. The human, in effect, along with the physical human activity is nothing other than the collectively human, it being the social coupled with the social action.22 As it hinges on the humans relations in society, social is held to correspond to inter-subjective.23 In turn, it points to an amalgam of shared human passions and reason.24 It mirrors social forces that while existing only in relation to each other, nevertheless they first become really explicit in the form of their own ensemble of social relations; instantiated as it is in the social interaction and consciousness of the constituent separate human agents and clusters of human agents that are the bearers of each of these social forces. Basically, inter-subjectivity is instantiated in a human situation in which certain social forces are related and bound together by bonds of all

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______________________________________________________________ sorts through their social action and, in that way, becomes embedded within the material. It is taken to denote a course of historical movement in between subjectivity and objectivity, which sets, within and among these social forces, the stage for the making of the objectified human material products of their social interaction and consciousness. These products therefore are of social substance insofar as their actual making goes through the collective cooperation of social forces co-existing as social relations in society. It is in this sense that they are socially or intersubjectively constructed or constituted. In effect, intersubjectivity rests with a historically developed social process of objectification, taking place inside and across particular ensembles of social relations, through which particular social forces make residues of the material and the ideational from the past an object of their social interaction in the present. Clearly, it is before everything else founded in social forces and their social action and accordingly proceeds with material and ideational elements or entities on the back of a particular objective reality.25 To say that differently, by involving social action and consciousness, intersubjectivity inherently embodies a relationship quality. Not only does the realisation of this quality make intersubjectivity endogenous to objectivity. More important still, as this quality is detailed in an ability to act and enter into social relations, intersubjectivity confers upon the social forces engaged a measure of emergent power. This is built into those forces interaction as a result of their necessity of social survival and evolution.26 It entails a unique material capability of social construction or constitution. Thereby, the objectified, social material products can be said to be intersubjectivities; in the sense that they are the socially or intersubjectively constructed or constituted products of the realised social action evolving out of the interplay of material conditions and ideas within the historical process. By extension, the social material world, representing the sum of the social forces social relations in society and their intersubjectivities, is the entire objectified product of social interaction and consciousness within a territorially delimited society developed in the course of history. In climbing down the analytical ladder, to come full circle, human appears as social and human agency as the sum of social forces with their inherent social action. Insofar as these forces become relevant only as social relations in society, they might be said to carry embedded with them society itself within and across a territorially confined space. But with society being the sum of ensembles of social relations, this means that the positions these ensembles hold between themselves reflect, in fact, the relationship with which social forces stand to one another within this society. In other words, the ensembles of social relations, that is, the social forces social relations in society, are linked and arranged in a way that make up configurations of

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______________________________________________________________ social relations labelled as social structures.27 Not only are the social relations in society of various social forces framed into their own collective human forces and their own social structure. Also, every social force resides in its own human agents and its own structure of relations. Additionally, as intersubjectivity is instantiated in ensembles of social relations, social structures accordingly are intersubjectively or socially constituted; that is, they are the objectified, social material products of the social action of the social forces involved. It is from this perspective that in being the bearers of society, social forces can so be regarded as the bearers both of human agency and social structures.28 This is meant to imply that in addition to the possession of emergent power, the primary property of social forces and their social action is the reproduction and transformation of social structures. The latter, embodying a configured context of social relations, confront social forces with definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.29 The result is that social forces interact and construct the material reality of the social world within a range of historical possibilities and action options circumscribed by the structure of their social relations. That is why the primary property of structures is their function as a material force that not merely enables and/or restrains the social action of social forces but also regulates the distribution of the objectified, social material products of this action. The intersubjective making and historical development of social life within a territorially confined society is structurally conditioned. Agents and their action are constitutive of the objective material reality of the present but under the shaping influence of existing social structures inherited from the past. In this sense, therefore, social interaction and consciousness in its capacity of being endogenous to social forces is nothing less than the interplay of agency and structures that is itself derived from and, simultaneously, constructs the interplay of the material and the ideational within the historical process. Social forces, social relations, social action and material conditions, all are internally related and historically instantiated in the interplay of agency and structures within the totality of the social material world. In this context, all material and ideational elements or entities are intersubjectively or socially constituted and structurally conditioned. And as such these are the objectified, social material products of the realized social action of social forces co-existing as social relations in society within a territorially delimited space. In turn, and that is the gist of the matter, social products and objective reality are inherently human. They are produced, reproduced, and transformed only thanks to collective human action, which inheres in the actual physical existence and development of humans with passions and reason. Overall, nothing in social life and history is above and

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______________________________________________________________ beyond the emergent power and sensuous reach of real living human beings engaged in social interaction in their collective form as social forces. 4. Conclusion So, where are we coming to? Security is intersubjectively constructed, the objectified, social material product of social interaction and consciousness evolving out of the interplay of the material and the ideational within the historical process. National security, understood as the freedom from threats of all sorts, a material condition that sets the stage for states to promote their professed interests, and thus to achieve the freedom from wants, is inherently human. My argument, in that regard, is that human and national security are neither separate nor identical. Rather, they inhere in the physical existence and evolution of humans, for they stand in a relation of commonality with one another. They are made by humans for humans, and for human purposes.

Notes
This paper builds on a research project on Human Security in Southeast Europe and Greek Foreign Policy, co-funded by the European Social Fund and National Resources (EPEAEK Programme, Pythagoras II). 2 The Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, United Nations, New York, 2003. 3 E Newman, A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept. Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 3, September 2004, p. 358. 4 L Freedman, The Age of Liberal Wars. Review of International Studies, vol. 31, December 2005, pp. 93-107. 5 K Marx, Selected Writings, edited by David McLellan, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 176. 6 ibid., p. 181. 7 The terms physical and natural, and subjects and human agents or actors, as well as activity and action are used interchangeably throughout the text. 8 Marx, op. cit., pp. 86-90. 9 ibid., p. 99. 10 ibid., pp. 171, 176-177, 181. 11 Essentially herewith, I introduce a distinction of the material as a whole between the natural material and the human material. The former, consisting only of elements or entities of nature, represents the first-born, original material basis of the physical action of humans, intrinsically marked out as they are by an amalgam of passions and reason. Initially, it is this physical human activity that by upgrading and transforming the natural material
1

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______________________________________________________________ produces the human one. Afterwards, within the process of historical progress and development, these two forms of the material might be held to have become constitutive of each other and thus internally related through human action. 12 In the light of the conceptual perspective presented in Note 11, speaking of the material character of the conscious physical human activity is meant to imply that in the first place it originates in the natural material. In the second place, this activity is unlikely to become really explicit without being built on elements or entities of the material and, simultaneously, being driven by human reason; otherwise, it is liable to remain a mere instinct, organic doing taking place on the back of nature. This relationship runs the other way around, however. Human thoughts and the material take shape and substance and acquire effectual relevance only by human action. For that reason, after all, the physical human activity is, in fact, a combination of activity and consciousness. Overall, material and intellectual elements or entities are not simply constitutive of human activity but also are embedded in and instantiated through it; and they all are internally related within the totality of the human world through the physical existence and evolution of real physical subjects in the course of history. Humans, in effect, produce, reproduce, and change the material and the ideational and concurrently are produced, reproduced and changed by them both through their conscious physical human action. It is through this historical process that humans are uniquely able to constitute and, at the same time, become substantiated as part of the human world. See also Note 11. 13 I take the ideational to denote human thought processes and products, including will, consciousness, images, discourse and language. I do not consider it an abstract thought creation of the human mind existing outside and apart from the material. Instead, by and through human activity it always becomes substantiated as part of the material reality of the human world. Even pure mentally processed and articulated products of all sorts are human material constructions, although they are, in fact, objectified to the extent that they are disseminated and experienced through particular material entities. That is so not simply because they are originally produced by the humans natural material need to preserve their physical existence, and thereby implant into them as an inbuilt trait the material; but also because they survive and produce real sensuous effects only when do real physical subjects make them an object of their action within the historical process. But this by no means entails that the ideational is a mere mechanical reflection of the material. As mentioned in Note 11, human action rests on human reason besides to a material basis and, therefore, these all are internally

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______________________________________________________________ intermingled. This inner connection clearly implies that material and ideational elements or entities are mutually constitutive of each other as well. It is in this respect that human consciousness plays its relative autonomous part in constituting the material reality of the human world, and by extension, as A Bieler puts it, embodies a transformative quality, in his Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas. Politics, vol. 21, no. 2, May 2001, p. 98. 14 Hence, subjectivity pertains to a humans individuality held to correspond to its own physical being with its inbuilt feelings and thought processes. 15 As regards this interplay, R Cox (2000: 56), drawing on A Gramsci, points out that ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other. Ideas have to be understood in relation to material circumstances, in his Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method, in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, S Gill (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 56. For further analysis of the material basis of ideas, see Bieler, op. cit.. 16 Marx, op. cit., p. 125. 17 ibid., pp. 92, 99. 18 ibid., p. 182. 19 Ibid., pp. 173, 183. From this angle, therefore, as Marx puts it, it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. See, ibid., p. 425. 20 Human relations in society refer to the fact that by and through their action, humans stand in a relation of cooperation and conflict with one another and, thus, blend together as though they give form to their own ensemble of relations in corresponding domains of human life. 21 An alternative adequate statement of this understanding is that society becomes really explicit and relevant as a material entity not only because it represents collective human forces relations in society, but also because it is territorially delimited. 22 As with the physical human activity, as already pointed out in the main text and Notes 11 and 12, social action or interaction, being indigenous to the physical actual existence of social forces or agents, is a combination of collective human action and consciousness. Also, it constitutes and, concurrently, is constituted by material and ideational elements or entities. Finally, social action, the material and the ideational, all are internally related within the totality of the social material world of human society. 23 Thereby, social and intersubjective are neither separate and contradictory nor identical and complementary.

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24

In other words, it implies the existence of a group of humans that as like physical beings share similar but not identical logic, feelings and perceptions, that is, a social force with common activity, interests and identity. 25 It follows from this that the intersubjective making of the objectified, social material products closely intertwines both with the ideational and the material. Intersubjectivity has to do not only with particular social forces shared meanings, perceptions and identity but also, more broadly, with their social action constituted as it is, as mentioned in Note 22, by material and ideational elements or entities. Clearly, this conceptualisation contradicts conventional wisdom in international relations theory. Encapsulating a widely held view, intersubjectivity, or the socially constructed elements or entities, refers only to the humans thought processes and their collective thought products, by and large knowledge, identity and interests. See A Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 393425; A Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. To give an example from standard works in security studies, Buzan, et. al. argue that securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed [ ] is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm, in their Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998, p. 31. This statement is explicitly representative of the mainstream view, even though, it seems to me, it separates the intersubjective in collective understanding from the socially constituted through collective action. Instead, I argue that in terms both of the material and the ideational, what is or becomes intersubjective concurrently is or becomes socially constituted by social interaction and consciousness. Also, thanks to social action what is intersubjective or socially constructed or constituted is such both in collective meaning and in collective material shape and substance. This virtually means that in the making of an objectified social product the component material part can not be constructed outside and apart from the simultaneous construction of an attendant component ideational part, and vice versa (read and relate this statement to Notes 11 and 12). From this viewpoint, my understanding of intersubjectivity is in part similar to that of Bieler and Morton, who appear to identify intersubjectivity with the ideational but not to separate it from the material and the notion of socially constructed. Following A Gramsci and R Cox, they venture that the state, for instance, as an intersubjective category refers to universal subjective. This means that it is shared in the subjectivity of various

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______________________________________________________________ people, which afterwards attains humanly objective consequences by shaping the everyday lives of real physical people. In this sense, to view states as structures as socially constructed, it entails that structures become part of the objective world by virtue of their existence in the intersubjectivity of various people. See A Bieler & A Morton, The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective. European Journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1, March 2001, p. 22. 26 As by the same token, as mentioned before in the main text, the conscious physical human activity originates in the natural material necessity of survival. 27 The totality of these social structures might be said to correspond to the structure of society in which all relations coexist simultaneously and support one another. See, Marx, op. cit., p. 220. In fact, every territorially confined society is made up of various constituent social structures, which objectify or substantiate the configuration and historical development of social relations in corresponding domains of social life. 28 Bieler & Morton, op. cit., pp. 5-35. 29 Marx, op. cit., p. 180.

Bibliography
Bieler, A., Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas, Politics, vol. 21, no. 2, May 2001, pp. 93-100. Bieler, A. and A. Morton, The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1, March 2001, pp. 5-35. Buzan, B., et.al., Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998. Cox, R., Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method, in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, S. Gill (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 49-66. Freedman, L., The Age of Liberal Wars, Review of International Studies, vol. 31, December 2005, pp. 93-107. Marx, K., Selected Writings, edited by David McLellan, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. Newman, E., A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept, Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 3, September 2004, pp. 358-359.

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______________________________________________________________ The Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, United Nations, New York, 2003. Wendt, A., Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 393425. , Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). Efstathios Fakiolas, who holds a Ph.D from the Department of War Studies, Kings College London, is EPEAEK Research Fellow in the Department of Geography, Xarocopeio University, Athens.

Teaching Nonviolence Helen Fox


Abstract In-depth interviews with undergraduates at a high ranking, politically liberal U.S. university suggest that young adults who are most likely to occupy future positions of influence are skeptical of the idea that a world without war is possible. Despite their aversion to war in general and the Iraq war in particular, these students nearly always said they believe that war is an integral part of human nature and that peaceful international relations will always be subverted by individuals and/or groups that insist on taking advantage of others. When students cited defended the need for war, they did not cite aggressive states or international terrorism as just causes, but rather the responsibility to protect defenceless others such as villagers in Darfur or Jews in Hitlers Germany. However, students knew little about the prevalence and efficacy of nonviolent movements or the range of diplomatic and political tactics that have been employed to deter violence. The author concludes that secondary schools and universities need to fill the gaps in students knowledge by teaching historical, social, political, and psychological information about peaceful solution to conflict, and should engage students in imagining and designing alternatives to violence. Key Words nonviolence, pacifism, peace education, higher education, Quaker *****

I am a pacifist. My pacifism is rooted in my Quaker faith. In a declaration to King Charles the Second in 1661, Quakers said, We utterly deny all outward wars and strife and fightings with outward weapons for any end or under any pretence whatsoever. This is our testimony to the whole world. Its true that not all Quakers are pacifists. Many fought in World War II, after becoming convinced that this was a good war, necessary to preserve peace and freedom, and to free others from oppression. But many other Quakers have been conscientious objectors, opposed to all war as a matter of principle. I joined their ranks after the New York World Trade Center was attacked on September 11th 2001. This is how I came to that realization in my life. On September 10, 2001, I had just returned from Cambodia where I had talked to survivors of the Khmer Rouge, who, as you surely remember, had sent most of the

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______________________________________________________________ population into slave labour in the countryside, declared money invalid, blew up the central bank, burned books, executed the intelligentsia, and turned the local high school into a torture chamber where they starved, mutilated, and executed seventeen thousand of their own people including many young children. Who were these monsters that inflicted such suffering? They were not an external enemy, nor were they some different ethnic or religious group. They were Cambodians who had turned against their neighbours, their teachers, their colleagues, even their own families. This is what still haunts Cambodians today, that they did all this to themselves, that they became so brutalized by an idea, and committed such atrocities out of fear, or revenge, or cold-blooded self righteousness. Looking around as I walked through the streets of Phnom Penh and the villages and towns I visited, I realized that many of the people I saw had been young adults during those terrible years, and had either been very, very lucky, or had participated in some way in this system. But strangely enough, I did not see a nation of people degraded by evil. In fact, I found Cambodians to be some of the most gentle, hospitable, and delightfully sunny people I have ever met. As a nation of Buddhists, they are taught to revere all forms of life and deplore inflicting pain on others. To get angry in public - over a cab fare or some other petty complaint - is considered childish and embarrassing. Even raising ones voice is culturally inappropriate. This is not something that arose recently, after the experience of such opposite sentiments. These values have been present throughout Cambodian history. My conclusion was that its simplistic to say, as my government does, and as all governments do when they want to prepare the people to commit unspeakable crimes of violence, that there are the bad people and the good people, the evil countries and the responsible countries, and that if we annihilate the evil ones we - the good and responsible people - will be safe, and evil will be defeated forever, or at least kept under control. Shortly after September 11th, when the United States decided to protect itself from terrorism by attacking two defenceless countries, one, desperately poor, the other trying valiantly to maintain itself under United Nations sanctions, I made several personal decisions, just to remain sane. One was to start speaking openly about pacifism. The other was to develop a new undergraduate seminar at the University of Michigan called Nonviolence in Action. After teaching that course for several years I began a study that I hoped would help me envision how to reach a wider audience of college students, and what that audience might need to know. I also wanted to understand more clearly what students at a high-ranking, politically liberal university think about the current war in Iraq, what they think of war in

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______________________________________________________________ general, and how they might view the possibility of a nonviolent future. We have now completed in-depth interviews of eighty University of Michigan students, about a quarter of whom have taken my class. These interviews, and my reflections on teaching nearly eighty more students over a period of five years, provide the information for this talk. Most students we talked to believe that the Iraq war is senseless. Many think the United States brought the September 11th attacks on itself by acting arrogantly in the world, bullying other countries or treating them as inconsequential. Most express cynicism toward the current administration as well as the media reporting of the war, which they find manipulative, biased, and superficial. If a military draft were reinstated (which is unlikely, but has been discussed) the vast majority of respondents said - rather rashly, I thought - they would flee the country or somehow make themselves unqualified for military service. Almost all said they do not feel safer as a result of the US response to the terrorist attacks, and that war is clearly not the best or only way to deal with terrorism. Some expressed the view that any war is pointless or self-defeating. Yet, the overwhelming majority said that wars will continue eternally, and that the dream of a nonviolent future is unrealistic. The reasons for this pessimistic view are many. Some respondents were quite sure that humans are violent by nature. Many pointed out that violence is the easiest and most definitive way for people or nations to settle their differences, much easier than trying to talk things over. Some said that humans are greedy, or enjoy controlling others, or that humans dont act rationally, or that terrorists dont act rationally, or that humans are accustomed to the tradition of war, so they have a hard time envisioning alternatives. A few said that the existence of the arms industry creates a need and desire for war, or that leaders are inherently violent because they are concerned primarily with their own power. Interestingly, most students tend to think of interpersonal violence in the same terms as large-scale national or international violence. Many said that war persists because of the inevitability of anger and disagreement among individuals, or the us and them mentality that has always plagued families and communities. They said that people will always get angry at each other, or use violent language to put each other down, or even just assert their will, and that means that in order to avoid violence, humans would have to agree about everything, and that would mean we would need some kind of thought police to avoid divisions between people. Humans would have to be perfect to outgrow the need for war, they said, and that will never come to pass. Heres a sample from one of the interviews: No matter what, theres always going to be violence, theres always going to be that one guy on the block who

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______________________________________________________________ abuses his wife, theres always going to be that one woman on the block who abuses her children, theres always going to be that one country around the corner that disagrees with our policy, theres always going to be that one president whos out of his mind that would bring us back to war. These reasons for the inevitability of war were almost always given in a tone of cynicism and even despair. Yet when asked how humans could learn to avoid war, almost all students gave answers that reflected their optimism about human nature, saying that tolerance, respect, and communication are key, or that we just need to sit down with the other side and work on problem solving together, or that more cultural understanding will help, as will alleviating world poverty. Trite as these responses may sound, they were offered to the interviewers seriously, even passionately, as if these alternatives to violence had never seriously been considered before. Many respondents also claimed that wars of liberation or armed humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme oppression or genocide are quite different from the greed or fear-inspired wars like Iraq or Vietnam that they so deplore. Like many Quakers, these students saw World War II as a good war, saying (erroneously) that the US entered into it to liberate the Jews from Nazi oppression. They also cited the U. S. Civil War as morally necessary, saying (again erroneously) that it was fought primarily to free the slaves. This strong impulse to justify armed intervention to protect the weak and vulnerable was echoed by the majority of students who enrolled in my nonviolence class. But let me tell you about the class and give you a bit of the flavour of my students. My classes are small because they are writing and discussionintensive. I never lecture; students are expected to come to class prepared with questions for discussion and debate. I tell them I dont expect them to adopt my pacifism, since I know its a rather extreme position, but that they do need to listen to the arguments that support it, and that I welcome their challenges and questions. Some students enrol in the course because they are looking for ways to convince their friends, or their parents, or indeed, themselves, that their impulse toward nonviolence is valid. Others take the course simply to satisfy the universitys upper level writing requirement, so they come with a great variety of viewpoints. One of my best students had done most of her schooling in India where she had become frustrated by the prevailing Mahatma craze, as she put it, the glorification of Gandhis bloodless war that defeated British control. She had come to the University of Michigan to study war, actually, since she had wondered all her life if the terrible violence between Muslims and Hindus at partition could have been avoided by armed intervention. She was taking my class to get the other point of view. Some

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______________________________________________________________ young men arrive in my class full of masculine bravado, believing, as one put it, that pacifists are worthless cowards, and that walking away from a fight is cowardly as well. The most common view is that nonviolence is irrelevant. When I came into this course, one student wrote at the end of the semester, I had a rather odd misconception that being non-violent meant having a lot of crappy bumper stickers on your car. Not much to it besides participating in a few peace marches that are largely ignored. We start the course by attempting to define violence and nonviolence (students inevitably want to define violence extremely broadly, including emotional and spiritual violence and even the violence of ideas, which, as they soon discover, makes nonviolence extremely difficult to achieve). We look at what anthropologists say about aggression and cooperation in human nature, and the ways that people can be psychologically manipulated to cause each other harm. We debate just war theory and try to apply it to current wars. We look at genocide in Rwanda and Darfur and the tragic consequences of the lack of action in those conflicts by the United Nations. Students choose among books about first person experiences of war, like Nuha Al-Radis Baghdad Diaries, or historical accounts of genocide, like Philip Gourevitchs book about Rwanda: We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families, or exposes of war crimes, like The Bridge At No Gun Ri, by Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza about the Korean war, or ruminations on violence in the aftermath of war like Akira Yoshimuras One Mans Justice. Once we have an understanding of how violence is defined, understood, regulated, promoted, and justified, we focus our attention on alternatives. We look at teachings of nonviolence in various religious traditions: not just Christianity, although that tradition has the most extensive and striking literature, but also Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and some Native American spiritual traditions. Then we come to the heart of the course: case studies and news footage of successful nonviolent direct action in Poland, Chile, South Africa, India, and in the African American and Chicano civil rights movements. We read about the Mothers of the Disappeared in Argentina, the resistance to the Nazis in Denmark, and many other examples of heroic and creative ways ordinary people have used to confront overwhelming destructive power. We look at Gene Sharps catalogue of 198 methods of nonviolent action that have been used in nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and non-violent intervention. We read testimonies of conscientious objectors in Israel in a wonderful book called Breaking Ranks by Ronit Chacham, and the history of the international accompaniment movement in Latin America: Unarmed Bodyguards, by Liam Mahony and Luis Enrique Eguren. We hear from local community activists who attend the yearly protest at the School of the

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______________________________________________________________ Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, whose graduates have participated in extreme acts of violence and repression in Latin America. And a former student from the Nonviolence course might come back to talk to us about how he joined a peace team in Iraq or Palestine. By the end of the course, most students express amazement that such important topics had been neglected in their previous fifteen years of schooling. They are energized by the film footage of nonviolent activism; they are moved by testimonies of peace keepers without arms; they ask themselves under what conditions they too would be brave enough to enter into a violent situation without the means to defend themselves. They completely give up their view of nonviolence as passive or somehow unmanly. But they rarely adopt my pacifist position. While they now see clearly the futility and cyclical nature of war, and are all too ready to point out the greed, lies, and manipulation that persuade people to engage in it, they are still not ready to give up the violence option entirely. The reason? There are just too many unanswered questions. What should we do instead of war and violent intervention? They envision a crisis: machete-wielding mobs attacking their neighbours; horsemen bearing down on defenceless villagers or their own countrys military gearing up for a shock and awe campaign that will inevitably destroy thousands of civilians. What can possibly deter these madmen from violence but more violence? Even when they see the circular nature of that position, it is not enough for them to say that the world should simply address the situation by creative, nonviolent means. Because they dont yet know well enough what those means might be. Their education, both formal and informal, has so neglected the range of diplomatic and political tactics that have been or could be employed to deter violence that they see no clear path to follow. I have no doubt that humans are intelligent and courageous enough to address their differences without war. But to get there, we must convince the young that peace is possible. High schools and even elementary schools need required courses in peace education that would teach nonviolent solutions to conflicts, both interpersonal and international. College students in political science courses should learn effective ways to address some of the major causes of war: global inequalities, religious extremism, and arguments over dwindling energy resources, with special attention given to points of view of countries and individuals most affected by these problems. History courses should give central consideration to the extensive history and theory of nonviolent activism, and challenge students to come up with their own ideas about how international conflicts could have been addressed without resorting to war. All these courses must be grounded in the personal: the stories, testimony, and deeply introspective accounts of the people we call friends and enemies. This is what touches students and gives them pause. At the end of my course, many of my students report that their new

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______________________________________________________________ understanding of nonviolence has come as a meaningful, personal revelation. As one wrote, Here is what I have come to believe: you cannot be a peace maker until you actually care about the welfare of other people. And that is easier said than done. Helen Fox teaches courses in nonviolent activism, human rights, race and racism, and international development at the University of Michigan, U.S.A.