## Are you sure?

This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?

Gonçalo Pina

+

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

December 2011

VERY PRELIMINARY

Abstract

In the last 20 years there has been an unprecedented wave of …nancial reform.

Financial reform is a complex phenomenon. Di¤erent reforms have speci…c timings

and targets, and yield di¤erent outcomes. In this paper, I investigate theoretically

and empirically the sequencing of di¤erent …nancial reforms.

Using data on …nancial reforms for 91 countries between 1973-2005, I study

micro …nancial reforms (reforms that target competition in …nancial markets) and

macro …nancial reforms (reforms that target aggregate prices and quantities). I …nd

that macro reforms tend to lead micro reforms. This new stylized fact is puzzling

because this sequencing is associated with lower growth when compared to other

sequencing strategies.

To understand these two observations, I setup a model that explores a second

best view of …nancial reform. I show conditions under which performing macro

…nancial reforms but not micro …nancial reforms is constrained Pareto optimal.

The …rst best is not attainable due to the interaction between strategic enforcement

breakdown and three externalities: (i) overborrowing by domestic entrepreneurs, (ii)

lack of coordination between savers, (iii) underinsurance by domestic intermediaries.

An imperfectly competitive …nancial sector can internalize some of these externali-

ties. The mechanisms explored in the model are important to explain the di¤erent

experiences in the sequencing of …nancial reforms observed in the data. They can

also account for the negative growth e¤ect of having macro …nancial reforms lead

micro reforms.

JEL classi…cation: F33, F34, O16

Keywords: …nancial liberalization, competition, capital ‡ows.

**I am grateful to Jaume Ventura for his valuable guidance. I thank Fernando Broner, and participants
**

of the CREI International Lunch and the XII Conference on International Economics for helpful com-

ments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, from the

Portuguese Ministry of Science and the European Research Council for …nancial support. Address: Fac-

ulty of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona,

Spain. E-mail: goncalo.pina@upf.edu.

1

1 Introduction

The last forty years have seen a wave of …nancial reform unprecedented in its intensity and

scope. Figure 1 plots the sample mean of a …nancial reform index for di¤erent groups of

countries and di¤erent types of reforms. The solid black line measures average …nancial

reform across di¤erent dimensions. According to this index, …nancial reform occurred

earlier and more intensively in advanced economies. But the wave of …nancial reform in

the early 90s in developing economies remains one of the most important economic events

in recent times.

In this paper, I study theoretically and empirically the sequencing of di¤erent …nancial

reforms. Financial reform is a multifaceted phenomenon. I divide reforms into macro and

micro dimensions. Macro …nancial reforms target aggregate prices and quantities in …-

nancial markets. Examples include the lifting of capital account restrictions, or abolishing

interest rate and credit controls. Micro …nancial reforms target the structure and organi-

zation of …nancial markets. Examples include allowing free entry in the …nancial sector,

privatization of …nancial institutions, regulation and the promotion of equity markets.

Using data for 91 countries between 1973 and 2005, I …nd that macro reforms tend to

lead micro reforms. This particular sequencing of …nancial reforms is important because

it comes associated with lower growth. Countries performing alternative sequencing - …rst

micro reforms or both macro and micro reforms simultaneously - tend to grow more. This

is a puzzling feature of recent …nancial liberalization.

1

To understand these two patterns I setup a simple model of …nancial trade, where I

exploit a second best view of …nancial liberalization. I focus on two policy dimensions:

capital ‡ow controls (as a macro reform) and domestic …nancial competition (as a micro

reform).

2

I take the view that the …rst best can only be obtained by lifting all restrictions

to capital ‡ows and competition. But the interaction between strategic enforcement of

…nancial contracts and the presence of externalities can make the …rst best unattainable.

I show that a simple second best argument justi…es the sequencing I document in the

data. A less competitive …nancial sector has its incentives aligned with enforcement and

partially corrects the externalities. This is the case the smaller are domestic savings, and

the larger are the …nancial intermediation needs prior to liberalization. I then perform two

empirical tests of the model. I show that important variables that determine sequencing

strategies in the model can help predict reforms in the data, and that these variables can

account for the negative growth e¤ect of performing …rst macro …nancial reforms.

The …rst contribution of this paper is to document two patterns associated with the

sequencing of …nancial reforms in the data. Macro reforms tend to lead micro reforms and

this is associated with lower growth. Figure 1 divides reforms between macro reforms and

micro reforms. Table 1 collects information on the sequencing of reforms in the data.

3

The

evidence suggests that most countries perform macro …nancial reforms before engaging in

1

The distinction between macro reforms and micro reforms follows Bandiera et al 2000. Bandiera et

al 2000 study the e¤ect of di¤erent reforms on domestic savings for a small group of countries. In this

paper, I use the extended dataset by Abiad et al 2010 and investigate the e¤ect of reforms on growth.

2

In particular, the government can open the domestic economy to unrestricted capital ‡ows and can

decide if domestic …nancial markets are organized in a monopoly or in perfect competition. In section

2.3. I discuss other examples of micro and macro reforms.

3

Table 1 de…nes a liberalization as a jump of 0.1 on an index going from 0 to 1. A reform is considered

simultaneous Macro and Micro if both happen within at most 2 years from each other. It follows that

reform X leads reform Y if it happened more than 2 years before reform Y.

micro …nancial reforms.

4

Furthermore, micro …nancial restrictions are in place long after

macro restrictions have been lifted.

5

This pattern is important because the sequencing of reform matters for growth. Table

2 shows that countries that do macro reforms before micro reforms tend to do worse in

terms of growth.

6

The omitted variable in this regression is a status quo situation. The

coe¢cient associated with having macro reforms leading is negative and signi…cant at the

10% level. The (negative) coe¢cient associated with having macro reforms leading other

reforms is di¤erent from the (positive) coe¢cient associated with a composite alternative

sequencing strategy at the 5% level.

7

These negative e¤ects are not surprising.

8

After all, lack of competition and missing

markets create distortions.

9

Why then do countries keep these distortions? And in partic-

ular, why do countries fully liberalize prices and quantities but are reluctant to introduce

competition in their …nancial sector?

Table 1: Ordering of Liberalization

% of episodes in which following dimension (partially) liberalized …rst

Regions Macro Reforms Micro Reforms Simultaneous

Advanced 57.6 15.1 27.3

Emerging Asia 81.9 5.6 12.5

Latin America 59.8 9.4 30.8

Sub-S. Africa 59.4 9.4 31.2

Transition 46.4 20.3 33.3

N. Africa & M. East 67.7 2.9 29.4

4

Table 10 in Appendix C collects regression results of Granger causality tests which con…rm this

pattern.

5

Although the observation that macro reforms lead micro reforms is a new stylized fact, recent papers

on …nancial reform already note that micro reforms targeting domestic …nancial competition are less

correlated with overall …nancial liberalization than other dimensions. See Abiad & Mody 2005 and Abiad

et al 2010.

6

I follow the approach of Bekaert et al (2005). The speci…cation is given by:

j

i;t+k;t

= ,Q

i;1980

+¸

0

A

i;t

+c

0

1i/

i;t1

+c

0

oc¡

i;t

+-

i;t+k;k

where j

i;t+k;t

is the average growth over non-consecutive 5 year windows. Q

i;1980

represents logged G11

per capita in 1980, and the other controls (A

i;t

) include government spending as a percentage of G11,

proportion of secondary school enrollment, population growth and life expectancy. I perform a pooled

OLS regression where I test the impact of di¤erent …nancial indices (1i/

i;t

= ¦All, Macro, Micro¦) and

di¤erent sequencing strategies (oc¡

i;t

= ¦MacroLead, MicroLead, Simultaneous¦).

7

This composite includes both the case where reforms are simultaneous and micro reforms happen

…rst. Looking only at the situations where there was a reform in place, and taking the simultaneous case

as the omitted variable, the coe¢cient on macro leading is -.011, and is signi…cant at the 5% level. The

coe¢cients for the (positive) micro leading and the (negative) macro leading are di¤erent at the 5% level.

8

Bekaert et al (2005) studies equity market liberalizations and capital ‡ows reform. In my work I

use a larger sample, and investigate a larger set of reforms. Furthermore, I explicitly study the growth

e¤ect of di¤erent sequencing strategies. As appendix C shows, my results are consistent with Bekaert et

al (2005). Equity market liberalizations - an example of a micro …nancial reform - are determinant for

growth, and capital ‡ows reform - an example of a macro …nancial reform - are not. Other micro and

macro …nancial have quantitatively important e¤ects that follow the pattern identi…ed for equity markets

and capital ‡ows.

9

Pasricha (2010) …nds an empirical link between de facto integration and domestic …nancial sector

competitiveness. Looking at deviations from the covered interest parity condition, she shows how the

lack of competition in domestic …nancial systems may prevent countries from reaping potential bene…ts

from …nancial integration, as it induces deviations from price equalization.

2

Figure 1: All refers to the sample mean of all the entries of the …nancial reform index

constructed by Abiad et al (2010). Macro reforms include capital account restrictions,

interest rate controls and credit controls. Micro reforms include entry in the …nancial

sector, privatization, regulation and the establishment of equity markets. All sub-indices

take larger values if there is more liberalization, except for regulation and supervision,

where the opposite is true.

Table 2 (1) (2)

LaggedFinReform 0.000566** 0.000578**

(0.000278) (0.000278)

MacroLead -0.00726* -0.00718*

(0.00415) (0.00415)

MicroLead 0.00576 0.00591

(0.00878) (0.00879)

Simultaneous 0.00337 0.00317

(0.00489) (0.00491)

log1980 -0.0138*** -0.0133***

GovGDP -0.000552** -0.000483*

Secondary -0.00980 -0.00979

PopGr -1.014*** -1.038***

Log(life) 0.106*** 0.105***

Advanced -0.00286

Constant -0.286*** -0.288***

Observations 316 316

R-squared 0.337 0.338

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3

I argue that a simple model of capital ‡ows with domestic …nancial intermediation

can explain these two patterns. A recent body of work led by Broner and Ventura (2010)

shows how models of capital ‡ows where enforcement of …nancial contracts is strategic

but it is hard to discriminate between domestic and foreign agents, can explain di¤erent

experiences with macro reforms.

10

The crucial element is that heterogeneity within the

economy creates domestic asset trade. Because it is hard to discriminate between domestic

and foreign asset trade, avoiding payments to foreigners implies destroying domestic asset

trade. There are two possible equilibria in this economy. In the optimistic equilibrium,

domestic savers save at home, entrepreneurs borrow domestically and abroad, investment

is large and there is no enforcement breakdown. In the pessimistic equilibrium, domestic

savers save abroad, entrepreneurs borrow abroad, and investment is small as there is

enforcement breakdown. In this view, capital ‡ows reform allows more …nancial trade

but worsens the strategic enforcement problem if trade with the rest of the world is too

large relative to domestic trade.

I take this perspective and introduce domestic …nancial intermediaries as the sole

agents that can lend to entrepreneurs. On the contrary, savers can access international

markets without resorting to domestic …nancial intermediaries. The second contribution

of this paper is to show that this asymmetry has important implications for the sequencing

of …nancial reforms. In the model there are two policy dimensions. Like in Broner and

Ventura (2010), the domestic economy chooses whether there is free movement of capital

with the rest of the world. Unlike in Broner and Ventura (2010), the domestic economy

decides also on the level of competition in its …nancial sector.

Imperfect competition is a distortion. It follows that in a …rst best world it is never

optimal to restrain competition in domestic …nancial markets. But the …rst best is not

always attainable. The reasons behind this are traditional in the macroeconomic analy-

sis of developing economies and play an important role in my paper. First, there is an

externality among entrepreneurs that sometimes makes the good equilibrium impossi-

ble. In…nitesimal entrepreneurs do not take into account the e¤ect of their actions on

enforcement, and this leads to overborrowing. Second, there is a coordination problem

between savers that makes the pessimistic equilibrium always possible. Savers do not

internalize the e¤ect of their actions on enforcement by the government. Third, there is

an underinsurance externality by domestic agents that do not internalize the impact of

their risk taking activities on government enforcement. Restricting competition alleviates

the strategic enforcement problem without fully compromising the in‡ow of much needed

capital.

To keep the analysis simple, I study two limiting cases of domestic …nancial compe-

tition. I assume that micro …nancial policy determines if the …nancial sector is either

perfectly competitive or a monopoly. In this framework, I show that if funds for invest-

ment are su¢ciently scarce, the constrained optimal policy is to liberalize capital ‡ows

while keeping a monopoly in the …nancial sector. The intuition is that the monopolist has

a stake in the economy. In other words, the monopolist has its incentives aligned with

enforcement and partially corrects the externalities. Of course, this is not to say that the

monopolist charges the optimal mark-up or replicates the optimal plan of the economy.

10

The assumption of non-discrimination between domestic and foreigners has been recently used by

Kremer and Mehta (2000), Brutti (2010), Guembel and Sussman (2009), Broner and Ventura (2011),

Broner and Ventura (2010), Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2010), and Rappoport (2010). Broner et al

(2010) argue that this assumption can be rationalized with su¢ciently deep secondary markets.

4

The monopolist only cares about maximizing pro…ts. In fact, an optimal credit policy by

a government could always lead to the …rst best, but the purpose of this paper is to study

situations where the government can not implement the …rst best, and has to resort to

second best policies.

Crucially, the asymmetry of …nancial intermediation explored in this paper also has

important predictions for the sequencing of …nancial reform. If the international interest

rate is larger than the autarky interest rate, savers are better o¤ following capital ‡ow

liberalization even if they save domestically. This wealth e¤ect of capital ‡ow reform

paves the way to domestic …nancial competition reform in a dynamic version of the model.

Richer savers reduce the amount of foreign …nance needed by the country and this increases

the costs of enforcement breakdown. In other words, it makes some of the externalities

less important and tilts the policy towards liberalizing also the …nancial sector. This way,

the model provides a rationale for the sequencing of …nancial reform found in the data.

In the empirical part of the paper, I test the implications of the model. I perform

two types of test. I …rst try to account for the observed sequencing in the data. The

model predicts that deep country characteristics that in‡uence the amount of domestic

savings relative to the need of intermediation determine the optimal sequencing of …nancial

reform. Following Abiad and Mody (2005), I estimate a process for macro and micro

…nancial reforms that is consistent with the model. I …nd that …nancial reform is not

completely exogenous and that lagged savings and credit have predictive power on which

reforms are implemented. Second, I come back to the growth regression presented in

Table 2. The model suggests that …nancial reform is performed in a second best world.

Countries that do macro …nancial reforms …rst and only later introduce micro …nancial

reforms would do even worse by performing them simultaneously. There is selection into

di¤erent sequencing strategies of …nancial reform. I …nd that this selection is correlated

with country characteristics suggested by the model. Introducing lagged deposits and

lagged credit in the growth regression presented in Table 2, I observe that the negative

growth e¤ect associated with the macro-lead sequencing strategy disappears.

Other theories have been to proposed to explain some of the facts presented in this

paper. Ragan & Zingales (2003) suggest there are political economy factors behind the

timing of reform. With respect to this literature, this paper presents a rational alternative

that is complementary to the political economy of reform. In this paper it is the market

failure that induces the lack of reform, and not the political capture. Fernandez & Rodrik

(1991) present a learning story where successful initial reforms promote further reforms.

It does not explain which reforms should be implemented …rst. The theory presented

in this paper suggests a pecking order for reforms that seems consistent with the data:

international capital ‡ow liberalization should precede domestic …nancial competition for

countries with low deposits but large need of …nancial intermediation. This paper is then

related to the second best globalization works by Stiglitz (2000) and Caballero & Krish-

namurthy (2000, 2005) and Broner and Ventura (2010). Political economy explanations

of reforms associated with ideology …nd mixed results (see Alesina & Roubini (1992) and

Bartolini & Drazen (1997)).

11

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model and discusses

the main results. Section 3 studies the determinants of …nancial reform, and tests whether

11

My paper is also related to the study of cross-border …nancial transactions with imperfect competition.

Paasche & Zin (2001) and Kletzer (1984) show how default externalities in sovereign lending make it

impossible to have an equilibrium with perfect competition.

5

the view presented in this paper can account for the negative growth e¤ect described

above. Section 4 concludes and points to future research.

2 A model of macro and micro …nancial reforms

I present a simple model of asset trade with heterogeneous agents: savers, entrepreneurs

and …nancial intermediaries. In this model liberalization of capital ‡ows represents macro

reforms and competition in the domestic …nancial sector represent micro reforms.

12

I …rst introduce di¤erent levels of competition on …nancial autarky. Under …nancial

autarky, capital is not allowed to ‡ow from/to the domestic economy. This allows me

to illustrate the trade-o¤s behind enforcement. I assume that enforcement maximizes

the average utility of the agents in the economy, excluding …nancial intermediaries. Un-

der …nancial autarky, enforcement breakdown only increases inequality between agents.

Furthermore, a monopolist simply extracts resources from the economy. Therefore it is

never optimal to do enforcement breakdown and as a consequence, to keep a monopolist

intermediary.

Then, I open this economy to capital ‡ows, and compare the perfect competition

benchmark with the monopolist. I showhowa monopolist can do better when externalities

interact with enforcement breakdown. I consider three externalities: overborrowing by

entrepreneurs, coordination problems by savers and underinsurance. I …nalize this section

by extending the model to introduce dynamics. I also discuss macro vs. micro …nancial

reforms more generally. Finally, I draw empirical implications of the model, that I test in

the next section.

2.1 Preliminaries and autarky

There are three maximizing agents in this economy. Savers have funds but do not have

good investment opportunities. Entrepreneurs lack funds but have good investment op-

portunities. Domestic …nancial intermediaries are the only agents that can lend to entre-

preneurs.

Institutional arrangements, such as the level of competition in the …nancial sector and

liberalization of capital ‡ows are determined by a forward looking calculation of average

welfare in the economy. They can not be overturned. On the contrary, contracts are

subject to an enforcement decision at 1 = 1 that is strategic. I assume that enforcement

of these contracts maximizes the utility of the average agent at 1 = 1. In other words, the

economy can commit to institutional arrangements but not to enforce …nancial contracts.

There is one good that can be used for consumption, storage or investment. There are

two periods 1 = 0 and 1. In period 1 = 0, the economy …rst decides on the institutional

arrangement: perfect competition vs. monopolist …nancial sector, …nancial autarky vs.

capital ‡ow liberalization. Then, agents choose savings and investment decisions. In

period 1 = 1, enforcement of …nancial contracts is strategic and chosen to maximize

average utility in that period. A crucial assumption is that enforcement of …nancial

contracts can not discriminate between domestic and foreign agents.

13

There are two technologies in this economy, storage (|) and investment (/). Storage is

less productive than investment. Storage simply transfers resources across time without a

12

I discuss how representative these reforms are of micro and macro reforms in section 2.4.

13

EXPLAIN WHY IT IS CRUCIAL?

6

return. Investing | units of the good in storage today yields | units of the good tomorrow.

On the contrary, investment has a return. Investing / units of the good today, yields ¹/

**units tomorrow, where / is capital and ¹ 1, c ¸ (0. 1).
**

Savers and entrepreneurs are in…nitesimal and have masses (1 ÷) and , respectively.

Savers have funds. They can use the storage technology but not the investment tech-

nology. Entrepreneurs have insu¢cient funds but can use the investment technology. A

crucial assumption is that only the …nancial intermediary can lend to entrepreneurs. In-

termediaries choose their actions in order to maximize period by period pro…ts. Savers

can deposit with the domestic …nancial intermediary or with foreign banks, if capital ‡ows

are liberalized. This asymmetry between the …nancial trades of savers and entrepreneurs

plays a crucial role in my analysis, and can be justi…ed by monitoring asymmetries. De-

posits do not need monitoring. But loans need to be monitored by a domestic …nancial

intermediary who is subject to domestic law and therefore to strategic domestic enforce-

ment.

14

To summarize, at 1 = 0 there are four possible institutional arrangements:

A1 = ¦(r. ¸) [r ¸ A = (Co:jctitio:. `o:ojo|¸) and ¸ ¸ 1 = (¹ntc:/¸. Ccjitc| 1|on:)¦

Institutional arrangements (r. ¸) are chosen to maximize:

l

0

= 1

0

[(1 ÷) ln (c

s

1

(1)) + ln (c

e

1

(1)) +o(1)] (1)

where o is the share of domestic intermediaries owned by domestic agents, are pro…ts

of the domestic …nancial sector and 1 summarizes the enforcement decision at 1 = 1. To

simplify, assume o = 0. I assume utility is of the log-type. Enforcement 1 can take two

values. If 1 = 1 there is enforcement of …nancial contracts. If 1 = 0 there is enforcement

breakdown of …nancial contracts and the economy is in a situation of widespread default.

Enforcement is strategic. In particular, it is chosen in period 1 to maximize average utility

of that period, given by:

l

1

= (1 ÷) ln (c

s

1

) + ln (c

e

1

) (2)

I will focus …rst in a situation of …nancial autarky. In the next subsection, I will

compare them with capital ‡ow liberalization.

2.1.1 Perfect competition

The solution is obtained by backward induction. Under autarky enforcement breakdown

only generates inequality, without increasing average utility. This means that following

criteria (2), enforcement breakdown is never optimal and 1 = 1. It follows that having a

monopoly is never socially optimal.

Savers

Savers wish to maximize utility at 1 = 1. A saver receives an endowment in pe-

riod 0 and 1 of n

s

0

and n

s

1

, respectively. He has access to two investment options: (i) the

storage technology (|) transforms one unit of the good at time 0 into one unit at time

14

EXPLAIN WHY IT IS CRUCIAL?

7

1; and (ii) …nancial trades with domestic intermediaries (/

s

0

), for a gross return of 1 in

period 1. Formally, a saver solves the following problem:

max

c

s

1

;b

s

0

, ln (c

s

1

)

s.t.

/

s

0

+ |

0

= n

s

0

c

s

1

= n

s

1

+ 1/

s

0

Given that there is no uncertainty, if 1 _ 1 storage is never optimal. Savings and

consumption are given by:

/

s

0

= n

s

0

(3)

c

s

1

(1 = 1) = n

s

1

+ 1n

s

0

(4)

c

s

1

(1 = 0) = n

s

1

(5)

In a symmetric equilibrium the total supply of funds is perfectly rigid and given by:

o = (1 ÷) n

s

0

(6)

Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs wish to maximize utility at 1 = 1. An entrepreneur receives an endow-

ment in period 0 and 1 of n

e

0

= 0 and n

e

1

, respectively. He has access to two investment

options: (i) an investment technology (/) that yields ¹/

**in period 1; and (ii) …nancial
**

trades with domestic intermediaries (/

e

0

), for a gross return of 1 in period 1. Formally,

their problem is given by:

max

c

e

1

;k

e

0

;b

e

0

ln (c

e

1

)

s.t.

/

e

0

+ /

e

0

= 0

c

e

1

= n

e

1

+ ¹(/

0

)

+ 1/

e

0

Entrepreneurs will borrow to equate the marginal return of investment to the marginal

cost. The solution to their problem is given by:

/

e

0

=

_

c¹

1

_ 1

1

(7)

/

e

0

= ÷/

e

0

(8)

c

e

1

(1 = 1) = n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c¹

1

_

1

(9)

c

e

1

(1 = 0) = n

e

1

+ ¹

_

c¹

1

_

1

(10)

In a symmetric equilibrium, the aggregate demand of funds is given by:

1 =

_

c¹

1

_ 1

1

(11)

And it is possible to see that

@D

@R

< 0. The demand of funds is elastic and depends

negatively on the interest rate.

8

Figure 2: Perfect Competition: the interest rate that clears the market is given by 1

PC

.

Market clearing

Market clearing will determine the interest rate 1. It is de…ned as o = 1 or as

_

/

i

di = 0 :

(1 ÷) /

s

0

+ /

e

0

= 0 (12)

Solving for 1 :

1

A;PC

=

c¹

_

1"

"

n

s

0

_

1

(13)

Remember that storage is dominated by deposits only if 1 _ 1.

15

Under perfect

competition, intermediaries are completely passive and make zero pro…ts. This setting

perfectly reproduces a market for bonds where entrepreneurs issue bonds and savers buy

these bonds from them. The solution is represented in Figure 2.

2.1.2 Monopoly

Suppose now that there is only one …nancial intermediary. Under autarky, this …nancial

intermediary will have both monopolist and monopsonistic powers. Therefore, one has to

distinguish between two contractual interest rates. Savers get 1

s

, which will also be the

marginal cost of funds for the monopolist. In autarky savers have no better outside option

other than storage. I assume that if they are indi¤erent between storing or depositing they

deposit their funds. The monopolist will charge 1

e

to entrepreneurs. Then, the problem

of the monopolist is given by:

15

This is the case if (1 ÷-) n

s

0

< -

_

A

1

_ 1

1

. I de…ne this as a situation where capital is scarce.

9

(1

s

. 1

e

) = arg max 1 (1

e

÷1

s

)

_

A

R

e

_ 1

1

s.t.

_

A

R

e

_ 1

1

_ (1 ÷) n

s

0

(`1)

1

e

_

_

A

R

e

_ 1

1

_

_ ¹

_

_

A

R

e

_

1

_

(`2)

1 = arg max

E=f0;1g

(1 ÷) ln (c

s

1

(1)) + ln (c

e

1

(1)) (`3)

c

s

1

(1) , c

e

1

(1) given by (4) . (5) and (9) . (10)

The …rst constraint (`1) states that the monopolist can raise the funds it wishes

to supply. In this simple model, the supply of funds is …xed if 1

s

_ 1. The second

constraint states that the monopolist’s total repayment is constrained by the total amount

of resources produced by entrepreneurs. The third constraint summarizes the enforcement

decision at 1 = 1. The monopolist only makes pro…ts if 1 = 1, and he will take that into

account when choosing the interest rates. In this paper, I will be interested cases where

under autarky the monopolist is starving for funds. In this simple model this is the case

if the constraint (`1) is binding.

16

If the …rst constraint is binding:

1

M;A

=

c¹

_

1"

"

n

s

0

_

1

(14)

Replacing it in (`2), it is possible to see that this is always feasible if c _ 1 and ¹

is large enough. In this case, the monopolist only redistributes surplus. As savers have

no outside option, 1

s

= 1.

17

The solution is depicted in Figure 3. Monopolist pro…ts are

given by:

= (1

e

÷1

s

) /

M

(15)

2.1.3 Policy and welfare

In both the perfect competition and the monopoly cases enforcement implies entrepreneurs

paying intermediaries who in turn pay the savers. Under autarky, enforcement breakdown

has no e¤ect on average consumption and only negative e¤ects on inequality. Therefore,

it is never optimal to do it. This further implies that the monopoly has no value under

autarky and perfect competition yields higher utility.

Let 1

PC;A

be the interest rate clearing the market under perfect competition, that

is, the interest rate that solves equation (13). Then, it is possible to compute welfare of

autarky under perfect competition as:

l

A;PC

1

= (1 ÷) ln (c

s

1

) + ln (c

e

1

) (16)

where,

16

This point holds in general if the supply of funds is upward slopping. This is the case if utility is not

of the log type.

17

There is no situation where no constraint binds. If ('1) is not binding, then ('2) is binding.

The largest interest rate possible the monopolist can charge is the one where it appropriates all of the

entrepreneurs revenues. This requires the monopolist to do price discrimination.

10

Figure 3: Monopoly: the interest rate that clears the market is given by 1

e

for entrepre-

neurs, and 1

s

for savers. The di¤erence corresponds to the monopolist spread.

c

s;A

1

= n

s

1

+

c¹

_

1"

"

n

s

0

_

1

n

s

0

c

e;A

1

= n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

1 ÷

n

s

0

_

**In this subsection I have shown that under …nancial autarky, perfect competition is
**

the optimal institutional arrangement. In the next section, I will show conditions under

which the opposite holds when it is optimal to open to capital ‡ows.

2.2 Capital ‡ows liberalization

Assume now that there is a deep international market with no enforcement problems will-

ing to supply or demand funds in period 0 in exchange for a gross interest rate of 1

=

1 + : in period 1, and no barriers to asset trade. In case of enforcement breakdown I as-

sume that there is no penalty from abroad. Defaulting on contracts with the international

market comes with no externally imposed costs, but it can have internal costs. This is

the case because of the assumption that the government can not discriminate between do-

mestic and foreigners. Enforcement breakdown means also that planned domestic trades

are canceled.

18

In these conditions, enforcement only occurs if:

l

1

(1 = 1) _ l

1

(1 = 0) (17)

18

Under discrimination this model is just like the conventional view of capital ‡ow liberalization and a

textbook monopoly.

11

Where l

1

(1) = ln (c

e

1

(1)) + (1 ÷) ln (c

s

1

(1)). The other crucial element is that

savers can deposit abroad or at home, but entrepreneurs have to borrow from domestic

intermediaries. With capital ‡ow liberalization these intermediaries can now now obtain

deposits abroad or at home. Throughout, I will assume a symmetric equilibrium for all

agents in the economy.

19

Because of enforcement problems, agents in this economy face

di¤erent interest rates from their …nancial trades with the international market. If an

agent is borrowing from abroad,

1

B;

(1) =

1 +:

Pr (1 = 1)

(18)

but if an agent is lending abroad,

1

L;

= 1 + : (19)

In this setting there are two possible equilibria that I label Pessimistic (1) and Opti-

mistic (C). In the optimistic equilibrium, savers save domestically and enforcement can

happen. In the pessimistic equilibria, savers save abroad and enforcement always breaks

down, independently of the level of competition. It follows that in order to have enforce-

ment, it is necessary that the deposits made by savers are subject to the enforcement

decision. But it is not su¢cient. The strategic enforcement will trade-o¤ these costs of

enforcement breakdown, borne by savers, with the bene…ts accruing to entrepreneurs. In

case of enforcement breakdown entrepreneurs do not have to pay back for the capital they

invested.

For an optimistic equilibrium to exist, entrepreneurs must not commit to too many

payments abroad. Because they are atomistic they do not internalize the e¤ects of their

individual actions in the enforcement strategy followed at 1 = 1. I refer to this as the

overborrowing externality. Savers are also atomistic and follows the sunspot variable

unless domestic …nancial intermediaries o¤er them better conditions. I refer to that as the

coordination problem.

Assume that which equilibrium is played depends on the realization of a sunspot

variable at t = 0 given by ¸ = (C. 1), with probabilities Pr (¸ = C) = 1 ÷ j and

Pr (¸ = 1) = j. I assume that the sunspot is revealed and perfect observable as of

1 = 0, but only after the institutional arrangement is in place. I will further assume that

this sunspot does not depend on the institutional arrangement. In order to distinguish

between domestic and foreign trades, let / stand for domestic …nancial trades and , for

foreign trades.

In what follows, I will show conditions under which each of these equilibria exists.

2.2.1 Perfect competition

Under perfect competition, the …nancial sector is composed by an in…nite number of atom-

istic intermediaries. In this case, the sunspot variable crucially determines the outcome

of this economy. In particular, it is possible to show that there always exists a pessimistic

equilibrium and that the existence of the optimistic equilibrium is not always guaran-

teed. The amount of savings and the entrepreneurs’ outside option following enforcement

breakdown at 1 = 1 crucially determine whether this optimistic equilibrium exists.

19

To simplify the description of the equilibrium, assume that gross positions are minimized.

12

Lemma 1 There is always a pessimistic equilibrium where /

0

= 0 and ,

0

= 0.

Proof. Suppose all savers deposit abroad and all intermediaries catering entrepreneurs

borrow from abroad. Then, because enforcement is strategic, enforcement only implies

a transfer of resources abroad, and there is enforcement breakdown. Since contracts are

never enforced, the interest rate 1

B

(1) = ·, and investment is zero.

If the pessimistic equilibrium is played, consumptions are given by:

c

s

(1. 1 = 0) = n

s

1

+ (1 + :) n

s

0

(20)

c

e

(1. 1 = 0) = n

e

1

(21)

Welfare is then given by:

l

P

1

= (1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

+ (1 + :) n

s

0

) + ln (n

e

1

) (22)

In an optimistic equilibria savers deposit domestically, and intermediaries complement

these funds with foreign borrowing to supply entrepreneurs. Enforcement is optimal. In

this equilibrium, enforcement breakdown would destroy so much domestic asset trade that

this does not compensate avoiding payments abroad. Then:

1

B;

(1 = 1) = 1 +: (23)

domestic deposits are again given by:

/

s

0

= n

s

0

(24)

and borrowing by entrepreneurs and intermediaries is given by

/

e

0

= ÷

_

c¹

1 +:

_ 1

1

(25)

,

e

0

= /

s

0

÷

_

c¹

1 +:

_ 1

1

(26)

At 1 = 1, consumption under enforcement and under enforcement breakdown are

given by:

c

s

(C. 1 = 1) = n

s

1

+ (1 + :) n

s

0

(27)

c

s

(C. 1 = 0) = n

s

1

(28)

c

e

(C. 1 = 1) = n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c¹

1 +:

_

1

(29)

c

e

(C. 1 = 0) = n

e

1

+ ¹

_

c¹

1 +:

_

1

(30)

13

Enforcement breakdown hurts savers and bene…ts entrepreneurs. If 1 = 0, savers lose

(1 +:) n

s

0

and entrepreneurs win c¹

_

A

1+r

_

1

. The condition determining the existence

of this equilibrium is then given by:

(1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

+ (1 + :) n

s

0

) + ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c¹

1 +:

_

1

_

(31)

_ (1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

) + ln

_

n

e

1

+ ¹

_

c¹

1 +:

_

1

_

The following lemma shows that the existence of the optimistic equilibrium depends

crucially on domestic savings and on entrepreneurs’ need of credit. Observing equation

(31) it is possible to see that if n

s

0

is su¢ciently large, this equilibrium always exists.

Finally, the need of intermediation also plays a role, in particular if

A

1+r

is too large, this

inequality will not hold and the optimistic equilibrium does not exist.

Lemma 2 The optimistic equilibrium exists if (31) is satis…ed.

Proof. The proof follows from the analysis above.

If the optimistic equilibrium exists, welfare is given by:

l

O

1

= (1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

+ (1 + :) n

s

0

) + ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c¹

1 +:

_

1

_

(32)

When deciding to liberalize competition the relevant welfare associated with a situation

of perfect competition with capital ‡ow liberalization is then:

\

PC

1

= (1 ÷j) l

O

1

+ jl

P

1

Which can be rewritten as:

\

PC

1

= (1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

+ (1 + :) n

s

0

) +

_

j ln (n

e

1

) + (1 ÷j) ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c¹

1 +:

_

1

__

It is possible to see that savers are not a¤ected by which equilibrium is played. The

welfare of entrepreneurs is decreasing in the probability of a pessimistic equilibrium j.

2.2.2 Monopoly

A monopolist cares about pro…ts but can internalize the behavior of atomistic agents.

If pro…ts are maximized under enforcement he will attract domestic savings by paying

a slightly larger interest rate on its domestic depositors and induce enforcement. The

presumption is that a monopolist can engage in ex-ante discrimination between domestic

14

and foreign depositors. On the other side of the market, the monopolist will constrain

lending, if necessary, to make sure that the optimistic equilibrium exists. Of course, if

pro…ts are higher under enforcement breakdown, he will arrange for that equilibrium to

be played.

This section contains the two main results of this paper: (i) the incentives of the

monopolist are aligned with enforcement and (ii) under some conditions it is better to

keep a monopolist intermediary following the opening to capital ‡ows. The intuition for

the incentives of the monopolist to be aligned with enforcement is simple. He bene…ts

more when he gets repaid. The monopolist extracts rents from the economy so prefers a

situation where the size of the economy is larger. These rents come with a dead weight

loss, a consequence of the monopolist markup. The bene…ts associated with enforcement

under a monopolist need to be compared with the lottery under perfect competition.

The problem of the monopolist looks very similar to the one under autarky, except

that now there are no constraints on the amount of funds he has access to. Furthermore,

the marginal cost of funds is larger. The problem can be summarized as:

(1

s

. 1

e

) = arg max 1 (1

e

÷1

s

)

_

A

R

e

_ 1

1

s.t.

1

e

_

A

R

e

_ 1

1

_ ¹

_

A

R

e

_

1

(`2)

1 = arg max

E=f0;1g

(1 ÷) ln (c

s

1

(1)) + ln (c

e

1

(1)) (`3)

c

s

1

(1) , c

e

1

(1) given by (4) . (5) and (9) . (10)

The monopolist understands that if the pessimistic equilibrium is played, enforcement

breaks down. In that case 1 = 0, and pro…ts are zero. It will then do the best he

can to keep savings subject to the enforcement decision. In order to attract savings, the

monopolist has to o¤er savers 1

s

= 1 + :. Remember that I assumed that if indi¤erent,

savers keep their savings domestically. The monopolist must also guarantee that these

are not tradable deposits abroad. In order words, the monopolist must be able to engage

in ex-ante discrimination between domestic and foreigners.

20

The marginal cost of funds

of the monopolist is now 1 +: while 1

e

is charged on …rms. Suppose that (`2) does not

bind and that 1 = 1. The solution is represented in Figure 4. It is possible to show that:

1

s

= 1 + :

1

e

=

1 +:

c

(33)

If with the interest rate 1

e

given by equation (33) there is no enforcement and 1 = 0,

the monopolist will increase it further to ensure that enforcement occurs.

21

Note that the

monopolist gets no pro…ts in the non-enforcement equilibrium. This point is more general

than the simple model studied here. It is possible to show that for any positive probability

that enforcement is always guaranteed at 1 = 1, the monopolist makes pro…ts even if non-

enforcement is a possible outcome, but it still favors enforcement. The intuition for this

result is that the monopolist has a stake on the enforcement decision. It follows that the

monopolist will try to induce it.

20

One way to implement this is to o¤er large interest rates for long term savings deposits with penalties

for early withdrawal. This e¤ectively works like a tax on capital out‡ows.

21

This occurs if PUT CONDITION HERE.

15

Figure 4: Capital Flow Liberalization with Perfect Competition and with Monopoly.

This section argues that the monopolist can potentially solve the two externalities

present in the perfect competition case. First, the monopolist can always reduce entrepre-

neurial borrowing to satisfy the condition that the optimistic equilibrium exists. Second,

if the monopolist can ex-ante discriminate, it can eliminate pessimism altogether. By

making sure that domestic savings are invested domestically, the monopolist coordinates

savers towards a situation that is independent of the sunspot variable ¸.

The next section studies the conditions, under the di¤erent roles of the monopolist,

that determine the optimal institutional arrangement at 1 = 0.

2.3 Optimal institutional arrangements

2.3.1 Constraining trade

Assume that the monopolist can not engage in ex-ante discrimination. Then the mo-

nopolist can at least constrain credit. To see this role of the monopolist, compare the

conditions guaranteeing the existence of the optimistic equilibrium under perfect competi-

tion and monopoly. Let :c· and c:cd represent the amount of savings from one saver and

the amount of funds lent to one entrepreneur, respectively. These conditions are given

by the following two inequalities, where 1C represents perfect competition, and ` the

monopolist situation:

(1 ÷) ln

_

n

s

1

+ (1 + :) :c·

PC

0

_

+ ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c:cd

PC

0

_

_

(34)

(1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

) + ln

_

n

e

1

+ ¹

_

c:cd

PC

0

_

_

16

(1 ÷) ln

_

n

s

1

+ (1 + :) :c·

M

0

_

+ ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c:cd

M

0

_

_

(35)

(1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

) + ln

_

n

e

1

+ ¹

_

c:cd

M

0

_

_

In this simple model, savings are inelastic and :c·

PC

0

= :c·

M

0

= n

s

0

, but the monopolist

can always reduce credit su¢ciently to ensure that this condition holds. Suppose that this

is given by the unconstrained solution to the monopolist problem given by (33). Then

c:cd

M

0

=

_

2

A

1+r

_ 1

1

< c:cd

PC

0

=

_

A

1+r

_ 1

1

. It is possible to see that the inequality holds

for a larger con…guration of parameters under monopoly than under perfect competition.

In other words, under a monopolist there are lower levels of savings such that the equality

holds. Formally, de…ne n

s

0

PC

and n

s

0

M

that make the inequalities (34) ÷(35) exactly zero.

It is immediate to see that n

s

0

PC

n

s

0

M

. It follows from the simple structure of this

model that if the monopolist can only constrain trade, a monopolist is only constrained

optimal when the optimistic equilibrium under perfect competition does not exist.

Focus now on condition (34). Rewrite it as :

(1 ÷) ln

_

n

s

1

+ (1 + :) :c·

PC

0

_

÷(1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

)

ln

_

n

e

1

+ ¹

_

c:cd

PC

0

_

_

÷ ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c:cd

PC

0

_

_

The right hand side is increasing in

_

c:cd

PC

0

_

**. To see this, di¤erentiate it with respect
**

to c:cd

PC

0

:

c¹

_

c:cd

PC

0

_

n

e

1

+ ¹ (c:cd

PC

0

)

÷

c(1 ÷c) ¹

_

c:cd

PC

0

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹ (c:cd

PC

0

)

0

It it possible to show that if c 0, this condition is positive. In other words, the

inequality is harder to satisfy the larger is credit in the economy.

2.3.2 Ex-ante discrimination

Assuming that the monopolist can ex-ante discriminate between domestic and foreign

depositors, the relevant trade-o¤ at 1 = 0 is between the sure distorted welfare of the

monopoly, and the lottery that comes with perfect competition. In this case, the mo-

nopolist makes sure that savings are deposited domestically. In the previous section, I

have argued that the optimistic equilibrium always exists under a monopoly. The relevant

trade o¤ is then:

\

M

0

_ (1 ÷j) l

O

1

+ jl

P

1

(36)

where l

O

1

is given by equation (32), l

P

1

by equation (22) and, \

M

0

is the value at 1 = 0

of a monopolist and is given by:

\

M

0

= (1 ÷) ln (n

s

1

+ (1 + :) n

s

0

) + ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c

2

¹

1 +:

_

1

_

in the unconstrained solution of the monopolist. Simplifying, (36) can be rewritten:

ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c

2

¹

1 +:

_

1

_

_ (1 ÷j) ln

_

n

e

1

+ (1 ÷c) ¹

_

c¹

1 +:

_

1

_

+jln (n

e

1

)

17

2.3.3 Underinsurance

[To Be Completed]

2.3.4 Sequencing of reform

[To Be Completed]

Suppose there are 3 periods in this economy. The additional period 1 = 2 is just a

replica from 1 = 1. At 1 = 1, before new borrowing and lending is done but after the

enforcement decision, it is possible to change the institutional arrangement in the economy.

We have seen before that the crucial determinants behind the trade-o¤ between perfect

competition and monopoly, given capital ‡ow liberalization, are savings and credit. If the

monopolist can not discriminate, then a monopolist is only preferable if savings are small

enough. If the monopolist can discriminate, savings are irrelevant and deep parameters

determining credit are crucial for the trade-o¤.

Suppose that we are in an economy that at 1 = 0 opens to capital ‡ows but keeps

a monopolist …nancial intermediary. Assume further that this monopolist can constrain

…nancial trade in the economy but it can not ex-ante discriminate between savers. This

section argues that at 1 = 1 the bene…ts from having a monopolist are smaller. One

of the consequences of the asymmetry in intermediation studied in this paper is that

opening to capital ‡ows always makes savers better o¤. This wealth e¤ect, everything

else equal, makes the trade-o¤ between perfect competition and monopolist easier. It

can then tilt the balance of …nancial reform also towards the introduction of domestic

…nancial competition.

2.4 Discussion and empirical implications

If the economy is capital scarce, I have identi…ed three socially valuable roles for a monop-

olist. All are classic second best arguments. The monopolist has a stake on enforcement.

This is because only through enforcement the monopolist can extract rents from the

economy.

22

First, if a monopolist can discriminate ex-ante between domestic and foreign

savers he will be interested in keeping domestic savings subject to the enforcement deci-

sion.

23

Second, even if the monopolist can not discriminate between savers, it can make

the optimistic equilibrium possible by constraining the amount of funds supplied to the

entrepreneurial sector. In a situation where enforcement would breakdown under perfect

competition because there is over-borrowing, a su¢ciently large monopolist mark-up can

correct these imbalances. Third, to the extent that the monopolist can use the monitor-

ing technology to adequately spread risk, the monopolist can solve the underinsurance

externality.

In the model I have focused on capital ‡ows and domestic competition but many other

reforms can be thought as having similar e¤ects. For example, other macro restrictions

22

This complementarity between private agents actions and enforcement is also present in Brutti (2009)

and Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2011), in a di¤erent formulation. Furthermore, these two papers focus

on the sustainability of public debt.

23

This notion of ex-ante discrimination is considered in Broner & Ventura (2011) as a desired policy by

a Government. They conclude that this assumption goes against the non-discrimination assumption that

is crucial for their analysis. In my paper, I keep the non-discrimination assumption by the Government,

but allow the …nancial intermediaries to perform ex-ante discrimination. That is, the monopolist can

target their activities and induce domestic agents to save with them.

18

such as restrictions on the interest rate and on the quantity of credit, can be thought of as

limits on the amount of funds that can be traded in the economy. In a perfect competition

world these can reduce the amount of intermediation but will not necessarily correct the

externalities I discuss in the model. Regarding micro restrictions, the establishment of

equity markets can be thought of as an increase of competition. Equity markets allow

…rms to get funds in the stock market, directly from savers. Therefore, this reform is very

similar to introducing competition in the …nancial sector, if debt and equity are perfect

substitutes. Regulation and supervision introduce checks on market power.

Although quite stylized, this model has some interesting empirical implications to

study …nancial liberalization. From an ex-ante perspective, the model suggests that open-

ing to capital ‡ows and to competition should depend on the ability to raise domestic

savings and on how large the entrepreneurial sector is. From an ex-post perspective, the

model suggests that opening up to capital ‡ows should increase credit more if there is

perfect competition in the domestic …nancial sector. When there is lack of competition,

opening to capital ‡ows might even decrease credit.

Finally, the model predicts that countries that are open to international …nancial

markets but have lower domestic …nancial competition are less subject to capital ‡ow

reversals. A simple extension with a positive probability that enforcement is always

guaranteed yields the prediction that crises happen only if there is su¢cient competition

in the domestic …nancial sector. The following section turns to the data to see which

elements of the model are consistent with the data.

3 Empirical analysis

There are two approaches to empirical work on …nancial reform. One strand of litera-

ture assumes reform is exogenous and studies the causal e¤ects of …nancial liberalization.

Another strand takes the view that liberalization is endogenous and looks for the determi-

nants of reform and reversals.

24

In this section, I perform both types of tests. I …rst focus

on the determinants of …nancial reform. To do so, I take advantage of the new dataset

on …nancial reform proposed by Abiad et al (2010) and I follow the analysis of liberaliza-

tions and reversals proposed by Abiad & Mody (2005). I …nd that relevant variables in

the model - savings and credit - help determine …nancial reform of di¤erent dimensions.

This suggests that …nancial reform, and in particular, di¤erent sequencing strategies of

…nancial reform are not exogenous. If reform is endogenous then I then introduce lagged

savings and credit in the growth regression and note that this absorbs the negative growth

e¤ect associated with doing macro …nancial reforms before micro …nancial reforms.

3.1 Data

3.1.1 The Abiad et al (2010) index of …nancial reform

The main innovation of this index is its breakdown of reform in seven di¤erent dimen-

sions of …nancial sector policy: (1) capital account restrictions, (2) credit controls and

24

These two views are not necessarily opposites. For reforms to be exogenous they must be unexpected,

or their e¤ects should not be felt before they are in place. For the two views to be possible, all that is

necessary is that the window of opportunity for reform to be exogenous, but the actual decision to be

endogenous, which is the view this paper takes.

19

excessively high reserve requirements, (3) interest rate controls, (4) entry barriers, (5)

state ownership in the banking sector, (6) prudential regulations and supervision of the

banking sector and (7) equity market policy. Along each dimension, a country was given

a score on a graded scale from zero to three, with zero corresponding to repression and 3

indicating full liberalization. This index is available for a sample of 91 countries over the

period 1973-2005.

Financial reform is a complex phenomenon, making it hard to isolate the e¤ects of

di¤erent policies. For instance, targeted policies have consequences across the board as

they a¤ect all the other dimensions of …nancial reform. Reforms from foreign countries

have an impact on domestic policies, and even technological change can determine how

restrictive some policies are. With these caveats in mind, I use this index of …nancial

reform and separate it between micro (1 ÷4) and macro reforms (5 ÷7). I construct the

following two indices:

:cc:o

t

=

ccjitc| ,|on:

t

+ c:cdit co:t:o|:

t

+ i:tc:c:t :ctc co:t:o|:

t

3

:ic:o

t

=

c:t:¸ /c::ic::

t

+ :tctc on:c::/ij

t

+ :cqn|ctio:

t

+ c¡nit¸ :c:/ct:

t

4

3.1.2 The Beck & Kunt database on …nancial development and structure

This dataset has been used much more than the previous dataset so it needs a smaller

introduction. It contains indicators of …nancial development and structure across countries

from 1960-2007. From this is very rich dataset, in this preliminary analysis, I extract data

on credit, domestic deposits and concentration of the banking sector.

3.2 Determinants of Financial Reform

In this section I study the e¤ect of the variables predicted by the model in overall …nancial

liberalization. The reason to focus on the general index, instead of focusing directly on

individual index levels or in the macro and micro division, is that …nancial reform is a

complex process, and its dimensions interact in di¤erent ways. Policy measures destined

to a¤ect the way …nancial trade is done domestically have an impact on how …nancial

trade is performed across borders, and vice-versa. Then, it makes sense to take advantage

of the larger variation and information available by looking at the overall level of …nancial

reform …rst. I then perform the same analysis for di¤erent types of reform.

The analysis in Abiad & Mody (2005) assumes the following process for …nancial

reform, where 11

**is the desired level of …nancial liberalization - aggregate or of a given
**

index - and c is a measure of the status quo bias:

´11

it

= c

_

11

it

÷11

i;t

1

_

+

it

(37)

In the benchmark speci…cation, Abiad & Mody (2005) assume the desired level of

…nancial liberalization to be 1 for all countries (the maximum). This paper suggests that

this level should depend on how much the economy saves, and how much credit there is

in place.

11

it

= c

1

G11

i;t

+ c

2

1cjo:it:

i;t1

+ c

3

C:cdit

i;t1

20

From Abiad & Mody I keep the assumption that there is a domestic learning process

in place, and choose c = 11

i;t1

, and that there is a regional learning process in place,

captured by the introduction of distance to the regional leader in reform:

´11

it

= o

1

11

i;t1

+ o

2

11

i;t1

G11

i;t

+

o

3

1cjo:it:

i;tx

11

i;t1

+

o

4

C:cdit

i;tx

11

i;t1

+ o

5

11

2

i;t

1

+

o

6

(11G_11

i;t1

÷11

i;t1

) +

it

(38)

The model suggests o

1

. o

2

0 and o

3

. o

4

< 0. Regional learning suggests o

5

0. Table

3 presents the results for regressions that use the ordered logit technique applied in Abiad

& Mody (2005) for developing economies. I combine the sample in Abiad & Mody (2005)

and Abiad et al (2010) with the dataset on …nancial development and structure. The

results presented in Table 3 are suggestive of the mechanisms of the model at work: for a

given level of …nancial reform in place, large deposits facilitate …nancial reform and large

credit hinders …nancial reform.

Table 3: Ordered Logit (1) (2) (3) (4)

l.indx 5.173*** 5.345*** 5.392*** 5.371***

(0.820) (0.838) (0.838) (0.833)

l.indx^2 -6.098*** -6.152*** -6.178*** -6.175***

(0.940) (0.951) (0.949) (0.946)

l.indx*GDP 3.15e-05*** 5.34e-05** 6.31e-05*** 6.17e-05***

(1.15e-05) (2.12e-05) (1.99e-05) (1.98e-05)

l.indx*Dep -0.704* 0.340

(0.421) (0.534)

l.indx*Cred -1.108** -1.427**

(0.430) (0.619)

RegCatchup 1.177** 1.205** 1.150** 1.128**

(0.530) (0.530) (0.540) (0.533)

Observations 1272 1272 1272 1272

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The ordered logit speci…cation is appropriate for a dependent variable that takes a

discrete number of values, and where the changes represent discrete jumps. Both this

speci…cation and Abiad and Mody (2005) use as a dependent variable the average value

of the …nancial index, which takes many values from 0 and 1. Although this variable

is not cardinal, it is hard to understand it as a purely ordinal variable, as the simple

average treats changes in di¤erent indices equally. Besides, the ordered logit speci…cation

introduces assumptions about the distribution of these variables and has hard to interpret

coe¢cients. To con…rm the results, Table 4 presents the results of an OLS speci…cation

which are very much in line with the ordered logit regression.

21

Table 4: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)

l.indx 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.102***

(0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0202)

l.indx^2 -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140***

(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0215) (0.0211)

l.indx*GDP 7.90e-07*** 8.56e-07** 1.14e-06** 1.03e-06**

(2.61e-07) (4.18e-07) (4.38e-07) (4.18e-07)

l.indx*Dep -0.00212 0.0183*

(0.00909) (0.0102)

l.indx*Cred -0.0123 -0.0285**

(0.0105) (0.0129)

RegCatchup 0.0276* 0.0277* 0.0275* 0.0263*

(0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0142)

Observations 1272 1272 1272 1272

R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.067

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.2.1 No e¤ect on macro reforms, but important e¤ect on micro reforms

I now perform two regressions on the macro and micro indices, assuming the process

represented by (38). Tables 5 and 6 show that the variables predicted by the model,

deposits and credit, matter crucially for micro reforms but not for macro reforms. Note

that deposits and credit are not signi…cant when accounting for macro reforms, but they

are jointly signi…cant for micro reforms (although deposits is not signi…cant individually).

These results further suggest that credit is the crucial variable determining di¤erent reform

strategies.

Table 5: Macro Reforms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

l.indx 0.148 0.155 0.160 0.157 0.150

(0.102) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107)

l.indx*l.indx -0.317*** -0.320*** -0.322*** -0.321*** -0.321***

(0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103)

l.indx*gdp4 3.62e-06*** 4.60e-06* 5.39e-06** 5.14e-06** 5.12e-06**

(1.35e-06) (2.40e-06) (2.35e-06) (2.29e-06) (2.33e-06)

l.indx*l.dep -0.0308 0.0496 0.0524

(0.0461) (0.0577) (0.0581)

l.indx*l.cred -0.0617 -0.108 -0.111

(0.0497) (0.0685) (0.0687)

catchup_ind 0.136** 0.137** 0.133** 0.130* 0.132*

(0.0649) (0.0661) (0.0660) (0.0665) (0.0667)

Observations 1272 1272 1272 1272 1272

R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.042

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

22

Table 6: Micro Reforms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

l.indx 0.413*** 0.431*** 0.435*** 0.433*** 0.432***

(0.0555) (0.0581) (0.0572) (0.0569) (0.0607)

l.indx*l.indx -0.424*** -0.430*** -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.432***

(0.0617) (0.0647) (0.0636) (0.0629) (0.0629)

l.indx*gdp4 1.31e-06 3.62e-06** 4.47e-06*** 4.32e-06*** 4.31e-06***

(8.98e-07) (1.43e-06) (1.37e-06) (1.34e-06) (1.35e-06)

l.indx*l.dep -0.0730** 0.0301 0.0307

(0.0301) (0.0356) (0.0377)

l.indx*l.cred -0.110*** -0.138*** -0.139***

(0.0348) (0.0494) (0.0508)

catchup_ind 0.0768* 0.0792* 0.0726* 0.0706* 0.0710*

(0.0433) (0.0416) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0422)

Observations 1272 1272 1272 1272 1272

R-squared 0.029 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.038

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.3 Ex-post results

3.3.1 Accounting for the negative growth e¤ect of sequencing

In this section I redo the analysis in Table 2, introducing credit and deposits in the

analysis. Remember that average growth was computed as a 5 year window, therefore,

credit and deposits are timed one period before this 5 year window. Table 7 collects

the results. Columns (1)-(2) are reproduced from Table 2. Columns (3)-(4) add lagged

savings as an explanatory variable. Note that the coe¢cient on the sequencing with

macro leading is reduced, and now insigni…cant. There is a positive and signi…cant e¤ect

of lagged savings on growth. This is consistent with the model. [To Be Completed]

23

Table 7 (1) (2) (3) (4)

LaggedFinReform 0.000566** 0.000578** 0.000593** 0.000606**

(0.000278) (0.000278) (0.000277) (0.000278)

MacroLead -0.00726* -0.00718* -0.00678 -0.00669

(0.00415) (0.00415) (0.00414) (0.00415)

MicroLead 0.00576 0.00591 0.00584 0.00599

(0.00878) (0.00879) (0.00875) (0.00876)

Simultaneous 0.00337 0.00317 0.00390 0.00369

(0.00489) (0.00491) (0.00489) (0.00490)

LaggedSavings 0.0229* 0.0232*

(0.0135) (0.0135)

log1980 -0.0138*** -0.0133*** -0.0141*** -0.0135***

GovGDP -0.000552** -0.000483* -0.000503* -0.000429

Secondary -0.00980 -0.00979 -0.0109 -0.0109

PopGr -1.014*** -1.038***

Log(life) 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.0995*** 0.0987***

Advanced -0.00286 -0.00308

Constant -0.286*** -0.288*** -0.261*** -0.263***

Observations 316 316 316 316

R-squared 0.337 0.338 0.343 0.344

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.3.2 Enforcement crises and concentration of the banking sector

The …nal tests are ex-post results. In a liberalized economy, does concentration predict a

lower frequency of defaults?

Pr(1c,cn|t) = 1

_

·

t

+ ,

1

1cjo:it:

i;t1

+ ,

2

C:cdit

i;t1

+ ,

3

Co:cc:t:ctio:

i;t1

+ A

0

i;t1

¸

_

Table 8 and 9 show that both the de jure index for concentration and a de facto

measure of (lagged) concentration of the …nancial sector suggest that higher concentration

is associated with a lower enforcement crisis, which is another prediction of the model. In

particular, these p

Table 8: Probit (1) (2) (3) (4)

L.Deposits -2.372*** -2.720*** -2.720***

L.PrivCredit 1.279*** 1.394** 1.369**

L.concentration -0.575 -0.808* -0.822*

L.growth -7.445*** -7.248*** -7.454*** -7.262***

L.curracc 0.00987 0.0163 0.0155 0.0160

L.reserves -6.014 -3.587 -4.712 -4.477

L.BankCrisis 0.203

Observations 1306 1306 1306 1306

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

24

Table 9: Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

L.entr 0.172* 0.170*

L.indx -1.091** -0.473 -0.537 -0.549 -1.165**

L.growth -5.929*** -6.312*** -6.149*** -6.063*** -5.653**

L.curracc -0.0299** -0.0361** -0.0369** -0.0353** -0.0316**

L.reserves -0.526 -1.543 -1.823 -1.465 -1.211

L.bdgdp 0.322 -0.480 -0.378

L.pcrdbgdp 0.530* 0.834* 0.790

Observations 1226 1226 1226 1226 1226

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4 Conclusion

This paper presents a stylized model that highlights two reasons why restricting domestic

…nancial competition when opening up to capital ‡ows might be a desirable policy mix.

A …rst pass at the data suggests that these mechanisms are important empirically, but

also unveils a more general view that the sequencing of reforms matters empirically, and

that there is an important distinction between reforms that target quantities and prices

in …nancial markets (macro) and reforms that deal with the structure of …nancial markets

(micro reforms).

Future research should study the robustness of the mechanism. Theoretically, this

simple model can be explored in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium

framework. Furthermore, there are other reasons why domestic …nancial competition

might be hurtful when opening up to capital ‡ows. The debate on competition and

stability in the banking sector is a important explanation (see Beck (2008) for a survey). It

follows then that a general model of competition and capital ‡ow liberalization should add

these to the mechanisms considered in this paper, and evaluate the relative contribution

of complementary explanations.

The biggest challenge lies with empirical work. This paper has presented some sug-

gestive evidence but if stops short of a full test of the theory. Although the episodes

and regressions presented in Section 3 seem to support the view that macro …nancial

liberalization interacts with domestic …nancial competition in non-trivial ways, the role

of competition remains hard to discern empirically. One di¢culty with the data is that it

is hard to measure competition in the …nancial sector. Also, a formal test of this theory

should account for the di¤erent episodes and for the complementary political economy

considerations that have dominated the literature thus far.

As the world economy exits the most important crisis since the great depression and

…nds itself struggling with a backlash against market-based …nancial reforms, the under-

standing of the optimal policy mix and timing of di¤erent reforms is of incalculable value.

The last 40 years have been rich in di¤erent experiences with reform and reversals which

provides economists with a laboratory to study the theory of …nancial reform. For these

reasons, the topics addressed in this paper remain an interesting …eld for future research.

25

5 References

Abiad A, Mody A. 2005. Financial reform: what shakes it? what shapes it? American

Economic Review 95, 66–88

Abiad, A, & Detragiache, E. & Tressel, T., 2010. "A New Database of Financial

Reforms," IMF Sta¤ Papers, 57(2), pages 281-302, June.

Alesina, A. and Roubini, N., 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies",

Review of Economic Studies, 59(4), pages 663-88.

Bandiera, O. & Caprio, G. & Honohan, P. & Schiantarelli, F., 2000. "Does

Financial Reform Raise or Reduce Saving?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol.

82(2), pages 239-263, May.

Bartolini, L. & Drazen, A. 1997. "When Liberal Policies Re‡ect External Shocks,

What Do We Learn?", Journal of International Economics, 42(3-4), pp. 249-73.

Beck, T., 2008. "Bank competition and …nancial stability : friends or foes ?,"Policy

Research Working Paper Series 4656, The World Bank.

Beck, T. and Demirgüç-Kunt, A. 2009. "Financial Institutions and Markets

Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis", World Bank Policy Research Work-

ing Paper No. 4943”

Broner, F. and Ventura, J., 2010. "Rethinking the e¤ects of …nancial liber-

alization," Economics Working Papers 1128, Department of Economics and Business,

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2010.

Brutti, F. 2011. “Legal Enforcement, Public Supply of Liquidity and Sovereign

Risk,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 84, Issue 1, May 2011, Pages 65-72

Fernandez, R. and Rodrik, D., 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias

in the Presence of Individual-Speci…c Uncertainty", American Economic Review, 81(5),

pages 146-55.

Gennaioli, N., Martin, A. and Rossi, S., 2011. “Sovereign Default, Domestic

Banks and Financial Institutions”(Manuscript)

Guembel, A. and Sussman, O., 2009. “Sovereign Debt Without Default Penal-

ties”, Review of Economic Studies, 76, 1297–1320

Kletzer, K., 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign

Risk," The Economic Journal, Vol. 94, No. 374, pp. 287-307.

Kremer, M. and Mehta, P., 2000. “Globalization and International Public Fi-

nance” (Working Paper No. 7575, NBER).

Paasche, B. and Zin, S., 2001. "Competition and Intervention in Sovereign Debt

Markets", NBER Working Papers No. 8679.

Pasricha, K., 2010. "Bank Competition and International Financial Integration:

Evidence Using a New Index," Working Papers 10-35, Bank of Canada.

Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the poli-

tics of …nancial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics,

Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.

Rappoport, V., 2010. “Trade-o¤ Between International and Domestic Risk Sharing

in the Presence of Sovereign Risk” (Manuscript)

Appendix

26

A. Case studies on competition in the …nancial sector and cap-

ital ‡ow liberalization

As an illustration, I discuss two cases of …nancial reform of countries with similar

levels of deposits and credit, prior to …nancial liberalization. Looking at Figure 4 it is

possible to see two di¤erent approaches to …nancial reform. India took the approach

suggested by the model presented in Section 3. It opened up to capital ‡ows gradually,

but kept some restrictions to competition in its …nancial sector. The outcome was slow

but steady growth in deposits and in credit. On the other hand, Indonesia liberalized

domestic …nancial competition more and together with capital ‡ow liberalization. As a

result it experienced faster growth, albeit with a famous crisis in the late 1990s, leading

to a reversal in …nancial reform. Although arguing that this crisis was an enforcement

crisis as the one studied in Section 3 would require signi…cantly more data, I believe that

these patterns are illustrative of the mechanisms studied in this paper.

0

.

5

1

1973 1981 1989 1997 2005

Year

BANK DEPOSITS / GDP PRIVATE CREDIT / GDP

Financial Reform Index (normalized), 0 to 1

India

0

1

2

3

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Year

International capital flows Entry barriers/pro-competition measures

India

0

.

5

1

1973 1981 1989 1997 2005

Year

BANK DEPOSITS / GDP PRIVATE CREDIT / GDP

Financial Reform Index (normalized), 0 to 1

Indonesia

0

1

2

3

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Year

International capital flows Entry barriers/pro-competition measures

Indonesia

Figure 4: The left panels plot Deposits/GDP, Credit/GDP and the index for …nancial reform

for India and Indonesia. The right panels decompose two categories that enter this index:

restrictions to international capital ‡ows and to domestic competition (3 = fully liberalized).

B. Correlation matrix

27

cred intr intl entr regl priv sec

cred 1

intr 0.5916 1

intl 0.5607 0.5992 1

entr 0.5123 0.5078 0.4816 1

regl 0.6 0.5248 0.5621 0.5149 1

priv 0.4863 0.4534 0.5362 0.4335 0.4786 1

sec 0.5757 0.5775 0.6915 0.5091 0.6119 0.482 1

C. Additional empirical results

Macro reforms lead micro reforms

A simple test of whether macro reforms lead micro reforms is to perform a Granger

causality test of the panel of reform. To this e¤ect, I run the following regressions:

:ic:o

t

= ,

0

+ ,

1

:ic:o

t1

+ ,

2

:cc:o

t1

+ n

t

:cc:o

t

= c

0

+ c

1

:ic:o

t1

+ c

2

:cc:o

t1

+ ·

t

(39)

I control for year and country …xed e¤ects. The null hypothesis for the experiment I

am considering is that ,

2

= 0. That is, that past levels of the macro index do not help

to explain current levels of the micro index. Furthermore, even if the data rejects that

,

2

= 0, it should be the case that it does not reject that c

1

= 0, meaning that macro

indices granger causes micro indices but not the other way around. Note that these indices

are stationary by construction. They are bounded above by 3 and bounded below by 0 .

Still, given that there is a reform process in place, the data may appear non-stationary in

the sample. To avoid concerns about stationarity, I perform the regressions in (39) also

in …rst di¤erences, where I remove country …xed e¤ects.

´:ic:o

t

= ,

0

+ ,

1

´:ic:o

t1

+ ,

2

´:cc:o

t1

+ n

t

´:cc:o

t

= c

0

+ c

1

´:ic:o

t1

+ c

2

´:cc:o

t1

+ ·

t

(40)

Table presents the results. It is possible to see that it is possible to reject that ,

2

= 0

and it is not possible to reject that c

1

= 0.

Table 10 Year FE + Country FE Year FE

Levels (39) Changes (40)

micro(t) macro(t) dmicro(t) dmacro(t)

micro(t-1) 0.778*** -0.0456

(0.0347) (0.0539)

macro(t-1) 0.0724*** 0.825***

(0.0190) (0.0302)

dmicro(t-1) 0.0671* 0.0325

(0.0379) (0.0684)

dmacro(t-1) 0.0794*** 0.0391

(0.0268) (0.0334)

Constant 0.505*** 0.844*** 0.00860 0.0300

Obs 782 782 748 748

R-squared 0.974 0.927 0.124 0.047

28

Growth regressions

In this subsection, I take the approach of Bekaert et al (2005) and estimate the e¤ect

of …nancial reform on growth. The main results are that using the graded index by Abiad

et al (2010), I can reproduce the growth e¤ect of equity market liberalizations. I then

proceed to study the e¤ect of macro vs. micro reforms, and their sequencing.

I replicate Table 4 in Bekaert et al (2005) using an extended time sample (1980-2005)

and a graded index instead of a dummy. The regression is given by:

¸

i;t+k;t

= ,Q

i;1980

+ ¸

0

A

i;t

+ c

0

1i/

i;t

+

i;t+k;k

(41)

Where ¸

i;t+k;t

are the average growth over non-consecutive 5 year windows. Q

i;1980

represents G11 per capita in 1980, and the other controls (A

i;t

) include government

spending as a percentage of G11, proportion of secondary school enrollment, population

growth and life expectancy. I follow Bekaert et al (2005) and perform a pooled OLS

regression where I test the impact of di¤erent …nancial reforms (1i/). Table 2 suggests

that increasing the equity market index by one unit increases average growth by 0.6%.

25

This e¤ect is still presenting when controlling for current account liberalizations.

Table 11

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

EM 0.0041** 0.0082*** 0.00588*** 0.00555** 0.00209 0.00173 0.00636*** 0.00628**

(0.00166) (0.00220) (0.00180) (0.00243) (0.00183) (0.00218) (0.00230) (0.00265)

l80 -0.0055*** -0.0137*** -0.0137***

GGDP -0.0009** -0.00025 -0.00025

2ndy -0.00652 -0.0128 -0.0129

PopGr -0.374** -0.479*** -0.478***

log(life) 0.0278 0.108*** 0.108***

CA 0.00013

(0.0023)

Cons 0.0125*** 0.0523*** 0.0222*** 0.0147*** 0.0215*** -0.101 -0.31*** -0.31***

Obs 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256

AdjR2 0.0189 0.0455 0.0387 0.0179 0.0378 0.0255 0.159 0.156

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3 performs the same regression as described in (41) on di¤erent dimensions of

reform.

25

Here I am assuming that the e¤ect is linear. An alternative speci…cation with a full set of dummy

variables for the alternative entries of this index ¦0, 1, 2, 3¦ yields similar results.

29

Table 12 Univariate Regressions Univariate Regressions Multivariate Regressions

(1) - (7) (8) - (14) (15) (16)

Capital Account 0.00285* 0.00280 -0.000146 -0.00133

(0.00170) (0.00202) (0.00260) (0.00242)

Credit Controls 0.00560*** 0.00633*** 0.00504** 0.00446**

(0.00173) (0.00180) (0.00227) (0.00208)

Interest Rate Controls 0.000512 -1.75e-05 -0.00375* -0.00419**

(0.00168) (0.00185) (0.00219) (0.00206)

Equity Market 0.00405** 0.00636*** 0.00228 0.00455*

(0.00166) (0.00230) (0.00259) (0.00268)

Entry Barriers 0.000916 0.00148 -0.00321 -0.00219

(0.00166) (0.00175) (0.00213) (0.00196)

Regulation 0.00615*** 0.00825*** 0.00544** 0.00572**

(0.00177) (0.00203) (0.00256) (0.00240)

Privatization 0.00197 0.00436*** -3.62e-05 0.00299*

(0.00150) (0.00153) (0.00185) (0.00177)

log1980 No Yes -0.0139***

GovGDP No Yes -0.000489

Secondary No Yes -0.0156

PopGr No Yes -0.476***

Log(life) No Yes 0.114***

Cons 0.0162*** -0.328***

Observations 256 256

Adj R2 0.0552 0.211

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The …rst column reports regressions (1)-(7). These are univariate regressions of the

each of the index entries on average growth. Column 8 regresses all the elements of the

index separately. Unsurprisingly, there is some evidence of collinearity between di¤erent

dimensions of the index. Capital account, interest rate controls and entry barriers all

have sign changes.

26

Table 4 performs the growth regression on micro and macro …nancial

reforms. It is possible to see that microreforms are crucial for growth, and that the e¤ect

is larger than just looking at equity market liberalizations in the spirit of Bekaert et

al (2005).

27

The coe¢cient of micro reforms is di¤erent from the coe¢cient for macro

reforms at the 10% level.

26

Further work is needed to disentangle the e¤ects of di¤erent dimensions. Appendix C presents the

correlation matrix between these variables.

27

The coe¢cient of equity market reforms in this data is 0.00636. The coe¢cient for the micro index

is 0.00932.

30

Table 13 (1) (2) (3)

Micro Index 0.00932*** 0.0101***

(0.00258) (0.00355)

Macro Index 0.00674*** 0.00164

(0.00244) (0.00325)

log1980 -0.0147*** -0.0139*** -0.0147***

GovGDP -0.000182 -6.81e-05 -0.000203

Secondary -0.0169 -0.0103 -0.0167

PopGr -0.512*** -0.465*** -0.518***

Log(life) 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.123***

Cons -0.362*** -0.345*** -0.363***

Obs 256 256 256

Adj R2 0.177 0.150 0.174

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5 introduces dummy variables that take a value of 1 depending on the sequencing

of reform. The omitted variable corresponds to a situation of status quo. The dummy

variable identifying periods where a macro reform took place but a micro reform did not

is negative and highly signi…cant. Column (1) does the analysis for the full sample, while

column (2) focus on developing economies. The e¤ect is stronger in the latter group.

A potential omitted variable problem remains. In a balance of payments crisis, an IMF

based reform may not maximize growth opportunities. In particular, it can be tilted

towards macro reforms. If that is the case, the dummy variable capturing leading macro

reforms is in fact capturing the recession during a balance of payments crisis. Current

research is addressing this issue by introducing information on balance of payments crisis

and on the content of IMF programs.

28

28

A description of IMF based reforms is an interesting project in its own right.

31

1

Introduction

The last forty years have seen a wave of …nancial reform unprecedented in its intensity and scope. Figure 1 plots the sample mean of a …nancial reform index for di¤erent groups of countries and di¤erent types of reforms. The solid black line measures average …nancial reform across di¤erent dimensions. According to this index, …nancial reform occurred earlier and more intensively in advanced economies. But the wave of …nancial reform in the early 90s in developing economies remains one of the most important economic events in recent times. In this paper, I study theoretically and empirically the sequencing of di¤erent …nancial reforms. Financial reform is a multifaceted phenomenon. I divide reforms into macro and micro dimensions. Macro …nancial reforms target aggregate prices and quantities in …nancial markets. Examples include the lifting of capital account restrictions, or abolishing interest rate and credit controls. Micro …nancial reforms target the structure and organization of …nancial markets. Examples include allowing free entry in the …nancial sector, privatization of …nancial institutions, regulation and the promotion of equity markets. Using data for 91 countries between 1973 and 2005, I …nd that macro reforms tend to lead micro reforms. This particular sequencing of …nancial reforms is important because it comes associated with lower growth. Countries performing alternative sequencing - …rst micro reforms or both macro and micro reforms simultaneously - tend to grow more. This is a puzzling feature of recent …nancial liberalization.1 To understand these two patterns I setup a simple model of …nancial trade, where I exploit a second best view of …nancial liberalization. I focus on two policy dimensions: capital ‡ controls (as a macro reform) and domestic …nancial competition (as a micro ow reform).2 I take the view that the …rst best can only be obtained by lifting all restrictions to capital ‡ ows and competition. But the interaction between strategic enforcement of …nancial contracts and the presence of externalities can make the …rst best unattainable. I show that a simple second best argument justi…es the sequencing I document in the data. A less competitive …nancial sector has its incentives aligned with enforcement and partially corrects the externalities. This is the case the smaller are domestic savings, and the larger are the …nancial intermediation needs prior to liberalization. I then perform two empirical tests of the model. I show that important variables that determine sequencing strategies in the model can help predict reforms in the data, and that these variables can account for the negative growth e¤ect of performing …rst macro …nancial reforms. The …rst contribution of this paper is to document two patterns associated with the sequencing of …nancial reforms in the data. Macro reforms tend to lead micro reforms and this is associated with lower growth. Figure 1 divides reforms between macro reforms and micro reforms. Table 1 collects information on the sequencing of reforms in the data.3 The evidence suggests that most countries perform macro …nancial reforms before engaging in

The distinction between macro reforms and micro reforms follows Bandiera et al 2000. Bandiera et al 2000 study the e¤ect of di¤erent reforms on domestic savings for a small group of countries. In this paper, I use the extended dataset by Abiad et al 2010 and investigate the e¤ect of reforms on growth. 2 In particular, the government can open the domestic economy to unrestricted capital ‡ ows and can decide if domestic …nancial markets are organized in a monopoly or in perfect competition. In section 2.3. I discuss other examples of micro and macro reforms. 3 Table 1 de…nes a liberalization as a jump of 0.1 on an index going from 0 to 1. A reform is considered simultaneous Macro and Micro if both happen within at most 2 years from each other. It follows that reform X leads reform Y if it happened more than 2 years before reform Y.

1

micro …nancial reforms.4 Furthermore, micro …nancial restrictions are in place long after macro restrictions have been lifted.5 This pattern is important because the sequencing of reform matters for growth. Table 2 shows that countries that do macro reforms before micro reforms tend to do worse in terms of growth.6 The omitted variable in this regression is a status quo situation. The coe¢ cient associated with having macro reforms leading is negative and signi…cant at the 10% level. The (negative) coe¢ cient associated with having macro reforms leading other reforms is di¤erent from the (positive) coe¢ cient associated with a composite alternative sequencing strategy at the 5% level.7 These negative e¤ects are not surprising.8 After all, lack of competition and missing markets create distortions.9 Why then do countries keep these distortions? And in particular, why do countries fully liberalize prices and quantities but are reluctant to introduce competition in their …nancial sector? Table 1: Ordering of Liberalization

% of episodes in which following dimension (partially) liberalized …rst Regions Macro Reforms Micro Reforms Simultaneous Advanced 57.6 15.1 27.3 Emerging Asia 81.9 5.6 12.5 Latin America 59.8 9.4 30.8 Sub-S. Africa 59.4 9.4 31.2 Transition 46.4 20.3 33.3 N. Africa & M. East 67.7 2.9 29.4

Table 10 in Appendix C collects regression results of Granger causality tests which con…rm this pattern. 5 Although the observation that macro reforms lead micro reforms is a new stylized fact, recent papers on …nancial reform already note that micro reforms targeting domestic …nancial competition are less correlated with overall …nancial liberalization than other dimensions. See Abiad & Mody 2005 and Abiad et al 2010. 6 I follow the approach of Bekaert et al (2005). The speci…cation is given by: yi;t+k;t = Qi;1980 +

0 4

Xi;t +

0

Libi;t

1

+ 0 Seqi;t + "i;t+k;k

where yi;t+k;t is the average growth over non-consecutive 5 year windows. Qi;1980 represents logged GDP per capita in 1980, and the other controls (Xi;t ) include government spending as a percentage of GDP , proportion of secondary school enrollment, population growth and life expectancy. I perform a pooled OLS regression where I test the impact of di¤erent …nancial indices (Libi;t = fAll; Macro; Microg) and di¤erent sequencing strategies (Seqi;t = fMacroLead; MicroLead; Simultaneousg). 7 This composite includes both the case where reforms are simultaneous and micro reforms happen …rst. Looking only at the situations where there was a reform in place, and taking the simultaneous case as the omitted variable, the coe¢ cient on macro leading is -.011, and is signi…cant at the 5% level. The coe¢ cients for the (positive) micro leading and the (negative) macro leading are di¤erent at the 5% level. 8 Bekaert et al (2005) studies equity market liberalizations and capital ‡ ows reform. In my work I use a larger sample, and investigate a larger set of reforms. Furthermore, I explicitly study the growth e¤ect of di¤erent sequencing strategies. As appendix C shows, my results are consistent with Bekaert et al (2005). Equity market liberalizations - an example of a micro …nancial reform - are determinant for growth, and capital ‡ ows reform - an example of a macro …nancial reform - are not. Other micro and macro …nancial have quantitatively important e¤ects that follow the pattern identi…ed for equity markets and capital ‡ ows. 9 Pasricha (2010) …nds an empirical link between de facto integration and domestic …nancial sector competitiveness. Looking at deviations from the covered interest parity condition, she shows how the lack of competition in domestic …nancial systems may prevent countries from reaping potential bene…ts from …nancial integration, as it induces deviations from price equalization.

2

00718* (0.106*** 0.000483* Secondary -0.105*** Advanced -0.337 0. Table 2 (1) (2) LaggedFinReform 0.0133*** GovGDP -0. * p<0.000566** 0. ** p<0.00726* -0.286*** -0.00979 PopGr -1.00337 0.00317 (0. where the opposite is true.Figure 1: All refers to the sample mean of all the entries of the …nancial reform index constructed by Abiad et al (2010). interest rate controls and credit controls.05.038*** Log(life) 0.000278) MacroLead -0. except for regulation and supervision. Macro reforms include capital account restrictions.288*** Observations 316 316 R-squared 0.00576 0.000278) (0.00491) log1980 -0.01.00415) MicroLead 0.00591 (0.00415) (0.00980 -0.1 3 .00286 Constant -0. regulation and the establishment of equity markets. Micro reforms include entry in the …nancial sector.00879) Simultaneous 0.338 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.000578** (0.0138*** -0.000552** -0.00878) (0.014*** -1. All sub-indices take larger values if there is more liberalization.00489) (0. privatization.

and investment is small as there is enforcement breakdown. Martin and Rossi (2010). 10 4 . I show that if funds for investment are su¢ ciently scarce. First. entrepreneurs borrow domestically and abroad. there is an underinsurance externality by domestic agents that do not internalize the impact of their risk taking activities on government enforcement. The reasons behind this are traditional in the macroeconomic analysis of developing economies and play an important role in my paper. entrepreneurs borrow abroad. In the model there are two policy dimensions. A recent body of work led by Broner and Ventura (2010) shows how models of capital ‡ ows where enforcement of …nancial contracts is strategic but it is hard to discriminate between domestic and foreign agents. I study two limiting cases of domestic …nancial competition. capital ‡ ows reform allows more …nancial trade but worsens the strategic enforcement problem if trade with the rest of the world is too large relative to domestic trade. In this framework. In other words. investment is large and there is no enforcement breakdown. Like in Broner and Ventura (2010). In…nitesimal entrepreneurs do not take into account the e¤ect of their actions on enforcement. Third. can explain di¤erent experiences with macro reforms. Brutti (2010). The intuition is that the monopolist has a stake in the economy. But the …rst best is not always attainable. the monopolist has its incentives aligned with enforcement and partially corrects the externalities. Gennaioli. Broner and Ventura (2010). It follows that in a …rst best world it is never optimal to restrain competition in domestic …nancial markets.I argue that a simple model of capital ‡ ows with domestic …nancial intermediation can explain these two patterns. the constrained optimal policy is to liberalize capital ‡ ows while keeping a monopoly in the …nancial sector. Second. the domestic economy chooses whether there is free movement of capital with the rest of the world. In the optimistic equilibrium. domestic savers save at home. To keep the analysis simple. Imperfect competition is a distortion. There are two possible equilibria in this economy. In this view. there is a coordination problem between savers that makes the pessimistic equilibrium always possible. In the pessimistic equilibrium. savers can access international markets without resorting to domestic …nancial intermediaries. Guembel and Sussman (2009). this is not to say that the monopolist charges the optimal mark-up or replicates the optimal plan of the economy. I take this perspective and introduce domestic …nancial intermediaries as the sole agents that can lend to entrepreneurs. Restricting competition alleviates the strategic enforcement problem without fully compromising the in‡ of much needed ow capital. I assume that micro …nancial policy determines if the …nancial sector is either perfectly competitive or a monopoly.10 The crucial element is that heterogeneity within the economy creates domestic asset trade. The second contribution of this paper is to show that this asymmetry has important implications for the sequencing of …nancial reforms. Broner and Ventura (2011). and this leads to overborrowing. The assumption of non-discrimination between domestic and foreigners has been recently used by Kremer and Mehta (2000). Unlike in Broner and Ventura (2010). Savers do not internalize the e¤ect of their actions on enforcement by the government. and Rappoport (2010). the domestic economy decides also on the level of competition in its …nancial sector. Because it is hard to discriminate between domestic and foreign asset trade. On the contrary. Broner et al (2010) argue that this assumption can be rationalized with su¢ ciently deep secondary markets. avoiding payments to foreigners implies destroying domestic asset trade. Of course. domestic savers save abroad. there is an externality among entrepreneurs that sometimes makes the good equilibrium impossible.

The model predicts that deep country characteristics that in‡ uence the amount of domestic savings relative to the need of intermediation determine the optimal sequencing of …nancial reform. Ragan & Zingales (2003) suggest there are political economy factors behind the timing of reform. 11 5 . With respect to this literature. an optimal credit policy by a government could always lead to the …rst best. I …rst try to account for the observed sequencing in the data. In other words.11 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. and not the political capture. I come back to the growth regression presented in Table 2. Richer savers reduce the amount of foreign …nance needed by the country and this increases the costs of enforcement breakdown. I test the implications of the model. Countries that do macro …nancial reforms …rst and only later introduce micro …nancial reforms would do even worse by performing them simultaneously. There is selection into di¤erent sequencing strategies of …nancial reform. Following Abiad and Mody (2005). Other theories have been to proposed to explain some of the facts presented in this paper. Political economy explanations of reforms associated with ideology …nd mixed results (see Alesina & Roubini (1992) and Bartolini & Drazen (1997)). I observe that the negative growth e¤ect associated with the macro-lead sequencing strategy disappears. Fernandez & Rodrik (1991) present a learning story where successful initial reforms promote further reforms. and has to resort to second best policies. Crucially. the asymmetry of …nancial intermediation explored in this paper also has important predictions for the sequencing of …nancial reform. Second. In this paper it is the market failure that induces the lack of reform.The monopolist only cares about maximizing pro…ts. and tests whether My paper is also related to the study of cross-border …nancial transactions with imperfect competition. Section 3 studies the determinants of …nancial reform. The model suggests that …nancial reform is performed in a second best world. Introducing lagged deposits and lagged credit in the growth regression presented in Table 2. I perform two types of test. savers are better o¤ following capital ‡ ow liberalization even if they save domestically. It does not explain which reforms should be implemented …rst. This way. In the empirical part of the paper. it makes some of the externalities less important and tilts the policy towards liberalizing also the …nancial sector. In fact. Section 2 develops the model and discusses the main results. I …nd that …nancial reform is not completely exogenous and that lagged savings and credit have predictive power on which reforms are implemented. This paper is then related to the second best globalization works by Stiglitz (2000) and Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2000. If the international interest rate is larger than the autarky interest rate. The theory presented in this paper suggests a pecking order for reforms that seems consistent with the data: international capital ‡ liberalization should precede domestic …nancial competition for ow countries with low deposits but large need of …nancial intermediation. 2005) and Broner and Ventura (2010). I estimate a process for macro and micro …nancial reforms that is consistent with the model. this paper presents a rational alternative that is complementary to the political economy of reform. Paasche & Zin (2001) and Kletzer (1984) show how default externalities in sovereign lending make it impossible to have an equilibrium with perfect competition. This wealth e¤ect of capital ‡ reform ow paves the way to domestic …nancial competition reform in a dynamic version of the model. the model provides a rationale for the sequencing of …nancial reform found in the data. but the purpose of this paper is to study situations where the government can not implement the …rst best. I …nd that this selection is correlated with country characteristics suggested by the model.

and compare the perfect competition benchmark with the monopolist. …nancial autarky vs. Section 4 concludes and points to future research.12 I …rst introduce di¤erent levels of competition on …nancial autarky. I …nalize this section by extending the model to introduce dynamics. Savers have funds but do not have good investment opportunities. In ow period T = 1. storage (l) and investment (k). monopolist …nancial sector. agents choose savings and investment decisions.4.13 There are two technologies in this economy. I open this economy to capital ‡ ows. Furthermore. 2. 2 A model of macro and micro …nancial reforms I present a simple model of asset trade with heterogeneous agents: savers. In period T = 0. In this model liberalization of capital ‡ ows represents macro reforms and competition in the domestic …nancial sector represent micro reforms. I draw empirical implications of the model. Domestic …nancial intermediaries are the only agents that can lend to entrepreneurs. I consider three externalities: overborrowing by entrepreneurs. Therefore it is never optimal to do enforcement breakdown and as a consequence. A crucial assumption is that enforcement of …nancial contracts can not discriminate between domestic and foreign agents. I assume that enforcement of these contracts maximizes the utility of the average agent at T = 1. Institutional arrangements.the view presented in this paper can account for the negative growth e¤ect described above. There is one good that can be used for consumption. Under …nancial autarky.1 Preliminaries and autarky There are three maximizing agents in this economy. such as the level of competition in the …nancial sector and liberalization of capital ‡ ows are determined by a forward looking calculation of average welfare in the economy. the economy can commit to institutional arrangements but not to enforce …nancial contracts. capital ‡ liberalization. the economy …rst decides on the institutional arrangement: perfect competition vs. micro …nancial reforms more generally. a monopolist simply extracts resources from the economy. Storage simply transfers resources across time without a 12 13 I discuss how representative these reforms are of micro and macro reforms in section 2. coordination problems by savers and underinsurance. In other words. storage or investment. On the contrary. entrepreneurs and …nancial intermediaries. Finally. EXPLAIN WHY IT IS CRUCIAL? 6 . enforcement breakdown only increases inequality between agents. I show how a monopolist can do better when externalities interact with enforcement breakdown. Storage is less productive than investment. Then. capital is not allowed to ‡ from/to the domestic economy. excluding …nancial intermediaries. There are two periods T = 0 and 1. This allows me ow to illustrate the trade-o¤s behind enforcement. Entrepreneurs lack funds but have good investment opportunities. to keep a monopolist intermediary. I also discuss macro vs. Under …nancial autarky. They can not be overturned. Then. I assume that enforcement maximizes the average utility of the agents in the economy. contracts are subject to an enforcement decision at T = 1 that is strategic. that I test in the next section. enforcement of …nancial contracts is strategic and chosen to maximize average utility in that period.

yields Ak units tomorrow. In the next subsection. 2 (0.14 To summarize. I assume utility is of the log-type. Under autarky enforcement breakdown only generates inequality. where k is capital and A > 1. Investing l units of the good in storage today yields l units of the good tomorrow. if capital ‡ ows are liberalized. A saver receives an endowment in pes s riod 0 and 1 of w0 and w1 . He has access to two investment options: (i) the storage technology (l) transforms one unit of the good at time 0 into one unit at time 14 EXPLAIN WHY IT IS CRUCIAL? 7 . If E = 1 there is enforcement of …nancial contracts. A crucial assumption is that only the …nancial intermediary can lend to entrepreneurs. investment has a return. Intermediaries choose their actions in order to maximize period by period pro…ts. It follows that having a monopoly is never socially optimal.1. without increasing average utility.return. To simplify. Enforcement is strategic. Savers can deposit with the domestic …nancial intermediary or with foreign banks. respectively. Enforcement E can take two values. are pro…ts of the domestic …nancial sector and E summarizes the enforcement decision at T = 1. They can use the storage technology but not the investment technology. given by: U1 = (1 ") ln (cs ) + " ln (ce ) 1 1 (2) I will focus …rst in a situation of …nancial autarky. Savers Savers wish to maximize utility at T = 1. On the contrary. respectively. Entrepreneurs have insu¢ cient funds but can use the investment technology. it is chosen in period 1 to maximize average utility of that period. at T = 0 there are four possible institutional arrangements: X Y = f(x. If E = 0 there is enforcement breakdown of …nancial contracts and the economy is in a situation of widespread default. y) jx 2 X = (Competition. Deposits do not need monitoring. assume = 0. Investing k units of the good today. ow 2. and can be justi…ed by monitoring asymmetries. This asymmetry between the …nancial trades of savers and entrepreneurs plays a crucial role in my analysis. This means that following criteria (2). Capital F lows)g Institutional arrangements (x. Savers and entrepreneurs are in…nitesimal and have masses (1 ") and ". enforcement breakdown is never optimal and E = 1.1 Perfect competition The solution is obtained by backward induction. In particular. M onopoly) and y 2 Y = (Autarky. But loans need to be monitored by a domestic …nancial intermediary who is subject to domestic law and therefore to strategic domestic enforcement. I will compare them with capital ‡ liberalization. y) are chosen to maximize: U0 = E0 [(1 ") ln (cs (E)) + " ln (ce (E)) + 1 1 (E)] (1) where is the share of domestic intermediaries owned by domestic agents. Savers have funds. 1).

Savings and s bs = w0 0 s s cs (E = 1) = w1 + Rw0 1 s cs (E = 0) = w1 1 (3) (4) (5) In a symmetric equilibrium the total supply of funds is perfectly rigid and given by: S = (1 Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs wish to maximize utility at T = 1. respectively. the aggregate demand of funds is given by: D=" And it is possible to see that negatively on the interest rate. Formally. e k0 + be = 0 0 e ce = w1 + A (k0 ) + Rbe 1 0 s ") w0 (6) Entrepreneurs will borrow to equate the marginal return of investment to the marginal cost.k0 . Formally. The demand of funds is elastic and depends 8 . He has access to two investment options: (i) an investment technology (k) that yields Ak in period 1.t. 0 their problem is given by: e maxce . if R consumption are given by: 1 storage is never optimal.be ln (ce ) 1 1 0 s.bs ln (cs ) 1 1 0 s. The solution to their problem is given by: e k0 = be = 0 A R e k0 1 1 (7) (8) ) A A R 1 e ce (E = 1) = w1 + (1 1 A R 1 (9) (10) e ce (E = 0) = w1 + A 1 In a symmetric equilibrium. for a gross return of R in 0 period 1. An entrepreneur receives an endowe e ment in period 0 and 1 of w0 = 0 and w1 . s bs + l0 = w0 0 s cs = w1 + Rbs 1 0 Given that there is no uncertainty. a saver solves the following problem: maxcs . for a gross return of R in period 1.1. and (ii) …nancial trades with domestic intermediaries (be ). and (ii) …nancial trades with domestic intermediaries (bs ).t. @D @R A R 1 1 (11) < 0.

In autarky savers have no better outside option other than storage. Savers get Rs . 2. 9 .1. This setting perfectly reproduces a market for bonds where entrepreneurs issue bonds and savers buy these bonds from them. Then. this …nancial intermediary will have both monopolist and monopsonistic powers. Under autarky. The solution is represented in Figure 2.P C = A 1 " s 1 w0 " (12) (13) Remember that storage is dominated by deposits only if R 1.Figure 2: Perfect Competition: the interest rate that clears the market is given by RP C . I assume that if they are indi¤erent between storing or depositing they deposit their funds. which will also be the marginal cost of funds for the monopolist. one has to distinguish between two contractual interest rates.15 Under perfect competition. intermediaries are completely passive and make zero pro…ts. I de…ne this as a situation where capital is scarce. the problem of the monopolist is given by: 15 This is the case if (1 s ") w0 < " A 1 1 1 . Market clearing R Market clearing will determine the interest rate R. The monopolist will charge Re to entrepreneurs.2 Monopoly Suppose now that there is only one …nancial intermediary. Therefore. It is de…ned as S = D or as bi di = 0 : (1 ") bs + "be = 0 0 0 Solving for R : RA.

The largest interest rate possible the monopolist can charge is the one where it appropriates all of the entrepreneurs revenues. Rs = 1. it is possible to compute welfare of autarky under perfect competition as: A.A = A 1 " s 1 w0 " (14) Replacing it in (M 2). This further implies that the monopoly has no value under autarky and perfect competition yields higher utility. then (M 2) is binding. The third constraint summarizes the enforcement decision at T = 1. Therefore. the monopolist only redistributes surplus. 17 There is no situation where no constraint binds. it is never optimal to do it. As savers have no outside option. This requires the monopolist to do price discrimination. Re ) = arg max E (Re s. If (M 1) is not binding. This point holds in general if the supply of funds is upward slopping. ce (E) given by (4) .3 Policy and welfare Rs ) k M (15) In both the perfect competition and the monopoly cases enforcement implies entrepreneurs paying intermediaries who in turn pay the savers. (10) 1 1 The …rst constraint (M 1) states that the monopolist can raise the funds it wishes to supply. 1 s 1 (1 ") w0 1 Rs ) " A Re 1 1 (M 1) A 1 A 1 Re " A " (M 2) Re Re s e E = arg maxE=f0. The monopolist only makes pro…ts if E = 1.1g (1 ") ln (c1 (E)) + " ln (c1 (E)) (M 3) cs (E) .17 The solution is depicted in Figure 3. Then. The second constraint states that the monopolist’ total repayment is constrained by the total amount s of resources produced by entrepreneurs. Under autarky. Monopolist pro…ts are given by: = (Re 2. it is possible to see that this is always feasible if 1 and A is large enough. that is.A be the interest rate clearing the market under perfect competition. and he will take that into account when choosing the interest rates. (5) and (9) . enforcement breakdown has no e¤ect on average consumption and only negative e¤ects on inequality. In this case.P U1 C = (1 ") ln (cs ) + " ln (ce ) 1 1 (16) where. In this simple model.1.16 If the …rst constraint is binding: RM. Let RP C. I will be interested cases where under autarky the monopolist is starving for funds. In this paper. the interest rate that solves equation (13). In this simple model this is the case if the constraint (M 1) is binding." A Re (Rs . the supply of funds is …xed if Rs 1. 16 10 . This is the case if utility is not of the log type.t.

The di¤erence corresponds to the monopolist spread. In case of enforcement breakdown I assume that there is no penalty from abroad.2 Capital ‡ ows liberalization Assume now that there is a deep international market with no enforcement problems willing to supply or demand funds in period 0 in exchange for a gross interest rate of R = 1 + r in period 1.18 In these conditions. enforcement only occurs if: U1 (E = 1) 18 U1 (E = 0) (17) Under discrimination this model is just like the conventional view of capital ‡ liberalization and a ow textbook monopoly.Figure 3: Monopoly: the interest rate that clears the market is given by Re for entrepreneurs. and no barriers to asset trade. Defaulting on contracts with the international market comes with no externally imposed costs.A = w1 + 1 A 1 " s 1 w0 " s w0 e ce. Enforcement breakdown means also that planned domestic trades are canceled. I will show conditions under which the opposite holds when it is optimal to open to capital ‡ ows. This is the case because of the assumption that the government can not discriminate between domestic and foreigners. 2. In the next section. and Rs for savers. 11 . s cs. perfect competition is the optimal institutional arrangement.A = w1 + (1 1 ) A 1 " " s w0 In this subsection I have shown that under …nancial autarky. but it can have internal costs.

I will show conditions under which each of these equilibria exists. I assume that the sunspot is revealed and perfect observable as of T = 0. But it is not su¢ cient. let b stand for domestic …nancial trades and f for foreign trades. In order to distinguish between domestic and foreign trades. savers save domestically and enforcement can happen. (E) = but if an agent is lending abroad. it is necessary that the deposits made by savers are subject to the enforcement decision. Assume that which equilibrium is played depends on the realization of a sunspot variable at t = 0 given by = (O. the sunspot variable crucially determines the outcome of this economy. Throughout. RL.1 Perfect competition Under perfect competition. Because they are atomistic they do not internalize the e¤ects of their individual actions in the enforcement strategy followed at T = 1. the …nancial sector is composed by an in…nite number of atomistic intermediaries. savers save abroad and enforcement always breaks down. In this case. If an agent is borrowing from abroad. In what follows. assume that gross positions are minimized. Savers are also atomistic and follows the sunspot variable unless domestic …nancial intermediaries o¤er them better conditions. I refer to that as the coordination problem. P ). In the optimistic equilibrium. borne by savers. I will further assume that this sunspot does not depend on the institutional arrangement. it is possible to show that there always exists a pessimistic equilibrium and that the existence of the optimistic equilibrium is not always guaranteed. RB.2. The strategic enforcement will trade-o¤ these costs of enforcement breakdown. agents in this economy face di¤erent interest rates from their …nancial trades with the international market. With capital ‡ liberalization these intermediaries can now now obtain ow deposits abroad or at home. with probabilities Pr ( = O) = 1 and Pr ( = P ) = . I refer to this as the overborrowing externality. with the bene…ts accruing to entrepreneurs. The other crucial element is that 1 1 savers can deposit abroad or at home. 2. entrepreneurs must not commit to too many payments abroad. but only after the institutional arrangement is in place. independently of the level of competition.Where U1 (E) = " ln (ce (E)) + (1 ") ln (cs (E)).19 Because of enforcement problems. It follows that in order to have enforcement. 19 To simplify the description of the equilibrium. In case of enforcement breakdown entrepreneurs do not have to pay back for the capital they invested. I will assume a symmetric equilibrium for all agents in the economy. In the pessimistic equilibria. 12 . In particular. = 1 + r (19) 1+r Pr (E = 1) (18) In this setting there are two possible equilibria that I label Pessimistic (P ) and Optimistic (O). For an optimistic equilibrium to exist. but entrepreneurs have to borrow from domestic intermediaries. The amount of savings and the entrepreneurs’outside option following enforcement breakdown at T = 1 crucially determine whether this optimistic equilibrium exists.

enforcement only implies a transfer of resources abroad. In this equilibrium. If the pessimistic equilibrium is played.Lemma 1 There is always a pessimistic equilibrium where k0 = 0 and f0 = 0. E = 1) = w1 + (1 + r) w0 s cs (O. and intermediaries complement these funds with foreign borrowing to supply entrepreneurs. Suppose all savers deposit abroad and all intermediaries catering entrepreneurs borrow from abroad. Proof. the interest rate RB (P ) = 1. enforcement breakdown would destroy so much domestic asset trade that this does not compensate avoiding payments abroad. Since contracts are never enforced. E = 0) = w1 (20) (21) Welfare is then given by: P U1 = (1 s s e ") ln (w1 + (1 + r) w0 ) + " ln (w1 ) (22) In an optimistic equilibria savers deposit domestically. consumptions are given by: s s cs (P. Then. E = 0) = w1 + (1 + r) w0 e ce (P. consumption under enforcement and under enforcement breakdown are given by: s s cs (O. Enforcement is optimal. and there is enforcement breakdown. and investment is zero. because enforcement is strategic. (E = 1) = 1 + r domestic deposits are again given by: s bs = w0 0 (23) (24) and borrowing by entrepreneurs and intermediaries is given by be 0 e f0 = = bs 0 A 1+r 1 1 (25) 1 1 A 1+r (26) At T = 1. Then: RB. E = 0) = w1 e ce (O. E = 0) = w1 + A 13 . E = 1) = w1 + (1 (27) (28) A 1+r 1 1 ) A A 1+r (29) (30) e ce (O.

savers lose A s (1 + r) w0 and entrepreneurs win A 1+r 1 . welfare is given by: A 1+r ! O U1 = (1 s s e ") ln (w1 + (1 + r) w0 ) + " ln w1 + (1 1 ) A (32) When deciding to liberalize competition the relevant welfare associated with a situation of perfect competition with capital ‡ liberalization is then: ow V1P C = (1 Which can be rewritten as: V1P C = (1 " s s ") ln (w1 + (1 + r) w0 ) + e ) ln w1 + (1 O P ) U1 + U1 e ln (w1 ) + (1 ) A A 1+r 1 !! It is possible to see that savers are not a¤ected by which equilibrium is played. The welfare of entrepreneurs is decreasing in the probability of a pessimistic equilibrium . The proof follows from the analysis above. If E = 0. The condition determining the existence of this equilibrium is then given by: ! (1 (1 s s e ") ln (w1 + (1 + r) w0 ) + " ln w1 + (1 ) A 1 s e ") ln (w1 ) + " ln w1 + A A 1+r ! A 1+r 1 (31) The following lemma shows that the existence of the optimistic equilibrium depends crucially on domestic savings and on entrepreneurs’need of credit. The presumption is that a monopolist can engage in ex-ante discrimination between domestic 14 . the need of intermediation also plays a role. this inequality will not hold and the optimistic equilibrium does not exist.Enforcement breakdown hurts savers and bene…ts entrepreneurs. in particular if 1+r is too large. Observing equation s (31) it is possible to see that if w0 is su¢ ciently large.2. 2. If the optimistic equilibrium exists. this equilibrium always exists.2 Monopoly A monopolist cares about pro…ts but can internalize the behavior of atomistic agents. A Finally. If pro…ts are maximized under enforcement he will attract domestic savings by paying a slightly larger interest rate on its domestic depositors and induce enforcement. Proof. Lemma 2 The optimistic equilibrium exists if (31) is satis…ed.

These rents come with a dead weight loss. The monopolist extracts rents from the economy so prefers a situation where the size of the economy is larger. Re ) = arg max E (Re Rs ) " RA 1 e s. This point is more general than the simple model studied here.and foreign depositors. This section contains the two main results of this paper: (i) the incentives of the monopolist are aligned with enforcement and (ii) under some conditions it is better to keep a monopolist intermediary following the opening to capital ‡ ows. One way to implement this is to o¤er large interest rates for long term savings deposits with penalties for early withdrawal. ce (E) given by (4) . 20 15 .20 The marginal cost of funds of the monopolist is now 1 + r while Re is charged on …rms. Remember that I assumed that if indi¤erent. the monopolist has to o¤er savers Rs = 1 + r.1g (1 ") ln (cs (E)) + " ln (ce (E)) (M 3) 1 1 cs (E) . and pro…ts are zero. It is possible to show that: Rs = 1 + r 1+r Re = 1 (33) If with the interest rate Re given by equation (33) there is no enforcement and E = 0. It follows that the monopolist will try to induce it. the monopolist will constrain lending.t. to make sure that the optimistic equilibrium exists. He bene…ts more when he gets repaid. In order to attract savings. 1 Re " RA 1 "A RA 1 (M 2) e e E = arg maxE=f0. Furthermore. the monopolist must be able to engage in ex-ante discrimination between domestic and foreigners. The solution is represented in Figure 4. Of course. the marginal cost of funds is larger.21 Note that the monopolist gets no pro…ts in the non-enforcement equilibrium. Suppose that (M 2) does not bind and that E = 1. but it still favors enforcement. a consequence of the monopolist markup. In order words. The intuition for this result is that the monopolist has a stake on the enforcement decision. It is possible to show that for any positive probability that enforcement is always guaranteed at T = 1. This e¤ectively works like a tax on capital out‡ ows. The bene…ts associated with enforcement under a monopolist need to be compared with the lottery under perfect competition. except that now there are no constraints on the amount of funds he has access to. (10) 1 1 The monopolist understands that if the pessimistic equilibrium is played. In that case E = 0. The problem of the monopolist looks very similar to the one under autarky. the monopolist makes pro…ts even if nonenforcement is a possible outcome. It will then do the best he can to keep savings subject to the enforcement decision. The problem can be summarized as: (Rs . if necessary. if pro…ts are higher under enforcement breakdown. the monopolist will increase it further to ensure that enforcement occurs. The intuition for the incentives of the monopolist to be aligned with enforcement is simple. he will arrange for that equilibrium to be played. 21 This occurs if PUT CONDITION HERE. enforcement breaks down. On the other side of the market. (5) and (9) . The monopolist must also guarantee that these are not tradable deposits abroad. savers keep their savings domestically.

Figure 4: Capital Flow Liberalization with Perfect Competition and with Monopoly. the monopolist can always reduce entrepreneurial borrowing to satisfy the condition that the optimistic equilibrium exists. The next section studies the conditions. Then the monopolist can at least constrain credit. where P C represents perfect competition. First. This section argues that the monopolist can potentially solve the two externalities present in the perfect competition case.3. These conditions are given by the following two inequalities. the monopolist coordinates savers towards a situation that is independent of the sunspot variable . if the monopolist can ex-ante discriminate. and M the monopolist situation: (1 > (1 s P e ") ln w1 + (1 + r) sav0 C + " ln w1 + (1 s ") ln (w1 ) ) A credP C 0 (34) + " ln e w1 +A credP C 0 16 .1 Optimal institutional arrangements Constraining trade Assume that the monopolist can not engage in ex-ante discrimination. under the di¤erent roles of the monopolist. Second. that determine the optimal institutional arrangement at T = 0. 2. To see this role of the monopolist. compare the conditions guaranteeing the existence of the optimistic equilibrium under perfect competition and monopoly.3 2. respectively. Let sav and cred represent the amount of savings from one saver and the amount of funds lent to one entrepreneur. it can eliminate pessimism altogether. By making sure that domestic savings are invested domestically.

3. and the lottery that comes with perfect competition. under a monopolist there are lower levels of savings such that the equality sP C sM holds. Then 1 2 1 A A < credP C = 1+r 1 . e s s ") ln (w1 + (1 + r) w0 ) + " ln w1 + (1 ) A A 1+r 2 1 in the unconstrained solution of the monopolist. the inequality is harder to satisfy the larger is credit in the economy. the monopolist makes sure that savings are deposited domestically. sP C sM It is immediate to see that w0 > w0 . I have argued that the optimistic equilibrium always exists under a monopoly. It is possible to see that the inequality holds credM = 1+r 0 0 for a larger con…guration of parameters under monopoly than under perfect competition. To see this.(1 > (1 s M e ") ln w1 + (1 + r) sav0 + " ln w1 + (1 s e ") ln (w1 ) + " ln w1 + A credM 0 ) A credM 0 (35) P M s In this simple model. In other words. In this case. (36) can be rewritten: e ln w1 + (1 ) A A 1+r 2 1 ! (1 e ) ln w1 + (1 ) A A 1+r 1 e + ln (w1 ) 17 . of a monopolist and is given by: V0M = (1 O U1 (1 P U1 O P ) U1 + U1 (36) V0M is the value at T = 0 ! ! by equation (22) and. savings are inelastic and sav0 C = sav0 = w0 . In the previous section. a monopolist is only constrained optimal when the optimistic equilibrium under perfect competition does not exist. but the monopolist can always reduce credit su¢ ciently to ensure that this condition holds. 2. Suppose that this is given by the unconstrained solution to the monopolist problem given by (33).2 Ex-ante discrimination Assuming that the monopolist can ex-ante discriminate between domestic and foreign depositors. In other words. the relevant trade-o¤ at T = 0 is between the sure distorted welfare of the monopoly. this condition is positive. The relevant trade o¤ is then: V0M where is given by equation (32). Formally. Focus now on condition (34). de…ne w0 and w0 that make the inequalities (34) (35) exactly zero. di¤erentiate it with respect (1 ) A credP C A credP C 0 0 " e >0 PC e ) A (credP C ) w1 + A (cred0 ) w1 + (1 0 It it possible to show that if > 0. Simplifying. It follows from the simple structure of this model that if the monopolist can only constrain trade. Rewrite it as : s P (1 ") ln w1 + (1 + r) sav0 C (1 e PC e " ln w1 + A cred0 " ln w1 + (1 s ") ln (w1 ) > ) A credP C 0 1 The right hand side is increasing in credP C 0 to credP C : 0 " .

if a monopolist can discriminate ex-ante between domestic and foreign savers he will be interested in keeping domestic savings subject to the enforcement decision.2. The additional period T = 2 is just a replica from T = 1. One of the consequences of the asymmetry in intermediation studied in this paper is that opening to capital ‡ ows always makes savers better o¤. In my paper. a su¢ ciently large monopolist mark-up can correct these imbalances. If the monopolist can discriminate. savings are irrelevant and deep parameters determining credit are crucial for the trade-o¤. 23 This notion of ex-ante discrimination is considered in Broner & Ventura (2011) as a desired policy by a Government. It can then tilt the balance of …nancial reform also towards the introduction of domestic …nancial competition. Third. before new borrowing and lending is done but after the enforcement decision. They conclude that this assumption goes against the non-discrimination assumption that is crucial for their analysis. then a monopolist is only preferable if savings are small enough. Martin and Rossi (2011). In the model I have focused on capital ‡ ows and domestic competition but many other reforms can be thought as having similar e¤ects. to the extent that the monopolist can use the monitoring technology to adequately spread risk. the monopolist can solve the underinsurance externality. 2. given capital ‡ liberalization. makes the trade-o¤ between perfect competition and monopolist easier.22 First. In a situation where enforcement would breakdown under perfect competition because there is over-borrowing. For example. All are classic second best arguments.3. even if the monopolist can not discriminate between savers. other macro restrictions This complementarity between private agents actions and enforcement is also present in Brutti (2009) and Gennaioli. If the ow monopolist can not discriminate.3 Underinsurance [To Be Completed] 2. the monopolist can target their activities and induce domestic agents to save with them. everything else equal. Assume further that this monopolist can constrain …nancial trade in the economy but it can not ex-ante discriminate between savers. Furthermore. I keep the non-discrimination assumption by the Government. At T = 1. That is.4 Discussion and empirical implications If the economy is capital scarce. it can make the optimistic equilibrium possible by constraining the amount of funds supplied to the entrepreneurial sector. The monopolist has a stake on enforcement.4 Sequencing of reform [To Be Completed] Suppose there are 3 periods in this economy. these two papers focus on the sustainability of public debt. but allow the …nancial intermediaries to perform ex-ante discrimination. This section argues that at T = 1 the bene…ts from having a monopolist are smaller. We have seen before that the crucial determinants behind the trade-o¤ between perfect competition and monopoly.3. This is because only through enforcement the monopolist can extract rents from the economy. it is possible to change the institutional arrangement in the economy. Suppose that we are in an economy that at T = 0 opens to capital ‡ ows but keeps a monopolist …nancial intermediary. in a di¤erent formulation. I have identi…ed three socially valuable roles for a monopolist. 22 18 .23 Second. This wealth e¤ect. are savings and credit.

I …rst focus on the determinants of …nancial reform. I …nd that relevant variables in the model . this reform is very similar to introducing competition in the …nancial sector. This suggests that …nancial reform. this model has some interesting empirical implications to study …nancial liberalization. Finally. all that is necessary is that the window of opportunity for reform to be exogenous. For the two views to be possible. Although quite stylized. opening to capital ‡ ows might even decrease credit. In a perfect competition world these can reduce the amount of intermediation but will not necessarily correct the externalities I discuss in the model. can be thought of as limits on the amount of funds that can be traded in the economy. or their e¤ects should not be felt before they are in place. Equity markets allow …rms to get funds in the stock market.24 In this section. directly from savers. 3 Empirical analysis There are two approaches to empirical work on …nancial reform. Regarding micro restrictions. One strand of literature assumes reform is exogenous and studies the causal e¤ects of …nancial liberalization. (2) credit controls and These two views are not necessarily opposites.1. Another strand takes the view that liberalization is endogenous and looks for the determinants of reform and reversals. the model suggests that opening to capital ‡ ows and to competition should depend on the ability to raise domestic savings and on how large the entrepreneurial sector is. Regulation and supervision introduce checks on market power. the model suggests that opening up to capital ‡ ows should increase credit more if there is perfect competition in the domestic …nancial sector. 24 19 . if debt and equity are perfect substitutes. and in particular.help determine …nancial reform of di¤erent dimensions. From an ex-post perspective. the establishment of equity markets can be thought of as an increase of competition. I perform both types of tests. di¤erent sequencing strategies of …nancial reform are not exogenous.such as restrictions on the interest rate and on the quantity of credit. A simple extension with a positive probability that enforcement is always guaranteed yields the prediction that crises happen only if there is su¢ cient competition in the domestic …nancial sector.1 3.savings and credit . I take advantage of the new dataset on …nancial reform proposed by Abiad et al (2010) and I follow the analysis of liberalizations and reversals proposed by Abiad & Mody (2005). which is the view this paper takes. From an ex-ante perspective. 3. the model predicts that countries that are open to international …nancial markets but have lower domestic …nancial competition are less subject to capital ‡ ow reversals.1 Data The Abiad et al (2010) index of …nancial reform The main innovation of this index is its breakdown of reform in seven di¤erent dimensions of …nancial sector policy: (1) capital account restrictions. When there is lack of competition. For reforms to be exogenous they must be unexpected. Therefore. To do so. but the actual decision to be endogenous. The following section turns to the data to see which elements of the model are consistent with the data. If reform is endogenous then I then introduce lagged savings and credit in the growth regression and note that this absorbs the negative growth e¤ect associated with doing macro …nancial reforms before micro …nancial reforms.

I extract data on credit. and vice-versa. I use this index of …nancial reform and separate it between micro (1 4) and macro reforms (5 7). (6) prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector and (7) equity market policy. where F L is the desired level of …nancial liberalization .1. is that …nancial reform is a complex process. F Lit = a1 GDPi. This paper suggests that this level should depend on how much the economy saves. I then perform the same analysis for di¤erent types of reform. instead of focusing directly on individual index levels or in the macro and micro division. Then.and is a measure of the status quo bias: 4F Lit = F Lit F Li. and its dimensions interact in di¤erent ways. From this is very rich dataset. Abiad & Mody (2005) assume the desired level of …nancial liberalization to be 1 for all countries (the maximum). The analysis in Abiad & Mody (2005) assumes the following process for …nancial reform. Policy measures destined to a¤ect the way …nancial trade is done domestically have an impact on how …nancial trade is performed across borders.t 1 20 . It contains indicators of …nancial development and structure across countries from 1960-2007. in this preliminary analysis. (4) entry barriers. (5) state ownership in the banking sector. The reason to focus on the general index. with zero corresponding to repression and 3 indicating full liberalization. For instance.2 entry barrierst + state ownershipt + regulationt + equity marketst 4 The Beck & Kunt database on …nancial development and structure This dataset has been used much more than the previous dataset so it needs a smaller introduction. This index is available for a sample of 91 countries over the period 1973-2005. Financial reform is a complex phenomenon.2 Determinants of Financial Reform In this section I study the e¤ect of the variables predicted by the model in overall …nancial liberalization.t 1 + "it (37) In the benchmark speci…cation. and even technological change can determine how restrictive some policies are. Reforms from foreign countries have an impact on domestic policies. domestic deposits and concentration of the banking sector.t + a2 Depositsi. (3) interest rate controls. With these caveats in mind. Along each dimension.aggregate or of a given index . a country was given a score on a graded scale from zero to three. I construct the following two indices: macrot = capital f lowst + credit controlst + interest rate controlst 3 microt = 3. and how much credit there is in place. it makes sense to take advantage of the larger variation and information available by looking at the overall level of …nancial reform …rst. making it hard to isolate the e¤ects of di¤erent policies.t 1 + a3 Crediti.excessively high reserve requirements. 3. targeted policies have consequences across the board as they a¤ect all the other dimensions of …nancial reform.

t 1 F Li.15e-05*** (1.98e-05) 0.371*** (0.940) 3.421) (3) 5. Besides.534) -1.t 1 + 2 4 Crediti.128** (0.indx^2 l. Table 3: Ordered Logit l.34e-05** (2.833) -6.15e-05) (2) 5. Table 3 presents the results for regressions that use the ordered logit technique applied in Abiad & Mody (2005) for developing economies.t 1 . large deposits facilitate …nancial reform and large credit hinders …nancial reform.345*** (0.t 1 + 6 (REG_F Li. and where the changes represent discrete jumps.540) 1272 1272 1272 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0. 2 > 0 and 3 .820) -6. which takes many values from 0 and 1.619) 1. Regional learning suggests 5 > 0. Although this variable is not cardinal.098*** (0.1 The ordered logit speci…cation is appropriate for a dependent variable that takes a discrete number of values.530) (0.t x F Li.178*** (0.152*** (0.17e-05*** (1. To con…rm the results.340 (0.t 1 ) + "it (38) The model suggests 1 .t x F Li.indx*GDP l. Table 4 presents the results of an OLS speci…cation which are very much in line with the ordered logit regression.indx*Cred RegCatchup Observations (1) 5.838) -6.150** (0.392*** (0.05.From Abiad & Mody I keep the assumption that there is a domestic learning process in place.indx*Dep l.t 1 + 5 F Li.01.31e-05*** (1. and choose = F Li. Both this speci…cation and Abiad and Mody (2005) use as a dependent variable the average value of the …nancial index.951) 5. as the simple average treats changes in di¤erent indices equally.t 1 GDPi.108** (0. 4 < 0.12e-05) -0. ** p<0.430) 1.t 1 + 2 F Li.427** (0.173*** (0. 21 .533) 1272 -1.946) 6.530) (0. and that there is a regional learning process in place. the ordered logit speci…cation introduces assumptions about the distribution of these variables and has hard to interpret coe¢ cients.175*** (0.205** 1. I combine the sample in Abiad & Mody (2005) and Abiad et al (2010) with the dataset on …nancial development and structure. * p<0.99e-05) (4) 5. The results presented in Table 3 are suggestive of the mechanisms of the model at work: for a given level of …nancial reform in place.t + 3 Depositsi.704* (0.838) -6.indx l. it is hard to understand it as a purely ordinal variable.949) 6.177** 1. captured by the introduction of distance to the regional leader in reform: 4F Lit = 1 F Li.

38e-07) -0.0275* (0.0581) -0.0685) 0.320*** (0.102*** (0.0202) -0.111 (0.101*** (0.140*** (0.0102) -0.0142) 1272 0.18e-07) -0.103*** (0. These results further suggest that credit is the crucial variable determining di¤erent reform strategies.indx l.0660) 1272 1272 1272 0.0213) 8.0142) (0.321*** (0.29e-06) 0.indx*GDP l.0496 (0.0661) (0.0129) 0.101*** (0.0105) RegCatchup 0.160 (0.136** 0.0649) (0.0211) 1.0308 (0.102) 5.041 0.105) -0.2.1 22 .18e-07) 0.indx*l.0285** (0.56e-07** (4.1 (4) 0.103) 5.03e-06** (4.indx*gdp4 l.indx*l.0276* 0.0198) -0.105) -0.40e-06) -0. Table 5: Macro Reforms l.indx*l.108 (0.35e-06) (2) 0.dep l.0577) -0.155 (0.101) 4.133** (0. Note that deposits and credit are not signi…cant when accounting for macro reforms. * p<0.102) -0.0497) 0.317*** (0.indx l.0123 (0.0203) -0.05.01.00909) (3) 0.107) -0. assuming the process represented by (38).321*** (0.0263* (0.130* (0. Tables 5 and 6 show that the variables predicted by the model.0687) 0.Table 4: OLS l. matter crucially for micro reforms but not for macro reforms.041 0. * p<0.066 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.62e-06*** (1.01.140*** (0.148 (0. deposits and credit. ** p<0.14e-06** (4.0665) 1272 0.102) 5.indx*Dep l.137** 0.042 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.0143) (0.100) 3.0461) (3) 0. ** p<0.0667) 1272 0.157 (0.cred catchup_ind Observations R-squared (1) 0.150 (0.33e-06) 0.140*** (0.indx l.indx^2 l.35e-06) (4) 0.14e-06** (2.0142) Observations 1272 1272 1272 R-squared 0.0215) 1.065 0.067 3.39e-06** (2.0277* 0.0183* (0.065 0.042 (5) 0.12e-06** (2. but they are jointly signi…cant for micro reforms (although deposits is not signi…cant individually).042 -0.322*** (0.0213) 7.00212 (0.61e-07) (2) 0.0524 (0.indx*Cred (1) 0.05.105) -0. but important e¤ect on micro reforms I now perform two regressions on the macro and micro indices.60e-06* (2.90e-07*** (2.132* (0.1 No e¤ect on macro reforms.140*** (0.0204) -0.0617 (0.

0508) 0.0706* (0.432*** (0.1 Ex-post results Accounting for the negative growth e¤ect of sequencing In this section I redo the analysis in Table 2.433*** (0.1 (4) 0. and now insigni…cant.0419) 1272 1272 1272 0. ** p<0.0301) (3) 0.435*** (0.62e-06** (1. introducing credit and deposits in the analysis.34e-06) 0.0307 (0.038 (5) 0. Columns (1)-(2) are reproduced from Table 2.424*** (0.indx l.indx*l.0301 (0. Note that the coe¢ cient on the sequencing with macro leading is reduced.0416) (0.0356) -0.3 3.0768* 0.0636) 4.indx*l. Columns (3)-(4) add lagged savings as an explanatory variable.432*** (0.029 0.432*** (0.034 0. Table 7 collects the results.cred catchup_ind Observations R-squared (1) 0.Table 6: Micro Reforms l.0581) -0.98e-07) (2) 0.0607) -0.47e-06*** (1.05.0377) -0.32e-06*** (1.31e-06*** (1.0569) -0.indx l.indx*l.413*** (0. There is a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of lagged savings on growth.0792* 0. Remember that average growth was computed as a 5 year window.0730** (0.31e-06 (8.432*** (0.110*** (0.43e-06) -0.0555) -0.0348) 0.0417) 1272 0.038 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.038 3. * p<0.35e-06) 0.3.0629) 4.37e-06) -0.0629) 4. This is consistent with the model.dep l.138*** (0.0647) 3.0494) 0.01.0617) 1.0433) (0.139*** (0.0572) -0. credit and deposits are timed one period before this 5 year window.430*** (0. [To Be Completed] 23 .431*** (0.0422) 1272 0.indx*gdp4 l.0726* (0.0710* (0. therefore.

0995*** 0.00414) (0.00369 (0.Table 7 LaggedFinReform MacroLead MicroLead Simultaneous LaggedSavings log1980 GovGDP Secondary PopGr Log(life) Advanced Constant Observations R-squared (2) (3) (4) 0.712 L.000277) (0.00678 -0. does concentration predict a lower frequency of defaults? Pr(Def ault) = F vt + 1 Depositsi.t 1 Table 8 and 9 show that both the de jure index for concentration and a de facto measure of (lagged) concentration of the …nancial sector suggest that higher concentration is associated with a lower enforcement crisis.1 (1) 0.0135) -0.369** -0.477 0.00979 -0.822* -7.PrivCredit 1.00337 (0.0133*** -0.000278) (0. * p<0.000593** 0.014*** -1.286*** -0.00415) 0.000278) -0.00591 0. ** p<0. In particular.720*** 1.01.248*** -7.00878) 0.288*** -0.00718* -0.00490) 0.105*** 0.00876) 0.Deposits -2.curracc 0.000278) -0.00489) (0.262*** 0.05.00308 -0.00669 (0.0109 -0.000483* -0.261*** -0. In a liberalized economy.000429 -0.038*** 0.05.263*** 316 316 316 316 0.2 Enforcement crises and concentration of the banking sector The …nal tests are ex-post results.454*** L.000552** -0.575 -0.0229* 0.337 0.t 1 + 2 Crediti.BankCrisis Observations 1306 1306 1306 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.0141*** -0.106*** 0.00599 (0.0160 -4.0138*** -0.0232* (0.t 1 0 + Xi.014 -3.3.00987 0.00286 -0.808* L.00317 0.concentration -0.00576 (0.01.0155 L. which is another prediction of the model.00875) (0.343 0.338 0.00491) (0.00415) 0.00726* (0.344 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.445*** -7.000606** (0. * p<0.0163 0.0135) (0.00415) (0.000566** (0.t 1 + 3 Concentrationi.00980 -0.0987*** -0.reserves -6.00489) 3.growth -7.587 -4.1 (4) -2. ** p<0.279*** 1.00584 0.00879) (0.0135*** -0.000578** 0.000503* -0.203 1306 24 .0109 -1.394** L.00390 0.720*** L.372*** -2. these p Table 8: Probit (1) (2) (3) L.

the understanding of the optimal policy mix and timing of di¤erent reforms is of incalculable value. but also unveils a more general view that the sequencing of reforms matters empirically.0316** -1.530* 0.823 (4) -0.05. this simple model can be explored in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.091** -5. The last 40 years have been rich in di¤erent experiences with reform and reversals which provides economists with a laboratory to study the theory of …nancial reform.1 (5) 0.149*** -0. The debate on competition and stability in the banking sector is a important explanation (see Beck (2008) for a survey).growth L. a formal test of this theory should account for the di¤erent episodes and for the complementary political economy considerations that have dominated the literature thus far.473 -6.526 (2) -0. Although the episodes and regressions presented in Section 3 seem to support the view that macro …nancial liberalization interacts with domestic …nancial competition in non-trivial ways.0353** -1.549 -6. * p<0.pcrdbgdp Observations (1) 0.063*** -0.537 -6. the topics addressed in this paper remain an interesting …eld for future research.322 (3) -0.653** -0.480 0. The biggest challenge lies with empirical work.378 0. One di¢ culty with the data is that it is hard to measure competition in the …nancial sector.01. For these reasons. Furthermore.543 0.834* 1226 1226 1226 1226 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0. A …rst pass at the data suggests that these mechanisms are important empirically. and that there is an important distinction between reforms that target quantities and prices in …nancial markets (macro) and reforms that deal with the structure of …nancial markets (micro reforms). ** p<0. and evaluate the relative contribution of complementary explanations.172* -1.0299** -0.165** -5. 25 .211 -0. It follows then that a general model of competition and capital ‡ liberalization should add ow these to the mechanisms considered in this paper.790 1226 4 Conclusion This paper presents a stylized model that highlights two reasons why restricting domestic …nancial competition when opening up to capital ‡ ows might be a desirable policy mix. Also.bdgdp L. the role of competition remains hard to discern empirically.reserves L.indx L. As the world economy exits the most important crisis since the great depression and …nds itself struggling with a backlash against market-based …nancial reforms.170* -1. there are other reasons why domestic …nancial competition might be hurtful when opening up to capital ‡ ows. Future research should study the robustness of the mechanism.Table 9: Probit L.312*** -0. Theoretically. This paper has presented some suggestive evidence but if stops short of a full test of the theory.0369** -1.entr L.curracc L.0361** -1.929*** -0.465 -0.

42(3-4). K. 2010. Martin. "Does Financial Reform Raise or Reduce Saving?. Journal of International Economics. 8679. Vol. 2005. and Demirgüç-Kunt. Gennaioli. Bank of Canada. S.. May 2011." Journal of Financial Economics. 1297– . June. 2003. 2011.. V.. 1997. Pasricha.. pages 663-88. B. and Ventura. & Zingales. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies". “Globalization and International Public Finance”(Working Paper No. & Honohan. Review of Economic Studies. 2010. A. Paasche. N. M. Brutti. 82(2). G. F. T. Elsevier. Bandiera. The World Bank. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk. “Trade-o¤ Between International and Domestic Risk Sharing in the Presence of Sovereign Risk”(Manuscript) Appendix 26 . "Bank competition and …nancial stability : friends or foes ?. J. and Zin.. D. L. 81(5). Issue 1."Policy Research Working Paper Series 4656. R. "Competition and Intervention in Sovereign Debt Markets".. No. A. A. vol. "Bank Competition and International Financial Integration: Evidence Using a New Index. F. "Rethinking the e¤ects of …nancial liberalization. Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions” (Manuscript) Guembel. and Rossi. 94. revised Dec 2010. July. pp. Public Supply of Liquidity and Sovereign Risk. S. O. & Drazen. "The great reversals: the politics of …nancial development in the twentieth century. 2000. “Sovereign Debt Without Default Penalties” Review of Economic Studies. 2009. "A New Database of Financial Reforms. "Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis".." The Review of Economics and Statistics. May. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Speci…c Uncertainty".. and Roubini. K. & Detragiache. 2000. P. T. pages 146-55.. 2008. "When Liberal Policies Re‡ External Shocks." The Economic Journal. 57(2)..5 References Abiad A.”Journal of International Economics. 1320 Kletzer. “Legal Enforcement. 2009. Beck." Economics Working Papers 1128. American Economic Review. pages 5-50. pp. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2010. Department of Economics and Business. and Rodrik. 84. pages 239-263. & Caprio. and Mehta. vol. NBER Working Papers No. 287-307. P. T.. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. A. ect What Do We Learn?". Pages 65-72 Fernandez. 69(1). pages 281-302. Vol. & Schiantarelli. 249-73. Beck. Luigi. Kremer. and Sussman. & Tressel. Bartolini. 76. 1984.. NBER). 2010. O." IMF Sta¤ Papers. 1991. N. 2001. Raghuram G.. 4943” Broner. Alesina. Mody A. A. 7575. 2011. “Sovereign Default. 374. E.. 66– 88 Abiad. Financial reform: what shakes it? what shapes it? American Economic Review 95. 1992. F." Working Papers 10-35. 59(4). Rappoport. Rajan. A.

Correlation matrix 27 . B. Although arguing that this crisis was an enforcement crisis as the one studied in Section 3 would require signi…cantly more data. Indonesia liberalized domestic …nancial competition more and together with capital ‡ liberalization. I discuss two cases of …nancial reform of countries with similar levels of deposits and credit. Credit/GDP and the index for …nancial reform for India and Indonesia. 0 to 1 Entry barriers/pro-competition measures Figure 4: The left panels plot Deposits/GDP.A. Looking at Figure 4 it is possible to see two di¤erent approaches to …nancial reform. leading to a reversal in …nancial reform. The right panels decompose two categories that enter this index: restrictions to international capital ‡ ows and to domestic competition (3 = fully liberalized). India took the approach suggested by the model presented in Section 3. As a ow result it experienced faster growth.5 0 1973 1981 BANK DEPOSITS / GDP 1989 Year 1997 2005 0 1 2 1970 PRIVATE CREDIT / GDP 1980 International capital flows 1990 Year 2000 2010 Financial Reform Index (normalized). but kept some restrictions to competition in its …nancial sector. I believe that these patterns are illustrative of the mechanisms studied in this paper.5 0 1973 1981 BANK DEPOSITS / GDP 1989 Year 1997 2005 0 1 2 1970 PRIVATE CREDIT / GDP 1980 International capital flows 1990 Year 2000 2010 Financial Reform Index (normalized). On the other hand. albeit with a famous crisis in the late 1990s. The outcome was slow but steady growth in deposits and in credit. It opened up to capital ‡ ows gradually. prior to …nancial liberalization. Case studies on competition in the …nancial sector and capital ‡ liberalization ow As an illustration. India 1 3 India . 0 to 1 Entry barriers/pro-competition measures Indonesia 1 3 Indonesia .

it should be the case that it does not reject that 1 = 0.4534 0.5123 0.0268) 0.5992 0.047 28 . even if the data rejects that 2 = 0.4816 0.5621 0.4786 1 0.cred intr intl entr regl priv sec cred 1 0. Note that these indices are stationary by construction.974 0.5149 1 0. 4microt = 4macrot = + 0+ 1 4microt 1 0 + 1 4microt 1 + 2 4macrot 1 + ut 2 4macrot 1 + vt 2 (40) =0 Table presents the results.0391 (0.0300 748 0. It is possible to see that it is possible to reject that and it is not possible to reject that 1 = 0.5362 0.4863 0. the data may appear non-stationary in the sample.5091 0.0724*** 0. I run the following regressions: microt = macrot = + 0+ 1 microt 1 0 + 1 microt 1 + 2 macrot 1 + ut 2 macrot 1 + vt (39) I control for year and country …xed e¤ects.778*** -0. Table 10 Year FE + Country FE Levels (39) micro(t) macro(t) 0.5757 intr 1 0.5078 0.6 0.0539) 0.0684) 0.6915 1 0. meaning that macro indices granger causes micro indices but not the other way around.0794*** (0.6119 0.124 0. Additional empirical results Macro reforms lead micro reforms A simple test of whether macro reforms lead micro reforms is to perform a Granger causality test of the panel of reform.0302) Year FE Changes (40) dmicro(t) dmacro(t) micro(t-1) macro(t-1) dmicro(t-1) dmacro(t-1) Constant Obs R-squared 0. The null hypothesis for the experiment I am considering is that 2 = 0.5248 0. Still.927 0.0325 (0.0456 (0.0334) 0. To avoid concerns about stationarity. I perform the regressions in (39) also in …rst di¤erences.825*** (0. where I remove country …xed e¤ects. Furthermore. given that there is a reform process in place.4335 0.844*** 782 0.482 1 C. that past levels of the macro index do not help to explain current levels of the micro index.0671* (0.5916 0.505*** 782 0. That is.5775 intl entr regl priv sec 1 0.0379) 0. To this e¤ect.00860 748 0.0347) (0.0190) (0. They are bounded above by 3 and bounded below by 0 .5607 0.

00652 -0.0128 -0.00013 (0. proportion of secondary school enrollment.0023) -0. 3g yields similar results.478* * * 0.00230) -0. The regression is given by: yi.00243) (5) 0.t = Qi.00025 -0.0125* * * 256 0. 1.0222* * * 0.00166) (2) 0.t+k. Qi. I replicate Table 4 in Bekaert et al (2005) using an extended time sample (1980-2005) and a graded index instead of a dummy. An alternative speci…cation with a full set of dummy variables for the alternative entries of this index f0.00628* * (0.0129 -0.00218) (7) 0. I then proceed to study the e¤ect of macro vs. Table 2 suggests that increasing the equity market index by one unit increases average growth by 0:6%.31* * * 256 0. and their sequencing. Here I am assuming that the e¤ect is linear.0179 0.0147* * * 0.t+k.0455 0.00173 (0.0041* * (0. * p<0.Growth regressions In this subsection. ** p<0.0009* * -0. I follow Bekaert et al (2005) and perform a pooled OLS regression where I test the impact of di¤erent …nancial reforms (Lib).108* * * 0.00025 -0.0137* * * -0.0189 (1) 0.00265) -0.156 0.0278 (4) 0.31* * * 256 0.t + 0 Libi.0378 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.00636* * * (0. The main results are that using the graded index by Abiad et al (2010).00209 (0.479* * * 0.01.0523* * * 256 0. I can reproduce the growth e¤ect of equity market liberalizations.0082* * * (0. Table 11 EM l80 GGDP 2ndy PopGr log(life) CA Cons Obs AdjR2 0.1980 represents GDP per capita in 1980.05.t+k.101 256 0.25 This e¤ect is still presenting when controlling for current account liberalizations.0387 0.t are the average growth over non-consecutive 5 year windows. 25 29 .0055* * * (3) 0.0137* * * -0.00183) (6) 0.108* * * (8) 0.00555* * (0.1 -0.k (41) Where yi.00588* * * (0. 2. population growth and life expectancy.0215* * * 256 256 256 0.t ) include government spending as a percentage of GDP .00180) -0.0255 -0.t + "i. and the other controls (Xi.1980 + 0 Xi. I take the approach of Bekaert et al (2005) and estimate the e¤ect of …nancial reform on growth.00220) -0. micro reforms.374* * 0.159 Table 3 performs the same regression as described in (41) on di¤erent dimensions of reform.

26 Table 4 performs the growth regression on micro and macro …nancial reforms.00197 (0.00268) -0. Capital account.05.00436*** (0.00170) 0.00196) 0.00133 (0.00446** (0.0162*** 256 0.00256) -3.00206) 0.27 The coe¢ cient of micro reforms is di¤erent from the coe¢ cient for macro reforms at the 10% level.00633*** (0.75e-05 (0. 26 30 .00228 (0.00166) 0.00636*** (0.00203) 0.000512 (0.00260) 0.000489 -0. Unsurprisingly.00405** (0.00185) 0.00242) 0.00219 (0.476*** 0.(7) 0.00173) 0.00213) 0.00455* (0.Table 12 Capital Account Credit Controls Interest Rate Controls Equity Market Entry Barriers Regulation Privatization log1980 GovGDP Secondary PopGr Log(life) Cons Observations Adj R2 Univariate Regressions (1) .00168) 0.211 The …rst column reports regressions (1)-(7).00227) -0. 27 The coe¢ cient of equity market reforms in this data is 0. Appendix C presents the correlation matrix between these variables.00202) 0.01. interest rate controls and entry barriers all have sign changes.62e-05 (0.00636.00208) -0.00230) 0.00321 (0.00175) 0.00153) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Multivariate (15) -0.000146 (0.00148 (0.00280 (0.00180) -1.00544** (0.00375* (0.114*** -0.328*** 256 0. Further work is needed to disentangle the e¤ects of di¤erent dimensions. Column 8 regresses all the elements of the index separately.0156 -0.00825*** (0.0139*** -0.00166) 0.(14) 0.00177) 0.00219) 0.00259) -0. * p<0.00419** (0. It is possible to see that microreforms are crucial for growth.00177) -0.00504** (0.0552 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0. ** p<0. These are univariate regressions of the each of the index entries on average growth.00932.00150) No No No No No Univariate Regressions (8) .00240) 0.00285* (0. The coe¢ cient for the micro index is 0.00299* (0.1 Regressions (16) -0. there is some evidence of collinearity between di¤erent dimensions of the index.00185) 0. and that the e¤ect is larger than just looking at equity market liberalizations in the spirit of Bekaert et al (2005).000916 (0.00572** (0.00560*** (0.00615*** (0.

The dummy variable identifying periods where a macro reform took place but a micro reform did not is negative and highly signi…cant.150 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.00674*** (0.000203 -0. Current research is addressing this issue by introducing information on balance of payments crisis and on the content of IMF programs. * p<0.177 0.362*** -0. it can be tilted towards macro reforms. A potential omitted variable problem remains. while column (2) focus on developing economies. the dummy variable capturing leading macro reforms is in fact capturing the recession during a balance of payments crisis. ** p<0.0103 PopGr -0. If that is the case. In a balance of payments crisis.00258) (2) 0.81e-05 Secondary -0.00325) -0.05.518*** 0.1 (3) 0.122*** 0.174 Table 5 introduces dummy variables that take a value of 1 depending on the sequencing of reform.363*** 256 0. In particular.00355) 0. The e¤ect is stronger in the latter group.00244) log1980 -0. an IMF based reform may not maximize growth opportunities.115*** Cons -0.465*** Log(life) 0.123*** -0. Column (1) does the analysis for the full sample.0139*** GovGDP -0.512*** -0.0167 -0. The omitted variable corresponds to a situation of status quo.0169 -0.Table 13 Micro Index Macro Index (1) 0.345*** Obs 256 256 Adj R2 0.0101*** (0.0147*** -0.28 28 A description of IMF based reforms is an interesting project in its own right. 31 .01.00932*** (0.00164 (0.000182 -6.0147*** -0.

- Lecture W10
- The Final Assignment
- Market Structures
- MIT14_01SCF10_lec14_300k
- 00 - TYS by Topics
- analysis of the ice cream industry
- Steve Keen - DeregulatorJudgment Day for Microeconomics
- Marketing 1
- Monopoly info by imran
- Chap 009
- market
- Eco
- Introduction to Various Conditons of Market
- Business Economics Edexcel Version Revision
- Do Regional Trade Agreements Hinder Global Welfare Maximization
- Port Law II 2
- Economic Analysis
- ECON 300 PPT Ch_05.pptx
- Bertaud_Governement_intervention_in_markets_the_case_of_China_FinalVersion130308_1_1_.pdf
- MCE Quiz 1 (Fall 09)
- Robins ASQ 1987
- FPP1x_--_Slides_Introduction_to_FPP.pdf
- Is National Defense a Public Good
- The Macro Environment
- TNB Market Structure 3rd Draft (1)
- Bilateral Control With Vertical Contracts
- Economics
- Chapter 14
- HC4 Competition Policy and Regulation
- Pricing in Service Industry

Skip carousel

- SENATE HEARING, 108TH CONGRESS - MONOPSONY ISSUES IN AGRICULTURE
- Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)
- International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 62 F.3d 69, 2d Cir. (1995)
- Working for the Few
- Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food MacHinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
- HOUSE HEARING, 110TH CONGRESS - COMPETITION AND THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL MUSIC
- Fairdale Farms, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Yankee Milk, Inc. And Regional Cooperative Marketing Agency, Inc., Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, 635 F.2d 1037, 2d Cir. (1980)
- Cung Le, et al. v. Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a UFC
- Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50 (1923)
- Sports Racing Serv. v. Sports Car Club, 131 F.3d 874, 10th Cir. (1997)
- Untamed Final Single Pages.pdf
- Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc., a Colorado Corporation and F.H. Markets, Inc., a Colorado Corporation v. Dillon Companies, Inc., a Kansas Corporation, 783 F.2d 159, 10th Cir. (1986)
- SENATE HEARING, 109TH CONGRESS - PRICE GOUGING
- The Concise Guide to Economics
- Working for the Few
- UT Dallas Syllabus for meco6360.001.09s taught by (oxc023000)
- Socialism As It IsA Survey of The World-Wide Revolutionary Movement by Walling, William English
- Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc, 255 F.2d 708, 3rd Cir. (1958)
- Eastman Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927)
- Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)
- Working for the Few
- Morris Communications v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 11th Cir. (2004)
- Dismal Science Fictions
- United States v. Dentsply International, Inc, 399 F.3d 181, 3rd Cir. (2005)
- Working for the Few
- HOUSE HEARING, 108TH CONGRESS - SAVING THE SAVINGS CLAUSE
- Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905)
- Duty Free Americas v. Estee Lauder.pdf
- Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co. Dempsey Pump Co. v. Kobe, Inc., 198 F.2d 416, 10th Cir. (1952)
- ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT First Paper

Sign up to vote on this title

UsefulNot usefulRead Free for 30 Days

Cancel anytime.

Close Dialog## Are you sure?

This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?

Close Dialog## This title now requires a credit

Use one of your book credits to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.

Loading