54501404 Conflicts Cases Complete | Will And Testament | Probate

Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan.

3, 1963 FACTS: Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in the Philippines, left a will, devising unto Maria Helen a certain amount of money and giving the rest of his estate to Maria Lucy. Helen opposed the partition on the ground that she is deprived of her legitime. Her contention is that the law of California directs that the law of the domicile (Philippines) should govern the will. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law or the domiciliary law should apply HELD: The intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the national law of the decedent. In the present case, the national law of Edward is the laws of California. However, there were two conflicting California laws regarding succession. One is enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which does not provide for legitimes) and another is Art. 946 of the California Civil Code (which provides that the law of the domicile applies). SC held that the national law is Art. 946, which is the conflict of laws rule of California. The reason is that In Re Kaufman applies only to residents while Art. 946 is specific to nonresidents. Thus, since Art. 946 contains a referback to Philippine laws (the law of the domicile), then Maria Helen is entitled to her legitime. Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967 FACTS: Amos Bellis, a US citizen, died a resident of Texas. He left two wills -- one devising a certain amount of money to his first wife and three illegitimate children and another, leaving the rest of his estate to his seven legitimate children. Before partition, the illegitimate children who are Filipinos opposed on the ground that they are deprived of their legitimes. ISSUE: Whether the applicable law is Texas law or Philippine laws HELD: Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should govern the intrinsic validity of the will and therefore answer the question on entitlement to legitimes. But since the law of Texas was never proven, the doctrine of processual presumption was applied. Hence, SC assumed that Texas law is the same as Philippine laws, which upholds the nationality rule.

Renvoi doctrine is not applicable because there is no conflict as to the nationality and domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen and a resident of Texas. So even if assuming the law of Texas applies the domiciliary rule, it is still Texas law that governs because his domicile is Texas. Gibbs v. Government of Philippine Islands Facts: Gibbs and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in California. They acquired lands in the Philippines. The wife died in California. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the intestate proceedings instituted in Manila. Gibbs asked the court to adjudicate to him lands acquired in the Philippines not under our laws on succession but because in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. CFI granted such to Gibbs upon proof of California law. The register of deeds refused to transfer such properties on the ground of nonpayment of inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that the conjugal right of a California wife in a community property is a personal right and even if this was a case of succession, California law would still apply. Issue: is Gibbs exempt from inheritance tax? Held: The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that was vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code. It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae. The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by

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virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. However, the argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands. However, the court held that it is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated. Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband and the descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. Fleumer vs. Hix 54 Phil 610 Facts:

The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that the will did not show the following: • acknowledgment by Hix in the presence of 2 competent witnesses • Witnesses subscribed to will in presence of the testator, and of each other Hence, this appeal. Issue: Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will? Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. • There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. Due execution of the will was not established: only showed testimony of the petitioner

The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West Virginia must be proved. Miciano v. Brimo

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Decedent is a Turkish citizen. He left a will stating that he wishes to dispose of his properties in accordance with Philippine Laws. His brother, Andre Brimo opposed the partition. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which states that testamentary successions shall be governed by the national law of the deceased. He was therefore excluded from the inheritance pursuant to a clause in the decedent’s will that anyone who would oppose the decedent’s wish to dispose his estate under Philippine law shall have his share annul or cancelled. Issue: Whether or not the declaration that Turkish laws are impertinent to this case; Whether or not the appellant’s exclusion from the will is valid? Held: 1st issue The oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, the Court finds no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. 2nd issue The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable. RULING: Prior evidence already presented to prove the existence of Texas Law. It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time). Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that “the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found”,

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We shall not. shall be filed and recorded by the clerk. the court shall so allow it. Philippine law should apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her estate insofar as her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are concerned. is a probate court must be proved. such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing. supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables (personal properties). if the same be admitted. and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. the law on the point in Rule 78. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. and probated in China be reprobated in the Philippines? Held: As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy. the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. as approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the case of “In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E. There is no proof on these points. provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law — see paragraph 2. by the executor or other person interested. Consequently. on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings. 1963. China. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. may be allowed. the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh. the petition was granted since there was sufficiency to prove the loss of the will. cannot be deemed and accepted as Suntay v. recorded and probated in the Amoy district court. China and thus filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will.R. which is the “national law” of the testatrix. the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy. G. because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters. China. Thus applying the “Renvoi Doctrine”. Section 3 provides: If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines. and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court. Silvino claimed to have found a will by his father which was filed. Private International Law Page 4 . In view thereof. filed. Thereafter the widow filed a petition for a probate of a will but was later denied when the will was lost after the filing of said petition. the Conflict of Law of Texas. according to the laws of such country. Section 2 provides: When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy. China. Suntay died intestate leaving properties in the Philippines and a house in China. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. Nota bene: When can foreign law be given judicial notice 1. Suntay Jose B.shall prevail. The order of the municipal district court of Amoy. are inadmissible. an attesting witness to the will. After liberation. Intestate proceedings were instituted. in the court having jurisdiction. and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance. Province of Fookien. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China objected to by counsel for the appellee. duly authenticated. signed by the Judge. to which shall be attached a copy of the will. 2. is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines. Christensen”. If the court of the forum is familiar of the law Or it is within the actual knowledge of the court Section 1 of the rule provides: Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country. China. He is survived by children from the 1st marriage and a child and his widow from the 2 nd. discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas. L-16749. On appeal. Linnie Jane Hodges. recorded. No. and a certificate of its allowance. Issue: May a will filed. However. and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines. promulgated January 31. at this stage. and attested by the seal of the courts.

the will referred to therein cannot be allowed. without pronouncement as to costs. Likewise. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. on account of any supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. In the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the United States. has no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands.proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and." The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters. In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution. In re: Johnson Emil H. Collector vs. therefore. instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. in our opinion. Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated according to law. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship. thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father. he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. Fisher Private International Law Page 5 . such as the age and mental capacity of the testator. on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois. and without fraud. filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters. nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him. and hence could properly be probated here. Proper rule in taking judicial notice: The proper rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts. That situation. or by someone in his behalf. Petitioner contends that the decedent is not a citizen of Illinois and prays to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration. can be annulled. the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony. United States of America. However. Held: Emil Johnson was a citizen of the State of Illinois. and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy. The acquisition of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. and as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive. The decree appealed from is affirmed. This is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. the signing of the document by the testator. and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States. that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State. Issue: Whether or not judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will. leaving a holographic will and is signed by himself and two witnesses only. We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning. may be likened to or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties. in any other proceeding whatever. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate. died in the city of Manila. The effect of this provision necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines. Johnson. China.

Collector. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9. Walter G. which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States.000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines. respondents herein. Muzzal. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. as a consequence. The Collector denied the claim. 61 Phil. and 210. (c) for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at P52. the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court. for the recovery of said amount. 1947. Inc.604.98 for estate tax and P10. whereto he and his wife moved and established their permanent residence since May 10. should be appraised at P0. Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. Douglas and Bettina Fisher.S." In that Private International Law Page 6 . Issue: whether or not foreign law needs to be proved in our jurisdiction? Ruling: It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. 1945. California. Like any other fact. as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. U. 1951 in San Francisco. after hearing. allegedly overpaid. The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U. Inc. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate. 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents. 1952. we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.875.23. pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption of P4. For this reason. the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525. although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule. 471.00. was accordingly requested by the estate.200. In this last return.147. and the laws applicable thereto. pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code. 1952. Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the Philippines.06 for inheritance tax and that. Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax. the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties declared therein.000.000.000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. 1125. rendered decision : that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G. as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson. Section 41. and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11. Stevenson. but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value. that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41. and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2.S. it had overpaid the government. 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23.023.000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines. the Collector assessed the state the amount of P5.500.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5.00. Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses. filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.Facts: This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G. except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4. Pursuant to Republic Act No. they must be alleged and proved.00 in the computation of the estate tax.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate. Acting upon said return.34 for estate tax and P238. or a total of P16.000. Stevenson. However. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2. The ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax return in pursuance of his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210.83." August 14. 71 entitled "Housman vs.259. 1951. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210.38 per share.39. This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22.A. The refund of the amount of P15.000.26 or inheritance tax.

. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24. 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. (Rule 123). O. Issue: whether the estementary dispositions. we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco. Bohanan Facts: Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. — An official record or an entry therein. Phil Trust Company vs. . as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. (par. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. old Civil Code. The law of Nevada. especially Section 9905.) In the proceedings for the probate of the will. or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them. Accordingly. Magdalena C. which are as follows: SEC. 10. making adjudications. Bohanan. The wife Magadalena C. Rafael Amparo. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will. the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence. new Civil Code. named as the executor of the will. it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. with a certificate that such officer has the custody.000. the Philippine Trust Company. . 2. is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. and accompanied. dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. 1956. and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death. Says the law on this point: Nevertheless. O. and that divorce was granted to him on May 20. presiding. Ramon San Jose. we find no error. the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. are valid? Ruling: The old Civil Code. the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator. which is the same as par. Art. the court made the following findings: According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. as it was the executor's duly to do. executed by him in Manila. Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project. Hon. 41. whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines. when admissible for any purpose. This contention is untenable. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated. Bohanan were married on January 30. Moreover. in accordance with the provisions of the will. admitted to probate a last will and testament of C.000 as her share. Bohanan. 1909. if the record is not kept in the Philippines. the foreign law. 16. in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions. 2 Art. consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4. In line with this view. the court finds that the testator C. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.00. California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted. We have. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20. legal and testamentary successions. Wherefore. being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire. Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court during the hearing of the case on before Judge Rafael Amparo. 1922. Private International Law Page 7 .case. The Court of First Instance of Manila. Hon. therefore. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines. or by his deputy. his stay here was merely temporary. That is his exclusive personal right. Compiled Nevada Laws was introduced in evidence by appellant's counsel. Proof of public or official record. It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition. he was a citizen of that state. however. presiding. In the said order. which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944. that sometime in 1925.

on a certain date." Out of the 42 names on the wait list. a contract of carriage arises. and their daughter. petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact. Zalamea vs. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. showing a party of two. children of the testator. Gwendolyn Lather.In addition. as it is hereby affirmed. Even if the claimed U.m. Inc. On the appointed date. In Alitalia Airways v. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Liana Zalamea. Zalamea and her daughter. the other appellants. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. CA Facts: Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. can be taken judicial notice of by us. this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight. or by his deputy. the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law. the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept.m. must be. no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board. the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions. its customer service agent. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. were not able to fly. and authenticated by the seal of his office. Under all the above circumstances. The two others. Zalamea. As it were. they must be alleged and proved. Thus. purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines. consul. do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. while his wife and daughter. with costs against appellants. As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code. already indicated above. 34. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. at No. consul general.00) Dollars. being ranked lower than 22. Ruling: That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed..S. and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. however. could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. 34. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines. Aside from said statement. 7 Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation. 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. Like any other fact. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith. who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter. Upon their arrival in the Philippines. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918. and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada. On appeal. in her deposition dated January 27. petitioners checked in at 10:00 a. The U. Mr. the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925. Petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations. and the passenger has every Private International Law Page 8 . on the other hand. Code of Federal Regulations does exist. As aforesaid. an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a. Thus. the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator. no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines. the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea. the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles. vice-consul. as in the case at bar. Court of Appeals. was allowed to board the plane.S. without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket.

Wildvalley Shipping Company. Like any other fact. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Venezuela. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. to load iron ore. 1961. will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.000. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and law is credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. On July 6. At this juncture. The vessel proceeded on its way. the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200. Vs. a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company. the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy. On August 15.00 plus attorney's fees. for the written law itself is the best evidence. and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation. grandfather of William Gatchalian. 1960. In the absence of pleading and proof. parol proof is objectionable. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits.. As a result of the blockage. Issue: Private International Law Page 9 . or state.. Santiago Gatchalian. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied. and sought admission as Filipino citizens. 1961. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. If he does not. Ltd. thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Ltd. we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was granted on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute. a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. then twelve years old. Felixberto Serrano. Thus on the 29th of the same month. was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. Issue: whether or not Venezuelan applicable to the case at bar? Ruling: It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. Subsequently. According to the weight of authority. with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue. A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law. Wild Valley Shipping Co. Willian. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. With respect to proof of written laws.000 cash bond. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked.right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs. and expenses of litigation. Dela Rosa Facts: On July 12. arrived in Puerto Ordaz. Inc. A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. Branch III against Philippine President Lines. the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute. arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines. CA Facts: The Philippine Roxas. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law. when a foreign statute is involved. they must be alleged and proved. and interest thereon amounting to US $400. the Malandrinon. On June 27. The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River. costs. an official pilot of Venezuela. said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages. vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer. 1990. consul. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible. was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. Board of Commissioners v. private respondent herein. consul general. and with the seal of his office. Inc. the laws of a foreign country.

for their object. intestate and testamentary successions. and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]). whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. Private International Law Page 10 . or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country. 15. in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship. the provisions of this Code shall govern their relations. If the husband is a citizen Art. and those which have. Art. (10a) The forms and solemnities of contracts. Doctrine of processual presumption Civil Code Art. An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Thus. or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. whether celebrated in the Philippines or abroad. wills. (9a) Real property as well as personal property is subject to Art. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding.Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen Held: William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party. as a material issue in the controversy. this Court declared that: (e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father. viz: We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency. In Moy Ya Lim vs. the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. their acts or property. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. public order. 17. shall also be valid in this country. except bigamous. even though living abroad. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative. whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. or to the status. Laws relating to family rights and duties. the following rules shall prevail: 1. and valid there as such. 71. (19a) If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner. Commissioner of Immigration (supra). unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated. and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid. (11a) Art. and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. 16. a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution. However. the law of the country where it is stipulated. the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner. 124. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. polygamous. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. Prohibitive laws concerning persons.

the laws of the husband's country shall be followed. law. Rule 132 Sec. deprivation 3. 25 What attestation of copy must state. 2003 SECTION 1. prohibited by the preceding article. (39) Section 46. Learned treatises. (n) The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides. Art. in substance. or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. by naturalization 4. if there be any. or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (669) Wills. Short Title. Arroyo on August 29. 2. (n) Art. The Private International Law Page 11 . 815. 816. conduct indicative of such intention Rep." SEC. when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. or a specific part thereof. 818. either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. by repatriation 3. Art. Declaration of Policy. (26a) Rule 130 Section 45. or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal. 9225 signed into law by President Gloria M. release 2. SEC. register.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. expiration 4. renunciation domicile 1. (40a) How to acquire nationality 1. 819. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the Philippines. Commercial lists and the like. When a Filipino is in a foreign country. and if the revocation takes place in this country. periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history. even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. that the writer of the statement in the treatise. by subrogation and cession how to lose a nationality 1. or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. (733a) A revocation done outside the Philippines. executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines. is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made. or in the same instrument. or a witness expert in the subject testifies. as the case may be. Art. the attestation must state. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. 1039. intent to stay 2. without prejudice to the provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property. he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. (n) Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. 829. Act No. natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have Art. or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time. (n) Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. that the copy is a correct copy of the original. (1325a) attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. periodical. 3. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list.2. — A published treatise. physical presence 3. by birth 2. science. under the seal of such court.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. Art. periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. by a person who does not have his domicile in this country. or according to the formalities observed in his country.

of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. 3. 5. 8. 4.If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid. any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective. SEC. 9189. at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Derivative Citizenship. and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: 1. ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP Section 1. Those born before January 17. those who: a. below eighteen (18) years of age. 7. after the effectivity of this Act. SEC. Repealing Clause. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. Effectivity Clause. make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who. SEC. and 5. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Republic Act No. That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by. decrees. whether legitimate. 2. . Philippines: The following are citizens of the 2. and/or are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided. 6. Separability Clause.The unmarried child. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. . 4. illegitimate or adopted. solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines. otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and. and 3. of Filipino mothers. SEC. . That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath.This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation. . SEC. and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.All laws. Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. b. 1.reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I ___________________________. 1973. Private International Law Page 12 . are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens. Article V of the Constitution. who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. . or extended to. orders.

If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith or after he has incurred in delay. it shall be necessary. or to the status. In any other case the place of payment shall be the domicile of the debtor. or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons. the additional expenses shall be borne by him. (n) For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. These provisions are without prejudice to venue under the Rules of Court. 99. the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. However. (10a) Art. 51. 50. themselves with a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage.4. under the law. There being no express stipulation and if the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Art. 15. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3). Art. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens or subjects of a foreign country. to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. intestate and testamentary successions. 1251. Art. the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was constituted. unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. Act No. to provide Art. (1171a) Art. 2710) Payment shall be made in the place designated in the obligation. (Sec. Laws relating to family rights and duties. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. 16. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (13a) Art. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship. even though living abroad. they are deemed. the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. unless by their act or omission. Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. to have renounced it. Section 3. (9a) Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. Section 5. before a marriage license can be obtained. (41a) No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition. Section 4. whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. 66. NCC Art. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. 2a. Private International Law Page 13 . Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. Section 2. 1039. (40a) When the law creating or recognizing them. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made. RA 9225 stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. May 11. the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance. by a person who does not have his domicile in this country. Rep. 9225. the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5. the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship in order to prevent the Justice Secretary from implementing R. What Rep. and if the revocation takes place in this country. FACTS: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent. No.Art. Section 5. 9225. For its part. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. Petitioner argues that RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. Act No. 2007 Sec. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. but with the status of naturalized citizens Private International Law Page 14 . 9225. 829. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the court Held: R. 3. the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se. Thus. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no jurisdiction yet to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. Issue: Whether R. Cases: AASJS vs. 160869. Act No. then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong. (n) taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.R. until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress. Act No. Plainly. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. On its face. Datumanong G.A. Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. but not those under Article 75. it does not recognize dual allegiance. (7a) A revocation done outside the Philippines. the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of Art. A. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic. The fact that the applicant their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. Article VI of the Constitution which states that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The court held that that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title. from Section 3.A. 5. Act No. Act No. or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Moreover. dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law.

851. 1959. Maine. xxx xxx xxx This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition to the petitions of both to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered his opposition. petitioner Marvin G. L-6897. They had been in the Philippines before. At the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14. Pursuant to this theory. Vol. 86. or. Being without issue. Under the Philippine’s political law. in 1953. it would be premature including for this the Court. 1960. all Chinese Nationals. a Filipino citizen. Barretto Gonzales v. and Chan Po Lan. Congress was given but also over the res. p. not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties. Both are citizens of the United States. he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base. Issue: Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines. the Court have. 305. Ellis. 58 Phil. p. Pampanga where both lived at that time. Baby Rose was born on September 26. Hashim. Fleumer. REPUBLIC 7 SCRA 962 Petitioner Marvin G. Gonzales. 855. Vol. Until this is done. mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Held: Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines — and. but not over the status of the petitioners. Cousine Hix v. who are foreigners. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. provides that: "The following cannot adopt: xxx xxx xxx (4) Non-resident aliens. Chan Po Lan was legally married to Cu Bon Piao. II. 713-714). even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. 29. who represents the Solicitor General. a Filipino citizen. 22. This. Mr. That sometime in the year 1937 Miguela was legally married to Sy Ing Seng. is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws. which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system. to be declared a Filipino citizens. on November 22. to exact. Gmur. in the year 1961. United States. under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory.who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their a naturalization. judicial to rule department. Art. Recto v. adopted the latter's view to the effect that personal status. 30 Phil. she being a citizen of the Philippines. ELLIS V. I. perhaps. hence. Four or five days later. the Court has jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose. if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that he has no opposition. Private International Law Page 15 . 1959. the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa — an institution for unwed mothers and their babies — stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family. Gonayeb v. petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. in general. California and is married to Gloria G. 1955)". in Angeles. nonresident aliens – the Court cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status. on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Maddela 27 SCRA 702 This is a petition to have the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat. Republic v. Harden. likewise. The court inquired from Fiscal Veluz. Since adoption is a proceedings in rem. 15 adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. a native of San Fransisco. Ellis in Banger. no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years. pp. 42 Phil.". is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by nonresident aliens. 55 Phil.). 67. The Conflict of Laws by Beale. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Nov. and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce — regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based — involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum. likewise. and that the petitioners have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizens. and Mrs.

is affirmed by this Court on the ground that the same is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. April 18. legally demandable and enforceable. their status. 57 Yale Law Journal. Burca motion for reconsideration: Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision in this case which reversed that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte declaring her a citizen of the Philippines. Private International Law Page 16 . their status. In Moy Ya Lim Yao. the general public and the courts themselves. and thus secure recognition of her status Filipino citizen. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is a Filipino Citizen. Such a procedure could be availed of Petitioner. Otherwise. (Tan v. However. L-14159. Under Philippine laws there can be no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Burca v. which is affirmed by this Court. for instance. there appears to be no valid reason why such finding should have no conclusive effect in other cases. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies. 1960). granted or sanctioned by law. Republic. an act or omission violative of said right. and make a pronouncement relative to. no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married. Issue: Whether or not a court may grant a judicial declaration of citizenship. Res Judicata Reexamined. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation" (Clear. the said court have found her to be married to a Filipino citizen and to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizen enumerated in the Naturalization Law. The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions instead. and a remedy.As such. where the same issue is involved. It must be noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is to have petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. for said breach of right. that the courts may pass upon. The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it. no need to prove the qualifications. although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times. the Court emphasized the administrative procedure that needs to be followed in the Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration. 345). As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy. Held: The Court cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial court's judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat and Chan Po Lan were declared a Filipino citizens by marriage and the Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card. Republic 51 SCRA 248 1st case: Burca not granted citizenship because such power is granted under the executive branch. or a legitimate child. the court may pass upon. such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. and make a pronouncement relative to. Judicial recourse would be avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner. if the decision of an administrative agency on the question of citizenship. or single. Held: Under Philippine laws. such as naturalization by judicial decree. It is as an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties. Issue: Whether or not a person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial declaration of citizenship. Moya Lim Yao: alien wife deemed ipso facto Filipino citizen as long as no disqualifications. including the Commissioner of Immigration as co-petitioner in view of the fact that the dispositive parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed to him for compliance. Thus. which imply a given right. the law permits the acquisition of a given status.

As the laws of our country. On the date of her arrival. Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. Held: Lau Yuen Yeung. after a fullblown hearing. the decision on the matter shows constitute conclusive proof of such person's citizenship. with a Filipino name except one. but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship. She could not name any Filipino neighbor. native born or naturalized. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law. it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim.Wherefore. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings. that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. an alien woman marrying a Filipino. Hongkong. Except for a few words. becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. after the expiration of her authorized stay. a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1. she could not speak either English or Tagalog. as a material issue in controversy. But it is made clear that in instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case proceeding. Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Likewise. for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to nativeborn Filipinos. who dies during the proceedings. in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof. and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April 1961.00 to undertake. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473. and this finding on the Citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court. an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen. among others. the Court declared it to be a sound rule. stand today. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos). On 25 January 1962. or sisters-in-law. Asher Y. Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. After repeated extensions. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings. unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated. both substantive and procedural.000. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Thus. Rosa. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival. Commissioner 41 SCRA 292 Facts: On 8 February 1961. she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. as the case may be. in another case or proceeding. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority Private International Law Page 17 . In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great-grand-uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon. it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. that where citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency. with the act participation of the Solicitor General or his authority representative.

473. No. shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to. In the case of a woman. a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war. a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted. states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided. That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to. the armed forces of said foreign country. Section 18 of said law provides that: A naturalization certificate may be cancelled by a competent judge on any of the following grounds: a. 2. 3. the armed forces of a foreign country. Commonwealth Act No. That the fact of the person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality. or is commissioned in. By naturalization in a foreign country. at the time of rendering said service. By express citizenship. however. upon her marriage to a foreigner if. or acceptance of said commission. shall be considered prima facie evidence of his b. and 4. or two years in any other foreign country. 63 and Commonwealth Act No. or commission in. finally. By rendering services to. 5. he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen. As stated in Commonwealth Act. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided. 473. renunciation of oath of allegiance incident thereto. or the acceptance of such commission in. The Private International Law Page 18 . by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country. which govern the Loss of Philippine citizenship. That the rendering of service to. The former applies to both natural-born and naturalized citizens and the latter applies only to naturalized citizens. By cancellation of the certificates of naturalization. That the Filipino citizen concerned. That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: 1. shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: 7. If the person naturalized shall. of the 6. or accepting commission in. unless subsequently. and taking the 1. return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided. These are Commonwealth Act No. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country. the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided. The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was fraudulently or illegally. and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. obtained 2. she acquires his nationality. Nota bene: There are two laws. By having been declared by competent authority. the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b). within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificated. with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. 63.decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. or said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided.

pursuant to Republic Act No. that before the naturalization certificate is issued. 3. The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February 9. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed — pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China. is not retroactive. because. the petitioner shall "solemnly swear. except that. A certified copy of the decree of naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior and the Bureau of Justice. potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen. thus. petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. before acquiring Philippine citizenship.intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same. 2639. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention taking of said oath. franchise or privilege. Similarly. Republic 29 SCRA 94 Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince. however." inter alia. Held: First issue: The order of February 9. 1966 (oathtaking) had not — and up to the present has not — become final and executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the constitutional provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise. however. 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final and executor. unless he or she performs certain acts or omission which would result to the loss of his or her citizenship. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public high school recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines. not by those of the Philippines. • Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. However. estoppel or laches cannot apply to the government in action for the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization. as a citizen of the Philippines. 473 provides. a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines. 2nd Issue: It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien. does not repatriate those who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural- 4. where Philippine history. he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties. since it is a known principle that the government is never estopped by the mistakes on the part of its agents. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the Private International Law Page 19 ." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality. On that same date. is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law. unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality. which our laws do not permit. according to the Constitution. otherwise. through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. However. The main reason why a decision in a naturalization proceeding is not res judicata is because such is not a judicial adversarial proceeding. As a consequence. Issue: Is the oath valid? Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China. government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum. marriage to an alien would not automatically divest a person of his citizenship. use or enjoyment of a right. Oh Hek How v. This provision. 5.

his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship.. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. also known as Fernando Poe. were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou). confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. and sought admission as Filipino citizens. initiated. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country. On June 27. his parents were foreigners. a Spanish subject. Willian. grandfather of William Gatchalian. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and. then twelve years old. filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. William and Johnson followed Private International Law Page 20 . Board of Commissioners v. and that San Carlos. when the Philippines was under Spanish rule. was an American. In support of their position. it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. 1960. so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines. would thereby extend to his son. Poe. having been born outside of a valid marriage. Thus on the 29th of the same month. and his father. was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. FPJ. Dela Rosa Facts: On July 12. his mother. Comelec 424 SCRA 277 Facts: On 31 December 2003. petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok. on 9 January 2004. a petition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a naturalborn Filipino citizen when in truth. being the son of Lorenzo Pou. Poe. he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ. including Francisco. There being none. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied. Allan F." Tecson v. On August 15. father of respondent FPJ. representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870. 1961. arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. The 1935 Constitution. if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired." or "Ronald Allan" Poe. was a Spanish national. Fornier. such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Allan F. stated his name to be "Fernando Jr. Victorino X. could have well been his place of residence before death. Bessie Kelley Poe. his place of residence upon his death in 1954. Hence. Poe was a Filipino citizen. the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200. according to Fornier. in the 2004 national elections. he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. likewise in China. the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated. Santiago Gatchalian. Petitioners. Held: Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old. the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. if acquired.000 cash bond. In his certificate of candidacy. Felixberto Serrano. And even if Allan F. married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. 1990. (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed. Allan Poe. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs. Ronald Allan Kelly Poe. Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen. Similarly. Pangasinan. Jr. claim that respondent is an alien. Santiago's children. (FPJ). in the absence of any other evidence. followed the citizenship of their mother. during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light.

867 [1924]. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]). Philippine law. Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen Held: In Miciano vs. in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12. the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. as records indicate. NUVAL VS. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. 30 Phil. in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship. 472. and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court. shall also be valid in this country . . In the case at bar. having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Lim and Lim vs.the citizenship of their mother. this Court declared that: Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases. and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. 36 Phil. . . every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage. the community of property during marriage. respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco. Art. . respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens who became as such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Thus. Collector of Customs. and valid there as such. the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party. Francisco. and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. as a legitimate child of the latter. there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage. a Chinese national. Brimo (50 Phil. Thus. there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt. 1960. Yam Ka Lim vs. following the lex loci celebrationis. Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage. GURRAY Facts: Private International Law Page 21 . The fact is. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative. Collector of Customs." (Emphasis supplied). birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. as a material issue in the controversy. 46 [1915]). Commissioner of Immigration (supra). Finally. 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof. all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. a Filipino. the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding. Nota bene: for Gatchalian In Moy Ya Lim vs. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. viz: We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency. Referring to marriages contracted abroad. An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid. 34. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. . Rule 130). the authority of parents over their children. foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "all marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. The testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages. the legitimacy of children. adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.

with costs against the petitioner. On that date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan. his birthplace. 1928. and on April 14. 1928." and in order to be registered in the subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 1928. where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. in which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria. a petition against Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said municipality. he applied for registration as a voter in Luna. by virtue of which he was registered as an elector of the said precinct. he commenced the construction of a house of strong materials in Luna. had lived in the municipality of Balaoan. Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto asking that Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previous to the election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be eligible to an elective municipal office. in order to be able to give an account of their acts as such treasurers at any time. On February 1. upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto Guray and others. 1922. In January. Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna. went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents. Province of La Union. in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality. Balaoan.• This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of La Union. municipality of Luna. due to the high cost of living in that municipality. having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in the general elections of 1925. My correct and new address is Poblacion. 1927. alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On the ground of • • • • transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of June. On February 23. 1 of Balaoan. Province of La Union. which has not yet been completed. up to that time. Gregorio Nuval filed. he obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20. Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan. he made it appear that his residence was the residential district of Balaoan. Norberto Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna. In the year 1926. 1928. which was accepted on the same day. which was dated January 15. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated. Norbeto Guray was elected to the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes. and on the 16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph. Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna. to which Norberto Guray was subject as such municipal treasurer. alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years. La Union. require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the municipality where they perform they official duties. also by telegraph. The rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union. Gregorio Nuval obtaining second place. In order to qualify and be in a position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31. In his cedula certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the year 1923 to 1928. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours. His children studied in the public school of Luna. 1928. Issue: Private International Law Page 22 . and there he passed the nights with his family. not being a qualified voter of said municipality and he had not resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code. included. his wife and children who. and neither be nor his family has lived in it. 1928. where he had voted in the general elections of 1922. declaring him resident of said town.

was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody. 1931." (People vs. the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the court its report. 145. and for such purpose.41 covers the assessment for income tax against said estate. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. he bequeathed all his property to his only sister. Province of La Union? Ruling: • • It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another state. hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and Testament . he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris. 1931. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the present case. In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts. and the other sum of P40. 28). on February 18. a petition to the will of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Bender. Palmer. by virtue of which will. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50. Ida M.767. That on November 4.) Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and acquired another in Balaoan. In his will. copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and made a part hereof. United States of America. 1928. Ida M. there must be a deliberate and Private International Law Page 23 . 1931.000 on July 22. That on July 22. but also personal presence in that place. p. "The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile. • • • • • • • Ruling: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile. 1931 to June 30. 144 N. who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York. but his personal presence in said municipality. duly probated by the court in a decree dated May 5. . bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609. he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law. 1933.' which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will. Manila. 1931. a citizen of the United States of America. Palmer another letter. in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of Luna. 1931. 1932.019. a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. an American citizen. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. S.Whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the general elections of June 5. India. came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta. an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1. par. That subsequently or on April 10. Moody. That on December 3. Y. 1932. making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13. 1931. 1931. the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by Ida M. the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. 1931.657. and the same was.. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. VELILLA VS. Moody. . That on February 24. August 15. the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the • • • • • estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return.. That on July 14. All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. That on September 9. both parties introduced oral and documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. 71. Palmer through her attorney. bank deposits and other personal properties.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653.47. 1931. POSADA Facts: • That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta. on February 18. That on January 21. and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding paragraph. in order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna. he needed not only the intention to do so.001. he left no property of any kind located anywhere else.1931. 1931.he made a statement that: Arthur G. So far as this record shows. India.75 on January 19. after hearing. 1931. residing in the Philippine Islands.

UJANO VS. 890). Ujano with whom he has one son. a permanent resident of the United States of America. Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. no matter how long. not of Bolinao. Such being the case. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization." CAASI VS. to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18. who is now of legal age. He is married to Maxima O. 1988. This 'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization. 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay. petitioner. Republic of the Philippines. After hearing. has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao. Pangasinan.A. the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent. 95 Phil. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: • These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective. because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Pangasinan. REPUBLIC Facts: Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. In his answer to both petitions. Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor. one's home.provable choice of a new domicile. made the following comment: "One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization' [Section Private International Law Page 24 . Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service. In the present case. that he voted in all previous elections. hence. Commonwealth Act No. or for reasons of health. with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode. the court affirm the judgment of the trial court. In other words domicile is characterized by animus manendi. though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. in denying the petition. He returned to the Philippines on November 10. second. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. who is presently a citizen of the United States of America. including the • Ruling: The court a quo. and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and. because the property in the estate of Arthur G. A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently. He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U. was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor. coupled with actual residence in the place chosen.S. He receives a monthly pension from the Social Security Administration of the United States of America. 3(1). on the ground that he is a green card holder. first. the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before filing his present petition. but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. either for business or pleasure. Ilocos Sur. Prospero. 63]. a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. is his domicile.

1995. On the contrary. did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. 12. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. (residence and domicile. prior to the local elections on January 18. Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. 84508).S. there be an intention to stay there permanently. 1988. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code. domicile can exist without actually living in the place. private respondent contended that Mrs. and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.1987. Pangasinan. Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo. there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao. G. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. such as a country residence and a city residence. (p. Omnibus Election Code). this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. Without such prior waiver. • After hearing the consolidated petitions before it. 68. MARCOS vs COMELEC Private International Law Page 25 ." Therefore. the COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that: The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. for purposes of election laws are synonymous…) The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Ruling: Despite his vigorous disclaimer. that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. A person can have two or more residences. No. Residence is acquired by living in place. It stands to reason therefore. he was issued by the U.R. on the other hand. Based on that application of his. As these concepts have evolved in our election Issues: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States. Held: So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases. inspite (sic) of his green card.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position. filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition. Rollo. referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. and the congressional elections on May 18. his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines.A. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws.1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. even if residence is also established in some other place.plebiscite on February 2. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines. from an elective office to serve that community. The important thing for domicile is that. he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. once residence has been established in one place. Residence in the civil law is a material fact." Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8.

Defendant did not submit herself to the examination and the court entered a decree annulling the marriage. The presumption is in favor of potency. bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Faypon vs. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In the case at bar. this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. The City Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. The court entered an order requiring defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. As long as the Domicile was not lost. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. JIMENEZ V. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases. HELD: The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. 5. but also personal presence in that place. regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.” The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. Prior to this: The civil code provides that the wife follows the domicile of her husband. this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law. Marcos did not overtedly abandon her domicile since even if living in Malakanyang. what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. Quirino. yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy.law. Recto v. 2. held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. A physical examination in this case is not selfincriminating. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. that she had not been physically examined because she refused to be examined. In Nuval vs. she constantly goes home to her domicile. She is not charged with any offense . Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part. 4. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent." Larena vs. the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Negros Oriental. is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place. 6. Guray. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint but she did not file an answer. Harden 100 Phil 427 Facts: Recto and Harden entered into a contract for professional services wherein the latter Private International Law Page 26 . REPUBLIC 109 PHIL 273 FACTS: 1. the Court held that "the term residence. A Person cannot have 2 domiciles. among the grounds that the defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law. “Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. . Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage with Remedios Canizares. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. it continues to be the same until replaced by a new one. . 7. He also claimed that the condition of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete. In Co vs. 3.

Harden ordered her counsel to vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein. mainly. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy. et al. 45 Phil. ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife. Harden and herein Appellee. 13) of Professional Ethics. that the terms of said contract are harsh. Dy Buncio & Co. was to defeat the claim of the former for attorney’s fees.. inequitable and oppressive. nor purports to give. it has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No.. Drinker. Harden. Subsequently however. that their aforementioned agreements. vs. 554. morals. Harden alleged that the purpose of the said instruments. Therefore. What is more. 30 C. 195. Law Dictionary. The Court awarded Mrs. For the same reason. 359 et seq. and acquired real and personal properties. BARNUEVO V. Gabriel went to the Philippines. during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. aliens can sue and be sued in our courts subject to Philippine procedural law even on matters relating to their status and capacity. Spain. good customs. In short. Thereafter. by way of contingent fees. that Mrs. Moreover. their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — by the laws of the United States. Manila Railroad Co. (see. Constanza later followed. the contract of services. The last objection is based upon principles of equity. Jur. and Appellants have not done so. upon the grounds that: (See 5 Am. 3. once established by the personal law of the party. likewise. Harden. and it is only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned. she entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. 475). he prayed that the court grant him the necessary fees. “in the United States. between Mrs. Harden previously filed for divorce against the Mrs. is given universal recognition. A few years however. and Mrs. allegedly in violation of Articles 1305..J. also. for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. Later. settled. Harden agreeing to a share of a lesser amount. but. Harden cannot bind the 2. 93 Phil. is not contrary to law. pursuant thereto. Harden an amount totaling to almost 4 million pesos plus litis expensae. for the circumstances surrounding the case show. Harden. Harden merely bound herself — or assumed the personal obligation — to pay.engaged the services of the former as her counsel against her husband for a claim in their conjugal property. FUSTER 29 PHIL 606 FACTS: Gabriel and Constanza were married in Spain. Mrs.. 176). the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent fees. in and to her aforesaid share. to the Appellee any right whatsoever. the wife instituted a petition for divorce here in the Philippines against the husband. Ballentine. inasmuch as Mr. neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Private International Law Page 27 .) Such is. and Mrs. The third objection is not borne out. under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. 20% of her share in said partnership. conjugal partnership without her husband’s consent. c that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce. Mr. Eventually. for which reason.” a. executed by Mr. 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Mrs. The contract neither gives.. or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. p. or by the intent of the parties thereto. S. which sanction divorce. one who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida. the second objection is. Held: The first objection has no foundation in fact. untenable. public order or public policy. likewise. By virtue of said contract. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States. Ulanday vs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce. personal or real. p. The husband opposed the petition on the grounds that: 4.. both parties executed a contract for their separation wherein the wife returned to Spain and has agreed to be supported by the husband to be paid in Madrid. either by the language of the contract between them.) 1. c that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees. However. 276. 2nd ed. the law to be applied by Philippine courts in determining their capacity and status is their personal law. It is a basic principle that status. Appellants assail the contract for professional services as void. were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein Appellee. Appellee counsel for Mrs. 540. to our satisfaction. the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between her and Mr.

On the contrary." (Torres Campos. the agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated. as the law of their personal statute. as to the allowance for support. Issue: Do Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the petition for divorce? What law should apply in construing the term pesetas? Held: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain. for. that during this not inconsiderable period. which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing the defendant... He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan. to whether he transfers his domicile. could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking. 34. and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent. in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate itself. 1909. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain. the complaint. irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. or in that where the plaintiff resides. Ortiz. where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein. 3 Phil.b. Rep. was a resident of these Islands. although he won his case. although Spanish Catholic subjects. the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction. and any children they may have. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical courts. it plainly appears. and as to the divorce. nor was it to be fulfilled. (Benedicto vs. which was what he had to demonstrate. shall be required. "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts. All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene. because these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain. As held by the Husband: "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. the action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. as well as their spouses. . since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila. In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants. should they be married. the authority established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce. or of any other place in the Philippine Islands. they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein." p. in the Philippine Islands. husband was unable to prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries with it. because. who must record them in the registry of Spanish residents. without proof to the contrary. De la Rama. Private International Law Page 28 . decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant. Defendant. should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. would not contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them. and Ibañez vs. in order to preserve the Spanish nationality. extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in March.) The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. As the Court upheld: The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which. subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code. . or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation. in China. that this being so. although a Spanish subject. 325). However. a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts. according to his own law of persons. we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven. 5 Phil. Rep. because the action therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts. It has been established that defendant is domiciled in the Philippines. Otherwise." while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages. he had constantly resided in the said Islands. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. 108." From this provision. In deciding the case. . had kept open house. in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found. since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country. "Elementos de Derecho International Privado.

Padlan. Thus. never received by the trial court. She married thrice thereafter. since no proof has been submitted to this effect. and actively participated in the proceedings. Upon his visit to his wife. both Filipinos. 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo." not being specific. with which conjugal partnership is known to be inexistent. . Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. they’re still married. which later on became final. and Claro. he became a US Citizen. says article 1407 of the Civil Code. named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition. 2000 FACTS: FE D. The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. DECEMBER 22. . Ruperto T. The Court maintains that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law. indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. was never received by the trial judge. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. 1998 and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan.The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. all the property of the marriage. he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. Padlan. and cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction. all surnamed Padlan. and which has never been subjected to any cross-examination. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. John Riley. claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo. which was never submitted as proof. Consequently. However. was ambiguous. she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. QUITA V. is not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies. also intervened. Zenaida and Yolanda. Ricardo. shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Lorenzo died.A. . With respect to their property regime. November 23. and obtained a final judgment of divorce. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. cannot apply since this affidavit was never presented in proof. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco. U. Llorente filed a divorce in California in which Paula was represented by counsel. now in force in these islands. Before the proceeding could be terminated. Issue: Whether or not petitioner could inherit as the surviving spouse of Arturo? Held: Case remanded subject to determination of petitioner’s citizenship. PADLAN GR NO. Sections 300. On 1972 Arturo died. Mexican being then the usual and current money in the Philippines. 124371. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. Nota bene: Van dorn: ang bana ga laot sa wife since under Philippine law. he left for the US where through naturalization. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 124371. Respondent Blandina Padlan claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan. the Foral Law presented by the husband in an affidavit. QUITA and Arturo T.S. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He left no will. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. Emmanuel. An appeal was made to the Private International Law Page 29 . California. LLORENTE V. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce. The court held that no dispute exists as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. ON PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL The court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. Case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings since the trial court was not able to completely ascertain petitioner’s citizenship. then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement was made. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. Soon after. Alexis. They were not however blessed with children." If in the contract the word " pesetas. were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.

even though living abroad. Absence – a special legal status. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. “Art. it is essential that: 1. Personal status – legal position of an individual in a society Capacity – power to acquire and exercise rights Incidental to personal status Foreign laws regulating the person’s status and capacity are to be disregarded where they are political or penal in character. the issue be identical. 4. if one The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.Court of Appeals. 16. Judicial jurisdiction – the authority of the court to hear and determine the cause of action Beginning of personality – conception provided subsequent birth End – death Other questions of status Likewise. Furthermore. is not in his domicile and his whereabouts is unknown. 3. there is no such thing as one American law. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties. and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question.” (emphasis ours) 5. Legislative jurisdiction – authority of the state of his nationality or domicile or where he may be physically present to promulgate laws affecting his status. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. or to the status. intestate and testamentary succession. which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties. 15. When can be declared: under civil code – a. the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. 1. his National Law allowed divorce. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Court of Appeals. Lapse of 2 years without news or since the receipt of last news Private International Law Page 30 . and 4. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. provided that they are valid in their National Law. or to the status. it is a judgment on the merits. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. First. 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). 2. may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation. Art. she and the deceased. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies. subject matter and cause of action. Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. 3. Second. Laws relating to family rights and duties. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code. even though living abroad. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. ISSUE: Nota bene: The following are the requisites of res judicata: 1. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. “However. there is — between the first and the second actions — an identity of parties. (FRDSCL) Whether or not national law shall apply? RULING: “Art. 2. the former judgment must be final. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens or subjects of a foreign country. condition and legal capacity of persons accompany a person even when he moves to a foreign country. Nota bene: Under Philippine law. Sec. Lapse of 5 years if absentee has left someone in charge of the administration of his properties Art. is such marriage valid? Family rights. Spouse b. and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. 17. (11a) Art. polygamous. and those which have. except bigamous. Relatives who will benefit in intestacy d. XV. or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. Conflicts problems respecting an individual’s name and extent of protection against abuse of his name Right to use a title of nobility is determined in accordance with his national law 3. before a marriage license can be obtained. 1987 Constitution The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Art. it is acquired and may be lost. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The duties of Who may declare: a. Cambodian law provides that age of majority is 16. the age of majority is 21 goes to the Philippines and gets married. supposing. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country. shall also be valid in this country. the capacity to dispose of real property is governed by the lex situs while the capacity to succeed is governed by the national law of the deceased. (13a) All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. wills. Minority CAPACITY 1. public order. 15. MARRIAGE Art. Prohibitive laws concerning persons. is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. considered inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. it shall be necessary. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. Those who have rights over the properties 2. Juridical capacity – the fitness to be the subject of legal relations. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. 1987 Constitution Marriage. NCC Art. (19a) Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. for their object. 2. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. II Section 12. or to the status. even though living abroad. their acts or property. Art. status. Art. as an inviolable social institution. and valid there as such. (9a) The forms and solemnities of contracts. Question: A 16-year old Cambodian inherited real properties from the Philippines. the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. 2. 71. 75. Laws relating to family rights and duties. duties. is the will now if probated in the Philippines valid? If an 18-year old foreigner. to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.b. Capacity to act – the power to do acts with legal effects. where in his country. 66. to provide themselves with a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage. he died and left a will which disposes of his properties in the Philippines. or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Private International Law Page 31 . Heirs c.

except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1). except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with FC Art. by: 1. (4). consul or vice-consul. rabbi. 7. 3637 and 38. except those covered the preceding Chapter. 10.the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls. 2. (52a) Marriage may be solemnized Article 29 of this Code. in the church. except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. shall also be valid in this country. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. (56a) All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines. consequences. Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31. 5. 26. consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. as the case may be. in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized. or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. chapel or temple. consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. and valid there as such. Any consul-general. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting Private International Law Page 32 . imam. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. (57a) FC Art. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Those solemnized without license. (n) FC Article 1. or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general. during a military operation. 4. 35. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. 3. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: 1. Art. likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consulgeneral. Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction. in the absence of the latter. 3. 2. or in the office the consul-general. and not elsewhere. 5. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature. (5) and (6). Any priest. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians. 4. (75a) Art. 8. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Article. acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect.

Art. and the properly relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws.chan robles virtual law library (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. Art. and Between brothers and sisters. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. . betrothal. solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law. divorce. — The provisions of the Revised Muslim Code 13. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter. breach of contract to marry. (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. 6. apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims. and Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. up to the fourth civil degree. A marriage contracted by any party who. rights and obligations between husband and wife parental authority. (82) PD (1) The this 1083. paternity and filiation. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child. whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: 1. 3. claims for customary dower (mahr). Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter. with the intention to marry the other. Application. the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. — Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Art. 36. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child. Art. 7. 8. 4. 180. killed that other person's spouse. or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. 37. support and maintenance.6. 38. 2. guardianship and custody of minors. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning. Its nature. Between adopted children of the same adopter. 2. Nature. (81a) Art. or his or her own spouse. — provisions of Title shall Private International Law Page 33 . Between step-parents and step-children. whether of the full or half blood. at the time of the celebration. 14. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree. consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation. the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage. party as to the identity of the other. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: 1. solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Art. and Between parties where one. Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate. 5. 9. Law applicable. except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

criminally and administratively liable. That the defendant. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38. demanded of her that she perform unchaste Private International Law Page 34 . 1915. 2. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly. (54a) Art. Mutual consent of the parties freely given. 3. (53a) formal 1. where they lived together for about a month.Penal Code relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married in accordance with the provisions of this Code or. 15. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: 1. marriage are: The 3. and Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. 4. Art. before its effectivity. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. and Stipulation of customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons. requisites of 6. one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff. 5. GOITIA VS. except as stated in Article 35 (2). Essential and Formal Requisites FC Art. Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent. requisites. and Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. Legal b. Art. CAMPOS RUEDA Facts: The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7. 35 (2) supra Muslim Code. (n) Art. capacity of the contracting parties. 4. except those covered the preceding Chapter. unless these essential requisites are present: 1. 2. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other. 35. A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title. 5. Authority of the solemnizing officer. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41. and A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. No marriage shall be valid. Essential No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are compiled with: a. — Art. 2. d. (53a. under Muslim law. may contract marriage. 3. 2. and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino. when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. c. 55a) Art. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. Those solemnized without license.

This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision. in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one. who always spurned them. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage.The reciprocal rights arising from this relation. and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. However. rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members the latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Private International Law Page 35 . are such as the law determines from time to time. the plaintiff. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make . and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered. that this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12. the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home.and lascivious acts on his genital organs. it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community. Issue: whether or not that the wife may claim for support against her husband outside of their conjugal abode? Ruling: marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. since that date had continually on other successive dates. she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. With these principles to guide us. petitioner initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila which incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari. the rights. nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term. as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. a village leader. but composed entirely of a new set of members. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature. Marriage is an institution. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. 1961. But it is something more than a mere contract. Where the wife. an obligation. her face and different parts of her body. made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife. that on June 28. Whereupon. a Filipino Citizen. that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio. Petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang. that the defendant. and that. the same Board of Commissioners. and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty. among others. so long as it continues. duties. WONG WOO YIU VS. China . that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas. which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips. and none other. notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the same. VIVO Facts: The Board of Special Inquiry No. as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. duties. It is a new relation. but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. and obligations. 3 rendered a decision finding. relief in some way should be obtainable.that they had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines. 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy. but the same was denied for lack of merit. we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.

Such being the case. he should share in the estate as a natural child. therefore. then in 1939. Section 2). although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935. ADONG VS. it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters. we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own. Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412. and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court. the same is not one of those authorized in our country. even if true. A marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. and a village leader is not one of them. Even if we assume. an instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. (FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation. CHAONG SENG GEE Facts: Cheong Boo. Persons Private International Law Page 36 . even though living abroad. The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws. that in an affidavit dated August 9. that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China. Philippine Islands on August 5. that said Board further held that." the Board of Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted. it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23. and lastly in 1941. a native of China died in Zamboanga.Blas was without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship". This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law. and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929. 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929. cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936. Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein. and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912. Thus. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased. a justice of the peace. Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia.000 which is now being claimed by two parties . 1919 and left property worth nearly P100. Issue: whether or not that the marriage is valid? Ruling: there is no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. then in 1937. coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship. ISSUES: Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid ? Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid? RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid. it is clear that petitioner's marriage. the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China.(1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985. 1935 and 1941.

section 2). Bulacan. strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. are valid in these islands. Fuster. 3613. 29 Phil. that up to June 21. by article 48 of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870. It is also beyond question that marriage was contracted by a man much over 16 years old with a girl 15 years old (Act No. among others. been declared an absentee nor generally considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at the time he married Maria Ching. “save upon proof so clear. or (c) that the absentee should have been generally considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at the time of contracting the subsequent marriage. (Act No. the wife has the duty. among other things. while in the first it will be valid without this limitation. whose articles 44 to 78 were. they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. after the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage. 612. to leave the parental home and to elope with him in the night of June 21. and are now partly. 1946. to Plaridel. neither of whom was included in any of the exceptions mentioned in section 28 of the same Act. 1946. marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages.. Issue: whether or not petitioner still retains his right to the custody of his minor daughter Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching? Ruling: the Philippine marriage between said respondent and Maria Ching before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel. 3 Phil. said marriage being said to be subsisting at the time respondent married Maria Ching. the courts can properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. in his answer. in the absence of counterpresumption or evidence special to the case. If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been sufficiently proven. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision. that respondent. 1946. Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21. that the said minor is his legitimate daughter. Petitioner further avers that Gue Min has never Private International Law Page 37 . (FOR PERSONS) Sec. This emancipation brought about the loss by the father of the parental authority that he claims. is undisputed. then in order that the subsequent Philippine marriage could be valid. it would have been necessary either (a) that the Chinese marriage should have been previously annulled or dissolved: or (b) that the first wife of respondent should have been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the respondent having news of the absentee being alive. in either of which last two cases the subsequent marriage will be valid until declared null and void by a competent court. the complete absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese marriage makes sections 29 and 30 of the Marriage Law inapplicable. it is first necessary to prove before the courts ofthe Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact. promises and cajolery. said minor had been living with and had under the custody of petitioner. he and Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching were legally married before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel.) But as already adverted to. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. 314 [1] and 315. and alleges that the essential requisites for such marriage were complied with. taking advantage of his confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her godfather. which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted. CO HEONG Facts: It is alleged in the petition. asserts that on June 21. should not be impugned and discredited. Bulacan. and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being. 1946. section 29 [a] and [b]. On the other hand. persuaded and induced her by means of trick. As to retroactive force. where they were married on the following day before the Justice of the Peace of said municipality. in force in the Philippines (Benedicto vs. and that ever since respondent has had the minor Maria Ching under his custody in Malolos.) CHING HUAT VS. It is further alleged that respondent had been previously married in China to Gue Min. (Yañez de Barbuevo vs. De la Rama. to be in fact married. nor in those stated in section 29 thereof for the reason that the alleged prior Chinese marriage has not been established. she became emancipated on that same date (arts. Respondent. section 30 [b]. and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. 3613. 34). said Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old. and has restrained her at her liberty.dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed. This as for public policy.” A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a socalled matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines. Bulacan. of living in her husband's company and of following him to wherever he transfer his domicile or residence. Civil Code). A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life. Bulacan. The reason is that such is the common order of society. IV of the Marriage law provides that “all marriages contracted outside the islands. 606.

to the effect that the consent of the bride's father or in the absence thereof. partida 4). To support her contention she presented a number of witnesses. It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage. living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his double marriage. (Article 69. Dee Tim likewise presented a certificate of marriage and that it was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with reference to Private International Law Page 38 . that of the chief of the tribe to which she belongs is an indispensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. believing that each was his sole and separate wife. a Chinaman of 52 years of age. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. an Imam or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans. Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong. that she and Yap Siong were joined in holy matrimony on the 14th day of September. the legal attorney of the Chinese Consul General in the City of Manila. Based on a preponderance of the evidence the Court was convinced that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith. having all the essential requisites. Dee Tim also presented a witness. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. and the form of proof issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. Mr. 1893. Issue: Who is the legal wife? Held: It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions. their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. in accordance with the laws of China. 65 U. Ty Cong Ting was. However. swore that he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China. a Chinaman. at the time he testified as a witness. Jan Peng. without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to the contrary.PEOPLE V. it is alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as husband and wife. Held: Marriage among Moslems is a fact of which no judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular case.. where two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man. she must be acquitted. that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida. Hennen. Maria claims that they had been married in the Philippines on June 24. section 96. The accused interposed an appeal. would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other.)c LAO AND LAO V. 1903. depending upon his interest and convenience at the particular time. Maria Lao and Jose Lao appeared claiming to be the legitimate spouse and son of the deceased. In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari. who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with reference to the forms of marriage ceremony. and until a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs became necessary. They were each married in good faith and in ignorance of the existence of the other marriage. for the same reason. that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his consent thereto. It is also perhaps true. DUMPO 62 Phil 247 Facts: Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and practice of the Mohammedan religion. DEE TIM 45 Phil 739 (1924) Facts: Yap Siong died intestate. Civil Code. Without this marriage being dissolved. marriage ceremonies. state that Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. 32 years of age and a lawyer. Gaines vs. accused’s subsequent marriage was void for lack of requisites necessary under Moslem law. Ty Cong Ting. He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with the customs and practices of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the manner and form in which they were celebrated.S. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. During the distribution of his estate. Las Leyes de Matrimonio. 553. title 13. On the other hand. Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1. Evidently he was attempting to keep the information. Maria Lao presented marriage certificates as proof. It has been established by the defense. Dumpo was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of bigamy. which he was quite able to do. until he had passed to that bourn from which none returns.

Finding merit in the petition. Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased’s acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego . Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. GONZALES 167 SCRA 736 FACTS: 1. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Sy Kiat. Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an. as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China. The testimonies of Facts: On May 24. REPUBLIC V. the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. 269. 5. 6.) filed a petition for the grant of letters or administration alleging that they were the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee et al. However. They have in their favor their father’s acknowledgment. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego. [Article 12. October 5. and 2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit of marriage. 1981. Petitioners are natural children. the lower court’s decision was set aside declaring petitioners as the acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego. they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. if not one of a higher degree. In 1986. A few years later. herein petitioner. The same evidence. ORBECIDO GR NO. 4. it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another.YAO KEE V. 2. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. California. uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. On appeal. Sometime in 2000. • • ISSUE: • Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a custom? Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or custom on marriage not only because they are self serving evidence. there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al. No opposition was filed. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural children of the deceased since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China. died in Calooocan City where he was then residing leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines.” The law requires that “a custom must be proved as a fact. evidence by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance.. Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state that “a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. the court granted the same. a Chinese national. She. Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.) alleging that they were the legitimate family. 3. 2005 HELD: • • • Custom is defined as “a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts. should be required of a foreign custom. Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom. 7. Civil Code] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat’s recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood. namely 1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and that their 3 offsprings were the legitimate children. Stanley and her child by him currently live in San Gabriel. legally binding and obligatory. and consequently. Ozamis City.. [See Art. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. through the Office of the Solicitor General Private International Law Page 39 . 154380. Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven. The Republic. but more importantly. according to the rules of evidence. the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom.

we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who. and render mutual help and support in accordance with this Code. we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. Mutual rights and obligations. 1. (117a) Muslim Code Art. the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. (110a) Art. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family.(OSG). In case of disagreement. serious. Art. In case of disagreement. such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms. 70. The latter may object only on valid. a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (111a) Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger. the court shall decide. one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. sought reconsideration but it was denied. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 69. Furthermore. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 2. disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. so long as they come within its spirit or intent. but later on. and 2. in the absence thereof. observe mutual respect and fidelity. The objection is proper. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection. 15. 73. that is. but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature. The husband and the wife are obliged to live together. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. PERSONAL RELATIONS The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. supra Family Code Art. it should be construed according to its spirit and reason. occupation. and moral grounds. CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE 1. the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. In view of the foregoing. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage. such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. the court shall decide whether or not: 1. at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens. Held: Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason. and Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. VI. Private International Law Page 40 . There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. dishonor or 2. 34. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. — Civil Code Art. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and. business or activity without the consent of the other. However. from the income or fruits of their separate properties.

the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family. Rights and obligations of the husband. The wife shall have the right to demand the satisfaction of her mahr. 144. Unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage settlements. Private International Law Page 41 . the parents and grandparents as well as the family council. 4. The husband and the wife shall have the right to divorce in accordance with this Code. acquire any property by gratuitous title. His income is sufficient for the family. However. PROPERTY RELATIONS Civil Code: Art. If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner. — 1. and take such measures as may be proper. In case of disagreement on this question. By custom. The wife shall dutifully manage the affairs of the household. If no agreement is still arrived at. shall be consulted. and 2. 5. without prejudice to the provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property. 1. 2. except from her relatives who are within the prohibited degrees in marriage. material injury upon the other. 35. the provisions of this Code shall govern their relations. 3. supra Art. The wife shall be entitled to an equal and just treatment by the husband. (n) The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: a. and the husband shall be bound to reimburse the expenses. The wife cannot. a. exercise any profession or occupation or engage in lawful business which is in keeping with Islamic modesty and virtue. The husband and the wife shall inherit from each other in accordance with this Code.His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. not safe for the members of the family or her property. By the provisions of this Code. the Art. if he has not delivered the proper sum. (1315a) If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner. provided: Art. the injured party may petition the court for relief. By contract executed before the marriage. Rights and obligations of the wife. 2. The court may exempt the wife from living with her husband on any of the following grounds: 1. 2.3. without the husband's consent. the laws of the husband's country shall be followed. Art. She may purchase things necessary for the maintenance of the family. 124. The wife may. However. the matter shall be referred to the Agama Arbitration Council. (1325a) Art. wife retain ownership and administration of her exclusive property. Her dower is not satisfied in accordance with the stipulations. 36. or b. for any reason. according to its social standing. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. 6. if the husband refuses to give his consent on the ground that his income is sufficient for the family according to its social standing or his opposition is based on serious and valid grounds. 117. The conjugal dwelling is not in keeping with her social standing or is. with her husband's consent. 118. 15. the husband may object. whether celebrated in the Philippines or abroad. b. and c. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the Philippines. 4. the following rules shall prevail: Art. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife. if any. The court may counsel the offender to comply with his or her duties.

7. Art. live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either of them. In the absence of proof to the contrary. (n) In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations. a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. save marriages of exceptional character. Art. 3. For purposes of this Article. or by the commanding officer of a military unit. Art. (23) 4. 80. (n) Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. Those solemnized without a marriage license. being unmarried. 5.but they are not married. their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Number 2. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. during war. or their marriage is void from the beginning. (n) Family Code: 1. 6. work or industry. the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. desire to marry each other. (n) No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: Private International Law Page 42 . 75. 147. even with the consent of the parents. 77. without the consent of the other. The official. properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts. until after the termination of their cohabitation. 74. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other. 76. Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83. Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively. in the absence of a chaplain. Art. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages. The duties mentioned in the two preceding articles shall be complied with by the ship captain. (n) 2. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls. rites. or practices of any church. priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. or religion it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony. Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in Article 82. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized by the captain of a ship or chief of an airplane during a voyage. Art. and shall be owned by them in equal shares. Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81. sect. Art. airplane chief or commanding officer.

guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party. 45. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens or subjects of a foreign country. By the provisions of this Code. That either party was of unsound mind. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. existing at the time of the marriage: 1. the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases. his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants. freely cohabited a. shall also be valid in this country. before a marriage license can be obtained. c. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. in that order. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes. in a suppletory manner. Art. his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. — The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract. 66. such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife. In the absence of descendants. VII. 148. time of the celebration of marriage. it shall be necessary. polygamous. (144a) Art. in the Private International Law Page 43 . Regime of property relations. unless such party after coming to reason. except bigamous. If one of the parties is validly married to another. (144a) Muslim Code: Art. by the general principles of Islamic law and the Civil Code of the Philippines. 2. shall be governed by the regime of complete separation of property in accordance with this Code and. In the absence of proof to the contrary. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one. and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents. 38. or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. and valid there as such. each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. (13a) All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. property. unless after attaining the age of twenty-one. and By custom. to provide themselves with a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage. their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (19a) Art. 37. 71. Annulment Civil Code: Art. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another. — The property relations between the spouses. Dissolution of Marriage 1. How governed. to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Family Code Art. By contract before or at the b. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article.

fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. existing at the time of the marriage. 48. Art. intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased. That the consent of either party was obtained by force. by the same spouse. regardless of its nature. or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity. no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. intimidation or undue influence. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses.3. she was pregnant by a man other than her husband. Concealment of sexually transmissible disease. 4. unless such party afterwards. (87a) 2. and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable. For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45. or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor. For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45. by the injured party. by the injured party. 5. unless the same having disappeared or ceased. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: 1. with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. who had no knowledge of the other's insanity. Art. 5. by the injured party. 46. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph. at any time before such party has reached the age of twentyone. 3. such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. at any time before the death of either party. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character. the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. within five years after the marriage. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude. For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by Art. 3. or That either party was afflicted with a sexuallytransmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage. That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud. 47. rank. or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane. That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other. habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. 49. 6. the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. within five years from the time the force. (85a) 2. For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: 1. health. within five years after the discovery of the fraud. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to Private International Law Page 44 . For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45. within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one. (88a) 4. the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent. with the other as husband and wife. (86a) Art. 4. or Concealment of drug addiction.

In said partition. shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children. and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. Art. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article. Art. In the partition. the partition and 5. shall be delivered in cash. 54. Private International Law Page 45 . the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated. even if pardoned. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years. 3. or connivance in such corruption or inducement. 6. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2). otherwise. or a child of the petitioner. unless the parties. computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents. the same shall not affect third persons. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner. or a child of the petitioner. by mutual agreement judicially approved. partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses. (n) Art.chan robles virtual law library Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. Art. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner. but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. the custody and support of the common children. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent. 4. 7. (3). (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage. to engage in prostitution. 50. property or sound securities. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation. otherwise. unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation. a common child. 52. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. whether in the Philippines or abroad.in Title IX. (n) Art. 55. 53. had already provided for such matters. a common child. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. (n) Art. 2. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: 1. the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent. 51.

Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The husband and the wife are obliged to live together. — 1. GONZALES VS. where he has 3. Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. The court may counsel the offender to comply with his or her duties. The husband and the wife shall have the right to divorce in accordance with this Code. 9. Art. the injured party may petition the court for relief.8. Accordingly. Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts? Held: Yes. Absolute Divorce ROEHR VS. legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. In order to take effect. and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. By a husband. Sexual infidelity or perversion. Negotiations between the parties. — Notwithstanding the rule of Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have more than one wife but one wife unless he can deal with them with equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic law and only in exceptional cases. GONZALES 2. 27. . the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court. betook himself to Reno. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger. supra Art. therefore. 17. observe mutual respect and fidelity. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has the parental custody. 15. For purposes of this Article. Negros Oriental. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner.chan robles virtual law library The husband and the wife shall inherit from each other in accordance with this Code. Facts: Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of Manila. or 10. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands. HARDEN (supra) Civil Code: Art. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. RECTO VS. the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan. RODRIGUEZ Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr. Private International Law Page 46 . Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. and render mutual help and support in accordance with this Code. 1919. married a Filipina. five hundred pesos (P500) monthly. Mutual rights and obligations. (9a) 2. and take such measures as may be proper. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19. 34. a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived together as man and wife. 4. and lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion. a German citizen. whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children. dishonor or material injury upon the other. Of this union four children were born. both being represented by attorneys. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity. Nevada. Supra Muslim Code: 45-55 supra Art.

the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. entirely mental in character. Philippine law. does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation. Article 9 thereof reads as follows: The laws relating to family rights and duties. shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country. we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. of Art. ." A decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355 Facts: • Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escano on Feb. and the decisions of this court. For Philippine courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State. condition and legal capacity or persons. their acts or property. clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. Later on. 17. Moreover. As of June 1948. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed. are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country. like her husband. 2710. 1948 in Cebu City. Defendant. public order. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this court. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion. 1955. The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. was still a Filipino citizen. Vicenta. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. the last part of which reads: . or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. their acts and their property. will be recognized in this jurisdiction.since remained. except it be for a cause. 15 of the New Civil Code. especially in view of the 3rd par. recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our • Private International Law Page 47 . And article 11. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands. Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against Vicenta and her parents in the CFI-Cebu. 24. of the New Civil Code which reads: Prohibitive laws concerning persons. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. the prohibitive laws concerning persons. • HELD: • At the time the divorce decree was issued. after his departure from these Islands. On July 30. On the record here presented this can not be done. Issue: Whether or not that the divorced acquired in Nevada is valid here in the Philippines? Held While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. Vicenta left for the US and filed a verified complaint for divorce against the Pastor in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty. TENCHAVEZ V. 1958. The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce. Vicenta married an American. She acquired American citizenship on August 8. for their object. She now lives with him in California and has begotten children. reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. and those intended to promote public order and good morals. under the NCC then now in force. or to the status. and those which have. At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. the newly-weds were already estranged. . She was then subject to Philippine laws under Art. Russell Leo Moran in Nevada.

of that year. 2710. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person. (Gorayeb vs. is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. Hilaria. The legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. Gonzalez. not of legislation. this did not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant a divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status. At the time of their marriage in 1904. and Cousins Hix vs. however. wherein she sought to compel the defendant to pay her a monthly pension of P500 as alimony or support. At such time. due to strained relations with the latter. That our divorce law. but his legal residence within the State (Cousins Hix vs. She chose the first remedy when she filed her action for support. Hashim. he went to Reno. 2710 and has been upheld by this court. civil case No. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion. Thereafter. an enlisted US Navy personnel left for the States 7 years after the birth of their first born. and (3) that the defendant did not have the means to pay the allowance sought. CANSON 67 PHIL 207 • • • • • • • • • Hilaria Sikat and John Canson contracted marriage and lived together as husband and wife until 1911 when they separated. SIKAT V. After a few years. JAVIER 95 PHIL 579 • Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him to give a monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31. And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers.) The allotment of powers between the different governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the confines of interpretation.) This was not a proceeding in rem to justify a Issue: Private International Law Page 48 . John Canson was an Italian citizen but on February 27. Plaintiff-appellant had made her choice of two inconsistent remedies afforded her by law: (1) to impugn the divorce and file an action for support. 1953. and on October 8. Javier. 851). in 1933. However. The lower court dismissed the complaint and declined to accord validity to the divorce obtained in Reno but found that Hilaria Sikat had forfeited her right to support because she had committed adultery. 2710. This judgment was not appealed and it became final. United States of America. he became a naturalized Filipino citizen. The divorce however was granted. Nevada. remarried the 3rd time. Canson interposed three defenses: (1) adultery on the part of the plaintiff: (2) absolute divorce obtained by the defendant as decreed by the court in Reno. she left and transferred to her hometown. ARCA V. because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. the present action was instituted by the plaintiff-appellant to obtain the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 1934. and believing that the first two divorces were valid. 55 Phil. The facts are not disputed. supra. he obtained an absolute decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. 50 Phil. sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC. Arca lived with Javier’s parents. 5398 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Nevada. Nevada. The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1 of Act No. Act No. the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court. Held: • It is not. • Javier and Arca got married in Manila. filed another action. but the case was dismissed without the court passing upon the merits thereof. Javier filed a case for divorce in Alabama against Arca alleging abandonment. The action is predicated on the existence of a final decree of absolute divorce rendered by the court of Reno. or (2) uphold the validity of the divorce and sue for a liquidation of conjugal partnership. since 1929. Fluemer. Arca made her reply claiming among other things that she never abandoned her husband and that their separation was due to a physical impossibility which justifies her separation if the husband moves to ultra-marine colonies. • Javier got married the 2nd time but was subsequently divorced. • • • court in entering a decree as to the res or marriage relation entitled to be enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court. On June 1. supra.• society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Philippines. Fluemer. is too strict or too liberal is not for this court to decide. 26. and to pay them attorney's fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court attributing five errors to the court below. a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens. clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. (Barretto Gonzalez vs. During the same year the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her spouses. 1922. In 1929. he went back to the Philippines. Therefore. She lost the case and should take the consequences. United States of America.

one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired. or had attempted to acquire. They had 3 children. 82 Phil. Federico. and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status. (Andrews vs. It is evident of course that the presence of both the spouses in that city was due merely to the mutual desire to procure a divorce from each other. Whereas Ana Ramirez was the latter's widow to which they Private International Law Page 49 . (See Note to Succession of Benton... R. Gmur. Ramirez v.) It follows that. 855. his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce. and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands by person domiciled here. for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila.. and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. after the divorce got married in London. This is especially true where the cause Leona Castro was the natural daughter of decedent Samuel Bischoff. Held: The status of Leona Castro as recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff is fully and satisfactorily shown. The heirs of Leona from the first marriage and the second now claims the Estate of Samuel to which Ana Ramirez opposed since Leona is not a recognized natural child. While it is true that Salud R. The evidence shows that the decree was entered against the defendant in default. She informed Kauffman that she no longer wished to stay with him to which the latter obtained a divorce in France where Leona was in default. With reference to the right of the von Kauffman children. The Court is of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by the representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippine Islands. Kauffman brought Leona to Switzerland to recuperate her health. (Ramirez vs. 55 Phil. if she had survived the testator. the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant. Elena. 59 L. his residence must be bona fide. 851. Leona was married to Kauffman. A. to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial forum. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction.Did the Circuit Court of Mobile County acquire jurisdiction of both spouses and effectively rendered a judgment in rem when it granted divorce to Javier? Held: • • • • • No. 14. his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. and Ernesto. and after which bore two children from which the last childbirth caused Leona her life. Andrews.. 856). It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status. his residence must be bona fide. Mory to whom she had a child. but this action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County. ed. It follows that. Later. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case. 188 U. for failure to answer. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce. A few years later. she fell for a Dr. and with no intention of remaining.) But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith. a permanent domicile in the City of Paris.. Fluemer. it is enough to say that they are legitimate children. Leona. and with no intention of remaining. 366. Leontina. to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial forum. Gmur 42 Phil 855 had no children. 47 L. and there is nothing to show that she had acquired. plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. and they are therefore entitled to participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother. born to their parents in lawful wedlock. S. such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country. and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction.

of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile.

and hence cannot be the subject of coownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas. VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139 Facts: • Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a US citizen; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972; after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot 2 children; Alicia filed for divorce in Nevada; the parties were divorced in Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. On June 18, 1983 Upton filed a suit against petitioner in the RTC-Pasay, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton be declared as having the right to manage the conjugal property.

MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY VS. TEODORO FACTS: Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . . Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . . . On March 26, 1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street . . . Manila. On September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A. Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957. Trinidad questioned the levy on the property since the property in question was her paraphernal property. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal? RULING: There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void. In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such coownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, •

Held:

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 13, NCC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondents from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Court said that “Ours is not only a court of law but also a court of equity.” The Court could not turn its back on its citizen when the foreign national itself benefited from such divorce decree; Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband who is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's obligations under the NCC cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs w/ possible rights to conjugal properties. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be observed.

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PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA 174 SCRA 653 • Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter a decree of divorce was promulgated. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".

therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, it is deemed admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Therefore, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000 FACTS:

Issue: WON the adultery case be sustained even though there has already been a finality of a divorce decree. Held: • The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. In these cases,

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California in which Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation. ISSUE:

Whether or not national law shall apply? RULING: “Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal

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capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. “Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law. “However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” (emphasis ours)

Australia. Trial Court declared the marriage dissolved based on the subsequent divorce decree obtained by the respondent. Issues: Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven; Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner; Held: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding? At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal principles; Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, Philippine courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. In the case at bar, Respondent only presented the divorce decree; Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country. However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a

Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are valid in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. GARCIA V. RECIO October 2, 2001 • Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian in Malabon Rizal. However, on 1989, they got divorced in an Australian family court. • On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He later married Petitioner in 1994 in Cabanatuan City. • Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. • While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to obtain a divorce decree in

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certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. thus by virtue of such waiver." It is a well-settled that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. they must be alleged and proved. is deemed admitted as evidence. The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status. who was then a naturalized Australian citizen. it may turn out that under Australian law. She. was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12. or at the very least. On its face. 154380. 1994. compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. the court granted the same. California. while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. Ozamis City. In the case at bar. appearance is not sufficient. 2005 Facts: On May 24. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. Like any other facts. herein petitioner. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent. there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Sometime in 2000. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board. Hence. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. After all. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. 1981. ORBECIDO GR NO. Who has the burden of proving a foreign law? Respondent has the burden of proof. 2nd Issue: Is Respondent capacitated to remarry? legally Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. had he duly presented it in court. A few years later. and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. The Republic. the Court cannot conclude that respondent. he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Private International Law Page 53 . Stanley and her child by him currently live in San Gabriel. Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code." This quotation bolsters the Court’s contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. The first kind terminates the marriage. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. But divorces are of different types. the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. In 1986. No opposition was filed. However. Finding merit in the petition. this matter was not objected to by the petitioner. October 5. Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. Based on the above records. Fortunately for respondent. REPUBLIC V. case was remanded to the court a quo for further determination of legal capacity and to receive evidence to determine if bigamy has been committed.

Held: Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason. 55. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. (9a) Civil Code: Art. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature. or a child of the petitioner. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner. the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. Private International Law Page 54 . disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. In view of the foregoing. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner. For purposes of this Article.through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. 56. at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens. sought reconsideration but it was denied. a common child. so long as they come within its spirit or intent. to engage in prostitution. Legal Separation Art. and 4. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms. (5) Drug addiction or alcoholism of the respondent. A separation may be filed: 1. we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 3. or connivance in such corruption or inducement. (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner. 5. Act No. but later on. An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years. or Art. 2. a common child. even if pardoned. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage. 2a. unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation. Furthermore. 97. we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who. it should be construed according to its spirit and reason. or a child of the petitioner. the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. petition for legal For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code. 2710) TITLE II LEGAL SEPARATION Art. (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage. that is. (n) No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition. one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. habitual (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent. 99. whether in the Philippines or abroad. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of. (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Sec.

60. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied. After the finality of the decree of legal separation. (107a) Art. if still pending. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Moreover. The court. 62. despite such efforts. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings. (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. but the marriage bonds shall not be severed. liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. In any case. (103) Art. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 61. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. that reconciliation is highly improbable. and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside. (101a) Art. (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse. (3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation. (105a) Art. (102) Art. (104a) Art. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. If the spouses should reconcile. unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses.(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of. (100a) Art. 65. subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code. 57. 63. shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy. (n) Art. the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. After the filing of the petition for legal separation. and (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. During the pendency of the action for legal separation. shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become final. 64. 59. the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse. but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist. which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2). (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation. (106a) Art. even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. 66. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (n) Art. (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation. 58. Alienations. or (6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (108a) Private International Law Page 55 .

without the consent of the other spouse. or natural children by legal fiction. with respect to the ward. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. 26. 26. (n) Muslim Code: TITLE V Parental Authority CHAPTER I Nature and Effects Who exercises. (4). (174a) Art. and valid there as such. the court shall. in its order. acknowledged natural children. take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. (195a. when the penalty imposed was six months' imprisonment or more. the father's decision shall prevail unless there is a 1. lex loci contractus rule Substantial validity – governed by: of Art. After due hearing. (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse. Personal law: status/legal capacity – 2. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines. The guardian. An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. 2. A married person. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 71. and (3) The names of all their known creditors. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. 67. Parents Relationship) Civil Code: Art. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified. In case of disagreement. 15. supra Art. 108a) Capacity to Remarry Art. adopted: The following cannot be 1. lex loci celebrationis:  National law of the parties exceptions: • Family Code Art. paragraph 1 • Consular Marriages – consul granted by the accepting country where such consular Private International Law Page 56 . VIII. 2. in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized. without the written consent of the other spouse. A married person. with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Those who have legitimate. 4. before the final approval of his accounts. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Nota bene: Formal validity – law of the place celebration.Art. 3637 and 38. 339. A person who has already been adopted. unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (5) and (6). 5. except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1). shall also be valid in this country. office was located to solemnize marriage and Children (Parental The following cannot adopt: 1. 3. Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime. 6. their addresses and the amounts owing to each. legitimated. Non-resident aliens. 3. — (1) The father and the mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate and acknowledged children. 335.

and punish them moderately. shall be the legal administrator of the property of the child under parental authority. — (1) Children shall respect. revere. — (1) The care and custody of children below seven years of age whose parents are divorced shall belong to the mother or. . In their default. 77. Private International Law Page 57 . Parental authority nontransferable. — (1) Parental authority terminates upon the death of the parents or the child. 73. Art. under the same circumstances.judicial order contrary. or upon emancipation. but the court may. — Parental authority can neither be renounced nor transferred except as otherwise provided in this Code and the general principles of Islamic law. If the property is worth more than five thousand pesos. and their duties complied with. and obey their parents always unless the latter cast them into disbelief. the son. with respect to their unemancipated children: (a) The duty to support them. — property of (2) The court may appoint a guardian (wasi) in the absence of one who is natural or testamentary. 74. Effects upon person of children. educate and instruct them in keeping with their means and represent them in all actions which shall redound to their benefits. and shall be consulted whenever practicable by all members of the family on all important questions. shall stay with the mother. when the best interests of the children so require. (3) The court may deprive a person of parental authority or suspend the exercise thereof if he treats his children with excessive harshness. the paternal grandmother. and shall particularly by precept and example. have them in their company. the sister and aunts. or in his absence the mother. Duty to children. unless the second husband is related to them within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. Extinguishment of parental Art. imbue them with religious and civic attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace. The minor above seven years of age but below the age of puberty may choose the parent with whom he wants to stay. Art. the widowed mother who contracts a subsequent marriage shall lose parental authority and custody over all children by the deceased husband. to the maternal grandmother.chan robles virtual law library Art. authority. (1) The father. 78. 75. (2) Grandparents are likewise entitled to respect and reverence. to the (2) The mother shall exercise parental authority over her children born out of wedlock. Art. Duty to parents. Effects upon children. appoint a general guardian. — Every parent and every person exercising parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the children are respected. or abandons them. gives then corrupting or immoral orders and counsel. Care and custody. Art. 76. — The parents have. 72. (2) Subject to Article 78. in her absence. and (b) The power to correct. — The following persons shall Art. 79. (2) The unmarried daughter who has reached the age of puberty shall stay with the father. CHAPTER II Custody and Guardianship Art. discipline. Guardian for marriage (wali). the father or the mother shall give a bond to be approved by the court. it shall devolve upon the father and the nearest paternal relatives.

in his default. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Legitimacy of a child may impugned only on the following grounds: be (c) serious illness of the husband. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. or (e) The court. provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. the child could not have been that of the husband. 169. (n) Art. 80. (256a) Art. 167. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife. fraud. that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons. unless otherwise provided in this Code. Guardian of minor's property. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (d) Paternal grandfather's executor or nominee. 168. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. — The following persons shall exercise guardianship over the property of minors in the order of precedence: (a) Father. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register. 165. (c) Brother and other paternal relatives. should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or. Art. violence. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate. in a proper case. if the husband or. or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination. (c) Paternal grandfather. or undue influence. 170. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 166. or . provided. 163. (d) Paternal grandfather's nominee. 258a) Art. (b) Father's executor or nominee. (255a) Art. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage. (259a) Art. (261a) Art. (55a. and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs. the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake. (n) Art. any of his heirs. even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded. 164. the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife. Art. (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible. intimidation. the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines. these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage. except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164. which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse. or Private International Law Page 58 .have authority to act as guardian for marriage (wali) in the order of precedence: (a) Father (b) Paternal grandfather. (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage.chan robles virtual law library (e) The court.

or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (263a) Art. were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Proof of Filiation Art. (269a) Art. in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames. (n) Art. whichever is earlier. the father's decision shall Private International Law Page 59 . Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children. in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support. within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who. 209. 171. (272a) Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. Legitimated Children Art. 178. or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. Except for this modification. 176. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. their ascendants. In the absence of the foregoing evidence. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights. (2) To receive support from their parents. 181. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. 173. (273a) Art. In case of disagreement. 172. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a)chan robles virtual law library Art. 182. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. 177. the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. (265a.registration of said birth. 266a. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173. their brothers and sisters. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. (264a) Chapter 3. except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172. and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. 175. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. (275a) Art. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Illegitimate Children Art. 267a) Art. (274) Art. (287a) Chapter 4. 211. or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom. in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. mental and physical character and well-being. In these cases. 179. parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral. (262a) Chapter 2. Art. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. and in proper cases. all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (313a) Art. the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. at the time of the conception of the former. (289a) Art. 174. 210. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother.

except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. in a criminal case. integrity. (311a) chan robles virtual law library Art. (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance. In case of foundlings. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (314a) Art. abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated. selfreliance. 213. Chapter 2. In case of absence or death of either parent. In case of death. unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The parents. to testify against his parents and grandparents. especially the choice of the child over seven years of age. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties: (1) To keep them in their company. 218. and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. 129. orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school. recreation and association with others. taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article. the same order of preference shall be observed. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. advice and counsel. (349a. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children Art. 214. No descendant shall be compelled. (n) Art. (2) The oldest brother or sister.prevail. and (3) The child's actual custodian. absence or unsuitability of the parents. the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent. instruction or custody. and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian. its administrators and teachers. In case several survive. unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n) Art. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations. unless unfit or disqualified. 351a. as provided in Art. (2) To give them love and affection. 212. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children. educate and instruct them by right precept and good example. studies and morals. In case of separation of the parents. unless unfit or disqualified. (315a) proceedings to heads of children's homes. parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. supervise their activities. entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision. unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. 217. over twenty-one years of age. Substitute and Special Parental Authority Art. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary. over twenty-one years of age. shall exercise the authority. inculcate in them honesty. self-discipline. to support. (n) Chapter 3. The school. 214. stimulate their interest in civic affairs. 220. entity or institution. the one designated by the court. or the individual. 354a) Art. protect them from bad company. 216. (349a) Art. (355a) Art. parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial Private International Law Page 60 . and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship. 215. industry and thrift. companionship and understanding. (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials.

(322a) Chapter 4. In case of disagreement. 323a) Art. and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. 224.000. grants the entire proceeds to the child. unless the owner. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children Art. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority. the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50. 227. or a parent has remarried. the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. 225. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger. (2) Upon the death of the child. Upon proper petition or at its own instance. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. or the guardian is a stranger. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. Parental authority terminates permanently: (1) Upon the death of the parents. 223. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) Art. 226. (317) Art. 221. 228. (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances. 222. (6) To demand from them respect and obedience. (391a) shall prevail. However. but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child. the father's decision Chapter 5. either of his choice or appointed by the court. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. irrespective of the merits of the petition. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education. unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. (316a) Art. the individual. to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. in their absence or incapacity. and (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (321a. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires. the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. In any case.(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests. The parents or. (318a) Art. may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides. (320a) Art. entity or institution exercising parental authority. for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. or when the circumstances so warrant. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority Art. in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. if the child resides in a foreign country. if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault. the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine. or Private International Law Page 61 . or. in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides.

The illegitimate child. teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. Galang which involved the illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of Chinese descent with a Chinese woman. Ching Liong Ding. (n) Ching Leng v. (n) Art. Galang 57 OG 2312 “In Ching Leng the provision in the 1935 Constitution stating "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" refers only to legitimate children. 1950 granting his petition for naturalization. even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the Filipino father. Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An. The illegitimate children were later on jointly adopted by the naturalized Filipino and his legal wife. So Buan Ty. Nevertheless. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate children became Filipino citizens by virtue of his Private International Law Page 62 . (2) Gives the child corrupting orders. or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial court’s decision are as follows: After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court dated May 2. declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and purposes the children of the adopter Ching Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and obligations provided by law. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong Seng. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a) Art. 230. counsel or example. he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court in Special Proc. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a full pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. cannot acquire the citizenship of the father. Finding the petition for adoption proper. parental authority also terminates: (1) Upon adoption of the child. this Court granted the same in a decision dated September 12. (327a) Art. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. (3) Compels the child to beg. 1955. Comelec)” The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known parent. Victoria Ching Liong Yam. If the degree of seriousness so warrants. or the welfare of the child so demands. Sy An.(3) Upon emancipation of the child. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (Tecson V. When the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment. No. 231. all minors and admittedly the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An. the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. In no case shall the school administrator. (330a) Art. On September 29. a Chinese citizen. (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose. 233. 1950. 229. (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority. such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. the framers did not attempt to change the intent of this provision. I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian. The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. even as they were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine. The Court made this definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. 232. or (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a) Art.

that the father of the little girl had given her to Marcosa S. was a very small child. 335336. at least is the father. Dy Jiongco. by legal fiction.. Collector 34 Phil 248 • • On 30th of October. A woman. as well as the meaning of children "whose parents are citizens of the Philippines" under the Constitution. Dy Jiongco could bring Ng Hian into the territory of the Philippine Islands as her adopted son has Private International Law Page 63 . otherwise. Thus. May 12. the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor child or children" in Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. 332. The Chinese wife of Juan Uy Tue died while the petitioner herein. together with two children. Republic. to refer to legitimate children. CFI granted entry to petitioner. (Chinese name) Ng Chion Tue. Republic. That Juan Uy Tue (Ng Chion Tue). In fact. it is generally understood. 544. for. despite the circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their legitimation. however. Ng Tio was the daughter of the brother of the said Juan Uy Tue. "and "those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines." who shall elect Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the age of majority". the term "children" could not possibly refer to those whose relation to the naturalized person is one created by legal fiction. and do not include the acquisition of the nationality of the adopter. Santos Co vs. as. Dy Jiongco. That fact is not denied of record. our fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. Quimsuan vs. Dy Jiongco. Petitioner petitioned for habeas corpus in the CFI. they are now being sought to be given the status of legitimate children of said appellant. married Marcosa S. There is nothing in the record which shows or tends to show that she had not adopted him in good faith. Collector of Customs appealed. Gallofin v. The Board of Special Inquiry refused the right of each child to enter the Philippine Islands. Dy Jiongco. petitioner Ching Leng addressed a communication to the respondent Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of registration of the said minors be cancelled. Held: It is true that the petitioner. Feb. had never been in the Philippine Islands before. not that of the illegitimate father (U. It appears that Ng Guan was residing in the Philippine Islands at the time of the presentation of the present petition. include adopted children. Although. Thus. for all intents and purposes. It is also true that the said Marcosa S. a legitimate child. the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful wedlock. Juan Uy Tue.S. Dy Jingco was his stepmother. adoption gives "to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter". illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is. 52 Phil. Marcosa S. after a rehearing. are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV. Section 1. Whenever. Gaz. 1953). The question whether or not Marcosa S. She swore positively that she had adopted him. Serra v. by adoption. Republic. Ng Hian v. 287. when the Constitution provides that "those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines. Moreover. for instance. before his marriage with Marcosa S. the place and time of birth of the child would be immaterial. 46 Off. when the adopter. being the stepmother of the said Ng Hian. L-4223. Thus the present petition. Marcosa S. Ng Tio was admitted but Ng Hian was not. Ng Hian. • • • • • • • • • • Issue: Whether or not the minor children of a deceased resident Chinese merchant have a right to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands. vs. Serra v. 29 Phil. had been married to a Chinese woman with whom he had some children. and not to illegitimate children. unless the context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Ng Hian. 543. born of a Chinese father and mother. Ng Tio a female of the age of 9 years. Similarly.naturalization. for. Marcosa S. 70 Phil. Dy Jiongco. De Leon. for instance. 1915 the steamship Tian arrived at the port of Manila. we have already seen that the rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264. pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code. 1952). However. and Ng Hian a boy of 16 years of age (the petitioner herein) were on board. Ordoñez. The fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation before us. 3652-3654. Until the fact is denied we must accept it. subdivisions 3 and 4). (Bold underscoring supplied) In Ching Leng. the petitioner herein and also one called Ng Guan. supra. Gov’t of the Philippines. after the death of his Chinese wife. the word "children" or "child" is used in statutes. a Filipina born of a Filipina mother and a Chinese father was married to a Chinaman by the name of (Filipino name) Juan Uy Tue. L-4693. used in these provisions. Ong Tianse. as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law. adopted him and was bringing him to the Philippine Islands to study. 16. The Court categorically ruled that these children refer to legitimate children only. Dy Jiongco. the Court held: It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child".

to petitioner. The court further said: Of course. the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children. open to investigation . must still be determined by our courts. (b) In case of a judgment against a person. ROEHR VS. fraud. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment. Accordingly. even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding. 938). Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts? Held: Yes.19 Van Dorn v. thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. where it is shown that the adoption was bona fide. In the case of Ex parte Fong Yim (134 Fed. a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure. such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court. the Federal Republic of Germany. the court held that: A Chinese merchant domiciled in the United States has the right to bring into this country with his wife minor children legally adopted by him in China.. the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German Court. to wit: SEC. or clear mistake of law or fact.The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country. RODRIGUEZ Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr. Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39.g. the Court consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has the parental custody. and that the children have lived as members of his family and have been supported by him for several years. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Court of Appeals. They had two children. it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Respondent Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The Court held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. Section 48.Blankenese with the custody of the children granted to the father. the question whether the adoption is a genuine one is a question of fact. Rep. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). want of notice to the party. .20 and Llorente v. the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16.been discussed by the Federal Courts of the United States. . I think that the same decision is authority for the proposition that he has the right to introduce his adopted children. save for the issue of parental custody. a German citizen. In Garcia v. 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. Negros Oriental. However. e. care and support of the children. where the Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country.. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan. The evidence shows that the practice of adopting children in China is very common. Recio. In this case. Jr. collusion. Thus. Effect of foreign judgments. in order for the court in this jurisdiction to Private International Law Page 64 . Under these circumstances I can see no difference between the legal status of adopted children and of natural children. that it takes place substantially without legal formalities. but that the rights and obligations of children adopted and recognized as such are similar to those of natural children. married a Filipina. Ibay-Somera. 50. Romillo. having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing. . divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. As a general rule. . provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg . Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine. In fact. The Supreme Court (of the United States) having decided that a Chinese merchant domiciled in this country has the right to bring into it his natural children. In order to take effect. on custody. therefore. legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing. but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction. but the legal effects thereof.

a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and.properly determine its efficacy. is subject to proof to the contrary. In this jurisdiction. it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam. The proceedings in the German court were summary. as distinguished from actions in rem. as such. Exam is on Wednesday 630 to 830 Coverage is from start to parents and children Private International Law Page 65 . In the present case.

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