OL.II NO.

3

NOVEMBER 1943

NTELLIGENCE ULLETIN

FOR USE OF MILITARY

OjJi^LY.i N T O TO t l fc^

!YXIKTELLIGENC

Intelligence Bulletin
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION War Department

VOL. II, NO. 3 MID 461

Washington 25, D. C. November 1943

NOTICE
The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for the use of junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for disseminating to them the latest information received from Military Intelligence sources. In order to insure the widest possible use of this bulletin, its contents are not highly classified; however, it is for the ex­ clusive use of military personnel. Reproduction within the mili­ tary service is permitted provided that (1) the source is stated, (2) the classification is maintained, and (3) one copy of the pub­ lication in which the material is reproduced is sent to the Dis­ semination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Depart­ ment, Washington 25, D. C.

It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized whenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discussions with troops. • Eeaders are invited to comment on the use that they are making of the Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for future issues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War De­ partment, Washington 25, D. C. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through channels for approval.

554765°—43—vol. 2, No. 3­

TABLE OF CONTENTS
P A R T O N E : G E R M A N Y
S E C T I O N I. G E R M A N SOLDIER D E S C R I B E S T E R R O R OF SICILY R E T R E A T , Page
I

1. Introduction 2. R e t r e a t in Sicily 3. A General W a s Bitter
II. S I X - B A R R E L R O C K E T W E A P O N ( T H E " N E B E L W E R F E R 41")

\ 2
8

9

1. 2. 3. 4.
III.

Introduction Description : Note on Operation H o w t h e German Army Uses I t

9
10
13
14

16

P R I N C I P L E S OF D E F E N S E A G A I N S T A I R B O R N E T R O O P S

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 2. G e r m a n E s t i m a t e of Our Tactics 3. G e r m a n Principles of Defense a. Obstacles b. Protection of Defenses c. Observation Posts
d. e. Communicating Preparation an Alarm__' of Mobile Reserves

16
17
18
18
19
19

20
20

f. Defense Tactics g. Opening of Fire h. Conclusions
IV.

:

20
21
21

22

W E A K N E S S E S OF ARTILLERY D E F E N S I V E POSITIONS

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 2. H o w Faults Were T o Be Corrected a. Precautions Against Damage by Fire b . Further Construction of Firing Positions c. Track Discipline d. Alternate Positions : e. "Last Covering Height" — _____ — f. Conclusion
V. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF F L A K IN THE F I E L D

22
22
22
23
24
24
25
25

26

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 2. H e a v y Flak a. General b . Employment c. Employment 3. Light Flak a. General b . Employment c. Employment
VI. MISCELLANEOUS

in Rear Areas in Forward Areas ___­ in Rear Areas in Forward Areas

26
27
27
30
30
33
33
34
35

37

1. Improvised Bangalore Torpedoes 2. N e w Army C a p
11

37
38

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART T W O : SECTION I. N E W JAPANESE WEAPONS JAPAN

IH

Page
39

1. Introduction 2. Pull-type Hand Grenade a. Description b. Table of Characteristics c. Operation d. Booby-trapping Possibilities 3. Offensive Hand Grenade a. Description b. Operation 4. Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun 5. Booby Traps a. Device Using a Parasol b. Device Using a Flashlight c. Device Using a Pipe d. Device Using a Bottle
II. N O T E S ON J A P A N E S E LANDING OPERATIONS

39 39 39 40 40 42 42 42 43 43 45 46 -46 47 48
49

1. Introduction 2. Action Before Landing a. Selection of Landing Points b. Reconnaissance of Landing Points c. Selection of Time for Landings 3. Action During Landing a. Water and Terrain Difficulties b. Overcoming Resistance c. Communication and Liaison d. Duties of Debarkation Work Units 4. Action After Landing
III. ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES

49 49 49 50 50 51 51 51 56 56 57
59

1. General 2. At Sea a. Weapons b. Tactics 3. While Landing 4. On Land
IV.

---

59 60 60 60 62 62
64

SOME D E F E N S E TECHNIQUES USED BY JAPANESE

1. As Seen by Observers 2. According to Documents
V. MORALE, CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIER

64 65
66

1. 2. 3. 4.

Introduction General Enemy Instructions Army-Navy Relations

i

66
66

67 69

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART T H R E E : UNITED NATIONS Page 70

SECTION I. SOME H E A L T H R U L E S FOR F A R EAST AREAS

1. Introduction 2. Insect Carriers of Diseases a. Mosquitoes b. Lice c. Fleas d. Ticks e. Mites f. Flies 3. Animals; Diseases Acquired from Them a. Rabies (mad-dog bite, hydrophobia) b. Snake Bite c. Leeches 4. Venereal Diseases 5. Sunburn, Sunstroke, and Heat Exhaustion 6. Minor Wounds
II. How To PROTECT YOUR F E E T

70 70 71 75 76 77 78 78 80 80 80 82 83 84 85
86

1. Introduction 2. Regarding Care of Feet 3. Regarding Footwear a. Fitting Shoes b. Care of Shoes c. Care of Socks 4. Regarding Foot Troubles a. Sweaty Feet b. Blisters

-

86 86 87 87 87 87 88 88 88

ANNEX
How TO IDENTIFY W A R GASES 89

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1. German Rocket Six-barrel Projector (side view) FIGURE 2. German Rocket Six-barrel Projector (front view) FIGURE 3. New German Army Cap FIGURE 4. Japanese Pull-type Hand Grenade FIGURE 5. Japanese Grenade Booby Trap_ FIGURE 6. Japanese Offensive Hand Grenade FIGURE 7. Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun 1 FIGURES 8-11. Japanese Booby Traps 10 12 38 41 42 43 45 46-48

PART O N E :

GERMANY 1

Section I.

GERMAN SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

1. INTRODUCTION

A letter found in an abandoned German gun posi­ tion near Troina, Sicily, gives a fairly comprehensive picture of what went on in the mind of at least one enemy soldier during the retreat. Possibly because their training has stressed offensive problems at the expense of defensive problems—the customary proportion has been 10 to 1—many German soldiers seem to lack enthusiasm for the defense. Readers of the Intelligence Bulletin will recall a num­ ber of articles in which high-ranking German officers have been quoted as expressing dissatisfaction, not only with the preparation of defensive positions, but with the defensive tactics of small units. This letter indicates that, although a number of factors can con­ tribute to the lowering of the German soldier's morale while he is on the defensive, XL S. artillery barrages play a substantial part in crippling the enemy's will to fight.
1 On page 8 of Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 2, the caption under figure 3 should read "Pulk Used for Winter Transport of German Light Machine Gun." In line 12 of the same page, the word "panoramic" should be inserted immediately before the word "sights."

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

IT. S. soldiers have been conducting a type of "psy­ chological warfare"—perhaps without realizing it. It must be remembered that a German's mind is as vul­ nerable as his body. This particular letter reveals a state of uncertainty and depression which might be called the symptom of a contagious mental illness. It is to be hoped that, under the pressure of our attacks and counterattacks, this illness will spread throughout the German Army. An order issued by the commanding general of the Hermann Goering Division is added, to illustrate how pessimism and fear can be communicated from one German soldier to another.
2. RETREAT IN SICILY

23 July 1943.
DEAR FAMILY:

I want to send you a report about these past few days, so that in case I never come home, you will know what we are putting up with down here in Sicily. Two days after the British and the Americans had landed, they had gained so much ground, and had succeeded in bring­ ing so many troops, that it was impossible to anticipate a battle with equal forces. On 14 July we missed being captured by just 1 hour. We took up a new position, which the Americans promptly covered with artillery fire, costing us our first victims. From this position we retreated again—toward the flank—and took up still another position. This move nearly sealed our fate. I am supposed to keep my vehicle near the commander, and serve as a communication trouble-shooter. Whenever the telephone line is damaged by artillery fire, the order is "Get out and repair." (We are fighting in the central sector, and are opposing crack U. S. and Canadian troops.) Such an order

GERMANY

SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

3

came at 2100 on 20 July, three nights ago. Right after we had left our position, such a terrific barrage started that an infantry sergeant swore he had never experienced anything like it, even in Russia. Many were killed. Several of my comrades and I were right in the thick of it. It is impossible to describe the terror of that experience. We pressed our faces to the ground and waited for a direct hit, or flying fragments, to take our lives. Meanwhile, people back home in Germany were vacationing, going to cafes and movies, and enjoying themselves. I asked myself "Where is the justice which is supposed to exist?" At 0400 we got back to our position. At least, we were still alive. We could hear machine-gun and rifle fire. We went to sleep, anyway, although our commander had already departed. Half an hour later, I was awakened suddenly. There were orders for me. The Americans were in the immediate vicinity, and all lines had to be disconnected. We were 10 men altogether. We had a large personnel carrier and a small one. It was necessary to go slowly on the dirt roads, but on the highway we traveled as fast as the vehicles would go. At a junction a car was lying on its side, constituting a road block. It seemed impossible to take the vehicles any distance across country, because of the nature of the ground, but we made it. Then it happened. We rounded a curve and ran into concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire. I felt as if God had suddenly put a wall of flying steel in front of me! At this moment I thought of all of you. I had to get the car through, and somehow or other I succeeded in doing it. Afterward, the man in the seat beside me looked at me and I looked at him. We were white as chalk. But we had survived. (May God always be with me ! I am asking this, and I know you are asking it, too.) A short distance away friends were waiting for us. They had observed everything through field glasses. When we reported that the other car could hardly be expected to come through, our 22-year-old lieutenant, who was already there, gave us a tongue-lashing. He said that he had expected more of us to get through, and that we should be ashamed

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

to say such things. I had to hold myself back in order not to leap at his throat. He didn't know the whole story, of course, inasmuch as he had left the position an hour earlier. However some of the missing men eventually got through by foot. A little town, which by now had been occupied by the Ameri­ cans, was shelled by our artillery. In return, the American ar­ tillery fired on our positions, costing us a number of wounded and forcing us to change our position once again. We had re­ treated 30 kilometers 2 and had had only a single day of rest. But here "rest" means—air attacks! ( I am obliged to admit that while I have been fighting in Sicily, I have seen only two German airplanes.) Hostile enemy air reconnaissance discovered us, and the next day the Americans placed artillery barrages on our new­ est position. I t became a miserable hell, and we had to abandon it that evening. As a rule, we travel only at night—in pitch dark, without lights, and seldom on a main road. You can imagine what this means— especially when we are forever under fire. At noon of this day, I was ordered to take out a detail and look for our motorcycle runner, who was missing up front. We searched for him until it was nearly dark, but without success. We returned, hoping to get some sleep after the misery of the past two days, but found that everyone had moved again to a new position, taking advantage of the darkness. We had a corporal with us who said he knew the route of march,. but he gave us faulty directions. A hundred times we had to drop to the ground because of hostile planes. Planes are always around—nothing but American and British ones, unfortunately. We rode through a town, but had to stop 500 yards beyond it, inasmuch as we didn't know whether this road was still in Ger­ man hands. Here we experienced a bombing attack. The town was very badly hit. Moreover, our vehicles were being shot at by mortars. We were terribly frightened, but we had to get through. Luckily, every bullet does not kill, and our venture succeeded.
2

1 kilometer equals approximately % mile.

GERMANY

SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

5

We had already been posted as missing and our lieutenant him­ self had gone out to look for us. Not only were we safe, but our motorcycle runner had returned safely, too! Our infantry had repulsed two heavy attacks. As a result, our light truck, which was all shot up, could be towed. While we were taking care of this, British planes appeared overhead. A moment later a nearby explosion threw my assistant driver and myself out of the car. I happened to land in the fairly soft earth of a bomb crater, and wasn't badly hurt. But my assistant driver was thrown onto the hard surface of the road and was still lying there when I found him. I took him to a field hospital. He had suffered head and face injuries. I feel very close to this fellow, since he and I have been through so many sad hours to­ gether. He will soon be with us again. We are always being pursued. Half the time we don't know what day or date it is. As you can probably guess, I have been writing this letter piecemeal from time to time. I started it a week ago. How many new positions we have retired to since then ! This past Sunday we were in still another one, and again the American artillery covered us. You have no idea what it is like to hear shells whizz over your head—all night long—everlast­ ingly. It's so hard to sleep ! At 0500 on Monday I had to go out trouble-shooting. The line was down in seven places. My car passed a field aid station, where there were men who had literally been torn to pieces. A ghastly sight! I couldn't eat anything that noon. All that day our position was shelled. We kept run­ ning and flopping down under the car—up and down, up and down. Suddenly, at 1900 a terriffic barrage came at us, and again my detail and I had to take down the communication lines while the others departed. Several times we had to stop, jump out, and take cover. The shells seemed to whistle past, a yard ahead of us or a yard behind us. At 0200 the next morning we were safe again. Unfortunately, I had developed a bad boil on my right knee. This morning they lanced it. It was very painful. Again we have taken up new positions. For the moment it is
554705°—43—vol. 2, No. 3 2

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

still quiet here—but for how long? The whole thing will start all over again. Today we learned that Mussolini had been kicked out. This means the end of Fascism, too. Will Italy turn against us now? Whatever will become of us is debatable. It can hardly be sup­ posed that this event will turn out for the good. Incidentally, Hans Maier and most of my other friends are all with the Services of Supply, 30 to 40 kilometers to the rear. I don't suppose anything much will happen to them. My comrade Huebner is in Germany by now, and has probably visited you and told you a small part of what is going on. He has had damn good luck. Do you know that recently wTe were awakened at 0300 because mail had arrived? At that time I received your letters of the 7th and 11th of July, as well as a newspaper and two picture post cards from Schala, who was vacationing in Allgaou. He said, "From a wonderful rest and furlough days, the heartiest greetings." You can't imagine what I felt like when I read that. Hourly I fight for my life, and then suddenly I get Schala's post card. I just haven't the heart to answer it. 28 July 1943. Yesterday things were fairly quiet in our new position, although occasionally we could hear artillery in the distance. A tremen­ dous number of planes passed overhead. Flak is constantly being fired, yet I have never seen a plane shot down. Our Luftwaffe must be employed elsewhere, because I still haven't seen any Ger­ man planes to speak of. Tonight there is a terrific thunderstorm going on, and our comrades who are further up front must be wretchedly uncomfortable. I can hardly stand listening to the noise any longer. The lightning—coupled with everything that has happened—shatters my nerves. I find it impossible to sleep after a storm like this. All I can manage are little naps, in which I have bad nightmares. Oh, if I could only have a roof over my head again! We're always sleeping on the ground, and in a different place every night.

GERMANY

SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

7

29 July 1943. Last night we moved out without having been fired on. Even in transit, we did not encounter what we call "magic fire" (Feuerzauher). This is the name that we give to the insane ar­ tillery barrages that the enemy places on us. Around midnight we arrived at our new position. While sleeping on the ground, we heard reverberations, as if we were sleeping in a basement while somebody upstairs was moving furniture. So even though we weren't directly under the "magic fire," we weren't allowed to forget it. . . . Our food is good. Every day we also receive a bit of hard candy, half a cake of chocolate, and a box of "Attikah" cigar­ ettes. The cigarettes don't last long, however. You have no idea how much one smokes, just to distract one's thoughts. As to myself, I must report that I am having a great deal of trouble with my ears. The artillery fire, together with the clouds of dust that we endure while we are traveling, deprives me more and more of my hearing. I really hear very badly now, and can notice it myself. This gives me a very insecure feeling. Since I was last in the hospital, I haven't had any pus in my knee— so that seems to be coming along all right. But my sense of hearing is something I'll never be able to regain entirely. If I live, I'll always have a certain degree of deafness. Two of our men remained too long under cover during an artillery barrage, and while they were there, the unit moved out. They didn't rejoin us until the following day. They were threatened with a court-martial. These fellows may have been a little bit to blame, but such a threat is too severe and very de­ pressing. One can very easily fall into a "bad light" here. Everything is construed as "dereliction of duty," and the sever­ est punishments are decreed. 1 August 1943. Sunday again. Will I ever be able to mail this letter ? Oh, I wish I could tell you, my beloved ones, what we are going through in this campaign! Our infantry suffers even more.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Yesterday I lost a very good comrade. Everything is against us. The hostile artillery fires with its heaviest-caliber guns on our road of retreat. Right now the "Tommy" is attacking. It won't last long. Our only possible line of retreat is through burning fields and woods and towns subjected to artillery fire. The future looks terribly dark. . . .
3. A GENERAL WAS BITTER

There were many other German soldiers in Sicily who felt as did the writer of this letter. An order of General Conrath, commanding general of the Hermann Goering Division, testifies eloquently to the fact that the BritishAmerican onslaught dealt a sledgehammer blow to the morale of a unit which formerly had been the pride of the German Army.
During the past few days, I have had the bitter experience of watching scenes which are not worthy of a German soldier, par­ ticularly not of a soldier of the Hermann Goering Division. Men came running to the rear, hysterically crying because they had heard the detonation of a single shot fired somewhere in the distance. Others, deceived by false rumors, moved whole columns to the rear. In one instance, supplies were senselessly distributed to soldiers and civilians by a supply unit which had fallen victim to a rumor. I wish to state that not only the younger soldiers, but also noncoms and warrant officers, were guilty of panicstricken behavior. Panic, "Panzer fear," and the spreading of rumors are to be eliminated by the strongest possible measures. Cowardice and withdrawal without orders are to be punished on the spot, and, if necessary, by the use of weapons. I shall apply the severest measures of court-martial against such saboteurs of the fight to free our nation, and I shall not hesi­ tate to pronounce death sentences in serious cases. I expect all officers to use their influence in suppressing this undignified attitude throughout the Hermann Goering Division.

Section II. SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON (THE "NEBELWERFER 41")

I. INTRODUCTION

Whenever the fortunes of the German Army take a new turn for the worse, Nazi propagandists attempt to encourage the people of the Reich—and influence pub­ lic opinion in neutral countries—by spreading rumors of new and formidable developments in German ord­ nance. Recently the Nazis have been releasing propa­ ganda declaring that spectacular results are being achieved with the German six-barrel rocket projector known as the Nebelwerfer (smoke mortar) 41. Actu­ ally, this is not a particularly new weapon. Its name, moreover, is extremely misleading. In the first place, the Nebelwerfer 41 is not a mortar at all, and, in the second place, it can accommodate both gas-charged and high-explosive projectiles, as well as smoke projectiles. It would be just as foolish to discount the German claims 100 percent as it would be to accept them unre­ servedly. Although fire from the Nebelwerfer 41 is relatively inaccurate, one of the weapon's chief assets appears to be the concussion effect of its high-explosive projectiles, which is considerable when the weapon's six barrels are fired successively, 1 second apart. The highexplosive round contains 5 pounds of explosive; this is
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comparable—in weight, at least—to the high-explosive round used in the U. S. 105-mm howitzer. In view of the mass of misleading information which has been circulated regarding the Nebelwerfer 41—or, as the Germans sometimes call it, the Do-Gerdta—it is hoped that junior officers and enlisted men willfindthe following discussion both timely and profitable.
2. DESCRIPTION

The Nebelwerfer 41 (see figs. 1 and 2) is a six-bar­ reled (nonrotating) tubular projector, with barrels 3 to 3% feet long and 160 mm in diameter. The projector

Figure 1.—German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (side view). U. S. soldiers in Sicily promptly nicknamed the Nebelwerfer U the 'Screaminsr Mimi."
X

GERMANY

SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

H

is mounted on a rubber-tired artillery chassis with a split trail. There is no rifling; the projectiles are guided by three rails, each about %-inch high, which run down the inside of the barrels. This reduces the caliber to approximately 150 mm. The barrels are open-breeched, and the propellant is slow-burning black powder (14 pounds set behind the nose cap). This propellant generates gas through 26 jets set at an angle. As a result, the projectiles rotate and travel at an ever-increasing speed, starting with the rocket blast. The burster, which is in the rear twosevenths of the projectile, has its own time fuze. The range is said to be about 7,760 yards. The barrels are fired electrically, from a distance. They are never fired simultaneously, since the blast from six rockets at once undoubtedly would capsize the weapon. The order of fire is fixed at 1-4-6-2-3-5. The sighting and elevating mechanisms are located on the left-hand side of the barrels, immediately over the wheel, and are protected by a light-metal hinged box cover, which is raised when the weapon is to be used. Each barrel has a metal hook at the breech to hold the projectile in place, and a sparking device to ignite the rocket charge. This sparker can be turned to one side to permit loading and then turned back so that the "spark jump" is directed to an electrical igniter placed in one of 24 rocket blast openings located on the pro­ jectile, about one-third of the way up from the base.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Figure 2,—German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (front view).

About one-third of the length of the projectile extends below the breech of the weapon. The projectile itself resembles a small torpedo—with­ out propeller or tail fins. The base is flat, with slightly rounded edges. The rocket jets are located about onethird of the way up the projectile from the base, and encircle the casing. The jets are at an angle with the

GEEMAKY-—SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

13

axis of the projectile so as to impart rotation in flight, in "turbine" fashion. The propelling charge is housed in the forward part of the rocket. A detonating fuze is located in the base of the projectile to detonate the high-explosive or smoke charge. In this way, on impact, the smoke or high explosive is set off above ground when the nose of the projectile penetrates the soil.
3. NOTE ON OPERATION

The following note on the operation of the Nebel­ werfer 41 is reproduced from the German Army peri­ odical Die WeJirmacht. It is believed to be substan­ tially correct.
The Nebelwerfer 4-7, or Do-Gerat, is unlimbered and placed in position by its crew of four men. As soon as the protective cover­ ings have been removed, the projector is ready to be aimed and loaded. The ammunition is attached to the right and to the left of the projector, within easy reach, and the shells are introduced two at a time, beginning with the lower barrels and continuing upward. Meanwhile, foxholes deep enough to conceal a man in standing position has been dug about 10 to 15 yards to the side and rear of the projector. The gunners remain in these foxholes while the weapon is being fired by electrical ignition. Within 10 seconds a battery can fire 36 projectiles. These make a droning pipe-organ sound as they leave the barrels, and, while in flight, leave a trail of smoke (see cover illustration). After a salvo has been fired, the crew quickly returns to its projectors and reloads them.

•JO470O°—43—vol. 2, No. ?,­

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4. HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES IT

The following statements have been made by a highranking German Army officer, and may be accepted as an authoritative expression of German ideas concerning the employment of this weapon.
Units of Nebeltruppen (smoke-laying troops) are organized as rocket-projector regiments (Werferregimenter), which are fully motorized and therefore extremely mobile. A rocket-projector regiment is divided into battalions and batteries, like those of the artillery. Since rocket-projector regiments are capable of play­ ing a decisive part in battle, they may be concentrated at stra­ tegically important points along a front. . . . The organi­ zation of a rocket-projector regiment is much like that of a [German] motorized artillery regiment; organizationally, the motor vehicles and signal equipment of both are also much the same. Since the projector units usually are kept close behind the forward infantry line, their batteries may also be equipped with antitank guns. Because of the light construction of the projectors, a 3-ton prime mover is sufficient for traction purposes, and can also carry the gun crew and some of the ammunition. . . . The Nebelwerfer 41 can fire three different types of projectiles: high-explosive shells, incendiary projectiles, and smoke projectiles. The high-explosive shells include those with supersensitive fuzes and those with delayed-action fuzes. The latter can penetrate reinforced cover. Because of their fragmentation and concussion effect, high-explosive shells are used primarily against personnel. It has been found that the concussion has not only been great enough to kill personnel, but occasionally has caused field fortifi­ cations and bunkers to collapse. The incendiary projectiles are psychologically effective, and under favorable conditions can start field and forest fires. The smoke projectiles are used to form smoke screens or smoke zones.

GE'RMANJY—SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON"

15

[This Die Wehrmacht article naturally does not discuss the possible use of gas-charged projectiles.] Kocket-projector troops are employed as battalion and regi­ mental units, in keeping with their task of destroying hostile forces by concentrated fire. One of the advantages of the Nebel­ werfer Jfl is that it can mass its projectiles on a very small target area. By means of a shrewd disposition of the batteries, a care­ fully planned communication system, and a large number of observation posts with advanced observers, the infantry can assure for itself maneuverability and a concentration of its fire power upon the most important points. Projectors are placed well toward the front—almost without exception, at points for­ ward of the artillery—so that they will be able to eliminate hostile command posts, destroy hostile positions, and even repulse sudden attacks effectively. The firing positions of the projectors are always carefully built up so that the weapons can give strong support to the infantry. In Russia, during the winter of 1942-43, many breakthrough attempts by hostile forces were repulsed by direct fire from rocketprojector batteries.

Section III. PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

1. INTRODUCTION

The German Army is not relaxing its long-standing vigilance in the matter of taking precautions against possible attacks by United Nations airborne troops. A German Army document of 8 April 1943 discusses methods that the enemy believes we are likely to em­ ploy, and summarizes the German principles of de­ fense against such attacks. The Germans admit that we can choose from a variety of tactics in planning an airborne offensive, and that our chances of achieving surprise are very great. Acknowledging that we may try to deceive them with ruses and stratagems, the Germans warn their soldiers to be prepared for all kinds of unexpected and unpleasant surprises. They point out that our parachute troops and air-landing troops are likely to be employed in "the most fantastic ways," and explain that for this reason each German soldier must be trained to meet any crisis decisively and with speed. The following statements are paraphrased from the German document.
16

GERMANY

DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

17

2. GERMAN ESTIMATE OF OUR TACTICS The United Nations have an excellent understanding of the two main methods of airborne attack: (a) A raid in which landings are made in the immediate vicinity of the objective, so that a surprise attack may be under­ taken. (b) An attack in which landings are made at some distance from the objective, and at a place where no effective immediate defense is anticipated. The United Nations units then group themselves, and prepare to advance and launch a planned attack. In the first type of attack, the opposition will attempt a num­ ber of separate small raids by parachutists, in an effort to gain possession of important objectives as quickly as possible. (The British, especially, will try to destroy these objectives at once in order to cause confusion.) These small detachments of para­ chutists with special tasks to perform may be dropped at night, some hours before the main attack. After landing, they will make the most of natural concealment, so as to approach their objectives unobserved. In the second type of attack, the landings are very often pre­ ceded by air bombardment, followed immediately by the first wave of parachutists. However, it is always possible that, in order to gain complete surprise, a landing will not be preceded by bombing—or even that the opposition will try to create a diver­ sion and deceive us by bombing an entirely different objective. British parachute troops have been practicing night operations for a long time. Hence it is necessary to be constantly alert. It must be expected that well-trained parachutists will be ready to fight a few seconds after landing. The United Nations can drop parachutists on terrain of vir­ tually any type. It is quite feasible to drop parachutists on stony, irregular ground (as at Narvik) ; on ground covered with thick, low growth and even with orchards (as on Crete) ; and on ground crisscrossed by canals and ditches (as in Holland). The dropping of parachutists is out of the question only on

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ground where there are many high-tension cables, in deeply ravined or thickly populated areas, or in woods where the trees are tall. It is self-evident, however, that the employment of parachute troops on a fairly large scale will call for open ground. Since such a tremendous amount of ground is suitable for the landing of parachutists and even of transport gliders—the latter can land in remarkably confined spaces—one must select and indi­ cate on maps only those areas which are especially advantageous for the landing of large numbers of parachutists and gliders, or which are conceivably suitable for landing transport planes. A battalion of parachutists needs a jumping area of 800 by 300 yards. The landing and debarkation of an air-landing battalion on an airfield of medium size takes 45 minutes, provided hostile forces do not interfere. It takes longer if artillery is carried. Since it is by no means necessary for transport gliders to land on airfields proper, these aircraft must be regarded as especially dangerous. Small gliders can dive and get beneath the fire of the defense. Also, since gliders are armed with machine guns, they can return fire effectively. Although gliders can often be used at night, they require a certain amount of light in the sky to land satisfactorily. It must be expected that gliders will be used in carrying out isolated raids. For example, two 30-seater "Horsa" gliders were used in a British raid near Trondheim. It is known that the opposition is building a large number of these and of 60-seat "Hamilcar'' gliders, as well.
3. GERMAN PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE a. Obstacles

We [the Germans] must erect obstacles on landing grounds and in areas likely to prove inviting to parachutists and gliders. Obstacles will be erected in front of, or all around, localities strategically important to the defense—for example, entrances to areas containing important establishments.

GERMANY—DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

19

Mines and wire can be especially effective against parachutists and air-landing troops. (The "S" mine is excellent for this pur­ j)ose.) In fact, the opposition is so aware of the danger of minefields to airborne troops that they will respect and avoid any area that they have reason to believe is mined. However, to help deter the opposition from attempting to land, dummy minefields, as well as true mines spaced far apart, must be maintained as though they were dangerous, thickly laid fields. AH types of dummy defense works should be employed. The defenders, as well as the attackers, must use imagination and cunning. Poles, ditches, piles of wood and broken furniture, farm wagons piled with junk and with their wheels removed, and large mounds of earth, stones, or manure can also prove effective obstacles.1
b. Protection of Defenses

Defenses must have all-around protection. For this reason important defense works must be barricaded all-around against raids by airborne troops. Also, all the inhabited area within a defended work must be covered by automatic weapons. Since batteries are very inviting targets, it will be necessary to provide a sufficient number of sentries and machine guns to protect them. Vehicles must never be concentrated in areas not adequately de­ fended.
c. Observation Posts

Observation posts must be maintained on all high landmarks (such as church steeples); this must be done everywhere, even in rear areas. Such observation posts are indispensable, especially in occupied territory, for spotting parachutists in time to give warning.
See Intelligence Bulletin Vol. I, No. 11, pp. 48-51 for other Axis methods of obstructing airfields.
1

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d. Communicating an Alarm Telephone lines are extremely vulnerable to destruction by air­ borne troops. Therefore, there must always be an alternative method of communicating an alarm. Church bells, bugles, or drums may be employed. e. Preparation of Mobile Reserves As a general rule, even in preparation for minor attacks, it is best to have mobile reserves available to serve as "commando hunters." Machine guns, antitank guns, or 20-mm dual-purpose guns should be mounted on the trucks that the reserves will use, so that it will be possible to open fire from the vehicles. Machine pistols and hand grenades should be provided, and—if possible— light portable searchlights. Flak personnel can be employed locally as combat squads. Tanks and armored cars, if available, will offer the best possible means of combatting airborne troops. f. Defense Tactics The defense must be conducted offensively. Therefore, do not split up your forces, but make arrangements for a strong shock reserve. If observation posts and reconnaissance units have not supplied precise information, attack decisively whichever hostile group seems to be tactically the most dangerous. An extended period of inaction can have unfortunate consequences. Use your reserves economically. All objectives of interest to the enemy must be adequately manned, even if your own attack is in progress. The main thing is to have an intuitive grasp of what the airborne attackers' real intentions are, and not to allow yourself to be deceived by diversionary attacks, dummy parachut­ ists, and so on.

GERMANY—DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

21

g. Opening of Fire The chances of your being able to hit parachutists during their descent are very slight. It will be advisable to open fire only at close range. Experience has shown that fire is likely to be most effective just after the parachutists have touched the ground, while they are detaching themselves from their parachutes, and while they are trying to regroup themselves. If it is not possible to cover with fire the locality in which parachutists are landing, there may be some advantage in plac­ ing sweeping machine-gun fire on the attackers while they are still in the air—even if they are not within close range. Transport planes flying overhead should be subjected to fire as long as they are within range. Just before parachutists are to be dropped, transports slow down and become extremely vulnerable targets. h. Conclusions It must be recognized that the British and Americans have made great progress in developing their methods of airborne attack, and that they are capable of undertaking airborne oper­ ations on a large scale. Whenever they believe that circum­ stances are favorable, they will attempt to achieve decisive suc­ cesses by using large numbers of airborne troops behind our coastal defenses. For this reason we must continually examine our defensive measures and keep them up to date. When an airborne attack occurs, we must be able to estimate the situation with lightning-like speed, dispatch accurate infor­ mation to the proper quarters, and launch a determined attack without regard to losses, even if we are outnumbered.
554705°—43—vol. 2, No. 3 4

Section IV. WEAKNESSES OF ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
1. INTRODUCTION

In Sicily the positions of the Armored Artillery Regiment of the Hermann Goering Division were so unsatisfactory that on 23 July the regimental com­ mander felt it necessary to issue a sharply worded order requiring that certain outstanding weaknesses be corrected at once. The commander had just re­ turned from a visit to the batteries. His most signifi­ cant statements are either quoted or paraphrased in this section.
2. HOW FAULTS WERE TO BE CORRECTED a. Precautions Against Damage by Fire

The regimental commander said, at the beginning of his order:
We are in danger of suffering great damage by fire, not only as a result of incendiary bombs, but because of the carelessness of our own soldiers. I notice that, in spite of my repeated written and oral warnings, the requisite measures for protection against damage by fire have not been put into effect. I shall hold the commanding officers of units responsible if adequate measures are not at once ordered and carried out.

The expression "repeated warnings" is interesting. Any weakness continually displayed by this regiment, once regarded as a superior outfit, may sooner or later become apparent elsewhere in the German Army,

GERMANY

ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

23

granting the existence of such pressure as the United Nations were able to bring to bear in Sicily. Even if the weaknesses noted by this particular regimental commander are not at present widespread, they are at least symptomatic—an indication that the harder we hit, the more rapidly German efficiency is likely to decline. The order stipulated that fire trenches be constructed around guns and ammunition supplies in such a way as not to interfere with the quick removal of camou­ flage, when necessary. In every position sufficiently large detachments of fire sentries were to be ready day and night with the necessary equipment such as Feuerpatschen (fire brooms), filled water containers, and so on. Prime movers and emergency trailers were to be kept nearby, so that guns could be removed quickly in case of danger or damage by fire or enemy shelling. Commanding officers were to check regularly to make sure that these measures were being followed.
b. Further Construction of Firing Positions

It was pointed out that the necessary attention still was not being paid to the construction of firing posi­ tions: the digging-in of the guns, the preparation of enough foxholes for proper cover, and the construction of ditches for ammunition, with shells and cartridges kept separate. The detachments in gun positions and observation-post personnel were not to rest until every­ thing was under cover. This work was to be done at night. In order to preserve, as far as possible, the fight­

24

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

ing fitness of over-tired elements in action in the firing positions and observation posts, the rear services were to be utilized for such additional digging.
c. Track Discipline

In some instances deep, conspicuous tracks led into the firing positions. No attention had been paid to the planning of routes which would afford at least some semblance of camouflage against air observation. Dis­ organized driving in and out-—that is, the movement of guns without an intelligently devised track plan—had been the cause of this. The regimental commander re­ minded his battery commanders that one of their pri­ mary duties was to take care of this aspect of the camouflaging of firing positions. He ordered battery commanders to inspect all positions from suitably high terrain points, for the purpose of taking advantage of all natural camouflage for tracks, and of visualizing how the positions would appear to hostile aircraft.
d. Alternate Positions

Alternate positions were not being occupied with the requisite speed, when such moves were dictated by the situation. The regimental commander ordered that batteries be made more mobile so that new positions could be occupied without difficulty. He pointed out that the shelling of German positions over open sights (with time and percussion fuzes and smoke shells) could be expected to force the abandonment of these posi­ tions. Too often, he said, batteries supplied with a large amount of ammunition, but insufficiently mobile.

GERMANY

ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

25

had been utterly destroyed in a matter of hours by con­ centrations of hostile fire.
e. "Last Covering Height*'

The importance of a "last covering height" was some­ thing that all members of the regiment seemed to have forgotten completely, the regimental commander said. He ordered that, inasmuch as most of the observation posts were on forward slopes or on gentle inclines, no­ tices be put up in places most exposed to the hostile forces, and that these signs read "Warning! Last cov­ ering height! Now you are observed by the enemy!" He required that the routes from observed positions to headquarters and observation posts be clearly marked with sign posts and that, if necessary, approach trenches be constructed to these positions after dark.
f. Conclusion

The final words of the order are perhaps the most revealing.
To sum up, units containing elements which still are inexperi­ enced or stupid or apathetic must be taken in hand, and ener­ getically taught and controlled by the officers in command of these units. If this is done, the heavy casualties that we have been incurring up to the present time may be avoided in the future. In particular, the most careful measures are to be under­ taken everywhere for the organization of an air-raid warning system. Each unit commander will see to it that the system operates smoothly and that any man who fails to perform his duty is punished ruthlessly. I have repeatedly stressed the principles contained in this order. Only when they are adhered to by everyone will the artillery avoid heavy casualties and, by maintaining its "strength, be able to carry out its task.

Section V.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IN THE FIELD

1. INTRODUCTION

The original German doctrine regarding the employ­ ment of German Air Force flak artillery in thefieldhas steadily been undergoing modification. German man­ uals formerly described the responsibility of flak in the field as primarily, and almost exclusively, antiaircraft defense; the engagement of ground targets was re­ garded as secondary, and only to be undertaken in an emergency. Although the older manuals admitted the possibility of using light flak to reinforce the fire of heavy infantry weapons, and of using heavy flak to sup­ plement antitank and other artillery, such employment was described as exceptional. There was nothing to suggest, for example, the now extensive use of the 88­ mm antiaircraft gun in an antitank role. The transition from the defensive doctrine of the earlier manuals to the more aggressive modern concep­ tion seems to date from the introduction of the Flak Corps—units of which first appeared during the Battle of France. The Flak Corps was created to perform the tasks described in the following enemy notes.
The Flak Corps is a wartime organization, and constitutes an operational reserve of the commander in chief of the German Air Force. It combines great mobility with heavy fire power. It can be employed in conjunction with spearheads composed of armored and motorized forces, and with nonmotorized troops in
26

GERMANY

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IN THE FIELD

27

forcing river crossings and attacking fortified positions. It can also be deployed as highly mobile artillery to support tank attacks. The Flak Corps can take part in antitank defense on a broad front, and can be employed in ground engagements at strongly contested points. Its capabilities are tremendous in antiaircraft defense, because its great mobility enables it to rush flak concen­ trations to strategically important points, and to transfer flak strength from one area to another, as required. It is also responsible for protecting forward ground organiza­ tions of the German Air Force.

As these notes show, flak in the field is now intended to serve as a powerful and highly mobile striking force. The emphasis laid on its employment in the ground role, and in an offensive capacity in conjunction with spearhead formations, is most important. Experience has verified that these principles are actively practiced in the field.
2. HEAVY FLAK
a. General

In operations with the field army, the 88-mm gun, as a result of its great mobility, has become almost the universal weapon of heavy flak. Larger calibers are usually encountered only in areas where the defense is static. The heavy flak battery consists either of four or six guns (usually 88's), with two light guns (20-mm) for close protection. Six-gun batteries are becoming in­ creasingly common. In theory the heavy battery con­ sists of two platoons, but in practice it is rarely divided in this manner. All the guns are generally fitted with

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

shields, to protect the detachments against small-arms fire, and with two sights—a telescopic sight for the direct engagement of ground targets, and a panoramic sight for indirect laying. In the interests of mobility, the fire-control equipment is often left behind. In addi­ tion to time-fuze high-explosive ammunition, armorpiercing and percussion-fuze high-explosive ammuni­ tion is normally carried. To avoid the muzzle flashes which, at night, readily give away the gun positions, the Germans now make widespread use of a flashless propellant. The 88-mm gun can be put into action in about 2 minutes. If necessary, it can be fired from its mount, but against ground targets only.1 Since the normal mount is conspicuous because of its height, the gun is ex­ tremely vulnerable to artillery fire. Whenever possible, therefore, the gun is dug in so that only the barrel appears over the top of the emplacement. (Actually, the time factor and the frequent moves do not always permit the Germans to devise effective concealment.) Realizing that destruction of hostile observation posts constitutes an indirect method of protecting their heavy flak guns, the Germans try to accomplish this at every opportunity. The 88-mm guns can open fire on armored vehicles at 2,500 yards with fair prospect of success, but are most effective at ranges of about 1,000 to 1,500 yards. They may fire at ranges of as much as 4,000 yards, if other and
1 Against ground targets on the Eastern Front, the Germans have used a self-propelled 88-mm gun, called the "Ferdinand." See Intelligence Bul­ letin, Vol. II, No. 1, a 1.

GERMANY

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IK THE FIELD

29

more inviting targets are not available. With the aid of a forward observation post, 88's sometimes engage such targets as troop concentrations at ranges of as much as 6,000 yards.2 The following are examples of the penetration performance with the 88-mm Flak 36, the most common model of this gun:
Thickness of armor Range (yards) 30° angle of impact Perpendicular (no angle of impact)

500 1,000 1,500 2,000

110 mm (4.33 in) 101 mm (3.97 in) __ 92 mm (3.62 in) 84 mm (3.30 in)

_. _ _ _ _ _ __ __

129 mm 119 mm 110 mm 100 mm

(5.07 in). (4.68 in). (4.33 in). (3.93 in).

It is estimated that the following figures are correct for the 88-mm Flak 41:
Thickness of armor Range (yards) 30° angle ef impact Perpendicular (no angle of impact)

500 1,000 1,500 2,000
2

150 mm 140 mm 130 mm 121 mm

(5.91 in) _ __ (5.51 in) ._ (5.12 in) ___ (4.76'in)

175 mm 164 mm 153 mm 142 mm

(6.89 in). (6.46 in). (6.02 in). (5.59 in).

The telescopic sight is.graduated up to 10.340 yards, and theoretically it would be possible to engage targets up to this range. In indirect fire, when the panoramic sight is used, the maximum range of the 88-mm Flak 36 is 11,445 yards with time-fuze high-explosive ammunition, and 16,132 yards with percussion-fuze high-explosive ammunition. Corresponding maximum ranges with the 88-mm Flak 41 are: Yards Direct fire (with telescopic sight) 11,770 Indirect fire (with panoramic sight) : Using time-fuze HE 13, 561 Using percussion-fuze HE 22, 091
554705°—43—vol. 2, No. 3 5

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

b. Employment in Rear Areas

In rear areas heavy flak has the normal task of pro­ viding antiaircraft protection for ports, airfields, dumps, headquarters, and points of importance on lines of communication. Predictors and/or auxiliary pre­ dictors are employed, and mobile radio-location equip­ ment may also be allotted. Although flak units in rear areas primarily have the task of providing antiaircraft protection, even these units are normally provided with armor-piercing and percussion-fuze high-explosive am­ munition, and therefore can operate against any hostile troops or armored vehicles which may break through. The heavy flak's degree of preparedness to meet such attacks naturally depends on the distance between the guns and the front.
c. Employment in Forward Areas

It is in the employment of heavy flak batteries at­ tached to the Army, for operations in forward areas, that current German methods depart most noticeably from the doctrine expressed in earlier manuals. Formerly, German doctrine outlined a primary anti­ aircraft role, a secondary antitank role, and, under ex­ ceptional circumstances, employment in a field-artillery role. It may be said that the antitank role now has assumed virtual priority, for experience has shown that the 88-mm gun has become an indispensable complement to the German Army's antitank artillery. A certain proportion of heavy batteries in forward areas is still deployed in an antiaircraft role, chiefly to protect for­ ward airfields, and during periods of inactivity or prep­

GERMAXY

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK INI THE FIELD

31

aration the antiaircraft role still predominates. For example, an assembly prior to an attack will usually be protected by heavy guns, and under these conditions the ground role is assumed only in the event that the Germans are subjected to a surprise attack. However, once battle is joined, whether in attack or defense (and especially when armored forces are involved), the heavy flak guns are usually employed against ground targets only, and the antiaircraft role becomes the exception. If necessary, even guns originally deployed to give anti­ aircraft protection to forward airfields are sometimes pressed into service as antitank weapons. The employment of heavy flak batteries naturally varies considerably, depending on the terrain and the nature of the fighting. In open country the 88-mm gun's long range gives it a distinct advantage as an antitank weapon. In North Africa, where so often there was no well-defined "line," heavy flak batteries often served as the nucleus of defensive "hedgehogs." In an advance the primary function of the batteries usually has been to provide antitank protection during the movement of German armored vehicles. The 88's have also been known to accompany tanks in an as­ sault-gun role. Although the battery is the normal fire unit, large numbers of 88-mm guns have occasionally been employed under one command when the situation has required that maximum antitank strength be con­ centrated at a single point. A striking example of the value of heavy flak in defense is afforded by the final phases of the Tunisian

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campaign, in which heavy flak units frequently pro­ vided the backbone of German resistance to the Allied advance. For this purpose several units were formed into mobile battle groups, a procedure which had been resorted to on previous occasions, and which pre­ sumably is dictated by the stress of circumstances. These flak battle groups are purely temporary units, formed for a specific purpose. They consist of a number of platoons, usually with two heavy and three light guns each, and may be employed either alone or in combination with other arms. They are used both in defense and in attack. Since they are mobile strik­ ing forces, there is always a possibility that they will be used by the Germans in attempts to repel landings on the European continent. They would afford a means of rapid counterattack in threatened sectors. The employment of these temporary units, which has become increasingly common, demonstrates the flexi­ bility of flak organization in the field and the extent to which the Germans use heavy flak to complement anti­ tank artillery. The employment of a heavy flak battery is naturally governed by the type of operation that is being under­ taken by the Army unit to which it is attached. Al­ though the lessons learned from desert warfare are not necessarily applicable to other theaters, the activity of a heavy flak battery during the early stages of the German counteroffensive in Cyrenaica in May 1942 affords some very good tactical illustrations. During this action the battery accompanied the Army unit to

GERMANY

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK INI THE FIELD

33

which it was attached, and provided protection both against air attacks and tank attacks. The ground role predominated. Not only were tank engagements fought by day, but at night the battery was deployed in an antitank role to protect its "parent" Army unit. The battery was continually on the move during the day. More than once it detached some of its guns to strengthen another Army unit, and at other times it, in turn, was given added strength. When opposition was expected, the battery took up an antitank siting, generally on high ground and facing the piobable line of attack. The choice of this position was not hard­ and-fast. The battery moved to a different position when reconnaissance had established the location and course of the hostile tanks. When in position, the battery often had to site its guns so that they faced in two directions, because of uncertainty as to the exact line of attack.
3. LIGHT FLAK a. General

Light flak units operating in the field are generally equipped with 20-mm guns (single- or four-barreled), sometimes with 37-mm (1.45 in.) guns, and once in a great while with 50-mm (1.97 in.) guns. A light bat­ tery normally consists of four platoons of 20-mm guns, or three platoons of the larger caliber light guns, with three guns to each platoon. Light flak guns are especially useful in combatting surprise attacks, because of the.rapidity with which

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these pieces can be put into action. The 20-mm Flak 30, for example, can be put into action in about half a minute, and in extreme emergencies all light flak guns can be fired (although with a limited traverse) from their mounts. In addition, it is known that self-pro­ pelled models of the 20-mm and 37-mm calibers exist and can engage both air and ground targets. Like the heavy guns, the light guns in the field are usually fitted with shields for protection against small-arms fire. They are also fitted with flak sights and/or telescopic or linear sights, and carry armor-piercing ammunition in addition to percussion-fuze high-explosive ammuni­ tion. Light flak guns may engage ground targets, es­ pecially "soft-skinned" vehicles, at ranges of as much as 800 yards, but are most effective at ranges up to about 300 yards. The following are examples of the penetra­ tion performance of the 20-mm Flak 30 firing armorpiercing projectiles:
Thickness of armor Range (yards) 30° angle of impact Perpendicular

100 200 300 400

31 mm (1.22 in) 29 mm (1.14 in) 27 mm (1.06 in) 25 mm (0.98 in)____ _

_

48 mm (1.89 in).
44 mm (1.73 in).
41 mm (1.61 in).
38 mm (1.50 in).

b. Employment in Rear Areas

In rear areas light flak batteries have the normal task of giving antiaircraft protection to such vital points as airfields, bridges, railroad stations and junctions, head­ quarters, and depots. For this purpose batteries are

GERMANY—TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IK. THE FIELD

35

generally deployed as a whole, with the guns sited by platoons. Although the antiaircraft role predominates, these batteries constitute an important element in the ground defense plan for the vital rear points they are protecting, and are prepared to engage any armored or other forces which may succeed in penetrating to that depth.
c. Employment in Forward Areas

Light batteries attached to Army units in forward areas may also operate as a whole, but platoons are usu­ ally detached to perform special tasks. On the march, platoons are generally spaced at in­ tervals along the column, or are sited at particularly vulnerable points along the route—such as bridges, de­ files, or crossroads—and subsequently "leapfrog" for­ ward. Their principal task is to protect the column against attack by low-flying aircraft; their secondary task is to engage ground forces. In battle light flak units afford protection for head­ quarters, field artillery concentrations, infantry concen­ trations, engineer units, motor parks, and so on. Also, it is sometimes considered necessary to assign a light platoon (three guns) to a heavy flak battery engaged in antitank work—presumably because, under certain cir­ cumstances, the two light guns belonging to the two bat­ teries do not afford enough protection. In all these tasks the antiaircraft role predominates, but engage­ ment of personnel and armored vehicles is also regarded as highly important and often takes place. Experience

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has shown that during tank attacks, light guns, as well as heavy guns, have ignored air targets and have con­ centrated on hostile armored vehicles, leaving German ground units to defend themselves against air attack by means of rifle and light machine-gun fire. (As previous issues of the Intelligence Bulletin have explained, Ger­ man Army training stresses the importance of smallarms fire in defense against low-flying aircraft.) It will be seen that whereas heavyflak—whichis well suited to combat ground targets, partly because of its penetration performance—is now being given wide tac­ tical employment in a ground role, light flak with the Army still clings pretty much to the principles outlined in German pre-war manuals. Although the capability of light flak in a ground role is always something to take into account, this type of employment seems to be the exception, rather than the rule.
NOTE.—This section has dealt solely with German Air Force flak. There are also (1) Army flak (Heeresflak) units, which include "mixed" battalions (containing both heavy and light batteries) as part of the artillery, and (2) light companies (Flu), which have light guns only, as part of the infantry. These other types are not numerous, however. As a rule, they are GHQ troops, and are attached to army units in much the same way that German Air Force flak units are attached. Recent enemy documents show that an Army flak battalion, consisting of two heavy batteries and one light battery, is now included in the tables of organization of armored and motorized divisions.

Section VI. MISCELLANEOUS
1. IMPROVISED BANGALORE TORPEDOES

Besides employing a standard Bangalore torpedo, the Germans make considerable use of improvised versions. The materials used in constructing weapons of this type depend entirely on local resources, while the method of construction follows one of two general principles: a. The tubular model, which is not built to any par­ ticular dimensions, utilizes any convenient length of piping, such as a drain pipe or metal water pipe. The pipe is filled with explosive, and each end is plugged with a piece of wood or any other suitable material that may be at hand. A detonator and a length of safety fuze are fitted to one end. b. The other version consists of a plank, or any con­ venient length of timber. At one end a number of charges are laid side by side. The exact number de­ pends on the task to be performed. These charges are fastened to the plank by means of wire or stout cord. A detonator and a safety fuze are attached to the charge at the far end. A typical example is a speci­ men which was captured recently; it consisted of a plank, 6% feet by 1% inches by 1 inch, to which 15 y2-pound (approx.) slabs of TNT had been tied. These were to be detonated by means of a detonator
554705°—43—vol. 2, No. 3 6 37

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and a length of safety fuze that would give a delay of 30 seconds.
2. NEW ARMY CAP

The adoption of a standard field cap (Ewheits­ miltze) for the German Army has been ordered (see fig. 3). The cap, which resembles that worn by X S. L railroad men, will replace the former German garrison ("overseas") cap. If the visor interferes with the handling of weapons or equipment, the cap will be worn back to front. Units wearing a black field uni­ form will wear a black cap. Generals caps will have gold cord around the top; all other officers' caps will have silver cord around the top.

PAKT TWO: JAPAN

Section I. NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS
1. INTRODUCTION

Several new types of Japanese weapons are described in recent reports from observers in combat areas of the Pacific. These weapons include: a. A hand grenade which is actuated by a pull-type igniter; b. A small, smooth-surfaced hand grenade which is actuated by striking the fuze against a hard surface— as in the case of the Model 91 and the Model 97 gre­ nades; * c. A 47-mm antitank gun which is completely mod­ ern in design; and d. Four types of booby traps.
2. PULL-TYPE HAND GRENADE
a. Description

This grenade, which has an over-all length of 3% inches and a diameter of 2 inches, is easily distinguished from Models 91 and 97 because it has no lengthwise grooves. The weapon has five traverse grooves, how­ ever, and it also has a lead cover which is grooved to
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 1, included a section devoted to these and other grenades and mines which have booby-trapping possibilities. 39
1

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provide a grip for the fingers in removing the cover. On one side of this grenade, fitted to the top and bottom, are two rings. These could be used for carrying the weapon, or for anchoring in case it is used as a booby trap.
b. Table of Characteristics Over-all length Length of body Length of cover Diameter of body Diameter of cover Body (material) Cover (material) Weight (total) Weight of Weight of body Loading factor Filler c. Operation 3% inches. 2% inches. 1 inch. 2 inches. iy 8 inch. Cast iron. Lead. 449 grams. 39.5 grams. 509.5 grams. 8.7 percent. Granular TNT.

filler

To remove the lead cover, depress the cover thumb release on the side of the grenade (see fig. 4). The cover then screws off in iy2 turns. This exposes the firing string. When the firing string is pulled, it draws a friction igniter between two pieces of match composi­ tion and fires them. The match composition, in turn, fires a 5%-second delay train, which fires the detonator, thus setting off the main charge.

JAPAN1—NEW JAPANESE

WEAPONS

41

Cover
thumb release

Firing string Brass plate Match composition Lead cover

Friction

Delay train ( 5 j sec)

Detonator

Figure 4.—Japanese Pull-type Hand Grenade.

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d. Booby-trapping Possibilities

Since this grenade can be activated by a pull on the firing string, it is better adapted to booby-trapping pur­ poses than the Model 91 and the Model 97 grenades. The grenade booby-trap sketch (taken from a Japa-

Figure 5.—Japanese Grenade Booby Trap.

nese document) in figure 5 is of the pull type. The enemy may rig up such booby traps on dead soldiers in battle areas in a manner so that a pull of a leg or some other part of the body will cause detonation.
3. OFFENSIVE HAND GRENADE a. Description

This grenade is small in comparison with the Model 91 and Model 97 Japanese grenades (see fig. 6). It is

JAPAN—NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS

43

Firing pinFir ing-pin retainer spring ­

• Sleeve •Safety-pin hole

Breather hole

Delay train­

•Grenade body Booster-

Figure 6.—Japanese Offensive Hand Grenade.

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3.5 inches long and 1.75 inches in diameter, and weighs approximately 10 ounces. Because of its light weight, the grenade can be thrown almost as far as a baseball. This fact indicates that the weapon is designed pri­ marily for use in offensive operations. It is called "offensive" hand grenade in this section because its model number is not known. The body of the grenade is smooth and cylindrical, both inside and outside, and has a rim at each end. Its nonserrated body is an additional help in distinguishing the weapon from the other types of Japanese hand grenades. It is closed by a threaded plug, which has a hole in the center to receive a threaded fuze. The workmanship of the grenade is good, and ord­ nance experts consider the fuze an improvement over that of the Model 91 and Model 97 grenades.
b. Operation

A sleeve that holds the firing pin and the firing-pin retainer spring in place is held to the fuze by means of a small screw. The detonator booster is crimped to the lower part of the fuze body. The safety pin, which pre­ vents the firing pin from striking the primer, is held in place by a cord. To arm the grenade, remove the safety pin and strike the head of the weapon against some hard object, such as a helmet. Thus the operation is like that of the Model 91 and 97 grenades.
4. MODEL 1 (1941) 47-MM AT GUN

This new Japanese weapon is a split-trail piece of modern design (see fig. 7). Its silhouette is low, and

JAPAN

NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS

4 5

its tread is unusually wide. Because of these features, plus the fact that the wheels are fitted with pneumatic tires, it is evident that the piece is adapted for towing by a motor vehicle.

Figure 7.—Japanese Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun.

The barrel of this weapon is extremely long, and is heavily reinforced at the muzzle. This indicates a high muzzle velocity. The trails, also unusually long, are equipped with a locking yoke and handles. The wide tread and small wheels permit a wide traverse. A wide shield, cut away at the bottom, is provided. A complete check has not been made on the ammuni­ tion used for this weapon. However, the armor-pierc­ ing round is 15.5 inches long and weighs 6 pounds 5 ounces, complete. The case, made of brass, is unusually large and long, and is necked down to take the 47-mm projectile. The projectile has a red tip, a black body, and a white band just in front of the cop­ per rotating band.
5. BOOBY TRAPS

Four types of booby traps which the Japanese may use in future operations are described below. The

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sketches and explanatory wording were compiled from various Japanese notes. They may have been copied from enemy military instructions or they may have been devised by individual Japanese soldiers with technical experience.
a. Device Using a Parasol
Phial containing sulphuric ocid Detonating fluid Mixture of detonating and ignition fluid Detonating fluid

Ignition fluid

Mixture of heat producing acid.

Figure 8.

This booby trap apparently is a combined explosive and incendiary device. Opening of the parasol prob­
b. Device Using a Flashlight

Explosive Switch Bicycle ball bearings (probably used as schrapnel) Dry cell battery

Figure 9.

JAPAN

NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS

47

ably breaks the acid vial, which in turn, ignites the det­ onating and ignition mixtures. In this type of booby trap, the flashlight switch is used to connect a circuit through an electric detonator. When the switch is pressed, the explosive is ignited.
c. Device Using a Pipe

Threaded joint

Explosive

Figure 10.

" A " is probably a safety pin, which, while inserted, prevents the unscrewing of the pipe stem. When the device is placed as a bobby trap, the safety pin would be removed; after this, unscrewing of the stem would release the striker pin, which would fire the percussion cap and explosive.

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d.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Device Using a Bottle
Rubber cork

Mixture of potassium chlorate and (T.N. unreadable)

Air space

Benzine or kerosene

Sulphuric acid

Figure 11.

If the bottle is picked up and shaken, or if it is tipped over, sulphuric acid coming in contact with the mixture in the cork would cause a small explosion and ignite the benzine. This type of booby trap is probably designed primarily for its incendiary effect.

Section II. NOTES ON JAPANESE LANDING OPERATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION

The information contained in this section has been extracted from several translated Japanese documents dealing with landing operations. Some of the state­ ments come from enemy field manuals, while others ap­ pear to be based on results of landing maneuvers. In connection with this section, reference should be made to information previously published in the Intelligence Bulletin and other M. I. D. publications on Japanese landing operations. For example, Intelligence Bulle­ tin, Vol. I, No. 8, included a lengthy article which was paraphrased from a translated enemy document titled "Amphibious Tactics Based on Experiences at Wake." In the paragraphs which follow, the reader must bear in mind that he is reading Japanese doctrine, some of which is experimental, and he must not confuse it with our own doctrine on landing operations.
2. ACTION BEFORE LANDING a. Selection of Landing Points

In selecting landing points, take into consideration the prob­ ability that hostile forces have a lot of mechanized vehicles and an excellent network of roads and other means of communication. The landing points should be suitable for landing installations,
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and especially convenient for the landing and subsequent advance of vehicles. In landing on hostile coasts where breakers are anticipated, it is best to select one or two alternate landing points because the actual condition of the surf may be different from that which was expected. For example, we had expected large breakers at one of the points considered for landing in the Philippines, but a close reconnaissance revealed that they were small. Therefore we landed there the first day. Toward nightfall, the surf became rough, so we changed anchorage and continued the landing opera­ tions at another point, where the surf was not heavy. b. Reconnaissance of Landing Points A thorough air reconnaissance of proposed landing points must be made by a competent officer who is scheduled to participate in the landings. Also, air photos must be made and distributed to each unit designated to take part in the landings. These photos must show views of the landing points during high tide and also during low tide. Keconnaissance of landing points from the sea must be carried out secretly and quickly. If possible, this reconnaissance, with the aid of air photos, should determine passages and points navi­ gable by boat. Reconnaissance of coasts with unusual charac­ teristics must be continued, even after the first wave of troops has landed. This is especially true if the first wave lands at high tide, because at low tide it may be necessary to change the route of approach or even the landing point. c. Selection of Time for Landings Ordinarily, landing operations will start early enough to allow the front-line units to reach shore at dawn. Where an attack by a superior air force, or an advance up a long defile, is expected after landing, it may be necessary to start landings about mid­ night, so that most of the personnel will be landed by dawn. On shores where it is difficult to land at night, a daylight landing in force may be necessary.

JAPAN

NOTES ON LANDING OPERATIONS

51

3. ACTION DURING LANDING a. Water and Terrain Difficulties

When the nature of the terrain around the landing point can­ not be determined in advance, it will be necessary to rely on a compass and navigational skill in landing. As much information as possible should be gained from tide charts, air photos, and sailing directories. If the characteristics of the coast necessitate the use of more than one landing place, collapsible boats, ponton boats, rafts, and so forth will be used. In seas where the current is swift and parts of the landing point are obscure, each boat should carry a searchlight- as a navi­ gational aid. Preferably, an experienced naval man should handle the searchlight.
b. Overcoming Resistance

(1) General
It is fundamental that we gain as much surprise as possible in landing operations. Surprise can sometimes be gained, at least for a time, by maneuvering the first wave of landing craft or by approaching by a roundabout route. In countering resistance by hostile forces, Army troops usually will handle the land opposition, and the Navy will take care of the opposition on water. However, to handle the destruction of small hostile boats and to give direct cover to the convoy, the Navy generally depends on the D engineer regiment's armored boats and other special craft. When landing on a coast directly defended by fortified posi­ tions, the fighting usually begins with the arrival of the landing craft offshore. Under heavy fire from such land positions, it is not only difficult, as a rule, to control units, but it is usually impossible to carry out a planned attack. Therefore, officers of all ranks in the front-line units must make the most thorough preparations to deliver a surprise attack or to counter the hostile

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attack successfully. These first-line units must strike hard against the enemy's [United Nations] weak points, and advance resolutely to the advance line agreed upon previously. They must also take advantage of deficiencies in the hostile plan offireand of any other weaknesses—and it must be clearly remembered that the hostile forces will have many wTeak points.

(2) With Artillery
When artillery is firing from transports to cover landings, the divisional commander must closely watch the progress of the landing units and give orders to fire at the right time. Premature fire might seriously expose our plans. To give direct support to the infantry in their battle near the water's edge, part of the field artillery and mountain artillery is sometimes attached to the first-line infantry and landed in the first echelon. This attached artillery is often given the task of advancing into the hostile lines, immediately after landing, for the purpose of neutralizing fire from loopholes of fortifications and of neutralizing the weapons protecting the hostile flanks. The artillery landed with the first echelon of infantry must at all costs follow the first-line units as supporting weapons. Liaison with adjacent artillery units in the forward area must be main­ tained so that the development of the artillery battle may be coordinated and controlled. The infantry commanders must give the accompanying artillery units any assistance necessary for changing positions, or moving forward. Immediately after landing, positions for artillery should be chosen near the point of arrival. If possible, these positions should not be on a distinct coast line. They must be well con­ cealed from the air and easy to enter quickly. Also, these posi­ tions should be inaccessible to hostile tanks.

(3) With Tanks
The first-line infantry commander decides, according to cir­ cumstances, whether he will use attached tanks at the water's edge

JAPAN—NOTES ON LANDING OPERATIONS

53

or in the battle after landing. Tanks to be used at the water's edge are allotted to the first-line infantry battalions for close cooperation in the infantry fighting. The battalion commanders must consider the strength of the hostile forces, the amount of light, the nature of the terrain, and especially the difficulties in­ volved in landing tanks: and they must not hesitate to allot these weapons to the different companies. Tanks to be used in the battle after landing may be coordinated with the general plan, detached to subordinate units to break through the main hostile defense lines, or used as the cores of the assault units. The tanks cooperating in the battle at the water's edge must also reconnoiter the hostile positions and the adjacent terrain. They will lose no opportunity to demolish systematically all the wire entanglements, protections against flank attack, fortified po­ sitions, lighting equipment, and so forth. The tank commander quickly takes control of his subordinates, maintains close liaison with the infantry and artillery, and warns against advancing recklessly and getting cut off from friendly forces. If necessary, the commander stops the tanks and. after determining the loca­ tion of our troops and studying the "lay of the land," he may choose hostile localities easy for maneuvers, or dead ground, and then wipe out objectives at close quarters. The leaders of tank platoons must keep in touch with neighbor­ ing tanks and also with their company commanders. They must see to it that no hitches occur in the fighting after daybreak. Tanks landed during the daytime to assist the infantry fighting are given protective cover by infantry and engineer troops who are fighting near the water's edge. The tanks assemble quickly near the landing point and complete their battle preparations, such as amending orders, removing waterproof equipment, and so forth. In cooperation with the front-line infantry and artil­ lery, these tanks neutralize hostile flank defenses and small ob­ stacles, take key points, and crush hostile counterattacking units.

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(4) With Special Assault Detachments
If necessary, each company commander should organize and train in advance a special assault detachment. These detach­ ments are designed to neutralize fortifications and to reduce cen­ ters of resistance, generally by attacking them from the rear. Personnel of the detachments use automatic weapons, demolition bombs, armor-piercing bombs, hand grenades, flame throwers, gas, smoke, and demolition charges placed in groups. Depending upon circumstances, it may be possible to block loopholes and use flame throwers from the beginning. I t is best to put all members of the special assault detachment in one landing boat so that they may push forward to the infantry front line immediately after landing, and carry out their duties with as much speed and secrecy as possible.

(5) By Use of Smoke
Smoke can be used so as to cover our operations, prevent illu­ mination of our movements by searchlights, cause deficiencies in the hostile plan of fire, or prevent the enemy [United Nations] from paying attention to other developments. How smoke will be used should be determined according to weather conditions (particularly the direction of the wind), ac­ cording to our plans, and according to the available manpower and the quality and quantity of our smoke equipment. Smoke may be spread directly in front of the hostile positions, it may be laid on the enemy [United Nations] objectives, it may be used so as to split up the coast on which we land, or it may be thrown as a curtain on the flanks and over the sea between the opposing forces. When surrounding the hostile forces with smoke, it is some­ times a good idea to combine it with toxic smoke. The time for starting the emission of smoke depends on the strength and disposition of the hostile forces, our situation and plans, the amount of light, and the speed and direction of the

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wind. Necessary preparations must be made in advance so that smoke may be emitted as soon as it is ordered. At night do not use smoke merely to interfere with search­ lights and artillery fire, but use it for the first time when the advance ashore is obstructed. With a moderate wind velocity, 10 to 20 smoke candles (float­ ing type) thrown upon the sea at the same time will form an effective smoke cover for about iy2 miles. When making a frontal or flanking smoke screen with the wind to your back, you can make the smoke continuous by throw­ ing two of the floating smoke candles on the sea at the same time and providing an interval of about 20 yards between each pair of candles. An armor-plated boat can carry about 150 floating smoke candles. Four to seven men will be needed to carry out a smokeemission assignment involving the use of floating smoke candles and smoke generators. First-line units which lay smoke screens in landing operations generally use grenade dischargers, smoke shells, discharging smoke candles, smoke candles, and so forth. When the wind is blowing toward the landing point at a speed greater than that of the landing boats, lay a smoke screen spread out widely o\7er the water. This can be done if each boat emits smoke as it moves toward the landing point. As far as possible, each boat moves in the thin part of the screen. If there is a cross wind or head wind, personnel in the first boats to land should lay a smoke screen immediately, in front or to the flank, in order to facilitate the landing operation. Artillery and debarkation work units on transports lay smoke screens against important parts of the hostile positions, such as observation posts, searchlights, and flank-defense preparations. Depending upon the direction of the wind, it is sometimes advan­ tageous to use red smoke shells along with the other shells. Eight smoke candles discharged from a boat with a simultane­

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ous firing device will cover a frontage of about 50 yards at the water's edge. When using the Type 99 discharging smoke candles (old type of discharging smoke candle), fire them when about 350 yards from the shore. c. Communication and Liaison The success of the landing operations largely depends upon the close cooperation between the units landed for immediate combat and the debarkation work units. Therefore, the liaison officers must do everything possible to unite the efforts of these units. For liaison and communication, do not wTait until a regular boat and communication network is established, but use boats, radios, flag and light signals, and, when the anchorage is close, lay a cable. It is also possible to use carrier pigeons. Anchorage headquarters must immediately build a lookout tower for the purpose of establishing command liaison with ships and boats at sea. d. Duties of Debarkation Work Units Immediately upon landing, the debarkation work units must make a quick reconnaissance of the coast line and the traffic ashore, and then hastily construct on-the-spot landing installa­ tions and open traffic routes. For landing large or heavy equipment, it is necessary to choose the most suitable places. These need not necessarily be the orig­ inal landing points. When unloading motor vehicles, gun car­ riages, and so forth, the work units must lay steel mats, wheel mats, boards, and so forth. If possible, tractors, trucks, and some­ times tanks or armored cars should be used. The work units must arrange for the necessary equipment to carry out these operations. However, each regular combat unit must make plans for its own unloading beforehand, and must prepare pulleys, nets, and other equipment before embarking. To reduce losses, it is necessary to spread out on the1 landing shore the various installations, the troops, and the munitions and

JAPAN

NOTES ON LANDING OPERATIONS

57

other supplies. Troops and materiel should be disposed so as to prevent confusion. Each combat unit must keep in close touch with the work unit for its landing sector. It is important that each fighting unit quickly move its men, horses, and vehicles away from the coast. When the line of advance from the coast is limited, unloading installations easily become crowded together. It is necessary to do everything possible to disperse these, and to establish traffic routes parallel to the shore. When possible, utilize to the fullest extent any native labor. Also seize any shipping in the landing area and utilize it in the landing operations. 4. ACTION AFTER LANDING The traffic control organization is assisted by sentries in the task of directing vehicles and personnel from the landing points to the various unit combat sectors. While the troops are embarking, the division commander must allot bicycles to the infantry and engineer units which are to lead the advance, or to the reserves who are to be thrown into the battle quickly at any opportunity to exploit success. At the time of landing the division commander must lose no opportunity to let the men have their bicycles. Depending upon circumstances, the bicycles are assembled on the coast at the various landingpoints. The main object in using bicycles is to supplement short­ ages in motor vehicles for long-range operations, especially dur­ ing pursuit, and to increase the division's mobility. Each unit should be in position to summon its vehicles quickly from the landing area or the vehicle-assembly point. Vehicles landed in the area of the division traffic-control organization should first be collected at the assembly point before following the unit to which they are allotted. As a rule, vehicles—especially motor vehicles—should avoid advancing parallel to each other or going in a reverse direction. A vehicle repair center must be set up as the units move into

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action. To accomplish this, part of the vehicle-repairing organi­ zation must be landed as quickly as possible. Particularly for the sake of increasing our maneuverability, commanding officers of all ranks should pay attention to achiev­ ing quick capture of hostile communication facilities, especially motor vehicles, railroads, and repair shops. The quick repair of demolished and obstructed roads is of the utmost importance. Regardless of the aid of engineers, all troops should be charged with opening up their o^Yn line of advance. The division commander must attach the necessary engineers to the front-line troops for landing operations, and give to the re­ mainder the task of repairing roads, railroads, bridges, and so forth. I t is essential that engineers quickly repair roads and bridges.

Section III. ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES
1. GENERAL

The following notes on Japanese antiaircraft meas­ ures were obtained from U. S. observers and from enemy documents. Observers report that, until recent months, the anti­ aircraft defenses on Japanese naval ships have been more accurate and more concentrated than the landbased antiaircraft fire. This distinction is no longer true, the observers say, because of improvements in the quantity and quality of land-based weapons. The nature of antiaircraft fire over enemy targets can frequently be predicted by evaluating certain fac­ tors concerning the target. For example, if the target has tactical or economic importance but is far distant and has not been visited in recent months, all types of antiaircraft guns may be encountered. However, they usually are not numerous and the crews are poorly trained. A less important but remote target frequently has only medium and light antiaircraft guns. A new target under development and not previously attacked may have no antiaircraft defense. The num­ ber and caliber of guns at frequently bombed targets will, as a rule, be continually increased. Apparently the enemy feels that such targets are strategically important to us because we bomb them often.
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2. AT SEA
a. Weapons

The size of Japanese sea-borne antiaircraft weapons generally is in proportion to the size of the ships. Merchant ships of 5,000 or more tons frequently carry heavy guns, while those between 3,000 and 5,000 tons usually carry medium guns. As a rule, smaller mer­ chant vessels are armed only with light weapons, but torpedo boats and even smaller vessels usually mount medium guns, while heavy guns are always found on destroyers and larger naval vessels. In arranging antiaircraft weapons on ships, the Japanese concentrate the guns at the bow and stern in order to obtain effective vertical (or near vertical) fire. Antiaircraft machine guns and pom-pom guns are generally placed on the top bridge or near the bow and stern. Light machine guns and rifles are placed around the front, back, and sides of transports in order to "cover" dead space caused by equipment. Sandbags are used to secure the tripods of the light antiaircraft weapons, and also to protect personnel from hostile fire and sea waves.
b. Tactics

Japanese ships usually execute sharp evasive move­ ments, with frequent changes in course, when attacked by aircraft. These tactics, the Japanese admit, lessen the accuracy of antiaircraft fire. The following notes were extracted from translations of Japanese documents dealing with antiaircraft de­ fenses.

JAPAX—ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES

61

Air sentries and soldiers will report airplanes according to the direction of the clock, using such expressions as "2 o'clock di­ rection." Open fire against hostile planes as soon as they come within effective range. Fire heavily, concentrating on the most threat­ ening targets, and seek to break up the hostile plan of attack before it can be executed. In firing at aircraft with rifles and light machine guns, it is essential to have a good position. Rest your body and your left elbow on the gunwale and keep alert. Fire when the ship is at the top or at the bottom of a wave. Get the bearing of the hostile planes, align your sights, and then use following fire. If the hostile aircraft are over 2.000 feet high, and if their cross-country speed is smallr you will find it profitable to fire on fixed lines.

The following are the most important points in anti­ aircraft firing:
a. Do your best to judge the height of aircraft with your meas­ uring instruments, and to judge their course and speed with your naked eye. b. Because of the pitching and rolling of the ship, the heightfinder generally is accurate only to within 4 to 5 degrees. If the pitching and rolling is considerable, special adjustments are made, or corrections are made when the boat is level. c. When attacked by a dive bomber, wait until the plane pulls out of its dive and then try to shoot it down. d. Against a torpedo bomber, it is necessary to open fire quickly and try to shoot it down at a range of more than 1,000 yards. Since the torpedo bombers fly low over the water as they come in to attack, fire shrapnel at them with field artillery and moun­ tain artillery guns, which are distributed aboard ship. A rapid rate of fire should be used. To prevent hostile planes from strafing at low altitudes, small balloons should be raised quickly.

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3. WHILE LANDING The protection of landing coasts against air attacks is the responsibility not only of the divisional antiaircraft dispositions but also of each individual unit commander. In accordance with this policy, the first-line units must form detachments for anti­ aircraft protection while landing, and must prepare for air raids immediately after landing. These detachments and the unload­ ing units must dig the necessary protective trenches near the shore. During landing operations, antiaircraft boats must be properly disposed, and part of the antiaircraft artillery company must be landed immediately for shore protection. When hostile planes dominate the skies, try to use the weapons attached to the large and the small motor landing boats. Boats which are not being used should be hidden immediately in the shade along the edge of the water, or camouflaged with ma­ terials similar to the surroundings. If boats in use are attacked, the formation and the direction of travel should be changed immediately. To reduce damage from hostile bombs, transport ships should be anchored in an irregular formation. Anchoring in a straight line would limit thefieldof fire of machine guns. As a precaution against bomb damages, ships should be anchored some distance apart. 4. ON LAND

According to observers, Japanese land-based antiair­ craft guns usually open fire while United Nations planes are still out of range, and continue firing until our air­ craft are well away from the target. In-most cases the fire is of the barrage type, although a good deal of aimed fire has been encountered. In one Southwest Pacific area, Japanese searchlights were slow in picking up planes—perhaps because the

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ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES

63

planes approached in a glide. However, after picking the planes, the searchlight crews held them well. One crew observed two or three banks of searchlights. Each bank consisted of 12 searchlights, and each acted as a unit. In the meantime, 15 or 20 other searchlights operated individually. Individual searchlights were spaced at intervals of not more than 400 yards along the shore of the defended area.

Section IV.

SOME DEFENSE TECHNIQUES USED BY THE JAPANESE

1. AS SEEN BY OBSERVERS

Particularly in some of the less active combat zones, the Japanese do practically no moving about dur­ ing the daytime, and do no firing until attacked. These tactics, plus excellent use of alternate positions, help the enemy to achieve surprise whenever day attacks occur. Almost all enemy positions in certain areas of level country were dug deep into the ground and were mu­ tually supporting. Back of these positions the enemy sited a large number of mortars. The crews for these weapons apparently determined in advance the exact range to the dug-in positions. And after United Na­ tions forces had assaulted these positions and had taken over part of the area, the Japanese mortars opened a terrific barrage. The enemy soldiers still occupying dug-in positions lay low until the barrage stopped and then counterattacked. Revetments, either of logs or concrete, were con­ structed at night around some Japanese positions as a protection from artillery fire. In the jungle the enemy frequently digs observation posts close to our own positions, primarily to prevent our forces from infiltrating into the area they occupy.
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JAPAN—SOME JAPANESE TECHNIQUES

65

In some areas the Japanese open fire with mortars, machine guns, and rifles immediately after our forces start an artillery or mortar barrage, or a concentration. Part of this enemy fire is trained on areas from which it is suitable for our troops to launch an infantry attack, and part of it is laid down on fixed lines.
2. ACCORDING TO DOCUMENTS

The following extracts on Japanese defense tactics were taken from translations of Japanese documents:
Only to defend is not enough; always to attack is going too far. Even in cases where our mission is only to defend, if we fall into a purely defensive attitude, we will not have enough men, no matter how many thousands may be available. In such cases we would suffer great losses because the enemy [United Nations], with insufficient forces to assault us, would undertake to destroy us by artillery fire alone. To rest on the defensive is death. When the hostile forces come, you must smash their offensive organization with a brisk, vigorous attack, and instill fear in them. Then they will keep their distance. On such occasions you must withhold reserves for counterattacks, and at the proper time these must be directed against the rear flanks of the hostile forces. When hostile reconnaissance units encounter our positions, they will first start a searching fire with automatic weapons. You must not return this searching fire, because such action would give away additional positions. In the jungle the enemy [United Nations] attack usually be­ gins with automatic rifle fire. Since the effective range of these weapons is about 50 yards, we can control their fire by cutting 50-yard-long fire lanes in front of our positions. Even when we fire at night, the hostile forces return the fire with trench mortars. Therefore, it is a good idea to change the positions of heavy weapons immediately after they are fired. For this purpose, always have alternate positions ready. It will be advantageous if we can draw hostile fire with dummy positions, false defensive structures, and dummy soldiers. Since it is easy for the enemy [United Nations] to outflank us in the jungle, it is well for us to break up their movement, or to frustrate their plans by changing our positions.

Section V .

MORALE, CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIER

1.

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary aims of the Intelligence Bulletin is to provide enlisted men and junior officers with all the useful information possible about the individual enemy soldier they expect to face in battle. A considerable amount of this type of information has appeared in pre­ vious issues of the bulletin, and reference should be made to it because very little repetition is published in this periodical. Vol. I, No. 12 of the Intelligence Bul­ letin contains an index which should prove helpful in making such references.
2. GENERAL

In both oral and written instructions, the Japanese have placed great emphasis on such subjects as "mili­ tary discipline," '"improving morale," "reforms in the service," "improvement of fighting power," "dying for the Emperor," and "brotherly teamwork" between in­ dividuals, units, and the various arms and services. However, the state of morale and combat qualities de­ sired by Japanese leaders are frequently missing. This is borne out by our observers in the field, by documen­ tary evidence, and by prisoners of war.
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JAPAN—MORALE. CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIER

67

The good characteristics of the individual Japanese soldier are summed up as follows: a. Physically, he is hardy and strong. b. In prepared defenses, he usually is tenacious unto death (this was not true in some instances in the fight­ ing on Attu). c. He is bold and courageous, particularly when his comrades are around and when he has terrain and fire­ power advantages. d. Because of good training, he is generally "at home" in the jungle. e. His discipline (especially fire discipline) is usual­ ly good. The poor characteristics may be summed up as fol­ lows : a. He is usually subject to panic when confronted by the unexpected. b. He is not always steadfast in battle. c. Usually his marksmanship is poor. d. Under certain conditions, he is unimaginative; he is a poor thinker when thrown l' on his own.'' Observers agree that there is nothing "super" about the Japanese soldier, and that he has the usual human frailties.
3. ENEMY INSTRUCTIONS

Various Japanese instructions on morale and aggres­ siveness in combat are given below. They were ob­ tained from enemy sources.
Form an unshakable group unity through harmonious relations. "The advantages of heaven and earth are of no avail against the

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unity of men" is an ancient but true maxim. Always maintain a calm spirit in battle, and forgive others generously. By forming around our commanding officers a unity like that of a blood brotherhood, we can overcome all difficulties. Manifest your morality on the battlefield. Morality is might in battle. Deal with your neighboring unit in a spirit of friendship and respect. Kespond immediately to the needs of others in an emergency. When another unit lacks some items, share what you have with them—even the most precious rations and ammunition are not for your use alone. You should know that kindness to others will always be repaid. Kead the training manual thoroughly, observe strictly the battle regulations, and never do things'your own way. The training manual is a guide which must be strictly followed regardless of the enemy or terrain; there is no need to change the manual. On the battlefield there are some who are prone to neglect the regulations, or thoughtlessly fail to keep them in mind. When assigned a duty, first of all consult the manual and familiarize yourself with the instructions regarding your specific assignment. Then, after the battle, go over your instructions step by step and determine what mistakes you made. You must realize that the training manual is the guide and mainstay of the unit. I t is the enemy's [United Nations] nature to be weak to the strong and strong to the weak; therefore, if we show any passive­ ness, hesitancy, or weakness, they will increasingly take advantage of it. Each unit and each individual, realizing this fact, must boldly and resolutely attack and crush the enemy's morale and put them in a shrinking, retreating frame of mind.

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69

4. ARMY-NAVY RELATIONS

The following translation of a Japanese document indicates that in at least some areas there is an out­ moded, shortsighted relationship between the Army and Navy.
For the sake of future relations, the Army units will give proper respect to the fact that the Navy has shown power in every area. In addition to recognizing and respecting the hardships the Navy has experienced, the Army units must try to keep trivial prob­ lems—such as those involving billeting or supplies—from causingany feeling of estrangement between the two services. Indeed, the fundamental basis of ultimate victory in the coming operation is dependent upon the close spiritual unity of both the Army and the Navy. Also, the mutual exchange of salutes between Army and Navy personnel must be strictly enforced.

PAKT THKEE : UNITED NATIONS

Section I. SOME HEALTH RULES
FOR FAR EAST AREAS
1. INTRODUCTION

The information in this section was prepared under the direction of the Surgeon General of the U. S. Army, in a War Department pamphlet titled " Health Precau­ tions for the Far East." Extracts from the pamphlet are reproduced below in order to insure a wide dissemi­ nation of this information among enlisted men and junior officers. In connection with this section, reference should be made to a similar article, "Some Health Rules for North Africa and the Middle East," which appeared in Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 9, pages 65 to 78. That article dealt mainly with the health aspects of water supply, foods, clothing, and housing in the North African and Middle East areas. Since this informa­ tion is also applicable to the Far East areas, it will not be repeated here.
2. INSECT CARRIERS OF DISEASES

The most important insect carriers of disease are listed below, together with brief discussions of-the dis­
70

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71

eases that they may carry and applicable precautionary measures.
a. Mosquitoes

(1) Malaria Malaria, which is spread only by the bite of the female anopheles mosquito, is a serious disease, and its danger cannot be overestimated. Anopheles mosquitoes feed during dusk or night periods, and possibly during the day when the light is greatly reduced, as in deep, shaded jungles or inside of dwellings. With the exception of a few of the mountainous areas, great numbers of mos­ quitoes, many of which may act as carriers of malaria, are found throughout the Far East. Man is the reservoir of malaria. Eighty to 90 per­ cent or more of the native inhabitants of some regions are infected with this disease. Anopheles mosquitoes become infected when they feed on (bite) a human being who has malaria. After an incubation period of from 14 to 40 days, these mosquitoes are capable of transmit­ ting the disease. While most anopheles mosquitoes breed in slow-moving streams, lagoons, and swamps, several varieties of malaria-carrying mosquitoes breed in small collections of water about houses. Unless care is taken, they may enter buildings through carelessly opened screen doors, torn screens, cracks at the junction of tiled or corrugated roofs with walls, and so forth. During the day these mosquitoes hide in corners and other parts of the house where there is little light but come out to feed after dark.

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Preventive measures include the following: (a) Sleep in screened rooms or under mosquito nets. Inspect screens, doors, and mosquito nets at regular in­ tervals, and search for live mosquitoes in those parts of the house where there is little light. (b) After dark, stay indoors in properly screened buildings as much as possible. (c) When it is necessary to be out of doors after dark, move about continually. (d) If possible, select camp sites on wind-swept ground away from areas infested with mosquitoes and far removed (at least 1% miles) from native villages (the inhabitants of which are usually infected and act as a reservoir of malaria). Additional measures that may be applicable include: (a) The use of head nets, gloves, and mosquito boots, along with other mosquito-proof clothing covering the entire body. Mosquitoes are able to bite through the material ordinarily used in shirts and other lightweight clothing. (b) Mosquito repellents applied to all exposed parts of the body at regular intervals. (c) Insecticide sprays used inside airplanes and in living quarters in the early morning and late afternoon, and at other times when necessary. (d) Quinine and atabrine do not prevent malaria. However, these drugs are of definite military value in that they do prevent clinical symptoms of malaria as long as they are taken, and thus afford a means of keeping troops fit during periods of emergency

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in the field. Such drugs should be used only under special conditions and when advised by medical officers, flight surgeons, or local health authorities. The present War Department policy advocates 0.1 gram of atabrine (IY2 grains or one tablet) once daily at the evening meal for six days each week (total, 0.6 gram or six tablets per week). An alternative method of administration which has been found satisfactory in some areas is to give 0.05 grain of atabrine (one-half tablet) once daily at the evening meal for six days each week, and a dose of 0.1 gram (one tablet) at the evening meal on the seventh day (total, 0.4 grain or 4 tablets per week). If atabrine is not available, take quinine sulfate 0.6 gram (10 grains or two tablets) after the evening meal each day. (Circular Letter No. 153, Surgeon General's Office, dated 19 August 1943.) (e) The estive-autumnal type of malaria may give rise to strange symptoms, entirely different from the usual chills and fever. It is therefore advisable, when residing in or traveling from malarial areas, to suspect malaria when the cause of an illness is unknown, re­ gardless of whether or not there is fever. A medical officer should be consulted and advised of the recent pos­ sibility of exposure. (2) Dengue Fever Dengue fever, or breakbone fever, is apt to occur in any part of southern Asia and is common in eastern India, the Netherlands East Indies, and along the coast and on the islands of the China Sea and the Sea of

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Japan. The "yellow fever mosquito/' Aedes aegypti, is the carrier in southern Asia, whereas Aedes albopictus most commonly carries dengue fever in China and Japan. These mosquitoes feed (bite) during the day but usually not in bright sunlight. Although this dis­ ease is rarely fatal, it may be the cause of much disa­ bility among troops. The precautionary measures out­ lined in (1) (a) and (d) and (a), (b), and (c) above, under preventive measures for malaria, are also ap­ plicable for protection against dengue fever. (3) Filariasis (elephantiasis) This disease, often called elephantiasis, is caused by several different types of small worms that can be in­ jected into man by the bite of mosquitoes. These worms travel through the lymphatic channels, frequently block­ ing them. While the disease ordinarily does not cause any serious incapacity, chronic swelling of the legs and scrotum may develop, and it seems certain that sooner or later all individuals affected will suffer some ill effects. Since the disease is prevalent throughout the Par East and chances for exposure are great, it is likely that con­ siderable numbers of soldiers will be affected by it. Methods for protection against malaria as outlined in (1) (a), (b), (c),and (d), (a), (b), and (c) above, also will prove valuable in preventing filariasis. (4) Yellow Fever Yellow fever has never been reported from Asia. However, the Aedes aegypti mosquito (the carrier of yellow fever) is found throughout the East, The trans­

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portation of infected individuals or of infected mos­ quitoes by airplane or ship from an area where yellow fever is present is a serious hazard, for by either of these means the disease could be introduced into the Far East. If it were introduced, its spread undoubt­ edly would be rapid.
b. Lice

Body lice are small, gray, flat, six-legged, wingless in­ sects. In the Far East they are the carriers of the epidemic form of typhus fever (not to be confused with typhoid fever) and louse-borne relapsing fever. Typhus fever is prevalent in the hill country of India and throughout all of China. It occurs sporadically in other parts of the Far East. To keep from getting lice, the following measures are advised: (1) Frequent bathing (when a satisfactory water supply is available) ; (2) Frequent changes into freshly laundered and pressed clothing; (3) Careful selection of sleeping quarters so that clean bed clothing is used; (4) Avoidance of native habitations and close contact with louse-infested individuals (sleep and eat only in the best accommodations available) ; (5) Use of Army-issue insecticide powder on the seams of clothing and on bedding as indicated; and (6) In the presence of mass louse infestation, group delousing methods as outlined in paragraphs 57 to 66, inclusive, FM 21-10, and additional instructions on de­

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lousing that are issued from time to time, may be employed.
c. Fleas

Fleas are small, wingless, brown or black insects with a flat body, small head, and large legs. In addition to being annoying, rat fleas are the carriers of bubonic plague and endemic or flea-borne typhus fever. Rats and other wild rodents suffering from these diseases in­ fect the fleas. At death the fleas leave the rat in search of a new host and infect man. The finding of dead rats or other dead rodents may indicate that these dis­ eases, especially plague, are prevalent. Plague in man (human plague or bubonic plague) was reported throughout most of 1942 from the Dutch East Indies, Java, Madura, West Java, New Caledonia, parts of China, India, French Indo-China, and Burma. Although not reported recently, the disease is known to be present in many of the towns and villages of central China and the seaports of Japan. Plague in wild rodents is known to be present con­ stantly in several large areas in central Asia, in north­ eastern China, and in Manchuria. Endemic or flea-borne typhus fever is found in the Malay Peninsula, the Dutch East Indies (where it is called shop typhus), the lowlands of India, and ports of the China Sea. Neither the plague nor the endemic form of typhus fever is likely to be of importance to individuals if the precautionary measures outlined under "Lice" (b

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above) are followed, and rats and rat-infested buildings are avoided.
d. Ticks

Ticks can be identified by their flat, oval body, small head, and comparatively large abdomen. In the Far East ticks are carriers of tick-borne relapsing fever, a disease which is found in Western and Central Asia and in China. In Northern India they transmit Indian tick typhus. Precautionary measures include: (1) Measures outlined under ''Lice" (b above). (2) Avoid native homes, especially at night, when the ticks come out of the walls. (3) Avoid sleeping on the ground, particularly in long grass, or resting near the trunks of trees (ticks hide in grass and under the bark of trees during the day). (4) Always examine your bed for ticks before turn­ ing in. (5) Examine skin and clothing for ticks at least twice daily. Remove all ticks and kill them. Never squash a tick on the skin or attempt to pull it out. Cover the tick with a good coating of oil, vaseline, gaso­ line, paraffin, or even spit. After a few moments the tick will let go and be easy to remove. The tick should then be killed by burning or by crushing between two stones. (6) The site of the tick bite should be cleaned and treated with an antiseptic such as iodine or alcohol.

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e. Mites

Mites are small insects resembling fleas. In different parts of the Orient they are the carriers of various forms of mite typhus. These diseases are common in Java, New Guinea, Malaya, Japan, India, and Burma. In Southern China their bite causes a skin disease known as "coolie's itch." Mites are usually found in association with rodents (particularly rats), with birds, and possibly in the flowers of certain palm trees. They are most com­ monly found in areas that are subject to flood and in recently cut-over jungle lands; they are most numerous in the late spring and early summer. Precautions include: (1) When possible, avoid mite-infested areas. (2) Wear clothing that protects the skin, such as longtrousers tucked into boots, long sleeves, and so forth. (3) Use Army-issue insecticide powder and insect repellents on skin and clothing.
f. Flies

Certain fly-borne diseases are of importance in Asia. (1) Common House Fly By mechanical means, flies are capable of carrying intestinal disease germs from filth and fecal matter to the food of man. Infectious material from the ulcers of yaws and Oriental sore may be carried byfliesin the same manner, and eye diseases may be transmitted mechanically by these insects.

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General precautionary measures (see par. 35, FM 21-10; also AR 40-205): (a) Destruction of flies by swatting, trapping, poi­ soning, and so forth; (b) Elimination of fly breeding places by careful and complete disposal of wastes and refuse (human excreta, manure, garbage, rotten fallen fruit, and other organic matter); (c) Use of insect repellents (sprays) ; (d) Use of nettings and/or screens; and (e) Protection of foods. (2) Myiasis (fly boils) The bites of certain types of flies (especially botflies and gadflies) may cause deep-seated abscesses or boils that heal with difficulty in the absence of medical atten­ tion. In the process of biting or alighting, the flies de­ posit their eggs or larvae (maggots, grubs) in or on the skin, open wounds, nostrils, or ear canals. The eggs of some of these flies may be carried by other insects, mos­ quitoes, for example. The development of the maggots in these locations is accompanied by bacterial infection and subsequent boil formation. Surgical removal of the growing fly larvae is necessary for cure. (3) Sand flies Sandflies transmit a virus disease known as pap­ pataci fever or sandfly fever. This disease is of a mild nature but is prevalent over practically all the Ear East, where it may cause considerable disability. Evi­ dence indicates that sandflies also are capable of trans­

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mitting the organisms causing Oriental sore, and may be responsible for the spread of kala-azar or Dumdum fever, a serious disease affecting many people in the Orient.
3. ANIMALS; DISEASES ACQUIRED FROM THEM

Animals are not only the hosts of insect carriers of disease (par. 2: rat fleas, lice, dog ticks, and so forth), but also may be directly responsible for the spread to man of diseases which these animals themselves con­ tract. The following animal-borne diseases are likely to be encountered in this part of the world:
a. Rabies (mad-dog bite, hydrophobia)

This can be acquired from both wild and domestic animals. This disease is of great importance through­ out southern Asia, especially in India, and also in parts of the Dutch East Indies, where great packs of dogs are kept as food. In the case of a bite by an animal thought to be rabid, the wound should be cleansed as thoroughly as possible, any available antiseptic applied, and a phy­ sician consulted as soon as possible. If practicable, save the animal for observation and examination.
b. Snake Bile

Poisonous snakes are found throughout tropical and temperate Asia. The majority of them do not attack man unless disturbed. Cobra venom contains a power­ ful poison which affects the nervous system, while the venom of the vipers affects the red blood cells. In case

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8 1

of snake bite, identification of the offending snake is less important in the Far East than in other areas, since the antivenom usually available is effective against both types (polyvalent). The presence of an undigested or partially digested "ball" of food in the snake's stomach may indicate the amount of venom injected into the victim. When a venomous snake kills, a part of its venom is used up; thus the presence of a visible food ball in its stomach may mean that its poison sacs were rela­ tively empty and therefore that probably only a small amount of venom was injected at the time of biting the person. Take the following precautions: (1) Wear boots when required to walk in snake-in­ fested areas. (2) Avoid the careless touching of shrubs, brush, trees, tree branches, and so forth, or walking near ledges where snakes may be hiding. (3) Examine clothing and shoes before getting dressed, and always look in cupboards, drawers, and other dark places before reaching into them. (4) Have a flashlight or other source of light avail­ able at the bedside so that the floor may be examined before getting out of bed in the night. (5) If bitten by a snake, the following procedures are recommended: (a) Immediately apply pressure or a tourniquet (rubber tubing, belt, piece of shirt, string, vine, or weed) above the bite, no tighter than a snug garter. This will stop the venous-blood return toward the heart and keep

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the poison from getting into the general.circulation. The tourniquet should be released for a few seconds every 10 or 15 minutes to permit some circulation. (b) Under field conditions, and in the absence of medical care, do not make an incision, but instead place a 3- or 4-inch square sheet of thin rubber (rubber from a condom or similar material) over the site of the fang punctures, and, by vigorously sucking and kneading with the teeth, remove as much venom as possible during a period of 5 minutes. The rubber sheeting will pre­ vent sucking the venom into the mouth. Wash the wound and the rubber sheeting and repeat the sucking and kneading at frequent intervals while removing the patient to the nearest medical officer or other physician. If no rubber sheet is available, blood from the fangpunctures may be sucked into the mouth directly. In this case, the person sucking should rinse out his mouth with water at frequent intervals to lessen any danger of his becoming poisoned from the venom. (c) If practicable, kill the snake and take it to the physician for inspection. (d) Whisky or other alcoholic drinks must not be given. (e) Keep the patient from exerting himself, for this will increase blood flow and thus cause more venom to be absorbed.
c. Leeches

Leeches look like thick, short worms. They are troublesome in India, the Malay Peninsula, and the

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Dutch East Indies. They are of two types, the large "horse" leech found in fresh water, and a small jungle leech found on shrubs and in tall grass in the vicinity of streams and rivers. They attach themselves to man for the purpose of sucking blood, and, although they are not dangerous in themselves, the site of their bite frequently becomes infected. Precautions: (1) Wear long trousers tucked into high shoes. The leech is capable of slipping through the eye-holes in shoes, or through coarse stockings; therefore the tongues of shoes should be sewn to the sides. (2) Do not pull off the leech, for if the mouth parts are left in the wound, an infection may take place. Re­ move the leech by touching it with the lighted end of a cigarette, by prodding it with a knife, or by applying common table salt, wet tobacco, or other chemical irri­ tant harmless to the skin. (3) To prevent infection, immediately apply a suit­ able antiseptic to the bite.
4. VENEREAL DISEASES

Venereal diseases are prevalent throughout Asia. In some areas, up to 100 percent of the native population may be infected with one or more of these diseases, which include the following: Syphilis, gonorrhea, chan­ croid (or soft chancre), lymphogranuloma venereum (tropical bubo), and granuloma inguinale. Briefly, it may be said that in the vast majority of cases venereal diseases are contracted through sexual contact, although syphilis may be acquired by kissing.

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5. SUNBURN, SUNSTROKE, AND HEAT EXHAUSTION

Personnel accustomed to climatic conditions in the United States fail to evaluate the intensity of the sun's rays nearer the equator. As a consequence, serious skin burns and sunstroke may occur after relatively short exposure. It also must be remembered that severe sun­ burn may be acquired from the reflection of the sun, although protected overhead, when in small boats on tropical waters. Exertion in hot and/or humid cli­ mates, with resulting loss of fluid and salt by sweating may cause heat exhaustion even in physically fit in­ dividuals. Glare from water or sand in intense sun­ light often results in severe eye irritation, and mechan­ ical irritation may be produced by wind and blowing sand and dust. Precautions: The following precautions are sug­ gested :* (a) Wear suitable headgear (sun helmet) when ex­ posed to the sun. (b) Do not expose large areas of the body surface to direct rays of the sun for more than a few minutes at a time unless a thorough tan has been acquired and then only during the early morning or the late afternoon. (c) The use of a superior grade of dark sun glasses is advisable. The Calabar lenses now widely used by Army Air Forces personnel are satisfactory. (d) Early recognition of the warning signs of heat stroke and heat exhaustion (dizziness, headache, blur­
Reference should be made to the list of precautions given on pages 71 and 72 of Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 9.
1

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ring of vision, nausea and/or vomiting) and early firstaid treatment of these conditions. Medical attention should be obtained as soon as possible. (e) Avoid or reduce to a minimum the consumption of alcohol.
6. MINOR WOUNDS

Wounds do not heal rapidly in tropical climates and infection is likely to take place. Minor wounds (cuts, scratches, abrasions, insect bites, and so forth) should be treated by application of iodine or other antiseptics. Burns should be covered with boric-acid ointment or sulfanilimide powder and a dry dressing applied. All wounds should receive medical attention as soon as prac­ ticable. » See FM 21-11.

Section II. HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FEET
1. INTRODUCTION

This section is based on a pamphlet titled " Watch Your Step/ 7 which was published by the British Army. The pamphlet is prefaced with the following state­ ments : "Your feet are among your principal weapons." "They need just as careful attention as your rifle." "If you fail to look after them, you are a hindrance, and not a help, to the Army." "Therefore, constantly read this pamphlet until you know it by heart, and above all, carry out the simple instructions it contains." These statements and the information which follows are as important to IT. S. troops as to the British. It will pay you to read this section more than once.
2. REGARDING CARE OF FEET

To avoid sore feet: a. Remove shoes as soon as convenient after a march; b. Wash your feet as often as possible; c. Dry thoroughly, especially between the toes; and d. Wash your socks at every opportunity.
To harden your feet:
a. Wash in cold water, using soap freely;
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b. Rub the bottom of your feet with soap or grease; and c. Soak the feet in a solution of salt.
3. REGARDING FOOTWEAR a. Fitting Shoes

The best time to fit shoes is on a hot day and after physical exercise. This is true because the foot expands in length and width y^ to y2 inch when the soldier is on the march in hot weather. Always fit shoes over army socks—never over the bare foot— and always stand up and walk a little while determining a fit. The sides of the shoe should feel comfortable and should show no signs of bulging.
b. Care of Shoes

After having been worn, shoes deteriorate fast if not used often thereafter. Rub a light coating of some acceptable leather preserver on the inside of the shoes at least once per week, but: (1) First remove all dust and dirt (if necessary, use a damp cloth). (2) Put paper or some similar substance inside wet shoes so that they will keep their shape while drying. (Dry slowly.) (3) Remember that it is better to apply leather preserver when your shoes are warm and slightly damp. (Apply the preserver until the leather is flexible.)
c. Care of Socks

Excessive rubbing, sweating, or boiling in water will cause wool to shrink. Always mend your socks from the inside. If the edges curl, they must be trimmed.1
FM 21-10, par. 108c (2) has the following to say about socks : "Darned socks, or socks with holes in them, should not be worn on the march because they will cause abrasions and blisters. Wearing two pairs of socks will aid in preventing friction between the shoes and the feet."
1

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If your socks are worn out and none are available for issue at the time, you can give good protection to your feet by wrapping them in a triangular piece of cotton cloth, or even paper, and then putting on your shoes. Your medical officer will show you how this is done.

4. REGARDING FOOT TROUBLES
a. Sweaty Feet Symptoms of sweaty feet are tenderness, local areas of redness, and the tendency of the skin to peel off. Treat sweaty feet as follows: (1) Wash them with soap and water; and (2) Dry them thoroughly and apply foot powder.
b. Blisters

Treat blisters as follows: 2 (1) Kemove the obstacle which caused the blister; (2) Clean the blister gently with soap and water; (3) Apply an antiseptic; (4) Sterilize a needle by passing it slowly through aflame,and then run the needle through the blister—in at one side and out the other—to drain out the fluid; (5) Do not remove the skin covering the blister; and , (6) Apply an antiseptic to the area, cover it with absorbent cotton, and cover the latter with a piece of adhesive tape. NOTE : Often you can manage to march in comfort with a blister if you fit a piece of cloth or bandage under your foot, over the instep, and around the ankle. Buckle the cloth over the outer ankle bone, pulling it tight. This arrangement lessens the fric­ tion between the shoe and the foot. Serious abrasions and ingrowing toenails should be shown to the medical officer at once.
FM 21-10, par. 108c (3) (b), has the following to say about treating blisters: "If blisters have appeared on the feet, they should be painted with iodine and then emptied by pricking them at the lower edge with a pin which has been passed through a flame."
2

ANNEX

HOW TO IDENTIFY WAR GASES

The name, symbol, and other means of identifying the common war gases made for the armed forces of Germany, Japan, Italy, France, and the United States are given in the comparison chart shown on the fol­ lowing pages. For reasons of security, the other gases of the United States and the Axis countries are not listed. The chart, compiled by the U. S. Chemical Warfare Service, is designed primarily to help in the identifica­ tion of gases used by the enemy, and to afford a means for quick comparison with U. S. gases of the same nature. French and Italian gases are included because of the probability that the Germans possess gases manu­ factured by these countries. In marking gas shells, the Germans may use a cross or a band to mean the same thing.
89

WAR GAS

Common name Physiological classification Odor Tactical class

Adamsite Arsine Bromacetone Brombenzylcyanide Benzyl bromide Cyanogen bromide Chloracetophenone ,.

Sternutator Systemic poison. Lacrimator Lacrimator Lacrimator Lacrimator. Lacrimator.

Faint aromatic Faint phosphorus Old leaves— bitter

Harassing... Casualty.., Harassing.]

Sour or bitter sweet.__ Harassing.. Aromatic—watercress _ Harassing.. Piquant—bitter Apple blossoms Casualty... Harassing...

Chlorine Chlorpicrin. Diphenylchlorarsine ! Diphenylcyanarsine

Lung irritant. Lung irritant. Sternutator..

Bleaching powder Flypaper Shoe polish

Casualty... Casualty... Harassing..

Sternutator

Bitter almonds.

Harassing...

Diphosgene. Ethyliodoacetate Ethyldichlorarsine Hydrocyanic acid Lewisite Lewisite and mustard... Methyldichlorarsine Mustard

Lung irritant. Lacrimator Vesicant and lung irritant

Musty hay. Pear juice Biting—fruity.. Bitter almonds.

Casualty.... Harassing.. Casualty... Casualty... Casualty... Casualty...

Systemic poison (paralyzant). Geraniums Vesicant Vesicant Casualty... Vesicant and lung irritant Vesicant Vesicant Vesicant and lung irritant. Lung irritant Garlic—onion. Casualty...

Nitrogen mustards._ Phenyldichlorarsine. Phosgene

Faint fish—soft soap. Bitter almonds Musty hay

CasualtyCasualty.. CasualtyHarassing.

Xylyl bromide

Lacrimator

Pungent—lilacs

90

INFORMATION CHART

Symbols, names, and shell markings o— f German Adamsit_-French -- 1 white band Italian Yellow body, red nose. Yellow body, red nose. Japanese Adamusaito: 1 red band. A r u s h i n : 1 blue band. United States DM:1 band.
8A BA.

red

B-Stoff T-Stoff: 1 white band. T-Stoff Ce-Stoff T-Stoff: 1 white band.

M a r t o n i t e or No. 9. Camite or No.
21.

Cyclite or No.
14.

Buromushian-ben- BBO. jiru: 1 green band. Buromuben-jiru Cloroccetafenone: Yellow body, 1 white band. Buromushian Kuroruasetofuenon: 1 green band. Enso
ON.

Chlor: 1 green band. Bertholite Klop: 1 green band Aquinite. Clark I: 1 blue band. Clark II or Cyan Clark: 2 blue bands. Perstofl or K-Stoff: 2 green bands. Jodessigester Dick: 3 green bands. Blausaure: 1 green band.
,

_ _ Cloropicrina Difenilclorarsina: Yellow body, red nose. Red nose Difosgene 1 green band

Rationite or No. 16: 1 whiteband. 1 white band Surpalite

Cl: 1 green band. Kurorupikurin: 1 PS: 2 green yellow band (?). bands. Jifuenirukurorua- DA: 1 red rushin: 1 red band.- band. Jifuenirushianarushin: 1 red band. DC: 1 band. red

-- Jihosugen: 1 yellow band (?).

DP: 2 green bands. ED: 2 green bands.

Vincennite or Manganite.

1 red band . . Lewisite

Winterlost

._.

Seisan: 1 brown AC: band. . . Ruisaito: 1 white L: 2 green and 2 yellow bands. bands. 1 white and 2 vellow HL: 2 green bands. bands.
MD.

Methlv Dick: 1 yellow band. Lost or Senf: 2 yel- Yperite or No. 20 I p r i t e : Yellow low bands. body, 1 green band. Stiekstoffibst: 1 vellow band. Pflffikus: 1 white Sternite or No Fenildiclorarsina band. 22. D-Stoff: 1 green Collongite or Fosgene: Yellow band No. 5. body, 1 white band. T-Stofl: l green band.

Masutado or Iperit- H: 2 green to: 1 white and 2 bands. yellow bands.
HN. PD.

Hosugen: 1 yellow band.

CO: 1 green band.

91

SECURITY
"Remember that your loved ones at home are far more inter­ ested in your safe return than in where you are now and what you are doing." ''A golden rule to observe when talking about military matters where you may be overheard: 'Think twice before you say any­ thing ; then keep your mouth shut'." "It is certainly not more blessed to give military information than to receive it." —From a Canadian Army Training Memorandum.

U. S . G O V E R N M E N T P R I N T I N G O F F I C E : 1 9 4 3

OL.II NO. 4

DECEMBER 1943

NTELLIGENCE ULLETIN

FOft USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY.. NOT TO B E ^ l l B L I S H E D

INTELLIGENGE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT *.-#&WASHINGTON, D. C
' ' • : • :

Intelligence
War Department

.

II-

D

II

••

VOL II, NO. 4

bulletin

MID 461

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Washington 25, D. C. December 1943

NOTICE
The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for the use of junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for disseminating to them the latest information received from Military Intelli­ gence sources. In order to insure the widest possible use of this bulletin, its contents are not highly classified; however, it is for the exclusive use of military personnel. Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided that (1) the source is stated, (2) the classification is maintained, and (3) one copy of the publication in which the material is reproduced is sent to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized whenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discus­ sions with troops. • Headers are invited to comment on the use that they are mak­ ing of the Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for future issues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, WaiDepartment, Washington 25, D. C. Requests for additional cop­ ies should be forwarded through channels for approval.
(i)

559150°—43—vol. 2, No. 4

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

j

PART ONE: JAPAN

Page

SECTION I. DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE FORCES 1

1. Introduction 2. General 3. Preparations a. General b. To Defend Airfields 4. Combat Tactics-_„__ a. General b. Against Parachute Troops. c. Against Air-landing Troops
II. NOTES ON AIR TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE

\

1
1
2
2
4
5
5
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1. Introduction 2. Bombing Attacks a. During the Day b. At Night 3. Torpedo Attacks against Convoys 4. Fighter Attacks against Bombers 5. Defense at Night
III. How

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JAPANESE RAIDERS DEMOLISH ARTILLERY

1. Introduction ­ 2. The Treatise a. Organization.. b. Personnel c. Weapons d. Supplies and Equipment e. Training f. Approach. __. g. Main Points in the Attack
IV. JAPANESE DEFENSE NOTES _

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1. Introduction 2. Defense Plans for " X " Area a. General b. Tactical Points c. Supplies d. Communication 3. Coastal Defenses a. Reconnaissance b. Tactics

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TABLE OF CONTENTS IV. JAPANESE DEFENSE NOTES—Continued. 4. Comments on Pantelleria Defense 5. Antiaircraft Observation
V. SUPPLEMENTABY NOTES ON BOOBY TEAPS AND MlNES__

III
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1. Introduction . 2. Use of Pull-type Grenade a. With 75-mm Shell b. Attached to a Rifle c. Attached to a Door d. Attached to Loose Rocks e. Attached to Felled Trees 3. Use of Antitank Mines
VI. JAPANESE SENTEIES

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Introduction Positions-­ Special Orders Observation Combat Tactics Communication, Movement, Relief
PABT TWO: GEEMANY

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SECTION I. GEEMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIE USE

31

1. Introduction 2. TheMG34 a. Table of Characteristics b. Method of Operation^. c. Use as Light Machine Gun d. Use as Heavy Machine Gun i_ e. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun f. Use in Armored Vehicles 3. TheMG42 1'IJL a. Table of Characteristics­ b. Method of Operation c. Construction '— _— d. Use as Light Machine Gun e. Use as Heavy Machine Gun f. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun g. Possible Use in Armored Vehicles

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IV
SECTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
GERMAN MACHINE

GUNS—Continued. 4. German Tactical Doctrine a. General . b. Attack c. Defense d. Conclusion 1. Introduction 2. Comments by U. S. Soldiers

Pag6

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II.

IT. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS

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54

III.

USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS AGAINST PARACHUTISTS

1. Introduction 2. The Document a. General b. Useof the Rifle.-l c. Use of the Machine Gun
IV. USE OF TANKS WITH INFANTRY

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1. Introduction 2. The Document a. Attack b. Defense c. Notes on Use of Ammunition d. Peculiarities of Winter Fighting
V. MISCELLANEOUS

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1. Engineer Reconnaissance 2. The German Soldier Writes Home 3. "Dig or Die"
PART T H R E E : UNITED NATIONS SECTION I. SECURITY FIRST

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1. 2. 3. 4.
II. How

Introduction Careless Questions How the Homefolks May Err Security Violations . 1

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71 72

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U. S. ARTILLERY TERMS DIFFER FROM BRITISH. _

1. Introduction 2. The List
III. A CASTAWAY'S DIARY

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79

1. Introduction 2. The Diary

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

V

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page

FIGURES 1-5. Japanese Booby Traps 22-25
FIGURE 6. Rear Sight of MG 34___^__. _ 33
FIGURE 7. Two Views of MG 34 on Bipod Mount 34
FIGURE 8. German Method of Firing MG 34 from Bipod Mount 35
FIGURE 9. MG 34 on Tripod Mount 36
FIGURE 10. MG 34 on Antiaircraft Mount 37
FIGURE 11. MG 34 in Action without Bipod or Tripod 38
FIGURE 12. MG 42 on Bipod Mount 40
FIGURE 13. German Vehicle Traps 47
FIGURE 14. German Machine Guns Sited for Mutual Support 51
FIGURE 15. German Tactical Employment of Supplementary Ma­ chine-gun Positions 53

Section I. DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE FORCES
1. INTRODUCTION

Some Japanese tactical plans for use against air­ borne forces are presented in an enemy treatise which is paraphrased below. The document outlines the tactics that hostile airborne forces are expected to use, and then discusses countermeasures planned by the Japanese.
2. GENERAL

The Japanese believe that airborne forces are most vulnerable to ground attacks from the time their trans­ port planes [and gliders] arrive over the landing area to the time when these forces complete their assembly for combat. A well-coordinated attack by the de­ fenders during this period is the "key to victory/' the enemy document states. Other important defen­ sive factors include thorough reconnaissance and se­ curity measures in advance, to prevent surprise at­ tacks, and the establishment of perfect communication and liaison between various units of the defending forces (especially in the case of air-ground communica­ tions and liaison).

2

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Regarding the plan of attack by United Nations forces, the document reads:
In connection with landing operations by ground troops, the opposition [United Nations] may dispatch airborne troops in­ land for the purpose of capturing important military points, key communication centers, and important military installations, such as our airfields or other areas suitable for landings. Thus the hostile forces will try to gain the initiative at the beginning of the landing operations. To maintain this initiative as the operations progress, the opposition, by close coordination with its ground fighting, may try to throw our rear into con­ fusion by use of airborne forces: to cut lines of communication (especially transportation routes and communication lines), to interrupt troop movements, and to destroy command and liaison systems. Or, the enemy may use airborne troops in the areas where their ground forces are fighting, in an effort to make a decisive attack immediately. To arrange successful countermeasures to the above tactics, it is necessary that our commanders be certain in their judgment of where and when the hostile forces will attack. It is also necessary that commanders be prepared to engage small numbers of hostile airborne troops who may be landed in the interior [of an island or a considerable distance back of the major ground operations] for the purpose of throwing the inhabitants into confusion. Our forces should look for any change in the attitude of the inhabitants [as a means of detect­ ing whether or not they may be hiding hostile troops].
3. PREPARATIONS a. General

Regarding Japanese preparations for airborne at­ tacks, the enemy treatise reads:
The commander of the security detachment must work very closely with all units concerned, especially the air units, in

DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE FORCES

3

detecting hostile plans and in disseminating this information. The commander will strengthen security measures in accordance with intelligence gained from air reconnaissance and from various intelligence reports and observations. The security-detachment commander will bear in mind that hostile forces will often land at dawn or at dusk, and that first of all, they will usually make a thorough reconnaissance, estab­ lish a detailed plan of attack, and execute strafing and bombing attacks. Because of this hostile reconnaissance, the security forces must try to conceal themselves completely against air observation, and, when the strafing and bombing starts, must fight back fearlessly and courageously. In seeking concealment from the air: (1) Use forests, buildings, and so forth, and their shadows as well; (2) Cover with camouflage nets the positions which are exposed; and (3) Disperse troops and execute movements rapidly if the orders above cannot be complied with. It is especially necessary for security-detachment commanders to keep communication facilities in good order so that there will be no hitch in troop movements during an emergency. The security-force commander Will arrange for construction of defensive positions in areas suitable for airborne landings and in the vicinity of vital points which hostile airborne forces may try to capture. The commander also will make a proper tactical distribution of antiaircraft units and of other troops necessary to the defense. Suitable places for hostile landings are: (1) Airfields and terrain suitable for aircraft landings; (2) Flat ground which has few, if any, obstacles; (3) Roads without obstacles; (4) Terrain on which planes can taxi; and (5) Bodies of water which can be used by seaplanes.
559150°—43—vol. 2, No. 4 2

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

If the security-force commander feels that the enemy [United Nations] is planning an airborne attack in a particular area, he will strengthen its defenses by concentrating tank units there, as well as other additional troops. Their advance will be concealed from air observation. Preparations must also be made for hostile "hit-and-run" at­ tacks. (In these attacks enemy troops expect to be removed by planes after accomplishing their mission.)
b. To Defend Airfields

Regarding security measures for airfields, it is necessary to guard each airfield and its perimeter, as well as the planes and in­ stallations. Preparations must be thorough. A careful check must be made on civilians going in and out of the airfield. Security measures must be especially strict at night. The distribution of the airfield security force may vary accord­ ing to its strength, the enemy situation, and the adjoining terrain. However, strong means of security must be placed near the planes and the more important installations. In making the proper distribution of security forces at airfields, it is necessary to place antiaircraft observation sentries at the required points and to have adequate patrols to make rounds through the areas adjacent to the field. The defense measures will also include the skillful utilization of terrain and other natural objects; the construction of barriers, positions, and so forth; and the establishment of adequate com­ munication with nearby units. In areas suitable for airfields or runways, it is necessary to place obstacles, or otherwise make it impossible for hostile air­ borne troops to use these areas. It is best to use such obstacles as wagons, barrels, and boxes, because they can be removed quickly iri case our own aircraft need to use the areas. In keeping watch over the civilians going in and out of the airfield, it is necessary to check their movements carefully and to inspect their clothing and anything that they carry. Individ­

DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE FORCES

5

ual civilian movements will be prohibited. The internal situa­ tion [regarding civilian inhabitants] will be investigated, and if necessary, communication with the outside will be stopped. It is especially necessary to take constant precautions concerning the movements of civilian families.

With regard to tactics that the Japanese may use against airborne troops, the enemy document says:
4. COMBAT TACTICS a. General

When hostile transport planes get within range, we will first concentrate antiaircraft fire in an effort to destroy airborne troops While they are still in the planes, or while they are parachuting down. From the time of landing, the fire of artillery, machine guns, rifles, mortars, and grenades will be used against the in­ vaders. Before the hostile troops are able to concentrate their strength, the rifle unit [or units] will make a quick, determined assault, and the tank unit, coordinating with the riflemen, will attack and crush the opposition. Combat tactics against airborne troops which have been able to concentrate in a landing area corresponds, in general, to ground combat tactics. Appropriate movements by tanks and other mobile units are especially valuable for this type of fighting. It is necessary to annihilate the hostile troops before reinforce­ ments can arrive by air or overland. Since hostile planes usually will continue to support airborne troops after their landing, it is necessary for our antiaircraft units to resume antiaircraft fire immediately after the hostile troops have landed—except in unusual circumstances. Since the attacking airborne troops—especially paratroopers— will attempt to use the transportation facilities, weapons, and equipment in the landing area, we must take the necessary counter­ measures. In case of a surprise attack, precautions will be taken so that secret documents and materiel will not fall into hostile hands.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN!

b. Against Parachute Troops

Parachute troops generally jump when the speed of the trans­ port planes is approximately 135 miles per hour and when the altitude is about 450 feet or more. The jumping is completed within 20 to 30 seconds. During this period the parachutists are easy targets for the various antiaircraft weapons, including machine-gun and rifle fire. While descending, parachutists carry only such weapons as pistols and grenades. For their full equipment they must rely on reaching packs which are parachuted down separately. Therefore, they are weakest from the moment they near the ground to the time they are able to reach their equipment and get ready for action. During this time it is essential that we launch an especially fierce and daring attack. Furthermore, shelling at the time of landing is very effective, since casualties are inflicted not only by shell fragments but by the shell-scarred areas which cause sprains and broken bones. We also should make every effort to capture dropped equip­ ment and supplies before the parachutists can reach them. Hostile forces sometimes try to make a display of force by dropping dummy men and materiel. The genuineness of these must be determined at once.
c. Against Air-landing Troops

At present the enemy [United Nations] lands from 10 to 20 riflemen per glider or plane. It is necessary to annihilate these groups individually just after they land and before they can effect a concentration. Heavy fire by artillery and machine-gun units and crushing assaults by tanks are especially effective.

Section II. NOTES ON AIR TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE
1. INTRODUCTION

The notes presented below on Japanese air tactics were extracted from various intelligence reports deal­ ing with the South Pacific area They are not com­ plete and are presented here merely as examples of enemy combat methods. Our observers generally agree that the Japanese vary their tactics a great deal, and that tactics used in one area may be dif­ ferent from those in another theater of operations. In general, U. S. airmen have found that the Jap­ anese fly better than they shoot, and that their Navy fliers appear to be better than their Army pilots. The Japanese during recent weeks have been mak­ ing a large proportion of their bombing attacks at dusk.
2. BOMBING ATTACKS a. During the Day

Japanese bombers usually drop their bombs at high altitudes, while flying in a V of V's formation. For protection, they have a tendency to depend more on altitude than on clouds. However, the enemy, quick
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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

to take advantage of bad weather, is likely to attack under very poor atmospheric conditions. These at­ tacks are made in good formations, which are held after the bombs are dropped. Japanese bomber formations usually consist of 9, 18, or 27 planes. In some sectors Japanese Army Air Force bomber operations have followed a fairly regular and charac­ teristic pattern, roughly along these lines: (1) Assembling units and moving them forward from rear airfields; (2) Making photographic reconnaissances of the targets; (3) Delivering the attack; (4) Repeating the attack; and (5) Withdrawing to rear airfields. Operation (1) was designed to achieve surprise by keeping aircraft out of view of our photo-reconnais­ sance flights—until the last moment. In follow-up attacks, Japanese bombers generally are persistent until their losses become very heavy. In their relatively new practice of making attacks at dusk with medium bombers, the Japanese nave often used as many as 40 to 50 escorting fighters. These attacks have usually been followed up by singlebomber harassing raids at intervals throughout the remainder of the night. Dive bombers also have been used in making attacks at dusk. The fighter escort generally consisted of 30 to 40 planes.

NOTES ON AIR TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE

9

Lately our pilots have noted that Japanese escort fighters have a tendency to work in pairs. In one instance 21 Japanese medium bombers, ac­ companied by a large fighter escort, made a high-level attack from 23,000 feet, while a smaller formation of light bombers carried out a low-level bombing and strafing attack. The medium bombers pressed home their attack despite the fact that a large percentage of them were destroyed or damaged by our fighters before reaching the target. The original formation was broken, but the bombers were still able to reach their objective when reformed into three flights, each consisting of four bombers and flying in a tight diamond-bow for­ mation. The Japanese apparently had little fire con­ trol, and the bombers carried out no evasive tactics except to nose down after passing the bomb-release line. The escorting fighters appeared to use a generous amount -of white tracer. The light bombers flew at approximately 200 to 220 miles per hour while making their bombing and strafing runs.
b. At Night

The Japanese apparently feel that moonlight bomb­ ing operations are not materially different from the same thing by day. They generally precede their raids with the usual reconnaissance, fly in formation, and use the normal pattern-bombing procedure with light bombs.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

In a recent attack on a U. S. Navy surface force, Japanese medium bombers approached during dark­ ness, in 2 formations of 12 planes each. One plane detached itself from the formation and flew parallel to the course of the ships on one side, for a distance of 5,000 yards. During this run, it dropped float flares at intervals of about 600 yards. The plane then flew about 5,000 yards across the course of our ships, to the front, and dropped a second line of flares at approximately the same intervals. Finally this planed dropped a red flare and a green flare abreast of the formation and outside of the parallel row of flares. Eecent action in the South Pacific has disclosed a Japanese tendency to employ intruder tactics. On at least one occasion a returning flight of friendly bomb­ ers was joined by a Japanese plane which followed the traffic pattern, turned on its landing lights, buzzed the control tower at about 500 feet altitude, and then proceeded to make a bombing run on nearby shipping. This attack occurred after dark but during a full moon period when visual recognition was most difficult.
3. TORPEDO ATTACKS AGAINST CONVOYS

Approximately 25 Japanese torpedo planes attacked one of our convoys in the following manner: The planes came in at angles of about 45°, covered with three levels of fighters up to 20,000 feet. The planes dropped their torpedoes from heights of 20 to 50 feet, while flying at about 250 miles per hour.

NOTES ON AIR TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE

H

The fighters strafed several of our ships during, and after, the period when the torpedoes were being dropped.
4. FIGHTER ATTACKS AGAINST BOMBERS

Observers report that Japanese fighter pilots gen­ erally are skillful in the use of clouds for cover before coming in close to attack our bombers. They are also adept at approaching from the direction of the sun. In some areas most of the enemy fighters have made their attacks from the 10- and 11- or the 1- and 2­ o'clock directions. They apparently preferred to fly parallel to the bombers before attacking, and were often first sighted 2 or 3 miles to the left or right, where they awaited an opportunity for, frontal at­ tacks. Usually the attacks came from below, and were both single and coordinated, depending on the number of fighters involved. In one instance, one fighter attacked at 5 o'clock and a second at about 2 o'clock. Each made a pass and then shifted to the other's position and repeated the,process. The enemy pilots usually opened fire at an estimated range of about 500 yards. After an attack, they halfrolled and dived to accomplish their breakaway. 3?he attacks usually were fairly continuous for about 15 to 20 minutes.
5. DEFENSE AT NIGHT

The Japanese in recent months have increased the number of fighter planes used for defense of airfields
559160°—43—vol. 2, No. 4 3

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daSCTELLIGENCE BULLETIN!

at night. In some cases, enemy searchlights have been operating in conjunction with the fighters. The searchlights track the targets until the fighters give a signal, and then all searchlight activity ceases. The fighters then attack from the 5- to 7-o 'clock direc­ tion, high or low. Sometimes enemy fighters have turned on plane searchlights when approaching our bombers. The fighters usually worked in pairs, with both twin- and single-engined fighters being used.

Section III. HOW JAPANESE RAIDERS DEMOLISH ARTILLERY
1. INTRODUCTION

During the course of fighting in the South Pacific, the Japanese have developed what they call raidingdemolition detachments for the purpose of destroying United Nations artillery and mortars. The organiza­ tion, equipment, weapons, and tactics used by these detachments are described in a Japanese treatise which is quoted below. The introduction to the treatise ex­ plains that the methods of destroying hostile artillery and mortars vary according to the situation at a given time. However, this "guide" deals with "the ac­ complishment of the mission in a short time by a raid­ ing detachment.''
2. THE TREATISE a. Organization

The organization and strength of the raiding-demolition de­ tachment depends on the number of guns to be destroyed and whether we [Japanese] attack with surprise or by storm. How­ ever, we usually attack with surprise and suddenness. The detachment generally consists of a demolition section, a rein­ forcement [reserve] section, and a covering section, in addition to the commander. When the raid is against a hostile battery of four guns, the basic strength will be as follows: (1) Demolition section—15 men, in 5 groups of 3 men each; 1 group is assigned to each gun, and 1 is held in reserve;
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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(2) Reinforcement section—one section of riflemen, who act as reserve for the demolition section; and (3) Covering section—one section of riflemen who protect the flanks. However, if an insufficient number of personnel are available at a certain time, it may be necessary for one section of rifle­ men to execute all three tasks—demolition, reinforcement, and cover. Only a demolition section was used during the early part of the Buna battle, and it gained success by surprise attacks. Later, when the hostile forces guarded their guns more closely, we used all three sections.
b. Personnel

Personnel of the raiding-demolition detachment must be es­ pecially calm and fearless. Each man must be quick-witted and always ready to take advantage of opportunities. Therefore it is not necessary that the leader be an officer. A noncom, or even a private, may be preferable. (During the Buna battle most of the raiding personnel were volunteers. Some of them were so earnest about their work that, after accomplishing their set mission, they searched out other guns and destroyed them with left-over explosives.)
c. Weapons

It is necessary that each man of the detachment carry three or more hand grenades. Members of the reinforcing and covering sections carry rifles. The demolition section carries 12 hand grenades (preferably tied together in groups of 3) ; 8 armor-rupturing mines; 8 to 10 explosives (igniters and slow-burning fuzes included); about 12 matches, or cigarette lighters (these must be moisture-proof); 4 picks; and smoke candles, if available.
d. Supplies and Equipment

Although the amount of rations depends upon the distance to the objective, normally it is necessary to carry a week's supply.

HOW JAPANESE RAIDERS DEMOLISH ARTILLERY,

1 5

Preferably, the regular type of ammunition is carried. All men are equipped as lightly as possible.
e. Training

The detachment must learn as many pertinent details as pos­ sible about its mission by studying intelligence reports and maps, and, if possible, by first-hand observation. The commander selects an assistant, and then rehearses the plan of attack with the detachment. This includes the route and disposition of the men during the approach, their disposi­ tion during the attack, and the training in demolition methods to be used. Each man must thoroughly understand his duty and its application to the objective as a whole.
f. Approach

The essential point in approaching the objective is secrecy. Therefore, the men must be prepared to take a roundabout way and cross difficult terrain without complaint. It is necessary to refer to tall trees and other prominent land­ marks en route in order to facilitate movement to and from the objective. All movements must be made with good judgment, and with the proper security measures in force. Should the detachment be discovered by hostile forces, it would be advisable to withdraw at once and change the route of advance to another direction. Discovery by opposing forces usually will cause a delay in reaching the objective. One raiding-demolition detachment, dispatched to a distant objective, made a detour and moved through a jungle area with the aid of a compass. The detachment usually concealed itself by day and collected information. Then, after searching and marking the next line of advance, it approached the objective at night.
g. Main Points in the Attack

When the objective has been approached, it is necessary to as­ certain conditions and wait persistently for the opportunity to

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

attack with surprise. Just before attacking, it is advisable to destroy the communication net in the vicinity of the line of guns. Unless circumstances make it necessary, do not attack while the guns are in operation, because practically all defending personnel will be available at that time. When it is necessary to attack by assault, the reinforcement sec­ tion should fire and subjugate the gun crews. Each of the threeman groups of the demolition section except the one in reserve will approach a gun and destroy it. At this time the covering section will protect the flanks. If possible, it is advisable to acti­ vate smoke candles to cover the demolition section while the guns are being destroyed. When the attack is made at night, it is advisable to throw hand grenades at the main groups of hostile forces in an effort to cause panic. Under certain circumstances, it is best to attack and annihilate the hostile gun crews before destroying the guns. Remember that artillery is weak in close combat. The following information concerns the destruction of enemy [United Nations] guns and mortars: (1) To destroy a trench mortar, drop one ignition hand gre­ nade into the barrel. (2) To destroy a cannon [any artillery piece], throw a Kessoku [presumably several hand grenades tied together] into the bore of the gun. To make the destruction absolutely sure, it is advis­ able to demolish the gun barrel (in the vicinity of the muzzle) with explosives or armor-rupturing mines. If possible, it is also advisable to destroy the gun cradle. The tangent sight and other laying apparatus should be crushed with picks. (3) If time is available, it is advisable to drop the entire gun into the sea or a river, or bury it in the ground. The same holds true for the ammunition for the gun. (4) The lenses of the panoramic sights should be brought back as proof of successful destruction. (5) When attacking a hostile artillery observation post, capture and bring back as much observation equipment as possible.

Section IV. JAPANESE DEFENSE NOTES
1. INTRODUCTION

The following notes on Japanese defensive tactics were paraphrased from translations of various enemy treaties on this subject. Readers are cautioned to bear in mind that these notes deal with combat methods devised for use by the enemy, and that they must not be confused with our own defense tactics.
2. DEFENSE PLANS FOR "X" AREA

Japanese plans to defend a certain area in the South Pacific are outlined below. The area is not identified. a. General
We will defend our present positions to the last maii, breaking up hostile attacks by fire power and counterattacks. Our recon­ naissance must be precise and systematic so that we may avoid being taken by surprise. Those units on guard in the outer areas will keep as much of their strength as possible in a mobile state of readiness.
b. Tactical Points

Front-line companies will make reconnaissances of the area extending 1 kilometer from the hostile positions, battalions will be responsible for the first 2 kilometers, and the regiment for over 2 kilometers. You will use infiltration and raiding patrols to confuse the enemy's rear.
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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN;

Upon discovery of a new enemy plan, you will display initiative to disrupt those plans. Every unit, from the smallest sentry group to the largest company; must consider the probability of hostile artillery attacks, and therefore strive to construct several alternate posi­ tions, to the left, right, and rear, so that our defense will be as mobile as possible. Construct strong aerial-defense trenches. Companies occupying positions the farthest forward will be relieved in about two weeks by battalion- and regimental-reserve units.
c. Supplies

"Get one of the enemy every time you shoot" is to be a maxim of this fight. The defenders must shoot the big forms of the enemy [United Nations] as they approach. As many provisions and as much ammunition as possible must be stored in the front lines. However, these supplies should be widely dispersed as a protection against bombing.
d. Communication

It is preferable to lay telephone wires between every observation post and company. Because of air attacks, important connec­ tions must be doubled. Also, wires must not be laid in groups. Men must be posted to guard wires, or reserve wires must be prepared. Communication between platoons or sections should be done by signals or by the speaking-tube system. In front of hostile forces, it is quite unnecessary to speak in a loud voice or to dispatch messengers. Kadio equipment and telephones must be installed in strong air-raid shelters.

JAPANESE DEFENSE NIOTE;S 3. COASTAL DEFENSES a. Reconnaissance

19

It is necessary to determine the landing plans of the hostile forces at an early stage. Their movements must always be observed—especially the activity of boats, torpedo boats, and reconnaissance planes. Patrol of the adjacent sea area by boats must not be left up to the Navy. Every unit must plan various measures for coast patrol. It is necessary to practice various methods of quickly reporting the discovery of hostile forces.
b. Tactics

Both day and night maneuvers must be held in rehearsing tactics to use in defense against landing operations. It is neces­ sary to develop various plans that the enemy [United Nations] may use, and to work out the proper measures to counter these plans. When it is known that hostile forces will attempt a landing, every unit must concentrate as much of its strength as possible to annihilate the invaders on the beach. Even those who are sick and wounded must, if at all possible, bear arms and participate in the battle with grim determination. It must be remembered that the hostile troops, upon landing, will not be familiar with the situation and will have no con­ structed positions. Furthermore, they will be confused, due to poor liaison and lack of control, and will therefore be in a very disadvantageous position. Under such conditions it is possible for even one of our smallest units to destroy a large number of the invaders by fierce and fast attacks. On the other hand, if the invaders are given time to reorganize and dig in, it will be very difficult to annihilate them later.
559150°—i3—vol. 2, No. 4 —1

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4. COMMENTS ON PANTELLERIA DEFENSE

The following observations are made in connection with the American and British attacks on the Italian island of Pantelleria: (1) To counter the enemy's [United Nations] large-scale, over­ whelming air attacks, it is essential to possess sufficient fighter planes and absolutely complete antiaircraft defenses and ground installations. (2) To counter hostile landings, it is essential to possess strong mobile forces for counterattacks, in addition to the fixed defenses for combat at the water's edge. (3) Isolated islands require an accumulation of sufficient water, rations, and materiel. (4) Evacuation of the inhabitants from Pantelleria was begun only a short time before the surrender. Although both planes and ships were used for this purpose, only a few hundred were removed. It was a blunder not to have cleared out all the in­ habitants before the decisive attack, regardless of their devotion to their soil.
5. ANTIAIRCRAFT OBSERVATION

An antiaircraft observation party should have field glasses, shutter field glasses, and simple communication equipment. The party should take up positions where its members will have a wide view and where the sound of planes can be easily heard. These positions should be located so as to facilitate com­ munication with the officer in charge and with the appropriate antiaircraft units. Antiaircraft observers must know how to distinguish between hostile and friendly planes. When any evidence of a hostile plane is detected, report to the officer in charge and to the antiaircraft units in the vicinity. If the identity of the plane cannot be determined, the procedure will be the same. Report to the officer in charge when a friendly plane is de­ tected coming in our direction.

Section V. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON BOOBY TRAPS AND MINES
1. INTRODUCTION

The information given in this section on Japanese booby traps is largely supplemental to the article, "Land Mines, Grenades, and Booby Traps," which was published in Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 1-15. While the Japanese have made no extensive use of booby traps to date, it is known that the subject has been under study in the enemy train­ ing program. (As a safeguard against booby traps, the Jap­ anese have been observed beating trails ahead of them with long bamboo poles.)
2. USE OF PULL-TYPE GRENADE

The Japanese pull-type hand grenade is well suited for booby-trapping purposes, and the enemy may use it extensively in future defensive operations. Details of this grenade were presented in Intelligence Bulle­ tin, Vol. II, No. 3, pages 39-42.1 Several ways in which the Japanese may use this grenade as a booby trap are illustrated below. Most of the diagrams were taken from an enemy publication.
^ n Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 40, par. 2b (Table of Character­ istics) "Weight of body" should be 409.5 grams instead of 509.5 grams. 21

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INTELLIGEXCE BULLETIN!

a. With 75-mm Shell

Figure 1 shows how the Japanese tied a pull-type grenade and a Model 91 grenade to a 75-mm shell to form an improvised booby trap. This combination was found by our troops during recent operations in the South Pacific. The pull-igniter string of the pulltype grenade was tied to some vines which were

Figure 1.

stretched between two trees. A person or a vehicle striking the vines would have activated the booby trap, which was hidden in some grass nearby. De­ tonation of the pull-type grenade would have set oft the shell and the Model 91 grenade.

NOTES' ON BOOBY TRAPS AND MINE'S

23

In improvising booby traps similar to the above, the Japanese are likely to use any type of highexplosive shell or other type of explosive conveniently at hand.
b. Attached to a Rifle

The rifle in figure 2 is connected to the pull-igniter string of the grenade by means of a string, cord, or

:

:v.*-V. '- .V.-':-;: {•;:./ •:<'.'•:•»/: -.•.••••.-.•--.•••••'•^ *'^^--•'••^;:;V>;.;v:^:::^v^//^•/^:.;:;/.vvyvV<v^•. .v.;::-.i.• .•.•.•.:;•..:­

: :

:

:

Figure 2.

wire. [& pull on the rifle will activate the grenade and the attached shell. Instead of the rifle, the Jap­ anese may use any other object they think will be attractive to United Nations soldiers. The booby trap illustrated in figure 2 is placed in a shallow hole and then covered. It may also be concealed in grass or bushes.

24 c Attached to

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN a Door

Figure 3.

Figure 3 shows how the pull-type grenade can be rigged to a door. Opening the door will activate the weapon.
d. Attached to Loose Rocks

o

O
o Q

Figure 4.

NOTES ON BOOBY TRAPS AND MINES

25

This arrangement of the pull-type grenade works on the same general principles as the other types. A wire, string, or cord connects the pull-igniter to one of several loose rocks, which are placed in a road or trail for obstruction purposes. Lifting the rock con­ nected with the grenade will activate it. Here, again, the grenade may be tied to some other type of explo­ sive at hand to increase the blast effect.
e. Attached to Felled Trees

Figure 5.

This arrangement is practically the same as in fig­ ure 4. The grenade, tied to a mine in this case, is attached to one or more of the felled trees by means of a vine or string. Instead of trees the enemy might use most any type of obstructing material.
3. USE OF ANTITANK MINES

All units in the Japanese Army are trained in the extensive use of antitank mines.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

These mines are likely to be found: (1) On logical routes of approach to enemy .positions; (2) On bridges and their approaches; (3) On all possible detours to antitank barricades; and (4) Under tank barricades of a temporary nature.

Section V I . JAPANESE SENTRIES
1. INTRODUCTION

At least a rough idea of how the Japanese use sentries in the South Pacific areas may be gained from the following collection of enemy information. Japanese sentries usually form a "line of observa­ tion on the foremost front line." They are given specific instructions, some of which must be carried out even if it means a stand to the death. The enemy "sentry" is divided into "special guard" and "double sentry." The special guard is posted at strategically important points or at places where ef­ fecting relief is difficult. It usually is composed of a noncommissioned officer or a superior private as leader and four to seven privates. This number may be increased under certain circumstances. Part of the guard is usually posted as observers while the re­ mainder is concealed nearby. All men are armed with rifles, and the group sometimes has a light machine gun also. A double sentry post is composed of a noncommis­ sioned officer or a superior private as leader and "the required number" of privates. Usually two to four men at a time will be on duty. From outpost detach­ ments (pickets) two men are sent out a distance of about 400 yards to form a "double sentry."
559150°— 43— vol. 2, No. 4 5 27

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2. POSITIONS

According to the Japanese, sentry positions must be capable of all-around defense. The "most suitable" places must not be selected, because they can be easily fired upon by hostile forces. The positions must be so concealed that they cannot be seen from a distance of over 5 yards. The Japanese also lay stress against the destruction of natural terrain features. "The positions of those on observation duty (more than two men) and those on relief must be close to­ gether," one Japanese document states, "so that the relief can be effected at the resting place. There­ fore the relief party does not have to move its position for the purpose of relieving those on observation duty."
3. SPECIAL ORDERS

The "special orders'' for Japanese sentries are given below.
Sentries must know: a. The number of sentries; b. The names of important roads, villages, and natural objects [in the area] ; c. The situation in regard to friendly units and patrols in forward areas; d. What ground must be particularly observed; e. The article regarding precautions against gas attacks; f. The position and the number of neighboring sentries, and the methods of communication; g. The position of pickets and your company, and routes to them;

JAPANESE SENTRIES

29

h. The methods to use in observing, what postures to assume, how to effect relief, how chemical troops move into action, and what to do in case of hostile attacks; i. How to signal and give alarms; and j . Any other precautionary item.
4. OBSERVATION

In regard to instructions for observing, the Japanese sources are quoted as follows:
Observation, in all directions, must be carried out constantly. This may sound easy, but there are certain tendencies to avoid. For example, the sentry who does not see hostile forces for several days in his area is apt to become lax. In this state he is likely to be fired upon before he sees the enemy, who more than likely will then be able to get away. The enemy who ap­ proaches must be killed, or, if possible, captured. It is necessary that sentries make good use of their hearing. In jungle areas, the sound of dead branches broken by footsteps can usually be heard before anyone can be seen (unless the move­ ment is over a road or trail). These sounds generally are fol­ lowed by the shaking of bushes or branches and then, finally, the appearance of the enemy. If anything regarding hostile forces is discovered, it must be reported immediately. If something occurs so suddenly that time does not permit reporting, it is necessary to signal by fir­ ing rapidly, or by some other means. The report will be made later.
5. COMBAT TACTICS

Upon contact with hostile forces, Japanese sentries have been instructed to take the following action:
Approach of the enemy [United Nations] will be signaled to the sentry leader and neighboring sentries. (A sentry should act at his own discretion. Contacts cannot be made.)

30

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

When the sentry (or sentries) is certain that the hostile forces plan to continue advancing, fire will be withheld until the latter are at point-blank range. Then the sentry will firefirst at the man carrying the automatic rifle and then at those who follow him. If the hostile forces are small, they will be shot or captured. If large, we must start firing from a greater distance than that outlined above. If the invaders attack persistently, we will use hand grenades in driving them back. With superior forces, the enemy may attack our rear; therefore we must guard it carefully. Sometimes, in retreat, the hostile forces are weak, and we should follow up with fierce attacks. The opposing forces will try to collect their dead, if any; therefore we must guard against these efforts. Each sentry leader will make a report after the hostile forces have been driven away.
6. COMMUNICATION, MOVEMENT, RELIEF

A Japanese document stipulates that only hand sig­ nals will be used for communication between sentries. Communication for effecting reliefs will be done with­ out speech or any other form of noise. Signals may be given, according to the document, by pulling a wistaria vine, or some other type of vine. Sentries will be relieved at "dawn, dusk, and so forth," the document states, "but we must be careful that the route of relief is not detected by hostile forces." Sentries are required to mess alternately, and quietly.

PAKT T W O : GERMANY

Section I. GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR USE
1. INTRODUCTION

This month the Intelligence Bulletin devotes two sections to timely information regarding German ma­ chine guns—a subject of particular interest to junior officers and enlisted men. Readers who wish to in­ vestigate this topic more extensively are referred to two M. I. D. publications: "German Infantry Weap­ ons" {Special Series, No. 14) and "The German Squad in Combat77 {Special Series, No. 9). The for­ mer is of value for its abundant technical detail, while the latter contains useful information about the tacti­ cal employment of a machine gun by the squad. Two types of German-manufactured machine guns are used by the German Army. These are the 7.92-mm MG 34, which was introduced before the present war, and the 7.92-mm MG 42, which was introduced in 1942 and which is gradually replacing the MG 34. Both types are issued for use in the following roles: a. As a light machine gun, fired from a bipod. b. As a heavy machine gun, with a tripod and a telescopic sight.
31

32

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN"

c. As an antiaircraft machine gun, fired from single and twin antiaircraft mounts. Also, the MG 34 is mounted on nearly all German tank and armored cars. German machine guns normally remain in use in the roles for which they are first issued. Production, maintenance, and training are simplified, however, by the Army's adoption of a single standard model. (Any existing duplication is caused by the present change-over period.) Ammunition is interchangeable throughout. The issue of ammunition to infantry is roughly as follows:
Light machine gun: Ball Armor-piercing Armor-piercing tracer Heavy machine gun: Ball Armor-piercing Armor-piercing tracer 2. THE MG 34 a. Table of Characteristics Weight (unmounted) Weight of bipod ___. Weight of HvMG tripod Weight of LMG light tripod_____ Over-all length of gun Cyclic rate of fire Practical rate of fire (LMG) 24 lbs 2y2 lbs 42 lbs 14 lbs 11 oz 48 in 800-900 rpm 150 rpm Percent 84 12 4 82 10 ._ 8

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR USE

33

Practical rate of fire (HvMG) Cooling Cartridge feed .

Ammunition carriage Sights

300 rpm Air Flexible metal belt containing 50 rds (two or more of these may be joined end to end) or a drum containing 50 rds. Belts carried in metal boxes; weight, with 300 rds, 22 lbs. . Blade front sight and leaf rear sight graduated from 200 to 2,000 meters (see fig. 6). Telescopic sight when used as HvMG.

sight leaf

Thumb nut for raising
sight
#or lowering Figure 6.—Rear Sight of MG 34 (showing relation between yards and meters).

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

b. Method of Operation

The gun is recoil-operated (by a barrel recoil of % inch.) This action is assisted by muzzle blast. The breech mechanism is of the Solothurn type (rotating bolt head). Provision is made for semi­ automatic fire.
Air-cooled jacKet Front sigrit

Feed cover Feed-cover catch

Plastic pistol

Figure 7.—Two Views of MG 34 on Bipod Mount.

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR USE

35

c. Use as Light Machine Gun (see fig. 7)

As a rule, the gun is fired from the bipod (see fig. 8), although three very light tubular tripods are

Figure 8.—German Method of Firing MG 34 from Bipod Mount.

carried by the company and are issued to the pla­ toons as required. These light tripods are used chiefly in antiaircraft defense, but occasionally ter­ rain conditions may warrant the use of the gun from this tripod against ground targets. The open sights are graduated to 2,000 meters, but German manuals give the maximum effective range as 1,500 meters (1,640 yards). The most effective range seems to be between 650 and 850 yards. The barrel must be changed after 250 rounds of more or less continuous fire. Two spare barrels are carried in separate barrel cases by members of the light machine-gun detachment.

36

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Bursts of 7 to 10 rounds are fired, and approxi­ mately 15 aimed bursts can be fired in 1 minute.
d. Use as Heavy Machine Gun

When the MG 34 is used as a heavy machine gun, it is mounted on a tripod known as the MG Lafette 34 (see fig. 9). The gun is carried in a cradle emClaws for attaching Hinge clam telescopic sight

Telescopic sight base

Figure 9.—MG 34 on Tripod Mount.

bodying a spring buffer, which enables the gun to recoil as a whole on its mount. This device adds greatly to the stability of the mount without increas­ ing the weight. Adjustable elevating and traversing stops are provided; these enable the gun to be ele­ vated and traversed within predetermined limits. An automatic searching fire device is incorporated, and is operated by the recoil of the gun in the cradle. A telescopic sight is fitted, with provision for direct fire up to 3,250 yards and for indirect fire to 3,800

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR

37

yards. Small targets usually are not engaged at ranges of more than 1,500 yards. Three spare barrels are carried.
e. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun

Figure 10.—MG 34 on Antiaircraft Mount (using drum feed).

Four types of antiaircraft mounts are provided. These are (1) the standard light tubular tripod issued for the light machine gun (see Hg. 10) ; (2) the stand­ ard heavy machine-gun tripod with an adapter; (3) a monopod mount fixed in vehicles used for transporting personnel; and (4) a twin mount carried in a small horse-drawn, two-wheeled trailer. The standard tri­

38

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

pods mentioned in (1) and (2) can rapidly be con­ verted for antiaircraft use. German soldiers are also taught to fire on aircraft and ground targets by supporting the gun on another man's shoulder (seefig.11).

Figure 11.—MG 34 in Action without Bipod or Tripod.

Regardless of the method used, fire above a maxi­ mum vertical range of 2,600 feet is prohibited.
f. Use in Armored Vehicles

Nearly all German tanks and armored cars are armed with one or two MG 34 's, in addition to the main armament. Under these circumstances the butt

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR USE

39

is removed, and the gun is fixed in a special mounting in the gun mantlet.
3. THE MG 42 a. Table of Characteristics Weight (unmounted) Weight (with bipod) Weight of HvMG tripod._____ Weight of LMG Over-all length of gun Cyclic rate of fire Practical rate of fire (LMG) Practical rate of fire (HvMG)_ Cooling Cartridge feed 20 lbs. (approx.) 2034 lbs 4314 lbs 14 lbs 12y2 oz 48 in 1,100-1,150 rpm.1 150 rpm 300-400 rmp Air Flexible metal belt containing 50 rds (two or more may be joined end to end) Belts carried in metal boxes; weight, with 300 rds, 22 lbs. Blade front sight and leaf rear sight graduated from 200 to 2,000 meters. Also uses tele­ scopic sight on tripod when employed as a heavy machine gun

Ammunition carriage Sights

b. Method of Operation

The principle of operation is a combination recoil and blow back. In place of the Solothum rotating bolt-head action of the MG 34, there is a new system. This involves a lateral separation of the bolt studs in the cylinder from the bolts in the barrel extension.
1

German documents give the cyclic rate of fire as 1,500 rpm.

40

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

An improved feed mechanism is provided. Barrelchanging is extremely rapid. No provision is made for firing single rounds.
c. Construction

The extensive use of stamping, riveting, and spot welding gives the gun a less finished appearance than that of the MG 34. There are few machined parts. However, this does not mean that its life is shorter or its performance inferior. Use of MG 34 and the MG 42 as light machine guns is comparable, except that, in the case of the newer model, the higher rate of fire and the conse­ quent "creep" of the gun makes shorter bursts (of 5 to 7 rounds) advisable. Twenty-two aimed bursts can be fired in 1 minute.
d. Use as Light Machine Gun (see fig. 12)
feed-COver colaft Rear (folded sight down) AA ring sight base flash Wder

Operating

handle

Bipod

catch

Figure 12.—MG 42 on Bipod Mount.

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR USE

41

e. Use as Heavy Machine Gun

The tripod lias been slightly modified to suit the catches on the gun, but has not been altered in essen­ tials. A new and slightly modified telescopic sight is also in use. German manuals advise bursts of 50 rounds for best results. As in the case of the MG 34, the barrel should be changed after 250 rounds of more or less continuous fire, although prisoners of war have stated that barrels need not be changed until 400 rounds have been fired. It has been suggested that the detachment may carry more than 3 spare barrels, but this point has not yet been established.
f. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun

Against aircraft the MG 42, like the MG 34, is fired from light and medium tripods as well as from single and twin mobile mounts.
g. Possible Use in Armored Vehicles

Although use of the MG 42 in tanks or armored cars has not yet been reported, it is being used in the "Ferdinand," and further development along this line should be regarded as a distinct possibility.2
4. GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE a. General

(1) Light machine gun.—While the basic princi­ ples of the tactical use of the German light machine
"The "Ferdinand" is a new German heavy self-propelled gun. Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 1-^.) (See

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

gun are not unusual, the following are especially stressed in enemy doctrine: surprise, fire and move­ ment, coordination of fire power, conservation of am­ munition, and alternate positions. (2) Heavy machine gun,—When issued with the heavy tripod, the MG 34 and the MG 42 are invariably used as heavy machine guns, except in the case of a surprise attack by a hostile force, when a gun may be off its tripod and not in firing position. Because of its dual nature, the weapon can be used as a light machine gun under such circumstances. In the German Army the heavy machine guns are carried in the machine-gun company of the infantry battalion. This company has twelve heavy machine guns in addition to six 3-inch mortars. The heavy machine gun is employed from open or covered positions. In the case of open positions, which may be taken up in battle, use is made of all available cover. A position of this kind is normally manned by a section (two guns) under the control of the section leader. Covered positions are generally on reverse slopes, and are normally manned by a whole platoon (four guns), which the platoon commander controls from a central command post. The heavy machine gun. is prepared for action be­ hind cover, and is placed in its firing position only at the last moment. Covered positions are almost always used when overhead fire is to be delivered.

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR USE b. Attack

43

In the attack heavy machine guns covei1 the deploy­ ment of the rifle companies from echeloned positions sited on commanding ground. In a penetration (Einbruch) the heavy machine gun, firing from posi­ tions in the rear of the attacking troops, aims at centers of resistance within the hostile position, and prepares to give covering fire against counterattacks. Heavy machine guns follow the attacking rifle companies from position to position. Inasmuch as unified control of this type of work is difficult, sections and platoons are usually placed under the command of the rifle com­ pany to exploit local successes. Single guns may even be used in support of rifle squads or platoons to con­ solidate ground gained and to cover the flanks; how­ ever, this is practically the only time when heavy machine guns are used singly.
c. Defense

In defense the heavy machine gun is normally sited under the direction of the company commander. Sec­ tions may be placed under commanders of advance positions or, less often, commanders of combat out­ posts. Otherwise, the heavy machine guns, although employed in the sectors of rifle companies, will form part of the battalion-fire plan. Their tactics involve exploiting all the possibilities of fire as early, as heavily, and at as long a range as possible. For this purpose positions are taken up in, or just to the rear of, the main line of resistance. Some heavy machine

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

guns may be sited forward as "silent" guns. It is a German principle to site them for enfilade and cross­ fire. The heavy machine guns are sited in covered positions, with open positions forward of the main line of resistance having been reconnoitered before­ hand and echeloned in depth. Thus the guns are able to move forward and engage any hostile force at­ tempting to penetrate. German doctrine stipulates that heavy machine guns in the rear of the main line of resistance may not fire overhead at ranges of less than 400 yards.
d. Conclusion

After the Battle of France a " Commander of Sup­ porting Weapons" was instituted in the infantry bat­ talion (normally, the commanding officer of the machine-gun company). However, there is now rea­ son to believe that heavy machine guns are increasingly being allotted in platoon strength (four guns) to the rifle companies, in whose sectors they are almost always employed in attack or defense. German training stresses cooperation between the heavy machine guns and the battalion support weapons (infantry guns and antitank guns and mortars). The utmost attention is paid to the careful siting of fire positions, as well as of alternate and dummy positions. It has been found that the Germans make every effort to gain surprise, and that their camouflage is usually excellent.

Section II. U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS
1. INTRODUCTION

"It's true that the Germans have a good machine gun," a U. S. junior officer who fought in Sicily re­ marked recently, "but, like many other German weapons, it doesn't live up to all the latrine rumors you hear. It doesn't walk on its hind legs or jump through hoops or anything like that. It's just a good, fast gun. I feel that the sooner our men understand how the Germans use it tactically, the more success we'll have in combating it." German machine-gun tactics figure prominently in the following comments by IT. S. soldiers who have been up against the gun lately, and who can speak with authority of the ways in which it is employed.
2. COMMENTS BY U. S. SOLDIERS

"What impresses me especially is the way the Ger­ mans site their machine guns so as to deliver crossfire from opposite sides of a road. I see a good deal of this, because I'm a jeep driver. They generally try to site guns at narrow places, such as defiles and bridges. The Germans like our jeeps just as much as we do, and they make a great effort to kill personnel
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without damaging the vehicles. They're always very much aware of salvage possibilities." " German machine-gun fire is usually so lowoften about a foot and a half above the ground—that we call it 'grass cutting.' The Germans know that U. S. soldiers don't allow their wounded to lie around any longer than is necessary, and that a man who has a leg wound of some kind will probably need a helping hand to get him to safety. It's fairly ob­ vious that the Germans know the value of immobiliz­ ing as many men as possible at one time. " Although the German machine gun is first-rate as to fire power, its dispersion is poor. One of my friends had so much confidence in his ability to get away from it that on one occasion, even though he had already received a number of shoulder wounds, he made a successful dash for safety, and then turned and got the machine gunner with rifle fire. Three shots in the stomach. "The machine gunners lie in wait for us. They're very patient. For example, they know that sooner or later we're going to want a certain little piece of commanding ground, or some spot that offers un­ usually good defilade. They lie motionless—always well camouflaged—for as long as may be necessary, and then let us have it. "The Germans make every effort to stop vehicles. Next to stopping a lot, they like to stop a few. Next to stopping a few, they're satisfied if they can stop

U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS

47

just one. One of their methods involves the use of two skillfully camouflaged vehicle traps [see fig. 13], extending halfway across a road from opposite sides, and with just enough space between the two traps for a single vehicle to pass. As * a rule, the Germans choose a piece of road with sizeable banks on each side. Even if a vehicle detects the traps, the enemy's

German camouflaged vehicle traps covered by machine guns.

Figure 13.

purpose is served, for the vehicle then must slow down in order to twist its way cautiously between the traps. This presents a good opportunity for enemy machine guns, well sited on each side of the road, to place fire on the vehicle.1
When there is no rising ground flanking a road, the Germans construct rectangular traps which extend from the center of the road well into the fields on each side.
1

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"Under these circumstances the machine guns can do a hell of a lot of damage unless they are neutral­ ized at once. "Vehicle traps are covered with tightly stretched canvas, which is sprinkled with dirt the same color as the road itself. I've even seen a good approxima­ tion of dusty asphalt." "It's amazing how those machine gunners can sit around and wait. One morning we were going up a hill. The Germans waited and gave it to us in the back. They were down in holes clear over their heads, with a harmless-looking little bush concealing each man. In other words, they didn't open fire until the split second when they were sure they could do the greatest amount of damage. "At night the enemy uses machine pistols a good deal—and machine guns, too. Once, around 2300, we were up a valley. We'd been out there two or three nights, and had gained pretty good control of the place. An enemy patrol came down the valley, and bumped into us. I'll never forget the speed with which they opened fire after they were challenged. There wasn't any interval of estimating the situation or of just standing around! They threw grenades almost as soon as the first English word was uttered, and instantly followed up with machine-pistol fire. In the dark those grenade-throwing babies can damn near hit you from the sound of your voice! They seem able to gauge where it comes from. I think it's reasonable

TJ. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS

49

to suppose that they're trained to hurl grenades—or something similar in weight and shape—at voices in the dark. However, the Germans aren't so hot at many other aspects of night fighting. In Sicily they had to undertake a tremendous variety of night ac­ tivity, for which they obviously had no particular appetite. "By the way, I saved my life once by speaking a single German word at night, although the only ones I know are nein (no) and ja (yes). The terrain was very rocky, and the night was pitch-dark. I was sleep­ ing about 15 yards from my machine gun. Suddenly I woke up and realized that a German patrol had filtered into the locality. A shadowy form crept alongside me, and a voice asked Neunten Kompanief which sounds enough like Mnth Company to be understood readily. I whispered Nein! impatiently, and then added Sssh! in a warning tone, to suggest that we were running a great risk in saying anything at all. He moved on, and I lay quiet. Presently I heard the voice of one of the men who were awake and manning my gun. He was challenging a Ger­ man. Then I heard the opening of fire. It didn't last long. The German patrol withdrew, and I got back safely to my gun." "It's true that the dispersion of their machine-gun fire is poor. "In retreat the Germans like to leave a few men and maehine guns behind to cover the movement. The

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idea is to make you think there are a hell of a lot of Germans around when there are really just a few. "When they're defending a town or a hill, they try to fool you by luring you within range of their densest fire power and then assaulting your flanks and rear with machine-gun fire. "In general, their machine-gun fire is very low. You can throw yourself down and feel reasonably secure—but you don't dare rise. As it is, there's only a tiny margin of safety. Often, however, the German can't prevent you from wriggling away, and then getting up and making a dash for it. Twelve of us did this once. We were inspecting an Italian truck, which was about 50 yards from a small house. The Germans had a machine gun on each side of the house and riflemen inside it. When they opened up, we dropped down, wriggled out of the dispersion areas as fast as we could, and then ran. All 12 of us got away without a scratch. Why the riflemen didn't get us I don't know. However, I've heard a great many U. S. soldiers comment that German rifle fire is not as accurate as ours. " I ' d like to add, too, that our Browning automatic rifle is accurate at a greater range than the German MG 42." "The Germans are very clever at determining our probable line of approach, and then siting machine guns to cover it. One of their favorite practices is to site three guns so that they will be mutually support­

U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS

51

ing while covering a saddle between two small hills as well as the side approaches [see fig. 14]."

Figure 14.—German Machine Guns Sited for Mutual Support.

"There's no question about the Germans being very adept at working out fields of fire. "In a withdrawal or a retreat, the Germans destroy everything that they can't take with them. Automatic stuff, especially. It literally amounts to a * scorched weapons' policy. "Every once in a while we find them using our hel­ mets and Ml rifles. " Their light machine-gun fire is harassing as hell, but I don't think much © its accuracy. As to height, f

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

I'd say it averages about two feet above the groundoften enough to let you slither out of the dispersion area. It's true that a man can dodge the fire in this manner. We've done it often. "They take high commanding ground and try for long, grazing fire. In defense they can pick their own ground, of course. In siting machine guns they often use the military crest of a hill, as well as the base. [Note: See the last statement in this section.] "The Germans fight a good rear-guard action. They're foxy. The U. S. soldier is a better fighter, though. He's got guts, audacity, and ingenuity. Al­ though he isn't crafty by nature, he soon learns to be just as sly as the enemy. There's no doubt about it—jAmericans learn fast." "German supplementary positions are imagina-j tively planned and used. At nightfall, for example, a platoon or company is likely to move about half of its machine guns up to the military crest of a hill, where they fire intermittently throughout the night. The other machine guns, still in the lower positions, remain silent. The purpose of this is to deceive us as to where the German strength is, and to lure our artillery into making preparations to place fire on the military crest. Then, before dawn, the Germans bring back the ma­ chine guns from the supplementary positions. This means that they are once again in full strength at the base of the hill, and are ready to surprise us as we advance [see fig. 15]."

U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN" MG TACTICS

53

Figure 15.—German Tactical Employment of Supplementary Machine-gun
Positions.

Section III. USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS AGAINST PARACHUTISTS
1. INTRODUCTION

The German Army attaches great importance to the use of infantry weapons against parachutists. A Ger­ man document acquired by United Nations forces in Sicily discussed the technique of employing rifles and machine guns for this purpose. The following ex­ tracts from this document should be regarded as sup­ plementary to a more general article, ''Principles of Defense against Airborne Troops," which appeared in Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3.
2. THE DOCUMENT a. General

German infantry units must at all times be prepared to meet surprise attacks by parachutists. Hostile parachute troops jump from an altitude of 3,000 feet or more, drop about 1,000 feet, and then open their parachutes; or they may jump at an altitude of about 400 feet, and open their parachutes after a drop of about 100 feet. One must reckon with a speed of fall of from 16 to 20 feet per second. When the first of these procedures is followed, the parachutists, in landing, are dispersed over a large area. When a platoon of parachutists fol­ lows the second procedure, it attains in the air a lateral dispersion of from 425 to 750 yards, a depth of about 325 yards, and a differ­ ence of altitude of 50 to 65 feet between jumpers.
54

USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS AGAINST PARACHUTISTS

55

In employing infantry weapons against hostile parachute troops, German soldiers will fire only on the order of a responsible commander, such as a platoon commander or squad leader. The individual parachutists—not their parachutes—constitute the proper targets. While a parachutist is landing, he may be attacked with every likelihood of success. At this time he must free himself from his parachute, and is helpless. If his weapons are dropped sepa­ rately, he must recover them. This, too, will occupy him for a few moments. All arms must participate in the task of crushing a parachute attack. Moreover, the employment of every form of ground defense for this purpose has the definite effect of breaking down the morale of the hostile force.
b. Use of the Rifle

Riflemen will fire on hostile parachutists as soon as the latter are within a range of about 425 yards. In a moderate wind, a rifleman will aim at the center of his target. In a strong wind, he will lead the moving target according to firing rules. The rear sight will not be changed while fire is in progress. Riflemen will also fire on ammunition and weapon containers. Standing or kneeling firing positions should be assumed. However, the situation may justify a prone position. Each rifleman will fire at the parachutist nearest him. When the parachutist jumps from an altitude of about 400 feet, the rifle­ man will not have time to fire more than five aimed rounds.
c. Use of the Machine Gun

Machine gunners will use ordinary ball ammunition against parachutists. It is advantageous to include armor-piercing tracer bullets in ammunition belts, in a proportion of 1 to 3. Fire will be opened with the rear sight set according to the actual distance of the target. With reference to wind velocity, the rules for aiming are the same as those in subparagraph b. The rear sight will not be changed while fire is in progress.

56

IINTEiLLIGEN'CE BULLETIN?

The machine gun may be fired from a bipod, as a light gun, or from a tripod, as a heavy machine gun; however, surprise parachute attacks will generally compel a machine gunner to fire from the shoulder of another man, If parachutists are dropped in front of a position, they are to be met with concentrated machine-gun fire. If they are dropped beyond the fire position on the flank, they are to be fired upon successively; that is, a machine gunner will fire on the nearest parachutist, and will then fire on any who remain in the line of sight. A volley of sweeping fire on scattered parachutists is a waste of ammunition, and is strictly forbidden.

Section IV. USE OF TANKS WITH INFANTRY
1. INTRODUCTION

The correct and incorrect ways of using infantry with tanks, according to the German Army view, are summarized in an enemy "document recently acquired. In this document the Germans list the correct and in­ correct methods side by side, an arrangement which is also followed in this section, for the convenience of the reader. The document is of special value and interest, not only because the column headed "Right" indicates procedures approved by the enemy, but be­ cause there are implications, in the column headed "Wrong," of certain errors that German units may have made from time to time. Extracts from the document follow.
2. THE DOCUMENT a. Attack
Wrong Right

Attack not thoroughly dis­ (1) Thorough discussions of recon­ cussed in advance. naissance and terrain will take place. Riflemen and tanks will maneuver jointly as much as possible, in ad­ vance.
57

58
Wrong

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Right

Inadequate coordination be­ (2) The mission of protecting armored elements not yet tween armored and artil­ discovered by hostile forces lery units. will be distributed among artillery. (Flanks will be screened by smoke.) Failure of armored cars and (3) Armored cars used for obser­ vation will maneuver with tanks to maneuver jointly tanks before an intended in advance. attack. Distribution of too many (4) Tanks not intended for use in tanks in proportion to in­ an attack will be kept out­ side the range of hostile fire. fantry used in the attack. Tanks deployed and distrib­ (5) For effective results, available uted among small units. tanks—at least an entire company—will be combined for the assault. The use of tanks in unrecon­ (6) Terrain must be reconnoit­ noitered t e r r a i n when ered, especially when an attack at g r e a t speed speed is essential. is contemplated. Facilities for mine clearance must be at hand. If a tank deto­ nates a mine, the remaining tanks must halt while the minefield is reconnoitered. After this, the minefield must either be cleared or by­ passed. (7) A number of tank command­ All tank commanders absent ers must always remain on reconnaissance. with the company.

USE OF TANKS WITH INFANTRY Wrong Eight

59

Tanks launched without a (8) The mission of tanks will be widely understood. clear statement of their mission. When a sector full of tank ob­ (9) Riflemen cross the sector first and create passages, while stacles has been taken, the tanks provide covering tanks are ordered to cross fire from positions on slopes. this sector in front of the riflemen. T a n k s advance so rapidly (10) Tanks advance only a shortdistance at a time. Rifle­ that riflemen are unable to follow. men advance with the tanks. When two successive objec­ (11) When two successive objec­ tives have been taken, the tives have been taken, tanks ignore the possible entire area between them presence of hostile forces must be made secure by in areas between these ob­ means of tanks, artillery, jectives, even though an assault guns or antitank attack on still another ob­ guns, and heavy weapons. jective is not contemplated at the moment. Tanks within sight of posi­ (12) Responsibility f o r covering fire is divided among artil­ tioned hostile tanks ad­ lery or heavy antitank guns. vance without benefit of If these are not available, covering fire. Pz. Kw. 3's and Pz. Kw. 4's provide protection. Tanks are ordered to hold a (13) As soon as an objective has been taken, tanks are with­ captured position, e v e n drawn and are kept in though heavy weapons are readiness for use as an at­ available for this purpose. tacking reserve or in the preparation of a new attack.

60
Wrong

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Right

Riflemen and light machine guns remain under cover during own attack.

Tanks take up positions so close to hostile forces that early discovery is inevita­ ble.

Tanks remain inactive when a mission has been com­ pleted.
b. Defense

(14) Riflemen and machine guns cover the antitank riflemen, who have the mission of destroying hostile tanks which may attempt to by­ pass. (15) If possible, tanks take up po­ sitions outside the range of hostile artillery fire. Tanks which are compelled to take up positions in the vicinity of hostile forces do so as late as possible, so that the hostile forces will not have time to a d o p t effective countermeasures. (16) When a mission has been com­ pleted, tanks promptly re­ ceive orders as to what they are to do next. (1) All available tanks are kept together so that during an enemy attack prompt action can be taken against an ad­ vantageous point. Tanks, assault guns, and heavy antitank guns must be kept at a distance while firing positions are being pre­ pared.

Distribution of tanks along the entire front.

USE OF TANKS WITH INFANTRY Wrong Right

61

Subordination of tanks to small infantry units for the purpose of static de­ fense. After repulsing an attack, tanks remain in the posi­ tions from which they last fired. As hostile tanks approach, own tanks advance, having failed to take up advan­ tageous firing positions be­ forehand. Tanks which have no armorpiercing weapons are sent into battle against hostile tanks.

When hostile tanks approach, German riflemen and their heavy arms remain under cover, and leave the fight­ ing against tanks with in­ fantry to own tanks, as­ sault guns, and antitank guns exclusively.

(2) When tanks have fulfilled their task they are with­ drawn behind the main line of resistance, and are kept in readiness for further action. (3) After repulsing an attack, tanks move to alternate positions as soon as heavy arms or riflemen have taken over the responsibility of delivering covering fire. (4) A firing front is created at a t a c t i c a l l y advantageous point in the area against which the attack is directed. Tanks deliver surprise fire— from positions on reverse slopes, if possible. (5) Tanks without armor-piercing weapons are kept back, and are used for antiaircraft protection, as well as in es­ tablishing communications and in supplying ammuni­ tion. (6) All arms take part in defense against hostile tanks. In­ fantry accompanying the tanks are kept somewhat a p a r t , however, so that tanks, assault guns, and antitank guns are free to engage the hostile tanks.

62
Wrong

JENTESLUGENOE BULLETIN

Right

All available tank reserves are compelled to remain out of action because of minor defects. Tanks which must remain in forward positions do not dig in, and thereby consti­ tute targets for hostile artillery.

(7) Kepairs will be arranged in such a manner that a num­ ber of tanks are always ready for action.. (8) Tanks which are within range of hostile observation must be dug in as fast as possible. In winter, they must be hidden behind snow walls.

c. Notes on Use of Ammunition When only a few hostile (1) When only a few enemy tanks tanks attack, fire is opened attack, it is best to wait un­ early. til they are within a favor­ able distance and then de­ stroy them with as few rounds as possible. Against a superior number (2) Fire is opened early on a su­ perior number of tanks, to of tanks, fire is opened at force them to change direc­ close range. tion. High-explosive shells are used at first. Since this early opening of fire gives away own positions, new po­ sitions must be taken up. Pz. Kw. 4's will fire hollow­ (3) Tanks which are short of 75­ mm armor-piercing shells c h a r g e ammunition at must allow a hostile force to ranges of more than 750 approach to a position with­ yards. in a range of 750 yards. d. Peculiarities of Winter Fighting Tanks are p l a c e d outside (1) "Tank shelters" are to be kept for the exclusive use of "tank shelters" when these tanks, assault guns, and shelters are being used for mounted antitank guns. other purposes.

USE OF TANKS WITH INFANTRY Wrong Right

63

In deep snow, tanks do not advance on roads. Winter quarters are located so far from the scene of action that the tanks, if re­ quired, may arrive too late.

W h e n "tank shelters" are snowed under, departure is possible only after hours of extra labor. In winter, tanks travel freely over roads which have not been used for a consider­ able time. In winter, tanks are ordered to attack distant objectives.

(2) In deep snow, tanks keep to roads. An adequate num­ ber of men are detailed to assist if fresh snow falls. (3) When action in appreciably distant places is under con­ sideration, arrangements must be m a d e for the smaller units—if possible, never less than a platoon— to reach the scene of action at the proper time. (4) Paths leading from "tank shelters" t o t h e nearest roads are kept cleared. Snow fences are provided for e x i t s . Readiness of tanks is always assured. (5) Because of danger from land mines, mine-clearance de­ tachments always precede tanks, especially if a road is seldom used. (6) All attacks consist of a num­ ber of consecutive attacks with "limited objectives/* When these objectives have been reached, the area is cleared and reorganization is completed before a new attack is launched.

Section V. MISCELLANEOUS
1. ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE

Engineer scout squads are sent out well in advance of proposed Engineer activity, and are ordered to report the following to their commander: a. The disposition of hostile forces in relation to German forces. b. Details of the location in which work is to be done, and of difficulties which will confront the engineers. c. The probable requirements as to men and ma­ terials. d. Recommendations as to the most suitable methods of accomplishing the task. e. The cover and concealment which will be avail­ able during the approach. f. The probable length of time required for the task, g. Recommendations as to the advisability of seek­ ing the cooperation of other arms.
2. THE GERMAN SOLDIER WRITES HOME

The German High Command is disturbed by what it calls "carelessness amounting to treason" in the German soldier's letters to his family and friends in the Reich. Security violations are only one aspect of the problem, it seems. Equally dangerous, according
64

MISCELLANEOUS

65

to the High Command, is the tendency to include in letters to the Reich remarks which may weaken con­ fidence in the armed forces. Criticism 'of superiors is placed high on the list of forbidden subjects. German soldiers are reminded that they may submit justified complaints through channels. They are ordered not to insert grievances about officers and noncoms into letters which, when circulated at home, are bound to make civilians wonder how an army that contains unfit and inferior leaders can be expected to achieve final victory. German soldiers have been informed that complaints about food and general treatment are also taboo. "What can a wife or a mother do when she re­ ceives such letters?" the commanding general of a German army asks. "Nothing! The only possible result is to arouse grave misgivings. Sometimes she may even try to send him food from her own rations. This is of no appreciable value to the man, and merely deprives his home of food which is sorely needed there. If complaints about bad treatment or insuf­ ficient food are justified, these, too, may be submitted to a proper military authority. Under no circum­ stance are they to find their way into letters which may undermine the morale of German civilians!"
3. "DIG OR DIE"

From the diary of a British junior officer:
During 6 April, shelling of my platoon was only fairly frequent. In the course of half an hour, we counted 16 shells in the im­

66

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

mediate vicinity of the post. We counted 80 to 100 shells in, or near, this small area alone before the end of the day. The only casualties were one killed, two wounded and half our breakfast missing. We were dug-in in the usual way.

No comment.

PART THREE : UNITED NATIONS

Section I. SECURITY FIRST
1. INTRODUCTION

Every member of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard has a personal stake in the matter of safeguarding military information. Even so, the most patriotic individual is always hi danger of forgetting that the enemy cleverly tries to collect "small" facts and dovetail them so that the "big" fact will emerge. A man may be eager to pre­ serve the nation's safety and his own, but the moment he forgets that the enemy's intelligence services work subtly, instead of in a predictable manner, he becomes easy prey for the Axis. We fight the enemy not only with guns, but with silence. The security campaign will not end until the war itself ends. This is wrhy the Intelligence Bulletin re­ ports, from time to time, new and helpful security information. This month a thought-provoking Item has been paraphrased from an article published in a South African Air Force pamphlet. The paraphrase is presented below. It is followed by a note on unin­ tentional compromising of security by Americans at home, and how servicemen can remedy this. The sec­
67

68

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

tion concludes with an extract taken from a War De­ partment pamphlet.
2. CARELESS QUESTIONS

We hear a great deal about "careless talk," but very little about "careless questions." Careless ask­ ing is all too often responsible for careless telling! While careless telling is seldom intentional, seemingly careless asking sometimes is deliberately and scientifi­ cally planned. The enemy agent—or the stooge whom he is bribing or blackmailing—has motives very different from those of one's mother, wife, sweetheart, or best friend. Un­ fortunately, they all ask their questions in the same casual, natural way. Every day the most innocent catch phrases, such as "What's new?" "How's everything?" "What's the dope?" and "What do you know?" lead to the committing of blazing indiscretions. Love makes most people possessive. The people who love us—and this is especially true of women— are always eager to project themselves into our lives, to share our experiences, at least with their minds and hearts. We are accustomed to talk freely with them. The habit, ingrained in so many of us, of "get­ ting it off: our chest" to the person we love is hard to overcome. Breaking the habit is particularly hard for those of us who loyally observe the tradition of writing home every week. In the armed forces the relationships between differ­ ent ranks are inevitably responsible for certain types

SECURITY FI'RST

69

of careless questions. The Senior asks the Junior a question, perhaps out of politeness, or perhaps because of an impulse to patronize. Junior is too overawed to identify the question as "careless." The Junior asks the Senior a question, perhaps because the Junior wishes to appear a superior fellow who is going places, or perhaps because he thirsts for information that is none of his business. The Senior, especially if he has only recently been promoted, is likely to find such questions irresistible. Nor must we forget the Seniorto-Senior and Junior-to-Junior combinations. Natu­ rally, we don't want our equals to get a jump ahead of us. We want to know all the dope (only we try to ex­ cuse ourselves by saying solemnly that we want to "keep ourselves up to date"). In the service, then, we fall into the habit of answering careless questions, just as we do when we are speaking or writing to the people we love. What are the mechanics of the careless question % It may be written, spoken directly, or telephoned. It isn't always easy to answer exactly as we should, and in a courteous manner. Because we are ordinary human beings, we would prefer to talk freely. More­ over, our reaction to the "careless question" is affected by our familiarity with faces and our personal affec­ tions or dislikes, and by our uncritical acceptance of uniforms and insignia. These things are largely re­ sponsible for our failure to detect questions of this type and, in so detecting, to avoid giving a dangerous answer.

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KNTEILLIG'E'N'OE BULLETIN

The written question gives us more time for re­ flection than does the question spoken directly or tele­ phoned. For this reason the written question is a little less dangerous—but only a little! The directly spoken question involves an added danger because of the rapid speed at which the aver­ age conversation is conducted. Although one can see and identify the speaker, analyze the tone of his voice, and study his facial expressions, the conversational "rate of fire" makes it impossible to examine every question deliberately and carefully. However, if we are able to show presence of mind, we can gain time by asking a noncommittal counterquestion. This gives us a moment in which to reflect. The telephoned question is by far the most danger­ ous. It is impossible for the staff of any switchboard to check.the origin of each telephone call and the credentials of each caller. Nor, in fact, is it the staff's duty to do so. It must be assumed that an enemy agent will have no trouble whatever in reaching by telephone anyone with whom he wishes to speak. We all are so accustomed to poor connections, people omitting or mumbling their personal identifications, sudden re­ quests for information, continually changing person­ nel, and so on, that we are a little hesitant about asking those ;who telephone us—often very high offi­ cers—to speak up, give their name and rank, specify their job, hang up and let us ring them back, and so forth. Internal and private lines are not absolutely

SECURITY FIRST

71

safe, either. There is no such thing as a telephone line that can't be tapped. In fact, the telephone is the happy hunting ground of the bluffer who is an expert at asking questions which will sound casual. In using the telephone, moreover, he exposes his person to no risk at all. It must be stressed again that an enemy agent asks his "careless question" deliberately, whereas a friend will employ the selfsame manner without any ulterior motive. The iact that the technique is the same is what causes all the trouble. We simply fall into a habit of answering questions asked in a casual, friendly tone. And sometimes, even if we do not answer a question outright, we are likely to reply in such a manner as to confirm or deny a statement related to a military secret. We may do this merely by implication. The question is what counts. It constitutes the first danger to military security. The answer constitutes the second danger, of course. The seemingly unimportant question, the seemingly unimportant answer. The light-hearted question, the lighthearted answer. The flattering question, the flat­ tered answer. The annoying question, the annoyed answer. The careless question, and the careless answer. Axis ammunition!
3. HOW THE HOMEFOLKS MAY ERR

Several reports have been received relating how par­ ents, relatives, and friends of men overseas are unin­ tentionally violating security regulations. These vio­

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lations involve the engraving on gifts of such secret information as the name of a soldier's unit and his arm of service. If soldiers with such information on their persons should fall into the hands of the enemy, it would greatly facilitate the latter's intelligence work. In one instance the unsuspecting parents of a soldier overseas purchased him an expensive identifi­ cation bracelet with the following engraved on it: his name, rank, serial number, APO number, Company D, 300th Port Battalion, Transport Corps. Luckily, a service-connected friend of the parents saw the engravings before the gift was mailed, and pointed out the security violations. Only the soldier's name, rank, and serial number should have been engraved on the bracelet.
4. SECURITY VIOLATIONS

So that troops in theaters of war may make full use of the weapon of surprise, it is of the utmost importance that all officers ancl men understand the seriousness of their responsi­ bility for safeguarding military information. Enemy intelli­ gence acquires much of its knowledge about impending opera­ tions by piecing together bits of information carelessly circulated by individuals who do not realize the importance of such bits of information. No officer or enlisted man in the U. S. Army has any excuse for failing to understand that the disclosure of such information constitutes a serious breach of military disci­ pline. The following examples of security violations are cited and will be brought to the attention of all personnel to serve as a warning: a. A private stationed in a staging area wrote a letter to a girl in which he listed several APO numbers with their geo­

SECURITY FEEST

73

graphic locations. The private was tried by a general courtmartial and sentenced to 6 months at hard labor with forfeiture of $30 per month for 6 months. b. A lieutenant colonel stationed in a large city had access to information involving troop movements and other matters vital to national security. One evening the lieutenant colonel told a woman over a public telephone that he was flying overseas the next day and named his destination and probable time of arrival. A high ranking officer was mentioned as being a passenger on the same airplane. The lieutenant colonel was relieved from active duty with the U. S. Army and reverted to inactive status. c. A private disclosed to a group of civilians the location of a regimental ammunition dump, the number of rounds of ammuni­ tion on hand at the dump, and the number of men on guard. One of the civilians reported the incident, stating that he had not known of the ammunition dump's existence before the soldier told him. The private was tried for disclosing military informa­ tion knowingly and wilfully, found guilty, and sentenced to con­ finement at hard labor for 3 months with suspension of $20 per month for a like period. d. A major, while serving on a staff in an active theater of operations, wrote letters to friends in the United States which disclosed order of battle and casualties, and contained violent criticism of superior officers, including the general in command of the entire operation. He was severely reprimanded by the chief of staff of that command, transferred to a home station, and reduced to his permanent grade of first lieutenant. e. A major, while on temporary duty in the War Department, sent a cable in the clear to the commanding general of the U. S. Army forces in an overseas theater advising him that he was be­ ing replaced by another officer. For disclosing this secret in­ formation, the major was reduced to his permanent grade of second lieutenant. f. A sergeant, in conversation with two United Nations non­ commissioned officers and in the presence of civilians- disclosed

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exact details of a new and secret type of combat airplane. The information revealed might have impaired the effectiveness of the airplane and resulted in serious loss of lives among United Nations forces. In any event, the information would have been of great value to opposing forces, enabling them to adjust their combat methods to meet this new weapon. The sergeant was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and dishonorable discharge from the U. S. Army. g. A major in an advanced base of operations sent several rolls of film to the United States without censorship. Many of the pictures taken were of military installations. The major was court-martialed and forfeited $50 a month for 6 months. h. A sergeant in a theater of war disclosed results of enemy action, casualties, and location of an APO address. He was court-martialed, restricted to the detachment area for 3 months, and required to forfeit $20 a month for the same period.

Section II. HOW U. S. ARTILLERY TERMS DIFFER FROM BRITISH
1. INTRODUCTION

A list of common XL S. artillery terms and their British equivalents is presented below. It is felt that this list will be a considerable help to.our artillery units since many of them may be in action beside British units, or in support of British units, or vice versa. The list of terms was compiled at a British artillery school.
2. THE LIST
AMERICAN BRITISH

Adjust Correct. Adjusting Ranging. Adjutant (S-l) Administration Officer. Aiming circle Director. Aiming stakes Aiming posts. Altitude (elevation) Height or elevation. Angle-of-site level., Sight clinometer. Army Artillery Group Army Group, R. A. (A. G. R. A.). Army Artillery Group Com­ mander Commander, Army Group, R. A. (C. A.G. R. A.). Brigadier G e n e r a l , Army Artillery Brigadier, R. A. (B.R. A.). Assignment Role. "At ease" Rest.
75

76 AMERICAN

IiNTEILLIGEA'OE BULLETIN BRITISH

"At my command" ,__. "Fire by order."
Attached Under command.
Azimuth Bearing.
Base deflection Line.
Base line ; — Zero line. .
Base piece Pivot gun.
Base point Zero point.
Apex angle.
Big "T" or Little "T" Boresight Test sights.
"Cease firing" (canceled by
"next elevation") "Stop" (canceled by "Go on" or fresh sequence of orders). Check point Witness point. Chief of section No. 1. Commands , Orders. :_, Signals. Communications Coordinates (12.3-45.6) or 2356. Map reference 123456. Corps Artillery Officer Commander, Corps, R A. (C. C. R.A. orM.G. R.A.). Counterbattery accuracies: P 50 yards. Q 100 yards. R 150 yards. ,_. Over 150 yards. S Continuous wave , Morse (key).
Deviation. Line error.
Direct support Supported arm can expect 60%
of its calls to be answered. Div Artillery Commander Commander, R. A. (C. R. A.). Executive.—., Gun-position officer (G. P. 0.). Fire Direction Center ._ Regimental Command Post. Five rounds per gmu Scale 5. General support In support. Gunner .__ Layer (No. 3).

HOW U. S. ARTILLERY TERMS DIFFER FROM BRITISH AMERICAN BRITISH

77

Gunner's quadrant--__, "H" hour , Location (accurate) Lost Map reference 36.6-49.5 : Mask Mission "Mission accomplished" Observing line "On No. 1 close — mils" "On No. 1 open — mils" Operations officer (S-3) Overlay Panoramic sight Piece Place mark Platoon . Precision fire Reciprocal laying Record base deflection Salvo fire Section Sense Sensing (U. S. method) : "100 short" "100 over" "100 left" "100 right" Sheaf Shift Site .

.

_ :

_. ___.

Field clinometer.
Zero hour.
Fix.
Unobserved (O. U.).
Map reference 366495.
Crest clearance.
Intention.
"Troop stand easy."
The line 0 . T.
"Concentrate — minutes on
No. 1." "Distribute — minutes from No. 1." Adjutant. Trace. Dial sight. Gun. Bearing picket (B. P.). Section. Pin-point target. Individual angles. Eecord zero lines. Troop fire, 2 seconds. Subsection. Spot (observe). Correction (British method): "Add 100."
"Drop 100."
"Eight 100."
"Left 100."
Subtension of troop at target. Switch. Angle of sight.

78' AMERICAN

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN BRITISH

Operating Proce- The interchange of Liaison Of­ ficers, complete with cable and wireless sets. Unobserved fire Predicted fire. _ K/T. Voice radio Volley fire ­ Salvo or gun fire. "X" Eastings. Map code. "X Y" template "Y"__ Northings. "Y" azimuth Grid bearings. 3.46 minutes. 1 mil 17.78 mils ­ 1 degree. 6,400 mils 360 degrees.

Standing dure.

Section III. A CASTAWAY'S DIARY
1. INTRODUCTION

A U. S. aviator, forced to parachute from his plane in the South Pacific, spent two trying weeks on the sea and on practically uninhabited islands before he was rescued. He kept a day-by-day account of his experiences, relating how he utilized his equipment, the mistakes he made, and how he obtained food and water. A condensed version of this pilot's diary is presented below. In addition to being interesting, his story is believed to contain lessons which will be profitable for other members of our armed forces. It is considered that the safe return of this pilot to his squadron should be attributed to his resourcefulness and the intelligent use he made of his equipment. The fact that he knew where he was and where he wanted to go, and knew how to go about getting there saved him from a great deal of futile wandering and mental distress. The names of persons and places have been omitted from the story.
2. THE DIARY May 2 [1943]

The opening of the 'chute snapped me up short, and I was able to look around and see my plane falling in two pieces—
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the tail section and about 6 feet of fuselage were drifting crazily downward and the forepart was fluttering down like a leaf. I tried to ease the pressure of the leg straps on my thighs by pulling myself up to sit on the straps, -but was unable to do so because of the weight and bulk of my life raft and cushions. As a result, my thighs were considerably chafed. I was so busy looking around that I didn't notice how fast I was descending, and before I knew it I had hit the water. The wind billowed the 'chute out as I went under, and I was able to unfasten my chest strap and left leg strap at once; unfastening the right strap took about 45 seconds, and I held on to the straps as I was pulled along under water by the 'chute. I couldn't under­ stand why I didn't come to the surface—then I remembered that I hadn't pulled the CO2 (carbon dioxide) strings of my life jacket. As soon as I had done this, my belt inflated and I came to the surface. I immediately slipped my life raft off the leg straps, ripped off the cover, and inflated it. During my descent I had hooked an arm through my back pack strap so as not to lose it, but during the time I was struggling under water it must have come off because, when I came up, I saw it floating about 20 feet away. I paddled over and picked it up, along with two cushions—one of which was merely a piece of sponge rubber, 15 inches square and 2 inches thick. After I got into the boat, I took the mirror from the back pack and discovered a deep gash, about 1^4 inches long, on my chin and another deep gash, about 3 inches long, on my right shin. I took out my first-aid kit, examined the contents, and read the instructions. I found that there was no adhesive tape in the kit—apparently it had not been replaced when the kit was checked on the ship coming down from Pearl Harbor. I sprinkled sulf anilamide powder on both wounds and put one of the two compress bandages on my leg. I haven't any idea how I got either one of these cuts. During this time I was having brief spells of nausea, but did not vomit. However, in

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a short while I had a sudden bowel movement, probably as a reaction from the shock and excitement. I felt very weak and dizzy. I began to take stock of my equipment and to figure out where I was by consulting the strip map which I had in my pocket. My chief aim was to reach the nearest land. i As I sat in the boat, still dazed and faint, I realized that, with the distance and prevailing northeast wind, I had little chance of making one of the larger islands. As nearly as I could figure out, I was about 10 miles east of a small island and about 10 or 15 miles south of another. Beyond reaching land I hadn't formulated any plans except to reach land. About 50 minutes after I had crashed, I saw a friendly fighter coming toward me from the west, about 50 feet off the water. I immediately grabbed my mirror and tried to flash the plane. The pilot wobbled the plane's wings, came in, and circled, and I saw that it was my wing man. Five other fighters came down and circled, apparently trying to get a fix on me, and I waved to them. Soon they went off toward the east, and I noticed to my con­ sternation that dark cumulus thunderhead clouds were moving in quickly from the northeast and that the sea was getting quite rough. I realized that no planes would come out for me then because of the approaching dusk. Just before sundown, rain began falling, the wind became stronger, and the waves got higher and higher. There wasn't much I could do—I was still weak and not a little scared. About all I did was to throw out my sea anchor—a small rubber bracket on a 7-foot line—and cover myself with my sail. Rain fell in torrents and the wind blew all night. I bailed out water six or seven times during the night with the small cup that the pump fits in and also with my sponge rubber cushion, but there were always 2 or 3 inches of water in the bottom. The rest of the time, I just huddled under my sail.

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May 3 The rain stopped about daybreak, but the sky was cloudy and the sea still choppy. Off to the east I saw what appeared to be two friendly fighters in the distance, but I knew they wouldn't see me. As day approached, I saw that I had been blown about 10 miles south of the center of the island I was making for. The wind was still from the northeast and I knew I would have td paddle like the devil even to hold my own and not be blown farther out to sea. I broke out one of my six chocolate bars and ate part of it, but I wasn't hungry. I also took a swallow out of my canteen, but I wasn't particularly thirsty. All day long I rowed with my hand paddles, sitting backward in the raft. By 1600 my forearms were raw and chafed from rubbing against the sides of the raft. I had stopped paddling only two or three times during the day, to eat a bite of chocolate and take a swallow of water. Rain began falling about 1600, and I hit a new low point of discouragement when I realized that I had apparently made no headway at all during the day. After night fell, the rain continued in intermittent showers until dawn. The sea was still rough and the wind was from the northeast. I tried to continue paddling, but a large fish hit my hand—I don't know what kind it was—in fact, I didn't even see it, but the experience dissuaded me from rowing any more in the dark. I threw out my sea anchor again—this time with the two cushions tied on the line for additional weight—and huddled under my sail for the rest of the night. I don't recall that I slept this night, or any night before I got to shore—I just seemed to lie in a sort of coma.
May If,

When the sun came up, I found that I was south of the west end of the island and about two miles farther out than I had been the previous morning. I broke out another chocolate bar

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for "breakfast,'' drank a little water, and began to paddle again. Some time during the day I got the idea of getting in the water and swimming along with the raft. The only result of this maneuver was that I lost one of my hand paddles, and I went back to paddling with the remaining paddle and my bare hand. The results of my continuous paddling were more heartening this day, and by about 1500 I realized that I had covered quite a little distance. Just about this time, however, a big storm came from the northwest, and it began to rain again. Again I put out my sea anchor with the cushions tied to it, and settled down under my sail. It rained off and on all night with a northwest wind. Although I was never very thirsty, I would catch rain on my sail and funnel it into the pump cup, drink some of it, and use the rest to keep my canteen filled. Before the storm came that after­ noon, the sun had been quite hot and I had kept my head covered with my sail and applied zinc oxide to my face. Earlier that day I had seen four friendly fighters, going west along the south shore of this island. I also saw a friendly patrol plane which passed over early every morning and late every evening, but because the sun was so far down each time, I was never able to signal with my mirror. May 5 At daybreak I saw that I had drifted to a point about 6 miles south of the east end of the island. I had another chocolate bar for breakfast and a little water, and I was considerably encour­ aged when I found that the wind was blowing from the southeast. This meant that I had a very good chance of reaching the island, so I pulled in my sea anchor and began paddling. Some time during the morning my remaining hand paddle slipped off in the water and, forgetting that I had my life belt inflated, I jumped overboard to retrieve it. Of course, I couldn't get under the surface and soon gave up. I stopped paddling only to take an occasional swallow of water, and about 1800 I came close to the shore. The surf didn't look

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too bad. I headed right in—a mistake, as it turned out, for as soon as I got in closer I found that the waves were at least 50 feet high,1 the highest surf I've ever seen. About this time a big one broke in front of me. I t was too late to turn back. I felt as if I were 50 feet in the air when it broke, and all I could see in front of me was the jagged coral of the beach. I tried to beat the next one in, but it caught me just after it broke and tossed me end-over­ the-kettle into the coral. Fortunately, I missed hitting the sharpest coral and received only a few cuts on my hands. My boat landed about 50 feet away in a sort of channel leading into the beach. I tried to stand up and found that I couldn't walk. Finally, I crawled over to the little channel, got my boat, and dragged it up on a small sandy beach. Since I had tied my belongings rather securely to the raft, the only items that were missing were the pump, the two cushions, and the can of sea marker. I was very tired and very weak; I turned my raft upside down and lay on it, with my sail over me, trying to sleep, but apparently I was too tired to sleep—I think I only dozed for periods of a few minutes at the most. May 6 At dawn I began to look for coconuts on the ground and found one mature nut under a tree. The tree was about 25 feet high, and I immediately set to thinking how I could get more of the nuts off it. I was, of course, too weak to climb and I thought of cutting notches in the tree. I t was hopeless, and I opened the one coconut. The seed had already sprouted and there wasn't much milk in it; since I wasn't hungry, I ate only a little of the meat. Instead, I had my usual "breakfast" of a chocolate bar, laid out my things to dry, cleaned my knife and gun as best I could, and rested some more. Although my .45 had been wet almost
1

This height, estimated by the writer, is believed to be excessive.

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constantly and was quite rusty, the moving parts worked all right after I had applied more oil to them. Then I started out to find some pandanus nuts, having read and reread my guidebook. I found a few, but they were so high I couldn't get to them. In the afternoon I sorted my equipment and rested. By this time I had decided to try reaching the western end of the island. I wasn't sure whether there were any Japs or natives on the island, but thought I might at least run into some natives. During the day I ran across a crocodile in a channel in the coral beach, but we parted company at once,' without incident. Toward evening, rain threatened. I made a coconut cup, im­ bedded it in the sand, and rigged my sail around it so that it would catch water and funnel it into the cup through a small hole in the sail. The rain began when it got dark. I settled myself on the ground under a tree and pulled my rubber boat over me for shelter. May 7 In the morning I worked out a plan for getting some coconuts. I cut several notches in the trunk of the tree and then made a sort of rope ladder with my sea anchor line, placed this around the trunk so that it would slip, and pushed it _up as far as I could. Climbing up by these means, I was able to reach and twist off two coconuts. This was pretty exhausting work, so I rested for a while and then filled my canteen with the rain water that had accumulated in the coconut cup. I drank the milk from the coconut and ate a little of the soft meat, but still I was not very hungry. My store of chocolate bars was down to two, so I decided to conserve them. I then packed all my gear in my back pack, rolled up my life raft, aiid set out to walk along the coast to the west end of the island. There was a 100-yard stretch of coral between the water and the beach, and it was not bad walking. Naturally, I was glad I hadn't discarded by shoes in the water. Several times I

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came to channels in the coral, usually at the mouths of small streams, and then I would have to blow up my life belt and swim across. At one such*place I saw more fish and tried to catch one with my fishing line and pork-rind bait, but the fish declined to bite. Late in the day I came to a sandy beach, along which I walked until it was dark. Then I made a crude lean-to of palm fronds against a tree trunk, blew up my life raft, and settled down on it with my sail as a cover. I smeared zinc oxide on my face—I put either zinc oxide or vaseline on my face each morn­ ing and night for protection against sunburn, and also periodi­ cally put vaseline on the gash on my shin and on my hands, which were cracked from the salt water. The snlfanilamide powder was rather water-soaked, so I used vaseline instead. Aside from a daily quinine pill, that was the extent of my doc­ toring. Fortunately, the gash on my chin had closed pretty well. That night I woke up from one of my periods of dozing to find that the tide had come in. I scrambled around, moving my gear to a dry spot, and discovered that the tide had carried away my sail and my shoulder holster. Luckily, I had my .45 close to my side, but one of the two clips in the holster contained all my tracer bullets. May 8 In the morning, after I had eaten half of my remaining choco­ late bar, I started walking again. Most of the time I walked in the water up to my knees. Soon the coral ledge ended and I had to strike inland because I couldn't get through the im­ mense surf that was washing against the high rock and coral of the shore. I would go inland a little way, parallel the coast by clambering up and down the ridges, and then go back to the shore to see if I could make my way along it. During the day I saw two more crocodiles in a small lagoon and my only snake, a small blue snake about iy2 feet long with a flat tail. During the day I found several coconuts along the beach and on the

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ground, and I drank the land, climbing one of the life jacket and back pack on my deflated life raft. I was lying in mud.

milk. As dusk came on, I was in­ ridges. It began to rain. I put my on the ground, under a log, and lay It rained all night, and by morning May 9

During the morning I crossed more ridges, which ran down to the shore from the central range. This was pretty tiring— mostly I would zigzag up them, and then slip and slide down. I was always hopeful that I would be able to make my way along the coast, but this was impossible. During the day I ate some fern leaves and the remainder of my last chocolate bar. At dusk I came down to the coast to see whether I had rounded a particular rocky point. I found that I hadn't, and decided to spend the night in a small cave in the coral, which was about 100 feet above and, 150 feet back from the water. I slept on my back pack and life jacket and used my deflated raft as a cover. After sleeping spasmodically, I was awakened at dawn by a wave breaking at the entrance to the cave. May 10 In the morning, rain was falling and the wind was blowing; I could make little headway over the rocks and coral so I took to the ridges again. I ate some ferns, and about 1450 I came onto the shore where there was a good sandy beach. The hills were smaller, and there was a grove of coconut palms. I was near the end of the island and could see the next one about 2 or 3 miles across the channel. In the shallow water I found two small crabs and about eight mussels. I ate the crabs raw, and, putting the mussels in my pocket, headed for a small bay. It was a fine afternoon and I built a lean-to of sticks and palm fronds and blew up my raft. I then tried some of the mussels and found that they were rather unpleasantly slimy. When I ate the rest the next day, I washed them first and they tasted pretty good. It rained that night, and since my lean-to did not

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prove to be as water-proof as I had expected, I got under my boat. May 11 The next morning I rested, and ate the meat and drank the milk of a few coconuts. I decided not to build a fire because of the possibility of attracting Japs, but to get to the next is­ land and try to make contact with the natives. I filled my canteen from a stream. Late in the afternoon a number of friendly bombers and fighters came over going west and soon returned. Both times I used my mirror to try to attract their attention. I was quite weak and tired, but built a new and bet­ ter lean-to. That night I dozed fitfully and the mosquitoes were quite annoying. The only other noteworthy incident that day was my first bowel movement since the one immediately after parachuting into the sea. May 12 In the morning I washed my clothes and set about making some oars. I found two small pieces of lumber with a few nails and a screw in them, and, using the nails and a screw, I attached two sticks to the pieces of lumber to make a service­ able pair of oars. Then I ran my sea anchor line around my boat through the rings, and attached to it another piece of rope that I had found. I made two loops in the rope for oar locks. By looping the rope around my feet I could get leverage for rowing. I used some sponge rubber from my back pack to make pads for oaxs. I slit my back pack and inserted a couple of sticks; this provided me with a sail. When I had completed my prep­ arations in the evening, I gave mv craft a brief shake-down cruise, dined on coconuts, and went to sleep.1 May IS With the meat of two coconuts and my canteen of, water as provisions, I set out early in the morning on my voyage to the

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next island. I went out to sea through a break in the reef and soon found that, although my course was due west, I was head­ ino- northwest. This was due to a north-northeast wind, and I rowed constantly because of the possibility of being blown south of the hook of the island. About noon I headed into a sandy beach on the south shore of the hook and again found to my dismay that I had underestimated the size of the surf. ;The waves caught me and tossed me onto a fairly smooth coral ledge. I was under water for what seemed a very long time— actually about 45 seconds—but managed to hold onto my boat. As I struggled to my feet I heard someone shouting and was overjoyed to see two natives in a canoe about 50 yards off shore waving to me. I got into the canoe with all my gear except the back-pack cover and we started east to the south shore of the point, where we met two more natives in another canoe and put into the beach. The natives brought some water and a taro from a hut. After a while we started around the point and along the shore. The natives asked me if I were thirsty, and when I said that I was, we again put into the beach and went into another hut, where I saw a collapsible Japanese boat. One of the natives climbed a 50-foot coconut palm and brought me some coconuts. Finally we pushed on to a village about halfway up the coast. There I was greeted by the- chief. After being given pineapple and taro, I was taken to another hut where it was indicated that I was to sleep. I was given a corner of a low platform, a clean bamboo mat, and a pillow and blanket. After eating more pineapple and taro, I talked mostly with the chief's son, who had been to a mission school and was quite interested in America. After dark we all went to sleep. Traveling from island to island for three days, the natives managed to get me to the U. S. outpost, where I was picked up and carried back to my organization.
U. S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING O f F I C E : 1 9 4 3

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