1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 v.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, EXXON CHEMICAL ARABIA, INC., : :

AND MOBIL YANBU PETROCHEMICAL : COMPANY, INC., Petitioners : : : : : No. 03-1696

SAUDI BASIC INDUSTRIES CORPORATION.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X Washington, D.C. Wednesday, February 23, 2005 The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:58 a.m. APPEARANCES: GREGORY S. COLEMAN, ESQ., Austin, Texas; on behalf of the Petitioners. GREGORY A. CASTANIAS, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the Respondent.

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ORAL ARGUMENT OF

C O N T E N T S
PAGE

GREGORY S. COLEMAN, ESQ.
On behalf of the Petitioners GREGORY A. CASTANIAS, ESQ.
On behalf of the Respondent REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF
GREGORY S. COLEMAN, ESQ.
On behalf of the Petitioners 45
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(10:58 a.m.)
JUSTICE STEVENS: We will now hear argument in

Exxon Mobil against Saudi Basic Industries.
Mr. Coleman, I trust you will soon tell us why
the case is not moot or whether you think it's moot, and
if -- if not, why not.
ORAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY S. COLEMAN
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
MR. COLEMAN: Good morning, Justice Stevens.

May it please the Court:
I will begin with that, if you would like.
This case is not moot because there is an
ongoing case or controversy between the parties. There is

a judgment, it is true, from the Delaware State court,
which has now been affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court.
But preclusion doctrines not Rooker-Feldman and not
mootness govern the resolution of the claims that we
asserted first -­
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: Well, what financial

interests do your clients have to keep litigating today in
another court?
MR. COLEMAN: I don't know the -­
What's going on? I mean,

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: it's very confusing.

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MR. COLEMAN:

Well, certainly, Justice O'Connor,

we've not yet recovered on our judgment and that judgment
is still there. It is still in existence. We've not yet

collected on it.
But I don't believe that mootness turns on
whether you have, in fact, collected on a judgment. There

are very few cases out there in which a party has, in
fact, obtained two judgments, one from a State court and
one from a Federal court, usually because a party waived
the application of preclusion doctrines. And -- and we

have conceded previously that that's not our interest.
What is our interest here is that we have
asserted Federal jurisdiction. Federal court by SABIC. This case was brought in

During the course of discovery,

we found some things out that they had been overcharging
us and we indicated that we were going to bring claims
against them in Federal court. They ran down to Delaware

court by forum shopping in order to try to obtain a
shorter statute of limitations, which turned out for them
to be a strategic blunder of monumental proportions.
But the Federal case, when we filed it, those
claims had original jurisdiction in Federal court. have not yet been resolved in a proper way. JUSTICE GINSBURG: case or controversy? We -­
They

But do you have a continuing

That was -- that -- that's a bedrock

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Article III requirement, and if you've got all the relief
that you were seeking -- let's put it this way. Suppose

your opponent SABIC says, here's the check for the $417
million and we undertake that we're not going to pursue
any further relief. left?
MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. We might not
Would you have a case or controversy

have an interest in pursuing the case, but we have a legal
interest in terms of Article III case or controversy. is well established that the -- the fact of taking a
judgment does not make a case moot. In fact, if there
It

were a holding that we think that the Federal case were
moot -­
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But if you've got all the

relief to which you are entitled, that does make a case
moot.
MR. COLEMAN: In terms of cases that involve

injunctive relief where it is impossible for a court to
give you the relief that you have -- that you are seeking,
that is true. But when you are seeking money damage, it

is at least theoretically possible -- we're not saying
that we're going to ask for that, but at least
theoretically possible that the Federal district court
could still give us relief. asking for is -­
And therefore, what we are

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JUSTICE STEVENS: JUSTICE SOUTER: JUSTICE STEVENS:

What relief could it give you? But what for? What relief? If you're paid

in full, what -- what relief are you entitled to? MR. COLEMAN: Well, we think the relief that

we're entitled to, in terms of this, is for the case to be remanded for the district court to resolve these issues under preclusion doctrines. JUSTICE STEVENS: the district court resolve? MR. COLEMAN: Preclusion. Well, if you win on the But what issues would -- would

JUSTICE SOUTER: preclusion -JUSTICE SCALIA: JUSTICE SOUTER:

Who cares? -- what do you get then in

MR. COLEMAN:

We don't necessarily intend to

take a -- another judgment in Federal court.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Then what do you intend to do?

If you win on preclusion, what do you do then?
MR. COLEMAN: Well, hopefully we'll win on

preclusion with respect not only to this suit, the New
Jersey II suit, but also the New Jersey I suit, which we
say the district -- or the Delaware judgment precludes.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I think we'd like an

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answer.

Justice Ginsburg gives us -- gives you a You've got the money. The judgment What is left to

hypothetical case.

has been discharged in the State courts. do in the Federal court? MR. COLEMAN: It is likely -­

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

Now, the one answer I heard

you give, well, we're interested in preclusion to say -­ well, that's all historical at that point. MR. COLEMAN: Who cares?

It -- it is likely, Your Honor -­

and we have previously said -- that we may very well dismiss the case of our own accord. mean -­ JUSTICE KENNEDY: We're looking for -- we're But that doesn't

looking for something that makes the case live. MR. COLEMAN: Our claims are alive. There are

claims there that seek relief -­ JUSTICE KENNEDY: But we're -- we're questioning

why that is and we're asking you what relief you need to get that you wouldn't get in the hypothetical that Justice Ginsburg posed. MR. COLEMAN: We thought we would not seek

further monetary relief. JUSTICE BREYER: JUSTICE SCALIA: So what -­ Do you know how many claims in

this case that -- that were not in the Delaware case?

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MR. COLEMAN:

We have affirmative defenses to

the New Jersey I, but -- but the claims in New Jersey II
and Delaware are the same, Your Honor.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is your answer that you might

want equitable relief, an injunction to continue making
payments in the future, or something like that?
MR. COLEMAN: No, Your Honor. We're not seeking

additional monetary or equitable relief.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: You -- you would be stuck

anyway because you made a counterclaim and -- and it would
be -- on which you prevailed. And in that counterclaim

you would be precluded if you didn't ask for everything
that you could get.
But -- but at this stage at least, the -- the
door -- there -- there is still conceivably an avenue of
further litigation because, SABIC hasn't yet said that
it's not going to do anything more, that it isn't going to
petition for cert, for example.
MR. COLEMAN: And, indeed, Your Honor. I mean,

SABIC has represented to the Court that it likely intends
to seek certiorari relief from this Court in the Delaware
suit.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: JUSTICE BREYER: So it has -­

So if they do, it's not

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MR. COLEMAN:

It is not finished -­
Yes, all right. I'll ask them

JUSTICE BREYER:

MR. COLEMAN:

Getting back to the Rooker-Feldman

issue, which is the issue on which the Court granted cert,
Rooker-Feldman is a narrow, limited doctrine, but it bars
only appellate review not parallel litigation in Federal
district courts. Rooker-Feldman is not a theory of

vanishing original jurisdiction, nor is it a
jurisdictional substitute for the preclusion analysis
mandated by Congress in the Full Faith and Credit Act.
The expansive interpretation asserted by SABIC
misperceives the fundamental nature of appellate review.
It's untethered to any natural negative implication in 28
U.S.C. 1257. It illegitimately displaces the application

of section 1738, the Full Faith and Credit Act, in most
cases to which it is traditionally applied, and it serves
absolutely no useful purpose.
JUSTICE BREYER: Well, the problem that bothers

me -- and I don't know that there's an answer to it -- is
you have plaintiff. Plaintiff goes into State court. He

brings a lawsuit, a tort suit, a contract suit.

And then
He

he decides he'd also like to go to Federal court. brings exactly the same suit.

And here we have two suits

and exactly the same thing running along at the same time.

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Now, I know there are principles from this Court's case
law that says, well, that's what's supposed to happen.
They've always bothered me.
But now let's take a special instance. The

special instance is that in court one in the State, the
plaintiff loses. Now, what he decides to do is to say to

the Federal court, we want you to review what they did in
the State court. Can't do that. Right?

MR. COLEMAN:

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay. So he brilliantly

JUSTICE BREYER:

figures out I will omit the word review from my -- from my
motion. I will ask for precisely the same thing just not
I will ask them to go and make

use that word review.

their decision which happens to be -- in my opinion should
be -- 100 percent the opposite of what the State court did
showing they're wrong. But I won't use the word review.

Now, you say because he cut the word review out, he can do
it.
MR. COLEMAN: No, Justice Breyer. It's not

because he cut the review out.

Rooker-Feldman is an issue

of appellate -- the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
So what does appellate jurisdiction mean? appellate -­
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Coleman, would you
Well,

clarify, I think, in response to Justice Breyer's inquiry?

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Rooker-Feldman both involved State court litigation that
was over and done with. court. Then you come to the Federal

You have two parallel cases would be -- brought

within a month of each other?
MR. COLEMAN: Within 2 months of each other.

Within a month of each other, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: And isn't the standard

defense of the person who has started the other suit
first, well, Your Honor, prior action pending, please hold
the case that started second in abeyance till we get done?
And if we win in the first case, then it will be
precluded. Then the second case -- the parallel case will
That's not Rooker-Feldman territory.
That's -- that's -- Your Honor,

be precluded.

MR. COLEMAN:

that's our position that -- concurrent jurisdiction is a
separate issue from the appellate review issue that
Rooker-Feldman raises.
Justice Breyer, the answer to your hypothetical
is that appellate review is something different from
having a parallel action. Appellate review is probably

best defined by two characteristics that I'll try to flesh
out for you.
The first is that the proponent alleges some
sort of injury-causing error by the trial court and not by
the adversary and then seeks an order reversing, vacating,

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or otherwise nullifying that lower court order.

When a

party alleges an injury by his adversary rather than the
trial court, the most that can really be said is that you
are continuing on a parallel litigation but not that you
are seeking appellate review. like appellate review. lower court. You do not have what looks

You're not alleging errors by the

You're not seeking an order that directly

nullifies or otherwise undoes the State court judgment.
JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but the argument -- it

seems to me the argument is that in a de facto sense, when
you try to litigate the Federal case, after losing the
State case, you in effect are asking the Federal court in
some sense to review what happened in the State court.
Justice Ginsburg's answer to that is preclusion is the
answer. Is that your answer?
MR. COLEMAN: Absolutely.
Because if that -- if that is

JUSTICE SOUTER:

-- if we accept that as the answer, then there's no
argument for saying you should expand Rooker-Feldman to
include the de facto review as opposed to the -- the very
strict sense of review that you're talking about.
MR. COLEMAN: That is absolutely our position,

Justice Souter, that preclusion addresses all of these
issues.
JUSTICE BREYER: Well, but can you -- can you

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expand on this a little?

I'm not taking a view on it.
I

I'm trying to clear up what's a confusion in my mind.

see how you could do this on the parallel business with -­
with delaying it on the docket and using the doctrine of
preclusion. I understand that.

But we've still got this doctrine called Rooker­
Feldman out there, and as long as you have that doctrine,
it strikes me as odd if -- say, it weren't a plaintiff.
Say it was the losing party, you know, that was asking the
Federal judge, Judge, you have this case on your docket.
Let's move it up. Let's decide it now. He doesn't use
He

the word review, but everything else is the same.

wants a decision out of that court that is going to be the
opposite of what the State court did. And what's

concerning me -- maybe I shouldn't be concerned, but
what's concerning me is whether he can get it or not seems
to turn completely on whether he uses the word review in
the petition.
MR. COLEMAN: is true. I don't -- I don't think that that

It should not and does not turn on the words
What it turns on is the

that you use in your petition.

fundamental nature of the injury that you claim and of the
relief that you seek.
One reason why you don't need to be necessarily
concerned about this is that in all of these cases in

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which one case has gone to judgment and there is a -­ either a continuation or a new case, preclusion is going to cover these. The only extension of Rooker-Feldman that SABIC is asking for is what they call the actually litigated test. That is the heart of the Full Faith and Credit Act. JUSTICE GINSBURG: Rooker-Feldman, if I

understand it correctly, is a subject matter jurisdiction bar. Is that -MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Yes. And -­ It -­

JUSTICE GINSBURG: MR. COLEMAN:

-- it arises from a negative

implication taken from section 1257 and a second negative implication from 1331. JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, to -- so if the two

lawsuits, the State court suit and the Federal suit -­ they're proceeding concurrently or one is held in abeyance waiting the other, there is certainly subject matter jurisdiction in the Federal court of the Federal action. MR. COLEMAN: Yes. To apply Rooker-Feldman in

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

that context would say you had subject matter jurisdiction at the outset, but then you lost it somewhere down the line. MR. COLEMAN: And -- and -- yes, Justice

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Ginsburg.

And that's a distinction between your
Justice Breyer's, as I

hypothetical and Justice Breyer's.

-- if I understand it correctly, is that the Federal suit
starts after the State court is done. Yours is where you
And where the

have parallel actions at the same time.

Federal claims are parallel or even filed first, as in our
case, you can't say that the moment you file those that
you're seeking review of some nonexistent State court
judgment. You're simply asking for relief from something

that your adversary did to you.
And the argument that SABIC makes that the court
relinquishes jurisdiction has no basis or justification in
anything this Court has ever said. It is a theory of

vanishing jurisdiction that I cannot understand.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: JUSTICE STEVENS: with a question?
MR. COLEMAN: Of course.
Is it your position that what
Suppose --
Mr. Coleman, can I interrupt

JUSTICE STEVENS:

should have been done in this case, not in the
hypothetical case, is the trial court should have just
stayed the action pending the outcome of the Delaware
case?
MR. COLEMAN: And, in fact, that's what the

Federal district court had done, Your Honor.

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JUSTICE STEVENS: that was correct.
MR. COLEMAN:

And that's what -- he did -­

Yes, Your Honor.
And then when the Delaware

JUSTICE STEVENS:

case was over, then what should he have done?
MR. COLEMAN: Well, we could either ultimately

dismiss it or the Federal district court could say, looks
like your Delaware case is over. JUSTICE STEVENS: SABIC brings a motion -­

And -- and he has given you
Therefore, you go ahead

all the relief your entitled to. and dismiss the case.
MR. COLEMAN:

Yes, or SABIC brings a motion -­
And therefore, my next

JUSTICE STEVENS:

question is why shouldn't we do exactly that now.
MR. COLEMAN: Because the question before the

Court today is a question of jurisdiction, not of
practical consequences other than the mootness question
that SABIC has raised. that what we may -­
JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, maybe we could vacate
But practical consequences are

the judgment of the court of appeals, say that was wrong,
but still, order it dismissed after we vacate the
judgment.
MR. COLEMAN: I think, as in Feldman, that's a

question that should be first addressed by the district

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court.

Certainly we hope that you will vacate or reverse

the Third Circuit's judgment and allow the district court to address those issues. Perhaps we dismiss it. But if you don't tell us what

JUSTICE STEVENS:

issue remains, I don't know why we shouldn't just direct the suit to be dismissed. MR. COLEMAN: There -- there is a live -- in -­

in the terms of Article III, there are live claims that remain pending before the district court. true -­ JUSTICE SOUTER: And I take it that's because And while it is

you don't have the cert period expired yet in the first action and you don't have the check. MR. COLEMAN: At the very minimum -­ Okay. It's -- if the 3 months

JUSTICE SOUTER:

is expired and the check is in your hand and it's certified, what's left? MR. COLEMAN: intention. As a practical matter, we have no

As a jurisdictional matter, there's still -­ JUSTICE SOUTER: I'm not asking about your

intention. further.

Let's assume you do intend to litigate

What for? MR. COLEMAN: If we did intend to litigate

further, SABIC would be entitled to go to the district court and say they can't. They are precluded.

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JUSTICE SOUTER: my question. left? MR. COLEMAN:

I want -- I want an answer to What's

What are you going to litigate for?

Well, again, setting aside our

intentions and hypothetically, there are cases in which -­ JUSTICE SOUTER: What's left? MR. COLEMAN: We -- we do not seek -- will not I'm talking about your case.

seek any further review from the district court. JUSTICE SOUTER: MR. COLEMAN: Nothing is left.

Yes, Your Honor. Now, suppose you don't have the

JUSTICE BREYER: What's left? MR. COLEMAN:

Well, the case is still up in the

JUSTICE BREYER: MR. COLEMAN:

Why?

Because -­ You have a judgment.

JUSTICE BREYER: MR. COLEMAN:

-- the case -- the case is not

Indeed, because the State -­ JUSTICE BREYER: I never heard of a case that I thought the case is

isn't over until you get the check. over when you have the judgment. (Laughter.) JUSTICE BREYER:

And then if they don't give you

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the check, you have a different matter. enforced.
MR. COLEMAN:

We have to get it

There is a different matter.

But as a matter of Article III jurisdiction,
Your Honor, the -- the mootness doctrine does not apply to
a situation where you have a judgment and it doesn't
necessarily apply the moment you get paid.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose that you lost in the
You then go to

State court and the judgment is final. Federal court.

Are -- is there a context in which Rooker­
This is all

Feldman might then be applicable? hypothetical.
MR. COLEMAN:

Our argument is that it would be

applicable only if the injury that we claimed in our
Federal suit was an injury caused by the State court -­
the court itself or the judge rather than our adversary
and we sought relief from that judgment. That would

obtain the nature of appellate jurisdiction rather than we
say, well, SABIC did us wrong, we'd like a judgment. And

then SABIC can come in and say, well, they're precluded.
They already tried that.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: In other words, if you had

some ongoing relation and, in this hypothetical, the State
court ruled against you and you went in to try to reverse
that ruling, that would be -- that would Rooker-Feldman.

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MR. COLEMAN:

Yes.

If we alleged harm from the

court and sought relief from the court's judgment.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: There were only the two

cases, Rooker and Feldman, that established this.
MR. COLEMAN: Yes.
Has this Court ever said

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

anything to suggest that Rooker-Feldman, as apart from
preclusion doctrine, applies to parallel litigation
instead of you go into Federal court after the State court
is over and you're trying to undo what the State court
did?
MR. COLEMAN: I don't think this Court has ever

held any such thing, and I think it would be inconsistent
with at least Feldman itself. The idea of -- of appellate

jurisdiction over the constitutional claims in Feldman
that were held not to be barred comes down in the end -­
SABIC says, well, those claims weren't actually litigated.
But the opinion itself on page 467 points out that the Mr.
Feldman had raised his constitutional claims in front of
the D.C. Court of Appeals in terms of asking for his
waiver. And when I checked the oral argument transcript

from the Feldman case, it was mentioned specifically in
terms of Mr. Feldman had raised the constitutional claims
in front of the D.C. Court. And that's on pages 9, 14,

and 16 of the LEXIS version of the oral argument

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transcript.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: unless they're also decided.
MR. COLEMAN: Yes. Well, yes. The district
But there's no preclusion

court could then decide whether in fact they were
precluded, and -- and it's likely that they were. I

didn't follow up on what happened when the case went back
down on remand.
But the Court said, we're not going to decide
that. We will allow the district court to address that in

the first instance.
And so we think that the actually litigated
revision of Rooker-Feldman is simply inconsistent with
Feldman itself, that it improperly displaces full faith
and credit that is not true to the negative implication
from section 1257 which has to be a very narrow
implication, indeed, because 1257 gives this Court
jurisdiction, and it's only appellate jurisdiction, to
suggest that another court doesn't have that appellate
jurisdiction must be -- must be narrowly limited to the
context, the type of lawsuits that this Court would seek,
which is not simply they did me wrong, please -- please
give me money, but rather, that lower court erred. violated my rights. It

It is structurally or in some -- in

violation of Federal rights or something that the court

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did and that you have been asked to fix.

That, we think,

is consistent with the proper negative implication from
1257, but overrunning most of preclusion law simply is
not.
For these reasons, we would ask the Court to
reverse.
And, Justice Stevens, I would like to reserve
the remainder of my time.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Castanias. You may do so.

I hope you'll tell us also

whether you think the case is moot before you're through.
ORAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY A. CASTANIAS
ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
MR. CASTANIAS: please the Court:
This case is moot. Mobil to get at this -­
JUSTICE BREYER: cert.
MR. CASTANIAS: JUSTICE BREYER: That's right, and that's -­
Well, then why is it moot?
We might get this case in
Well, you're still asking for
There is nothing for Exxon
Justice Stevens, and may it

Because something could happen.

theory, take it on cert, and discover a jurisdictional
problem that somehow destroys the case without a decision,
and should that happen, there luckily for them they have

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this other case going.

So as long as -- you're prepared,
If that's

I take it, to say you're going to ask for cert.

what you're going to say, I don't see how the case is
over. It's up to you.
MR. CASTANIAS: Okay. Well, I'm -- I'm not

going to take the Hobson's choice, Your Honor, but I am
going to tell you, first of all, that SABIC is going to
apply for cert. At least that's my current understanding.

And second of all, that shows why this case is
not justiciable at this point because if the most likely
event in the -- in the event of this Court's review of the
Delaware determination, is a reversal on a statute of
limitations problem. That's the reason this suit was

brought as the, quote, insurance policy that the Third
Circuit identified, which was if the Delaware Supreme
Court or the Delaware Superior Court had kicked this suit
on the ground of the 3-year statute of limitations -- and
if you look at page 20a of the supplemental brief, the
corrected supplemental brief that we filed with the Court,
including the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion, you'll see
that they had a whale of a time getting over the plain
language of their own statute.
JUSTICE BREYER: All right. If for -- somehow

you won on that, even though it sounds a little like a
State law issue, but nonetheless, if you won on that and

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they reversed it as a statute of limitations, then what
they're saying is, well, that's just why we filed in
Federal court. We didn't want the Federal court to review
We wanted our Federal court suit as an

the State court.

insurance policy in case something goes wrong with the
State court suit. Rooker-Feldman. said. It has nothing whatsoever to do with

It is parallel adjudication, just what he

Now, what's your response?
MR. CASTANIAS: My response, Justice Breyer, is

twofold.

First of all, with regard to the mootness

question, if that eventuality occurs, that's the time when
there may be a justiciable issue for a Federal district
court. Not now. We've been talking about ifs and

hypotheticals and what may happen in the future.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Castanias, was there a

proper case in the district court when the complaint was
initially filed there some 2 months after you filed in
Delaware?
MR. CASTANIAS: Justice Ginsburg.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: All right. So you can bring
We've never disputed that,

two cases, identical cases, in two different courts, and
that's an everyday thing, and the defense is prior action
pending.
MR. CASTANIAS: Right.

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JUSTICE GINSBURG:

Now, you are urging that

Rooker-Feldman which this Court never applied when you had
parallel litigation be extended into a domain which is
ordinarily taken care of by preclusion doctrine. Why

would you want to mix those two things up that now seem to
me rather clear, that if you have Rooker-Feldman, when you
rush into a Federal court and say, Federal court, undo
that State court judgment, I don't like it? just a paradigm case of that. spread that doctrine? Rooker was

Why would you want to

What is -- what is there that

preclusion doctrine doesn't accomplish?
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, Justice Ginsburg,

preclusion doctrine may accomplish this in a certain
number of cases, but I think it's important -- and I think
I have to correct my colleague on the other side here with
regard to the state of the record. Yes, there was a stay

of the New Jersey II trial court litigation, but it wasn't
because of the Colorado River application that we made.
In fact, if you'll look in the appendix to the petition -­
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, I'm not talking about
Prior action pending
They

anything fancy like Colorado River. is a familiar defense.

You've got two actions.

could even be in different districts of the same State and
one says, Your Honor, this case started second, the other
one is going forward, hold it abeyance because there's a

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prior action pending.

That's not Colorado River

abstention or anything like that.
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, I -- I think, Your Honor,

you will see that that is a component of Colorado River,
and that was part of the application that we made to the
district court in this case under Colorado River. And my

only answer -- the only reason that I'm bringing this up,
Justice Ginsburg, is that if you'll look in the appendix
to the petition for certiorari, you will see that SABIC,
my client, made an application for Colorado River
abstention, and the district court denied that. district court denied that in this case.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, sometimes district
The

judges rule incorrectly, but -- but what happened here is
the district court case did not go on because the two of
you, both sides, said, okay, the district court -- they're
all bollixed up with this Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act,
so we're going to agree. You agreed that the case would
Is that

go forward in Delaware, the trial in Delaware. not so?
MR. CASTANIAS:

Well, it was -- it was -- if

you'll look at -- I believe this is at page 8a of the
addendum to the red brief. You'll see that it was Exxon

Mobil that pushed in Delaware, but that actually happened
before the ruling on sovereign immunity, that -- that they

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elected to go forward in Delaware.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, when you say they

pushed in Delaware, you brought them into Delaware and a
-- in a reverse suit. liability.
MR. CASTANIAS: Right.
They brought their case for
They were forced by you
You wanted a declaration of non­

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

liability in the Federal forum.

into the Delaware forum, and now you're saying you were
pushed, that Exxon pushed. Delaware. They didn't.
MR. CASTANIAS: We -- that is true that we
You brought the case in

brought the initial case, but the case was eventually
tried on their counterclaims. make them the party plaintiff. The case was inverted to
They went first at trial

and is it -- at the page I cited to you, that was where
they decided to go forward with the Delaware case.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: forum, not theirs. But it was your preferred

When they filed their complaint, they

filed it in New Jersey where they had a related case
pending. So you chose the forum.
MR. CASTANIAS: That -- that is absolutely the

case with regard to the Delaware matter.
But I think what your question is getting at -­
and I think I have to go back a couple of minutes in our

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colloquy here to talk about why abstention won't do the
work in this case. In the lion's share of cases, it

probably will, Your Honor, but in this case it didn't.
And this brings me back to Justice Breyer's
question which said -- in which he said that -- that
concurrent jurisdiction has always bothered him because
what you're ending up with is a race to judgment. it's important again, Justice Breyer. judgment.
JUSTICE BREYER: Well, that's -- you see,
I -- I mean, she wasn't
But

It's a race to

Justice Ginsburg answered that.

answering my question, but she did say what was a
perfectly satisfactory approach, that -- that the second
person says, you know, Judge, there's another one pending
and the judge says, okay, we'll let that go first except
in some unusual instance.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Which happens thousands of
It's very common and I
It's

times in -- in all of the courts.

don't know why we're over-designing this vehicle. simply other action pending. MR. CASTANIAS: End of case.

Justice Kennedy --
Or end of argument, not end of

JUSTICE KENNEDY: case.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE BREYER:

So why isn't it that the end?

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I mean, here it's not moot.

They filed the other action.

You point out that you not only think something could
wreck the State claim, you would love it to wreck the
State claim. And -- and therefore, they have this

insurance policy in Federal court which they'll gear up if
and when the State claim does get wrecked as you hope.
MR. CASTANIAS: Justice Breyer, I think this is

the point in the argument where I want to turn to the
definition of review as this Court has -- has put it forth
in cases like ASARCO. This is a case that Exxon Mobil
I don't

dismisses in their reply brief as mere dictum.

think that this -- the discussion of Rooker-Feldman and
the ASARCO case can be dismissed as dictum in that it was
a specific response to a specific proposal by the United
States appearing as amicus to dismiss the case for lack of
standing and instead remit plaintiffs to pursuing a second
suit.
In that case, the Court wrote that to re­
adjudicate -- and I'm quoting here from the opinion, and I
don't have the particular page here -- to re-adjudicate
the very same issues that were determined in the State
court proceedings would be -- again quoting -- in essence,
an attempt to obtain direct review of the Arizona Supreme
Court's decision in the lower Federal courts.
In ASARCO, there was no reference to what the

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intent of the plaintiffs was.

There was no reference to
It was simply that

what the timing of the lawsuits was. identical issues actually litigated.
JUSTICE GINSBURG:

So perhaps the Court, if it

had been more cautious, would have spoken not in terms of
Rooker-Feldman or review, but in terms of this matter has
been decided. It is claim-precluded. That's what
So in that
Maybe it

preclusion doctrine is supposed to do.

context, maybe this Court used the wrong word.

should have said, you litigated it, it's over and done
with, now it's precluded. the word review?
Isn't that -- unless you're going to say every
time court A decides a case and then you're in court B and
someone is raising the same claim, that is a review of
court number one rather than you're precluded in court two
because of what is -- has been litigated and decided in
court one.
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, first of all, Justice
Why do you need to interject

Ginsburg, I'm hesitant to say that this Court was
incautious in its use of words. JUSTICE GINSBURG: MR. CASTANIAS: This was --

It is sometimes.

But -- understandably, but -­

but with regard to -- with regard to Rooker-Feldman, it
was not just -- it was not just an accidental -­

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incidental invocation of it. rejection of the argument. judicata.

It was the reason for the

The reason was not res

The reason was respect for the dignity of the

State court's work in the case, and that's ultimately -­
JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's why one has preclusion

because you are giving respect, full faith and credit, to
a decision elsewhere. all about. That's what preclusion doctrine is

We respect the judgment of the court that
We, therefore, give it full faith and

rendered it. credit.

That's what preclusion doctrine is about, is
Isn't that so?
That's -- that's -- that is -­

about respect and credit. MR. CASTANIAS:

that is generally right, Justice Ginsburg, but at the same
time, there -- we all agree -- Exxon Mobil, SABIC, and the
decisions of this Court -- that there has to be some
overlap with regard to Rooker-Feldman and SABIC -- and -­
excuse me -- and -- and preclusion doctrine. The -- the

argument made by Exxon Mobil, which is, in essence, the
same question you're asking me, would have destroyed any
reason whatsoever for the Rooker and the Feldman cases, as
well as the ASARCO case. There's also a significant body

of law that's body of law that's been built up over the
last 85 years in the lower courts in -- in this regard.
And -­
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you -­

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JUSTICE O'CONNOR:

So some of the lower courts

have given a broad interpretation to Rooker-Feldman and
have turned it into something other than the narrower view
of it. And I think that's why we granted cert in this

case, to decide whether to give it a broad or a narrow
interpretation. The Third Circuit applies a rather broad

interpretation of it.
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, I -- I guess in that

respect, Justice O'Connor, I disagree because the Third
Circuit, admitted by its own words, applies a very narrow
version of Rooker-Feldman. And, in fact, using this case

as the vehicle to decide this, the -- the definition of
Rooker-Feldman in this instance amounts to no more than
barring jurisdiction in a second Federal suit over the
identical claims. This is not a case where you have to

worry about claims that might have been brought, the sort
of things that footnote 16 in Feldman dealt with.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: But maybe that isn't a proper

application of Rooker-Feldman where the complaint is not
about something the State court has improperly done.
MR. CASTANIAS: Well --
It isn't. And so in that

JUSTICE O'CONNOR:

sense, the Third Circuit has a rather broader view of it
I'd say.
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, to be sure, Justice

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O'Connor, the Third Circuit's view is broader than that which appears to be adopted by the Ninth Circuit, as well as the Seventh Circuit. And I think this brings me back to the definition of review. The -- the Ninth and Seventh

Circuits' views in our estimation are wrong because they strictly look to the subjective intent of the plaintiff and as to whether the plaintiff is, in fact, seeking reversal. cases. That -- that's the term that's used in these

Noel says seeking to set aside. But section 1257 -­ JUSTICE STEVENS: Of course, that's the language

that was used in both Rooker and Feldman too I think. MR. CASTANIAS: And that's because, Justice

Stevens, that's -- that was the particular fact pattern of this -- of that case. JUSTICE STEVENS: And that's the only fact

pattern any of our cases have dealt with. MR. CASTANIAS: that's right. JUSTICE SOUTER: And the -- and the concern is I That's -- in the Supreme Court,

think -- at least as I understand the -- the concern with it, it -- it boils down to something like this. Somebody Don't

comes along and says, don't apply claim preclusion.

apply it because, for whatever reason, there's this -­

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there's something wrong here, and -- and Federal court
should determine the -- in fact, the -- the claim
preclusion of the State judgment should not apply. The

answer to that is, look, that's an issue to be raised by
way of appeal of your State judgment. State judgments in Federal court. You don't appeal

Out.
The only

There's no such claim being made here.

claim that's being made here or the only conceivable
claim, I guess, that can be made here is that we might
want to do some litigating in the Federal case after the
State case is over. There's no claim here that claim

preclusion should not apply in that instance, and because
there's no such argument that claim preclusion does not
apply, the answer to the problem that you're worried about
is simply claim preclusion doctrine. There's no reason to

add a perihelion or something onto Rooker-Feldman to deal
with what is really a very simple problem and that is, if
they try to relitigate anew in Federal court, as Justice
Ginsburg says, you -- you plead claim preclusion. Simple.

Why do we need to complicate it beyond that simplicity?
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, Justice Souter, I -- I

don't have any qualms with the application of claim
preclusion here. The -- the Third Circuit, though, was

being -- was being sensitive to the interests of the State
courts, as well as sensitive to the fact that it had

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another jurisdictional issue in front of it, which was
subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. And I'm -­

I'm certain, as certain can be, that that court would have
reached the same result if res judicata had been before
it.
But the -- the fact is that Rooker-Feldman is
there and, again, as -- as with my response to Justice
Ginsburg earlier, your -- your question would effectively
rub out any need for even Rooker and Feldman themselves.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, no, because the -- it -­

it would not rule out the need to have some answer when
someone in a Federal court comes along and says, don't
apply claim preclusion, whatever the reason may be. apply the claim preclusion rules. unfair about doing it here. There's something
Don't

The answer to that is, look,

what you're really asking us to do, when you say don't
apply claim preclusion, is to review what happened in the
State court, and we don't sit as an appellate court on
State courts. So there's still something for Rooker­

Feldman to do on, as it were, Justice -- Justice
Ginsburg's claim preclusion argument.
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, Justice Souter, I think

again, with respect to the hypothetical that you've put to
me, the claim preclusion is appropriately -­
JUSTICE SOUTER: It'll get the -- it'll get the

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job done that you say will need to be done if you get to
that point.
MR. CASTANIAS: done.
JUSTICE SOUTER: MR. CASTANIAS: Why won't it?
Well, there -- there are -­
The -- the
It -- it should get the job

first of all, there are no guarantees.

preclusion doctrines are -- are riddled with exceptions.
JUSTICE SOUTER: MR. CASTANIAS: JUSTICE SOUTER: ask for a new body of law. Then -- then you -­
The preclusion doctrine -­
Then -- then you appeal. Don't

Just say, look, you got the
We're

application of claim preclusion wrong in this case. going to appeal.
MR. CASTANIAS:

I -- I disagree, Justice Souter,

that -- that we're asking for anything like a huge, new
body of law or that the Third Circuit was making a huge,
new body of law.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, you're asking us to

extend Rooker-Feldman beyond where this Court has taken
it, and if I recall correctly, you really didn't ask for
this. case. The Third Circuit injected Rooker-Feldman into the
Is that not true?
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, that's true, Justice

Ginsburg, but it's true because of the briefing cycle.

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When we briefed the case, there was no Delaware judgment.
And it was only on the eve of oral argument -­
JUSTICE SCALIA: MR. CASTANIAS: JUSTICE SCALIA: to mootness? Ms. Castanias -­
Yes.
-- could -- could I come back

One -- one could say that not only is claim

preclusion the answer to Rooker-Feldman, it's also the
answer to the asserted mootness here. I mean, you -- you
All you have to

don't have to move to dismiss it as moot.

do is move to dismiss because of a prior adjudication that
has resolved this question.
Do you know of any case in which the existence
of a prior judgment in another court has been held to
render a suit that someone wants to press to get a second
judgment moot? I mean, you'd think there would be a case

on that, and I suppose the reason there isn't is that
because the other side is always going to plead res
judicata.
MR. CASTANIAS: to give up.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Or give up.
Well, or the other side is going

But is there any case in which mootness is
established by the fact that there is a prior judgment of
another court giving you what you are asking for from this
Court?

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MR. CASTANIAS:

Well, Justice Scalia, in the -­

in the realm that we're talking about here, the Fourth
Circuit's decision in the Friedman's case came to a
mootness conclusion. We've also cited in our brief -- and

I don't recall the names of them off the top of my head -­
two cases in which the Court either -- either dismissed or
remanded for consideration of mootness in light of another
State court judgment. So I think there is -- there is a

body of law, but I also know that it is -- as recently as
yesterday looking at Wright and Miller on this issue, that
when complete relief has been accorded by another
tribunal, that is the classic case of mootness.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I -- I don't know why -­

well, if it's -- if it were so classic, there would be a
lot of cases, and I don't -- I'm not sure that any of
yours are right on point. And -- and I think the reason

is that you don't need it, that claim preclusion is -- is
the remedy for the party who wants to get out of it.
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, and again, I'm -- I'm

certainly not going to fight claim preclusion because this
is a suit that should not be here. This is -- this has

had moving parts since we -- since the petition was
granted with the Delaware Supreme Court ruling and now
with yesterday's denial of reargument in the Delaware
Supreme Court. What -­

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JUSTICE BREYER:

Why is it moot?

Or even on -­

why does claim preclusion apply?

I mean, if you win, from

what you've said -- somehow convince us that this refusal
to apply the State statute of limitations properly
violated some Federal law, let's say -- then that would
show that the State statute of limitations applied and
barred their claim. Would that be sufficient to knock out

the Federal suit too?
MR. CASTANIAS: I'm not sure I understand the

question, Justice Breyer.
JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, is -- does the State

statute of limitations, if -- if it applied to the State's
case, does it also apply in the Federal cases, the
identical ground that everybody agrees that the State
statute governs?
MR. CASTANIAS: The -- the -- there could be -­

there could be issue-preclusive grounds on such a ruling,
Justice Breyer, but -- but -­
JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, if you -- if you win,

then -- then -- if you win your State case, because of the
argument you made, do you also automatically win the
Federal case? Is it the same issue?
I -- I don't think I could say

MR. CASTANIAS:

that at this point because -­
JUSTICE BREYER: So it may not be the same

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issue.

Then -- then they say, okay, it's not going to be

claim preclusion, and you'd have to say insofar as it's
not the same issue, it's not claim preclusion. And

therefore, they could proceed with their Federal case,
which is what they want to do I guess.
MR. CASTANIAS: event.
JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. So we can't say it's moot
And -- and that is a future

in any -- and we can't say there's an alternative basis
where they'd win, can we?
I mean, I'm saying -- I'm thinking if we get
into conference, we're discussing this case, and I say,
well, I have to think this through, is it the case that if
you're right and you end up winning in this Court, that
their case in Federal court is over? not be. The answer is it may not be. I think no, it may
Then this is not
They

moot at all.

This is not claim-precluded at all.

then might proceed with their Federal claim.
MR. CASTANIAS: Breyer -­
JUSTICE BREYER: MR. CASTANIAS: JUSTICE BREYER: MR. CASTANIAS: Is that right or not?
I don't think it's right.
Because?
And -- and I think the reason
Well, I -- I guess, Justice

it's not right is because that just shows that there's no

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live controversy right now. might happen in the future.
JUSTICE BREYER:

That's a controversy that

Oh, well, but that -- that

isn't fair to them because, for all I know, they filed the
Federal case because there's a different statute of
limitations, say, that governs it that will have expired
if you don't let them file it by the time -- until this
whole thing is over. They just wanted it as protection.
Well, two answers to that,

MR. CASTANIAS: Justice Breyer.

First of all, that seems to be a -- a

place for State doctrines of tolling to apply, not Federal
law.
Second of all, this Court in -- in Heck against
Humphrey, which we cited in our brief, solves this -­
JUSTICE BREYER: That's explaining the unclear

by the incredibly hard to understand.
MR. CASTANIAS: Breyer.
JUSTICE BREYER: It's explaining the unclear by
But go ahead.
I'm sorry. I'm sorry, Justice

reference to the incomprehensible. (Laughter.)
JUSTICE SCALIA: (Laughter.)
MR. CASTANIAS: Scalia.

I think I wrote that opinion.

And indeed, you did, Justice

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JUSTICE SCALIA: (Laughter.)
MR. CASTANIAS: impression.

I never did like it.

I -- I've also gotten that

But -- but Heck I think teaches an important -­
Heck teaches an important lesson for this case as well,
which is that Heck was just a suit for money damages, just
like this suit. And -- and yet, this Court said that

there's going to be no cause of action under section 1983
because of the intersection of 1983 and habeas. have the same result here. Well, we

There should be no Federal

court case here because of the intersection of section
1257 -­
JUSTICE GINSBURG: you walk in the door. No, no, because it's where

And you started out by saying this
It

case, I think as you must, was a proper Federal case. was properly filed in -- and it was properly filed in
Delaware.

So you can't talk about a case that says, if
If

you've got this kind of case, you go in this door. that kind of case, you go in that door.

You have a case

here that could go in either door, the Federal, the State.
The usual rule is, is it not, that if Federal
jurisdiction attaches, it doesn't get lost because of
subsequent events. For example, if a defendant moves into

the plaintiff's State and the only basis for Federal

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jurisdiction is diversity, subject matter jurisdiction
isn't lost, is it?
MR. CASTANIAS: No, and in fact, the case that's

cited against us for that proposition, the Freeport­
McMoran case, makes clear, in the portion of it not cited
by Exxon Mobil, that that rule is limited to the diversity
context. And it's not -- it -- it does not have its
We don't want to
We don't want
So

genesis in statute, but it's in policy.

keep people from moving across State lines.

to -- want to impede their -- their free movement. we're going to look at it at the time of filing.

But what we have here is a case where maybe it
was original jurisdiction when the case was filed, but
it's not original anymore.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: maybe -­
MR. CASTANIAS: this case, yes. Well, in this case, yes. In
Maybe. It's not -- it's not

But original jurisdiction when the case

was filed but not anymore because there's nothing original
about it.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: A case can become moot, but

we've already expressed considerable doubt whether that is
the fate of this case.
The notion -- you used it derisively -- the
insurance policy. Lawyers bring protective actions all

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the time, don't they? that.

There's nothing wrong with doing

MR. CASTANIAS:

Well, I guess I come back to -­

to where I started with Justice Breyer on the -- on the
merits of the Rooker-Feldman issue this morning, which is
that the concurrent jurisdiction is something to be dealt
with. This Court has an uneasy body of law in the

abstention area dealing with the issue of concurrent
jurisdiction, but what it doesn't have is anything that
deals with judgments, once you get to a judgment.
JUSTICE STEVENS: an unfair question. May I ask you? It's perhaps

The Chief Justice generally likes to

confine our attention to cases of this Court rather than
the courts of appeals for our primary guidance, and most
of the Rooker-Feldman law is court of appeals law, as we
-- we both know. Going back just to Rooker and to

Feldman, those two cases, and putting aside ASARCO for a
minute, which of those two cases do you think provides you
the stronger support, if indeed any support, between
Rooker and Feldman?
MR. CASTANIAS: Well, I -- I would have to say

that Feldman, of the two of them, is probably stronger
support.
JUSTICE STEVENS: And that is the case in which

the court of appeals was itself a party to the litigation.

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MR. CASTANIAS:

That's right.

But at the same

time, the -- the Rooker case also dealt with relitigation
of the identical issues.
And if I could just sum up here, seeing that the
light is on here, the issue in this case is limited to
identical lawsuits, identical claims. The Third Circuit's

decision in this case, if it constitutes an extension of
Rooker-Feldman at all, is only a modest extension because
it recognizes, consistent with ASARCO, consistent with
Heck, and consistent with the very notion, Justice Souter,
of de facto appeals, not actual appeals, but de facto
appeals being prohibited by the doctrine -- it recognizes
that claims actually litigated in a State suit to a
judgment, if they are litigated anew in the Federal court,
that is de facto appellate review.
The judgment of the Third Circuit should be
affirmed.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Thank you, Mr. Castanias.

Mr. Coleman, you have 8 and a half minutes left.
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY S. COLEMAN
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor.
I believe the concession that the Federal court
exercised original jurisdiction at the time our case was
And I'll take just a few of them,

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filed is an important concession because I simply do not
see yet still any rationale for this idea of vanishing
original jurisdiction.
I also see the concession made in response to -­
to your question, Justice Breyer, about what happens if
they win on the statute of limitations issue. Well, one

of the cases they cite on page 12, footnote 5 of their
brief, the Northern Natural Gas case itself makes clear -­
and there are other cases. They went to Delaware to apply
They conceded in

the Delaware statute of limitations.

front of the Delaware Supreme Court that even if they had
won that, it wouldn't bar another lawsuit in a different
forum applying a different statute of limitations. The

only way they could even hope to get the shorter statute
was in Delaware. The Delaware statute would never apply

to our Federal claims, so that if somehow it went back on
that procedural ground, it would not bar a trial in
Federal court. We don't think that that's likely to

happen, but that is another explanation yet of why it's
moot.
We also cited to the Court the Male case. It is

an old case, but it does make clear that when there is the
question of jurisdiction before the court and some other
court rules on the merits, that does not make the case
moot. In fact, you really wouldn't have a need for claim

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preclusion if that were the rule in -- in mootness,
because once the case is final over there, they'd all be
moot, and you wouldn't need to apply -­
JUSTICE SCALIA: MR. COLEMAN: Well, that depends on who wins.

You're right.
I mean, if you lost in the
I mean, it

JUSTICE SCALIA:

other suit, your claim here wouldn't be moot.

-- it would be precluded, but it's certainly not moot.
MR. COLEMAN: I -- I think that's right.

I'd also like to address, just very briefly, the
ASARCO question. The language that the Court used in

there we don't necessarily think was loose or
inappropriate, Justice Ginsburg, and the reason was the
Court cites at that point an amicus brief by the United
States and it cites a particular footnote. And what that

footnote says is it's a recommendation that the mining
company in that case could file a Federal lawsuit seeking
a judgment that the invalidation of the statute was not
necessary. But by challenging the invalidation itself,

that -- that looks more like a direct challenge to the
State court judgment. It's not simply a relitigation. So

that behind the Court's language there -- and of course,
it was really just addressing standing. directly addressing Rooker-Feldman. It was not

But the U.S.'s

suggestion in that case was a suit challenging the State

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court judgment, and in that situation, it looks more like
appellate review, more likely to infringe upon Rooker­
Feldman-type interests.
In the end, we believe that preclusion doctrines
adequately cover all of this, that it is not true -­
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Coleman, I don't mean to

take your time, but in the ASARCO case, was the State
court judgment final at the time in dispute?
MR. COLEMAN: about that. Your Honor, there's a question

I mean, the Court kept jurisdiction, but

there was a determination that the statute was invalidate
-- was invalid and then a remand back to the district
court for further proceedings.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Because if the judgment were

final, then that would fit right into your -- your
analysis, if the judgment of the State court were final.
MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor, it would.
Yes.

JUSTICE STEVENS: MR. COLEMAN:

In the -- at the end of the day,

we believe that this Court's preclusion jurisprudence is
not riddled with vagaries, that it's not difficult to
understand, and that it's certainly not more vague or
difficult than the borrowing that they are attempting to
do to bring existing preclusion doctrines into -- in order
to expand Rooker-Feldman.

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Preclusion is the answer in this case.

We

believe that the district court should be permitted to
address that in the first instance, and we would ask the
Court to reverse the judgment of the Third Circuit.
Thank you.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Thank you, Mr. Coleman.

The case is submitted.
(Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the case in the
above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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