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Almeda vs CA Facts: The brothers Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto Almeda applied for the registration of the land

which they inherited from their father who had inherited the same from their own parents. The Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General opposed to the application. The Court found that the applicants' possession of the parcel of land sought to be registered, together with that of their predecessors-ininterest, has been public, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner for a period of more than thirty (30) years, and, that the land is not located within any forest reservation nor mortgaged or encumbered in favor of any person or lending institution. The trial court affirmed the order of general default and confirmed the title of the applicants to the parcel of land. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, appealed and alleged that the applicants-appellees have not met the statutory requirements on possession under Section 48(b) of CA 141, mainly because the land applied for was inalienable forest land before its release as alienable and disposable land on January 3, 1968. The applicants' possession thereof prior to January 3, 1968 was invalid for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. They have to their credit only seventeen (17) years possession and occupation of the land, counted from January 23, 1968, when it was declared alienable and disposable, up to September 12, 1984, when their application for registration was filed. Issue: Whether or not the classification made by Director of Forestry could affect the vested rights of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest who had continuously occupied and profited from the land since 1918 or very much earlier. Held: The SC held that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. . It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

CFI of Albay ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by EO No. 17 unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. and January 17. 1913. As testified by the District Forester. Ignacio filed a petition for reconstitution on May 30. RTC ad CA ruledagainst the Palomos. cannot convert it into private property. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. 40 to Diego Palomo. however. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. On July 10. Held: There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and. 1974 petitioners filed a civil case against privaterespondents who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered their land and cut down bamboos. December 28. no matter how lengthy. On May 7. 496). Palomo donated several parcels of land to his heirs. records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present. they form part of the forest zone. 1916. 1950 as the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese Occupation. 40 which reserved parcels of land for provincial park purposes in Tiwi Albay on June 13.The Palomos. Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death. It is not registrable and possession thereof. On December 9. . as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. therefore. continued in possession of the property. 16 Moreover. 1917. herein petitioners. The Republic of the Philippines also filed a Civil Case for the annulmentand cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving the 15 parcels of land. is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. Issue Whether or not the land claimed by the Palomos may be acquired by adverse possession. 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.Palomo vs ca Facts: Governor General William Cameron Forbes issued EO no.

And lot 4 was donated by spouses Paulo G. 1928. In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs.Rep vs ca roman catholic Facts: On February 2. portion of Lot 2 also by purchase thru Rev. filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. The Solicitor General further contended that granting title to alienable lot of public domain to respondent would be in violation of Article XIV. the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena. IAC. Issue: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop can acquire alienable land of public domain. section II of the 1973 constitution. while the remaining portion of Lot 2 and Lot 3 were already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even prior to the survey of the said three lots in 1928. be not applicable. The Republic of the Philippines thru the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development represented by the Solicitor General. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such. the Constitutional provision involved will. alleging that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcels of lands. filed an opposition on April 20. 1979. Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. Sanchez. represented by Msgr. Father Raymundo Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado on October 20. Macasaet and Gabriela V. 1969. . 1941. Jose T. The applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928. 1979 in the Court of the First Instance of Quezon. de Macasaet on February 26. Held: There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property. nevertheless. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court. Father Raymundo Esquenet from the spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia Descaller on May 22.

1621 5 of the Civil Code. filed a complaint questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances — between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman. Held: Jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen. and his son. The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. 25 Godinez vs. who are owners of the adjoining lot. Pak Luen. . David Rey Guzman sold said parcel Emiliano Cataniag. 26 Vasquez vs. . since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag. defendant appellee [also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman. in the cases of Sarsosa vs. the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." 22 Likewise. The objective of the constitutional provision — to keep our land in Filipino hands — has been served. leaving real properties in the Philippines. died sometime in 1968. Issue: Whether or not the subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen is valid. that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.Halili vs ca Facts Simeon de Guzman. [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands. 28 which similarly involved the sale of land to an alien who thereafter sold the same to a Filipino citizen. His forced heirs were his widow. Luy Kim Guan. defendant appellee [herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman. 29 Accordingly. as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case. 1991. . an American citizen. Li Seng Giap thus: . Li Seng Giap 27 and Herrera vs. Cuenco. Petitioners. On February 5. both of whom are also American citizens. the Court again applied the rule that the subsequent sale can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos. a Filipino citizen. the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag — and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art.

1946. which issued TCT no. . hence. petitioners Ong Ching Po. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese. On March 19. have been disqualified from acquiring public lands. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas. private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po. the same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to private respondent in 1947. petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his children. Jimmy Ong and David Ong filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent. The latter. petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. 9260. Held: The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986. she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po. The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition. The translation showed that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. the wife of Ong Yee. Petitioners claimed that on July 23. Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of Land to private respondent Soledad Parian. 1947. On December 12 1985. exploitation. the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po. Private respondent contended that when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. Issue: Whether or not Ong Ching Po acquired title to the lands. development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. whether individuals or corporations. She demanded that the lot be vacated when her husband died because she was going to sell it but the petitioners refused to vacate. 1984.]). On December 6. they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.Ong Ching Po vs Court of Appeals Facts: On July 23. The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed. died in January 1983. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English and the document was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila. Aliens . petitioners Jimmy and David Ong. 1983.

. the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. "natural resources. an alien. as above indicated. Kriventor. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if. he filed for registration. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII.Krivenko vs Register of deeds Facts: Alexander A. Held: Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution. they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. and it reads as follows: Sec. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Save in cases of hereditary succession. corporations. In May. Both sections must. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta. no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals. The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war. 1945. and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. with the exception of public agricultural land. from which Krivenko appealed to the Supreme Court. This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands." And the subject matter of both sections is the same. therefore. be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. after all. The register of deeds of Manila denied on the ground that. he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction." and with respect to public agricultural lands. Undoubtedly. section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. shall not be aliented. their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. on December 1941. being an alien. Issue: Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. 5. Inc. namely.

is composed of only one person. in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc. a Canadian citizen. although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church. 1954. The Registry of Deeds required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members thereof were Filipino citizens Davao when the deed of sale was presented to them for registration. a Filipino citizen executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land. (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole. church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass. usually the head or bishop of the diocese. there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen.Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc v LRC Facts: On October 4. unlike the ordinary corporations which are formed by no less than 5 incorporators. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation. as such. property. .. or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao. as actual incumbent. the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital.. Issue: Whether or not a corporation sole may acquire and register private agricultural land when the Head. was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens. Rodis. if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located. upon his death not his personal heirs but to his successor in office. and (4) the latter. A resolution was rendered holding that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution. is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country. As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if the document. a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever. Manager. thus. (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole. s corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws. a Roman Catholic Church. separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See. nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole. by operation of law. Clovis Thibault. the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution in accordance with section 4 of Republic Act No. Inc. Administrator or actual incumbent is an alien. Furthermore. management or administration of the corporation sole. Held: It has been held that: (1) the corporation sole. with Msgr. 1151. Mateo L.

the disposition. If this can be done. but in a codicil of a later date she appears to have a change of heart. But if an alien is given not only a lease of. the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal. until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. Register of Deeds. Held: Taken singly. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned. but considered collectively. tomorrow. she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. In 1958. Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. she executed two other contracts. Vs lui she Facts: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila with two residential houses.Phil banking corp. blind. Issue: Whether or not an alien can lease and or own lands. as announced in Krivenko v. She filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. but also an option to buy. On September 22. a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Justina Santos executed a contract of lease in favour of Wong which was for 50 years with the right to withdraw at any time. by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property. . they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits.22 is indeed in grave peril. then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi. She was at the time 90 years old. the next day. To be sure. The sisters lived in one of the houses. jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred. a Chinese. while Wong Heng. jus utendi. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary. then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines. Register of Deeds:20 [A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. In the two wills executed. and so on. 1957. and another fixing the term of the option of 50 years. Wong also took care of the payment of several expenses in her behalf. Wong became her trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping. The contract was further amended. a piece of land. she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes. one extending the term of the lease to 99 years. As this Court said in Krivenko v. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year. crippled and an invalid who lived by herself with no other relative. the use. lived with his family in the restaurant.21 this to last for 50 years.