13/03/2009 06:41:00

FOREIGN CULTURES 48: The Cultural Revolution Midterm Study Guide

“Overview of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76” (Lieberthal: Governing China, pp. 84-112) The Maoist Era Mao was the source of ultimate wisdom; policy making was an example of the “bandwagon effect,” where other officials would try to sense in which direction Mao was leaning and then jump on the Maoist bandwagon Mao had and especially strong impact concerning three issue areas: o Relations with the U.S. and Soviet Union o o Policies to promote the revolution in China Agricultural policy

Mao felt least comfortable with urban economics 1949-56: Economic and political recovery and basic socialist transformation o Four broad policies of the early years:     o 1) Cement terms of relationship with USSR 2) Establish governing apparatus to rule urban China and unite the country 3) Restore urban economy 4) Consolidate control over countryside while instituting land reform on a nationwide basis Mid-1950: CCP instituted series of mass political campaigns:  (1950-52) Land Reform Campaign: CCP sent land-reform teams to redistribute land from the landlords to the peasants; they also categorized peasants into different classes • •  Very violent; at least 800,000 landlords killed CCP able to establish communist power structure in the countryside

Wielding Power

(1951) Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign: targeted civil-servant holdovers from KMT regime and urban secret societies • Did not involve mass mobilization Three Anti Campaign: targeted waste, corruption, and bureaucratism among basic-level urban cadres

(1951-52) Three Anti Five Anti Campaigns: against corruption •

Five Anti Campaign: targeted corruption, tax evasion, stealing state property, cheating on state contracts, and stealing state economic secrets among urban businessmen

• 

Campaigns involved mass mobilization, study groups, thought reform

(1951-52) Thought Reform of Intellectuals Campaign: encouraged university student to criticize their teachers and advocate the Soviet system over the American/European models • Campaign involved mass mobilization, thought reform

o

Socialist transformation of the economy   (1953-1957) First Five-Year Plan: involved funneling resources into investment in almost 150 Soviet-assisted new enterprises (1955-56) Agricultural cooperativization • At the same time, the Socialist Transformation of Industry and Commerce campaign allowed urban capitalists to sell their enterprises to the state

-

1956-57: Contradictions and Rethinking of the Soviet Model o Four tensions that led to the Great Leap Forward   1) Mao’s role in the system: Mao felt that he could not exit from the bureaucratic routine (“retreat to the second line”) without risking loss of control and power 2) Soviet-style economic development favored top-down control as well as inequalities in income and power; Soviet system sought to exploit the countryside to serve the urban population   3) China’s need to mobilize domestic capital formation 4) Tension between peasant cadres and urban intellectuals: intellectuals regarded peasant cadres as uncivilized, peasants regarded intellectuals as elitist and “bourgeois” o 1956: Soviet de-Stalinization initiative made Mao rethink Khrushchev’s policies and qualifications  Mao began to modify the Soviet model to made it more applicable to his own priorities: “On the Ten Major Relationships” o (1957) Hundred Flowers Movement: Mao encouraged intellectuals to speak their minds and point out the errors of party officials, but the outpouring of criticism drove Mao to end the campaign o  Antirightist Campaign: initially targeted dissenters from Hundred Flowers campaign but ended up indiscriminately labeling many individuals “rightists”  Important results of Antirightist Campaign: • 1) No one dared to criticize the shift toward radical political and

economic policies • 2) Many intellectuals lost (professors, engineers, economists, scientists), which would make a highly centralized, government-administered approach to economic development difficult 1958-61: The Great Leap Forward o Idea that China could leap over the normal stages of economic development, based on the notion that the organized masses could transform their labor into capital o o Great Leap approach expanded role of CCP at the expense of the government, greatly decentralized policy implementation Key slogan: “Strive to go all out to achieve more, faster, better, and more economical results”  o In reality, “better” and “more economical” were sacrificed for “more” and “faster” Aug 1958: Mao called for the establishment of “people’s communes,” large, centralized organizations in the countryside meant to facilitate meshing the government administration with economic production o In terms of the PLA, Great Leap favored some of its previous guerrilla-war traditions  o Military was made more egalitarian, more involved in domestic economic construction and in developing extensive militia organizations  Great gains in production (i.e. steel output)   Partly due to many key Soviet-aided plants that came on line in 1958, good weather Many problems arose: • Disorganization: too many people removed from the fields to permit successful harvest, steel produced in backyard smelters was of very poor quality, transportation system clogged • • o Problems of administration and morale in the people’s communes Officials inflated production figures

(1959) Lushan Plenum: Peng Dehuai criticized the excesses of the Great Leap  Mao criticized and purged Peng and colleagues  Consequences: • • • Future policy debate discouraged Peng Dehuai replaced with Lin Biao Radicalism surged anew during 1959-60

o

Famine in the countryside  Low agricultural production, but leaders still demanded for food for the cities

 o o -

Roughly 30 million people starved to death

Chinese economy sunk into depression 1960: Soviets withdrew aid

1962-65: Recovery and Growing Elite Divisions o 1961-62: 20 million citydwellers forced back to the countryside via rationing of urban food and consumer goods o o Urban unit system led to a two-tier system of privileged urban society and exploited rural society Mao feared economic rehabilitation policies would steer China away from revolution  continued mobilization to attack internal political enemies  Mao feared China would follow the Soviets (no longer appeared socialist under Khrushchev)

Increasingly relied on PLA, headed by Lin Biao Fairbank, The United States and China, pp. 53-70, 106-7, 110-123 The Confucian Pattern 1) Most successful of all systems of conservatism a) Was the main orthodoxy of for 2000 years b) Did go through reforms, decline and revival, and innovation during this time 2) Confucian aristocracy a) “government by the best” b) Chinese philosophers adopted meritocracy during the Warring States Period c) Men are perfectible through education 3) Government by Moral Prestige a) Mandate of Heaven dates by the Zhou period (ca 1027-770) and emphasized that good conduct or virtue gave the ruler ethical sanction to rule b) “right of rebellion” stems out of the idea that Heaven can withdraw its Mandate i.e. any successful rebellion is justified c) “proper behavior according to status”- code of conduct initially only applied to scholar-officials; the common people were to be controlled by rewards and punishments d) Confucian ideals stem from relationship of Chinese man to nature i.e. fengshui i) Human conduct is reflected in acts of nature ii) Man must harmonize with unseen forces to avoid calamity iii) Ruler thought to intervene between mankind and the forces of nature; maintained universal harmony through right conduct i.e. “government by goodness”

4) Early Achievement sin Bureaucratic Administration a) Han Dynasty formalized the bureaucratic system i) Chief ministers administrate on behalf of the Emperor’s authority ii) Emperor exercised power of appointment iii) Developed system of inspection where officials checked on each other independently b) Central problem: selecting & controlling bureaucrats i) Gained strength from Legalist methods ii) Civil service exams established and later reinforced under Tang Dynasty 5) Classical Orthodoxy a) Classics mentioned during Han Dynasty: Book of Changes, Book of History, Odes, Book of Ceremonies and Proper Conduct, Spring and Autumn Annals b) Book of Mencius elevated to a classic under Tang Dynasty c) Classics depict paternal government as key to social order

d) Religious side: official rites, temples, pantheon of sages, etc state cult e) During decline of Han, almost eclipsed by Buddhism revived under Tang
f) Foreign aggression during the Song Dynasty strengthened ethnocentricity which has remained a chief characteristic. 6) Neo-Confucianism began during the Song Dynasty

a) More systematic and more complete more metaphysical content
b) Absorption of idealistic elements mainly from Buddhism to fill spiritual vacuum

c) Greatest Neo-Confucian synthesizers is12th century philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200); i) Absolute first principle is the Supreme Ultimate; li, the laws or principles of form, is a
manifestation of the Supreme Ultimate

ii) Evil: obscuring of the li and qi (physical matter). No active principle of evil.
iii) Highest Confucian virtue “complete sincerity” iv) Believed in original goodness of man 7) Chinese Militarism a) Man of violence looked down i) Every dynasty is established by the sword, but after conquest is over, civil rule is more esteemed ii) Problem of force in China essentially a police problem (1) Difficult to reconcile police institutions with type of warfare needed to defend borders b) Military always just part of the bureaucracy while orthodoxy was the primary means for preserving order c) Violence is last resort i) Sun Zi stated: “The acme of skill in warfare is to subdue the enemy, without fighting.”

The Political Tradition Imperial system survived until 1912 1) Bureaucracy a) Administration divided among Six Ministries of civil office (revenue. but object was to “punish only to be able to stop punishing. each with higher/lower grade i) Emperor appoints all officers down to county magistrate ii) Circulation: few officials left at one post for more than 3 years f) Principle to set one official to check upon another i) Each province has a governor and every two provinces has a governor-general ii) Under Qing Dynasty. the Grand Council. etc e) Imperial civil service has nine ranks.” b) Law not regarded as an external and categorical element in society i. 1 Chinese) iii) Censorate entrusted with duty to inform the Emperor of all matters in his kingdom i. war. law is a means to sustain moral order c) Confucius said that legal rules came from the moral character of nature itself Law is subordinate to morality & law is an inferior substitute for morality d) Chinese imperial code was chiefly penal i) Law pertained only to public affairs and occupied small share of public scene ii) One major aim of the legal system was to preserve the Confucian social hierarchy e) Private law remained underdeveloped in this legal system appealed to old custom for resolution of private conflicts i) Partially due to non-development of private business. the Emperor’s eyes g) Safety in conformity tended to kill initiative at the bottom and efficiency of one man at the top was impaired by a bottleneck h) Bureaucracy relatively small: relied on gentry class to lead the peasantry i) Low salaries corruption 2) Law a) Rewards and punishments useful to enforce order. punishments.e. and public works) + military + Censorate + minor offices b) Ming Dynasty created the Grand Secretariat (body of high officials to assist Emperor) c) Manchu’s added a less formal body. at the top of administration d) 18 provinces divided into circuits.e. all businesses in China were family businesses . no “high law” through divine revelation. Ministries have 2 presidents (1 Manchu. ceremonies. then prefectures.

e.3) “The Victory of the Chinese Communist Party. 39-56) Six basic strategies for the CCP’s path to power o Labor mobilization (1921-23)   CCP formed a labor secretariat to organize trade union activity Problem: China’s small proletariat (less than 1% of population) could not stand up to warlords •  o  i. pp. enhanced United Front with the GMD (1924-27) . emphasizing antiimperialism Tensions between CCP and GMD resulted in GMD forces slaughtering communists in Shanghai and Wuhan (1927) • CCP members who emphasize urban revolution (rather than rural) were mainly the ones killed  those left were more inclined toward peasant mobilization o Adapting to the countryside (1929-34)   Mao Zedong and Zhu De established the Jiangxi Soviet in Ruijin Mao and colleagues experimented with land reform. means of recruiting and training a revolutionary army o Strategic retreat: the Long March (1934-35)  Two main legacies: • 1) Mao Zedong achieved primacy within in the CCP at the Zunyi meeting in 1935 o Mao fought to consolidate his victory over Wang Ming for the next seven years • o 2) The march became the basis for a heroic myth that bolstered CCP unity and prestige The Yan’an Era (1935-47)  CCP greatly expanded its base. which was recognized as a force for Chinese nationalism CCP focused on political organization in urban areas. help the GMD to power. February Massacre  Comintern advised CCP to ally with GMD Communists sought to gain access to a broader spectrum of the populace. 1917-49” (Lieberthal: Governing China. developed techniques of governance. and then take control •   CCP benefited from identification with GMD. methods for developing peasant political involvement.

torture. special case groups to elicit confessions from alleged enemies Fighting a civil war (1947-49)    CCP strategy: surround major cities and cut them off (guerrilla.its political prestige   Consolidation of Mao’s power from 1942 to 1944  1945: Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought adopted as guiding ideology of CCP 1942-1944 “thought-reform campaign” to eliminate any remnant influence of Soviet-oriented communists •  Implemented echniques of “washing the brain” through pressure. developing and maintaining close ties with local population. preference for officials who could provide general leadership. mass political campaigns. whom they hoped to win over Legacies of the CCP’s path to power o Discontent within Chinese society made it very “mobilizable” o o o o o o o CCP typically failed to translate popular support into sustainable political power. ostracism. and reintegration The “Yan’an complex”: CCP emphasized decentralized rule. importance of ideology in keeping cadres loyal to leaders. the GMD essentially helped take itself down Long March and Yan’an Period helped shape subsequent CCP policies and views Mao attained unchallengeable stature in the CCP Overwhelmingly rural party membership was reflected in CCP’s subsequent policies (i. rural-based strategy) Huai-Hai campaign (1949): huge communist victory GMD fell more quickly than expected • 1948: Communists shifted their war strategy and political line to appeal more to capitalists and intellectuals. egalitarianism and simple living among officials  o Rectification campaign led by Kang Sheng: used false accusations. decentralization.e. attacks on intellectuals) Peasant-based military path to power  deeply intertwined party and army CCP developed mindset that the proper combination of will and strategy could overcome any difficulties CCP grew cautious of Soviet advice .

and members remained the same. • Shared ideology and common goals o Ideological commitment to Marxism. increased living standards. took major steps toward industrialization. Strong elite was necessary for real debate—policies could be discussed without fearing for the regime o Confidence from this united leadership also impressed population and local officials. no single group posed a threat to unity. ← ← success • • • Only one major purge affected the top elite—Gao Gang and Rao Shushi Ruling elite was stable—few power shifts occurred. achieved a good rate of economic growth. and implemented Marxist social principles in a relatively smooth fashion.). Roots of unity • Victory in 1949 o Culmination of long struggle. The Politics of China. which in turn helped solidarity Success also tended to smooth over long-term inconsistencies in policies The unity and cohesion of CCP leadership played an instrumental role in the regime’s early . pp. regardless of any factonalism pre-1949. and success led to most CCP civilian and military members getting positions. 5-40 Between 1949 and 1957. Since spoils were shared.← ← ← MacFarquhar (2nd ed. o o Cohesive leadership produced good policies. which made acquiescence to Party programs easier. and broad consensus that China should industrialize and transform socially. the CCP established a strong centralized state.

though in this early period these differences did not disrupt larger group cohesion. cleavages would erupt again.  Observed rules of collective leadership and democratic discussion: officials were valued for their input and various expertise. like Liu Shaoqi). emphasis was still on Party line. party. or underground work. Further aided by instances where he individually clashed with key colleagues o Mao overrode concerns of his associates by involving China in the Korean War. o Tension certainly existed. o o o Personal tension—Mao and Peng Dehuai already had a tense relationship Disagreements over speed of economic development and social transformation. Mao’s authority was linchpin of elite stability—   Final arbiter of disputes Policy advocacy was aimed at winning Mao’s approval rather than individual prestige.o • Soviet model helped focus debate on details rather than fundamental approaches. . But when Soviet model was no longer guiding principle. which lowered the stakes of any conflict. and policies led to disasters. ← Mao Zedong • • Unchallenged leader—power was built off successful strategies during and after SinoJapanese War. But during this time. Those who worked in the white areas. which demonstrated Mao’s insight Hundred Flowers was third instance of a break from elite’s viewpoints—less successful but his immediate shift to the right mitigated the damage. so less infighting b/c discouraged competition—Mao wanted solidarity. o o o Decision to speed up agricultural cooperativization led to achievement far before the original projection. Potential sources of disunity o Participants of the revolution had taken part in different groups and organizations. and had different experiences (ie. Benefits in security and international peace helped Mao’s reputation for political wisdom. but disagreements tended to be minor Individual leaders increasingly identified with their respective departments—Zhou Enlai with government vs. but it was willingness of leaders to overlook them and work toward consensus that ensured unity. Peng Dehuai with the army.

but would require replacing China’s traditional parochialism (life revolved around villages and small social networks) with societal structures more directly connected to the center. Military victories helped facilitate reunification—helped build patriotic support for CCP. Organizational presence was established here down to the grassroots. which helped him mediate conflicts within the party rather than exacerbate them. and finally Chengdu in December. Mao kept out of most policy areas. Sometimes aims conflicted: economic revival required reassuring groups in society and making some concessions. And he was relatively centrist at this time. northeast. . centralized state. ← Broad agreement on following Soviet model helped facilitate stability • • • Basic question: how should soviet model be adapted to fit Chinese situation? How fast to industrialize? Important questions. USSR had influence over larger Chinese society as well—model used in propaganda and slogans. centralized government. but a strong government required organizational control • Different areas had different needs o “old liberated areas” of north. o o o Economy was severely damaged Establish a strong. but by 1956 making modifications • • • Committed to similar ideas of socialist modernization and urban-oriented development strategies—was seen as natural consequence of revolutionary success Soviet model was not just one course of action—there was a wide body of perspectives and ideas to look at. o Would require social transformation to encourage more mass mobilization and political awareness. Strong soviet system bolstered Chinese confidence But kept Chinese priorities and realities clear—strong nationalism helped keep CCP from uncritical borrowing from Soviets. limiting himself to areas of expertise— agriculture and revolution. Shanghai in Apr and Wuhan in May. o First five year plan imitated USSR. ← 1949: Consolidation and Reconstruction • • • Beijing fell to CCP in Jan 1949. parts of northwest  revolution had essentially been won in these areas. PRC. • Other concerns o Need to reunify in face of years of warfare—still groups that resented the CCP. Wanted integrated. Took Guangzhou after est. but not ones that would split the party.

CCP had some experience from before 1949. But political organization was soon centralized. . o CCP unaccustomed to running cities. and had to restore order and production while in a more precarious position because countryside was unsettled—didn’t have a supportive rural base. urban infrastructure. but seizing the cities. Production was restored in many areas by 1952. Began developing specialized cadres that would be able to deal with economic management. Factories had stopped working.   Initially mobilized private and local organizations to provide services—like benefit societies. and then branching out). land reform declared complete. and carry out land reform and cooperative agriculture. etc. even from non-Communists. or such a large area in general  Lacked adequate #s of personnel: led to rapid recruitment. and south of yangtze  the Party had lacked organizational support or resources here—control had come from military conquest.  Growth of labor unions and extensive labor policies helped solidify central gov’t’s access to urban industry. and other policies to stimulate growth. o Coped by making use of existing personnel/ systems to restablish order while finding add’tl resources. “new liberated areas” much of east and central china. (had not been policy of countryside surrounding the cities.  Had to deal with the presence of resistance groups. bc of patriotic desire for unified nation o Traditional aspect: saw CCP as new dynasty o • KMT had been discredited—occupying KMT forces had been corrupt Unification was part of united front strategy o Gathering a wide collection of allies by setting limited goals and defining narrow enemies. wage limits.  o Main task was to extend party control to pockets unoccupied by CCP. ← United Front and democratic dictatorship • • Maximized support and minimized fears Unification had won CCP widespread support. but Liu pushed for production again by calling for labor discipline. and 1/3 of population in mutual aid teams (MATs)—first step to cooperatives.  Also attitude that urban phase of revolution was to be welcomed—made Party devote attention to recruiting workers and addressing urban problems. By mid 1950.

o Mao articulated clear distinction between civilian and military authority as early as 1938: “Our principle is that the Party commands the gun. Was crucial at first because areas were so different from one another and needed decentralized rule.• Developed Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—a system of people’s congresses that drew lineage from a similar KMT organization. o Military Control Commissions were set up as local authorities. including small middle class and intelligentsia groups. but still different because not wartime anymore. ← Land Reform • Familiar terrain for CCP. military and decentralized rule because newly liberated areas fell to PLA. o Small democratic parties put into these congresses. and bureaucratic capitalism    Patriotic policies asserting China’s rights Large enterprises run by KMT were bur. feudalism. • But shifted to civilian authorities as soon as possible o Regional admin remained until 1954. and military roles were diversified to create a modern.” o Appointments to regions were all held by pol figures (except for Lin Biao). o Central authority came up with policy. but power shifted as soon as it could—MCC responsibilities were quickly taken over by governmental groups. professional military—part of Common Program and motivated by Korean War.   Sometimes this led to lags: in Guangdong. but genuinely sought opinions of non-Communists. • Blueprint for future: Common Program was moderate and conciliatory. Capitalism. and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. people served parochial interests by doing land reform slower. Landlords = feudalism • ← Constituted a people’s democratic dictatorship—not just dictatorship of proletariat. CCP in formal power and held most seats. Role of military • First. bc bourgeoisie and peasantry joined working classes as ruling class. o Adopted gradualism o Narrowly defined enemies as imperialism. Used old liberated areas like North and northeast to test and optimize policies before implementing in less stable areas. and often entered local regions without knowledge of conditions or often even dialect. but regional admins decided pace and implementation. .

and intense psychological pressure used o Forced confessions in small groups and mass trials attended by tens of thousands. as freeing rural productive forces for industrialization. Reworked it by emphasizing class struggle and mass mobilization—some social transformation would be necessary to make land reform stick. Work teams mobilized villages against landlords with speak bitterness campaigns and mass trials.    Class identification. reduced rents and interests. o But also presented convenient opportunity to push campaigns that were already planned . After: work teams came—only small proportion of members had experience with northern agrarian struggles. and still mindful of traditional power structure.• • First to arrive: PLA that suppressed bandits. then land confiscation and redistribution. and disarmed population.quanxi. organized local militias. o Collected taxes o o Organized peasant associations. Characterized land reform. whereas most were urban intellectuals and students. • • Constant propaganda during this time—used persuasive and coercive methods Land reform demonstrated party’s credibility—enhanced future persuasive capabilities among peasants. Many were very young or had questionable class backgrounds—trying to prove revolutionary status. o Fostered climate of distrust that broke down interpersonal relationships. and carried out campaigns against landlords and old elite.  Helped break down paternalism in urban society because traditional bonds broken • Happened after entry into Korean War—so fear of KMT sabotage was very real. as per Liu Shaoqi’s instructions. Urban mass movements • • Feb 1951-1953: Campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries Fall 1951-Summer/ Fall 1952 o Three Antis Campaign against corrupt cadres o o • Five Antis Campaign against respected national bourgeoisie Thought reform campaign aimed at intellectuals Often violent.  o But didn’t work very well—peasants hesitant about CCP’s promises.--> often led to violence and brutality Inverted power structure—new ruling elite was poor and middle peasants.

set up Party branches in many enterprises—gave authorities much greater knowledge of internal workings of businesses.Bo Yibo denounced for lightening the tax load on capitalists. though frightening. but so were some people who were prominent and may have become alternate leaders. 6.planned industrialization over 15 years still united front slightly more radical policy overall than seen previously  formulation of “general line for the transition to socialism”     Mao plays a large role in shifting emphasis to transformation. head of State Planning Commission Rao Shushi = director of Central Committee's organization department. pp.” The Politics of China.5 million members by 1953. 40-86.o o • Opponents of revolution and regime were targeted. General idea was to weaken influence of all intellectual currents that weren’t Marxist-Leninism. but many found themselves rudely awakened o Three Antis: targeted urban cadres who had become corrupted from dealings with bourgeoisie o Five Antis: directed at lawbreaking capitalists. Chinese approach: get mass participation to not offend public opinion. 1953-6   new phase entered as a result of increasing political controlling beginning of national economic planning  1955. The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime. many affiliated groups) regularization/centralization in all spheres of life greater emulation of Soviet methods The Gao Gang Affair       only serious high-level purge of the period Gao Gang = Politburo member. warning for others  CCP has significant base reserves with which to carry out change (80% of industry. 1946-57. Socialist Construction and Transformation.first five year plan for 53-57 approved continuity with previous period gradualism. General public found campaigns understandable. leading party figure in East China Gao and Rao attempt to out Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai from their positions  .  While investigating capitalist crimes.

debate over speed.Gao takes this as motivation to act Rao jumps on the bandwagon. Mao approves of/trusts Gao. could move to industry once again. doesn't kill peasants. well thought-out program “better to err to the left than the right” peasant resistance appears in China. thought out process that Soviets. eventually commits suicide Lessons-Mao is crucial. expresses dissatisfaction with Liu/Zhou.no secession of minorities  Agricultural cooperativization   very significant achievements Mao pushed for more rapid cooperativization.his actions are brought to Mao's attentions.basic unit of socialized agriculture debate over speed of socialization.even more so than with APCs importance of science and technology Adjusting the new Socialist system. disciplined party.Mao pushes for more rapid process.Gao is formally criticized. win backing of other high officials by promising them better positions Gao travels around China to try and garner support. then in squashing it 1954. try to garner Soviet support. which is extension of 1949 Common Program very similar to Stalin's constitution of 1936.feels insecure in his current position etc.that agriculture was largely socialized by 1956 was vindication of Mao. overfulfillment of targets. direct suffrage creation of separate/visible chairman position for Mao “ “unified multinational state”. 1956-7   reassessment of conditions → new course socialism has officially triumphed over capitalism . equal.adopt state constitution. BUT Chinese system has ■ ■ ■       The constitutional and institutional pattern   no universal. Mao emphasizes need for alacrity again. less emphasis on all agriculture being used to support industry Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (APCs). but to a MUCH lesser degree than in USSR – gradualism. who expresses his anger December Politburo meeting. Use debates to attack policies of Liu and Zhou. first as inspiration for affair. good rural economic policies help this       Transforming the modern sector and the first leap forward     now that agricultural socialization was succeeding. success for party CCP carries out a much more logical. is successful because of his undisputed leadership.

absence of any perceived incompatability in policies key in successful. intellectuals do criticize party. persuasive appeals in securing compliance.faulty assumption that intellectuals are on the side of the party    Party Ramification and the Hundred Flowers       The Anti-Rightist Campaign      direct counterattack to intellectual criticism of Hundred Flowers Mao is at forefront of this effort defensive tone to campaign harsh attcks. .end of turbulent revolution shift of priorities to economic development social forces should be mobilized in new adaptation of united front   attitude towards intellectuals softens Adapting the Soviet Model   beginning of censure of Soviet ideas Mao's speech in april 1956. economic progress as opposed to revolution not as much of a personal triumph for Mao (in light of Kruschev. new propositions:    attenuated class conflict. particularly student vehemence morale suffers.“Ten Great Relationships” ■ changes to Soviet structure-. leadership unity. experiment is a failure. de-emphasis of personality cult) Mao begins to plan for orderly succession expansion of Politburo and CC. bureaucratism. sectarianism cautious approach to party reform initial plan to accept input from intellectuals etc. but overall remarkably successful since 49 soviet model. application of successful revolutionary era strategies.these attacks are unsettling to the party. struggle meetings viewed as overly harsh post-Mao Conclusions   major problems by 1957.less emphasis on heavy industry. increased bureaucracy reform targeting subjectivism. changes in economic administration (greater consultation with local authorities)  The Eighth Party Congress    September.doesn't go over so well eventually. 1956 emphasis on steady (not crazy rapid) advance.

o o • Replaced technical expertise with efforts to rouse workers’ enthusiasm Strained Sino-Soviet relations because USSR advisors lost prestige in country. ← Origins of GLF • Problems with Five Year Plans o Chinese didn’t have the same consistent rural surplus that Soviets could use to implement their other policies and provide a buffer for rough times. o Mao’s search for allies and alienation of colleagues who disagreed with him would define the political landscape for years to come. whereas Soviets were urban. The Politics of China.  FYPs in Soviet Union were exploitative and led to millions of peasant deaths —the CCP (mostly rural) was unlikely to favor this. though still the dominant authority. o His colleagues thought CCP should shift emphasis on technical expertise and specialists to guide growth. But GLF fared poorly—was used to justify a lot of extremism and produced poor economic results. pp.Overview • 1958. couldn’t. had suffered for the misjudgments of the GLF. CCP leaders still confident about China’s progress. political tensions flared. Even when Mao began to try to bring situation under control again. still advocated it to prevent the bureaucratic deterioration of the revolution that he observed in USSR. on top of damage that had already been done by the Leap. • • Party would lose the prestige it had enjoyed from 1949-1957. though. but within 8 years leadership would be wracked with division.← ← ← MacFarquhar (ed). 1961: economic malaise spread from rural areas to cities. • 1960: Soviet aid withdrawn—hurt a number of key industrial development projects. • Once things got better. . o Coupled with political attacks from within against the GLF: Peng Dehuai cultivated strong relationship with Soviets and criticized Great Leap. 87-117 Great Leap Forward. Mao. which was the result of strong leadership and effective policies Great Leap Forward (GLF) was alternate plan meant to replace the Five Year Plans imported from Soviets—made use of mass mobilization. a technique that had worked in the past. o CCP was also predominantly rural. and Mao would launch an attack on his colleagues that would lead to a decade of tumult and chaos. and though it had been clear that mass mobilization had failed to bring econ progress.

 Larger reason for defeat was ideological shift in party. 5th ranking member of the party and economic specialist. embracing several standard marketing areas 1959-1962—communes became smaller so they could be better managed. bourgeois experts. Mobilization over expertise also meant that CCP would play greater role than government bureaucracy. o People’s Communes were developed to provide bigger organizational unit in order to facilitate mass mobilization.  But Hundred Flowers and Antirightist Campaign had largely discredited the urban. GLF’s particular methods helped refocus policies on areas with which he felt familiar. commerce and civil service had grade system that led to more status consciousness and careerism—good for growth but Mao didn’t like it. Plan relied on continued centralized control of economy.• Debated a new strategy that would allow rapid growth of heavy industry while expanding agricultural output—without the human cost. Discussed at 3rd plenum of Eighth CC 1957. and had led to a strong belief in the power of mass mobilization because of the success of cooperativization in the countryside. at first.  But defeated by impatience—plan would take years to implement. this would also produce enough profit to develop heavy industry quickly. Over time. not urban economics. Everything collectivized. work that required literacy and statistical skills—more prevalent in urban intelligentsia than peasant masses. o Ultimately relied on creative set of military and political policies centered on mobilization of wide range of forces to save the day— .  Chen wanted emphasis on light industry so peasants could benefit from the economic growth. o Needed to provide incentive for peasants to increase output even thought state investments were used on heavy industry. o Mao thought organizational and political tools could be used. Other motivations  Soviet approach to status had led to stratification of cities and party— industry. thought peasants would only respond to material incentives. and then based on the brigade or team that they were in. and incomes paid out to people equally. (1958)    o o Initially huge. but Chen Yun.  Mao’s area of expertise was rural policy.

Military also did not like obligations to support miltias and participate in civilian work—most prominent dissenter was Peng Dehuai. GLF was way to cast Soviet model. Use modern and traditional methods to increase output    o Invest in major steel complexes Also build backyard furnaces Traditional sectors usually used to feed inputs into modern sector with nothing in return. who were necessary to help China build a strong. Zhou would have lost power given the strategy of mass mobilization and decentraliztion) o Liu shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were involved more with the party.  ← GLF: Strategy • Strategy flushed out over several conferences/ meetings GLF formally adopted at Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in May 1958. and elimination of money in communes led to belief that food problems had been solved and commune dwellers got free supplies of food. CCP and leadership found this encouraging  People generally supportive. who had always had a stormy relationship with Mao o He also wanted good relationship with Soviets. faster. . o o o But 1958 weather was good. Many projects from first FYP had stared to come on stream. which did make agricultural performance better. Deng was part of Antirightist campaign and played key role in managing GLF. o • Liu was has succession in mind. modern army. Disregard expertise in favor of more. so they liked the plan. ← Politics • Most people encouraged GLF. so this led to impressive growth in output. professional. Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun only dissenters in Politburo (as Premier and head of the state council. Motivated by the hard work put into mass mobilization. and agreeing with Mao would be important. Four key elements o Make up for lack of capital in agricultural and industry by mobilizing underemployed labor power—produced essentially self-financed development o o Set ambitious goals for leading economic sectors and encouraged any innovation necessary to prevent bottlenecks and promote growth. economical results • Initial success was largely false o Destroyed statistical system and applied great pressure to cadres—led to falsifications.

Lasted an entire month—Mao launched attack against Peng Dehuai—defense minister and one of the PLA’s ten marshals. he responded by calling Peng Dehuai a right opportunist who had deliberately attacked Mao in the letter. July 1959 • . o Many mid-level cadres unwilling to abandon the radical approach—wanted to keep strategy of going all out. Set in motion effort to replace him with Lin Biao. • Spring 1959: Tibetan revolt o Due to some actions and missteps by han soldiers and civilians in 1959. o Kruschev cancelled aid right after Peng had been in Moscow—Mao claimed this meant he was scheming with Krushschev o o Peng also criticized small group discussions during the conference. Was very popular with peasant cadres bc of emphasis on abandoning urban expertise. but these mostly kept along with what others were saying. to place in politburo above Peng o Once GLF ran into trouble.  o    Baffling bc Peng had not really said anything that extraordinary Peng had been involved in Gao Gang affair. a vice minister of foreign affairs who had close ties to Moscow and Peng. Mao had wanted Lin Biao to take his place anyway. July 14: Peng wrote letter to Mao to complain about GLF.• Mao moved Lin Biao. Letter was printed and circulated to all participants at Lushan by Mao—July 23. but was edged out by Mao and steadily demoted since then. was just taking opportunity. a close supporter and great military tactician. these underlying tensions would bubble to the surface. and letter may have seemed like 2nd attempt to position for higher office. ← Planned adjustments to GLF after bad reports started coming in • • • Peasant food shortages despite optimistic official reports—sometimes food not harvested because people had left to join local industry or gone to cities to work at factories. Considered it a breach of permissible behavior. and put Peng up to write letter. Advocated adjustments at First Zhengzhou Conference Nov 1958—asked for figures for production to be a bit more realistic Feb 1959: mao urged to use right opportunism—wanted decrease in communization. But other circumstances: ← Lushan Conference. Zhang wentian. could have been General Sec of Party during Long March.

6 different factors . (Deng Xiaoping is cited as an example. ← Failure of second leap and outrage over Peng Dehuai’s dismissal broke down solidarity cultivated • Kruschev had wanted to discourage China from GLF by withholding aid. o Most devastating famine of 20th C in China 1959-60. was elevated to a higher post in Hunan. o Mao feared soviet revisionism more and more and used that as impetus for movements.  Mistaken policies led to food shortfalls—like insisting that peasants leave land fallow or poor management due to push for more efforts in industry.) Different leaders drew diff conclusions from failure of GLF o Mao realized political mobilization couldn’t produce rapid economic growth since Yan’an.before. • Anti-Right Opportunist Campaign also attempted a second leap forward in 1960 o Failed: agric output in 1960 was 75% that of 1958. Mao believed that the Soviet system had degenerated from socialism to fascism. and Kang Sheng’s experience with Stalinist politics would give party politics a more Stalinist air rather traditional maoist one. and hua guofeng. Zhang also removed. By the end. leaders could freely voice opinions    Mao labeled it “unprincipled factional activity”—sowed some personal bitterness Lin Biao bumped up to defense minister—gave Mao more influence over the PLA than he had had before. o • Found himself pushed out of day to day affairs more. Consequences o Mao broke unwritten rules of debate among top leadership. and Mao began to fear that his life’s work would be wasted in a similar way in China o Mao would devote much of his time to dealing with the Soviet issue—bringing on kang Sheng to help due to his experience with soviet affairs. who undercut Peng to service Mao. Light industrial output declined 21% in 1961 severe goods famine to complement food shortages. but this only caused Mao to reevaluate the Russian Revolution. and didn’t think he was getting as much deference as he had been. Peng was ousted and told to study for a few years. Luo ruiqing became chief of staff.o • Afterwards. • Mao’s prestige in highest levels of CCP suffered— o Made a form of self criticism at CCP Central Work Conference in Beijing in June 1961. during Lushan Plenum and MAC meeting that followed.

But 1960-3. Mao’s own self criticism was never circulated to lower levels. o Zhou Enlai helped put out Twelve Articles of People’s Communes. and thus distanced himself from even more of his colleagues. o Mao blocked it. and raising standards” as formula. distrib of power. faster. But many of his colleagues and supporters wanted to get rid of political campaigns altogether—the time of high tide politics of Yan’an was over. so needed simplification: produced Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong—little red book. Wanted to regain control and repair national apparatus by setting 6 regional bodies. o Peng petitioned for rehabilitation based on rural investigations. After the leap: Liu and Deng • Beidahe Meeting in Jul/ Aug 1960 began to tackle issue of dealing with GLF disaster o Policies came out of this meeting and following months as harvest looked bad o o Second leap terminated Guiding policy changed from “more.000 character document to central committee about how he had been right.o o • But he retained faith in mobilization as a method to produce changes in values. Targeted toward barely educated peasants. and outlook. filling out. most people did not think Lin’s method served a purpose outside of the army. industry as leading factor. • • Disagreed over how quickly China was recovering—Mao was super optimistic o Mao began to sense that pessimists were limiting his flexibility within the system. . And question of how to deal with lower levels also caused dissension. CCP lost prestige and organizational competence bc it had run GLF o Cadres who had supported second leap were branded as leftists and purged. consolidation. o • Agriculture as base became official policy at 9th Plenum in Jan 1961. o Lost a lot of morale. and submitted 80. better” to “agriculture as base. which permitted great decentralization in communes—led to GLF’s collapse o • Helped create material incentive again for production Two types of responses predominated in spring 1961 o Lin Biao and military: stressed renewed study of politics to boost morale and increase discipline    Sept 1960. with readjustment. Lin called for program of concentrated study of Mao’s works. Extraordinary damage had been done—vindicated what Peng had said.

 No evidence Mao disagreed with these trends in 1961. . then solicited opinions from experts. Multiple drafts resulted from frequent consultations with other party members and experts. which GLF had been against (opting instead for self reliance) Bo yibo’s report on industry placed emphasis on material incentives and experts Articles on literature valued traditional art forms.     Economic policy: chen yun and li fuchun Cultural and edu affairs: peng zhen Political and legal work: Deng Xiaoping In making reports.    1961-2: various major policy papers produced. typically ascertained actual situation with on the spot investigations. team as basic accounting unit. But he gradually grew more disconcerted as investigations and consultations yielded more and more to policy. (#s of articles) Party leaders took charge of drafting process Three broad policy groups were developed under Secretariat to oversee and coordinate policy issues.     Large plants also required imports. People’s communes article shifted toward more private plots. Emphasis on expertise clashed with lin biao’s approach. which claimed that Mao’s thought held answers to any question. and articles on education undercut many of the local schools that had opened. He wrote the 60 Articles on People’s Communes himself.  Liu and deng’s policies also undercut basic GLF tenets  Large scale factories in sharp contrast with the small scale production encouraged in GLF (backyard furnaces…) Uses fertilizer plant as example. and generally more material incentive.o Liu and Deng: series of investigations that provided material used for programmatic policy documents in various areas.

Liu. he stands above the hierarchy  No institutional curbs on his power o Other divisive issues:  Rehabilitation of rightists: some want to bring back Peng Duhuai  Evaluation of current situation: Mao was optimistic  Party rectification: issue of how best to reconstruct a disciplined party Ministry of Finance projection by Chen Yun o Huge deficit o Gloomy forecast. with Mao out of town. however. does not bring up this report o This shows the extent of Mao’s authority  Mao is truly in a unique position: as Chairman. for the most part o They disagree. Chen Yun say situation is desperately bad. thinks economy is doing fine o Zhou agrees with Mao. a de facto partial decollectivization Thus. Pg 117-147 • 7000 Cadres Conference.The Politics of China (Continued). to address the issue  Endorsed Chen’s assessment  Support systems of “individual responsibility” in agriculture. overall positive about the GLF  This reflects Zhou’s “operational practice of siding with Mao whenever there was an open clash” o Peng Zhen’s position  Ordered his Beijing subordinates to investigate the real causes of the GLF and prepare a report  Deng Tuo is in charge of the investigation  The report blames the disaster directly on the mobilizational politics of the GLF strategy  “GLF disaster must be laid largely at the doorstep of the Politburo”  Peng. in their evaluation of the GLF  Liu thinks bad policy is 70% responsible for the disaster. bad weather 30%  Mao thinks this should be flipped. upon sensing the tenor of the conference. they hurt the Purty  Mao actually agrees. we had two different assessments of the 1962 situation: o Mao/Lin argue that the country is well on the way to recovery. opposes further decollectivization o Deng. scaling down of production o 1962-1965 will be a “period of recovery” o Xilou Conference: called by Liu. Jan-Feb 1962 Convened to “review methods of leadership and to sum up the situation” o Liu: let’s avoid the brutal purges and counterpurges. situation demands decollectivization Beidaihe Conference. 10th Plenum o Clash of the two approaches o • • • .

solidify his relationship with Mao o Reforming the PLA  Bringing Military Affairs Commission (MAC) bck into prominence  A party body use dto control the military  Personnel changes to ensure his control fo the ministry of defense  Stress role of Mao Zedong thought in the military  Enhance role of PLA in CCP affairs Criminal responsibility is not pursued by the authorities during and after cultural revolution “Students and Red Guards who when the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ began were under eighteen years of age. Lin Biao. Mao got disappointed by the progress of the conference. Changping country. leaving egalitarian paths)  Here. Mao sent Li Na to Beijing Geological Institute. Thus. Bourgeois reactionary line---. Most of them were confused from the beginning. Kang Sheng o At conference. Top leaders sent their children to the local communities and universities to get a true sense of what was going on there. on the other hand.the term Mao Zedong coined in Red Flag magazine to instruct the mass about the situation. local and central leaders tried to understand the aims of Cultural Revolution. stresses need for class struggle. Chen Boda’s report on “bourgeois reactionary line”: o . No one really knew what Mao wanted. Mao attacks Ministry of Finance. Daxing county) September 2. The elders and kids got killed as well in some extreme cases. compromise is reached: Mao’s ideas are embraced in theory Rise of Lin Biao o Faced with two tasks: consolidate his position in PLA. creates a coalition of his own  Jiang Qing. one-on-one connection was built between top leaders and the leaders of selected organizations. warns against retreat from socialism o 10th Plenum: Mao warns against revisionism (catering to intellectuals. they supported Lin Biao’s note on “not defining everything based on family background. Mao. tacitly supported more mature university students in a head-on conflict with the local state. the central authorities issued Zhongfa [1966] 445 in a first attempt to bring the “red terror” under control. Capital 3rd HQ and Zhu Chengzhao. the group endorsed by top leaders. are not to have it held against them that they participated in mass beatings with a fatal outcome” Violence is not limited in cities. on one hand.” They helped to organize the hearings about the progress of Cultural Revolution for the top leaders. The central work conference followed up on “bourgeois reactionary line”. I meant to clarify the relationship between Red Guards and the police. (e.g. and whose current behavior is good. southern outskirts of the capital.• • • • • • • • • • • • Mao feels like he’s losing his grip in the Politburo. who later realized and admitted their errors. and north of the city. grew rapidly. had hundreds of thousands of teenagers destroy the “four olds” in an orgy of violence and destruction. all suffered greatly. he resolutely opposes decollectivization and insists that communes remain intact o At tenth plenum. Daxing county.

for example. finds widespread corruption o Revised Ten Points. o Criticize the work team o Self criticism. Concern about evolution of Revolution  Soviets have gone astray from fundamentals  Mao questions the permanence of any socialist revolution  Writes polemics against USSR. the Secretariat leader. Liu Shaoqi’s self criticism. goes to Henan. take them over. Imposed penalties that were too harsh on cadres  3. Jan 1965  Work teams pull back.• • • Describe the current situation as “excellent” Criticize the role of the sons and daughters of high level officials. Related sense of impending death o 1. Sept 1964: Reflects these worries. Worries about succession  Compains that Deng. Concern about succession  3. Narrowed target of attack from revisionism to corruption  2. punished cadres are rehabilitated Why did Mao decide to launch an assault against his colleagues in the Politburo? o 3 elements affected Mao’s psychology in 1959-1966:  1. did not consult with him on policy o . They sometimes assumed that they were the successors to the revolution. Khruschev  Mao shares his political views through these polemics  Mao genuinely worries about the youth growing up with a “revisionist perspective”  He did not want to be seen as China’s Stalin. Deng Xiaoping’s criticism. for 3 reasons:  1. carry out urban Five Antis Campaign o Eventually shifts to rural areas: high level cadres go to rural areas. report on conditions  Liu Shaoqi. Mao sees problems at both the apex and the base of the political system o o • • Apex: Colleagues want policies that strength anti-Communist forces o Base: GLF has done huge damage to basic-level Party units Mao believes rectification campaigns can solve both problems o Former Ten Points: Lays out structure of Socialist Education Movement (SEM) o Sets up poor and middle peasant associations to serve as a vehicle for exercising supervision over the erring basic level cadres o Called for formation of urban-based work teams. not jus tabout battling corruption  Mao tries to change the direction with his 23 Articles. calls for large work teams to go to select communes. o Mao didn’t like these revised ten points quite as much. Involved imposition of massive work teams instead of mobilizing the masses o Mao wants the SEM to be about fighting revisionism. the person who was later seen as having led the country astray o 2. Concern about evolution of Chinese Revolution  2. and shake the minto shape.

 Mao tries to get his way: in culture. in the countryside  Objecting to economic centralization. at best. Mao calls for greater regional selfsufficiency  Liu implemented Mao’s wishes only halfway. Mao’s personal security forces  Role of Zhou Enlai is obscure: did he begin to see himself as Liu’s replacement? o Three factors led to the split in the leadership:  Different lessons drawn from the GLF  Tensions regarding the issue of succession to Mao  Growing fears of an aging and possibly senile leader  . boost production once again. “Mao increasingly saw his colleagues as running a bureaucratic leviathan that gobbled up his pressing demands and turned them into relatively innocuous reforms…” (144) o 3.• Mao pulls back from regular meetings because he dominated the political system to such a great degree  Implemented strategy of stepping back to give more influence to successors  BUT after collapse of GLF.  Achieve immortality through proper revolution The split in the Yan’an leadership o Leaders did not appear to see the impending showdown with Mao. believe that mass mobilization is no longer a useful tool for policy (read: GLF failure). found that they were “inadequate”  Mao retains his faith in mass mobilization as an instrument of social change. Concerned about own moratality  Saw his fundamental identity tied to the fate of the revolution he had fathered. his suspicions fed by Jiang Qing and others  Role of public security apparatus. Mass mobilization is anti-bureaucratic. he has a hard time assuming full control of policy  Liu and Deng restrict his access to policy flow  He tested his successors on their loyalty. although they did try to keep PLA/Jiang Qing in check o Areas of doubt:  What did the leadership who did not join the CR coalition think about the policies? It seems that they “tried to meet Mao more than halfway”  Mao appears to have distorted reality in his own mind. antiintellectual  Liu and co. Experts need to take control of the economy. ideological renewal. emphasizes learning from average people.

tradition as well as legal-rational considerations reinforced the essentially charismatic basis of Mao’s legitimacy 1959-1965 Legal-Rational and Traditional Ambivalence Lushan conference affects Mao’s standing The developments at Lushan can be seen as the relationship between an emperor and his • • • • • • • . Mao's role established as the "exceptional" strategist leading communist and national victory and liberation • Achievement of socialist transformation and economic growth o 1st FYP(1953-1957): collectivization of agriculture. pp. 62-76 4 period of Mao's leadership: (1)1949-1958: all modes of legitimation reinforced Mao's authority (2)1959-1965: Mao's behavior led to reservations on traditional and legal-rational grounds by ranking officials but no serious challenge (3)1966-1971: the resort to unbridled charismatic claims destroyed legality and caused graver doubts within the elite (4)1972-1976: limited challenges to Mao's authority appeared Major setback to Mao's authority: • Economic crisis following GLF: shook the faith of peasantry • Consequences of Cultural Revolution: disillusioned intellectuals. o Goals accomplished ahead of time. socialization of commerce and industry. Legitimacy.Teiwes. ordinary Party members and bureaucrats 1949-1958 Mutual Reinforcement • With victory of the revolution. o It is an anti-personal cult movement led by Khrushcheve’s denunciation of Stalin. urban youth. and Conflict in China. Leadership. high economic growth rate • Mao's specific policy initiatives: o Operated as a consensus leader o Made wise decision in case when he needed to play forceful role • Korean War made China a force to be reckoned in international politics Made the mistake in the Hundred Flowers since the initial plan fell and he used the Anti-Rightist Campaign to restore the prestige in the party Mao pushed GLF since the output of the agriculture by the end of 1958 was nice Mao’s personal cult: o The excising of the “thought of Mao Zedong” from the new Party constitution. No purge for policy reason until late 1957 In earliest period of the PRC.

more pragmatic officials). Faith still existed based on pre-1949 successes of Mao 1972-1976 Traditional Resistance to the Leader Mao was physically unable to make decisions among factionalized power (“Gang of Four” vs. less on recent achievements. influence diluted. Liu’s position was dependent on the favor of the charismatic leader. He was suddenly given power during August 1966 Plenum. Charisma Triumphant Frustration with current policy led to Mao’s fundamental rejection of legal rational norms during the Cultural Revolution. The campaign attacked on long standing CCP norms. Zhou protected high-ranking comrades during the Cultural Revolution. and purged most of the top elites. Some high officials also plotted secretly with Deng. Liu Shaoqi was chosen as successor. This added to prestige. the disruption of this period led to net loss of authority of Mao among public. Mao is more inclined for the radical side. instead of coalescing to oppose Mao. mixture of imperial dynasty founder. by 1976 even could not communicate. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . Even though he tried to purge Deng again and put Hua Guofeng as premier after Zhou’s death. Yet the elites only defended reputation and avoided disgrace. it never worked in reality. distortions of revolutionary history virtually eliminate the contributions of most other leaders. His power limited. revolutionary leader. In February Adverse Current in 1967. after getting sanctions from Mao through Zhou’s urging. Mao’s authority was still enough to keep him on the throne. but not enough to command full obedience or prevent his comrades from planning a reversal of the course he had set in his last decade.veteran officials failed to restrain Mao. threat from military which Lin controls. No more official endorsement for the “Four Modernization” that Zhou promoted and the legal organs sanctioned. 1966-1971 Legality Shattered. hope that Mao will ultimately act within bounds. Lin Biao was pictured as “Mao’s best student” and has his authority derived from Mao.• • ministers. even though they didn’t prepare to act against Mao himself. and Mao could hardly have enhanced his reputation within the top elite. Politburo was replace by CRG where Jiang Qing was key role. Deng later returned to power. Cultural Revolution attacked all institutions except PLA. and any opposition or deviation from Mao is viewed culpable now. But his personal cult sent to the masses an image. Why they refused to fight: fear of damaging the system that relies on its founder. As Mao’s cult intensifies. the rebellious and egalitarian. Mao’s authority significantly faded. In reality. and remote father. mainly based on favor of charismatic leader just like Liu Shaoqi. All those failures in economic reform or other campaigns paled in comparison with Mao’s dual victory of Communist revolution and national liberation.

many punished/imprisoned/removed from office • Marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution . pp. released to public 1967 • Four families condemned. Zhu De and Deng to defend Luo.Mao’s Last Revolution (MLR). Zhou. stand up against Mao Last chance for them to restrain Mao before they were divided and denounced Peng’s February Outline and Jiang Qing’s Forum Summary <1966> Chapter 2: The Siege of Beijing (p32-51) <April 1966> Peng Zhen criticized by Kang Sheng and Chen Boda • February Outline annulled. not extremely out of the ordinary • But. Group of Five dissolved • Replaced by “cultural revolution document drafting group”  Central Cultural Revolution Group <May 1966> Dismissal of Lu Dingyi (Peng’s senior colleague in the Group of Five) • Lu’s wife Yan Weibing wrote letters accusing Ye Qun of being a slut Lu accused of collaborating with wife to frame Lin Biao and his family Yang Shangkun (controls paper flow) accused of tape recording Mao’s conversations • Part of normal process. 14-51 Chapter 1: The First Salvos (p14-31) The Campaign Against Wu Han The Purge of the PLA Chief of Staff: Luo Ruiqing <1965> • Lin Biao first targeted Xiao Xiangrong (Luo’s deputy) – accused of being anti-Mao Defended by Luo  gives Lin Biao an opening • Ye Qun’s private conversation with Mao 1) Unwillingness to report to Lin on a regular basis 2) Attempts to supplant Lin by getting him to resign • Mao denounced Luo as a way to sever the link between the PLA and the CCP Accused Luo of being revisionist • Members of Politburo were uneasy about the Luo case Ideal opportunity for Liu. Mao wanted someone he could totally trust to control the CC’s paper flow Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang purge is a hinge event: last pre-Revolution purge. first purge of the Revolution May 16 Notification – published 1966.

Lin Biao’s wife Ye Qun campaigned against Luo. Li summoned on 1 Jan. 1966 to see Mao at Nanchang because he was ill Mao was surrounded by female attendants. Mao agreed with Lin that ideology was more important than weapons. over professionalization of the military). Lu.• • Party cadres found it difficult to believe the accusations against Peng. pp. Li dilutes his sleeping pill supply with placebos because he doesn’t want Mao to overdose on his watch Mao read histories of earlier dynasties. and addicted to sleeping pills for insomnia. 433–463 Nov. including Liu Shaoqi Mao was paranoid about the guesthouse. rather than Marx. but Peng Zhen and others tried to protect Wu Han Li did not understand at the time that Mao was planning to attack the top leaders in the party. Mao placed the real blame on higher ups. accused the guesthouse of being poisonous and decided to move to Wuhan . Mao supported Yan Wenyuan’s published article attacking Wu Han. so Li says it was almost inevitable that he would be purged Luo Ruiqing had differences of opinion with Lin Biao (esp. 1965—Li visited by Wang Dongxing. was ill with a cold and fever. led to some of the most radical and worst excesses of the Revolution <1966> Mao is paranoid  established the Capital Work Team to secure the capital and Zhongnanhai Li Zhisui. Luo. there was talk that Luo wanted Lin Biao to resign Wang Dongxing summoned back to Beijing. when preparing for political battle Mao thought that Wu Han’s play about Hai Rui was meant to be an attack on his dismissing Peng Dehuai. so Luo was in trouble with Mao. head of Central Bureau of Guards Discussion of the Luo–Lu–Peng–Yang purges: Mao purged Yang Shangkun because he never trusted him over the “bugging” incident. partly due to Jiang Qing’s urging. but struck at mid-levels first Kang Sheng told Mao that Peng Zhen had anti-Mao tendencies Lu Dingyi was in charge of propaganda. only Mao could decide who the revisionists were Never revealed his thoughts  people “work toward” the Chairman. Yang  worried about who might be next In reality. where Yang used tape recorders to keep records of what Mao said.

1966—Mao arrives in Shanghai. Peng. Outline. so moves to Wuhan on June 28 . but Peng and Lu tried to promote the view that the disagreement was academic only. Kang Shen. Zhou Yang (deputy chief of propaganda). thought someone broke into his guesthouse attic. Mao explained to Li that the “four cleanups” were no longer a priority. and Zhang Chunqiao. forges an alliance with Lin Biao and writes a document attacking Lu Dingyi Mar. Kang. had fear of water and never used a toilet 15 Mar. Mao interpreted it as a rebuke to his own views. April 1966—Mao officially expands his criticisms to include Peng Zhen 24 April 1966—enlarged PSC meeting discusses Chen Boda’s draft revoking Feb. Wu Lengxi (head of People’s Daily) meet with Mao to discuss Wu Han’s play. Outline 4 days later. convenes Politburo meeting where he singles out Wu Han and three others for particular rebuke. Mao adjourned meeting without making his views clear and refused to review Peng’s document (the February Outline) After publication of Feb. Kang declared Wu Han to be anti-party.In Wuhan. under PSC’s direct supervision. proposes launching a “Cultural Revolution” in literature. letting others work things out. too hot. 1966—Lu. law. 1966—Li learns from Lin Biao’s doctor that he was a hypochondriac. economics At the same time. learns from his wife that he had been addicted to opium and later to morphine (treated in the Soviet Union in 1949). Peng Zhen was to be toppled for it Mao became irritable. telling them he wanted the Five-Man Small Group of the Cultural Revolution and the Beijing Municipal Party Committee abolished. Mao went outside the PSC and met with Jaing Qing. turns out to be wildcats. history. asked Li to stay Feb. returns to home village of Shaoshan on June 18. circular submitted to enlarged Poliburo in May and passed (May 16 Circular) Mao suggested that Li make peace with Jiang Qing. but Mao insisted on leaving and moving to Hangzhou Dinner with Mao revealed that he thought the characters that Deng Xiaoping employed in the central secretariat were shady Jiang Qing meets with Mao. Li did not wished to and tried to find other protection May 1966—Mao retreats from politics. new Central Cultural Revolution Small Group formed.

were sent in to stabilize the situation. Mao gets ready to return. . Cao Yiou Cao. Mao instructs Li to see Tao Zhu and to investigate the Cultural Revolution in Beijing 16 July 1966—Mao swims in Yangtze. floats “like a balloon. deliver a judgment. and distribute punishments and rewards. The first such poster. She had joined the CCP in 1938 at age 17. which is what happened with criticisms at the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Nie Yuanzi Not known as a very good person since her years in Yan’an during the Sino-Japanese War. pp. Jiang Qing excited about letter and tries to have it published. created by Nie Yuanzi and six colleagues at Beida. the wife of Kang Sheng.Mao writes letter to Jiang Qing. and writing about his discomfort with his cult of personality. was sent by her husband on a secret mission to Beida to stir up grassroots opposition to the school’s party leadership. but Mao withdraws the copies July 1966—Beijing in chaos. establish reasons for the problems.” gets ready to return to political stage (arrives in Beijing on 18 July) MLR. Work Team Whenever problems arose. helped mobilized the masses and led to utter chaos. 52-70 Potential IDs “News blackout” Refers to the consignment of criticism to inner pages or academic supplements of newspapers. Nie helped bring down party leaders at Beida in 1966 after an unsuccessful first attempt to knock the university president Lu Ping off his perch in 1965. She had access to valuable information as head of her husband’s private office. One of the only restrictions on their leadership is that they have to receive permission from the central authorities before taking action against cadres at or above the rank of country governor. Marxist-Leninist Big-Character Poster These posters would have big characters written on them to accuse certain Party leaders of being “revisionist. composed of trusted cadres from uninvolved units. work teams. writing that rightist movements cycle and reappear every few years.” etc.

titled “What are Song Shuo. who headed the People’s Daily work team. Nie teamed up with leftist colleagues. urging people to rise up in the “Great Socialist Cultural Revolution.” But Nie and her colleagues called these attempts to direct the Cultural Revolution “revisionist.” Chaos ensued.” sending Zhang Yan. with hundreds and thousands of big-character posters put up soon after.” a reference to Song’s support of stronger leadership when the Beijing Party Committee was no longer functioning in order to persuade the masses to the “correct road. Constant noise was a hallmark of the revolution. It was clear. Nie Yuanzi had been severely criticized in 1965 because of her vendetta against university president Lu Ping. top Communists did not necessarily trust the “worker-peasant-soldier masses” to emerge victorious. The movement of foreign journalists was curtailed. Emboldened by Cao.” In early 1966. The noisy fairground atmosphere that gave foreigners . The real purpose of the trip was to stir up grassroots opposition to the school’s party leadership. Kang Sheng sent his wife Cao Yiou on May 14 to Beida supposedly to examine the “academic criticism” at the university. The poster. newly appointed Beijing first secretary. Mao ordered it be broadcast in its entirety by Xinhua News Agency and published in all the nation’s newspapers. The public announcement on June 3 of the dismissal of the Beijing Party Committee was the more significant “explosion. who ultimately decided to attack with a big-character poster. Lu Ping. At midnight on May 25. General Summary In Phase II.Chen Boda New leader of the Chinese Communist Revolutionary Group (CCRG). Cao gave the green light to Nie to put it up despite not seeing the text. deputy director of the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office.” Yet. China seemed to be far more concerned with escaping poverty than with “class struggle. June 2 became a turning point for Cultural Revolution activity in colleges. and Peng Peiyun up to in the Cultural Revolution?” was put up on May 25. Li Xuefeng. the Xinhua News Agency had imposed a news blackout on the criticism of people such as Wu Han.” since it would have followed the line of Peng Zhen’s February Outline. The answer was “cunning scheme. three days later a powerful editorial in the Liberation Army Daily “leaked” the main points of Jiang Qing’s Forum Summary. From reading the People’s Daily. As evidenced in diary entries. though. Not until April 15 did this practice change. Alongside the text in the People’s Daily was a laudatory essay written under the direction of Chen Boda.” After reading the text on June 1.” particularly for foreigners. and was about to lose her job. The first battles of the Cultural Revolution largely did not affect ordinary citizens. which had not yet been publicly repudiated by Mao with the May 16 Notification. visited 800 CCP and CYL members to stress the importance of “struggling in an orderly fashion. Zhou Enlai tried to ensure a “controlled burn. Nie and her leftist friends realized that the widening of the anti-Wu Han campaign to include Deng Tuo meant that Bejing party propaganda establishment was in trouble and Lu Ping had lost his high-level protection. that the criticism would be “bogus” rather than “genuine. Mao manipulated a mass movement at China’s educational institutions to unseat the head of state. to remind everyone that the presence of foreign students imposed certain restrictions on the right to put up big-character posters in public places.

Chen took over on May 31. or was unaware of the situation in Beijing. when in reality. but colleagues with confidential insider information or even chauffeurs. But due to the incompetence of the untrained workteams and the explosive craziness of the students. It was the student’s revolution. a revolution began at the university levels with Big Character Posters and student movements. IDs: • Socialist Education Movement: Investigation led by Liu Shaoqi reported that there was a . In addition. During the early weeks of June 1966. When Liu and other leaders went to report to Mao in Hangzhou on June 9. The Central Committee Secretariat then sent a work team to take over at the Propaganda Department on June 6. pp 70-85 Summary: This section of the book concentrates on the Fifty Days (see IDs) at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution without the guidance of Mao. but also wanted to avoid criticism from their classmates. not the workteam’s. though.239 cadres entered educational and cultural institutions in Beijing. it was the top leaders from the center. and Deng Xiaoping decided to send in a temporary work team under Chen Boda. In order to control this chaos. an expanded PSC meeting under Liu’s chairmanship agreed that the new Beijing Party Committee should send in work teams to various colleges and schools. Mao finally returned to the scene in mid July (Yangzte swim to show his health and power). everyone was being attacked. Students and junior staff turned against anyone who might be a potential member of the “counterrevolutionary black gang. The practice of acquiring/releasing information through the children of the politburo members began. However. the new head of the CCRG. Chen Boda opposed the decision. Since there didn’t seem to be a set target. On May 29. He showed great dissatisfaction with the progress of CR and the decision of sending in workteams. called this period the fifty days and used it to condemn Liu and Deng. Class-based discrimination charges found a more receptive audience than gender-based discrimination charges did. students were in an uproar. Important things to remember: Mao never lost control of the revolution. and on June 3. Students didn’t want to humiliate teachers too drastically. and officials were at risk from not only students. to take over at the People’s Daily (Zhou immediately phoned Mao to get his permission). no one really understood who the real target of the revolution is. work teams totaling 7. He finally within drew the workteams. MLR. there was great resistance and rebellion against authority.the illusion of good humor and organization was achieved only by considerable behind-the-scenes activity by the Beijing Garrison. After the May 16 Circular. Zhou. Provincial party committees also began to send work teams after Beijing. Most people still believed it to be the intellectual bourgeois. Liu. though he said that sending in work teams too early would not be good. The problem was that he kept his colleagues in the dark about what he was trying to achieve.” but discarded this label in August after two months for supposedly not indicating the nature of the person labeled as such. One can only learn to make revolutions by making revolutions. Mao refused to be pinned down on what should be done. Mao approved sending in a Beida work team. Liu and Deng decided to send work teams to universities in order to control the students.

but Mao ordered that the poster be broadcast and published nationally. Kuai Dafu: one of the leading radical students at Qinghua University.significant anti-Party sentiment in rural China ca. Workteams were therefore withdrawn and those who had been punished by them were rehabilitated. Even before its elimination after the fifty days. July 1966. This announcement served to legitimate spontaneous mass protest as part of the campaign against revisionism. He told his workteam leaders “You trick the snakes into leaving their pit. his case was the subject of a high-leve Party meeting in Beijin. This was the Socialist Education Movt. on June 1. and the Cultural Revolution Group. Like many others. This served to increase the division among cadre ranks in rural China just as the Cultural Revolution was about to take off. they were almost impossible to enforce due to the uncontrollable Red Guards and incompetent and unprFMJepared workteams. she led a group of radical professors and teaching assistants to write a largecharacter wall poster (dazibao) criticizing the university’s leadership for having supported the liberal policies of the February Outline and for having prevented mass discussion of the political issues raised by the Hai Rui affair. It marked the beginning of the conflict between the radicals (connected to the central CRG advised by Kang Sheng) and Liu Shaoqi and his work teams. 1964. ’64) sent large workteams to selected communes to thoroughly shake themup and wipe out all revisionism and anti-Party ideology.” Eight-Point Guideline: Drafted by Li Xuefeng. Liu Shaoqi attacked Kuai as a troublemaker. but was soon to be breached.Workteams would stay in a commune for up to 6 months and punish severely those who opposed them. • • • Fifty Days: A critical period from June to July 1966 (during the eve of the Cultural Revolution) that resulted in the downfall of Liu Shaoqi and Mao’s approval of the Red Guards. The university administration and Zhou Enlai opposed this dissent. Mao reorganized this movement issuing his “23 Articles” in Jan ’65 such that it became a campaign to educate all levels of the Party on the evils of revisionism. and Kang Sheng defended Kuai’s right to criticize revisionism in the Party. Mao felt that Liu’s approach here was flawed in that it focused on fighting corruption more than the greater threat of revisionism. and counterrevolution was a serious threat. and Zhou Enlai even sent a second central work group to criticize Nie’s wall poster. in the May . • Nie Yuanzi: a teaching assistant in the philosophy department at Peking University. On May 25. Basically Mao. Mao also felt that it was too harsh on basic-level party cadres. Bo Yibo: vice premier at the time of the Fifty days who chaired the Sate Council’s Industry and Communications Office Party Committee. Nie probably received encouragement from Kang Sheng’s wife. Basically 8 rules limiting and regulating the activities of the Red Guards. Cao Yiou. criticized there by the work teams sent. with favorable commentary. Result = “Revised Later10 Point Plan” (Sept. and then you wipe them all out at the same time. claiming that it was the outspoken teachers and students. he inaccurately predicted the true targets of the Cultural Revolution. At the meeting. There was widespread corruptionand to deal with this he recommended severe measures be introduced.

It gave almost totally free reign to the red guards to continue their work. Mao raged against the party members after it became clear that some of them were luke-warm rather than enthusiastic to the removal of work teams. With Mao gone from Beijing and “mumbling” whenever consulted. mass involvement was restricted. The work teams were not well trained.. the Chinese Youth League. and the Socialist Education Work Teams. Mao used these 50 Days to discredit Liu Shaoqi and set him up for a fall in his position in the Politburo Standing Committee. Eleventh Plenum – Gathered after Mao had evicted Liu Shaoqi from control over the Cultural Revolution. Mao criticized Liu’s approach as too similar to the Socialist Education Campaign: low officials were attacked. but low in quality. had called for a thorough purge of revisionism and capitalists in Chinese culture and the CCP bureaucracy. Teams were ordered to replace the authorities of the schools.) This work team campaign lasted for 50 days until Mao stepped back in and the work teams were recalled. The terms below detail the important points.16 Circular. This platform was more moderate than one would have expected from Mao’s speeches at the plenum. pg 86-101 Summary: This short part of the book depicts Mao’s starting actions against the establishment. All of this helped set up the CR. Mao signed them and gave symbolic support to the red guard’s actions. . sold and presented to the public. The phrase is symbolic of the purging of the top level of the CCP.g. These work teams were composed of personnel from the Party. involving only the cultural and education spheres and denunciations of the usual suspects of bourgeois background. It attacked the “four olds” and suggested that the CR would continue much as before. they had been used in the late 1950s to aid the collectivization of farming throughout China. and try to bring students back under party control while “leading the CR”. “Bombard the Headquarters” – Mao wrote this phrase on a character poster during the 11th Plenum. Work teams were the usual method Communists used to organize large events. MLR. From the 11th plenum to purges of officials and reorganization of party organs. During Liu Shaoqi’s opening remarks. The Plenum was a gathering of party leaders. This had led to student uprisings sparked by Nie Yuanzi’s dazibao attack on Beijing University authorities. and no one acknowledged the responsibility of higher officials for revisionism. Mao interrupted frequently and asserted that the work teams for which Liu had taken responsibility were major errors. as Liu was put in the difficult situation of having to simultaneously support the revolutionary movement and maintain some semblance of party order and control on the campuses. They were large in size. While students initially expected the arrival of these work teams to resolve the conflicts with the School Party Committees. The Sixteen Points – Mao’s blue print for the cultural revolution. It was broadcast . (E. Liu Shaoqi suspended enrollment for 6 months in the schools and sent 400 work teams to enact reforms. restrain campus violence. Tsinghua Red Guards – A group of red guards that sent Mao two big character posters. they were dissatisfied with the work teams and began to crit icize them too.

By 1967 it grew to a bureaucracy employing thousands. Zhou Enlai and Lin Bao praised it as having firmly carried out Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line at its dissolution. replacing the CC secretariat and becoming as powerful as the MAC and State council on paper.Central Cultural Revolution Group – Campaign headquarters of the Cultural Revolution. The book notes that it was a very chaotic institution due to internal disagreements. . It began as a group of 10 party intellectuals and the wife of the CCP chairman charged with drafting policy documents for the PSC.

invites students to visit the capital. not counterrevolutionary. and to struggle against revisionism. The Red Terror began its spread through the capital that Saturday night. Red Guard rallies After Chen Boda. At the first six-hour rally on Aug18. Zhongfa 312 Revoked by Mao on August 5. at Mao’s insistence. did not support the appeal. wanting chaos. By the last rally on Nov26. he believed that China’s youth should see leaders in person in order to keep them loyal to the cause. Song Binbin She was one of the students chosen to meet the leaders during the rally. In Mao’s opinion. the appeal spoke of “hooligans” masquerading as Red Guards causing chaos and called on genuine Red Guards to end the disorder. Red Guard movement Movement born as early as May 29 when students from elite middle school attached to Tsinghua University organized themselves to support Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. a million students and teachers were led into Tiananmen Square to visit Mao and other officials. pp. eight massive rallies were held in Beijing between mid-Aug and late Nov. Mao. 102-128 “Red Terror” A well-known period of violence from Aug-Sept 1966 during which private and public property was destroyed. this communication had endorsed the Peking University work team’s breakup of the June 18 incident. The violence that spread through the campuses of colleges and middle schools was a product of the Red Guard movement and Mao’s endorsement of student rebellion. Aug 13 – Rally at Beijing Workers’ Stadium Event staged by the Beijing Party Committee during which 70. an act which removed the constraints on violence imposed by earlier work team. the incident was revolutionary.MLR. urban undesirables expelled. Her placement of a Red Guard armband on Mao’s arm signaled his support of the movement and legitimized it nationwide. In early August.000 youth gathered to watch the denunciation of about a dozen “hooligans” who were eventually beaten up when the rally got out of control. Red Guard “Urgent Appeal” Issued Aug 6 by Red Guards from three elite middle schools. . Mao gave the Tsinghua middle school Red Guards his “ardent support” and the movement took off. Mao had manifested himself to 12 million Red Guards from all over China. and a significant number of people murdered.

they. hooligan. In the course of four weeks. Wu Xun A 19th century cultural hero. His ministry also sent a report to Mao that became Zhongfa 410. Wu Xun was a beggar that used all the money he gained to found schools. educator.” These were reaffirmed in Lin Biao’s speech during the Aug18 rally. Zhang Shizhao Zhang was a retired journalist.) and political backing from the authorities (likely because its members included the children and grandchildren of influential cadres). 1967. Tan Houlan A young cadre that led fellow students and teachers from Beijing Normal University to Qufu county where they destroyed the Confucius Temple in November 1966. reactionary. and official that had earned Mao’s gratitude for arranging financial assistance for a nascent CCP. Repatriation The eviction of urban residents from their homes and forced removal to the villages of their ancestors Five black categories The “bad” classes targeted for repatriation: the landlord element. He was attacked as “a propagator of feudal culture” and his corpse was exhumed. and burned by Red Guards. this Central Document prohibited police suppression of student movements. rich peasant element. and martyrs’ relatives. including Song Qingling. customs. or rightist. the West City Pickets received material support (office space. revolutionary cadres. soldiers. . vehicles. poor peasant. His complaint to Mao after Red Guards trashed his house enabled Zhou to issue an order protecting the homes of several senior non-Communists. Chen Boda had decreed it alright to level the grave of Confucius. and habits of the exploiting classes. including 2000 graves. 1966. joined by locals and students from the Qufu Teachers’ Institute. destroyed 6618 artifacts.“Four Olds” Prime task for the Cultural Revolution was the elimination of “old ideas. etc. Destroying the four olds and fostering the four news became one of the Red Guard’s first tasks. Issued August 22. Xie Fuzhi (Minister of Public Security) He approved 100+ municipal level mass rallies struggling deposed authorities from April 23 to October 27. West City Pickets An elite Red Guard organization that enforced the repatriation program. broken. Five red categories The “good” classes: workers. culture.

were humiliated. this process relocated 397. MacFarquhar argues that the Cultural Revolution provided them with the opportunity to emulate their parents and take advantage of knowledge gained from reading secret documents at home. the most fervent supporters turned out to be the middle and even elementary school students. There was even an attempt. Chen Boa invites students to the capital. etc. the Great Hall of the People. the broadcasting station. Mao also believed that Red Guards should enjoy free travel and accommodations s they traveled the country “igniting the fires of revolution. and destruction of property belonging to families of “bad” class background. Jinggangshan was led by Kuai Dafu. to rename Beijijng “East Is Red City. Carried out by the Red Guard and supported by party members (often under pressure to conform). and other bourgeois regardless of status.000 people throughout China.000 were arriving by train every day.) and Hai Rui’s grave. The police were told to support the Red Guards . prevented by Zhou. declaring the Forbidden City. At Mao’s insistence. mainly “places of cultural or historical significance. and airfields off-limits. personal.” including the Confucius Temple in Qufu county (Confucianism was thought to foster landlords. calls for a 25 year drinking/smoking age requirement. denunciation of vulgar language. there was mass searching. With the cooperation and logistical support of authorities. looting. During the Red Terror starting in the summer of 1966.” Many changes were made. Some destruction was organized and sanctioned officially and the CCRG used the media to encourage and promote the Red Guards. By November. many others committed suicide. newspaper offices. especially top-level “revisionists” like Peng Zhen and Peng Dehuai. etc.) to reflect the revolutionary ideal. post. since Red Guards could not consult party members every time. some urban residents were evicted and forcibly repatriated to their ancestral villages. his attempts to issue nationwide orders of protection and set rules restricting Red Guard behavior were vetoed by Mao and the CCRG. As the Red Guard movement took off and pledged to combat the four olds. rich peasants. but also entered homes of adres and people connected to the movement. to criticize teachers for their bourgeois/revisionist teachings. the CCP decided to temporarily suspend all classes. landlords. However. Red Guards first targeted capitalists. the group organized a large on-campus rally that “struggled” Wang Guangmei (Liu Shaoqi’s wife) and 300 others. more than 200. Many were tortured and killed. Zhou sought to limit the destruction. On June 13. as the last of the rallies were held. General Summary As the Cultural Revolution started. During this period. some eclectic aspects of the movement included demands for undesirable elements to labor under mass supervision (and in one case to collect their own feces themselves). They also destroyed public property. and the changing of names (street. often beaten to death. it was safer to go along with most changes. Others.” This exciting time for students was an administrative nightmare and also led to outbreaks of epidemic meningitis. shops. Many students were the children and grandchildren of party leaders that outranked their teachers.Jinggangshan organization An organization of Red Guards at Tsinghua University. Students were encouraged to devote themselves full-time to the Cultural Revolution – to start Cultural Revolution committees and small groups. in front of mass rallies designed to rouse the Red Guards to greater fury against Mao’s enemies. or struggled. and to create. and study big character posters.

then you should probably read the article — Nick 7. even after the Cultural Revolution. I’ve decided not to put in lots of examples because you’ll never remember them anyway. 96-123 (Readings 7. or covered many important artifacts (for example. Qi Benyu. and mention some particularly good supporting evidence if necessary. the Imperial Palace. 64-95. “China’s patron saint of cultural relics”: Protected Beijing Ancient Observatory.e. To Protect and Preserve Short Summary The article covers the “Destroy the Four Olds” campaign over the period from 1966-1967. a temple bell from the Sigou village temple) • Active resistance (i. and even Kang Sheng (who actually protected them to seize them for his own collection) • Passive resistance from villagers and local committee members. State Council. this is not everything—if you feel this is very important.. the author basically argues that it was not a “one-sided. all-consuming mass movement in which Chinese culture was wholly repudiated. The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History. Be warned though. Specifically. closed up. 8) *Note* to be honest. physical violence against red guards) as in the defense of the Confucius .” apparently authorizing the destruction of Chinese cultural relics.” He gives examples of how in all segments of society (from the highest party officials to the local peasantry) there were those who actively opposed the work of the Red Guard in destroying Chinese cultural artifacts. no flowing without damming. pp. I’m not sure how useful any of the material in these two readings will be to you: it seems to be more like a context-builder and discusses some pretty ancillary topics in way too much detail (lots and lots of anecdotes…). Esherick et al. and no motion without rest. I’m only going to lay out the argument. Li Xiannan. he became the symbol of cultural preservation—many citizens would write personally letters pleading for his assistance in protecting one artifact or another • Key members in Central Committee. It was inspired by the essay “on New Democracy” which said that “there is no construction without destruction. who buried. together issued two circulars directly advising against the destruction of relics)—names include Chen Yi. Han tombs at Mancheng Lingshan etc… Even if he did not do all the protecting.and. Contrary to popular view. and Central Military Commission (bodies which. we have efforts from these elements of society • Zhou Enlai. no criminal responsibility for the murders was pursued by the authorities.

though it was eventually lost after they were reinforced by other red guards The red guards (or certain ones among them) viewed certain relics with an element of national pride. Successfully (and violently) resisted first Red Guard attempt.” or because they would be useful as educational materials for the future. After his public disgrace. Enlai and others might never have gotten away with protecting as many relics as they had— the Red Guard were simply too powerful to control absolutely. and might have stayed their own hands when it came to certain things. no one “wanted to be identified with ‘counterrevolutionary revisionist’ Peng Zhen. Relics were declared safe on the pretext that it would be good for the revolution. it was far from it: the temple’s destruction was contested (and indeed to some extent advocated against by Party leadership). and finds that there are substantially more mass killings in the former two than in the latter.” so the Palace was saved. Destruction of the Qufu Confucius Temple Complex – although this incident is regularly used as an example of the wholesale renunciation of traditional culture. A general theme that flows through is the idea of using revolutionary rhetoric to persuade the Red Guards not to attack the property. . one of the four types.e. military captive.• Temple complex in August 1966. because they were “state property” or because they were “fruits of the genius and creative power of the Chinese masses. Potential IDs (again. These are defined as incidents in which 10 or more non-combatants belonging to a single “category” (i. etc…) were intentionally killed over a short time period He examines their prevalence on a county level in three provinces: Guangxi. Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution Short Summary This reading discusses the phenomenon of mass killings that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. and Hubei. Revolutionary rhetoric – is so vague that it could clearly be used to argue on both sides. which illustrates the general point that not all (or even most) of China was very convinced by Mao’s orders to “bombard the headquarters” 8. Guangdong. A great example is that the Forbidden Palace was spared not just due to Enlai’s efforts. Even as people might pretend to support Mao and his revolution. a large number might actually have had ulterior motives and even objectives directly conflicting with Mao’s own agenda. More generally what this paper illustrates is that there was not a mass hysteric frenzy in support of Mao. Otherwise. not sure how much material will show up. but because it surfaced that Peng Zhen had initially planned to make changes to the palace. but some helpful points) Zhou Enlai – protector of cultural artifacts. major centrist and was key to the preservation of many key sites.

and the revolutionary committees that were called for by party policy had to use “class struggle” terms to attack their enemies to gain control (possibly intentionally encouraging their outright execution). The remainder of the paper discusses the reasons for variation between low-occurrence provinces like Hubei. this might have just been the rhetoric concealing the true motive: • There was a great deal of factionalization. and to even do that required some crafty rhetoric and extreme violence. But as in the previous reading. Perhaps due to differences in government structure (Hubei incorporated those who were against the preCultural Revolution government. they took a long time to form. and more violent ones like Guangdong. while Guangdong had more conservatives). 93 -123 . The situation was worse because the Cultural Revolution caused disintegration of the infrastructure of the state: even if the upper levels of the government did not view the violence as acceptable. Esherick et al. of which I have selected some salient facts: • In Guangxi. 15 counties out of sixty-five reported more than 1000 deaths (each).” and there seems to be a connection between violence. • They were perpetrated by governmental authorities. with the worst county (Wuming) having 2463. as the Cultural Revolution was in full swing and interrupted usual means of party control. they would always find out too late to do anything about it Potential IDs Only one big one I can think of here: Factionalization: even though the order to form revolutionary committees came from the very top of the party bureaucracy. and furthermore how tenuous a hold the party had on everything. who viewed “killing as a political duty.. and future political reward. pp. It goes to show just how fragmented the political climate was. Similar in Guangdong • Hubei rarely had killings. The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History. such that the mass killings might be attributed to conservatives lashing out against opposition without restraint. though it often had beatings • Killings happened after the formation of revolutionary committees. in rural areas far from the provincial capital. Another theory is that mass-killing is part of the class-elimination policy of the part (but taken to an extreme). and a more diverse government provides deterrents.Most of the paper is actually a summary of these findings.

if anything • Definition: intentional killing of a significant number of the members of any group of noncombatants Membership based on alleged political crimes or unfavorable family background Event must not have occurred during armed combat between mass factions • “Four-types”: landlords. counterrevolutionaries. rich peasants. bad elements • Types of mass killings 1) Pogrom against the “four-types” 2) Killings in a political witch-hunt: based on association with alleged conspiratorial groups 3) Summary execution of captives Mass Killings in Three Provinces • Most mass killings in Guangxi and Guangdong. and Hubei provinces • County gazetteers will underreport. and more moderate faction defending the government • Type I provinces (i. often with political rewards Provincial Variations .Hypotheses • Differences not historical fact. mass organizations. abundance in rural villages Reflects disconnect between lower-level jurisdictions and upper-level authorities Indicates weakness of state control at lower level • Perpetrators organized by governmental authorities (militia. united with revolutionary committee to crush the rebel faction .Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution: A Study of Three Provinces Most mass killings took place when party-state began to form new local governments and demobilize mass organizations • Local representatives of the state turned “class struggle” into a reign of terror  mass killings Documenting Mass Killings with County Gazetteers: Guangdong. new volunteers) Killings carried out as political duty.e. rebel faction had been included in the new government • Killings tend to occur in commune or brigade level. Guangxi. not in detail” Hubei gazette may have been more conservative – however. but result of editorial policies in compiling county gazettes “Recording in broad strokes. reports many injuries Differences most likely indicate real differences in political events across provinces Divergent paths of prior conflict leading to the founding of revolutionary committees • Most provinces had two factions: more militant rebel faction wanting to overthrow pre-Cultural revolution government. rather than county level • Lack of mass killings in urban settings. unlike in Guangxi and Guangdong. fewer in Hubei • Peaks of mass killings closely followed the founding of the revolutionary committee Killings concentrated in a few months  evidence for correlation with establishment of revolutionary committees and demobilization of mass organizations • In Hubei. Hubei): rebel faction dominated the new government • Type II provinces (Guangdong. Guangxi): moderate faction dominate.

as did disappearance of the CC Secretariat and disappearance of CCP’s regional bureaus 8 Jan. military/industrial complex least affected. purges senior staff in State Council. . Zhou Enlai. Mao sent his documents to Lin Biao.• Hypothesis: Hubei government was more representative of oppositional elements  deterred mass killings The Political Context • <1967> Mass factions demobilize. 1966—Mao toasts cultural revolution at his 73rd birthday. Deng. 155–198 26 Dec. public health most affected Zhou promoted the idea that power seizure in the ministries was a political. 1967—Mao declares ministries superfluous for revolution. laid down guidelines and tried to make sure that routine performance was not affected May 1967—Zhou gets Mao’s permission to send in PLA into the ministries as government crumbled. not professional act. CCRG. but not other PSC members (Tao Zhu. education. central and provincial governments constantly warned against excess violence Clogged channels of information flow from top down and bottom up State do not find out about mass killings until too late. culture. Chen Yun). looks forward to year of all-round class struggle From early 1967. creation of Central Caucus at 11th Plenum strengthened power of radicals. Liu. Mao wants revolutionary committees established by Feb 1968 • Two tasks involved in establishing a new order: 1) Installing an effective local government 2) Cracking down on dissenting mass opposition • Leaders of the mass factions that were shut out of the revolutionary committee could become strong opponents of the new order • Revolutionary committees encouraged to defend their power and treat opposition in “class struggle” terms  terror campaigns • Mass killings involve dehumanization of a population segment – the “class enemy” Whoever the local government deemed to be standing in the way of the new social order Enables manufacture of tangible threats to justify terror • However. localities do not report mass killings Conclusion/Main Points: 1) Mass killings result from province-specific conditions rather than national politics as a whole 2) Result of repression by local state rather than of conflicts between independent mass groups 3) Primarily rural phenomenon 4) Perpetrators were local leaders and their mass followers MLR. pp.

in return. municipal committee effectively collapsed. 1967—open letter to people of Shanghai published in Wenhui Daily 4 Jan. 1966—four hours of fighting. orders all workers’ militia members to hand in weapons for “inspection and repair”. 1967—upon return to Beijing. 5 Jan. put up by Wan Hongwen. Scarlet Guards capitulate (“Kangping Road incident”). 1967—Liao Zhengguo. 1967—Wenhui Daily and Liberation Daily publish joint “urgent notice” on measures to fight economic chaos. organ of power changed on Feb. Liberation Daily. 1967—establishment of Shanghai Commune. beginning 1968. 16 Jan. 1967—Mao formally approves Shanghai seizure of power 5 Feb. etc. 6 Jan. radio and TV stations. 23 to “Revolutionary Committee of Shanghai Municipality. commander of Shanghai Garrison. 1966—Zhang Chunqiao informed that Scarlet Guards planning to cut off utilities in Shanghai.” etc. signifying beginning of nation-wide violence 1 Jan.000 gather to witness denunciation of Chen Pixian.” . begin precipitating rebellions at Wenhui Daily. under Zhang and Yao’s leadership 12 Feb.000-strong Scarlet Guards 28 Dec. with WGHQ being dominant To combat. establishment of a united organization. Zhou Enlai phones Shanghai party secretary Chen Pixian and orders him back to work and to disperse the 20. Mao reads and endorses. mayor and deputies purged 9 Jan. Zhou drafts telegram congratulating rebels in name of party centre.taking various levels of control. try to foment rebellion 12 June 1966—first workers’ big character poster. 1967—Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan arrive in Shanghai from Beijing. ordered WGHQ for action 30 Dec. encounter resistance and appeal to WGHQ for help. Shanghai Party Committee organizes 800. large percentage of ministry employees sent down to “May 7 Cadre Schools” to do manual labour Late August 1966—Beijing Red Guards arrive in Shanghai in three waves. Zhang and Yao are informed that Mao has changed his mind about the commune idea (thought “commune” would be too lax). Chen Pixian orders urgent meeting drafting order to petitioners to withdraw and open letter calling on people to “grasp revolution. promote production.000 Scarlet Guards attempting to petition authorities in Shanghai and disrupt traffic. who later emerges as head of Workers’ General Headquarters (WGHQ) 30 Nov. 1967—100. 1966—Red Guards occupy Liberation Daily offices. etc.

saying that they are taking too serious a view of student assaults 2 April 1967—People’s Daily editorializes on behalf of leftists (“Adopt a Correct Attitude toward the Little Generals”) 6 April 1967—on basis of editorial. anecdotes about confrontations at Qinghai Daily in Xining 1 April 1967—Mao critiques PLA. 1966 23 Jan. 1967—extended session of MAC ask Lin and Biao for measures to restore order in PLA. party first secretary skilful enough to manoeuvre into becoming chair of revolutionary committee (Pan Fusheng) In Shanxi. 18–19. party first secretary imprisoned and committed suicide Beijing had already experienced a power struggle. only 8 were recognized in 1967. 20 more not till 1968. request was granted and Mao acknowledged the 8 measures as “very good” (known as the Eight Points) 19 Mar. maintaining security and playing key role in power seizures (major force behind successes of early power seizures). most attempts at power seizures failed. but on Jan. workers were told to make revolution in their spare time. Jiang Qing explains that the 8 Points and 10 Points are not contradictory: one was to “support the army” and the other to “cherish the people” . along Third Front. in favour of rebels. were causing Five-Year Plan targets to slip PLA played double role. limits to travel. as Lin Biao had conceded that military academy students could challenge leaders just like Red Guards as early as Oct. Mao ordered military to support rebels in Hefei when they requested However. schools recalled. peasants. who with backing of military district put himself at head of command. workers. 1967—“Three Supports and Two Militaries” published. work stoppages. 1967. Heilongjiang: revolutionary committee set up 31 Jan. chaotic attempt to take over lead by various rebel coalitions. party first secretary was outsmarted by party secretary Liu Geping (Muslim). esp. Lin Biao draws up 10-point order endorsed by Mao. Spring 1967—Zhou gets Mao’s approval for limiting confusion of revolution.In wake of Shanghai’s January Storm. taking control 12 Jan. shoots “rebels”. 1967. national security buildings were off-limits. urban youths originally sent to countryside who had returned during revolution were sent back. military ordered to support the left. and to carry out military training and control Military tries to impose control. problem with military discipline. Zhou had to mediate and the revolutionary committee was finally inaugurated April 20.

Anti-PLA riots break out in response to order Mao seems never to have ordered execution of his colleagues. Tao tried to protect his former Central-South Region deputy Wang Renzhong 27–28 Dec. Wang Li and others accuse him at expanded Politburo conference. 1966—meeting to discuss Wang Renzhong turns into attack against Tao. guards rush in to protect Tao and he is accused of suppresses the masses 4 Jan. transferred to centre from the Central-South Region. accuses them of being opportunist. 1966—Jiang Qing requests document detailing 7 of Tao’s crimes from Guan Feng. tells CCRG to hold meeting to criticize Jiang Qing and Chen Boda. 1967—Mao summons Lin Biao. 1967—Chen Boda and Jiang Qing denounce Tao. 4 attack on Tao Zhu. attacks Chen and Jiang. appoints Wang Li to succeed Tao Zhu as head of CC Propaganda Dept 3 Feb. loses his temper at their Jan. Mao’s reaction unclear 6 Dec. extensively in second half of 1966. Zhou. Li Fuchun. but Zhou’s ability to protect them was limited. Zhou denies Tao is guilty of suppressing the masses. and discusses with Tao need for 2–3 month provincial tour to inspect Cultural Revolution’s progress 30 Dec.” that he was “very dishonest.” denies personal knowledge of Tao before his transfer to the centre. Ye Jianying. Mao’s reaction ambiguous 8 Jan. 1967—Mao criticizes CCRG for submitting reports only irregularly 10 Feb. to a question from Mao. Kang Sheng. Jiang Qing. 1966—Mao criticizes Jiang Qing for not getting prior permission for attack on Tao. because he has in other cases intervened personally much more decisively on behalf of colleagues he wanted to save. wishes Red Guards good luck in dragging out Tao. this frustrated Zhou Zhou had relied on Tao Zhu. CCRG leaders. attacked Tao instead 27 Nov. Chen Boda. angry words. knowing they could not attack Zhou. probably moved Tao to centre earlier as calculated move to separate Tao from his power base Li Fuchun shares Mao’s criticisms of Jiang and Chen with other members of Poliburo . 1967—Mao comments that Tao Zhu’s issue was “very serious. praises Tao’s work. 1966—first serious attack on Tao Zhu. but says this issue not to be debated elsewhere Mao probably did not really want to save Tao. Wang Li to meeting. and here he did not. 1966—Tao Zhu has confrontation with Red Guards who claimed to be aiming to seize Wang Renzhong. none of his Politburo colleagues defend him 29 Dec.

Xu Xiangqian (marshal). significantly. threatens to fight guerrilla war again if opposed.11 & 16 Feb. these were sons and daughters of high-level officials who organized to oppose “left-opportunism. to CCP members) as it was externally. 1967—unity meeting with Zhou Enlai and Feb. . says that Tan Zhenlin (vice premier). Peng Zhen and others that would serve as fuel for the denunciations. Yao Wenyuan meet with Jiang Qing. etc…) that show how the Cultural Revolution was just as destructive internally (i. Old Guard attack CCRG (February Countercurrent)..e. permits them to watch May Day fireworks from Tiananmen Schoenhals. • This includes the big-character poster “Unmasking the Inside Story of the Big Renegade Clique” which made public the list of names. pp. were to self-criticize 22 Apr. transcripts. Chen Yi (marshal). Mao becomes angry upon hearing of Chen Yi’s remarks that the guys in power are the ones who are revisionists 18 Feb. and for Liu Shaoqi’s downfall. who were the principal Old Guard attackers. In order of documents: 19 “Annihilate Every Renegade” (Nankai University Red Guards) • Details the Nankai University Red Guards’ role in “uncovering” the renunciation of communism by Bo Yibo.” but was privately furious 19 Feb. China's Cultural Revolution. 93-135 (Reading 9) Not a Dinner Party Short Summary Basically a collection of primary sources (party documents. speculation that reason for freeing them was that Mao did not want to antagonize Old Guard further 30 Apr. 1967—Mao signs off on Zhou Enlai’s submitted editorial “Cadres Must Be Treated Correctly. etc. 1967—Mao orders United Action Committee members freed. Countercurrent protagonists. Zhou Enlai did not support his colleagues from the State Council and PLA Zhang Chunqiao.” Jiang Qing. 1967—Mao launches counterattack at meeting of senior officials. 1967—two meetings of Central Caucus. and had been imprisoned three months earlier. agree that the three men would report to Mao. Wang Li.

which paints Bo Yibo in a completely different light: here he is the martyr.” The reserved. she clearly fears them greatly. but perhaps a way for Kang to justify the suppression of evidence against those who were not meant to be purged. • • • Describes how Bo was tortured. and is humiliated by them with little protest • She cannot even reason with them. cautious tone is slightly ironic (especially given the subsequent document in which Kang is adamant that they extract a confession from Bo Yibo) Not just ironic. and principled idealist who refused to bow to the injustices of his guards.• In general the ostentatious and propagandistic tone of the report conveys the political atmosphere at the time: Red Guardists were keen to interpret any and all evidence as categorical proof that the enemies of China were precisely the ones Mao said were his enemies. Wang Guangmei (Qinghua University Red Guards) • A frightening look at the power of the Red Guards: interrogating a former lady. Again refers to the “Open Notice of Renunciation of Communism” . 20 Interrogation Record. and you are a notorious counter-revolutionary old hag. Directly criticizes the factional fighting that characterizes the period (and comes up in previous documents) 22 Bo Yibo Has an Attitude Problem • Account from much after the Cultural Revolution. the upright. struggled against. and humiliated constantly in order to force from him a confession that he was reactionary and a member of the renegade group of traitors. she is accused of her own “crimes” • 21 On Case Examination Work (Kang Sheng) • Document from Kang Sheng giving guidance to those conducting Case Examinations • • • • Preaches a degree of moderateness and the need to be exceptionally careful in considering the circumstances of the past. Secondarily. as they refuse to hear anything they do not like “We are the revolutionary masses. Don’t try to confuse the class demarcation line” Interesting points: Main purpose of interrogation is to get material to implicate Liu Shaoqi further as a reactionary revisionist. given that the result could affect “a person’s political life. Also interesting because it illustrates just how substantially party position changed after the Revolution.

not weapons.”In the end. the longer it lasts. Kang Sheng/Case Examinations – Investigations to find evidence against key members to justify their purge. This potentially explosive atmosphere directly threatened the legitimacy and power of Zhou Enlai. Lin Biao. as both groups claimed to be the true left. the judgment from the center at Beijing was quite the opposite. Lin Jie.” However. Although Chen Zaidao and Zhong Hanhau almost succeeded in gaining the support of the CCRG after returning to Beijing for a meeting. it was difficult to determine who to support and who to suppress. with the specific intention of targeting foreign diplomats (incl. the regional commander in Wuhan.” horrific acts of violence occurred everywhere. Although ostensibly. the better. in August 1967. After aligning with the conservatives. Therefore. the PLA’s ability to keep order was weakened. And due to the ten-point MAC order of April 6 and the February Countercurrent.became motivated to press for wider attacks on conservative groups. pp 221-238 After the Wuhan incident. and Mao. it also created many tension and division within the organization. in reality. even incidents of children being paid to kill other children were recorded. Jiang Qing interfered and caused a series of confusion. The members of the mass organizations were not the only ones affected.” However. Chen Zaida. this constant contradiction of restoring order and supporting chaos not only confused the role of PLA. he appeared to advocate for nonviolence. of course. He declared them as a disruptive “counterrevolutionary adverse current. disbanded the Workers' General Headquarters of the radical side. Four of the most radical members (Wang Li. he was willing to sacrifice anything for the sake of revolution. reacted with his usual ambiguous manner. ultimately Zhou Enlai) and the PLA. MLR. a Wuhan civil war broke out between the radical SteelTempered groups and the conservative Million Heroes. The role of the PLA was to support “the revolutionary masses of the left.supported by the CRG . On his departure. radicals . Mao. Guan Feng) were dismissed and . As a result. Each side claimed that CCRG was on their side. Mu Xin. Despite Mao’s order of “struggle with words. he addressed the PLA senior officers with the line “The bigger the trouble gets. the CRG was ordered to reorganize.Potential IDs Nankai University Red Guards/Open Notice of Renunciation of Communism/Bo Yibo – important fuel for the fire that would ultimately purge Liu Shaoqi and supporters from the Politburo. pp 199-238 Summary: This part of the book is divided into two parts: The Wuhan Incident and The May 16 Conspiracy pp 199-220 The Wuhan incident occurred during a period of chaos and struggle between the conservative and radical mass organizations of the Cultural Revolution.

The fallen individuals in this group of targeted radicals were known as the “May16th Group” (the "516 Group"). everyone thought the Chairman was behind them and believed they were supporting Mao’s Thought. etc. In 1967. pushing them out of all of their strongholds in just over a month. IDs: • Million Heroes: This organization. “Attack with words. a member of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee. military and the CRG. purportedly made up of 1. Lots of bloodshed & death.2 million people. which was under the editorship of Chen Boda and had been a mouthpiece of the CRG. and the rebels had control of the city. They did not realize that Mao was in Wuhan and that most of the orders came from him. kidnapped Wang and beat him up. Because Mao sort of gave contradictory messages. Wang Li was one of the two representatives of the CRG to attend the meeting. the conflict between the radical group and the conservative (the “Million Heroes”) in Wu Han was very intense. Wang Li was rescued by Zhou Enlai and brought back to Be ijing. probably because the Ministry of Public Security played such a large role in the conflicts leading to the CR. and at the eleventh plenum in 1966 was appointed an alternate member of the Politburo. Xie formed a close association with the CRG. when Mao labeled them as “conservative. Xie Fuzhi : He replaced Luo Ruiqing as Minister of Public Security and had a subsequent meteoric rise in the CCP in 1966-7. They disbanded soon afterwards. The end of the Million Heroes was sort of the last stand of armed resistance against the radicals. he was dismissed as a result of May 16th Conspiracy. the Million Heroes destroyed the radicals. they were angered and beat up Chen Zaidao (leader of the Wuhan Military Re gion. Opposite them were the Rebels who were made up of 50 Red Guard organizations and workers. The important thing to note is that. He received a formal welcome. was forced to suspend publication. which had sided with the MH) because they thought he had given up on them. Then Wang Li and Xie were to inform the party. In 1966. In end. as Mao said. Wang Li: a member of the Cultural Revolution Group. medical care. They didn’t like the insecurity and instability of the CR in Wuhan and decided to take violent action against the rebels. Chen Zaidao requested a meeting with Zhou Enlai.” their days were soon over.” After this incident. and named a member of the Party Secretariat responsible for all political and legal matters (a position formerly held by Peng Zhen). the radicals weregiven weapons and the military was strictly ordered to support the radicals (unlike previous vague orders to “support the left”). The Million Heroes even paid for the murders of Red Guards. The majority of them were workers in the factories of Wuhan who felt indebted to settled authorities for their work related benefits (housing. upon their dissolution.the Party's theoretical journal Hongqi. defend with weapons. • • . at this time in Wuhan. Because the radicals were fragmented and the Million Heroes were well organized. Basically Chen Zaidao made self-criticism and promised to reinstate the workers organization. the Million Heroes stormed Wang and Xie’s hotel. Later they even kidnapped Wang Li (important member of CRG). Angered by this development. they didn’t realize that they were not in his favor until after several weeks of violence. However. was the more conservative organization in Wuhan at the time of the Wuhan Incident. When Beijing told them to stop.). The military commander in Wu Han.

and ordered that it be reinstated. the party published directives that greatly limited the PLA’s ability to suppress radical organizations. and told the rebels to overthrow the Shanghai Party Committee and assume power. The radicals in Wuhan (and all across China) protested. he recognized the Workers’ General Headquarters (WGH) under Wang Hongwen and met their “five-point demands. and ruled that the Wuhan Military Region had acted correctly. a conservative umbrella organization. Radicals like Jiang Qing threw their weight behind the radical protests. However. The group actually agreed with Chen. The radicals could not be easily be controlled by the army. Wang Hongwen and the CRSG supported him and the students were suppressed. repudiate the military region command. Chen Zaidao: the commander of the Wuhan Military at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.• • with Wang Li. saying that the actions of Chen Zaidao and other players in the adverse current were suppressive. Chen was let off . Because of the changes. dealing a major blow to the Red Guard movement. while Chen Zaidao was taken in for questioning. Wang and Xie stuck around to enact his orders. he would be able to disband the Workers’ General Headquarters faction in Wuhan. as a part of the CRG. About two weeks later in late January. He became First Party Secretary/Mayor. At the end of it all. giving her ammunition to undo the agreement. Wang was seized but Xie was spared because of his formal position of vice-premier and minister of public security. possibly beating Wang in the process. A conservative group called “The Million Heroes” was established in defense of the military. The Million Heroes and the radicals continued to fight. met with the WGH. the struggle between large organizations in Wuhan intensified. The Wuhan Incident was only resolved when Zhou Enlai came to restore order. since some of the central authorities were restricting the Cultural Revolution. they presented Mao’s instructions as a censure of the military. he and Yao returned to Shanghai. necessitating a second series of meetings with Zhou Enlai and two members of the CRG (Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi). Xie and Wang returned to Beijing as heroes. The Million Heroes representatives were angered by this announcement and stormed the hotel where Xie and Wang were staying. the Red Revolutionaries (a Red Guard group) attack Zhang. Under the directives. and endorse the city's radical mass organizations. and that the radicals (under the umbrella of the Workers’ General Headquarters) should stop attacking the city. Zhang was sent to deal with the Anting incident and pacify the workers. Mao even attended a couple of meetings. After Mao left. Zhang Chunqiao: In 1966. In response. was left to convey the results of Mao's dictates after the Wuhan incident (in which the Million Heroes. had begun to take over Wuhan) to criticize the Million heroes. He felt that. This centralized the authority in China—only Beijing could classify groups. After the February Adverse Current. Unfortunately for Chen. the armed forces could o longer declare an organization to be counterrevolutionary or to make mass arrests. In 1967. Despite the ruling. Surprisingly. and endorsed the radicals.” Mao approved. and many radical groups seized weapons and munitions from army storehouses. Chen Zaidao requested a meeting with Zhou Enlai and the Cultural Revolution Group. Chen decided that the radical organizations were gaining too much control in Wuhan. The Million Heroes stormed the hotel where Wang and Xie were staying to retaliate. word of the agreement reached Wuhan before Beijing made an official declaration—Jiang Qing said that this meant that Chen was taking advantage of his success and going behind the party’s back. Instead. Mao and Zhou both criticized the decision to disband the Workers’ GH.

the radicals were allowed to flourish. but with the tacit support of Mao. He tried to limit the Workers’ General Headquarters. and efforts to curtails their activities were generally destined for failure.the hook without facing any major consequences. . So. the whole point is that Chen was at the center of one of the more important events at the beginning of the CR.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful

Master Your Semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master Your Semester with a Special Offer from Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.