You are on page 1of 14

G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al.

, accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants. CRUZ, J.: Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the penalty. The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment meted out by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be. Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed. Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muñoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal. The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3 As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4 After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muñoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5 In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her husband. They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and missed. 6 The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Muñoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses. 7 The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three victims. Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood by and the mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court especially noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who positively identified Minora as the killer and described the participation of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by Muñoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed her mind later on cross-examination and named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00 promised by his father although she actually did not receive the money. 14 For her part, Juana related how she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and then also shot to death, also by Muñoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16 The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred to these witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not allow them to report their

Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically lacerated. Lomibao.1/2 inches in diameter. 2. in diameter.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. Both claimed that Mislang having complained of cattle rustlers. 22 The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did not give the impression that he was telling the truth. stayed in the former's house the whole night of June 29. it took him all of one year to report the alleged shooting encounter. leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of June 30. barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located. 21 Another witness for Millora. to their complaints. also of alibi. Jose and Melecia. The alleged redemption made by Muñoz was described by the trial court as preposterous. De Vera. In fact. 32 . 1972. testified to having seen the encounter between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. in diameter. 29 Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense. The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as false and unbelievable. Such a traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have been easily wiped out from their minds.27 The lawyer corroborated him. might have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muñoz and the three appellants herein when the Bulataos were murdered. no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos. de Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning to investigate the killings. It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with the group that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muñoz. who positively identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the face and killed him instantly. which he also did not mention that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to condole with them. as testified to by Dr. who also testified for the accused. 1972. said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had paid Mauro P400. 1972. 26 Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings.grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew. 2. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after drinking beer with Atty. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee because they had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were already dead in the field. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened with the brain tissue outside. especially since no shred of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler. who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house. more so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention.31 Moreover. the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. however. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side around 1 cm. including Tayaba.30 Significantly. as follows: Mauro Bulatao: 1. after Mislang had served them breakfast. Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right jaw bone around 1. it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 2 cm. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left clavicle around 1. It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly pointed out by the appellants. 28 but he cannot be more credible than Mauro's own children.1/2 cm. 2. let alone his 16 year old son. 20 Graciano Muñoz. corroborating Bacani. 18 The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by the medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the victims. much less encouragement. who corroborated them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's witnesses. having gone there in the evening of June 29. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. 23 Moreover. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out. Alejandro Bulatao: 1. 1972. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or June 30. including Mauro. Aquiline Bulatao: 1. Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 25 As for De los Santos. is only two kilometers from Balite Sur. a group of policemen. Orlando de los Santos. 17 but these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential truthfulness of their accounts of the ruthless killings. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.

pursuing a common design previously agreed upon. No one interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino.. which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house. 40 as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum. the Court has since February 2. Those who disagree feel that Article III. Together they dragged Aquilino from the house and the rest watched while Muñoz kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground. participated in the killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution. 34 In support of this finding. However. for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance. there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. as before. There was treachery because every one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed by the accused with no risk to themselves. the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three murders. as they properly were. is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question. There is no question that the group moved in concert. When Millora shot Mauro.All told. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. It is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the above provision. who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at the trial and assess their credibility. come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. to be sure. that made each of them part of a conspiracy. the Congress hereafter provides for it. The rest stood by with their weapons as Muñoz shot Alejandro in the head. The defenses of the herein appellants should be. i. 36 Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder. the appellants and the others stood by with guns at the ready. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the head and shoulders. These should be maintained intact. together with Muñoz and their seven other companions. unless. As we said in a previous case: We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge. The written record will not show that nuance of tone or voice. They knew where to look for them. to wit. This conclusion is not unanimous. being still applicable in all other cases. there is much to be said of the opposite view. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. when the eleven men went out to look for the suspected cattle rustlers. Muñoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices. the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium. the same period applied. and in Criminal Case Nos. was thus maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition. with the minimum period. four of them went inside while the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. All these subtle factors could be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting declarations before him. Intino. 33 We agree that the three appellants. We hold that there was. the penalty that may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Millora was found guilty as principal and Muñoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides . e. who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing and telling evidence submitted by the government. Later. nor cruel. they took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. Indeed. after extended discussion. and reclusion perpetua as the maximum. it is clear that from the very start. including death. the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and the prompt reply. They knew whom they were looking for. we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each of the appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. 0177 and 0178. The Court has reconsidered the above cases and. and the expression or color or tilt of face that will affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. the minimum and the medium. Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as follows: Excessive fines shall not be imposed. In Criminal Case No. regardless of who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. the Court. Alejandro was lying down when he was shot in the head. The majority of the Court. Mauro was completely taken by surprise when he was shot in the face. Conformably. Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19. we affirm the findings of the trial judge. None of the three victims had a chance to resist. Together. 0176. Narvasa in People v. In People v. also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. reclusion temporal maximum. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty. Paras in People v. however. Indeed. qualified by alevosia. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a co-principal. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. and we do not find that he has erred. 35 As such. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium. but this was modified by Article III. each of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three killings. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. without categorically saying so. The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods. Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R. Section 19(l) of the Constitution. by reducing it to reclusion perpetua.

to state it categorically and plainly. 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. The statute is not abolished. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital. Whatever the intention was. while rather awkward. Masangkay. assuming such intention. The medium period isreclusion perpetua." especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). This is not a necessary consequence of the provision as worded. All we are saying is. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. express or even implied. 41 At that. leaving no doubt as to its meaning. BERNAS: Certainly. July 18. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain. 749). the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record. we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. But the range of the penalty for murder consists of three periods. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before. MR. CONCOM. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged. is still plain enough. If we now remove the death penalty. if there really was one. While it has a duration of 30 years. So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty. is not at all expressed in Article III. have a range of penalty of 17 years. we are still not persuaded that it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the original penalty. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty. what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. FR. Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. it is an indivisible penalty. That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task. It is definite that such a requirement. we will. for example. Vol. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for the penalty for murder. Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted." whatever that means. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III. the range cannot go as far as death (Record. but the penalty is abolished. this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry. The language. would not be of much assistance either in the case at bar. this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. if already imposed. we are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. 1986. even if made. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. . The following exchange cited by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive of the question: FR. The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra. I. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about. but I suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another-or strangely. Vol. MR. it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids. (we) will be equal to (our) tasks. The maximum period is death.for it and. therefore. like the records of the constitutional convention. Instead. 1986. which is the Revised Penal Code. The only thing is. BERNAS: As I said. While we are told that the trodden path is best. One searches in vain for such a statement. It would have been so easy. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. the Court finds that such resort. CONCOM July 18. it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. and can. And well it might. All but two members 42 at that time still sit on the Court today. with the hope that "as judges. for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. p. FR. if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the degrees. for its interpretation. because the statutes. the penalties lower than death remain. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. growing things subject to change as all life is. do not necessarily punish directly with death. shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation. Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. 750). Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment? FR. We understand this to mean that they were not saying more." Assuming that Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body. Accordingly. if there is a range. considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough. I. The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. And what would be the effect on the judges. especially in the General Criminal Law.

as feared by them.. in which the Philippine Racing Club. 0176. the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is authorized to hold . BARRERA.000. petitioner-appellant. True enough. and that the 6 additional sweepstakes races authorized under Republic Act No. That is a question of wisdom. GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS BOARD. SO ORDERED. or a total indemnity of P90. No. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. the court. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. the court is of the opinion and so holds that once a month on a Sunday not reserved for the Anti-Tuberculosis Society. There is therefore no deprivation of property without due process of law. 0177 and 0178. 309. Wherefore. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. Saturday and legal holiday. in their arrogance. 309 and 1502 in such a manner that the 30 Sundays unreserved for charitable institutions and therefore belonging to the private racing clubs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. is still reclusion perpetua. conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced.000.R.. we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses. petitioner-intervenor-appellant. Coming back to the case at bar. WHEREFORE. the White Cross and other charitable institutions by Section 4 of Republic Act No. praying that judgment be rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB). not construction. It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have remained unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials. Respondents duly filed their respective answers to said petition and the case was heard.00 for each of the deceased. especially the police and the prosecuting officer. rendered a decision which. with costs. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30. J. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. Thus. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount.: This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club. 1960 MANILA JOCKEY CLUB. ET AL. the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is using their premises and equipment under separate contracts of lease voluntarily and willingly entered into by the parties upon payment of a corresponding rental.00 in line with the present policy. 1957. or on any other day of the week besides Sunday. L-12727 February 29. nor can respondents compel petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its license revoked. and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon: (a) Interpreting Republic Acts Nos. 1502 should be held on 6 of the 12 Saturdays not reserved for any private entity or particular charitable institution under Section 4 of Republic Act No. INC. in part. and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30. (b) Holding that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use the race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent.. As judges. who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. Did you not agree with me for a penny?' The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Each of them is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties ofreclusion perpetua. in the Court of First Instance Manila (Civil Case No. 309. 31274). INC. vs. we can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. believe that they can flout the law and frustrate justice because they have the protection of powerful patrons.00. 309 continue to pertain to said private entities. intervened as party in interest with leave of court. the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as principals in Criminal Case Nos.. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB. I do you no wrong. reads: The court does not deem it necessary to rule on the deprivation of property of the petitioner and the intervenor without due process of law.The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Inc. Inc.. The courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons against those who. because as they have stated. After hearing. respondents-appellees. the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which.000. on July 5. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder. the latter replied: "Friend. G.

In the first place........ 1956. approved on June 16.. The issue is the proper placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. These days can not be disposed of by the GAB without authority of law....... 12 Saturdays 4 Saturdays 24 Saturdays 12 Sundays 6 Sundays 4 Sundays 1 Sunday 23 Sundays 29 Sundays 52 Sundays 12 Saturdays 52 Saturdays C......... are as follows: A. Secondly.... (3) For private Individuals and entities duly licensed by GAB and as may be determined by it .... relief. 983........ as later amended by Republic Act No......... have been reserved for private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB.... petitioner and intervenor interposed the present appeal... form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law — the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races....—Private individuals and entities duly licensed by the Commission on Races (now GAB) may hold horse races on Sundays not reserved under this Act...... contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President.......... (5) For private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB. 309......... and legal holiday...... 1502..... subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. all other Saturdays not reserved for the latter . B. pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No....... the White Cross..... Legal Holidays: All.. (4) For races authorized by the President for charitable... as amended by Republic Act No.... (2) For the White Cross. 1502.......... or even to the 24 Saturdays (except....... commonly known as Independence Day.. It is suggested that the GAB should have chosen any week days or Saturday afternoons... Republic Act No. specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society.......... ... or 53 for leap years......... the law provides: SEC.......... on the holidays).. commonly known as Rizal Day. but without specifying the days on which they are to be run.... perhaps.............. the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races... From this judgment.. As stated. sweepstakes races have always .. by express terms................... or civic purposes..... but without specifying the days for holding them.one regular sweepstakes draw and races.. and on legal holidays... and 12 Saturdays to the President for other charitable.. Republic Act No.... ....... Inc.... Total ..... other Sundays not reserved under this Act. Saturday.. 4. (2) For the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) ....... the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six.. 309. July fourth... ..... Total .... except Thursday and Friday of Holy Week.. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races.. and the PCSO...... or 30 for Leap years Total for the year ....... The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of Republic Act No.. or civic purposes other than the particular charitable institutions named above.... When.. 983..... Section 4 Republic Act No. as it did..... As to the remaining racing days..... and December thirtieth..... Inc............................. subject to licensing and determination by the GAB....... or civic purposes.. The law does not authorize the holding of horse races with betting on week days (See Article 198 of the Revised Penal Code).. To accommodate these additional races..... relief... It is clear from the above-quoted provision that appellants have no vested right to the unreserved Sundays... as may be determined by the GAB . week days are out of the question....... Racing days...................... (4) For the Grand Derby Race of the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society .... thus reducing the number of Sundays which may be 6dmissib to private entities by the Games and Amusements Board..... Appellants’ contention cannot be sustained. in virtue of Republic Act No.... relief......... therefore. the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines... because their holding of races on these days is merely permissive.... Inc........... Saturdays: (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ...... on twenty-four Saturdays as may be determined by the said Commission (GAB). . . except Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week.................... for charitable.. or should be assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday... (3) For the White Cross... 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve.. Sundays: (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society . July 4th and December 30th. Appellants protested......

so to speak.1 In view of these conflicting authorities. Be that as it may. the language of Republic Act No. common usage and practice under the statute. In support of this contention. but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. to set aside the resolution of the GAB. Besides. 1502. if we adopt appellants’ theory. 1023). unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document. So. is made up of two elements — an internal and an external one. 1502 in June. that while Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda were. and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized. in voting for its passage. is in the line with this theory: The intention of the legislature to which effect must be given is that expressed in the statute and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influence the legislature. made during the general debate on the bill on the floor of each legislative house. Furthermore. it is not possible to hold them on Saturday afternoons as. is cited: Mr. it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors. yet if they are held on a club race day. every time the PCSO uses appellants’ premises and equipment. deserves no serious consideration.n. nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman. Upon the other hand. As the lower court has found. it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. taken from 59 Corpus Juris 1017. and since the court does not find that a grave abuse of this discretion has been committed. “On the principle of contemporaneous exposition. inconvenient. still there is nothing in Republic Act No. 1956. and the running of the sweepstakes races. of the view that the additional sweepstakes races may be inserted in the club races. when Congress chose not to specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would be held. the long.2 in the interpretation of a legal document. therefore. is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used. It is to be noted in the specific case before us. May 17. I move that we vote on the measure. emphasis supplied. . twelve. . (t. Appellants’ contention that to compel them to permit the PCSO to use their premises and equipment against their will would constitute deprivation of property without due process of law. they are paid rentals in accordance with the terms of separate contracts of lease existing between them and the PCSO. separate and apart from the club races. as it was finally enacted. rather. so far as it has been expressed in the act. and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during the whole day. or individual members. especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time. the purpose of the inquiry. at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. especially a statute. I want to make it of record that it is the clear intention of the House to increase by two the ten regular and special Sweepstakes races making it all in all. With this background. Mr. This is. for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication. Mr. appellants contend that even granting that the six (6) additional sweepstakes races should be run on Sundays. there seems to be no reason. The gentleman from Ilocos Norte is correct. and those who spoke. ABELEDA. Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides and. not a case where a doubtful wording is sought to be interpreted.s. it is claimed. no appreciable reliance can safely be placed on any of them. which became Republic Act No. or the legislature. The legal act. if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before). the following quotation from the debate in the House of Representatives before voting on House Bill No. It is pertinent to observe here that. J. ABELEDA. 5732. might differ from each other. which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues. 1956. likewise. or a course of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it. admittedly. the appellees. 1502. the GAB should only insert them in the club races and not given the whole day to the PCSO. before we proceed to vote on this bill. legal or otherwise. .) Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view that in the interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely differing constructions. by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. a whole day is necessary for the mixing of the sweepstakes balls. in ascertaining the meaning of a statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all members of the legislature or its legislative committees or any other persons. (59 C. following its presentation by a standing committee. as pointed out by one of appellants’ own cited authorities. continuous. quote in their briefs other authorities to the effect that statements made by the individual members of the legislature as to the meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently enacted into law. Upon the other hand. legislative debates and explanatory statements by members of the legislature may be resorted to.. . it is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing situation and practice. . It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill. the law would not have included regular races.been held on Sundays. Likewise. and it would be confusing. the drawing of winning sweepstakes numbers. will frequently be of great value in determining its real meaning. clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. Congress. Speaker. but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The following. MARCOS. since the law has given certain amount of discretion to the GAB in determining and allocating racing days not specifically reserved. to the exclusion of appellants. hence. may not have agreed with those who did. 1502 in authorizing the increase. Proceedings in House of Representatives. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which could. admittedly. are generally held to be in 7dmissible as an aid in construing the statute. to throw light on the meaning of the words used in the statutes. Failure of the latter may defeat the former. the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day. we would be supplying something that does not appear in the statute. Those who did not speak. . be inserted in the club races. . may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. and that in cases where a sweepstakes race falls in a club race days the Sweepstakes races should be inserted in the club race. If there are no more amendments. In short. Mr.

1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co. --G. The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2. We do not view the situation in that light.: The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4. MAKALINTAL." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27. bureau or office. respectively. as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both. its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities. the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. Gozar and Associates for respondents-appellees.. 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order. in the discretion of the court. as contemplated in the law. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period. Specifically referring to this case. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines. In an order dated March 4. 1972. with costs against the appellants. 5. B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. government official. a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier. To satisfy the judgment. Tan Kim Liong. 1405 which. and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants. J. being in consonance with the above findings and considerations of this Court. is whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor. and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it. Tagalo." Resisting the two orders. by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. Sec 3. Del Rosario and Associates for petitioners-appellants. or in cases of impeachment. Inc. 1973 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG. are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court. Branch VIII. of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. ACABAN. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads: Sec. 2. On January 20. the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. vs. Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation. WENCESLAO ORTEGA. inquired or looked into by any person. and if there is any deposit. In reply. Sy Santos. or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials.The decision appealed from. 75138. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits. the same is hereby affirmed. otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court. Accordingly.. 1972. 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4. petitioners-appellants. the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law. No. except upon written permission of the depositor. 1405. HON. the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition. and VICENTE G. so that the bank would hold the same . * On December 17. or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.R. respondents-appellees. Sec. to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court. However. L-34964 January 31. 1972 and March 27. So ordered. it was alleged.

That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit. MARCOS. Mr. definitely establishing the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed . MACAPAGAL. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended? Mr. MARCOS. RAMOS. suppose the tax liability is P1. MARCOS. Suppose an individual has a tax case. RAMOS. for instance. in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached? Mr. Therefore. RAMOS. that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual. Mr. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. RAMOS. if approved. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Thus: Mr. then this is fully covered by the law. say. Mr. Mr. Once the judgment is rendered. Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law? Mr. but..intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. Mr. And it protects the depositor. MARCOS. That is the effect. in the execution of that judgment. as I said before. Let us assume. xxx xxx xxx Mr. MARCOS. I see. but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. does this bill. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for. MARCOS. Yes. MARCOS. but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation. the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government. which later became Republic Act 1405. the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. or rather. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. RAMOS. without judicial authorization. . that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. No. 351 and House Bill No. or this proposed law. So I come to my original question.000. That is so. Mr. Into the very nature of such deposit.000. will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed? Mr.. Yes. RAMOS. such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law. it protects the depositor. I am glad that is clarified. preliminary garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed? Mr. Mr. MACAPAGAL. Now. 3977. allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment? Mr. RAMOS. Yes. for purposes of the record. does it not? Mr. but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes. Therefore. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the Government. RAMOS. Suppose there has been a decision. RAMOS.00 worth of tax liability. Mr. RAMOS. MARCOS.000 and the deposit is half a million. Mr. Mr. P1. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited. does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant? Mr. and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

as amended provides: Loans and advances extended by Rural Banks. but the offer was turned down. as the sole bidder. as contended by the defendants and held in the decision appealed from. as unpaid balance of the loan. on questions purely of law. at public auction.00. on said date. even if ordered by the Court. --G. Villaluz. Rosa L. 1958. 1955). 1961. II. On March 2. . 1963. to compel them to reconvey the property to him. Besides. Camarines Norte. on May 8.00 as attorney's fees. For the purposes of this Act. 363 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for said province. . He having subsequently defaulted in the payment of this obligation. plaintiff-appellant.00. a small merchant shall be one whose capital investment does not exceed twenty-five thousand pesos. 3978 issued to Lamadrid. 1961." upon the ground that "the law does not distinguish between the two kinds of conveyances. that Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No.00 as interest. or by Section 5 of Republic Act No. as asserted by the plaintiff. vs. however. taken by the plaintiff. on February 6. Transfer Certificate of Title No. issued. defendants alleged in their answer that the right of redemption expired on February 4. the lower court rendered judgment for the defendants. which. two (2) years from and after the date of the sale. Plaintiff Laureano Oliva was the owner of a parcel of land of about 3. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or free patent. No. After appropriate proceedings. he mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Daet.R. WHEREFORE. are hereby affirmed." No redemption having been made within said period. under the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. in his name. he instituted the present action against Lamadrid and his wife. 141 refers only to voluntary conveyances and that the foreclosure sale had been made under Republic Act No. Lamadrid for the sum of P350. CONCEPCION. municipality of Daet. on February 27. T-3968 issued in the name of the Bank. L-23196 October 31.00. 1963. upon the theory that Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. Hence. In the granting of loans. they maintain. The certificate of sale. Congressional Record. for the aggregate sum of P188. July 27. of Republic Act No. 3839-3840. this appeal. 1932. pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. Prior to May 31. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case. defendants-appellees. as security for the payment of a loan in the sum of P250. which he deposited with the Clerk of Court. as amended by Republic Act No. As early as July 30. 1963. as amended. 720. in the aggregate. organized and operated under this Act.5258 hectares. as well as the normal credit needs of cooperatives and small merchants. pp. the corresponding deed of sale was executed in favor of the Bank. attorney's fees and costs. on February 4. for said sum of P350. No. and to recover damages. 720.00. Hence. by the provincial sheriff. with costs against the petitioners-appellants. . issued by the sheriff. NICOLAS V.(Vol. House of Representatives. 363 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1961. stated that the property could be redeemed "within . 18863 and Original Certificate of Title No. through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank. The main issue is whether the period of redemption is governed by Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. accordingly. On October 2. barrio of Lalawigan. directly to the Supreme Court. respectively. the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the property sold. LAMADRID and ROSA L. He claimed that. VILLALUZ. 2670. The property was covered by Homestead Patent No. to the Bank. 1967 LAUREANO OLIVA. is controlling. the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27. the date of the auction sale.: Appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte dismissing the complaint herein. 1963. or until February 4." Upon the other hand.2this Court explicitly rejected the theory that said provision "refers exclusively to voluntary conveyances and not to involuntary ones. plus P12.00. 720. and P16. the Rural Bank shall give preference to the application of farmers whose cash requirements are small. T-3968 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process.J. 141. he is entitled to redeem the property within five (5) years from February 4. on which date said Original Certificate of Title No. as holder of a free patent and a torrens title. 720. plaintiff offered to repurchase the property for said sum of P350. C. Upon the other hand. 19511 it has been settled. representing P160. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. located in the sitio of Pinagdamhan. not more than fifty hectares of land dedicated to agricultural production. on February 28. province of Camarines Norte. Section 5. shall be primarily for the purpose of meeting the normal credit needs of any small farmer or farm family owning or cultivating. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts.00. 141. the latter sold the property to Nicolas V. 1963. 1963. 1972. and. 12.

or Commonwealth Act No. No. finally. that this proposal was eventually found to be unwise. that is to say the Public Land Act. 1966. 720. AVELINO VILLACORTA. as provided in the general law. shall have the right to redeem the same within two years from the date of foreclosure: Provided. our considered view that plaintiff herein has the right to repurchase the property in question within five (5) years from the date of the conveyance or foreclosure sale. in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila. including interests due and unpaid. Proof of publication as required herein shall be accomplished by the foreclosure sale and shall be attached with the records of the case: Provided. MANUEL CUDIAMAT. continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner. MARIANO MAGSALIN.respondents.00). JR. and. with the specific intent and understanding that homesteaders or holders of free patent would retain the right to redeem within five (5) years from the conveyance of their properties. further.00 paid by Lamadrid and the former has actually deposited this amount in the lower court. . the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. It should be noted that the period of two (2) years granted for the redemption of property foreclosed under Section 5 of Republic Act No. does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2. 720. in his capacity as Mayor of Manila. or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved. shows that the original proposal was to give homesteaders or free patent holders a period of ten (10) years within which to redeem their property foreclosed by rural banks. as amended by Republic Act No. That in the case of landspending homestead or free patent titles. thereafter said sum of P350. JR.5 WHEREFORE. PABLO OCAMPO. from the viewpoint of said banks. JR. That when the corresponding titles are issued the same shall be delivered to the register of deeds of the province where such lands are situated for the annotation of the encumbrance: Provided. LEONARDO FUGOSO.. within 30 days from the date on which it shall have become final and executory. ALFONSO MENDOZA. EDUARDO QUINTOS." or "of lands pending homestead or free patent titles. JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO. which is not permissible on appeal. continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved. in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila. the proposal was given up. consequently. ANTONIO J. amending Republic. That when a land not covered by a Torrens Title. Moreover." who can "show five years or more of peaceful. L-23475 April 30. CESAR LUCERO. if the borrower applicants fail to present the final proof within thirty (30) days from date of notice. and that. That the applicant for homestead or free patent has already made improvements on the land and the loan applied for is to be used for further development of the same for other productive economic activities. as redemption price. EDUARDO QUINTOS. plaintiff now alleges that he is bound to pay no more than P188. vs. had." Plaintiff. accordingly. as well as their heirs. APOLONIO GENER. copies of notices for the presentation of the final proof shall also be furnished the creditor rural bank and. refers to lands "not covered by a Torrens Title. FRANCIS YUSECO. the homesteader or free patent holder. the property in litigation had been redeemed by him. It is so ordered. The foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks shall be exempt from the publication in newspapers now required by law where the total amount of the loan. in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila. SERGIO LOYOLA.. and the period of two (2) years prescribed in the latter is not applicable to him." or to owners of lands "without torrens titles. FRANCISCO GATMAITAN.R. 2670. directing the defendants to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance in his favor. as amended.000. Act No. It shall be sufficient publication in such cases if the notices of foreclosure are posted in at least three of the most conspicuous public places in the municipality where the land mortgaged is situated during the period of sixty days immediately preceding the public auction. because its effect would have been to dissuade rural banks from granting loans to homesteaders or free patent holders — which were sought to be liberalized — said period of redemption being too long. which were issued over 26 years prior to the mortgage constituted in favor of the Bank. and another one shall be entered declaring that. the legislative history of the bills3 which later became said Republic Act No. 2670. in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service. we cannot entertain this pretense entailing as it does a substantial change of the theory under which plaintiff had litigated in the lower court. JOSE SEMBRANO. and that having exercised such right and tendered payment long before the date last mentioned. FELICISIMO CABIGAO. Independently of the amount due under section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. a homestead or free patent land is foreclosed. --G.Loans may be granted by rural banks on the security of lands without torrens titles where the owner of private property can show five years or more of peaceful. MARTIN ISIDRO. finally.00 be turned over by the Clerk of Court to the defendants. GERINO TOLENTINO. THE HON. PADERES TINOCO. therefore. a free patent and a Torrens title. 141. and that. or up to February 4.. 141. there is no conflict between section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. JOSE BRILLANTES. in their capacities as members of the Municipal Board. Said deed of reconveyance shall be executed by the Clerk of the lower court. petitioner. the provisions of any law or regulations to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided. on the land in question. however. in the event of failure of the defendants to comply with this decision. defendants herein are bound to reconvey said property to him. 1974 HERMINIO A. CITY OF MANILA. this being the sum for which the property had been foreclosed by the Bank.. 720. ABELARDO SUBIDO. Accordingly. a homestead or free patent. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.00 by plaintiff herein. AMBROCIO LORENZO. ASTORGA. Although plaintiff had offered to redeem it for the sum of P350. That in case of borrowers who are mere tenants the produce corresponding to their share could be accepted as security. 141 and section 5 of Republic Act No. upon the judicial consignation of the sum of P350.00.4 It is. the creditor rural bank may do so for them at their expense: And provided. with costs against the latter. VILLEGAS.

operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065. Astorga. who was then going abroad on an official trip.:p The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 1964 House Bill No. On July 31. Reports 1. principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts. 4065. the Manila Chief of Police. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20." The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed: On March 30. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives. Antonio Villegas. 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. addressed a letter dated July 11. . 1964. On May 21. who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18. et al. a bill of local application. as Amended." The original petitioner. "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the ViceMayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders from this Court. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 1947). adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress. it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent. filed a petition with this Court on September 7. Roxas.J. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. the then Vice-Mayor. Herminio A. 1964 for "Mandamus. the Commissioner of Civil Service. 1965. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza. the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065. and copies thereof were caused to be printed. appeared as amici curiae. through the Secretary of the Senate. 1964 to the President of the Philippines. with previous leave of this Court. and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties. Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine. As a consequence the Senate President. without bond. C." Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21. 9266. On April 28. Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila. supported by copious citations of authorities. On June 16. the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Lengthy arguments. vs. 9266. that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3). Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment. and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment. the Executive Secretary. 9266 as sent back to it. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. was filed in the House of Representatives. Lopez Vito. 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. which became Republic Act 4065. who on July 5. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. suggested by Senator Roxas. 1964. 1964. Herminio A.MAKALINTAL. 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila. 78 Phil. et al. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine. A subsequent letter dated July 21. issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners. this Court issued a restraining order. upon motion of respondent Mayor. Astorga. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag. has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. 1964 "with amendments. "An Act Defining the Powers. (March 5.

receives his approval. 9 the U. 10although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. and is deposited in the public archives." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute. The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. 7 Another case however. carries. through their presiding officers. excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy. as having passed Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance. Moran. Clark. the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments. although not required by the Constitution. on its face. its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. or by published statutes or resolutions. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions." Sec. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question. is conclusive evidence of its passage. 2210. the sanction of the legislative branch of the government. And when a bill. In one case in the United States. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions: Sec. 8 But in the case of Field vs. in due form." which requires the judicial department "to accept. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 21 (2). The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point. Pablo and Jose M. namely. or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands. holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented. thus attested. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. It reads: The proceedings of the Philippine Commission. it is pointed out. that it was passed by Congress. when the question properly arises. 10 (4). Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses. provided. "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings. or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof. would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto. charged. all bills authenticated in the manner stated. and to accept. thus attested. of an enrolled bill. all billsauthenticated in the manner stated. as having passed Congress. respectively. that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature. is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. as amended by Act No. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval. when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies. concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla. 5 The affirmative view. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication. a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments. so authenticated. Hontiveros. and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution. The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. and of the President of the United States. the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. in open session. The main opinion. that a bill. or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary. an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State. 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. leaving the courts to determine. and the yeas and nays on any question shall. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. whether the Act." Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion. It is a declaration by the two houses. and from time to time publish the same. be entered in the Journal. by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. under the same circumstances. "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage. with the duty of enacting and executing the laws. at the request of one-fifth of the Members present. where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory. which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.S. and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government. the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. of the President of the Senate. except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its . and." specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190. to the President. by the President of the Senate. has received. printed by their order. Guillermo F. is in conformity with the Constitution.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall." Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment. This argument begs the issue. for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. This We do. the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. before it becomes law. goes farther. 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. The temporary restraining order dated April 28. and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. otherwise fully enacted as a law. granting it to have been validly made. which admittedly is a risky undertaking. 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. when they withdrew their signatures therein. would only mean that there was no attestation at all. what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. required. supra. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. the point is irrelevant in this case. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case. and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter. of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement. Hence. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did. . but would not affect the validity of the statute. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer.immediate enactment. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law. there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill. this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed. The inquiry. Republic Act No. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated. It is merely a mode of authentication." Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President. and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. Morris. As far as Congress itself is concerned. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors. The Constitution requires it. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses. by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government. the Supreme Court of Missouri. however. 4065 would remain valid and binding. In view of the foregoing considerations. FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE. AS AMENDED. it is pointed out. 1965 is hereby made permanent. is not attested by the presiding officer. it is said. No pronouncement as to costs. interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute.