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De la Llana vs Alba Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129 In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An

Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in

accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board e Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject. HELD: The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.”

“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the

Metropolitan Manila Commission.”

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial lossesestimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and

disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.


(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Sta. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. which have the effect of extending. a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. this appeal to the SC. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1. and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect itsgeneral provisions. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. Facts: On March 7. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in freshwater fisheries. Cruz. October 18. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. On appeal. 84-1. FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. Hence.R No. Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. the CFI affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid? HELD: NO. Issue: . Hence this petition. 1977 Aquino J. or which conflict with the authority granting statute. Maceren G. 32166. By such regulations. Godofredo Reyes. the law itself cannot beextended. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach. to the detriment and prejudice of the populace.PEOPLE VS. MACEREN Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of thelaw. 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing. Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. the rules of administrative officers and boards. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. 1969 Jose Buenaventura. As electro fishing is not banned under that law. Benjamin Reyes. do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power People vs. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same.

of course. seeking to declare the questioned Department Order unconstitutional for it was issued without any legal basis and for violation of the due process clause for lack of due notice and hearing before issuance. the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. INC. If it were a legislative function. the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. there is no such violation. As electro fishing is not banned under that law. to regulate school fees includes the power to prescribe school fees. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION.Whether or not the 1967 regulation. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function. Thereafter. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the . and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.Petitioner still protested the increases and filed a petition for prohibition. the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such. CULTURE AND SPORTS If the rates prescribed by an administrative agency is in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION. 3512. Held: No. ISSUE: Whether the Department Order is valid? HELD: YES. Administrative Orders Nos. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. are devoid of any legal basis. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that the increases were too high. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. VS. in penalizing electro fishing. 84 and 84-1. promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid. as granted by law. a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. The power of the DECS. FACTS: The Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report recommending an increase in school fees. In other words. the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission. By such regulations. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing a 15% to 20%increase as recommended. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing. As to the issue of due process. penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. prior notice and hearing is not essential tothe validity of its issuance. Republic Act No.

does not call for the dismissal of the case they may partake of a legislative character. FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD1206. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES. It was also granted a coal operating contract in the socalled Giporlos Area. specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. US VS. it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration. it applies to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country and the issuance of the department order is in the exercise of DEC’s quasilegislative power. Hence. ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case? HELD: YES. under a regulatory scheme. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which. CA The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough. Jesus S. in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise. the Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. ANG TANG HO . IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. In this case. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. INC VS. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. Clearly. then its function is quasi-judicial in character. however. then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance. However. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case. based upon a finding of fact. prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance. exploitation and development of coal blocks. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). Mr. the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. This being so. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). have been placed within the special competence of anadministrative body.

On 08 August 1919. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. On the other hand. and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos.Delegation of Power – Admin Bodies On 30July 1919. he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.respondents Type of petition filed: petition FOR CERTIORARI ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. he was charged in violation of the said EO. Ang Tang Ho. upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. The said Act. HELD: Fist of. Pursuant to this Act. voluntarily. Bureau of Animal Industry. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature. Integrated National Police. the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. if necessary. Iloilo & the Regional Director. Hence. an owner of carabaos Station Commander. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice. . a rice dealer. as to the judgment of the SC. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.A case Digest RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner. it is a law in all its details in presenti. so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. Region IV. Palay and Corn. but which may be left to take effect in future. Barotac Nuevo. one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. On 01 August 1919. in form and substance. Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. so that. the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. Further. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. Ynot vs IAC . 626-A is constitutional or not.00 fine. wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain.

Therefore. and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. G. 1984. February 01.R. HELD: Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications: 1. the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.000. However. petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions: 1. Case involved ‘roving commission’ and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power 4. NO. Petitioner raised the issue of EO’s constituitonality and filed case in the lower court.FACTS: Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13. 74457. 626-A. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. 20 MAR 1987] Sunday. 3. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order. ordered the confiscation of the bond. Iloilo. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was immedeiately condemned and punish YNOT VS. for violation of the above measure. The government argued that Executive Order No. as raised by the petitioner. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require theirinstant destrcution 3. Political Law Facts: Executive Order No. Measure should have not been presumed 4. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and impartial court. . Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as there’s no exigency showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President 2. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright 2. IAC [148 SCRA 659. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President. when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo. since they could no longer be produced. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery.00.

worse. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transferof carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. finally.Issue: Whether or Not EO No. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power. He said that the authority provided by EO 626A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. There is. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. To strengthen the law. . because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. On 13 Jan 1984. Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. is unduly oppressive. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. will not prevent the slaughter either. Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court Police Power – Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. after the slaughter of the carabaos.

it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President. may only be impaired by a court order. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. But President Corazon Aquino. 4-5 of the Constitution).. “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. She is obliged to protect the people. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar 4. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country.G. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. bureaus and offices. has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders 2. devastated economy because of 1.e. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people.” However. in his deathbed. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events: 1. Residual powers. inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman. 2. this list is not defined & exclusive. the power to execute the laws. According to the Marcoses. 1989 Marcos. Issue: 1. Sec. the appointing power to grant reprieves. Manglapus. public safety and health. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security. secessionist movements in Mindanao 7. Communist insurgency movements 6. in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution. September 15. 88211. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of . Whether or not. accumulated foreign debt 2. considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-today operation of the State. Marcos. such act deprives them of their right to life. the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. according to Theodore Roosevelt. Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. (Art. Article 3 of the constitution. has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists 3.R. i. According to Section 1. supra at 153). Decision: No to both issues. Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president. II. the power of control over all executive departments. promote their welfare & advance national interest. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). liberty. respondent (Part 1) Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. petitioner VS. Petition dismissed. Honasan’s failed coup 5. property without due process and equal protection of the laws. No. Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin.

2. G. right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. Manglapus. Fears were mere conjectures. Dissenting 1. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments: 1. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President. safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. the Court by a vote of eight to seven. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Concurring 1. after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. dismissed the petition. and for the tranquility and order of the state and society. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. Dissenting Sarmiento. President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways. petitioner VS. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. homesick. As a citizen of this country. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return. Threat is real. he/she should be buried w/in 10 days. it is Marcos’ right to return. 2. such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. 2. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Dissenting 1. Fears are speculative & military admits that it’s under control. tyrant. Thus. 4. Such threat must be clear & present. public safety/health demands that such be restricted. . or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be agreed upon by the court. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos. the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. it’s the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national security. Dissenting 1. Fernan. Paras. She has to uphold the Constitution. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals. October 27. subject to certain exceptions. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. In that context. Padilla. order. 1989. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational. Compassion must give way to the other state interests. The president’s power is not fixed. 1989 Marcos. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law. . 3. she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines. whether patriot. respondent (Part 2) Facts: In its decision dated September 15.R. live & die in his own country. prodigal. Marcos died in Honolulu. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. No. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand. 3. 88211. Untenable that without a legislation. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies. Cruz. etc. 3. Hawaii. For issue number 2.the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel. On September 28. 1989. We can’t sacrifice public peace.

al. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. This does not amount to dictatorship. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers. to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president. Amendment No. . leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit. in the exercise of the powers granted in her by the Constitution. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision. have not been shown to have ceased. Ratio: 1. in compliance with his (or her) oath of office. interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). 3. 4.2. Aquino has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning. Issue: WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Marcos v Manglapus. 3. Ruling: Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President. Facts: Same as above. The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. she had exercised it arbitrarily. Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution. it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power”. et. 2. Even the members of the Legislature has recognized that indeed Mrs. US). 1342. Decision: No. if she has. Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. the remains of Mr. The threats to the government. the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country. as per House Resolution No. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. except that Ferdinand has died. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily Facts: Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to order respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

But fact finding is not adjudication. Budoy and del Castillo. i.204 SCRA 546 • Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. To be considered such. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.D. they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee. gathering in peacable assemblies. allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. Also in the meantime. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. While the case was pending with CHR. 41. 807 and temporarily replaced.. raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate. the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be . The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran. Eventually. etc. eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged. or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes. CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. upholding the Sec. Despite this. and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. The case was eventually elevated to SC. SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier. and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country.…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges. a case was filed with RTC.” ISSUE: • Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power.” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. P. In the meantime. the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions. For failure to heed the returnto-work order.e. properly speaking. converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio.

or agency in the performance of its functions. and the entry of a judgment. Power to Investigate The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. . study." The purpose of investigation. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. Whether in the popular or the technical sense." "to inquire. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . “Investigate” vs. in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. to decide. rule on. . obtain information. arbitrate. examination. bureau. the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. means to examine. for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters. . means to adjudge. to subject to an official probe . It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . to find out by careful inquisition." In the legal sense. in cases of violations of said rules." "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function. resolve. This function. determine. to learn." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights. to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy. . . an inquiry. subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law." cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case . . “Adjudicate” "Investigate. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and. finally and definitively. . . . or to sentence or condemn.accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth.: to conduct an official inquiry. deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. act as judge. of course. explore. a legal inquiry." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to repeat." commonly understood. . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . 257. to make an investigation. the taking of evidence. Implies a judicial determination of a fact." commonly or popularly understood. judicial or otherwise. To determine finally. It may also request the assistance of any department. to find out. . judge. To trace or track. these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. settle. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense. . cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. . the Commission does not have. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. "to search or inquire into: . settle or decree. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. . is to discover. to search into. . decide." "Adjudicate. or even quasi-judicial bodies do. having merely the power "to investigate. office. inquire or delve or probe into." and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially. research on. . .

No. and in the event of an adverse verdict. and the failure of theteachers to discontinue those actions. the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law. and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education. the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. and also. and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions. Nevertheless. or are justified by the grievances complained of by them. and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. as it has announced it means to do. being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law. constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions." are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. The issue was then investigated. some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. More particularly. Carino vs CHR Adjudicatory Power of the CHR On 17 Sept 1990. eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. of Education. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions. . The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial. initiated and conducted by the DECS. It has no judicial power. may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. Manner of Appeal Now. whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process. within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC. and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights. their human rights. 90-775. and on 17 Dec 1990. Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. if any. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence. or civil or political rights had been transgressed. In the meantime. may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino. As a result thereof.

he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE). 1985. herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work.00 a month.Rizal Empire Insurance Group v NLRC Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580. Hence. 1983. CORIA. 1983. pp. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. In July. 1978. Xie xie! LABOR CODE.R. G.00 a month plus cost of living allowance. 1985. 73140 May 29. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10. private respondent Rogelio R. Being a permanent employee. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Accordingly.00 a day.00 plus allowances and other benefits. the instant petition. On January 1." In the same year. he was made a regular employee. he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the . 31-32). TEODORICO L. Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal. 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22. SECTION 6. respondents. having been appointed as clerk-typist. without change in his position-designation. pp. Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality. as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. No extension of period. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. with a monthly salary of P300. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. 1977. (a) Appeal. vs. In 1980. allegedly. ARTICLE 5: RULES AND REGULATIONS RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS. on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. 1985 (Record.00. 80-87). the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. petitioners. provides: SECTION 1. and in a Decision dated March 14. RUIZ. he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information. 1985 (Ibid. he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11. No. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but. Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations. in a Resolution dated November 15. 1987 Facts: In August. On October 15. The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1.

April 30. it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce. manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. Gatmaitan GR Nos. The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay. the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. 1957 Felix. L-9191. aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15. the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker. 137 SCRA 314 [1985]). between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. this petition is DISMISSED. EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. In another resolution. Subsequently. and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President . Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules. 66 and 80 2. a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. Philippine Veterans Administration. the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. J. Araneta vs. who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Thereafter. L-8895.National Labor Relations Commission. Even on the merits. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment. ISSUES: 1. the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct. In response to the pleas. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Moreover. have the force of law.

Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act. the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders. ex parte. 2. an authority to increase provisionally. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law. The Order. While under EO 172. the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines. it may order. tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing. in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay. as it did. to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood. subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. YES. Maceda vs. 1990 Sarmiento. a provisional increase. YES. Pending that. and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. it does not preclude the Board from ordering. or 3) to deny the application. When the President. Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. EOs 22. however. ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion HELD: NO. he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. Petitioners submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. was a response to the separate applications of Caltex. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment. subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. However. under Section 8 of EO 172. subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent. The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products.66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law. . regulations. without need of a hearing.2) to reduce or increase it further. Energy Regulatory Board GR Nos.HELD: 1. Hence. a hearing is indispensable. decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. 95203-05. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes. December 18. J. which was in pursuance to EO 172.

Inc. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. equipment and other properties. Globe Wireless Ltd. the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating. practices. or service to be furnished. and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. was not delivered to the addressee. and general welfare of the people. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner HELD: NO. J. As enunciated in the BOT circular. 1982 Melencio-Herrera. the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine. Section 5 of RA 4630. However. observed. After being informed of said fact. 52 instructing Regional Directors. vs. Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators.Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila. ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power HELD: NO. Pursuant to the said memorandum. They filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. to implement said Circular. the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. supervision and control over all public services and their franchises. The message. petitioner denied liability but questioned PSC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. Board of Transportation GR No. imposed. can prescribe regulations to promote the health…. Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. all within the National Capital Region. September 30. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards. limited respondent Commission’s jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The State. regulations. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner. the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT. In its answer. and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. Agrava . L-59234. classification. vs. The assailed memorandum order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. After hearing. Public Service Commission Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. however. in the exercise of its police power.

the representation of applicants. COMELEC Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. and other persons. engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. should be allowed to practice before the said office.Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office. ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice of law HELD: YES. members of the Philippine Bar. In proceeding on this matter. exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. On the other hand. their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers. and the prosecution of their applications for patent. the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. . Furthermore. for such power is inherently judicial in nature. among others. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office. the Director of Patents. Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office. The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles. GUEVARA vs. ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings HELD: NO. it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law. it did not exercise any judicial function. oppositors. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground. it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar. respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training. because of his legal knowledge and training. According to said circular. Such being the case. it only discharged a ministerial duty. without further examination or other qualification.

. and (2) that Act No. which referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC. Jr. CSC According to Asuncion Salazar’s service record filed with the CSCS. Stanton Youngberg. 3155 was constitutional and. revealed that she was appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. J Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50) FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent. on a permanent status. the petitioner appealed to this court. but reconsideration was denied. That being so. She became permanent with a designation of stenographer. which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. No. she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide. she was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent as cause of action HELD: Yes. the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. She was then promoted to Technical Assistant III. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 1931 MAURICIO CRUZ vs. From that order of dismissal. Cruz. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for. GSIS vs. L-34674 October 26. as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry. 3155. namely. (1) that if Act No. she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. STANTON YOUNGBERG Ostrand.R. The demurrer was based on two reasons. Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees.G. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Thereafter. the position she held when her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority. therefore. it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void. Salazar's GSIS Service Record however. valid. Thereafter.

Powers and Functions of the Commission. promotion. ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case HELD: No.D. On June 30. Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such jurisdiction. 1409. . reassignment and other personnel actions. is null and void. except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power.” When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters. Hence. in which case. 1975 Fernando. J. Presidential Decree No. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22. both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. The GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning the removal of officers and employees from the service. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions: j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. the Order of the Board setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction over the matter. Board of Transportation GR No. Likewise. March 21. creating the Merit Systems Board provides that the Merit Systems Board has the function to “Hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment. detail. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P. it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction. the Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the Civil Service Commission. the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back salaries. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board. transfer. 1987. L-39655. Arrow Transportation Corp. 1409. the Board set aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. Hence. The Board however affirmed her termination. 1988. In the case at bar. as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the merit system. the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal.In a resolution. Hence. to wit: SECTION 9. vs. Presidential Decree No. the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. its decision in favor of Salazar and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are void. this petition.

the committee recommended petitioner’s reinstatement. He was charged in an administrative case resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board and the creation of a three-man committee to investigate him. not only because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter Corpus vs. The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to Mactan Interantional Airport and vice versa. the Board issued on order granting it provisional permit to operte on the line applied for. March 30. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari. however. J. 1962 De Leon. Without the required publication. . Ordinarily. A motion for reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of such provisional permit but without awaiting final action. GR No. mandamus and quo warranto. there was pending with respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed. FACTS: Petitioner was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank. such remedy is permissive only. this petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of provisional permit was patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction. Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Subsequently. After several hearings. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have exhausted all administrative remedies HELD: NO. The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply where. its resolution should be awaited. warranting the conclusion that the legislative intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted. After conducting hearings. the court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies. ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial determination HELD: YES. by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy. The Monetary Board. Sr.FACTS: Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. Cuaderno. respondent Mariano Marcos was appointed to replace petitioner. L-17860. adopted a resolution stating that petitioner is deemed resigned as of the date of his suspension. The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage.

Consequently. entered into a contract with petitioner for the latter’s management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public Market. oppression. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. The writ applied for was denied. . petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard.1992 Davide.KBMBPM vs. the Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract. FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals. cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void. specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. ISSUES: 1. Dominguez GR No. Whether or not the issued Order was valid 2. 91927. Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM. Thereafter. 337. The procedure was not followed in this case. paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. accompanied by the Bunye and the latters’ heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. NO. Subsequently.. Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department. Thereafter. thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos. the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract. does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox copy. abuse of authority and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market. J. contrary to the provision of Section 143. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Jr. Mayor Ignacio Bunye. But even without said provision . Mayor Carlos’ successor. petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. respondent Madriaga and Coronado. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available HELD: 1. directed the review of the contract. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. Amado Perez. January 13. On October 1998. and the patently inequitable rental. filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives.

The debates. which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public. interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent. YMCA protested the assessment. non-profit institution. pursuant to its religious. Fr. CA G. Sec. stating that the tax exemption covers property taxes only. Joaquin Bernas. recourse to the courts could be had immediately. an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom. Moreover. as hereinafter shown. October 14. deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. or where the questioned act is patently illegal. adhered to the same view that the exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes. No. VI. YMCA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members. unless actually disapproved by him. The Court is not persuaded. 124043. VI. Justice Hilario Davide Jr. stressed during the Concom debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself. Such is the claim of petitioners which.R. arbitrary or oppressive. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President. charitable or educational purposes. Indeed. Justice Jose Vitug concurs. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. those exempted from real estate taxes are lands. buildings and improvements actually. In his treatise on taxation. the income tax exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. such as when the question involved is purely legal. 1998 Sunday. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. 28(3) of the Constitution. the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts. Sec. bear the implied approval of the latter. a former constitutional commissioner. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax. as in the instant case. is correct. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. directly and exclusively used for religious. educational and charitable objectives. . Issue: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and parking fees is exempt from taxation Held: YMCA argues that Art. January 25..NO. Political Law Facts: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock. especially the young people. as an alter ego of the President.

YMCA also invokes Art. XIV. The Court reiterates that YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax. issued memo. T (Truck). directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. and TC (Tourist Cars). The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. refers to a school. 4(3) of the Constitution. It has behind it the presumption of validity. 4(3) of the Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock.. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually. but not income tax on the rentals from its property. F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites. The term “educational institution. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual . Min. (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Art. and cancellation of registration. Therefore. However. Transportation. it falls under the classification non-stock. non-profit educational institution. those classified as S (Service). Bautista v. it must prove with substantial evidence that: 1. providing penalties for viol. and 2. 127 SCRA 329 (1984) Issue: Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid. The resps. have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI. however. DPL (Diplomatic). The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock. of the LOI. Moreover. non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually. for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision. It excepted. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. CC (Consular Corps). namely. Hence. the Court notes that YMCA did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually. confiscation of vehicles. of Public Works. The resps. seminary.” when used in laws granting tax exemptions. denied the petitioner''''s allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion. fine. non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax. Juinio. XIV. directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. college or educational establishment. HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy''''s Kaiser Jeep. directly and exclusively for educational purposes. Sec. Sec. They. YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the said constitutional provision. Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. therefore.

the latter is accorded much leeway. HELD: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations. then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. The LOI is an energy conservation measure. which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play. 2 took no part FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No." It would follow. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid. Fernando (CJ): 7 concur. 39 imposing penalties of fine. it is an apporpriate response to a problem. 869 on May 31. Moreover. insistent and the least limitable of powers. such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process. Pursuant thereto. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. for them. public safety and the general welfare. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. Juinio. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential. confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.' " In fact. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Bautista vs. extending as it does 'to all the great public needs. Juinio GR L-50908.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health. the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none. Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a of record overthrowing the statute. 31 January 1984 En Banc. cannot be validly invoked. of the resps. discriminatory. to that extent the memo. much less infringed. in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. to wit. 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Negatively put.. [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Edu. which imposed "the penalties of fine." There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character. public morals. would be ultra vires. and welfare of society. 39. respondent Alfredo L." (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort. for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power.” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings. therefore. reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays.' " Furthermore. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly . It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable. so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. safety. more specifically. Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. then Minister of Public Works." ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. Due process. Furthermore. the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. where the American Supreme Court summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. energy conservation. especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property. was not ignored. the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process.

NO. viz: one. The President "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. No. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or. 308. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22. more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees. we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT.O. Araneta).O.O. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.O. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of . 1997 and January 23. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional. therefore. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.lodged in him. then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE. petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents. A. are charged with the implementation of A. NO. On April 8. THEREFORE. Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS. B. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights. the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. On January 24. 1997. at the very least. 1997. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O.O. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds. the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. help in easing the situation. Absent. No. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A. Ople vs Torres Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. Issue: Petitioner contends: A. No. SO ORDERED. The Memorandum Circular No. NO. recommended itself. C. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. and two. 1997. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality." Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF.

a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22. imposes no duty. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. 308 is not a law because it confers no right. No. ROBERT BARBERS. CIELITO HABITO. RUBEN D. TORRES. the dissent of Mr. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. 1997.O. who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. 308. AFRICA. the choice of policies. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security. 308. petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents.1987. Indeed.O. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.O. which the revered Mr. viz: (1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government.O. BLAS F. No.O. a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality. 1997 and January 23. No. the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government. No. and (2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE. CESAR SARINO. HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. No. 1997." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. Justice Mendoza states that the A. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds.O. A. we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. etc. TOMAS P. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. On April 8. are charged with the implementation of A. the contention that A. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy. On January 24. 308 Ruling: YES . HECTOR VILLANUEVA. then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies. Under A. No. No. Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. RENATO VALENCIA. 1997. affords no protection. CARMENCITA REODICA. and creates no office. OPLE v. Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.

O. respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation. As early as January 19. 308. No. No. No. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). 308 have yet to be promulgated. 1997. US VS. FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed . No. In this light. PANLILIO The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not an offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation. 1. Moreover. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.O. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. 308 have yet to be promulgated. the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right. More specifically.O. 308 without waiting for the rules.O. the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A. petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A. petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear.O. respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A. respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so. No.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. As a Senator.

permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. Section 8 of Act No. Nowhere in Act No. are statutes and particularly not penal statutes. 581. ISSUE: • Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction HELD: . However. be punished. and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. as authorized by paragraph. is not a violation of the provision of the Act. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture. Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. However. Syquia vs. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture. Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rinder pest was still in effect. the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3. In her answer. Board of Power and Waterworks 74 SCRA 212 FACTS: Ruiz. This case does not fall within any of them. the accused did violate Art. 1760 ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture? HELD: NO. while they may possibly be said to have the force of law. nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. upon conviction. ¶2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals. nor is such violation punished in any way therein. 4 and 5. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall. saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense.

MOSES) 74 SCRA 212 TEEHANKEE. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15. Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.000. . wherein she questioned the complaints as beyond the jurisdiction of the board as a regulatory body. SYQUIA V BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS (RUIZ. ENRIQUEZ. in that Syquia billed Ruiz et al various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments for the months of May to September 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by the board.December 1974 > Ruiz. Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondentscomplainants as her tenants. . She added that the tenants including Ruiz et al had no complaint under the contractual set-up of billings for water and electric service consumption. the payment for which was advanced by Syquia and later collected by way of reimbursement from the tenants pro rata.Syquia filed her answer. 1976 NATURE Petition for special civil action for certiorari FACTS . but that Ruiz et al alone complained later when on account of the energy crisis. 1975 > Syquia further manifested her willingness to abide by such computations as the board may determine to be the correct electric billing that should be charged against Ruiz et al for their respective electric consumption and submitted pertinent records of the electrical consumption and Meralco billings. for selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by the board. and their relationship is contractual in nature. Manila. . Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void. since she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts. Meralco billings include all consumption in the entire compound. Nov 29.August 28.00 a year arrogated the judicial function.Syquia’s motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual obligations of Ruiz et al as apartment tenants and were beyond the board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter. including the common areas. since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Enriquez.Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.Syquia pointed out in her MFR that the board's computation would not reimburse her for the cost of the electric consumption in the common areas and elevators with a resultant loss to her at the least of . servants' quarters and elevators. Moses (respondents) filed 3 complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia (petitioner) as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate. additional fuel adjustment costs were added by Meralco to their billings which were likewise passed on by Syquia to all the tenants pro rata. The board in said order however came up with its computation which would allow Syquia to charge Ruiz et al only the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by Syquia for the cost of electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas. . whereby while individual electric meters are installed in each apartment.

Ruiz et al’s complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws.250. since Syquia is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. Therefore. 1999. since Syquia does not operate.Under the reorganization plan effected by PD No.00 a month or P15.000. acting through its Acting Chairman de Guzman denied reconsideration and ruled that since the tenants are already paying rentals for the use of their rooms and for the cost of their electricity within their rooms. if such amounts should be borne by the tenants at all. supervision and control over public service related to electric light. since electricity is directly and uninterruptedly supplied to the end-user. Disposition The orders of the board are annulled and the complaints of Ruiz et al are ordered dismissed Secretary of Justice vs. the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available. the board.Comment of Acting Solicitor: the regulatory board acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaints. jurisdiction. Reasoning .The dispute between Syquia the landlord and her tenants as to how much each tenant should be correspondingly billed. they should no longer be required to pay for the extra cost of electricity in common areas such as the elevator and the servants' quarters. power and waterworks utilities formerly vested in the Public Service Act were transferred to the Board of Power and Waterworks. it cannot be correctly claimed that Syquia is selling electricity nor can she be considered a middleman in the electric power business. 1 as amended by PD No. is an issue affecting mathematical computations and conditions of lease between landlord and tenant. In compliance with the related municipal law. 1974. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America”. manage or control the power plant and furthermore. . .00 a year and reiterated that this was a contractual obligation of the tenants over which the regulatory board had no jurisdiction. Judge Lantion GR 139465 Facts: On June 18. specifically Presidential Decree No. 458 issued on May 16. for it is only fair and equitable that the cost of electricity for common areas such as the elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered alone by the owner of the building as part of the cost for the rentals being paid by the tenants ISSUE WON the Board of Power and Waterworks has jurisdiction over the said case HELD NO Ratio The board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by Ruiz et al against Syquia. . for the actual electricity consumed and as to the proportionate amount each tenant should bear for the common facilities used in the apartments. The board acquired no jurisdiction over Syquia’s contractual relations with Ruiz et al as her tenants.P1. the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.

national legislative enactments. Mark B. there is no conflict between international law and municipal law.Issue: 1. At the same time. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Jimenez. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty. but are not superior to. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing.The rule of pacta sunt servanda. On the other hand. but a very imminent one. where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law. In fact.Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. however. Judge Lantion 343 SCRA 377 (2000) . neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite. Secretary of Justice v. granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process. jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. In a situation. In this case.In this case. be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto 2. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process.Whether or not private respondent. Efforts should be done to harmonize them.

Finally. 3. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US 2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax 3. the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RPUS Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. . LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)] Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC Facts: On June 18. False statement or entries 5.SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. radio. and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request.S. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. Fraud by wire. 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U. country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice (DOJ). through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. grounds: 1. The Grand Jury Indictment. or television 4. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. The U. At that point in time. then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. Respondent. the warrant for his arrest. 2.S. Charges include: 1.

Issues: 1. and prohibition. as well as conducting further proceedings. & to the deprivation of his liberty. In the case at bar.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion. it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life. or property. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing Yes. therefore. In essence. the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. liberty. certiorari. the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing . This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Thus. similar to a preliminary investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution.The respondent filed for petition of mandamus. Because of such consequences. Clearly. & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent. the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. can possibly lead to his arrest. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal. the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite.

Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests. 3. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. cancellation of passport). and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No.S. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. padlocking filthy restaurants. 2. & upon notice. b. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights & . & the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer. civil & administrative proceedings. may claim the right to appear therein & present their side. as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.according to A3 §14(1) & (2). The U. replacement of an appointee) c. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. Twin rights have been offered. thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a.

0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. 1999. wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. RULING: Petition dismissed. decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with. as applied in most countries.S Note Verbale No. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. Doctrine of incorporation under international law. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. Mark Jiminez through counsel. but are not superior to national legislative acts. On June 18. The human rights of person. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. Lantion Posted on June 29. signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty No.A. No conflict. Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.S. whether citizen or alien . 2008 by asteroids08 FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon. and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents. . The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage. Secretary of Justice vs.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial. a place when directly attached. must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy. in all controversial questions. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. G. Due to alleged shortage of leather. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. namely. that of having something to support its decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should. 46496. NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. 27 FEB 1940] Sunday.Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved.R. it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded. ANG TIBAY VS. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right. Political Law . therefore. Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635. February 01. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. NO. They are.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. and the reasons for the decisions rendered. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court. It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. and in accordance with. The fact.Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines. the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted. investigate. the provisions of CA 103. Issue: Whether or Not. As laid down in the case of Goseco v. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive. and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers. which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. Inc (NLU). but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. and equity and substantial merits of the case. and settle any question. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. 103). subject to. affirmative and dynamic. CIR. from work. acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant. matter controversy or disputes arising between. and regulates the relations between them. decide. the function of the CIR. that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does . The CIR. The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU. however. as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active. to consider.

CIR FACTS: The respondent National Labor Union. (7) The Board or body should. Inc. and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR. in all controversial questions. the motion for a new trial should be. Inc. from work. ANG TIBAY vs. itself. entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. who is the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay. (2) (3) (4) The The tribunal decision The must must evidence consider have the something must evidence to be support presented. and the reason for the decision rendered. was falsely claiming that there is a shortage of leather soles for him to temporarily lay off the Members of the National Labor Union. (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy. So ordered. substantial. avers that: (1) Toribio Teodoro. and unjustly favoring the National Workers’ Brotherhood. (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing. (2) the alleged lack of materials was a scheme to discharge systematically the Members of the NLU. and not simply accept the views of a subordinate. Inc. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. . as it was unsupported by records. Inc. (3) The National Workers’ Brotherhood of Ang Tibay is an illegal union which is dominated by Toribio Teodoro. which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof. Accordingly. with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant.not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it. Toribio Teodoro. and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. and the same is hereby granted. and that (4) The employer. was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the NLU. render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved.

Decision must have something to support it. but it does not mean that it can ignore entirely the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. 3. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented. in all controversial questions. 4. which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2. Evidence must be substantial (more than a mere “scintilla”. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved. . or at least contained in the record or disclosed to the parties affected. The board or body should.The case enumerated the specific powers of the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: What are the cardinal rights or the requisites of procedural due process which must be respected in administrative proceedings? HELD: The Court provided the ff. relevant evidence a reasonable mind accepts to support a conclusion) Decision must be rendered on the evident presented at the hearing. 7. The CIR. 5. and the reason for the decision rendered. as the Court observed is not constrained by technical rules of procedure in hearing the matters before it. The right to a hearing. as the requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings: 1. 6.