INTRODUCTION

Purposes, Roadmap, Thesis…

I. BACKGROUND

a. Defining Secrecy

Events such as the attacks upon the World Trade Centre and The Pentagon in the United

States of America in 2001, the London Bombings of 07/07 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 have

led people all over the world to feel more insecure than ever about their safety and security.

What many people don’t realize, however, is that this threat has been there all along, it is only

through the these acts of terrorism that we have now realized it; prior to events of 2002 we were

largely living in a fool’s paradise. The way in which this was possible is through the secrecy of

those people who did know of the threat. Military and intelligence agencies are potentially the

biggest endorses of secrecy in the world today; for them secrecy is fundamental to the roles they

perform and if classified information were to find itself in the wrong hands, lives could be lost.

However, one of the biggest issues with a concept such as secrecy is its subjective nature. What

does, and does not, constitute secrecy is open to debate and therefore so is the concept of what

information should and should not be disclosed to the public by these agencies.

The Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (1997)

discusses secrecy:

Secrecy is a form of government regulation. Americans are familiar with the tendency to

overregulate in other areas. What is different with secrecy is that the public cannot know

the extend or the content of regulation.1

1
The Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Senate Document

1
 Secrecy therefore is an extremely complicated area of political science; whilst some

people argue it is a form of government regulation, others that it is compulsory to protecting the

security needs of a nation and others still that it is a means by which basic democratic rights are

undermined.

In order to understand the issues further it is worthwhile taking a look at the

justifications for secrecy given by those who keep the secrets.

b. Secret Agencies and Open Societies: A Brief Discussion of the Balance Between

Democratic Ideals and the Need for Secrecy

A 2001 article in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences

describes how, whilst secrecy is a fundamental process of society, “In a democratic society

secrecy and openness reflect conflicting values and social needs and exist in an ever-changing

dynamic tension”2. It is true that matters pertaining to secrecy and democracy appear to be

opposing; democracy as a form of government requires that “citizens have an obligation to

become informed about public issues”3 yet making a decision to keep a secret represents a

105-102, 103rd Cong, 1997

2
Marx, G. (n.d.). Censorship and Secrecy, Social and Legal Perspectives. Retrieved
January 14, 2009, from < http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/cenandsec.html>
3
Stanford Lecture. (2004, January 1). What is Democracy?. Retrieved January 14,
2009, from <
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm>

2
violation of these rights. However, as we established in section x.x, secrecy can often be

fundamental to the basic survival of a nation and it can therefore be considered wise that

governments preserve secret information in the interests of public security. As such, the concept

of a secret agency within an open society presents an interesting dichotomy. Loch Johnston in

his novel America’s Secret Power discusses the antithesis of democracy and secret intelligence

agencies but claims that the two can exist side by side providing …

II. EVOLUTION OF CIA REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Background to the CIA

Following the events of World War II, the government of the United States recognized the

need for an organization that could supply the US Government with intelligence that could be

utilized to protect the nation. The events of Peal Harbor had surprised the US government and

caught them off guard and a new organization was called for that, with presidential supervision,

could “procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide

intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence

material collected by all government agencies”4 (Fay 147). The news of the creation of a new

security agency was initially met with a great deal of resistance from the groups such as the

military and the FBI. However, President Harry Truman, upon the recommendations of a council

of advisors who had reviewed the military and government operations of World War II, persued

his plans to create a security agency and, in January 1946, established the Central Intelligence

4
Fay, John. Encyclopedia of Security Management, Second Edition (Encyclopedia of
Security Management) (Encyclopedia of Security Management). St. Louis:
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007. P.147

3
Group.5

The CIA was officially created on the 18th September 1947 through provisions contained

within the National Security Act6, which was endorsed and signed by President Truman. The act

outlined the ways in which departments such as intelligence, security and cryptology, that had

previously been utilized during the war, would be restructured in order to amalgamate military

divisions. As well as outlined the roles and responsibilities of agencies such as the army and the

navy, the act created an air force, a National Security Council that would act as presidential

advisors, and the CIA. The CIA, through the National Security Act, were “charged (…) with

coordinating the nation’s intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating

intelligence affecting national security”7. Since 1947 the direction of the CIA and their function

within the United States Government has changed in many ways, as we will see in sections x-x.

However, despite this, their basic roles have remained as they were originally planned.

The organization and role of the CIA

Eras of Intelligence Accountability

Johnson Lock, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia, has outlined

five significant phases of intelligence accountability that the CIA have progress through since

their inception in the 1947 National Security Act. He refers to these as the “An Era of Trust

(1947-1974), Era of Uneasy Partnership (1975-1986), an Era of Distrust (1987-1991), an Era of

Partisan Advocacy (1992-2001), and an Era of Ambivalence (2002-)”8. Each of these eras reflect
5
"The Creation of a Central Intelligence Group." Central Intelligence Agency. 8 May
2007. 17 Jan. 2009 <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v39i5a13p.htm>
6
"National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 235, 80 Cong., 61 Stat. 496
7
History of the CIA. (2007, April 10). Retrieved January 14, 2009, from
<https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/index.html>.
8
Lock, Johnson. "The contemporary presidency: presidents, lawmakers, and spies:

4
changes in the extent to which the CIA have been monitored and supervised.

The Era of Trust: 1947- 1974

During the period following the creation of the National Security Act America was at war

with Russia. The Cold War represented a period of heightened conflict and tension in America’s

history and they were involved in a nuclear arms race that threatened devastating consequences if

they were caught unawares in the same way they had been during the attack upon their base in

Pearl Harbor. They needed to ensure that they had sufficient intelligence to protect themselves

and for this they relied heavily upon the CIA who were held in high regard and were permitted a

great deal of flexibility and autonomy in performing their duties: “the intelligence agencies were

permitted almost complete discretion to chart their own courses, free of meaningful scrutiny by

overseers in the congress”.9 Although the CIA were technically required to report their activities

to the White House and gain official approval for any actions they took, the Director of Central

Intelligence was given significant discretionary powers and the reports he did make to the White

House were described as “sketchy, perfunctory, and often unwanted by law makers”10

X. Secrecy and Domestic Abuses: The Era of Uneasy Partnership- 1975-1986

The year of 1975 was an extremely significant year for the CIA and a number of events

occurred that entailed that this year in America’s history was later dubbed The Intelligence Year.
intelligence accountability in the United States. (01-DEC-04) Presidential Studies Quarterly."
AccessMyLibrary - News, Research, and Information that Libraries Trust. 1 Dec. 2004. 15 Jan.
2009 <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-18243474_ITM>.
9
Johnson, Loch K.. America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. New York: Oxford
University Press, USA, 1991. P. 9.
Tsang, Steve. Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism (Stanford
10

Security Studies). Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2008. P.55

5
Events started in 1974 with a set of articles that had been written by Seymour Hersch and were

entitled The Family Jewels. The articles, which appeared in the New York Times, had a

significant impact upon the population’s perspectives of the CIA as they contained claims that

members of the CIA had abused their authorities by conducting covert intelligence work within

the United States itself. The fact that the CIA had potentially been spying upon their own

citizens angered the US public who felt that their right to privacy at threat. The controversy did

not stop at the New York Times article. The CIA were also charged with attempting to bring

down a democratically elected Chilean government and suddenly the faith of the government and

the public in the CIA’s operations waived. In response to the allegations that were being made

the Government passed the Hughes-Ryan Act.11 The act, which was named after the members of

senate who had created it (Harold Hughes and Leo Ryan), mandated that the US President

reported all of the undercover operations of the CIA to congress within a specified time of their

occurrence and acted as a response to accusations that congress had been too lenient and naïve in

the jurisdiction they had given the CIA.

During the Period of Uneasy Partnership and the government investigations of the claims

that the CIA had been spying on US citizens, a number of startling facts were uncovered:

The inquiries uncovered assassination plots against foreign leaders; illegal mail openings,

wiretaps, and international cable interceptions; intelligence files on over a million

American citizens; improper drug experiments and the unlawful sequestering of

prohibited lethal chemical and biological materials; a master spy plan to conduct

surveillance against Vietnam War dissenters in the United States; intelligence infiltration

of a range of groups in American society, from universities to religious and media

11
Hughes-Ryan Act (Pub. L. No. 93-559; 32, 88 Star. 1804)

6
 organizations; the incitement of violence against African-American groups; and covert

actions abroad aimed not just at autocracies but democratically elected regimes as well.12

These findings, together with a similar backlog of controversial acts performed by the Federal

Beareau of Investigators, rocked nation’s leaders and the need to balance the protection provided

by an intelligence agency with the rights to freedom of the American people became a pressing

issue.

X. X. The Rockefeller Commission

The events of 1975 led to the establishment of the United States President’s Commission

on CIA activities within the United States under President Gerald Ford which was mandated with

investigating the activities of intelligence agencies such as the CIA. The commmison, led by

Nelson Rockefellar, subsequently became known as The Rockefellar Commission.13 The

commission was asked to establish whether or not the domestic activities of the CIA had

exceeded their legal authority. The commission published their final report in June 1975 and

their findings revealed that there were a number of activities that constituted abuses of the CIA’s

authority: “the CIA conducted a mail inception program that involved the US government

opening thousands of letters sent to and from persons living in the United States (…) [and] also

found that the CIA established a Special Operations Group (…) [which] resulted in the collection

of significant information and materials on domestic dissident groups”14. The CIA responded to

these findings by admitting that they had performed such acts but had done so in the interests of
12
Johnson, Loch. "Governing in the Absence of Angels:." On the Practice of Intelligence
Accountability in the U.S. Congress . 5 Mar. 2003. 15 Jan. 2009 <
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/ACF852.doc.>
13
"Rockefeller Commission Report." History Matters Home Page. 15 Jan. 2009 <
http://www.history-
matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents_church_reports_rockcomm.htm>
14
Forest, James J.F., Russell D. Howard, and Joanne Moore. Homeland Security and Terrorism
(The Mcgraw-Hill Homeland Security Series). New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005. P.388

7
national security. These admissions coupled with the results of the Rockefellar Commission

caused such a stir in the United States that further, more comprehensive investigations were

ordered into the CIA.

X.X Recommendations of The Rockefellar Commission

X.X The Church Committee

The next investigation conducted during the era of uneasy partnership was entitled The

Senate Select Committee to Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities and,

because it was led by a man named Frank Church, it became known as The Church Committee15.

The hearings commenced in 1975 and ran for over a year. During the hearings a great deal of

information about the CIA’s actions were revealed that were potential threats to existing security

operations and President Gerald Ford personally requested that the inquiries were ceased.

However, despite this, Church proceeded with his investigations and further information about

the couvert actions of the CIA were revealed to the American public. The Church Committee

eventually published over 14 reports that detailed the activities of US intelligence agencies and a

number of further acticities of the CIA emerged these included the fact that the CIA had utilized

the services of journalists and academic professionals as spies, had created products that were

intended to perform mind control functions, had completed drug testing couvertly on

unsuspecting candidates and had formulated a number of conspiracys to assassinate oversears

political figures.16

15
"Church Committee." History Matters Home Page. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.history-
matters.com/archive/contents/contents_church.htm>
16
Benson, Michael, Allan Swenson, and Allen Swenson. The Complete Idiot's Guide to the
CIA. New York: Alpha, 2002 p. 178

8
 X.X Recommendations of the Church Committee

X.X The Pike Committee

The Pike Committee, led by Otis Pike of New York, ran parrell to the Church Committee

but differed slightly in its underlying objectives. Whist the Church Committee had concerntrated

on the performance of illegal activities by the CIA, the Pike Committee was concerned with the

financial viability of the CIA and the cost effectiveness of their work. As with the Church

Committee, the Pike Committee faced some resistance from the Ford adminidtration and conflict

soon emerged pertaining to the availability of classified materials and a clash emerged that

entailed the final report of Pike’s committee was never officially published due to Congressional

resistance.17

X.X Recommendations of the Pike Committee

The Era of Uneasy Partnership- 1975-1986: A Summary

The various committees and investigations that occurred during the 1970s had a major

impact on the support that the American people gave to agencies such as the CIA and the

existence of an uncontrolled intelligence organization was no longer acceptable: “America's

support for an unbounded intelligence capability would have to compete with another value that

had long invested the rest of the government, namely: liberty--the safeguarding of the people

against the power of their own government, not just foreign governments”18. The outcome of all

this had a major upon the CIA’s reporting requirements and public awareness of their activities.
17
"Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board, Chapter 1." Federation of
American Scientists. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/arrb98/part03.htm>
18
Johnson, Loch. "Governing in the Absence of Angels:” ibid.

9
They were no longer permitted the autonomy that they had previously enjoyed and their

legislative practices were much more closely monitored. Johnson describes this as a

“democratoization” of intelligence. Whilst this provided closer supervision of the activities of

the CIA, which was considered necessary given the nature of some of the allegations that had

been made against them, not everyone was in agreement with the outcome. Critics argued that

through making the agency accountable to the public and the government the very objective for

the existence of the CIA was undermined; America’s ability to protect itself against enemies was

at threat.

The Era of Distrust: 1987- 1981

The trust in the CIA that the law-makers had been trying to establish since the events of

the 1970s came quickly and abruptly to a halt when, once again, the activities of the CIA

appeared in newspaper reports. This time the news appeared in the Beruit magazine Al-shiraa on

November 3rd 1986. On this occasion the accusations involved two other countries; Nicaragua

and Iran. The US government had been, for some years, attempting to depose the government of

Nicaragua. Covert CIA operations had been utilized in this cause and had been engaged in acts

of terrorism

Despite Ronald Reagan’s best efforts to persuade the American public to support the

contra activities, reports detailing some of the activities of the CIA had led many Americans to

be wary of the acts that were being committed in Nicaragua. This was worsened by the

publication of a CIA manual that had been written for the contras and provided advice and

guidance on unethical methods of persuading the citizens of Nicaragua to support the contra19.

Blanton, Tom. "Electronic Briefing Book: The CIA in Latin America." The George Washington
19

University. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB27/index.html>

10
Once again congress became concerned about the activities of the CIA and took actions to cease

funding for contra operations. However, Reagan had found other methods of funding the

activities of the CIA and it soon emerged that during this period his administration had been

engaged in the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages. The

proceeds of such sales had gone directly to support CIA contra dealings in South America.

Despite inititially denying that the government had engaged in these activities, Reagan

eventually admitted it was true:

A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart

and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is

not “20

Reagan’s admission coupled with the publication of this story in the Beiruit newspaper

seriously undermined the doctrines of the New Oversight. Reagan and his administration had

paid very little attention to the rules and regulations it had established and once again, the

information that had been kept from the American public under the guise of being in the interests

of security seriously damaged the reputation of the CIA and the credibility of their function.

Congress responded to the Iran-Contra scandal through the creation of further restrictions

and laws. The most significant of these was the Intelligence Oversight Act of 199121 which

determined the requirement for “prior, written presidential finding for important covert actions –

not ex post facto oral approval as once given by President Ronal Reagan”22. The regulations

extended beyond the CIA to all government agencies and specified the requirement for Congress
20
"The American Experience | Reagan | Primary Source Documents: Speech about Iran
Contra." PBS. 4 Mar. 1987. 15 Jan. 2009 <
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/filmmore/reference/primary/irancontra.html>
21
Intelligence Oversight Act Public Law 102-88; 105 Stat. 429.(1991)
22
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri, and Christopher Andrew. Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA. Portland:
Frank Cass, 1997 p. 184

11
to be involved if any third party or country outside of these agencies became involved in

operations. Whilst these new reporting requirements went a long way towards tightening

intelligence requirements there was gaps left by the omission of a time limit on reporting to

Select Committees on Intelligence. President Bush commented on this saying:

where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate that notice will be provided within a few

days. Any withholding beyond this period will be based upon my assertion of authorities

granted this office by the Constitution23

Boland Ammendment

Era of Partisan Advocacy (1992-2001)

This period of time in the history of the CIA deals with the effects of a partisan discord

caused by a change in government and a new Republican President upon congress. The

Intelligence Commitees were beleaguered by political arguments and differences and the actions

and regulations of the CIA became more of a political tool than a well managed government

agency and the Clinton administration were openly accused of neglecting matters of public

safety, “We don’t care about national security,’ said the Clinton people”24

On September 11th 2001 terrorists staged a castrophic attack on America’s World Trade

Centre and The Pentagon killing 2,819 people25 and suddenly the role of the CIA and their ability

to gain intelligence that could protect American citizens was catapulted back into the fore. The

events of 911 were largely blamed on intelligence failures and three major accusations, amongst

23
"Congressional Record: Intelligence Authorization Act." Federation of American Scientists.
28 June 1991. 15 Jan. 2009 <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1991_cr/s910628-ia.htm>.
24
Goss qtd in Johnson, Loch. "Governing in the Absence of Angels:” ibid
25
"September 11 by Numbers." New York Magazine -- NYC Guide to Restaurants, Fashion, Nightlife, Shopping,
Politics, Movies. 5 Sep. 2002. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm>

12
many others, emerged. Firstly, given the primary role of the CIA is to enforce national security

and that the terrorist attacks violated that same national security then this could only constitute a

failure on the CIA’s behalf. To put it simply, they did not perform the job for which they had

been assigned:

There was never any doubt that the events of 9/11 represented the kind of surprise attack

that the CIA had been formed to secure against, and hence a catastrophic intelligence

failure.26

Secondly, and perhaps even more worryingly, there were also accusations that the CIA

had been in receipt of intelligence related to the attacks but had failed to act in a manner that was

sufficient to prevent them. Finally, there were some schools of thought that actually accused the

CIA of orchestrating the 911 attacks27 in order to provide the US Government with justification

for declaring war upon Afghanistan and Iraq. Whilst we will not engage in discuss pertaining to

the merits of such arguments here, the fact that such rumours emerged show quite clearly the

distrust that many people all over the world, including America itself, have for the CIA

organization.

It wasn’t just the intelligence agencies that were in the firing line for the events of 9/11,

congress too were facing a great deal of accusations and, in response to this after attempting to

form a joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the 9/11 Commission was officially created.

X.X The 9/11 Commission

Gill, Peter, and Mark Phythian. Intelligence in an Insecure World. University Park, PA: Polity,
26

2006. P. 1119
27
See "9/11 Conspiracy Theory Books Dominate Debate at Frankfurt Book Fair", October 10, 2003, DW-
World.de, "German Sept 11 theory stokes anti-US feeling", Kate Connolly, November 20, 2003,
telegraph.co.uk for examples

13
The 9/11 Commission had the express aim of investigating the alleged intelligence failures and

“to prepare a full and complete account of the events surrounding the September 11, 2001

attacks”28. The Commission was officially created on November 27th 2002 by President George

W. Bush, consisted of 5 Democrats and 5 Republicans and was presided over by the Govenor of

New Jersey, Thomas Kean. The Commission was in session for over 18 months before the final

report was published on the 22nd July 2004. The final report of the commission was damning to

both the CIA and the FBI and contained evidence that both agencies had failed to act

appropriately upon information that they had that could have prevented the attacks. The report

commented that whilst the attacks “were a shock... they should not have come as a surprise”29.

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission

In response to the findings of the 9/11 commission and the findings of a further

commission, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission30, the Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act of 200431 was put in place. This act necessitated the creation position

of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a new role that had three main functions:

“To serve as head of the Intelligence Community, (…) to act as the principle advisor to

the president, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for

intelligence matters related to national security, [and to] oversee and direct the

28
"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 26 Mar. 2003. 15 Jan. 2009 <http://www.9-
11commission.gov/press/pr_2003-03-26.htm>.
29
Sorlucco, Jerry. Facing Fascism: The Threat to American Democracy in the 21st Century. -:
Authorhouse, 2006.
30
"Final Report of the WMD Commission." Federation of American Scientists. 26 Mar. 2005.
15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf>
31
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458

14
 implementation program of the National Intelligence Program”32

a. Post September 11th

i. The 9/11 Commission

1. Reforms Suggested/Reforms Implemented

ii. Post 9/11 Secrecy

1. …

2. FOIA and CIA Disclosures (?)

III. CASE STUDY: THE ROCKEFELLAR COMMISSION

IV. ANALYSIS (11)

a. Critique of Current System

i. Reforms Suggested by Church and Pike Committees

1. Which reforms were adopted?

2. Which proposed reforms were discarded?

32
Best, Richard, Alfred Cumming, and Todd Masse. "Director of National Intelligence:
Statutory Authorities." CRS Report for Congress <
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22112.pdf>

15
 ii. Reforms Proposed by the 9/11 Commission

1. Reforms Adopted

2. Reforms Discarded

b. Proposed Solutions

i. Proposed by Bok: Analogizing Nuclear Disarmament and Dismantling of

Government Secrecy

ii. Proposed by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones: Drawing Out Solutions Based on

Historical Patterns in CIA Performance Revealed Through Permutations of

Political Environment, Relationship with the Executive, and Tasks

Proscribed.

“By examining the CIA over time, it is possible to appreciate the danger of adopting

rigid, unchanging criteria by which to judge the Agency’s performance or axiomatic precepts to

explain it.” Expectations, political environment, personality, and tasks proscribed influence CIA

effectiveness. Furthermore, the same combination of factors may give rise to different effects at

different times.33

33
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy.

16
 iii. Proposed by …

V. CONCLUSIONS

a. What worked, what didn’t, why/why not?

Great website= http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3020376.html

b. Alternative Solutions to Presently Employed Reforms?

17