Dharmakīrti on pratyakṣa Pramāṇavārttika Pratyakṣapariched, PV 3 : 1-7, 123-133.

  English translation: The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy—Dinnaga and Dharmakīrti: Appendix IV Dharmakīrti on Sensation (pratyakṣa) (Amar Singh, 1984:142-4) Japanese translation available in: 戶崎宏正 《仏教認識論の研究》 上卷: p. 55-68, 202-214 (tosaki_bukkyo_ninshikiron_vol.1: p. 55-68, 202-214)

mānaṃ dvividhaṃ meyadvaividhyāt śaktyaśaktitaḥ | arthakriyāyāṃ keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ || (PV 3.1) 1. The means of knowledge is of two kinds, because there are two kinds of objects, as there is or is not a capacity for action towards an object. Hair and such things arc not objects, because there is no reliance on them of the kind that occurs towards objects. sadṛśāsadṛśatvāc ca viṣayāviṣayatvataḥ | śabdasyānyanimittānāṃ bhāve dhīḥ sadasattvataḥ || (PV 3.2) 2. And (also) because of similarity and non-similarity, because of being and not being within the scope of language, and because, when other signs (than the object) are present, intellect occurs with respect to one but not with respect to the other. arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat | anyat samvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe || (PV 3.3) 3. That object with respect to which (purposeful) action is possible is called the ultimate real, whereas the other is the conventionally real. These are respectively the unique particular and the universal. aśaktaṃ savam iti cet bījāder aṅkurādiṣu | dṛṣṭā śaktiḥ matā sā cet samvṛtyāstu yathā tathā || (PV 3.4)

4. If it is argued that nothing has a causal capacity, (we point out that) the causal capacity of seeds, etc. towards sprouts, etc., you may argue that the capacity is regarded to be merely conventional. So be it. sāsti sarvatra ced buddher nānvayavyatirekayoḥ | sāmānyalakṣaṇe 'dṛṣṭaś cakṣurūpādibuddhivat || (PV 3.5) 5. If it is argued everything has causal capacity, we reply that there is none in universals, because of the not seeing of the cognition of logical agreement and non-agreement like the cognition of a visible object through the eye.* *Text with Prajnakaragupta reads: It is not seen of the cognition of agreement and non-agreement in the universal characteristic like the cognition of a visible object through the eye. etena samayābhogādyantaraṃgānurodhataḥ | ghaṭotkṣepaṇasāmānyasaṅkhyādiṣu dhiyo gatāḥ || (PV 3.6) 6. By this (absence of causal capacity in the universal, its effect being mere knowledge) the notions of such things as a pot, upward motion, general characteristic and number are explained due to conformity with such things of the mind as convention, enjoyment, etc. keśādayo na sāmānyam anarthābhiniveśataḥ | jñeyatvena grhād doṣo nābhāveṣu prasajyate || (PV 3.7) 7. Hair, etc. are not universal, because there is no desire for them of the kind that occurs towards real objects. In the case of absent things, there is no fault (of their having the features of a universal), because they are grasped as knowables. * PV3: 123-133

pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati | pratyātmavedyaḥ sarveṣāṃ vikalpo nāmasaṃśrayaḥ ||123|| 123. Sensation, which is free of conceptualization (imagining), is established only by means of sensation itself. The conceptualization (imagining) of all (beings), which is cognized individually (subjectively) is dependent on names. saṃhṛtya sarvataś cintāṃ stimitenāntarātmanā | sthito 'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam īkṣate sākṣajā matiḥ ||124|| 124. One who remains with a tranquil mind, having withdrawn his thought from all (concepts), looks at a visible object with his eye: that thought is born of sensation. punar vikalpayan kiṃcid āsīd vo kalpanedṛśī | iti vetti na pūrvoktāvasthāyām indriyād gatau ||125|| 125. Then, forming a judgment he knows “There was something like my (present) imagining” . There is no access of the sense-organ to the situation just stated. ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi kvacin nānyatra dṛśyate | na tasmād bhinnam asty anyat sāmānyaṃ buddhyabhedataḥ ||126|| 126. For a particular observed in one place is never seen elsewhere. Therefore, it is not the case that owing to a non-difference in cognitions there exists another, a universal which is separate (from the particular). tasmād viśeṣaviṣayā sarvaivendriyajā matiḥ | na viśeṣeṣu śabdānāṃ pravṛtter asti sambhavaḥ ||127|| 127. Therefore, every thought born of sensation has a particular as its object. There is no possibility of the functioning of words

with respect to particulars. ananvayād viśeṣāṇāṃ saṅketasyāpravṛttitaḥ | viṣayo yaś ca śabdānāṃ saṃyojyata sa eva taiḥ ||128|| 128. Particulars have no agreement (with words) because no convention functions: and the object of words may be connected with them (with words, not with particulars), asyedam iti sambandhe yāv arthau pratibhāsinau | tayor eva hi sambandho na tadendriyagocaraḥ ||129|| 129. For when there is a relationship of the form “ this (expression) is of that (object)” , the relationship is between only those two objects, which are imaginings; then it is not within the range of the senses. viśadapratibhāsasya tadārthasyāvibhāvanāt | vijñānābhāsabhedo hi padārthānāṃ viśeṣakaḥ ||130|| 130. Then, because there is no (longer) a discovery (as in sensation) of an object with a clear image, a difference of form in consciousness is what distinguishes objects. cakṣuṣo 'rthāvabhāse 'pi yaṃ paro 'syeti śaṃsati | sa eva yojyate śabdairna khalv indriyagocaraḥ ||131|| 131. Even when an object appears through the eye of which one says: “ It is other than that” only that (conception, imagining) is connected with words, surely not the range (object) of the senses.
avyāpṛtendriyasyānyavāṅmātreṇāvicāraṇāt |

na cānuditasambandhaḥ svayaṃ jñanaprasaṅgataḥ ||132|| 132. Because there is no discovery, that which is not engaged with

the senses merely through the other word and an unexpressed relationship (between word and object) itself is not connected with cognition. manasor* yugapadvṛtteḥ savikalpavikalpayoḥ | vimūḍho laghuvṛttervā tayor aikyamvyavasyati ||133|| 133. (If) there were a simultaneous functioning of without-imagining (sensation) and with-imagining (sensation), affecting the mind, (then) there would be bewilderment. Or (If) their functioning were extremely rapid their unity would tend to result (they would appear in the mind to be the same, resulting in the same confusion).