UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

SLOVENE HISTORY – 20TH CENTURY

SELECTED ARTICLES WRITTEN BY DR. BOŽO REPE

Ljubljana 2005

Contents

1. Slovenia during the time of Balkan wars

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2. Racial legislation, propaganda and measures in the Kingdom of 9 Yugoslavia and in the German, Italian and Hungarian occupational zones in Slovenia during the WW II 3. Slovenia during the Second World War 17

4. The place of the Second World War in the internal evolution of Post- 25 War Slovenia and Yugoslavia 5. The Partisan Press 36

6. Migrations and deportations of Slovenians, Germans and Italians 42 during the Second World War and after the War 7. Migrations in the territory of former Yugoslavia from 1945 until 46 present time /today/ 8. The influence of shopping tourism on cultural changes and the way 49 of life in Slovenia after World War II 9. The Attitude of Slovenian authorities and the press towards 55 shopping in Austria and Italy 10. Liberalization of Slovene society in the late sixties 11. Titoism 12. Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 13. Human rights and democracy in communist Slovenia 61 66 79

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14. The introduction of political parties and their role in achieving 96 independence 15. Slovenia: From Communism toward Democracy (1980-2000) 106

16. International recognition of Slovenia (1991-1992): Three 110 Perspectives; The View from inside: the Slovenes, the Federation and Yugoslavia's other republics 17. Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia over 115 Slovene Society
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18. Slovenians and the disintegration of Yugoslavia 19. Slovenians and the border questions 20. Slovenes and their national position in 20th Century

130 151 154

21. The instruction of History and History Textbooks in Slovenian 159 History 22. The impact of historical enemy images within education 23. National holidays (Slovenia) 24. Slovenia (Chronology) 171 173 175

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1. Slovenia during the time of Balkan wars1
Slovenia used to be a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The majority of the population lived within the Austrian part of the monarchy, and a minor part (in Prekmurje – the region along the river Mura) and in Porabje (a region in the present Hungary) belonged to the Hungarian part of the monarchy. The people of those two regions lived separately from the majority of the Slovenian population (they were separated by the river Mura and there were hardly any traffic connections). They spoke their own dialect and possessed their own culture. The population of the Austrian part lived in the regions with strong historical tradition. The country identity was very strong; people had different habits and spoke different dialects, although a standard literary language was being formed from the mid-19th century on. The strong literary and cultural tradition dates back to the 16th century, when the Slovenians got their first published book and soon afterwards the translation of the Bible. The majority of the population was literate and the instruction in primary school was carried out in Slovenian language, whereas secondary and higher schools were mostly German. The Austrian authorities did not allow a foundation of a Slovene university. Apart from the Slovenians living in the Hungarian part of the monarchy who presented a large and strong protestant community, most Slovenians were of Catholic religion. There were only very few Jews since most of them 0had been driven out of the Slovenian territory in the previous centuries. Slovenian science and art had been following the contemporary European tendencies of the time. Numerous Slovenians asserted themselves in science; they worked as university teachers in diverse Austrian universities. During the nineties of the 19th century, political parties emerged in the Slovenian territory. They took part in the elections and delegated their representatives to the Austrian Parliament (Austria introduced a general right to vote for men in 1907). Three political camps gradually came forward within the Slovenian territory: the catholic, the liberal and the social-democratic. Since 1908, the political parties mostly advocated for trialism, as regards the regulation of the national question (at that time Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina which led to a substantial increase of the Slav population within the monarchy). Austria-Hungary was thus to be divided into three parts: the Austrian (German), the Hungarian and the South-Slav. Other Slav nations (the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Poles were in favour of setting up or restoring, respectively, their own states; however, this solution would have not allowed the Slovenes to establish a connection with them, since the Austrian Germans were situated in between). Only a minor group of revolutionary students called Preporodovci (after the magazine Preporod) and very few individuals (among them however, the best known Slovenian author Ivan Cankar) supported the idea of uniting Slovenia with other South Slav nations and establishing a separate state outside Austro-Hungary. The knowledge about other South-Slav nations was scarce and strongly idealised. There were 1 320 000 Slovenians living within a 50 million population of Austro-Hungary at that time. Due to low death-rate, which was a result of modernised agriculture, improved nutrition and better hygienic conditions, but also of prevailing Catholic mentality, which demanded from couples to have as many children as God was willing to give them, the birth rate was very high, but on the other hand there was a strong emigration from Slovenian regions to other European countries, to the United States of America and also North Africa. There were very good traffic (railway) connections: the most important Austrian railway line Vienna – Trieste actually crossed Slovenian territory. Trieste (which fell to Italy after World War I) was the most important seaport. It had 230 000 inhabitants, among them 53 000
Slovenia during the time of Balkan wars. V: The Balkan Wars. Workbook 3. Teaching Modern Southeast European History. Alternative Educational Materials. Theassaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, 2005, p. 104-105.
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Slovenians. Ljubljana, which is now the capital of Slovenia, had 50 000 inhabitants, Maribor, the second biggest city 30 000; other Slovenian towns were smaller and hardly exceeded the population of 10 000. In terms of the economic development, Slovenian regions lagged behind some more developed parts of the monarchy (the most developed one was Bohemia); however, at that time industrialisation was in progress in Slovenia too. Steam energy was replaced by electricity; bigger Slovenian cities possessed electric light. The most important branches of industry included metallurgy, coal-mining and woodworking industry, secondary industry was in progress too (leather and textile, breweries, oil mills, tinned meat factories, the production of straw hats). In addition there were a number of crafts and - due to favourable geographic position - also commerce. Agriculture was triturated, weak and fragmented; on the one hand there were some big estates (mostly owned by the Church or by big companies), on the other numerous small farms with less than 5 hectares of land. Over 60% of the people were still peasants. The majority of the capital was in foreign hands (mostly Austrian and German respectively); the proportion between the foreign and the Slovenian capital was approximately 10: 1. Slovenian press, above all the two leading dailies Slovenec and Jutro, reported about the Balkan wars in detail. Strong sympathy for South-Slav nations was evident. The war was presented as the war of the suppressed nations against Turkish supremacy (dating from the times of Turkish raids, the image of the Turks was still extremely negative in Slovenia), as a cultural and religious (Christianity against Islam) war, and also as a war for the union of South-Slav nations. Though the policy of Slovenian political parties was not directed towards finding perspectives for the solution of the Slovenian national question outside the borders of Austro-Hungary, they shared the belief that the liberation of South-Slav nations would strengthen the position of the Slav nations within the AustriaHungary monarchy. The media and the general public were thus disappointed, when the second Balkan war broke out. It was perceived as a “fratricidal war” and the responsibility for it was to a large extend attributed to Serbia (for which there were rather negative feelings because of its disputes with Austria-Hungary and also because of the official propaganda), whereas there seemed to be more sympathy for Bulgaria. After both wars, a lot of articles appeared about the newly established geopolitical situation on the Balkans. As early as in 1914, a book with the title War on the Balkans 1912/13 was published, which brought an in-depth analysis of the nations involved in the war, the causes and consequences of the war. Before the War2 - Reasons for War …Serbia will to the sea On its west, Serbia borders to Bosnia and Herzegovina: on this territory the population is strictly Serbian. Serbia’s southwestern border is with Turkey, where a lot of Serbs live too. This territory has been in a state of unrest up to the present. As you probably all remember, The Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, which closed the natural access of Serbia to the seacoast, almost led to a war between Serbia and the monarchy. The war could be prevented but Serbia – for any case - immediately started with thorough preparations; and as the present state of its army shows, it is excellently prepared in all respects. Why then did Serbia start the war anyway? Serbia is the most densely populated country in the Balkans with the densest railway network. However, the more intensive the economic development of the country in recent years became, the more it felt how
Vojska na Balkanu, (War on the Balkans), edit by Anton Sušnik in dr. Vinko Šarabon, royal professors in Ljubljana, Katoliška bukvarna v Ljubljani, 1914, p. 27.
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handicapped it was because it did not have a direct access to the sea. Six or seven years ago, all the exports of Serb cattle and agricultural products went to the north, to AustriaHungary and from there to other countries. But the customs conflicts between our country (Austria-Hungary) and Serbia forced the latter to direct its exports towards the south (Thessalonica). However, due to the recurring uproars in Turkey, the commerce was constantly threatened. Every Serbian farmer has thus experienced that Serbia was an encircled country and Serbian nation a captured one. It is obvious that Serbia could not develop accordingly within such borders. Only if Serbia could get the Old Serbia from which there is the shortest access to the Adriatic coast along the river Drina valley, to the ports of Sv. Ivan, Lješ and Drač, it would have the necessary conditions for normal life and economic development… …Bulgaria will liberate the Macedonians Now, that their happier brothers in the Balkans went to the battle to free themselves from the terrible slavery, now the Macedonians have risen again too. They forgot the party disputes and brotherly embraced each other, when fighting for their home country. Some of them have joined the Bulgarian army as volunteers, others went to the mountains; they were both fighting for freedom for which they had craved for such a long time and for which so much blood had already been shed. They have risen to revenge themselves for the innumerable wrongs and atrocities, to avenge their fathers and mothers, their wives and children. Now they did not retreat to the mountains to hide from the Turks, they were allured by a bright glow, which announced the home country a new, free life. The big day now came for them about which our poet Simon Gregorčič wrote as early as in 1876: Balkans, the sad giant, For five hundred long years Fettered in the Turkish yoke, Counted to the dead and yet still alive! Balkans, the giant slave – A Disgrace for Europe And deep sadness for their brothers, The martyr from the south: The day of your salvation has finally come! This is your great hour, And your tormentor will pay for its sins! A bloodshed dawn is coming into view, It must fall, it must! (free translation) Greece demands Crete The reason, which led the Greeks to join the Balkan states in the war against Turkey, was the island Crete…. ….Since in 1669 Crete came under the Turkish authority, it has experienced a rapid decline. Due to the poor economic situation and high taxes there have been constant rebellions. A particularly serious one took place in 1866, which the Turks only just managed to suppress in 1867. At that time the European great powers supported the annexation of Crete to Greece, yet they withdrew their support after Turkey had promised reforms. In spite of that, Greece and Crete never abandoned their plan; they made use of every opportunity to come forward with their demand, among other occasions also during the Russian6

Turkish war. At that time (1878) Crete got its National Chamber, financial independence and a Greek governor. The Greeks did not support the 1889 uprising. In 1896 however, Crete drove away the Turks forever with the help of Greece. As already mentioned, this led to the war between Greece and Turkey. However, even this time Greece and Crete did not succeed to get united… …Greece obviously attacked because of Crete: this is particularly evident from the fact, that even before the war was announced on October 14, the Greek president Venizelos allowed the representatives of Crete to enter the Chamber of Athens and so practically annexed the island to Greece. Anyway, Greece had a number of other reasons for the attack. Like the Slavs, also the Greeks suffered under the Turkish rule. Particularly in Epirus, the Turks and the Albanians slaughtered each other constantly. There was no peace on the islands either; shortly before the war, a ruthless rebellion was raging on the island of Samos. Europe and Turkish promises3 Who could wonder that under such circumstances the Balkan nations constantly “sharpened their swords”? If they hadn’t done it, they would have died from starvation. Still, it is beyond belief that the civilised Europe calmly observed such terrible conditions and tolerated the injustice and atrocities, which were destroying the life of Balkan nations and impeded any development on the cultural and economic field. The Turks suppressed, murdered, robbed and burnt houses, they killed and tortured, and the Christian small fry suffered and cried from despair and pain, people were dying in streams of blood, when at the same time “European diplomats were sitting peacefully in their offices, watching the butchering and even praising the God”. Peace and split4 On the 30th May ambassadors in London signed provisional peace treaty…. A Latin proverb says woe to the vanquished. With the Bucharest and Istanbul Peace, the Bulgarians, in fact not defeated at all, had to experience it to an extend not ever experienced before in the history. They sacrificed most (50 000 casualties, 50 000 wounded, 1000 million crowns only during the second war) but won least. They had to turn over 8 000 km² of ancient Bulgarian territory northern of Varna to the Romanians. This was the most advanced area of the empire with the population of 250 000 people, among them over one hundred millionaire farmers and over 2 milliard (billion) crowns of national property. And all this was lost for the Slav world! Many thanks to the Serbs! With superhuman efforts the Bulgarians managed to take away 38 000 km² of the Turkish territory but then had to give away 15 000 km² of it, together with famous places like Odrin (Adrainopolus), Lozengrad, Ljule-Burgas and others (in total 250 000 people). What they had to give to Turks is the best part of Tracie. Again, they have to thank the “Slav” Serbs and Russians for it. If the Russians only said a word, the Turks would have never dared to push forward towards Adrianopolus. And what is the benefit for the Russians to support Turkey? A German general in Istanbul! So Bulgaria only gained 15 000 km² of territory and 800 000 people. Along the Aegean Sea, its territory stretches itself from Dedegač (which belongs to Bulgaria too) to the mouth of the river Meste; the border then turns to the north and the west – Kavala, Drama and Seres belong to Greece – only to
Vojska na Balkanu, (War on the Balkans), edit by Anton Sušnik in dr. Vinko Šarabon, royal professors in Ljubljana, Katoliška bukvarna v Ljubljani, 1914, p. 42. The book based on newspaper articles, books, brochures and other materials which were published in Slovenia, Austro Hungary and Germany before and during the Balkan Wars. 4 Vojska na Balkanu, (War on the Balkans), edit by Anton Sušnik in dr. Vinko Šarabon, royal professors in Ljubljana, Katoliška bukvarna v Ljubljani, 1914, p. 233 and 235.
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give the Bulgarians a charity gift of Strumica. Then the border turns back to the east and further to the north again so that it reaches the ancient/ old Bulgarian territory south of Džustendila. Ohrid, the Prespan lake and Bitol belong to Serbia and so does Dževdželi in the valley of the river Vardar; further to the south all the territory belongs to Greece. Before the war, Greece had a territory of 65 000 km², whereas at the time we are writing this article (December 1913) it has 108.000 km² without the islands. The question of islands still remains unsolved. Serbia covered an area of 48.000 km² before the war and after it 90.000. However, Serbia ceded a part of Sanžak, Novi Pazar and the towns of Peć and Djakovo with their outskirts to Montenegro so that its territory grew from 9 000 km² to 16 000 km². According to Istanbul peace, 23 000 km² of territory remained for Turkey, whereas Romania grew from 131 000 to 139 000 km². Bulgaria made particular effort to get the port of Kavala with its fertile land around it where excellent tobacco is grown, yet it did not succeed although the population there is Bulgarian. The mountainous territories they could keep in Macedonia and Tracie were poor and thinly populated. Of course the tough Bulgarians will soon improve everything; even now they have established such order as cannot be found anywhere else in the newly conquered countries. Instead of Kavala, they got the bay of Lagos, which was no replacement for Kavala. A million of Bulgarians were thrown at mercy of Serbia (600 000) and Greece (400 000)! If to the 400 000 people living under the Greeks the 250 000 seized by the Romanians and 250 000 given to the Turks are added, we get a million of people who are mostly of Slav origin even now and who would certainly remain Slavs in the future. A million of Slavs lost on the territory, which plays today such a role in the history of the world! 2 000 Bulgarian Schools have been closed in Macedonia! Even the Turks were not like the Serbs and the Greeks are! They want to destroy everything that reminds of Bulgaria and even pursue the Bulgarian church. Since around 1895 on, huge sums of Bulgarian money have flown to Macedonia, thousands of Bulgarians shed their blood for liberation of their fellow countrymen. Bulgaria was the only support for Macedonians, and now? The Macedonians are now in a worse situation than they were under the Turks. When we started to write the history of this war, we couldn’t even imagine, that things would come this far. The only hope for Bulgarians is Austria. Russia is striving to renew the Balkan union, yet so far without success.

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2. Racial legislation, propaganda and measures in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in the German, Italian and Hungarian occupational zones in Slovenia during the WW II5
Yugoslav state was created in the wake of World War I from parts of the former AustroHungarian monarchy and of some lands that were in the 19th Century part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1929 King Alexander suspended the constitution and the parliament and proclaimed a royal dictatorship. In 1934 Croatian and Macedonian extremists organized the King’s assassination in Marseille. Polarized country with huge nationalistic quarrels and authoritarian regimes in the second half of the thirties was more and more under the influence of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Anti-Semite legislation was introduced, Concentration camp in Bileća for the opponents of the regime established and Parliament was dissolved at the end of thirties. The war in Yugoslavia began on April 6th 1941 with bombing Belgrade. Yugoslavia was quickly defeated, surrendering in Belgrade on April 17. The government fled into exile. When the Axis powers in April 1941 invaded Yugoslavia, Ustasha regime seized power in Croatia and “Independent Croatian State” under German and Italian control was set up. Other parts of Yugoslavia were divided among occupiers. In Slovenia all of three occupying forces wanted to include the occupied territories into their respective states permanently, extending their administration to the Slovenian territory and including it into their social order. Illustration:

Occupying zones in Slovenia.

Repe, Božo. Racial legislation, propaganda and measures in the German, Italian and Hungarian occupational zones in Slovenia during the WW II: prispevek na 20th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Sydney, 3-9 July 2005. Sydney, 2005.

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The Hungarians annexed Prekmurje by a law adopted by Hungarian Parliament on December 1941. They also annexed other territories of former Yugoslavia: Baranja, Bačko and Medmurje). Prekmurje was not governed as a single administrative district. One of them (Murska Sobota with its broader surroundings) was annexed to the district Vas (Vasvármegye), with the centre in Szombathely and the second one to the Zala district (Zalamegye) with the centre in Zalaegerszeg. This administrative division dates back to Austro-Hungarian times. The Hungarians namely regarded the occupied territories as the return of the territory, which they had lost with the Trianon treaty after World War I. Hungarians regarded the people of Prekmurje as being Vends, a special nation with its own language, which adopted Hungarian culture during the long centuries of living together. According to them, the only missing element for complete assimilation was the replacement of the “Vend language” with the Hungarian. Former Yugoslav officials and teachers, colonists and other immigrants (about 600 of them), who moved to Prekmurje between the two Wars on the basis of racial measures were confined in the camp Sárvár. Influence of members of the Hungarian fascist party - the Arrow Cross Party (so called “nyílas”) raised. After the German occupation of Hungary and Prekmurje, most of the Prekmurje Jews (452 persons) were imprisoned in concentration camps. 328 of them were then killed in Auschwitz-Birkenau in April 1944. The territories occupied by Germans were given the same status as Alsace, Loraine and Luxembourg. The plan was to annex them formally to Germany as quickly as possible and thus become the southern border of the German Reich. This would have meant a complete elimination of Slovenians as a nation (ethnocide). A special civil administration introduced in 1941 was supposed to be of a temporary nature. According to German plans, the territory was to be annexed to the Reich on October 1, 1941. Until then, the administration of the occupied territories was to be adapted to the one in the neighbouring districts of Štajerska - Steiermark and Koroška – Carinthia (which was actually carried out) and thus the Slovenian question “permanently” solved. The German leadership assigned the responsibility for the solution of the “Slovenian question” to various offices under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler, the state secretary for reinforcement of germanness. The plan for the elimination of Slovenian nation was based on three basic elements: mass deportations of the Slovenians (between 220 000 and 260 000), the settlement of Germans (about 80 000) and a complete assimilation of the people who stayed in their homes because they could meet the required political and racial criteria. First they brought people to collecting camps from where they were shipped to Germany, Croatia and Serbia. The deportation was to be carried out in several waves: the first to come were the nationally feeling Slovenes who were followed by those who moved to Slovenian territory after 1914, and finally by those whose estates and property were needed for the German colonisation. This plan was intended to be carried out in five months. Due to the problems of transportation, the uprising of the population6 and
Resistance was organized by Slovene Liberation Front (first named Anti-Imperialist Front), established on April 27th 1941 in Ljubljana. Slovene Communists took the initiative. Christian Socialists, the liberal Sokol (Falkon) patriotic gymnastic society members and group of intellectuals were founders of Liberation Front. The actual uprising extend after German attack on Soviet Union to most Slovene lands. The partisan movement liberated Slovenia, coordinating operations with Tito’s National Liberation Struggle in Yugoslavia, which was since 1943 a part of allied Antifascist Coalition. During the war Communist Party in Slovenia, which organized and operationally controlled the resistance, began articulating revolutionary goals. In March 1943 it persuaded non - Communists in the Liberation Front to submit to unity under Communist leadership. Liberation Front had the support of the majority of Slovenian population, but not all in Slovenia joined to it. Former middle - class parties and leadership of Catholic Church in Ljubljana Province (Provinzia di Lubiana) in collaboration with occupiers organized the resistance (counterrevolution)
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because Croatia and Serbia were unable to accept as many deportees as planned, about 80 000 Slovenians were deported (about 17 000 of them fled to Italian occupation territory). 12 000 Germans from Slovenia (Gotschee Deutsch) were settled, mostly to the borderland with the Independent State of Croatia, along the rivers Sava and Sotla in agreement with the Italian occupational authorities. The Nazi order, including the mobilization into the German army was introduced. Next to the so-called Volksdeutscher (German minority), also a part of Slovenian population was granted - though only conditionally and after a political and racial assessment – German citizenship. The use of the Slovenian language was forbidden, geographical and personal names were germanized, and the occupied territories looked like as if they were German. Ilustrations: a) A FRAGMENT FROM THE REPORT OF A FEDERAL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WITH THE HEAD OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FOR LOWER STYRIA DATED MAY 30, 1941 ABOUT THE MASS EVICTIONS OF THE SLOVENIANS7 The most difficult problem to be solved within the Lower Styria is to cleanse the lower Styrian national body from the foreign Slav element, which cannot be submitted to the Germanising process. If the regermanisation of the lower Styria is to succeed at all, and this south-eastern end of the German Reich is to become a reliable barrier against the ever tumultuous Balkans, the local population has to be freed of every substance which either racially or behaviourally sabotages germanisation. The task of the Styrian Patriotic Association can only succeed if the ground is accordingly cleansed. Therefore a deportation (removal) of the population is planned, which will be carried out in four stages and in a way which has proved successful in similar activities in other regained territories of the Reich (especially in the east). The deportations to Serbia and partially to Croatia will be carried out in trains containing about 1000 persons. The time of its beginning and its extend (for the time being one or two trains daily are planned) have not been determined yet…. According to the plan, the deportations will take place in four waves.
to the Liberation Front. First in 1942 the Village Guard (Milizia Volontaria Anticomunista) and later (after Italian capitulation in September 1943) the Home-Guard (Landeswehr) mounted armed opposition to the leftist character as well as the excesses of the Partisan resistance. This led to a civil war in a part of Slovenian territory. The partisan movement won, middle – class politicians and Home-Guardists after unsuccessful attempt to establish their own parliament and government in May 1945, mostly fled to Austria together with German Army. They were sent back by the British and majority of them, treated as traitors, were executed without a trial. In September 1943 a wartime assembly had already come to represent Slovenians in Partisan – held areas. Delegates were sent to Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the central political and representative body of the National Liberation Struggle of Yugoslavia (established in November 1942 in Bihać, Bosnia). AVNOJ on his second meeting on November 29th, 1943 in Jajce, Bosnia, proclaimed itself supreme legislative and executive body under Tito’s leadership. Royal government in exile later accepted the Jajce provisions. In 1945, the participants of Yalta Conference requested that AVNOJ include also representatives of other political parties outside the liberation movement (those who had not collaborated with Axis powers). At its third meeting, held in Belgrade in August 1945, AVNOJ officially became a provisional Parliament of Yugoslavia. In Slovenia, on May 5th, 1945 the Liberation Front established a Slovene government. In November 1945 a federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed and Slovenia became one of the six republics. The settlement of borders at the Paris Peace Conference in September 1947 was - due to active resistance during the war – quite favourable for Slovenia. It was unable to obtain Carinthian Slovenian lands in Austria (Austria was considered a victim, not an aggressor in WWII) and also not some territories in Italy, including port Trieste, but it did acquire most territories that had belonged to Italy between both of World Wars. 7 Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem (Occupational Systems on Slovenian Territory), Modrijan, Zgodovinski viri, Ljubljana 1997.

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b)

Unknown girl, waiting for the deportation, near Celje. c) Fragment from the interview with Cveto Kobal8 “After a few days they crowed us together for transport. About 1000 people were transported in one single train. The drive took two days. On the way some people already died in our wagon. There was terrible heat, unbearable conditions. The wagons were cattle trucks, without any possibility to use toilet. Then we carried the dead bodies from the railway station to the top of the hill, where concentration camp was. Just before we came to Mauthausen, one prisoner was shot only because he picked up green apple from the ground... Speaking from my experience, I would like to say to the younger generations how necessary it is to fight against any violence. No violence, even with the best of intentions, can’t be justified…”

Front page of the brochure on Mauthausen, written by Cveto Kobal in June 1944, first known published text about one of the most horrible concentration camps.
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Cveto Kobal was born on 15.12. 1921. He became a member of resistance movement in Slovenia in 1941. In January 1941 he was arrested and sent to the concentration camp in Auschwitz, and afterward to Mauthausen. In the spring of 1944 he escaped from working camp in Linz (Austria) and joined partisans in Slovenia. In June 1944 illegal partisan printing works published his brochure on Mauthausen, which is first known published text about one of the most horrible concentration camps.

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d)

Poster with the names of killed hostages in German occupying zone. After a short military administration, the Italian occupiers transformed their occupied territories into the so-called Province o Ljubljana (Provinzia di Lubiana), which became one of the Italian provinces. It was led by the High Commissionaire (first this was Emilio Grazioli who was later followed by Giuseppe Lombrassa and finally by general Riccardo Moizo). Annexation of the Italian occupational zone to Italy was based on the King’s order dating from May 3, 1941 the so called Province of Ljubljana The Chamber of Fascies and corporations confirmed his order on June 10, 1941, whereas the legislative commission for internal affairs and legislation within the Senate did not acknowledge it until June, 10, 1943, whereby the King’s order became a law. Mussolini hastened to with the annexation because he feared Hitler could further reduce the territory previously allotted to him. Provinzia di Lubiasna gained in some areas an autonomous status which manifested itself in a different name for the person in charge (High Commissioner as opposed to Prefect as called in other parts of Italy), in bilingualism, in formal co-administration by the advisory committee for the Province of Ljubljana whose members were Slovenians and finally by the fact, that Slovenian citizens did not have to serve the army. In the legal field, the former Yugoslav legislation was preserved to a high extend. Italians were appointed as the heads of local districts, whereas the lower ranks (mayors) could also be occupied by the Slovenes, after they had sworn to the Italian King. In the areas of economy, finances, banking and insurance the Italian fascist corporate system was introduced. Parallel to Yugoslav, Italians gradually set up their own administration, however, due to lack of Italian staff, there were more Slovene than Italian officials in the Province of Ljubljana. Apart from the army, there were four other types of units responsible for peace-keeping: the police, gendarmerie (the “carabinieri”), financial guards and on the frontier with the German occupational zone and along the former Rapallo border, the frontier police, which was preserved and which thus separated the Province of Ljubljana from Italy. All those units were Italian, however, the carabinieri and the police also included former Yugoslav policemen (of 1350 members of the police, 322 were Slovenians; a further 204 were given a salary although they were not on duty). Along with that, Italian court-martials responsible for the offences perpetrated or only planned against the Italian army or its members started to operate. In practice this meant that they were responsible for any form of opposition towards the Italian occupation; the law-court in Ljubljana handled 13 186 persons until the capitulation of Italy, out of which 8737 were found guilty and sentenced. 13

The fascist party introduced all the organizations, which existed in Italy, to Slovenia, as well. Membership of those parties was restricted to Italian officials; however, young people attending schools and universities as well as the members of some women’s and workers’ organizations, were also accepted in order to speed up the process of assimilation. After hesitating for some time, the Italians also allowed the so-called Voluntary Anti-communist Militia (Milizia volontaria anticommmunista) to be formed; its main task was to fight the partisans. The Italians, being so sure of the predominance of their civilization and the fascist ideology (according to the well-known diary of Gaelazzo Ciano, the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs) planned to carry out ethnocide over the Slovenians over a longer period of time than the Germans. In the Italian occupational territory similar plans as in German were made in spring 1942: there were planned mass deportations of the Slovenians and Italian colonisation of the emptied Slovene territories. However, Italy surrendered before the above plans could be implemented. Yet, the Italians succeeded to deport about 25 000 thousands Slovenes into Italian concentration camps. The preserved documents let us believe that in case of their victory, the Italians would have introduced the same denationalising regime as the one that was carried out in the Slovenian coastal area and Istria during both World Wars.

Illustrations:
a) Report of the high Commisssioner for the Province of Ljubljana, August 24, 1942 on a Programme of activities in the region9 The Kingdom of Italy High Commissioner for the Province of Ljubljana; The Office: personal secretariat No 1387/2 confidential To the Ministry of Interior The Cabinet

August 24, 1942/XX Highly confidential

Regarding the confidential document No 1362/2, dated August 16, I allow myself to give an outline of the programmes of activities I intend to carry out in this province. a) The problem of the Slovenian population could be solved in three ways: 1) By its destruction; 2) By deportations; 3) By removal of opposition elements, which could be reached by carrying out a hard, yet fair policy of bringing together, with the purpose of laying the foundations for a useful and fair cooperation. This would give us a possibility for assimilation, which could be achieved only with time. Thus we have to decide which way we want to choose.

While Italian “soft” occupational policy was unsuccessful, military and civil authorities, following the instructions of Mussolini, took the same measures as Germans in their occupational zone: shooting of hostages and mass executions of captured partisans, illegal activists of Liberation Front, inhabitants of places suspected of allegiance to the liberation movement but also completely innocent persons (in the total period of the Italian occupation of the Ljubljana Province the Italian armed forces shot at least 416 individual persons and 238 groups with 1153 persons, a total therefore of 1569 persons, not taking into account those convicted by the military court in Ljubljana, and mass deportation. Final goal was to “clean” Slovenian national territory and prepare it for Italian settlement after war.

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b) For mass deportations of the population we would have to follow a programme prepared in advance, which would have to be carried out within the entire province. It would be better to set up work camps instead of internment camps in which people do nothing but idle. c) For the purpose of replacing Slovenian population with the Italian, the following has to be determined: 1) Where Slovenian population should be moved; 2) Where suitable Italian population should be found in which case it has to be considered, that the people from the northern and the central areas are the most appropriate ones to be settled in Slovenian territories; 3) If the area along the border is to be completely Italianised, its width is to be determined (20 to 30 km); 4) If the entire Slovenian population is to be moved, the process should be started in the areas along the border, where Slovenians live under Italy. It is my opinion that a complete or even a partial relocation of the Slovenian population would hardly be possible during the war. b) Don Pietro Brignoli10: Holly mass for my shooting dead (fragment from diary) “25. August. Desperate women. One of them is asking for justice. In the village, we just come in, we imprisoned all men, as elsewhere. At the beginning of the operations people didn’t get anxious when we imprisoned adult men, because they new nothing about what to expect. As news about what was going on spread around,11 some kind of desperation wave rose. The same was in this “liberated” village. Because they took men and guarded them in the meadow, women gathered not far away, they plead for the men and cried with such emotions, that even less sensitive soldiers were struck by that. From time to time someone scold this miserable group and threatened that all of man will be shot if women would not pleading. For a moment, all became silent, than we heard restraint sobbing and in the end they cried even more desperately then they did before…” After Italian capitulation, the former Italian occupational territory was taken over by the Germans. Due to their military weakness, the Germans were forced to acknowledge the existence of the Slovenians and introduce an occupying policy, which differed from the one, which they applied on the territories, which were planned to be annexed to the German Reich. The Germans promised to the Slovenians within the Province of Ljubljana a kind of autonomy and restoration of the former Austro-Hungarian district of Krain. A step in this direction was the appointment of the district administration, which was led by a president. After a consultation between the Nazi officials and the Ljubljana bishop (an unusual case of cooperation), Leon Rupnik was appointed for the president. Rupnik was an aging general of the Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav army who under Italians served as the Ljubljana mayor. Fascinated by the power of Germans, his ideas were highly pro Germanic and conservative, based on the mottos of mother, homeland, God. His
Don Pietro Brignoli was curate in Italian occupation army in Slovenia and Croatia. During the war he was writing a diary, which was published in the sixties. He was loyal to Italy, but he also described and condemned the cruel treating of Italian soldiers with civil population during the Italian offensive in summer and autumn of 1942: burning of villages, shooting hostages, deportations in concentration camps, robbery… Brignoli for all the horrors he saw, blamed the war itself and he was somehow searching for the answer of his distress in war as the universal culprit. 11 Shooting of hostages or sending people to the concentration camps (remark B.R.)
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orientation being expressively anti-communist and anti-Jewish, he established collaborationist units called Home-guard, which were fighting against the partisans. The Germans did formally acknowledge Italian sovereignty, yet they prevented the effective take-over of administration, they disarmed the gendarmes and the fascists and fired Italian officials. They supported Rupnik who refused a renewed arrival of Italian officials. The regional administration assumed a similar form to the one it had as the former ban’s dominion within Yugoslavia. The administration was in fact a “controlled head” since a great deal of the territory was controlled by the partisans who set up their own administration. The district authorities thus only controlled Ljubljana and the most important railway and roadside posts. In spite of the formally Slovene management, the German superiority could be seen everywhere. So, the judiciary system in Ljubljana was controlled by the High Commissariat in Triest (the seat of the Adriatic coastal region). The police was German, led by the SS general Erwin Rösner who was under the immediate command of Himmler. Slovenian uniformed police did exist along with the German, yet it was supervised by the German officer for connections. It also had its political section that had a task to deal with the members of the resistance movement. As the president, Rupnik was supported (similarly as the Italian Prefects in other regions) by German advisors whose task it was to make sure that German policy was carried out. The welfare state Italy had no competences (though the territory formally belonged to Italy). For the reasons of rationality, the Germans preserved lira as the currency, and also the postal and banking system remained to be Italian. Such concept was preserved till the end of the war. Before the withdrawal of the Germans, the Slovenian middle-class politicians tried to take over power from Rupnik (whom they previously supported), set up their own parliament, renamed the Slovenian Home-guard into Slovene National Army and then awaited the Allies. Due to the superiority of the Partisans their plan failed and they withdrew along with the Germans and the Home-guard.

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3. Slovenia during the Second World War12
INTRODUCTION The war in Yugoslavia began on April 6th 1941 with bombing Belgrade. Yugoslavia was quickly defeated, surrendering in Belgrade on April 17 1941. The government fled into exile. Slovenia was occupied by Germans, Italians and Hungarians. The German Reich claimed the northern and eastern areas (Carniola, Styiria and Posavje (neighbouring areas with Croatia along rivers Sava and Sotla), Hungarians took Prekmurje, Italy the Central and Western part of Slovenia. All three occupiers wanted to include Slovenian territory into their states. Italians and Hungarians did that officially. Germans due to various reasons did not (troubles with deportations of Slovenian populations and with germanisation, resistance movement), but they used German racial legislation on occupational territories. All the three occupational forces condemned Slovenians to ethnocide. However, their methods and the required time in which the plan was to be carried out differed. Most drastic deportations were carried out by the German occupants. The German leadership assigned the responsibility for the solution of the “Slovenian question” to various offices under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler, the state secretary for reinforcement of germanness. The Germans planned to deport between 220 000 and 260 000 Slovenians. First they brought them to collecting camps from where they were shipped to Germany, Croatia and Serbia. The deportation was to be carried out in several waves: the first to come were the nationally feeling Slovenes who were followed by those who moved to Slovenian territory after 1914, and finally by those whose estates and property were needed for the German colonisation (about 80 000 German immigrants were planned to be settled in this area). This plan was intended to be carried out in five months. Due to the problems of transportation, the uprising of the population and because Croatia and Serbia were unable to accept as many deportees as planned, only 80 000 Slovenians were deported (about 17 000 of them fled to Italian occupation territory). 12 000 Germans from Slovenia (Gotschee Deutsch) were settled, mostly to the borderland with the Independent State of Croatia, along the rivers Sava and Sotla in agreement with the Italian occupational authorities. In the Italian occupational territory similar plans as in German were made in spring 1942: there were planned mass deportations of the Slovenians and Italian colonisation of the emptied Slovene territories. However, Italy surrendered before the above plans could be implemented. Yet, the Italians succeeded to deport about 25 000 thousands Slovenes into Italian concentration camps. The preserved documents let us believe that in case of their victory, the Italians would have introduced the same denationalising regime as the one was carried out in the Slovenian coastal area and Istria during both World Wars. The Hungarian occupiers deported those Slovenes who moved to Prekmurje (the river Mura region), which was allotted to Yugoslavia after World War I, until World War II. About 600 of them (mostly immigrants from Primorska, the territory awarded to Italy after World War I) were deported to the concentration camp Szaszvar in the spring of 1942. After the German occupation of Hungary and Prekmurje, most of the Prekmurje Jews (452 persons) were imprisoned in concentration camps. 328 of them were then killed in Auschwitz-Birkenau in April 1944.

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Repe, Božo. Slovenia during the Second World War and the current perspectives on that period. Moscow, Russia, International scientific conference "The Second World War and the XX century", 5. - 9. 9. 1994.

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Resistance was organized by Slovene Liberation Front (first named Anti-Imperialist Front), established on April 27th 1941 in Ljubljana. Slovene Communists took the initiative. Christian Socialists, the liberal Sokol (Falkon) patriotic gymnastic society members and group of intellectuals were founders of Liberation Front. The actual uprising extend after German attack on Soviet Union to most Slovene lands. The partisan movement liberated Slovenia, coordinating operations with Tito’s National Liberation Struggle in Yugoslavia, which was since 1943 a part of allied Antifascist Coalition. During the war Communist Party in Slovenia, which organized and operationally controlled the resistance, began articulating revolutionary goals. In March 1943 it persuaded non - Communists in the Liberation Front to submit to unity under Communist leadership. Liberation Front had the support of the majority of Slovenian population, but not all in Slovenia joined to it. Former middle – class parties and leadership of Catholic Church in Ljubljana Province (Provinzia di Lubiana) in collaboration with occupiers organized the resistance (counterrevolution) to the Liberation Front. First in 1942 the Village Guard (Milizia Volontaria Anticomunista) and later (after Italian capitulation in September 1943) the Home Guard (Landeswehr) mounted armed opposition to the leftist character as well as the excesses of the Partisan resistance. This led to a civil war in a part of Slovenian territory. The partisan movement won, middle – class politicians and Home Guardists after unsuccessful attempt to establish their own parliament and government in May 1945, mostly fled to Austria together with German Army. They were sent back by the British and majority of them, treated as traitors, were executed without a trial. In September 1943 a wartime assembly had already come to represent Slovenians in Partisan – held areas. Delegates were sent to Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the central political and representative body of the National Liberation Struggle of Yugoslavia (established in November 1942 in Bihać, Bosnia). AVNOJ on his second meeting on November 29th, 1943 in Jajce, Bosnia, proclaimed itself supreme legislative and executive body under Tito’s leadership. Royal government in exile later accepted the Jajce provisions. In 1945, the participants of Yalta Conference requested that AVNOJ include also representatives of other political parties outside the liberation movement (those who had not collaborated with Axis powers). At its third meeting, held in Belgrade in August 1945, AVNOJ officially became a provisional Parliament of Yugoslavia. In Slovenia, on May 5th, 1945 the Liberation Front established a Slovene government . In November 1945 a federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed and Slovenia became one of the six republics. The settlement of borders at the Paris Peace Conference in September 1947 was - due to active resistance during the war – quite favourable for Slovenia. It was unable to obtain Carinthian Slovenian lands in Austria (Austria was considered a victim, not an aggressor in WWII) and also not some territories in Italy, including port Trieste, but it did acquire most territories that had belonged to Italy between both of World Wars. Illustration:

Occupying zones in Slovenia 18

Document No 113 Illustration:

Lines behind the shop in Ljubljana during the war. Lack of everything, especially of food, distribution of necessities of life by cupons and bons was triviality during the war. Document No214 A FRAGMENT FROM THE REPORT OF A FEDERAL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WITH THE HEAD OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FOR LOWER STYRIA DATED MAY 30, 1941 ABOUT THE MASS EVICTIONS OF THE SLOVENIANS15 The most difficult problem to be solved within the Lower Styria is to cleanse the lower Styrian national body from the foreign Slav element, which cannot be submitted to the Germanising process. If the regermanisation of the lower Styria is to succeed at all, and this south-eastern end of the German Reich is to become a reliable barrier against the ever tumultuous Balkans, the local population has to be freed of every substance which either racially or behaviourally sabotages germanisation. The task of the Styrian Patriotic Association can only succeed if the ground is accordingly cleansed. Therefore a deportation (removal) of the population is planned, which will be carried out in four stages and in a way which has proved successful in similar activities in other regained territories of the Reich (especially in the east). The deportations to Serbia and partially to Croatia will be carried out in trains containing about 1000 persons. The time of its beginning and its extend (for the time being one or two trains daily are planned) have not been determined yet….. According to the plan, the deportations will take place in four waves.

Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem (Occupational Systems on Slovenian Territory), Modrijan, Zgodovinski viri, Ljubljana 1997 14 Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem (Occupational systems on Slovenian Territory), Modrijan, Zgodovinski viri, Ljubljana 1997 15 Germans between both world wars counted Slovenian territory as German and after occupation they wanted to include it formally in Germany as south border of Reich. This should be done in six months (till the end of 1941). Slovenians should be deported or Germanized and country inhabited by Germans.

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Document No 416 REPORT OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE PROVINCE OF LJUBLJANA, AUGUST 24, 1942 ON A PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION17 The Kingdom of Italy High Commissioner for the Province of Ljubljana; The Office: personal secretariat No 1387/2 confidential To the Ministry of Interior The Cabinet

August 24, 1942/XX Highly confidential

Regarding the confidential document No 1362/2, dated August 16, I allow myself to give an outline of the programmes of activities I intend to carry out in this province. . d) The problem of the Slovenian population could be solved in three ways: 1) By its destruction; 2) By deportations; 3) By removal of opposition elements, which could be reached by carrying out a hard, yet fair policy of bringing together, with the purpose of laying the foundations for a useful and fair cooperation. This would give us a possibility for assimilation, which could be achieved only with time. Thus we have to decide which way we want to choose. e) For mass deportations of the population we would have to follow a programme prepared in advance, which would have to be carried out within the entire province. It would be better to set up work camps instead of internment camps in which people do nothing but idle. f) For the purpose of replacing Slovenian population with the Italian, the following has to be determined: 1) Where Slovenian population should be moved; 2) Where suitable Italian population should be found in which case it has to be considered, that the people from the northern and the central areas are the most appropriate ones to be settled in Slovenian territories; 3) If the area along the border is to be completely Italianised, its width is to be determined (20 to 30 km); 4) If the entire Slovenian population is to be moved, the process should be started in the areas along the border, where Slovenians live under Italy. It is my opinion that a complete or even a partial relocation of the Slovenian population would hardly be possible during the war.

Tone Ferenc: okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem (Occupational systems in Slovenian territory), Modrijan, Zgodovinski viri, Ljubljana, 1997. 17 While Italian “soft” occupational policy was unsuccessful, military and civil authorities, following the instructions of Mussolini, took the same measures as Germans in their occupational zone: shooting of hostages and mass executions of captured partisans, illegal activists of Liberation Front, inhabitants of places suspected of allegiance to the liberation movement but also completely innocent persons (in the total period of the Italian occupation of the Ljubljana Province the Italian armed forces shot at least 416 individual persons and 238 groups with 1153 persons, a total therefore of 1569 persons, not taking into account those convicted by the military court in Ljubljana, and mass deportation. Final goal was to “clean” Slovenian national territory and prepare it for Italian settlement after war.

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Illustrations:

Poster with the names of killed hostages in German occupying zone Illustration:

Unknown girl, waiting for the deportation, near Celje Document No 518 BASIC POINTS OF THE OSVOBODILNA FRONTA (OF) (THE LIBERATION FRONT OF SLOVENIAN NATION)19

Božo Repe: Sodobna zgodovina. Zgodovina za 4. letnik gimnazij (Contemporary History. History for the 4th Grade of Grammar School), Modrijan, Ljubljana 2002 19 Shortly after Germany, Italy and Hungary occupied Slovenia in April 1941, the Communist Party of Slovenia (CPS) organized an Anti - Imperialistic front, whose aim was to liberate Slovenia with the help of Soviet Union. Such organization did not extend in the other parts of Yugoslavia. Beside the CPS founding groups were Christian Socialists, liberal group named Sokol (Falcon) and left and liberal oriented cultural intelligentsia. After Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union (June 22th, 1941) organization was renamed in Liberation front of Slovenian nation (Osvobodilna fronta slovenskega naroda – OF). OF in the summer of 1941 called to armed resistance against the occupiers. Many people of different political persuasion went in Partisans. In autumn 1941 it accepted the program, called basic points of the OF. Although the OF included political groups of different ideologies, CPS had taken control. Beside the liberation, thee goal of the CPS was also revolution what repelled many people and also provoked Civil War in the part of Slovenian territory. But in general, majority of Slovenians supported OF which joined the Antifascist Council of the Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), which laid down the basic principles of new federal Yugoslavia. In October 1944 at the OF Congress, attended by delegates from all of Slovenia, National Liberation Committee was elected, year later renamed in parliament, which formed its presidency as provisional government. OF as part of People’s front of Yugoslavia seized the power on first after war elections in 1945.

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1. A merciless armed battle against the enemy is to be carried out. 2. This activity represents the foundation for the liberation and uniting of all the Slovenians. 3. Understanding the community of Yugoslav nations as a natural and historic one, the Liberation Front (OF) does not recognise the break up of Yugoslavia. It will use all its efforts to fight for good understanding and unity of all Yugoslav nations. At the same time it strives towards a union of all the Slav nations under the leadership of the great Russian nation on the grounds of the right for selfdetermination of every nation. 4. By the liberation act and activation of Slovenian people, the Liberation Front (OF) will reform the Slovenian national character. Fighting for their national and human rights, the Slovenian people create a new form of the active Slovenianship. 5. All the groups participating in the Liberation Front have agreed to be loyal to each other. 6. After the liberation of the nation, the Liberation Front will assume power in the Slovenian territory over the Slovenian nation as a whole. 7. After the liberation, the Liberation Front will consequently introduce people’s democracy. All the questions exceeding the scope of the Liberation Front will be solved in a democratic way /…/ 8. According to the solemn statement of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, the Slovenian nation will be able to decide by itself about its internal order and foreign affairs. The Liberation Front will defend this fundamental right of the Slovenian people with all the means. 9. The Slovene national army will be raised from the Slovenian national liberation partisan and national defence troops, which all the nationally minded Slovenians are invited to join. Illustration:

Secret partizan hospital Franja, near Cerkno. Illegal medical service inside Liberation Front - probably the most humanistic mission during the war - was organized very well, despite extremely hard conditions. In January 1945 it had 281 secret hospitals and 6 legal (another 62 under construction ) hospitals, all together with 2260 beds. During the 22

war 11 321 wounded and ill people were under the medical care of thirty doctors and 652 nurses and other members of staff. 19 doctors lost their lifes. Document No 6 Don Pietro Brignoli20: Holly mass for my shooting dead (fragment from diary) “25. August. Desperate women. One of them is asking for justice. In the village, we just come in, we imprisoned all men, as elsewhere. At the beginning of the operations people didn’t get anxious when we imprisoned adult men, because they new nothing about what to expect. As news about what was going on spread around ,21 some kind of desperation wave rose. The same was in this “liberated” village. Because they took men and guarded them in the meadow, women gathered not far away, they plead for the men and cried with such emotions, that even less sensitive soldiers were struck by that. From time to time someone scold this miserable group and threatened that all of man will be shot if women would not pleading. For a moment, all became silent, than we heard restraint sobbing and at in the end they cried even more desperately then they did before…” Dok No7: Fragment from the interview with Cveto Kobal22 “After a few days they crowed us together for transport. About 1000 people were transported in one single train. The drive took two days. On the way some people already died in our wagon. There was terrible heat, unbearable conditions. The wagons were cattle trucks, without any possibility to use toilet. Then we carried the dead bodies from the railway station to the top of the hill, where concentration camp was. Just before we came to Mauthausen, one prisoner was shot only because he picked up green apple from the ground... Speaking from my experience, I would like to say to the younger generations how necessary it is to fight against any violence. No violence, even with the best of intentions, can’t be justified…” Illustration:

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Don Pietro Brignoli was curate in Italian occupation army in Slovenia and Croatia. During the war he was writing a diary which was published it in the sixties. He was loyal to Italy, but he also described and condemned the cruel treating of Italian soldiers with civil population during the Italian offensive in summer and autumn of 1942: burning of villages, shooting hostages, deportations in concentration camps, robbery… Brignoli for all the horrors he saw, blamed the war itself and he was somehow searching for the answer of his distress in war as the universal culprit. 21 Shooting of hostages or sending people to the concentration camps (remark B.R.) 22 Cveto Kobal was born on 15.12. 1921. He became a member of resistance movement in Slovenia in 1941. In January 1941 he was arrested and sent to the concentration camp in Auschwitz, and afterward to Mauthausen. In the spring of 1944 he escaped from working camp in Linz (Austria) and joined partisans in Slovenia. In June 1944 illegal partisan printing works published his brochure on Mauthausen which is first known published text about one of the most horrible concentration camps.

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Front page of the brochure on Mauthausen, written by Cveto Kobal in June 1944, first known published text about one of the most horrible concentration camps. Dok. No 8: Interview with Jože Požar, boy orphan from WW II JOŽE POŽAR (1932) “I remember war like nightmare, which was, unfortunately, true. But all memories were mist with fact, that one day Italian soldiers took away my father Jože and shot him as a hostage in Podpeč, together with five other villagers of Brest. My memories on youth are painful. It that time life was very hard. On the small farm we lived four children: me, sisters Milka and Marija, brother Marin, father Jože and mother Ivanka. We made a living by farming, despite that father was cartwright, but he didn’t find proper job. Our life was alike life of the other families in village Brest and in the neighborhood. All changed, perhaps I should say broke down, when they took and shot my father. It was even get worse, when in 1944 mother was sent to German concentration camp. I had twelve years than and at first I took care for the home and the family. Later sisters Milka and Marija and brother Martin were provide by aunt Alojzija Gruden from Ljubljana and for me our neighbors took care. I rested at them till 1945, when my mother returned from concentration camp….Life is going on. We all managed some – how, but it would certainly be better if we had father, when we need him the most…It still distress for me any time when I stand before father’s grave in Tomišelj and think on his death in time, when we needed so much.

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4. The place of the Second World War in the internal evolution of Post-War Slovenia and Yugoslavia23
In Yugoslavia, as well as in Slovenia, until the beginning of the eighties, World War II was mainly discussed within the following parameters: the leading force of the liberation movement was the Communist Party which initiated revolutionary measures under the cover of the war, and carried out a revolution after the war; in Yugoslavia an (informal) civil war had been going on during World War II 24. The wartime was characterised by dualism of authority (the internationally acknowledged King’s government in exile on the one hand, and the newly established authorities under the leadership of Tito, which arose from the liberation movement and strove to achieve international recognition, on the other). The western powers, particularly Great Britain, tried to solve this problem by dividing on the grounds of interest spheres (in the case of Yugoslavia, the principle of “fifty–fifty” was applied). Because of the Slovenian (and Croat) resistance in the ethnic territory after World War II, a possibility for revision of the western border (Julian March, Trieste, Carinthia) 25, without consideration for the pre-War borders, was opened. This led to tension with the Allies (the crisis of Trieste); there was fear of a conflict between the western Allies and the Soviet Union, which would have involved Yugoslavia too, and possibly led to resumption of civil war. Slovenia — where the final military battles continued, even after the German capitulation, until mid-May —, lived to see the end of the war as a part of the Yugoslav resistance movement which made it a part of the antifascist coalition. This fact made it possible for Slovenia to incorporate the coastal region to its territory (almost one third of the national territory), however, it did not succeed in uniting the complete ethnic territory. In accordance with Tito’s policy of brotherhood and unity, which was based on the explicit recognition of all Yugoslav nations and on their right of self-determination, Slovenia formally enjoyed a federal status within the Yugoslav federation. However, due to the reasons stated above, Yugoslavia became increasingly centralised (this included the abolition of the Slovenian Partisan Army, which was incorporated into the Yugoslav Army). Revolutionary measures were carried out (nationalisation, agrarian reform), opponents were eliminated (until the eighties, these events were either not discussed at all or presented one-sidedly) 26. The so-called system of people’s democracy and administrative socialism was introduced.
Repe, Božo. The place of the Second World War in the internal evolution of Post-War Slovenia and Yugoslavia. V: The second world war in 20th century history, (Bulletin du Comité international d'histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre mondiale, No. 30/31). Paris: Institut d'histoire du temps présent (CNRS), 2000, p. 127143. 24 Civil War was seldom interpreted ideologically i.e. as a struggle for power between two opposing sides: the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary, but more as a struggle between a) the powers of the national liberation movement and b) collaborators and national traitors. In Slovenia, the existence of civil war was even denied. It was not until the mid-eighties that the definition was introduced into historiography, that elements of civil war — though geographically restricted to the so-called Province of Ljubljana, the territory occupied by the Italians — had been present (since 1942). In the military since it was more a combined fight of the quisling and Italian and German forces against the partisans. However, a “pure” civil war was actually going on in the autumn of 1943, after the capitulation of Italy, when the former units of the Milizia volontaria anticommunista - MVAC [Voluntary Anticommunist Militia] and some few Chetnics were fighting the partisans. Milizia volontaria anticommunista also known as the so-called village guard, was set up by the Italian occupiers in the spring of 1942 for the purpose of protecting various territories from the partisan terror. 25 The revision of western borders was also aspired by the emigrant government which received some noncommittal statements of support from Great Britain. 26 The post-war vengeance against collaborators and political opponents was carried out by executions without previous trial (the victims were predominantly home-guard men i.e. armed Slovenian quisling units, which were set up by the Germans in the autumn of 1943, for the purpose of fighting the partisans), through
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A completely different evaluation of history emerged after Tito’s death in 1980. To a certain extent these events could be compared to the attitude of the French toward World War II and the Vichy Regime as described by Henry Rousso 27, the only distinction being that in Yugoslavia the problem appeared more than two decades later 28. Due to earlier denial, ideological control and misuse of ideological issues for the purpose of political and international interests, these events were all the more intensive. Criticism was first expressed in literary works, both by the already established authors (like Dobrica Čosić) and authors who only gained their reputation by writing about the war and post-war issues 29. The problems associated with the treatment of the common past of Yugoslav nations were almost completely transferred to the field of politics. The political elite in the individual republics attempted to strengthen their position and their own vision of the reform of Yugoslav society. Everything related to the evaluation of the past: the works of art, memoirs, both the facile and the “real” historiographic works, became subject to polemics which led to obliteration of the distinction between professional historiography and the more popular genres; historiography became increasingly politicised and consigned to individual republics. In 1985, Dr. Dušan Bilandžić wrote: “When the entire history is written from opposing previously-determined positions, it becomes a part of the political struggle in Yugoslavia.” 30. In the eighties, a battle about the interpretation of past was fought in Yugoslavia (the Serb journalist Aleksander Tijanić wrote then: “We’ll see what will happen in the past.”). No other decade brought as many books, specialist discourses, publicist works, newspaper articles, diverse round tables, radio, TV and other discussions about history than the eighties, a decade that may even have exceeded that of the entire post-war period 31 In this great precipitation, the future seemed to be completely forgotten, so it is hardly surprising that no Yugoslav historiographer predicted the dissintegration of Yugoslavia. The interest in treating historical issues started to grow about a year or two after Tito’s death. Prior to that a sort of pietistic atmosphere prevailed, as if energy was to be built up for a true “historiographic thunderstorm” which gradually converted into a steady rain which didn’t cease until the beginning of the nineties 32. The polemics were particularly fierce between 1985 and 1988, at which time the attitudes of single nations towards the future of Yugoslavia and the national programmes were being formed (in 1986 the memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts, in 1987 the Slovenian National Programme, published in the Nova Revija). Along with the break in communication at the political level, there was also a gradual break of ties between Yugoslav historians. Apart from some rare individual connections,
court trials, moral cleansing (the so-called Courts of National Honour), suppression of the right to vote, redundancies, etc. Some of these actions were induced by the nationality (the German minority whose members were mostly nazified before and during the war). 27 Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy de 1944 à nos jours, Le Seuil, Paris, 1990. 28 For possible parallels between France and Slovenia see Božo Repe, “France during World War II: the Issue of Collaboration, Resistance and Purge and the Possible Parallels to Slovenia”, Borec [a journal of history, literature and anthropology], No 561-562-563, Ljubljana, pp. 5-92. 29 In my paper I mainly concentrate on the historiographic treatment. The issue was discussed more in detail in my article “Razpad historiografije, ki nikoli ni obstajala” [The Downfall of the Historiography that Never Existed], Zgodovina za vse [History for Everybody], Volume III, No 1, 1966, p. 69-78. 30 Dušan Bilandžić : “Predrasude povijesti” [The Predjudices of History], Vjesnik, 9 Nov. 1985, p. 6. 31 A complete survey of the Yugoslav journalistic and other historiographic production, which comprises hundreds of articles, is virtually impossible, due to insufficient bibliography and the disintegration of the state. When writing this paper, I referred to about 150 newspaper and magazine articles treating the most burning issues of that time. 32 According to Dušan Bilandžić, 426 conferences gathering historians and actors or witnesses of world war II were held on this topic in Yugoslavia between 1979 and 1982. Dušan Bilandžić: Jugoslavija poslije Tita 1980–1986 [Yugoslavia after Tito 1980–1986], Globus, Zagreb, 1986, p. 200. In the mid-eighties the intensity of the discussions even increased, but faded gradually or became restricted to single republics towards the end of the decade.

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they were virtually completely interrupted by the end of the eighties. From 1988 on, any idea of organising a significant all-Yugoslav meeting was a sheer utopia. After its final congress in Priština (1987), the Yugoslav Union of Historians unobtrusively died away, too. The last major joint enterprise in which historians took part was the preparation of the new edition of the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia, which was never finished due to the disintegration of the state. The last printed volume, however, did bring a new interpretation of the formation of the state in 1918 and its further development. In spite of numerous critical observations, all the republic’s editorial boards adopted the new historical interpretation. However, due to the disintegration of the state, most of the copies were left unsold in the warehouse of the publishing house in Zagreb. The final attempt to publish the History of Yugoslavia was dropped as early as 1987 (two volumes treating the period before the 18th century were already published in the sixties). Yugoslav historians simply could not muster up a sufficient degree of unity. The re-evaluation of the wartime events and the first post-war years had to be seen within a broader context of appraisal of the past and assessed also in the light of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Numerous very diverse issues, covering different historic periods, caused controversy, especially those covering the more recent history. There were two key issues which dominated the polemics 33. The first one — the question of the socialist system — was argued through the criticism of revolution, and the second one — the question of the relations among the nations within Yugoslavia — through the criticism of Yugoslav (con)federalism. Both issues were directly connected to the period of World War II, the role of the Communist Party in it and the conception of the so-called Avnoj Yugoslavia, so called after the session of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Avnoj), held on 29 November 1943 in the Bosnian town of Jajce. At this session, the representatives of the Yugoslav nations decided on the federal system. In the first stage of this conflictual situation, the main topic of discussion was Josip Broz–Tito. As a leader of the national liberation movement and revolution, he also became the leading architect of the post-war Yugoslav order, and as such, the symbol of both disputed issues. Vladimir Dedijer, Tito’s official biographer, was the first to start to demolishing his myth. In his second biographical book on Tito (the first one was published in 1953) entitled Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza–Tita [New Contributions for the Biography of Josip Broz–Tito], Zagreb, Rijeka 1981, he published a variety of documents, memoirs, but also unverified stories on both, Tito’s private life and issues concerning revolutionary measures and the national relations 34. Dedijer’s aim was more for selfpromotion than for the development of a certain political concept. In this book, he did not broach either of the two controversial subjects with consistency (however, he did so in some of his later works). Neither did his criticism of Tito go as far as the criticism of some other authors, who simply declared Tito as an “obedient spy of the Comintern”. The book which actually strained the ideological structure of authority in Yugoslavia was a work by two Belgrade sociologists, Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški: Stranački
Among others, the concrete issues connected to World War II that led to disagreements were the decisions made by the second session of Avnoj in November 1943 in Jajce and the formation of a federal state; the so-called Bujana conference at the end of 1943 (in which the delegates from Kosovo and Metohia voted for the annexation of Kosovo to Albania); the question whether armed resistance made sense at all; the civil war (particularly strong efforts were made towards rehabilitation of the Chetnics); further, the history of the first post-war years that were still connected to the wartime events: the vengeance upon the opponents (liquidation of the quisling units returned by the Allies); the seizure of power through the socalled system of people’s democracy by the Communist Party and the implementation of revolutionary measures; the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and arising from that, the Stalinist nature of the Yugoslav authorities, as well as the conflict with Informbiro. 34 Critical records concerning Tito encouraged the authorities to adopt a law protecting the name and the works of Josip Broz–Tito. A special board was set up whose task was to protect the names of the deceased revolutionaries. This led the Slovenian historiographer Dr. Dušan Biber to make an ironic suggestion to set up a board for the protection of the entire revolution.
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pluralizam ili monizam [Party Pluralism or Monism], Belgrade, 1983, in which the authors described (predominantly from the Serb angle) the post-war seizure of power by the Communist Party 35. The second question, the issue of regulating relations between the nations of Yugoslavia, was opened after two books by Veselin Djuretić Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama [The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama] appeared in Belgrade in 1985. The main purpose of the book (proclaimed a “first class historiographic provocation”) was the rehabilitation of the Chetnic movement, but Djuretić also discussed the issues of revolution and civil war. One part of the book was aimed at proving that the second session of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Avnoj) on 29 November 1943 in Jajce failed to solve the Serb question adequately. According to the author, it was the misinterpretation of the Avnoj resolutions that later led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It was certainly not a coincidence that a demand for the socalled third Yugoslavia (a return to the former centralist order) was mentioned for the first time on the occasion of the festive promotion of Djuretić’s book in the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences 36. There was a sort of harmony in terms of criticism (and defence) of the revolution in all kinds of environment until almost he end of the eighties; in the mid-eighties, however, the opposing positions of national historiographies had crystallised entirely. In the mideighties three historiographic works were published which caused a big stir. In different environments they experienced a very different reception, proving the motto “no matter how you comment upon a certain issue, be it about history or any other subject, you can tell in advance that it will be applauded in some environments and fiercely criticised in others”37. The books in question are: Dušan Bilandžić Istorija SFRJ [The History of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia], Zagreb, 1985; Janko Pleterski’s Nacije, Jugoslavija revolucija [Nations, Yugoslavia, Revolution], Belgrade, 1985; and Branko Petranović’s and Momčilo Zečević’s Jugoslavija 1918 -1984 [Yugoslavia 1918–1984], Belgrade, 1985. Bilandžić was accused of attempting to ascribe the Serbs aspirations for a redefinition of Yugoslavia; by selecting and shortening documents, Petranović and Zečević were accused of attempting to present the Serb view on the constitution and development of Yugoslavia, whereas Pleterski was criticised for his thesis on “multinational revolution” (according to him, each Yugoslav nation conducted — under the direction of the leading political power, the working class — its fundamental political battle by itself, in its own way, with its own efforts and specific problems). Petranović opposed this thesis, which again led to a polemic between the two historians (the first time they argued was two years earlier, in 1983, when Petranović’s book Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji [Revolution and Counterrevolution in Yugoslavia] was
The “bourgeois” interpretation of the relations in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the assessment of the national liberation movement and the revolution, did appear in some works as early as in the seventies (before that it was characteristic of the emigrant authors, whose works entered Yugoslavia illegally). In their works, the middle-class/bourgeois authors denied the “noble” aims of the revolution; the liberation movement was presented as civil war and the activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as blind obedience to the Comintern and the struggle for power. According to these authors, the Communist Party (characterised as a Stalinistic party) could only win this battle because of specific circumstances and “machiavelism”. Through the revolution, the Yugoslav society was virtually transferred back to the absolutism of the 18th century (this thesis was, among others, developed by Ljubomir Tadić (in his book Tradition and Revolution which was published at the beginning of the seventies). An important element of these writings was also the rehabilitation of the quisling and the counter-revolutionary forces. To a certain extent they influenced the Marxist historiography which then (at least partly) opened some controversial questions, i. e. the liquidation of quislings after the war or the so-called “left movements” (the fight against the supposed class opponents in Montenegro in 1942, but also elsewhere). 36 “Dr. Zlatko Čepo: Opake besede gospoda akademika” [Mean Words from Mr. Academics], Danas, 14 October 1986, pp. 25–28. 37 Dušan Bilandžić: “The Prejudices of History”, Vjesnik, 9 November,1986, p. 6.
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published). Dr. Dušan Biber (a severe critic of attempts to rehabilitate the Chetnik movement and the idea of Great Serbia), entered the polemic too, first on during a round table at the Belgrade Institute for Contemporary History, and later also in newspapers. He fiercely opposed the assertion that Chetniks were antifascists, too 38. However, the “Slovene-Serb” historiographic dispute was hardly more than warming 39 up . With occasional outbursts in the first half of the eighties, the Croat–Serb conflict which had been smouldering for quite some time, became a key issue, though it was mostly wrapped up as an ideological conflict. The Serb and Montenegrin historians, e.g. Velimir Terzić in his book Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije [The Breakdown of the Kingdom Yugoslavia], launched a thesis according to which the Croat nation betrayed Yugoslavia in 1941. The Croat historian Dr. Ljubo Boban publicly opposed this assertion. A number of historians therefore demanded that historiography should investigate and prove the “existence of continuity between the nationalist and separatist movements and the organisations which attempted to break down Yugoslavia between the world wars on the one hand, and the present nationalism on the other” 40. In some other works 41, a thesis was presented stating that the Croats were a genocide nation. Supposedly dated back to the 16th and 17th century and not just to the time of the Pavelić NDH (Independent State of Croatia). Such assertions led to an intensification of the historiographic war between Serb and Croat historians (who were of course writing respectively for their own magazines and newspapers) until the real war broke out and even after that 42. “Unchaining the dog”, as the Slovene historian Dr. Tone Ferenc called the crossbombardment with historiographic themes, proved to be a double-edged matter for politics. On the one hand it pleased and even encouraged it (particularly in terms of conflicts between the republics), on the other, it became uncontrollable; it started to damage its very legitimacy, grounded in the revolution. The politicians therefore tried to make historians “chase the dog” which proved to be a rather fruitless business, since even the Marxist historians of different nationalities did not share the same ideological and political views, in spite of their membership of the communist party. In addition to that, many of them were not on speaking terms. Towards the end of the eighties, the politics of disciplining failed even at the symbolic level. The battle for reinterpretation of the past was continued within the individual republics. In Slovenia too, as in other republics in the mid-eighties, there was an increased interest in discussing the issues that were previously only one-sidedly, or ignored, or else plans were made for discussion in the future 43.
38

Mirko Arsić: “Ambicije i interesi” (Ambitions and Interests), Komunist, Ljubljana, 27 December 1995. See also other articles. 39 The Slovene–Serb conflict was not unimportant, particularly since the Serbs associated it with the Slovenian support to the Albanians. In the eighties several books on Kosovo and Albanians were published in Slovenia. All of them were disputable for the Serbs. 40 “Agonija učiteljice življenja” [“The Agony of the Teacher of Life”], a conversation with Prof. Dr. Miomir Dašić, president of the Yugoslav Union of Historians, published in the Belgrade magazine Duga and reprinted in Slovenian magazine Naˇi razgledi on 21 November 1986, p. 651). 41 For example, the article by Vasilije Krestić: “O genezi genocida nad Srbima” [About the genesis of Violence over the Serbs], published in the magazine Književne novine, Belgrade, 15 September 1986. 42 Even before that, some other issues led to polemics, i. e. the one about the communist leader Andrija Hebrang (according to official sources he committed suicide after the war, but he was probably killed). He was alleged to have collaborated with the Ustasha (the Croat quislings) and accused of nationalistic and separatist orientations. The latter was believed to be a common characteristic of all Croat communists during the war. From as early as the sixties, the number of Serbs killed in the Croat concentration camp, Jasenovac, was disputed. Because of his attempt to prove that the number of victims was smaller than officially stated Dr. Franjo Tuđman was attacked at that time. In the eighties, a polemic about the number of victims was carried out between Dr. Boban and Dr. Rastislav Petrović. 43 One of such plans was to publish documents about national treachery, the collaboration and the counterrevolution, respectively, but this was never done.

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This discussion comprised everything, from ideologically propagandistic stigmatisation of the national liberation movement to serious scientific debates. The prevailing themes were monopolisation of the resistance movement (the Liberation Front) by the Communist Party, execution of war time collaborators and anti-communists, implementation of the so-called second phase of the revolution (settling accounts with the big landowners and other class opponents on the liberated area), and the question as to who actually started the civil war, and finally, the elimination of the returning home-guard units at the end of the war. Emigrant authors, but also some Yugoslav historians as Dušan Biber — in his feature published in the Zagreb weekly magazine Vjesnik u srijedu, 17 and 24 October, 1973) — wrote about these units in their works. In 1975, an interview with the writer and one of the wartime non-communist leaders of the Liberation Front, Edvard Kocbek, was published in the Trieste magazine Zaliv in 1975, in which he also wrote about the post-war execution of the home-guard men and about the need for national reconciliation. This was the first time that someone’s assertions triggered such a lively response in the public and such a severe criticism by Slovene politicians 44. In the seventies there was an appeasement in the relations between the Catholic Church and the State (the authorities regarded the Church as the main advocate of collaboration and until the sixties, also, as the most dangerous opponent) as was conveyed in the statement of the archbishop of Ljubljana, Dr. Pogačnik, in 1977. When referring to the wartime events, he said that the Catholics “forgive everything that was inflicted upon [them] by human fault. We condemn all the wrongs done in the name of the Christian religion [...]” 45. A fierce debate broke out again in 1984, when the sociologist Spomenka Hribar wrote her text “The Guilt and the Sin” in which she claimed that the home-guard men were fighting for their country, too. She pleaded for the idea of national reconciliation and suggested the erection of an obelisk in Ljubljana as a symbol of that 46. Her ideas were criticised in the leading newspaper Delo, even before they were published. Afterwards there was also severe criticism from a part of the leadership of the Union of Communists and the Veterans’ League. It was not until a few years later that her text could be published. Due to shortage of documents, the fate of the home-guard men only gradually became the subject of professional studies. In 1985, on occasion at he fourth (and last) round table in which British and Slovenian historians took part, a discussion was held about the return of the home-guard men 47. Apart from that, this topic was mainly treated in newspaper articles and other publications. The question of reconciliation became a burning issue after the change in the government system in the spring of 1990. Before the change of government, the presidency of Slovenia made a statement on reconciliation, which was followed by the statement of the Slovene Bishops Conference. On 5 March 1990, the presidency of the republic published its views in a special letter and urged that the civil dispute be calmed. The letter also expressed the view that the struggle of the Liberation Front was met with opposition from some citizens, particularly those from the Province of Ljubljana. Different reasons (ideological, political, the mistakes by the Liberation Front) led these citizens to turn against the liberation movement and seek contact with the occupiers. The presidency
44

“Edvard Kocbek : pričevalec našega časa” [Edvard Kocbek: a Wittness of Our Time], an interview with Edvard Kocbek by Boris Pahor, Magazin Zaliv [The Bay], Trieste, 1961, Reprinted in Naši Razgledi, Ljubljana, 9 May, 1975. 45 From the sermon of the Ljubljana Archbishop and Metropolitan Jožef Pogačnik on the Holy Thursday, 7 April, 1977, France M. Dolinar: “Resnici na ljubo” [For the Sake of the Truth], and “Statements by the Bishops of Ljubljana about the Wartime events”, Družina, Ljubljana 1988, p. 24. In his statement to the Prime Minister of the first post-war government, regret about the mistakes committed by some priests and other Catholics was expressed as early as June 1945 by the then vicar of the Ljubljana diocese and future bishop Anton Vovk. 46 Spomenka Hribar: Krivda in greh [The Guilt and the Sin], ZAT, Maribor, 1990. 47 Dušan Biber, (ed.), Konec druge svetovne vojne v Sloveniji [The End of World War II in Slovenia], Borec, Ljubljana, no. 12, 1986.

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pleaded for the examination of the responsibility of government organs for the wrongs done and for reconciliation, which was not to be misappropriated for political purposes. The statement was submitted to the assembly (parliament) for implementation, but there was no reaction to it before the change of government. On 13 March, the bishops conference led by the reconciliation leader, Dr. Alojzij Šuštar, declared reconciliation with the dead to be a decent remembrance of all deceased, regardless of the ideology that caused their death. The conference also pleaded for the establishment of graves, the evaluation of wartime and post-war events from the perspective of the circumstances of the times; and an effort to determine correlation. According to the bishops, every wish for vengeance should be renounced 48. This statement was a deviation from the otherwise severely counter-communist tone of the religious press and public appearances of the majority of the church ideologists. In his speech on the occasion of the constitution of the multi-party assembly (parliament) on 9 May 1990, its first president, France Bučar, characterised this event as the end of civil war, which had been breaking and paralysing the Slovenes for almost half a century 49. Even before the 1990 elections, the Party of Democratic Renovation (which succeeded to the Union of Communists) condemned the so-called Dolomiti statement. With this statement the Communist Party usurped the power and abolished the coalition principle of organisation within the Liberation Front in 1943. In 1990 the organisation of home-guard veterans, Nova slovenska zaveza (The New Slovenian Alliance), was set up, named after the organisation created in Slovenia in 1942 at the incentive of Draža Mihajlović. Its aim was to promote the “home-guard” truth; with the help of the church they erected memorial plates for the home-guard men and sought to determine how many were killed. The New Alliance defended the viewpoint that the communist threat was more dangerous than the threat from the occupation; and thus that armed resistance by the occupiers was legitimate. After the first multi-party elections in 1990 and the subsequent change of government, a symbolic reconciliation ceremony was held in one of the places where home-guard men had been killed (Kočevski Rog). The president of the state and the archbishop of the Catholic Church also attended the celebration 50. Apart from its symbolic meaning, this reconciliation ceremony had no major effect on ideological disputes and viewpoints regarding World War II. The parliament set up a commission (first called the inquiring commission and after independence, the investigating commission). Its task was to investigate the post-war killings and dubious court trials as closely as possible, but the work has never been finished 51. During the struggle for independence, national interests were at the forefront, and ideological conflicts regarding the evaluation of World War II and its post-war consequences seemed to recede into background. In spite of that, some overzealous local rulers and other individuals induced some minor excesses related to the past. In some places monuments (particularly those of Tito) and other World War II and revolutionary symbols were removed. On balance however, it can be stated that the transition was highly civilised, although a dispute is still going on about the monuments in memory of the two most significant communists and national liberation movement leaders
“Slovenska Škofovska konferenca: Izjava o narodni spravi” [Slovene Bishop Conference: The Declaration on National Reconciliation], 13 March 1990, Resnici na ljubo [For the Sake of the Truth, op.cit. p. 31. 49 France Bučar: Prehod čez rdeče morje [Crossing the Red Sea], Ljubljana, 1993, p. 11. 50 During the war, the Catholic Church acted differently in different occupational zones. In some of them priests supported the partisan movement, in others, particularly in the Province of Ljubljana (Italian occupational zone) it opposed the resistance (which was equated with communism) and favoured collaboration. 51 The investigating commission for examining post-war mass killings, dubious court proceedings and other irregularities was set up on 5 June 1993. The commission issued a preliminary report in two parts. Poročevalec državnega zbora Republike Slovenije (The Parliament Reporter of the Slovenia Republic, no 38, 4 October1996 and no 42, 17 October 1996).
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(Boris Kidrič and Edvard Kardelj) which are located in the centre of Ljubljana. Political division cropped up in 1990 when national holidays were being redetermined. As a result of the balance of power in the parliament, a compromise was found and April 27 remained a holiday, but its name was changed from “Liberation Front Day” to “Resistance Day”. The holiday was (and still is) boycotted by a part of the political spectrum. Several attempts, which all failed, were made in the parliament to abolish this holiday. A heated polemic was also carried out in 1995, on the occasion of celebrating the victory over fascism and the end of World War II. A struggle for redefinition of the past broke out again after a relatively short polemicfree period when Slovenia was fighting for independence. The new head of the parliament, Herman Rigelnik, a pragmatic manager, asked Slovene historians to prepare a scientific report on Slovene contemporary history. The text was to be a historiographic foundation to serve the parliament for its declarations on some unsolved issues concerning the near past 52.Thereafter a team of twelve historians prepared a 111 pages report which provoked different reactions, but had no major influence on the decisions of the politicians. In the mid-nineties the Catholic Church started to seek rehabilitation of the wartime bishop Dr. Grigorij Rožman. After the war he was found guilty of collaboration and treason and sentenced in absentia. The efforts of the church were strongly supported by the Attorney General Anton Drobnič, a former home-guard man. Drobnič first commissioned a historical study on Rožman which was supposed to prove that the sentence was not justified 53, and afterwards suggested to file an appeal. So far the court has not ruled on the matter. Shortly before his period of office was over, he demanded that the verdict be annulled, on the grounds that the trial was illegal, but his successor withdrew the motion. Rožman’s co-defendants were General Leon Rupnik (the leader of the Slovenian homeguard formations), Dr. Lovro Kacin (the wartime head of the political police), Dr. Miha Krek (an emigrant politician), Milko Vizjak (a home-guard colonel) and the nazi war criminal Ervin Rœsener. The General Attorney did not demand annulment of the verdict upon Rœsener, but it was obvious that he too would be acquitted if the court determined that the trial was illegal 54. In 1997 and 1998 different political parties (among which, the United Union of the Social Democrats, successor of the Communist Party) prepared several draft declarations on national reconciliation and on the assessment of wartime and post-war events. The most rigorous were the ones prepared by the right wing parties, which accused the Communist Party of taking over power and of being responsible for post-war killings. They characterised the communist period between 1945 and 1990 as being totalitarian, and the regime as criminal 55.The right wing parties proposed a bill for cleansing legislation, based on the Czech model. Attempts to formulate a single declaration, acceptable to all parties failed; therefore the original plan, to have the declaration adopted by the Parliament and

Ključne značilnosti slovenske politike v letih 1929–1995 [Key Characteristics of the Slovene Politics between 1929 and 1995. A scientific report], Institute for Contemporary History in Ljubljana, Ljubljana, September 1995, introductory notes. 53 Two studies published in the book Rožmanov proces [The Rožman Trial], Družina, Ljubljana 1996, were separately written by Tamara Griesser Pečar and France M. Dolinar. Pečar’s text defended Rožman, whereas Dolinar’s treatment was more complex. 54 “Predlog državnega tožilstva okrožnemu sodišču v Ljubljani” [The motion of the Attorney General to the district court in Ljubljana], newspaper Delo, 18 November, 1994, p. 4. 55 “Predlog deklaracije o protipravnem delovanju komunističnega totalitarnega reûima” [A draft declaration on unlawful activity of the totalitarian communist regime]. “Poročevalec državnega zbora” [The Parliament Reporter, 23 December 1997, p.35-36]. The motion was handed in by two members of Parliament: Janez Janša, the leader of the Social Democrats, and Lojze Peterle, the head of Christian Democrats.

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thus recognised as “the truth” about the wartime and post-war events, was not carried out. For various reasons, historiography mostly rejected demands (to a large extent ideologically and politically determined) for the revision of history after the change of power. A new, young and unbiased generation of historians asserted itself in the eighties. After getting rid of one tutorship, it had no intention of accepting another. Apart from that, most findings of the older generation were accurate and coincided with the factual data. Some themes, however, were not researched at all or only to a limited extent. A series of monographic studies has appeared, but an authentic wartime history and the history of the entire 20th century is yet to be written. Previously, this subject was only treated in school textbooks and diverse chronicles. But now, a comprehensive history of Slovenians in the 20th century is being prepared by the Institute of Contemporary History in Ljubljana. After the disintegration of the state, no one in Slovenia seemed to be concerned with the Yugoslav history within a broader context 56. Occasional critical attention is paid to the Encyclopaedia of Slovenia, a project that started at the beginning of the eighties. The first volume was published in 1987, and the last two are yet to appear. Entries regarding World War II and the post-war period were selected and often enough written in accordance with the former criteria. Some topics are therefore unbalanced; the Encyclopaedia is reproached as ideologically biased. On the occasion of the exhibition “Slovenes in 20th Century”, which was prepared by the Museum of Contemporary History in Ljubljana, historiography was again criticised, and accused of holding to the old ideological dogmas. Writer Drago Jančar publicly criticised the exhibition as one-sided, claiming that it showed only the “bright” side of the past; he initiated a “complementary” exhibition with the title Temna stran meseca (The Dark Side of the Moon) 57. The maxim of the exhibition was the following: since the communist seizure of power, throughout the wartime and post-war revenge acts against the opponents and until 1990, Slovenia was governed by a totalitarian regime, whose true nature hardly changed throughout this whole period. The exhibition and the publication 58. with the same title induced fierce polemics. When defending their assertions, the authors of the exhibition also appealed to the Livre noir du communisme [The Black Book of Communism], although the case of Yugoslavia is only briefly treated within a broader regional context. Neither does this work present the entire post-war period. In October 1999, the Museum of Contemporary History prepared an exhibition about the home-guard men entitled “Mati, Domovina, Bog” [Mother, Homeland, God]. Along with it, an extensive publication with the same title was prepared. The latest attempt to revise the views on World War II is the book by Aleksander Bajt (one of the best-known Yugoslav socialist economists, head of the Institute of Economics at the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana, and adviser to the last two governments of former Yugoslavia). In his book, Bajt, who spent part of the war as a member of the chetnik staff in Rome, attempts to rehabilitate the chetnik movement and accuses the partisans of being responsible for beginning the civil war, since they were the ones who first attacked the Chetniks. He claims that civil war was more important for the partisans than the resistance itself. As to resistance, Bajt thinks it was unreasonable, since occupation by the Red Army and sovietisation (Stalinisation) of Yugoslavia were unavoided, anyway. For the Slovenes (and Yugoslavs) it would have been much better to await liberation from outside and thus avoid causing victims 59. Part of the press and the
One of the exceptions was Dr. Dušan Pirjevec, a Slovenian from Trieste who wrote a book entitled Jugoslavia 1918–1922, Koper, 1995. This book was first published in Italian. 57 Upon his criticism of the exhibition, the museum offered Jančar an opportunity to present his own vision of the situation. The team he selected to prepare the exhibiton was given expert support by the museum. The exhibition was funded by the state. 58 Temna stran meseca. Kratka zgodovina totalitarizma v Sloveniji 1945–1990. [The Dark Side of the Moon. A short history of totalitarianism in Slovenia 1945–1990], Ljubljana, 1988. 59 Aleksander Bajt: Bermanov dosje [The Berman Dossier], Ljubljana, 1999.
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public welcomed Bajt’s interpretation as a revision of history. Some euphoric comments even introduced the thesis that the “genuine” truth had finally been written and thus historians were not needed any more. The answer to Bajt’s theses arises from historical facts: during the war, the Slovenian nation was condemned to death; the Germans started a mass migration and forced mobilisation and the nation would not have survived if it had not been for resistance. Slovenia’s post-war situation would have been completely different if it had not been part of the antifascist coalition (the situation in Yugoslavia would have been different if the state had been restored: the question of the borders would have been treated differently, there would have been no dispute with the Informbiro, Yugoslavia would not have become non-aligned, etc.). The attitude of people towards World War II and resistance is generally more positive than can be concluded from the political and public polemics. The polemics are carried out between more or less the same circles, mostly through comments from a select group of authors, and readers’ letters in magazines and newspapers. Most people questioned in a representative 1995 opinion poll (carried out by the Faculty of Social Sciences and repeated in 1998), which examined the attitudes of the Slovene population towards its past, stated that the Slovene nation would have faced a peril of death and extinction as a nation if there had been no resistance, even if it was led by the communists. Only a small percentage of respondents felt that the communist revolution presented a greater risk than the occupation and that the resistance against the occupiers caused too many victims. Seven per cent of the respondents felt the role of the communists was very positive, 57%: positive, whereas 15% believed it was negative. Almost 50% felt that the post-war killings were a terrible crime, 20% believed they were a major political mistake, over 11% saw them as a tragic, yet unavoidable consequence of the civil war, and 7% thought they should be regarded as punishment for betraying their country. The majority believed the resistance movement enjoyed the support of the major part of the population. In opposition to that, the home-guard movement was judged as negative. Less than 2% judged the role of the Catholic Church as very positive, 25% as positive, over 42% as negative and 10% as very negative (according to the Catholic Church, over 70% of Slovenians declare themselves as Catholics) 60. Between the years 1995 and 1998, there was a slight decline in the positive rating of the resistance, along with a more critical attitude towards the Communist Party and more understanding for the home-guard movement. This was probably the resault of the gradual filling of blank spots in historiography, of a more pluralistic approach to history, which acknowledged the existence of diverse “truths”, and also of a political offensive on the media . On the whole, the period of World War II and its consequences still present a major political issue in Slovenia and continues to divide its people. Political parties abuse it in their efforts to gain political influence. People perceive it in accordance with their ideological convictions (as seen from the opinion polls, which depend far more on their own personal and family experience, than on the influence of teachers, textbooks and media). The younger generation tends to be less and less interested in the subject. Yugoslavia, as it emerged from World War II and was then gradually transformed into a tolerable form of self-managed socialism, is judged rather positively or at least neutrally by the majority of people 61. In the last decade of its existence (1980.-1990, the primary
The data quoted are taken from: Slovensko javno mnenje, podatkovna knjiga [The Slovene Public Opinion 1998, Data Book, Niko Toš et al., University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana, December 1998], and Božo Repe: “Kaj Slovenci mislimo o svoji preteklosti” [What Slovenians Think about their Past], published in Slovenian State, Society and Public (edited by Anton Kramberger), Faculty for Social Sciences, Ljubljana, 1996, pp. 85-91. 61 7% of the quesioned people characterised life in Yugoslavia as very good, almost 80% as good, and 6% as bad. 34% of the people questioned had mainly positive experiences, 50% had both, positive and negative experiences and a little less than 7% had only negative experiences.
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fear of Germans and Italians as prime enemies was gradually replaced by the fear of a new enemy, the Serbs, who acquired this position because of their constant internal conflict. After attaining independence, the former fears seem to grow again due to Italian and Austrian pressure. In neighbouring Italy and Austria, a revival of neo-fascist ideas can be perceived, which could be clearly seen after Haider’s substantial electoral success in Austria in 1999. Due to major changes after 1990, the re-evaluation of World War II was inevitable. Of course this also affected the Slovene people, but fortunately and fundamentally no major changes can be noted in the mostly positive attitude towards the evaluation of antifascism and resistance.

Summary This paper treats the gradual change of attitudes towards World War II in Yugoslavia after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, with special focus on the following questions: Tito’s role in the contemporary history of Yugoslavia, the nature of the chetnik movement, the civil and ethnic war (struggles between individual nations), the number of victims, the formation of the new Yugoslavia, the post-war vengeance against collaborators and political opponents, the role of communists in the national liberation movement and revolution. Throughout the eighties, diverse meetings, round tables and the media, fiercely debated the subject of contemporary history, particularly World War II. The polemics became increasingly nationalistic until virtually all institutional (and to a large extent also personal) ties between Yugoslav historians were destroyed. All joint projects came to a standstill, including those on researching common history. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the debates continued within individual republics (states) and were strongly influenced by the new situation. In Slovenia, the subjects under discussion were mainly the leading role of the Communist Party in the liberation movement, the post-war seizure of power and the totalitarian nature of the regime, wartime collaboration, the post-war killings of the homeguard men, and vengeance against political opponents. Recently the question of whether resistance made any sense at all has been hotly debated; the allegation being that it brought nothing but numerous needless victims. The question of national reconciliation between the wartime opponents has remained open since the mid-eighties. The author believes that a re-evaluation of history was certainly necessary, considering the major changes that have been going on in Europe since 1990, including the democratisation of the Slovene society, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the attainment of independence. He ventures the opinion, however, that the majority of Slovenian people have not changed their positive views on antifascism and resistance.

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5. The Partisan Press62
»We reject culture that speaks through guns, rifles, aircrafts and bombs and is characterized by violence, injustice, arsons and murders, one brought in by the representatives of the thousand years old Roman culture – the Italians. We want to create a new culture, one that will grow from the depths of our honest people and attain an enviable level among nations. We are no recognized artists. We are the working people so we do not flinch before any tool, be it a hammer, scythe, sickle, gun or pen.” (underlined by B.R). This quotation from the first issue of the Levstik brigade paper called Naprej (Forward), one among many Partisans’ gazettes, aptly illustrates the enthusiasm and determination of the creators of the partisan press. The passage was signed by a certain Šimen and rescued from oblivion by Djuro Šmicberger in his famous monograph The Partisan Fourth Estate. Actually, the term “press” in this context is inappropriate, because what was involved was a much wider information network of the national liberation movement (popularly referred to as the “partisan fourth estate”). It comprised a multitude of publications including those signed by central and local political bodies and mass organizations, books and other cultural titles, brochures, various propaganda material such as posters and hand-outs, publications produced in prisons and camps, as well as the war-time correspondent network, the Slovenian section of Tanjug (The Telegraph Agency of New Yugoslavia), and broadcast news (radio Kričač and later Radio Osvobodilna fronta). In the widest sense of the word, the partisan press (the press of the national liberation forces) was part of the powerful cultural movement that served as an inspiration and a source of moral support in the national liberation war. In addition to its popular nature and self-initiative (the most obvious manifestation of the latter was the local press and army gazettes), there are at least two other outstanding traits that importantly define the partisan press: its absolute devotion to the goals of the national liberation movement, and self-education and amateurism in the positive sense of the word. The press of the national liberation forces was created as an alternative to the so-called bourgeois press in the Ljubljana region where, unlike in Prekmurje, Štajerska and Gorenjska, the main newspapers continued to be published after the outbreak of war, although only 13 of the 53 pre-war periodicals carried on. These were later joined by several new titles, among these the publications of Domobranci (Home-guards63) that appeared after 1943 (plus various illegal publications of anti-Partisan or anti-revolutionary character that were published all through the war). Undoubtedly, to call this press “alternative” is to define it too narrowly, since the significance and the purpose of the partisan press was much wider. Although systematic data about the participation of journalists in the liberation war are not (yet) available,64 the impression is that the majority of professional pre-war journalists and editors in the
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Repe, Božo. Partizanski tisk = The Partisan press. V: PAVLINEC, Donovan (ur.), PEČAN, Marija (ur.), MOČNIK, Rastko, ŠKRJANEC, Breda, PAVLINEC, Donovan, REPE, Božo, STEPANČIČ, Lilijana, ŠEMROV, Andrej, ŠKRJANEC, Breda. Partizanski tisk. Ljubljana: Mednarodni grafični likovni center: = International Centre of Graphic Arts: Muzej novejše zgodovine Slovenije: = National Museum of Contemporary History, 2004, p. 41-58. 63 Domobranci - Home Guard (1943-1945), collaborationist units established by Germans in Ljubljana to fight against partisans. They numbered about 15 000 men. Home Guard confirmed their loyalty to Germans in a public oath-taking Ceremony on April 20, 1944 (Hitler's birthday). At the end of the war they retreated to Austria, where they were met by the British, disarmed as German collaborators and returned to Slovenia. Most of them were brutally murdered in June 1945. During the war they published review Domobranci. 64 The only document that exists is the list of partisan journalists published by Šmicberger. By contrast, the wealth of data about doctors, teachers, lawyers and cultural workers indicate their high participation.

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territories occupied by Italy adjusted their work to the new circumstances, meaning that they followed the line of occupier’s politics and were subject first to Italian and later German censorship. Only a minor part changed sides and joined the partisans, or secretly worked for the national liberation movement (for example, the group of journalists working for the Jutro (Morning) was connected with the OF (Liberation Front); on May 9th, 1945, when the partisan troops entered Ljubljana, they published a special edition with the banner headline Ljubljana Greets the Liberators, but the new ruling power blocked the sale of this edition and instead distributed the Slovenski poročevalec (Slovenian Reporter); it was the first issue of Reporter printed in the liberated country). The confirmation of the bourgeois party press’ orientation also came from Dr. Lovro Kuhar, one of the leading SLS politicians in emigration. In his letter of March 1943 to the bishop Gregorij Rožman he wrote: “Is it necessary and politically tactical at all for our papers to carry on and report in the Italian spirit?” The partisan press evolved from the well organized, albeit small-scale and illegal, pre-war press activity. It was introduced into the liberation movement by the Communist Party and then upgraded and expanded with the help of contributors who had no previous media experience. The combination of several factors – the pre-war practice of communist revolutionaries to impersonate several functions (they were politicians, trade unionists, cultural workers, writers and editors all at once), the polarization that occurred during the war yielding the partisan and anti-partisan (i.e. revolutionary and antirevolutionary) camps, and the existential struggle of the Slovenians – produced the type of journalism in which, in the words of Boris Kidrič, politicians were journalists and journalists were politicians. Politics, propaganda and journalism fused into an effective whole. Some of our contemporaries (including those who experienced the socialist-era journalism) may be tempted to reproach the partisan press for its ideological bias. However, who could (and who would want to) act differently at those times? And who could (would want to) act differently now, if such vital issues were at stake? One only needs to recall the reporting of the Slovenian press and other media in 1991, the year of Slovenia’s struggle for independence, to realize that its tone of reporting was comparable to that of the partisan press during the Second World War. As for the content of the partisan press, it closely followed the political (and military) developments during the war. Its first phase of development was characterized by decentralized reporting and, taking into account the circumstances, even plurality manifested through the existence of a number of local and regional editions of the main newspapers (sometimes even slightly “edited” local editions). During the second phase i.e., after the second AVNOJ65 session and the beginnings of the formation of the new Slovenian and Yugoslav state, it was most decidedly characterized by increasing centralization, the strengthening of the role of agitprop, external censorship (which replaced the former, instinctive following of the “line”), uniform propaganda, a systematic development of the correspondent network and no less systematic education of the cadres.

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Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia - Antifašističko veće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije (AVNOJ) was the central political and representative body of the National Liberation Struggle of Yugoslavia. Founding meeting was in Bihać (Bosnia) on November 26 and 27 1942. The second, historic meeting held in Jajce (Bosnia) on November 29 and 30, 1943. AVNOJ elected a state presidency and a government National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership. AVNOJ also proclaimed itself supreme legislative and executive body and announced a reunited Yugoslavia on the basis of democratic federalism. Slovenia after war would join the new Yugoslavia as one of the six republics. In 1944 Ivan Šubašić, prime minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile met with Tito and accepted the Jajce provisions. At his thitd meeting, held in Belgrade on August 7 and 8, 1945, AVNOJ officially became a provisional Parliament.

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It is possible to identify several milestones that marked the otherwise “smooth” transition from one stage to the next. One was the journalistic conference held on May 5, 1944 in Metlika with more than 100 partisans-journalists participating. According to Marija Vilfan66, at that time the partisan press comprised 378 publications, accounting for almost 70% of all the Slovenian language newspapers printed in Slovenia. For new, inexperienced journalists (who constituted the majority) the conference marked the beginning of their systematic professional and political education. Vida Tomšič67 thus summarized the purpose of the meeting (and the partisan press): “Our entire press bears the mark of our liberation war; our entire press is a political press arising from our identical understanding of the political events and from our shared aspiration – to promote our nations’ struggle for liberation.” The second milestone was the establishment of the alternative (Partisan) association of journalists (Slovenian Journalistic Society) on October 22, 1944. On July 15, 1945 the Society took over the function (and the property) of the pre-war Slovenian Journalistic Society (the latter was dissolved on may 20, 1945, or rather, the two organizations merged). Even before that, at the time of Ljubljana’s liberation, the Slovenski poročevalec (Slovenian Reporter) and Ljudska pravica (People’s Justice) took over the printing plants and other facilities of the two main pre-war dailies, Slovenec and Jutro (Morning). Regional dailies experienced a similar fate. The third pivotal event was the systematic creation of the new Yugoslav awareness based on the policy of brotherhood and unity. It was first announced in the mid 1944 by Boris Kidrič in an article entitled “Več jugoslovanstva” (More “yugoslavism” ). The partisan press and propaganda were meant to surpass various localisms, and the idea about the united Slovenia was to be emphasized within the context of the emerging federal state of Yugoslavia. The generation of journalists that developed along with the partisan press subsequently formed the core of the post-war socialist journalism. The Slovenski poročevalec was the main newspaper and for a long time a kind of informal “official gazette” of the liberation movement (it published all important decisions and orders issued by the leadership of the national liberation movement, while the first official gazette of the Slovenian National Liberation Council appeared only in March 1944). The newspaper dated from the pre-war period (two issues of the Slovenski poročevalec were published in July and October 1938). The first war issue, indeed without the date printed, appeared in May 1941 and its circulation totaled 2,000 copies, while the second issue bears the date June 8, 1941. From that time on it was published more or less regularly, once or twice a week, depending on the circumstances. The nameplate of the initial several issues bore the line that read “The paper of the antiimperialistic front”, later replaced with The News Gazette of the OF and eventually with The Gazette of the OF. The tone of its reporting was influenced by the prominent politicians of the liberation movement, most notably Boris Kidrič, whose leading articles clearly and comprehensibly explained the orientation of the Liberation Front. The titles of these articles unambiguously point to the turning points in the development of the national liberation movement. In Ljubljana alone Slovenski pročevalec had the readership (including the pass-along readership) of around 50,000. This number further increased when it became accessible all over the Slovenian ethnic territories thanks to the
66

Marija Vilfan, journalist, editor, political worker, in that time Chief Editor of Slovenski poročevalec, later head of the Press bureau for Slovensko primorje (Slovenian Coastal Region). After war among the other posts she was Yugoslav representative in Unesco. 67 Vida Tomšič, political worker, national heroine, in that time editor of Slovenska pravica and member of Slovene national liberation council (Slovenski narodnosvobodilni svet, SNOS) - Slovenian parliament established in february 1944 in Črnomelj. First woman to be appointed for the minister in Slovenian history (minister for social policy in 1945-46). Representative of Yugoslavia in different international institutions, expert for women's rights and family policy.

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extensive courier network and local editions (there were local editions in the Ljubljana region, Gorenjska, Primorska, Štajerska and Koroška). The Slovenski poročevalec continued to be published after the war, until 1959 when it merged with the Ljudska pravica (People’s Justice) into the newspaper Delo. During the period 1941 – 1942, the OF published another newspaper as well, called Osvobodilna fronta (Liberation Front). Early in 1942, both OF newspapers published the Basic Principles of the Liberation Front. The newspaper Delo, the paper of the Communist Party of Slovenia, was published before and during the war (1941 and 1942). The first war edition of the Delo is connected with a small historical secret. Not one copy of the first, May 1941 edition has been preserved. In the opinion of some historians (Bojan Godeša), it secretly disappeared because it featured the communists’ eulogy to the end of the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It was a piece written in the spirit of the (short-lived) “anti-imperialist” politics of the time and inspired by the communists’ expectations that the revolution was going to produce quick results. According to the testimony of Janez Martinc, this lost issue contained the following sentence by Boris Kidrič: “I’m proud that we brought down that Yugoslav monster.” The third issue of the Delo, dated September 1941, featured the invitation “Join the Partisans!” and the famous poem by Oton Župančič entitled “Sing after me”, nowadays better known under the title “Poet, Know Your Debt.” In this poem Župančič called on the Slovenian poets and writers to break the silence and join the liberation movement. The Delo, a party nespaper, was followed by the Ljudska pravica (the paper was randomly published even before the war, in 1934, 1935, 1939 and 1941). Other groups too published their own gazettes, among these the Christian socialists. Their paper was called Slovenska revolucija (Slovenian Revolution) and its editor (and the main contributor) was Edvard Kocbek. It was not a widely read newspaper, but it is significant for those historians interested in the intellectual group of Christian socialists and their position within the OF. The titles with longer tradition that continued to be published after the war (some of these are still around) were mainly gazettes of various mass organizations. The trade union’s paper Delavska enotnost (Workers’ Unity) first appeared in December 1942. It emerged after the conference at which the communists, Christian socialists and socialist expert organizations agreed on a joint trade union, which was an event that significantly strengthened the workers’ component within the Liberation Front and anticipated its unification that occurred three months later with the famous Dolomite Statement. At the Workers’ Unity conference, the Christian socialists acknowledged the proletarian avantgarde role of communists. Among other important newspapers, we should mention Kmetski glas (Farmers’ Voice), another paper with a pre-war tradition that gained wider popularity. The Naša žena (Our Woman), originally called Našim ženam (To Our Women), was a gazette of the Anti-Fascist Women’s Association. It first appeared in 1943 following the founding congress of the organization, and there were five issues published during the war. It has survived to date and it undoubtedly deserves credit for the emancipation of the Slovenian women during the war and particularly during the post-war decades. In fact, all until the 1970s the Naša žena was the only magazine targeted at women, promoting their education and gender equality. The Mladina (Youth) played a similar role. Originally titled Mlada Slovenija (Young Slovenia), it was the gazette of the Youth Association of Slovenia (this organization was a result of the merging of several youth organizations in 1943, more specifically the Sokol, Christian socialist and communist youth organizations). Initially, its content provoked grudging remarks by the leadership as well as individual parts of the then youth organizations, but over time it managed to gain a foothold. However, viewed from the perspective of a wider historical context, its time of glory came only forty years later, in the mid 1980s, when it began to stab at the failed 39

idea of the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nations and the until then glorified Yugoslav People’s Army. Other youth magazines were Mlada Slovenija (Young Slovenia) and Slovenski pionir (Slovenian Pioneer). Outstanding among the numerous war time gazettes – at the peak of the war-time publishing activity, in 1944, there were 378 titles altogether including two daily newspapers, 60 periodicals, 72 pocket editions and 30 wall papers – was the Partizanski dnevnik (Partisan Daily). It first appeared in 1943 as the gazette of the Triglav division (later the 31st division). Its initial circulation of 400 copies later rose to 5,000 copies and as the war was drawing to a close it amounted to 20,000 (at that time it was published by the Il Piccolo daily’s printing house in Trieste). In total, 437 issues of the Partizanski dnevnik were published during the war. On May 15, 1945 it was renamed Primorski dnevnik (Coastal Daily). For many decades after the war it gauged the pulse of the Slovenian minority in Italy and the coastal, Slovenian and Yugoslav everyday while pursuing a unique, temperamental Mediterranean reporting style. Actually, the first Slovenian army paper was the Slovenski partizan (Slovenian Partisan), a cyclostyled paper that first appeared in October 1941. The main contributing authors were partisan commanders Aleš Bebler, Stane Rozman and Dušan Kveder.68 Originally, the Slovenian Partisan was conceived as a one-time publication, so the next issue appeared only in June 1942. The first issue described the purpose of the partisan movement and the role of partisan and Narodna zščita (National Protection) units within the national liberation movement.69 It also included practical advice on how to organize partisan units, how to survive through the winter and prepare various actions. The Nazi propaganda unit located in Bled translated it into German and distributed it as classified material to the regional NSDAP70 headquarters. The surge of war time gazettes during the early stages of the national liberation movement was characterized by variegation in terms of publishing intervals, circulation and technical characteristics (according to some sources, in July 1942 the Slovenian Partisan was even outstripped by the printed edition of broadcast army news distributed by Peter Šprajc, a teacher from Savinjska dolina). The situation remained largely unchanged during the next few years – most of these publications were low circulation, hand-written or cyclostyled sheets. Some appeared only once, while others even aspired to become daily newspapers, for example Partizanski vestnik krimskega bataljona (The Partisan Messenger of the Krim Battalion) that first appeared on January 5, 1942 and was followed by 23 issues within the next two months. Virtually every partisan unit had its own paper or at least its own wall newspaper (stenčas). It is definitely impossible to delineate all of the various aspects of the partisan press (the press of the national liberation forces) in this short essay. However, one of its components that should be mentioned here is the local press, particularly the regional papers that covered the areas on the edges of the Slovenian national territories: Beneška Slovenija, Koroška, and, towards the end of the war, Prekmurje. In addition, there were satirical periodicals (Bodeča Neža, Pavliha, Partizanski toti list), then publications produced in prisons and penitentiaries across Slovenia and in the concentration camps in Italy, Germany and Austria (Kibla, Kapucinski toti list, Arestant, Naša bolha-naša uš, Želja, Rdeči cvet, Glas slovanskega juga, Spoletski poročevalec, Razsvit, Dachauski poročevalec and many others). These publications brought at least a partial relief to the humiliated and tortured prisoners who were living in impossible and hopeless conditions and helped them cling to a shred of hope that they would survive and see the day of the liberation. Those rare prisoners who managed to escape disseminated news about the
68

Even before the appearance of the Slovenian Partisan, there was issued a Slovenian translation of the Bulletin of the Headquarters of the Yugoslav National Liberation Partisan Units, which began to be published on August 10, 1941 in Beograd and was initially edited by Josip Broz Tito. 69 Article entitled “Partisans – the Iron Fist of the Slovenian Nation.” 70 Nationalsozialistische Deutche Arbeitpartei (The National Socilaist Workers' Party)

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horrendous circumstances in Italian, Home Guard and German prisons and concentration camps. One of them was Sveto Kobal (Florjan), initially a Mathausen prisoner subsequently relocated to a working camp from where he escaped, managed to reach Slovenia and joined the partisans. In 1944 he published the first known brochure about the horrors of the concentration camp in Mathausen. The partisan press also comprised publications in Italian and German targeted at Italian and Austrian fighters within the Slovenian national liberation movement. Such a range and diversity of partisan publications could exist thanks to partisan workshops (initially Centralne tehnike KPS – various technical units that existed before the war). During the war, this organization united under its roof an assortment of activities ranging from the partisans’ puppet theater to the units for the production of explosives, cold steel and other army accessories. However, its main activity was printing, which was carried out by public printing houses and technical workshops in the liberated territories and by illegal workshops elsewhere. These illegal technical units, which operated throughout the national liberation war, were characterized by extremely hard working conditions. Workers worked by poor light and under the permanent threat of being discovered by the enemy. So they remained in the same location three to four months on average and were then forced to move to evade the enemy. Initially a large number of these workshops were located in Ljubljana, but later moved to the liberated territories. Towards the end of 1942 there were more than 20 illegal workshops. Almost every larger partisan unit had its own cyclostyle workshop. Towards the end of the war some publications of the Slovenian liberation movement were printed in Dalmatia and in the bases of the overseas brigades in Italy. Modern propaganda and new norms of information provision were born during the First World War. Ever since the Second World War, the psychological war exploiting the word, either written or spoken, has been as much important factor of success as the armed struggle. Of course, the “partisan fourth estate” in Slovenia would not have been able to score victory on its own, without other components of the liberation movement, particularly the partisan combat units that represented the “armed fist” of the Liberation Front71. The Partisans’ press (the press of the national liberation forces) provided the direct support to the armed struggle without which the nation would not be able to survive, and so did many other non-combat groups providing services such as medical care and other forms of assistance, among these the Scientific Institute of the Slovenian National Liberation Council. At the same time, the partisan press was the promoter of the emerging Slovenian statehood and nation’s faith in a more just society following the war. A “march to the sky,” whose important segment was directed by the partisan press among others, perhaps took a different twist after the war, such as was not envisaged by the more critical journalists and editors who matured during the war (France and some other countries experienced a similar situation; there, pluralism of the press later evolved from a different platform). In Slovenia, the war-time press was turned into the messenger of the victorious socialist ideology. Freedom of the press was won only in the second half of the 1980s, and among the most deserving contributors were precisely several newspapers and magazines that evolved from the partisan press. Viewed from the historical perspective, it is not possible to imagine the survival of the Slovenian nation, its victory as part of the anti-Fascist coalition, and the first modern form of statehood as a Yugoslav republic, without the contribution of the partisan press. As part of the unique and unmatched cultural movement that was born out of resistance, it provided information and moral support, and boosted national awareness.

We should add here that there were numerous other forms of liberation movements that restricted their activities to espionage, press publication, propaganda and perhaps several commando-style actions. They too deserve their share of credit for the victory over Fascism.

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6. Migrations and deportations of Slovenians, Germans and Italians during the Second Word War and after the War72
The three big ideologies (fascism, nazism and communism) resulted in huge migrations from the Slovenian territory. The first big wave of migrations actually happened in the twenties when a lot of people moved from the territory, which fell to Italy after World War I (Venezia – Giulia). Slovenian national community in Italy, which before the war amounted to about 300 000 people lost until the mid-thirties most of its anyway weak economic foundation, which was mainly concentrated in co-operatives, loan societies and savings banks. The economic crisis and the fascist pressure caused mass migrations of all strata of the society, beginning with the intelligence and the clerical staff. The result was a strongly changed social structure: the Slovenians practically completely lost their middle class. Most of the economic and political migrants – around 70 000 – moved to Yugoslavia, 30 000 to South America and several thousands to other European countries.73 The unknown number of people, mostly clerks, teachers and policemen moved to Venezia Julia from inlands in the time of fascist Italian rule between 1922 - 1943. In spite of the strong migrations, the countryside predominantly remained Slovenian, whereas the Italians dominated bigger cities. During World War II, all the three occupational forces (the German, the Italian and the Hungarian) condemned Slovenians to ethnocide. However, their methods and the required time in which the plan was to be carried out differed. Most drastic deportations were carried out by the German occupants. The German leadership assigned the responsibility for the solution of the “Slovenian question” to various offices under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler, the state secretary for reinforcement of germanness. The Germans planned to deport between 220 000 and 260 000 Slovenians.74 First they brought them to collecting camps from where they were shipped to Germany, Croatia and Serbia. The deportation was to be carried out in several waves: the first to come were the nationally feeling Slovenes who were followed by those who moved to Slovenian territory after 1914, and finally by those whose estates and property were needed for the German colonisation (about 80 000 German immigrants were planned to be settled in this area). This plan was intended to be carried out in five months. Apart from the reasons stated above, the deportations began to be carried out as punitive actions against the relatives and the supporters of the partisans. 75 Due to the problems of transportation, the uprising of the population and because Croatia and Serbia were unable to accept as many deportees as planned, only 80 000 Slovenians were deported (about 17 000 of them fled to Italian occupation territory). 12 000 Germans from Slovenia (Gotschee Deutsch) were settled, mostly to the borderland with the Independent State of Croatia, along the rivers Sava and Sotla in agreement with the Italian occupational authorities.

Repe, Božo. Migrations and deportations of Slovenes, Germans and Italians during the Second World War and after the War : predavanje na mednarodnem kolokviju Zwangsmigrationen in Europa 1938-1950, Prag, 25.-28. September 2002. Praga, 2002. 73 Jože Pirjevec, Milica Kacin-Wohinz: Zgodovina primorskih Slovencev (The history of the Slovenians living on the Coast), Nova revija, Ljubljana 2002. 74 Tone Ferenc: Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Slowenien 1941 – 1945, Obzorja, Maribor 1980. 75 Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem 1941 – 1945 (Occupational systems in Slovenia 1941 – 1945), Modrijan, Ljubljana 1997.

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The (Kočevje) Gotschee Germans had lived in coexistence with their Slovene neighbours for more than 600 years. As the of World War II approached, they became increasingly captured by the nazi movement; half-military units were formed and most of the German population joined the Kulturbund.76 Between April 10 and April 14 they seized power over the (Kočevje) Gotschee area and started to chase and arrest the Slovenes (the sama happened in the mayor sities in Styria where Germans also lived). They were extremely disappointed that the (Kočevje) Gotschee area fell under Italian occupation, which led to increased tensions between the Italian authorities and the Germans. Since 1939 there had been hints about their being moved to some other area, yet the decision came in haste only in April 1941. Due to various problems, they were moved as late as in winter of 1941-1942. Most of the (Kočevje) Gotschee Germans (more than 12 000) decided for the project. They were settled on the farms of the deported Slovenians. Apart from them, some Germans living in Ljubljana and other Slovene areas (a little over 1000) were moved too. Mostly they went to Gorenjska and Koroška (Kärnten) but also to the »old« Reich and to Eastern Europe. The choice of their future residence was based on their racial assessment. In the Italian occupational territory similar plans as in German were made in spring 1942: planned were mass deportations of the Slovenians and Italian colonisation of the emptied Slovene territories.77 However, Italy surrendered before the above plans could be implemented. Yet, the Italians succeeded to deport about 25 000 thousands Slovenes into Italian concentration camps.78 . The preserved documents let us believe that in case of their victory, the Italians would have introduced the same denationalising regime as was carried out in the Slovenian coastal area and Istria during both World Wars.79 The Hungarian occupiers deported those Slovenes who moved to Prekmurje (the river Mura region), which was allotted to Yugoslavia after World War I, until World War II. About 600 of them (mostly immigrants from Primorska, the territory awarded to Italy after World War I) were deported to the concentration camp Szavar in the spring of 1942.80
Biber Dušan: Kočevski Nemci med obema vojnama (Gotschee Germans between both World Wars), Zgodovinski časopis (Historical Review) 17, Ljubljana 1963; the same:Nemci in nacizem v Jugoslaviji (Germans and Nazism in Yugoslavia) 1933 – 1941, Ljubljana 1966; Janez Cvirn: Nemci na Slovenskem (Germans in Slovenia) 1848-1941 (published in: Dušan Nećak (editor) : “Nemci” na Slovenskem 1941 – 1955 (The »Germans« on Slovenian Territory 1941 – 1955), Znanstveni inštitut filozofske fakultete (Scientific Institute of the Faculty of Arts), Ljubljana 2002 (second edition) 77 On 31.July 1942 in Gorica (Gorizia) Benito Mussolini had meeting with military official from Slovenian occupational zone. He ordered the change of Italian policy from “soft” to “hard”. He confirmed mass deportation of Slovenian population (Protokol from the meeting with Mussolini in Gorizia, 31.7. 1942, published in Tone Ferenc: Occupational systems in Slovenia 1941- 1945). An huge military offensive from July till September 1942 followed, during which few hundred civilians were killed and few tenth villages were burned (Narodnoosvobodilna vojna na Slovenskem 1941 – 1945, (National – liberation War in Slovenia) Ljubljana 1978. 78 Slovenci skozi čas (Slovenians through time), Ljubljana, 1999. 79 In report of High Commissioner for Provinzia di Lubiana (Ljubljanska pokrajina – Ljubljana county) from 24 August 1942 (published in Tone Ferenc: Occupational systems in Slovenia 1941- 1945) following measures were planned: -the hardest possibly line toward Slovenians; -the problem of Slovenian population could be solved with mass destruction; with deporation; or - as third possibility - with elimination of “opposite elements” and on a long term with assimilation of the rest of population; - mass internment must me realized according to given plans, it must be decided were to deport Slovenian population and from where to take Italian population for the replacement ( the most appropriate - by suggestion of High Commissioner - supposed to be population from the Central and North part of Italy). If there all Slovenian population will be deported, deportations should be started in the zone across the old border (by the opinion of Commissioner that should be done after war because of difficulties during the war). 80 Gregor Kaplan, Vrste in oblike nasilja madžarskega okupatorja (Violent measures of Hungarian occupier) Ljubljana 2002.
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After the German occupation of Hungary and Prekmurje, most of the Prekmurje Jews (452 persons) were imprisoned in concentration camps. 328 of them were then killed in Auschwitz-Birkenau81 in April 1944. Due to political and national reasons, between 15 000 and 20 000 Slovenes fled their country and moved to overseas countries towards the end of World War II and shortly after it. After the annexation of Primorska (the coastal region of Slovenia) to Yugoslavia, the inhabitants of this territory were given the right to choose either the Yugoslav or the Italian citizenship. The inhabitants of the Yugoslav territory with permanent residence right until June 10, 1940 and their children lost the Italian and gained Yugoslav citizenship. However, they were offered the possibility to opt for Italian citizenship. The offer stood for one year after the implementation of the Peace Treaty.82 If they decided to opt, they had to move to Italy. From Slovenian territory annexed to Yugoslavia by Paris Peace Treaty opted 21 323 Italians, all inhabited between both world wars (so called “recignoli”) because in this part was almost no Italians living before first World War (by census from 1910 only 222 Italians lived in this territory). So in the first emigration wave after Peace Treaty majority of autochthon Italian population was from Croatia. In Slovenia autochthon Italian population lived in that day Koper County (Zone B of Free Territory of Trieste which by London agreement belonged to Yugoslavia). 83 Their problem was sold with Memorandum of understanding between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United states and Yugoslavia, regarding the Free Territory of Trieste (signed in London on 5 October 1954) and later the Osimo agreements (signed by Yugoslavia and Italy on 10 November 1975 in Osimo near Ancona ) and at the end with the Agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy concerning the final settlement of all mutual obligations arising from article 4 of the Osimo treaty (signed February 1983). From Slovenian territory under the condition of Paris Peace Treaty and Memorandum of understanding left 27 810 (we do not have data, how many Slovenians were among them). 84 There is no exact number of refugees from Croatia, but estimations for the whole Yugoslavia are between 200 000 and 300 000.85 Yugoslav and Slovene authorities respected the right for the choice of citizenship and emigration, people were not forced into decisions. The reasons for emigration were mostly of political and economic nature. Italy, however, encouraged immigration from Yugoslavia and persuaded its citizens to move to Italy. The migration was presented as mass flight. Later Italy regretted this attitude, because it assessed a stronger national
81

Darja Kerec, Judje v Murski Soboti v letih 1943-1954 (The Jews in Murska Sobota between the Years 1943 and 1954),Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje (Review for History and Etnography), No. 4., year 71, Maribor 2000. 82 Pariška mirovna pogodba (Paris Peace Treaty), Peace Treaty with Italy, integral text, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana 1997. 83 London agreement is international agreement by which the military administration was brought to an end in Zone A and Zone B of Free Trieste Territory. It was signed by the representatives of Italy, Yugoslavia, Great Briatin and USA on 5 October 1954 in London. Yugoslavia and Italy confirmed the existing demarcation, the Italian civil administration was extended throughout zone A, and the Yugoslav throughout Zone B. Guarantees were given for the unhindered return of persons who had formerly held domicile rights on the territories under Yugoslav or Italian administration, Special statute guaranteed for both sides the national rights of minorities. 84 In the report of mixed Slovene – Italian Historical and Cultural Commission which deals with Slovene – Italian relations between 1880 and 1956 (Nova revija 2001), page 159 it is stated: “In the post war period, the Istrian territory which came under Slovene sovereignty, witnessed the departure of over 27 000 persons, more less the whole Italian population. 85 This is the number established by mixed Slovene - Italian Historical and Cultural Comission and quoted in above mentioned report. See also: Marina Cattaruzza: Der “Istrische Exodus”: Fragen der Interpretation, in Detlef Brandes, Edita Ivaničkova und Jiri pešek (Hg.) Erzwungene Trennung, Klartext verlag Essen, 1999.

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minority in Slovenia would have been of more use to it.86 In spite of everything, Italian minority was preserved; it was awarded legal protection and it counts today about 4000 members. Due to voluntary or forced immigration, the German minority virtually disappeared after the war. Most of the about 24 000 Germans, the so-called Volksdeutscher, (15 000 Kočevje -Gottschee Germans and 9000 of other Germans) fled. According to the then allied policy and the principle of the collective responsibility, about 9000 were forcefully deported by the authorities. It was a measure, which resulted from the attitude of the Germans and the German minority towards Slovenians during the war. 87 In 1948, 1824 people declared themselves as Germans and 582 as Austrians, which in total amounts to 2406 people. In 1991, both nationality groups together only amounted to 745 people .88 In the post war years, the German speaking people did not enjoy the status of a national minority. Due to various reasons (the war and the big ideologies), about 170 000 persons emigrated more or less forcefully from the Slovenian territory from the mid-thirties to the beginning of the fifties of the 20th century; among them there were Slovenes, Germans and Italians. The consequence of this process led to major economic, social and cultural changes. SUMMARY The three big ideologies (fascism, nazism and communism) and Second World War resulted in huge migrations from the Slovenian territory. The first big wave of migrations actually happened in the twenties when a lot of people moved from the territory, which fell to Italy after World War I (Venezia – Giulia). During World War II, all the three occupational forces (the German, the Italian and the Hungarian) condemned Slovenians to ethnocide. However, their methods and the required time in which the plan was to be carried out differed. Most drastic deportations were from the early beginning carried out by the German occupants. In the Italian occupational territory similar measures in larger scale (mass deportations of the Slovenians) started only in 1942. The Hungarian occupiers deported those Slovenes who moved to Prekmurje (the river Mura region), which was allotted to Yugoslavia after World War I, until World War II. They also deported the Jews, who were mostly murdered in nazi concentration camps. Due to political and national reasons, between 15 000 and 20 000 Slovenes fled their country and moved to overseas countries towards the end of World War II and shortly after it. Some 27 000 Italians and 24 000 Germans also left Slovenian territory. In general, due to various reasons (the war and the big ideologies), about 170 000 persons emigrated more or less forcefully from the Slovenian territory from the midthirties to the beginning of the fifties of the 20th century; among them there were Slovenes, Germans and Italians. The consequence of this process led to major economic, social and cultural changes.

Zbornik Primorske – 50 let (The Anthology of Primorska – 50 Years) , Primorske novice, Koper 1997. Tone Ferenc: “Nemci” na Slovenskem med drugo svetovno vojno “(The »Germans« on Slovenian Territory during WW II), Božo Repe: “Nemci” na Slovenskem po drugi svetovni vojni “ (“Germans” (The »Germans« on Slovenian Territory after WW II), Dušan Nećak: “Nemci na Slovenskem 1945 – 1955 v luči nemških in avstrijskih dokumentov (The »Germans« on Slovenian Territory through German and Austrian documents), all in The »Germans« on Slovenian Territory 1941 – 1955). About broader Yugoslav context of this problem look: Božo Repe: AVNOJ: Historische Tatsache und aktuelle politische Frage, Ost-West Informationen nr. 2, Oktober 2002, Alternativ – sozialistisches Osteuropakomitee Graz. 88 Mitja Ferenc: “Nemci” na Slovenskem v popisih prebivalstva po drugi svetovni vojni (“Germans” on Slovenian Territory in post war censuses in: Dušan Nećak : »Nemci« na Slovenskem 1941-1955 (The »Germans« on Slovenian Territory 1941 – 1955).
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7. Migrations in the territory of former Yugoslavia from 1945 until present time /today/89
Since the second half of the 19th century, migrations in the territory of former Yugoslavia were strong and frequent. Its reasons were of economic, political and religious nature. The most important economic reasons were economic retardation, agrarian overpopulation and the growing birth rate. Of the political and religious reasons the most important ones before 1945 were the change of the state format (i.e. the inclusion of Kosovo and Metohija into Serbia and later into Yugoslavia. The consequence was a mass migration of the Turks and also of the Albanians or the inclusion of the Bosnia and Herzegovina into Austria Hungary, which provoked similar processes among the Muslims. The unsuccessful rebellions against the Turks (i.e. the Ilinden rebellion at the beginning of the 20th century) can also be attributed to the religious and political reasons. Due to the new borders After World War I, there were further mass migrations which resulted in the emergence of numerous strong national minorities. Out of 300.000 of the Coastal Slovenians who became Italian citizens, over 70.000 migrated partly to Yugoslavia, partly to the overseas countries, predominantly the USA and South America. From the end of the 19th century until World War II there were also temporary migrations due to seasonal work (falling trees, work in the fields), which usually lasted a few months. From the end of the 19th century until the beginning of World War II almost 1.000.000 people left the country for the USA, Canada, Australia, South America and several European countries (mostly France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany - above all Westfallen). World War II was characterised by refugees, mass – mostly forced - migrations (deportations), i. e. of the Serbs from Croatia or the Slovenes to Serbia, Croatia and Germany, and the colonisation of the evacuated territories by German population (in Slovenia this meant, that 15.000 members of the Götscher German minority were settled in the homes of the deported Slovenians in the Posavje and the Obsotelje region. After World War II, the first wave of emigrants from all republics consisted of political emigrants (members of collaborationist units and their families; people who could not accept communism). Most of them fled at the end of the war, however, the allies returned a part of them. An exact number of people who fled the country after the war has never been established, yet the estimations go up to several hundred thousands. A part of the emigration wave consisted of the members of the German and the Italian nationality. Almost all the members of the numerous German national minority emigrated after World War II (the reasons being mass nazification and the collaboration in the occupational apparatus during World War II). Based on the agreement between the Yugoslav and the Italian government on the possibility of the choice of citizenship, the majority of Italian population moved from Slovenia and Croatia; yet the Italian minority - contrary to the German - was preserved and eventually gained strong protection as a minority. Due to victims of war and post-war migrations, Yugoslavia is estimated to have lost between 2 1000 and 2 9000 of its inhabitants (the numbers were frequently a subject of political manipulations). After that, the population started to grow - from 15 million it grew to 22 million at the beginning of the eighties, which corresponds to the growth of 41,6%. The birth rate in the more developed parts of the country (i.e. Slovenia and Croatia) was 20%, whereas it amounted to 60% in the less developed parts and even to 116% in Kosovo. Until the beginning of the sixties, there had been no further mass migrations, which is among others due to the fact that Yugoslavia was a politically closed and
Repe, Božo. Les migrations sur le territoire de l'ancienne Yougoslavie de 1945 a nos jours: predavanje: Séminaire européen d'enseignants "Etre migrant(e) en Europe", 6-9 mars 2002, Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, Université de Neuchâtel. Neuchâtel, 2002.
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isolated country (disputes with the western allies because of the border, disputes with the Soviet Union because of the Inform biro). The settlement of the border issues in the midfifties and the gradual opening of the country resulted in the increased wave of economic emigration. In the forties, the internal migrations were first caused by colonisation. From mountainous areas of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, people were moved to fertile Vojvodina, to the possessions, which previously belonged to Germans. These colonisations brought about numerous national and psychological consequences. People from the mountains were not used to the farming in the plain country; between them and the natives conflicts occurred even if they were of the same nationality - the cultural differences were simply too big. Another aspect of the migrations was that the authorities wanted to change the nationality structure, particularly in regard with the strong Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. The second wave of migrations was caused by the accelerated industrialisation in the mid-fifties, which was carried out in Yugoslavia according to the Soviet model. Several hundred thousands of mostly unskilled workers moved to the towns. Since the politically initiated industrialisation was not followed by setting up an appropriate infrastructure (flats, schools, kindergartens, shops, services, etc.), the settling was more or less carried out spontaneously, by erecting improvised housing units from which people only very gradually moved to the big, newly built residential quarters. Slovenia turned to become the largest immigration area. In the mid-fifties, it was the first Yugoslav republic to change from a predominantly agrarian into a predominantly industrialised society, the consequence being a constant influx of people from other republics. On the whole, till 1990, over 289 000 people moved to Slovenia, as opposed to the 207 000 who left it (out of which over 70 000 went to western European countries; the rest of them either returned home to their respective republics, or moved elsewhere, mostly to the west). As you may know, Slovenia has a population of less than two million; according to the national census of 1991, 87,6% were of Slovenian nationality. In 1990, the total rise of the population due to immigration thus amounted to 140 000 people. In the period between 1960 and 1966, about 380 000 people moved from Yugoslavia to other countries; mostly due to economic reasons. In the mid-seventies when the emigration was at its peak and the needs for labour force in the Western-European countries the biggest, about 1 400 000 people used to be on the so-called "temporary labour" abroad. After that, the number began to fall gradually (about 400 000 returned home). In the mid-eighties it amounted to a million clear. In the first period, most economic emigrants came from Serbia (37% of the total number), later from Croatia (24%). In the eighties, however, there was an increased influx of emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the mid-eighties, 180 000 emigrants from this republic used to work in Western-European countries. For the former Yugoslavia economic emigrants was be a very special psychologicalsociologic phenomenon. On the one hand they presented a strong economic support for the country (most of them kept their money in Yugoslav banks, they built houses of their own, supported their relatives), yet on the other, they brought the market mentality into the socialist society, imported the most up-to-date domestic appliances and western cultural patterns. Particularly before the holidays, the mass migrations led to indescribable crowds of people waiting at the border crossings.

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The last wave of migration from Yugoslavia affected the country because of the political, the national and religious, and partly also because of economic reasons during the wars (1991 - 1996). During the war, a methodical ethnic cleansing was carried out. According to different sources, about three million people either emigrated or moved away. In 1994, there were almost 700 000 refugees from former Yugoslavia in various European countries. The ethnically cleansened areas were Bosnia and Herzegovina, the territories of Croatia previously inhabited by the Serb population, and to a large extend also Kosovo (as early as in the eighties, several tens of thousands Serbs moved away). During the 45 years of its existence, the second, socialist Yugoslavia thus went through numerous migration waves - both, internal and external. Whereas the politically motivated migrations took place during World War II, immediately after it and then again during the recent wars in the nineties, the economic migrations were going on in the fifties and the sixties of the previous century (the internal ones as a result of industrialisation and the external due to the surplus of the labour force), and partly in the nineties (i. e. from Serbia, from which about 300 000 young people moved because of poverty and hopelessness. Due to political and economic reasons, the newly established states in the territory of former Yugoslavia are more or less closed and the formerly strong migration currents thus interrupted (with the partial exception of returning of the refugees, which seems to be very slow). In the formerly more developed parts of the country, predominantly Slovenia, there is a new need to import labour force, partly for unskilled work and partly for the highly skilled one (i.e. doctors), for whom there is a major shortage in Slovenia.

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8. The influence of shopping tourism on cultural changes and the way of life in Slovenia after World War II90
From the beginning of the sixties on, Yugoslavia differed a great deal from other Eastern European countries. The difference did not only show in the political system but also in the personal standard of living, tourism, travelling, shopping abroad and imitating the western life style. In a addition to that Slovenia had a specific position within Yugoslavia: bordering to Italy and Austria, and with strong national minorities in those countries, it was Yugoslavia’s most developed and pro-west oriented region. This allowed Slovenia with the exception of the first post-war years - to be constantly in touch with the two countries and to make realistic comparisons of the standard of living. Since the mid-fifties the authorities in Slovenia had been striving to approach the level of personal and social standard of living of the neighbouring capitalist countries. However, the system remained a socialist one, despite some capitalist elements it contained. It was based on egalitarianism, full employment, a high degree of social protection, as well as on the specific socialist ideology and morale. Community (collective), not the individual were given privileged position, although Slovenians are great individuals by nature. A blend of socialist system and capitalist influence from the west created an unusual atmosphere. People did believe in Tito, in self-management, in non-alignment but also in washing machines, refrigerators, TV sets and other postulates of consumer society. Since the laws of market economy and competitiveness were not being fully implemented, the production was unable to comply with the demands of the customers and fashion trends. As a result of that, the only real contact Slovene people had with western type consumerism in the sixties and also in the seventies was through shopping abroad, in which they frequently and readily indulged. 91 Italy was the first window to the western world for the Slovene (and Yugoslav) people. Incising painfully in the life of people who had until then lived together, first within AustriaHungary and later, between the two World Wars, under Italy, a new border - to the advantage of Yugoslavia - was set between the two countries in 1957. In some cases the border ran between the houses, crossed gardens, or even - as in the case of village Miren - divided the graveyard into two parts. (At funerals armed border guards are reported to have been present along the provisional demarcation in the graveyard and the coffin was literally pushed from one state to the other by the mourners in order to allow the relatives and friends from both states to take leave from the deceased). 92 In order to preserve a small piece of land for their country, people used to move the provisional demarcation pales until the boundary stones were placed. The relations with Italy remained tense as long as until 1954 when the so called Trieste question was resolved by the London memorandum (the division of the Free Territory between Yugoslavia and Italy). Border crossings were therefore scarce; only people who lived within the 200 m frontier zone and the so called double owners (i.e. people who possessed land in both states) were entitled to them. The latter were allowed to take the shortest route to their land in the other state but forbidden to visit bigger villages or towns.
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Repe, Božo. The influence of shopping tourism on cultural change and the way of life in Slovenia after World War II: paper at the conference Culture with frontiers: shopping tourism and travelling objects in postwar Central-Europe, Budapest, CEU Gellner Room, April 26-28, 1998. Budapest, 1998. 91 Božo Repe: Turizma ni mogoče zavreti, čeprav bi ga prepovedali z zakonom ( Tourism cannot be slowed down even it was forbidden by law) Razvoj turizma v Sloveniji, Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 1996, str. 157-164. 92 Andrej Malnič: Topopography of the memory of Zone A International Conference The Paris Peace Treaty, the new Yugoslavian-Italian borderline and the annexation of Primorska to Slovenia, Koper-Nova Gorica 25.-27. September 1997.

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In spite of the strict control on both sides of the border they did visit them (on Italian side they were frequently recognised by their “socialist” shoes or by the license plates on their bicycles). As the first buyers of western products people living along the frontier used to smuggle them to Slovenia. The goods were mostly hidden on bicycles or under the garments. One man even built a secret telpher line (lift) across the border to help himself at the smuggling (border guard catched him and he was sent into prison for two years). 93 The most attractive smuggling articles being sugar, coffee, rise, lemons, medications, soap, cameras and other goods lacking in Slovenia (like blue copperas used in winegrowing and even scrubbing brushes and brooms). The shopping was predominantly based on exchange of goods; in return, meat, brandy, eggs and butter were smuggled to Italy (even today the story about a woman smuggling butter can be heard; hiding it under her blouse it melt and started to trickle exactly when she was at the border crossing). Some smugglers even had an agreement with the police whom they helped to purchase office materials, type writers and similar. In the first half of the fifties foreign fashion articles became an attractive smuggling business; this was especially the case with a sort of raincoats made from synthetic material. The risky smuggling business paid well, and quite some people living along the border made enough money with it to be able to build themselves houses of their own. In summer 1950 rumours spread along the Yugoslav - Italian border that the residents of the frontier zone from both states were to meet at all major border crossings. Three years after this region was divided by the frontier, the residents from both states were to meet their relatives, renew connections with friends and demonstrate their wish for coexistence. On 6 August, 1950 there was such a meeting at the border crossing Rozna dolina in Gorica and it should be repeated on 13 August, 1950. On that day thousands of people gathered - predominantly on the Yugoslav side - at the border crossing; they literally pulled it down and scattered subsequently along the streets and shops of Gorica. The unexpected “shopping spree” was described as the “march of the hungry” by the Italian press (although people were mainly buying scrubbing brushes /brooms/, which were lacking in Slovenia), but there was no report about the incident in the Yugoslav press. The press of the Slovene minority in Italy published the following: “On Sunday morning our people pulled down the unjust border at the check-point near Rdeca hisa (red house) and for half a day Gorica regained its position as the centre of Slovene people from the Soca (Isonzo) and Vipava region.”94 The author concluded that sooner or later the artificial frontier would have to be removed; but not just for a few hours. In his opinion the frontier should be moved to where it belongs, namely to the boundaries of the territory with Slovenian population on the other bank of the river Soča. There were other commentaries, i.e. in the Trieste workers’ newspaper Il lavoratore (which supported Kominform - at that time the conflict between Yugoslavia and The Soviet Union was at its height), which wrote: “The Tito government organised jointly with the Italian one a ‘legal’ crossing of the border to feed its people.” After this unusual incident the border remained tightly closed for the next five years, until the Videm (Udine) agreement was signed.95 In 1955 Yugoslavia and Italy signed an agreement on the local border (border land) traffic the so called Videm (Udine) agreement.96 It was the first agreement of its kind to be signed by a capitalist and a socialist state respectively during the period of the cold war. The right to crossing the border was expanded to all the population living along the frontier which resulted in vast increase of border crossings. People of these regions were
93 94

Guestionare, realized by students in 1996 and 1997 in border area Primorski dnevnik, 15 August, 1950. 95 Branko Marušic: Z zahodnega brega (From the west side), Nova Gorica 1995. 96 Slovenija, Italija (Slovenia, Italy, White book on Diplomatic relations, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve republike Slovenije (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana 1996

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particularly keen to visit diverse fairs (i.e. the fair of St. Andrew in Gorica), where they were buying cheap goods. One of the most popular articles was the so called “bambola” - a big baby doll clad in coloured dress; as decoration such dolls were placed on matrimonial beds. Further, people used to buy confetti (for marriages), chewing gum and typical Italian sweets. The goods purchased on Italian stands had a major influence on forming the taste of Slovenian and Yugoslav customers in the fifties, but also later on. Double land owners were not allowed to enter Austria before 1953 when the agreements on frontier traffic and real assets of Austrian double owners on Yugoslav territory were signed.97 Apart from double land owners, in exceptional cases other residents of the frontier region were granted three-day permits for crossing the border, whereas there were no limitations for doctors, veterinarians and midwives. (In 1958 6000 and 5000 permits for crossing the border were issued on Yugoslav and Austrian side respectively). In 1960 an additional agreement on frontier traffic was signed, according to which residents of the 10 km frontier zone were allowed to enter Austria. These people received permanent permits for crossing the border; they were allowed to go abroad four times a month and stay there up to 60 hours. The same border crossing had to be used upon their return (the regular border crossings between Austria and Yugoslavia totalled 19). A Yugoslav citizen was allowed to take 3500.- dinars (about 12$) abroad every month. However, due to its moderate range of goods available and higher price level, Austria was not as attractive as Italy for Yugoslav shoppers. 98 People who were not living within the 10 km frontier zone were able to acquire a passport (either a personal, a family or a group passport). Passports were issued by the district departments for internal affairs; application for a passport could be refused without further explanation; further, passports were not issued to men who had not yet served the army. A visa was necessary for almost all the states; in addition to that, a Yugoslav citizen had to provide a letter of guarantee from the destination state. Until the beginning of the sixties administrative hindrances and also low standard of living prevented Yugoslav citizens from more frequent visits abroad; their travelling was restricted to business trips and visiting relatives. Quite a number of people crossed the border illegally and emigrated afterwards to overseas countries. In the second half of the fifties, however, tourism began to develop which resulted in more frequent visits of foreigners in Yugoslavia. A lot of them were attracted by diverse trade fairs. A gradual opening towards western culture in the late fifties and in the sixties was also demonstrated by organising fashion shows, song festivals (after San Remo festival in Italy) and miss competitions. In 1958 regular TV broadcast was introduced in Slovenia; in the sixties TV became a mass phenomenon.99 Its programme (western TV serials, films, music programmes and also commercials) additionally promoted the consumer mentality and affinity for western values; this everything enhanced the wish for travelling abroad. Most Slovenians were able to receive either some Austrian or Italian TV programme; their shopping decisions abroad were therefore frequently based on information gained from commercials. Some Italian and Austrian shop owners (especially those of Slovene origin) gradually started to advertise their products in Slovene newspapers and radio. In the mid-sixties Yugoslavia opened up towards the world and the standard of living increased a great deal. Passport became available (with hardly any administrative hindrances) to the majority of the citizens; visas for the neighbouring countries were gradually abolished. In 1962 Yugoslav citizens were allowed for the first time to purchase legally foreign currency in the amount of 15 000 dinars (50 US$; a larger sum was only
Archive of govrnement of Slovenia, Comittee for internal Affairs and Comittee for tourism and catering trade. 98 Guestionare, realized by students in 1996 and 1997 in border area 99 Slovenska kronika 20. Stoletja (Slovene Chronicle of 20 th Century), Nova revija, Ljubljana 1996
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available for the purpose of medical treatment abroad and attending international meeting/conferences). It was possible to open a bank account for foreign currency. Masses of people went to Austria and Germany to work there; only through employment agencies 62347 Slovenian citizens found work in the west between 1964 and 1969 but there were even more people who moved to the west on their own. 100 For major holidays they were coming back home and bringing products from the west. The western shopping trend gradually moved from jeans (being one of the first citizens of Ljubljana wearing jeans in the fifties, the famous Slovenian actor Janez Hocevar still bears the nickname Rifle), tennis shoes (in Slovenia they are still called “superge”, after the popular Italian trademark), cosmetics and washing powder towards washing machines, vacuum cleaners and other domestic appliances and even cars. I can remember purchasing a washing machine Candy (the most popular Italian make for domestic appliances of that time) in Trbiž (Tarvisio) with our neighbours who had already possessed a car. My mother possessed only a half of the necessary money, but the Slovenian dealer was willing to grant her a credit, so she could pay it on instalments (six months). During that time the Slovenian production and trade were gradually adapting to the needs of their customers: Gorenje started to produce domestic appliances which became popular in Eastern European countries in the following years; self-service stores and department stores started to emerge. However, the supply of goods in these shops was not as good as in the west and the prices were higher. Like elsewhere in the world, towards the end of the sixties the teenage generation gradually became a very strong consumer group. The socialist supply of goods was not able to cover their demands for all sorts of notebooks with portraits of film stars, felt-tip pens, school bags, fashionable clothes, records and similar articles. Even if this was not so (like in the case of high-quality skis Elan), they were often considered to be inferior and the parents were forced to buy - with their modest socialist salaries - fashionable foreign makes of skis abroad. As regards the standard of living, the seventies turned out to be the best post-war years for Yugoslavia (Slovenia). The non-aligned Arab friends had prevented Yugoslavia to suffer from the oil-shock; foreign loans were cheap - due to its specific position, they were literally forced upon Yugoslavia. The official policy had defeated the liberal orientation of the sixties; it wanted to prove that the self-managed socialism was the best system in the world.101 With the help of cheap loans, a large number of Slovenians were building houses of their own in the seventies. Shopping abroad proved this tendency: building material which was either better in quality, cheaper, or not at all available in Yugoslavia was transported in car boots from abroad. The most popular articles purchased abroad were bathroom tiles, wash-basins, water-taps, furniture, diverse (garden) and other tools (even concrete-mixers). There was a great demand for domestic appliances, clothing articles, shoes (Italian shoes have remained to be a byword for quality, despite the good quality of Slovenian products), foodstuffs, spirits and items which were - due to ideological reasons - not available in Slovenia (communion and confirmation clothes, garlands, white shoes and handbags, etc.). Another phenomenon of the seventies was the so called “Ponterosso”, where cheap goods and gimcrack were sold. It attracted thousands of Yugoslav buyers who were coming as organised groups by regular trains, buses and cars even from the most distant parts of the country,. They were buying everything, even most worthless goods. “Ponterosso” grew into a symbol of consumer mentality, adapted to socialist buyers with
Archive of Republic of Slovenia, fund of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People Koordinacijski odbor za delavce na začasnem delu v tujini ( Coordinating Committee, for workers temporary working aborad) 101 Božo Repe:«Liberalizem« v Sloveniji (»Liberalism« in Slovenia), Borec, Ljubljana 1992
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little money. Hiding purchases from the customs officers (duty free imports were limited to the value of 100 dinars only) was one of the favourite Yugoslav sports of the seventies, regardless the age or sex of the people involved. Mass shopping in Italy was also a result of the so called Osimo agreements, which Italy in Yugoslavia - influenced by the spirit of Helsinki - signed in 1975.102 Yugoslav-Italian border became by far the most open border between a socialist and a capitalist country. In 1978 over 40 million people crossed the border in the Triest region (Trzaska pokrajina); 21 million with passports and 19 million with regular border permits. New border crossing points were opened but there were traffic hold-ups in spite of that, particularly during weekends; a phenomenon which had first started in the sixties. The frontier zone was increased to 30 km (the residents of Jesenice, a community bordering on Austria and Italy were so entitled to Austrian and Italian regular border permits). The authorities were not enthusiastic about shopping abroad because so much money was spent on it; but on the other hand, foreigners were shopping in Yugoslavia too, particularly petrol, meat and other food which was cheaper in Yugoslavia. Even more important was the ideological reason: how is it possible that people living “under the best system in the world” go shopping to Italy? From time to time therefore articles criticising shopping abroad appeared in newspapers, often with the comment that Yugoslav shoppers were being exploited by the capitalist traders. Particularly communists and public officials/civil servants were advised not to succumb to that shopping fever, but there were no sanctions and no other efforts to reduce shopping abroad (except for customs measures). The third phenomenon of the seventies was the expansion of agency tourism/organised tourism. From the beginning of the seventies on, Yugoslav travel agencies had been organising holidays abroad, particularly in Spain, Italy and Tunisia; further, they organised shopping trips to the main European capitals and even USA (especially New York). 103 Organised shopping tours focused on consumer electronics / audio systems (Munich was considered to be the best place to buy these products), or clothes and leather products (Istambul). In the eighties Yugoslavia glided into a crisis. The standard of living fell to the level of the mid-sixties. A number of products were rationed or not available at all (petrol, oil, washing powder, citrus fruits). Shopping abroad concentrated therefore on buying foodstuffs; and anyway, due to the growing inflation rate which in the mid-eighties grew to hyperinflation Yugoslav citizens were hardly able to afford to buy anything else. The geographic position of Slovenia allowed its citizens to compensate the shortage by weekly shopping trips abroad (and besides, the supply in Slovenia was better than elsewhere in Yugoslavia). The buying power improved in 1990 when the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković froze the exchange rate of the national currency dinar in relation 1: 7 to German mark. For a period of a few months Slovenian salaries have reached the level of Italian and Austrian ones, which had an immediate effect on shopping across the border. 104 After the crisis, which led to disintegration of Yugoslavia and consequently to independence of Slovenia, shopping abroad gradually normalised. Goods are abundantly available in shops at home, therefore shopping abroad is not a consequence of insufficient supply anymore; it is rather a matter of lower prices and (or) of prestige. Border crossings, shopping abroad and travelling have importantly influenced the life style of Slovene people in the post-war decades. They sharpened their sense of quality and influenced domestic production and trade which made effort to reach the western
102

Slovenija, Italija (Slovenia, Italy, White book on Diplomatic relations, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve republike Slovenije (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana 1996 103 Archive of govrnement of Slovenia, Comittee for tourism and catering trade, Chamber for economy. 104 Archive of govrnement of Slovenia , meetings of Govrnement in 1990.

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standards. Shopping abroad further exerted indirect pressure on politics, which was - at least to some extend - forced to take account of the demands of consumers and act accordingly. It has to be mentioned however, that shopping was limited - particularly in the fifties and in the first half of the sixties - by the low standard of living. In the course of time a specific consumer ritual was established, a sort of shopping fever to which the majority of Slovenians (and even more Yugoslavs) succumbed. A typical feature of that attitude was that people did not only buy products they really needed. When abroad they had to “take the opportunity” to make the journey “worth the money and time” it took and therefore used to buy everything that came to their hands. This philosophy was in perfect agreement with the belief that saving and rational spending of money made no sense, since in socialism the state was believed to be responsible for providing housing, regular income and solving other problems of the citizens (however, not everything could be implemented and especially Slovenians tended to be more economical; a lot of them bought flats or built houses on their own). Shopping tourism was only one of the influences that formed the post-war socialist consumer mentality in Slovenia. Its impact has to be seen within a broader context, together with films, music, television, mass motorization, expanding of foreign tourism in Slovenia and economic emigration. 105 Everything this led to the fact, that Slovenians accepted western standards and behaviour patterns as regards the style of home decor, clothing and spending leisure time as early as in the “liberal” sixties (in the second half of the seventies, for example, the more affluent citizens already had access to international credit cards, including American Express). People took from socialism what was of use to them (free schooling, good health services, full employment), whereas ideology that filled political speeches, newspaper articles and TV news was perceived as the necessary evil. During the last two decades, the self-managed socialism was hardly taken seriously by anyone. This was probably also due to the fact, that both, regime critics and party officials met on their shopping tours across the border.106

105

Slovenska kronika 20. Stoletja (Slovene Chronicle of 20 th Century), Nova revija, Ljubljana 1996.

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9. The attitude of Slovenian authorities and the press towards shopping in Austria and Italy107
With the opening of Yugoslavia towards the west which gradually started in the second part of the fifties the official authorities, party ideologists and the press were faced with a number of dilemmas. The crucial ones were: firstly, which categories of citizens should be allowed to cross the border, up to what extend the formalities should be simplified (i. e. access to passports, issuing of visas, establishing regular bus and railway connections, setting up of new border crossings). And secondly, how to face the established image of self-managed socialism (according to ideologists it was supposed to be “the best system in the world”, and thus better than the ‘real existing socialism’ and also better than capitalism) with the image, people were able to form when crossing the border and shopping abroad. At the beginning, access to passports was complicated.108 Gradual democratisation of Yugoslavia and its opening towards the world led to a new legislation on issuing passports, which brought simplification of the proceedings. The changes first appeared in 1953 and then again in 1960. Finally, in 1965 a law on passports was passed which guaranteed access to passport and visas, as well as free border crossings and staying abroad to all Yugoslav citizens (the exceptions were also regulated by the law). In the sixties, passports became available to the majority of Yugoslav citizens and travelling abroad became an everyday matter. People living along the border (within 15-kilometre zone) even enjoyed additional privileges: according to a special agreement first with Italy and later also with Austria they were issued special permits which allowed them to cross the border. They were the first to travel abroad, and establish contacts there; in the first post-war years they (especially the citizens living within the 100-metre state frontier zone) represented the only connection with the capitalist world from where they brought rare western goods.109 Due to the increased interest for travelling abroad, additional regular bus and train, as well as flight connections were set up. Initially, in the second part of the fifties, they were rather scarce, but in the sixties daily connections were available. Special lines were organised particularly when major fairs were held in Austria and Italy. From the sixties on, regular bus and railway lines were set up between Italian and Austrian shopping centres and major Yugoslav towns, at the same time there was a major increase in travelling by private cars which resulted in traffic hold-ups at the border crossings. With its Ponte Rosso, Triest was the most important shopping centre, a synonym for buying cheap goods.

107

After 1949 (before that time travelling abroad was extremely limited), the application for the passport, or better, for single trips abroad (until the beginning of the sixties passports for free border crossings were not issued) was to be made to local authorities (commissariats for internal affairs of the provincial or municipal people’s committee). With the application a number of certificates had to be handed in (certificate of citizenship, impunity certificate, and the certificate on not being involved in criminal investigation, respectively, a certificate that the applicant had paid all the taxes, that he had already served the army and that military authorities allowed his travelling abroad. 109 For more information see Božo Repe: The influence of shopping tourism on cultural changes and the way of life in Slovenia after World War II.

108

The attitude of Slovenian authorities and the press towards shopping in Austria and Italy. Repe, Božo. Paper for the project Culture with frontiers: shopping tourism and travelling objects in post-war CentralEurope Budapest, 1998.

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In spite of gradual opening of the border, there was a lot of mistrust on both sides, conditioned by national, as well as ideological reasons. Italians couldn’t get over the fact that the “slav-comunism” managed to push the border towards the west, whereas Slovenes hadn’t forgotten the fascist oppression and the yet unsolved question of the Slovene minority in Italy. Similar was the situation with Austria, which was, mostly due to the resistance of Slovene partisans in Carinthia, proclaimed for “the first victim of nazi aggression” by the allies. In spite of that, Carinthia went to Austria. In the minds of people on Slovene side, the genocidical tyranny of the German occupant authorities during World War II, in which Austrian nazis played an important part, was still present. This is why neither Germans nor Austrians were particularly welcome guests in Slovenia during the first post-war years (This attitude was not changed until the beginning of sixties). According to the treaty between the two states which was concluded in 1955, Austria was obliged to protect Slovenian and Carinthian minority, but after it was re-established as a state and well anchored within international relations, it was trying to decrease the level of their rights, which consequently led to occasional conflicts with Yugoslavia. On the other hand the minorities represented a firm enough connection because of the family and friendly relations among the people. Even in the worst post-war years, ideological and other restrictions could not completely separate them. Another important factor was economic interest (commercial contraband routes through Austria and Slovenia had been existing for centuries). From smuggling and exchanging goods like sweets, brooms, zip-fastened slippers, soap, washing powder, nylon stockings and coats in the first post-war period, the assortment changed to washing machines and cars in the sixties. Although burdened with hindrances and prejudices but also with mockery and constant search for mistakes on the opposite side which resulted in occasional harassment in concrete cases, the official policy on both sides had to adapt to the changed situation. The propaganda was naturally particularly strong along the border, where both worlds came together and faced each other, but in a specific way also interwove into one another. In the first post-war years the situation was still very tense and the flow of information limited, but in spite of that people were able to see the difference in provision of the population as provided by the communist system (although it was also a result of general shortage after the war which did not only depend on the political system), compared to provision provided by western allies, first in Zone A of the Julian March and later within the Free territory of Triest which was also a part of Zone A. Chocolate, tobacco, textile were everyday items in Zone A (also because they were given as presents or sold by American soldiers), whereas there was a considerable shortage within Zone B. Italian press therefore systematically built its propaganda on emphasising the shortage and even hunger.110 Slovene authorities themselves admitted that the shortage was also caused by the administrative distribution of the goods but in their opinion this was a result of inexperience and new organisation.111
This propaganda was particularly strong around Christmas, New Year and some other holidays. Italian nespapers reported that Slovene families in Zone B could not afford turkeys, geese or chicken because poultry was not available in shops. The Slovene press replied that 177 hundredweight of hens, geese, ducks and turkeys had already arrived for the New Year holiday from Yugoslavia and that “street-sweepers were very busy removing all the hen, turkey, goose and duck feather which was dumped in front of the entrances by the housewives.” (Famine in Zone B or poultry for free sale, Primorski dnevnik, 29 December, 1950, p. 5 111 “We can all see how our trade is being improved after the heavy mistakes, which were made in recent past. The distribution of goods did not work properly, in some places the warehouses were full of goods and the shops empty which left people without the clothes they needed most. These mistakes were mostly due to inexperience but they were removed. The goods are not held back anymore, high prices and hunt for profit have been abolished … “ (Slovenski poročevalec, 1 January, 1947, p. 3)
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At the same time a series of articles in Slovene newspapers systematically reported about incidents on Italian, allied side, (which in fact happened quite often), about disorder, poverty which was reported to be even worse than on Yugoslav side, about shortage of single products, high prices, monopolies, but also about violence applied by allied and Italian authorities.112 A frequent topic of newspaper articles was also the demand that Triest should remain economically linked with its hinterland or else it would be ruined; its economic prosperity was believed to be possible only within Yugoslavia. The press also systematically emphasised that Italians economy was falling behind, and criticised the (American) price level. Marshall’s plan was reported not to have succeeded in Italy.113 One of the more entertaining articles which was to persuade Slovene readers about catastrophic situation on the other side of the border is an article about the Italian butcher who was allegedly selling cat’s and dog’s meat to customers while proclaiming for rabbit and goat meat.114 After the Videm treaty was concluded (20 August 1955), all the permanent residents of the border region obtained the right to at least four border crossings a month. Further alleviation was introduced; farmers were allowed to sell certain amount of their own products across the border. Trading was revived, mass border crossings followed. Once or twice a month fairs took place in which farmers could sell their products. In addition textile products and sundry other products (junk) were sold. Initially, a part of trading was carried out as barter since there were no official exchange-offices. Gradually Italian merchants started to accept dinars. Immediate contacts between people of the two states led to breaking the prejudices, better provision of Slovene (Yugoslav) customers, but they also led to improvement of supply in Slovene shops. Due to trade, Italian towns in frontier region lived to prosperity. It became obvious how much they depended on Yugoslav customers towards the end of the fifties, when due to ptyalism and food and mouth disease the permit holders were not allowed to cross the border for some time. The shops on Italian side were completely deserted. Following the changed situation, newspaper articles became less ideological, although occasionally still ironical. Yet, the majority of them was favourable to coexistence along the border. There were a lot of different anecdotes about the situation on the border in circulation, i. e. about an elderly man who was reported to have told the customs officers the 20-pound pork shoulder he brought across the border was for his lunch, or about a turkey which fluttered away from under the lifted car bonnet.115 At the same time some articles criticised high prices In Italy, especially in Triest, unfriendly attitude of the sales assistants and Italians generally, poor quality of Italian products and harassment of Italian customs officers.

As an example of propaganda I quote two of the articles: “In Kamen near Bistrica an invalid from World War II Maks Skočir was even arrested when he was on his way home from an event. He was beaten and his cigarettes were seized.” (About a provocation of Italian police, Slovenski poročevalec, 7 January 1947, p. 3 “On 9 January the Kobarid civil police took away all the people’s property which was stored in roadmenders’ warehouse … They are now planning to rob the well known artificial fish pond in Kobarid and take away the engine used for fish breeding.” (Slovenski poročevalec, 15 January, 1947, p. 2 113 Primorski dnevnik, 11 November, 1950, p. 4 114 Dog’s and cat’s meat sold as rabbit and goat, Primorski dnevnik, 10 September, 1950, p. 4 115 It is busy on the border, Slovenski Jadran, nr. 46, 9 November, 1956; quoted from the seminar project by Monika Černe and Nataša Prinčič, Shopping in Italy after the conclusion of Videm treaty 1955-60

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In the sixties the press continued to emphasise different negative events, i. e. disputes with customs officers which were occasionally caused by Italian citizens.116 The press also had a critical attitude towards tourist and catering services; they were reported to be too expensive, supposedly camps were in worse condition than the Yugoslav ones, there were a lot of thefts,117 but occasionally also positive experiences were reported.118 Italian side replied by bringing articles, which expressed a contemptuous attitude towards the Yugoslavs. This was also a consequence of visa abolishment, which led to an increased number of shoppers from the southern parts of the country. They were coming to Triest and other towns in masses, bringing Balkan habits with them. After eating in parks and in the streets, they dumped empty tins, plum-brandy bottles and other waste onto the streets (the situation was particularly bad around railway stations). Frequently they were found stealing in shops. Being faced with such behaviour was a surprise for the inhabitants of the towns along the frontier, since they were used to culturally similar Slovene citizens (the pressure of the customers from the southern parts of Yugoslavia was typical for the seventies). The municipal authorities paid them back – at least those visitors who arrived in their own cars – by having as many cars with Yugoslav registration plates as possible towed away, (on some occasions even if they were parked correctly) or fined. A group of Slovene journalists reported at the beginning of the seventies, how they were observing for a longer time a policeman who was placing parking tickets in the Della Geppa street only to cars with Yugoslav registration number, while “he skipped those with Italian number”119. However, from socialism spoilt Yugoslav shoppers learned quickly, that fraud was something that existed within the capitalist system; one could encounter middlemen, currency dealers and “guides” through shops who were not exactly benefactors, “golden” watches were not always made of gold, many a technical article broke down even before it was brought home, and the beautiful fashionable flimsy dresses shrunk and coloured beyond recognition after the first wash. Increase in trade led to the growth of individual and organised smuggling, which was severely criticised by the Slovene press. It was not unusual if the customs officers discovered 200 and more women’s dresses or suits with individual travellers. A major part of the cheap goods went to the southern regions of Yugoslavia, and then also further to Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Smuggling was defined as being “non-socialist and inhumane towards working collectives, the commune and the social community”120. Also those Slovene (and Yugoslav) girls who earned their money as prostitutes in Triest and other Italian towns and then generously spent their liras in department stores were severely criticised. On the whole it can be stated that the press, but also other media (radio, television) were in favour of opening the borders. The then still very young Ljubljana TV station made a film about the regular border traffic. The screenplay was written by one of the most popular Slovene poets Janez Menart. The director Sajko stated that the purpose of the film was “to show through the film art the harmony of our politics of co-existence between the nations with different socio-economic orders and its implementation in practice…”.121

For example, the newspaper Delo reported in January 1960 that intoxicated Italian citizens on some border crossing were insulting customs officers which consequently led to a scuffle between the Italian and Yugoslav citizens. 117 Some advice to a nomad tourist to Italy, Tedenska tribuna, 22 February, 1961 118 The magazine Avtomoto (30 April, 1964, p. 5) brought an article on a Slovene traveller whose care broke down but was repaired by an Italian mechanic in the middle of the night. Apart from that he invited them for a cup of coffee. Presenting them his business card, he instructed them that this was the way things were done in a tourist country. 119 The degraded and humiliated dinar at Ponte Rosso, Ljubljanski dnevnik, 31 May 1970, p. 14 120 Primorske novice, 10 September 1960, p. 5 121 Documentary film about regular border traffic, Primorske novice, 1 November 1961, p. 5

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The opening of borders was also used by the Slovene press to criticise socialist trade which only very slowly adapted to the market. The demands for western type supermarkets turned up. At the beginning of the sixties they only had a “theoretical meaning”122, yet, in the second part of the sixties they became an everyday matter. Similar was the situation with the industry (especially textile and footwear), which was to “specialise and pay main attention to quality, rich choice, fashionable taste and attractive as well as comfortable models, similar to the ones launched by fashion workshops of our neighbours Italians.”123 Competition was also encouraged by the advertisements of Italian and Austrian merchandise in Slovene newspapers. Advertising paid: at the beginning of the sixties the turnover of the exchanged goods reached 9 milliard (billion) liras (as compared to 1946 when it only reached 600 million liras).124 In 1963 more than 8 million border crossings were registered in the Triest and Gorizia area, a year later the number increased to over 9 million passengers; in addition, new border crossings were being opened.125 On occasion of Yugoslav national holiday (Republic Day) in 1966, only Triest was visited by 250 000 Yugoslavs (in the seventies the number of passengers varied between 300 000 and 350 000). Especially the inhabitants of border regions could not imagine what life should be like with borders closed. According to some survey, more than 88% of the families questioned crossed the border at least once in 1966.126 The seventies represented the height of “Ponte Rosso” shopping tourism. This was not only due to the rising standard of living in Yugoslavia, but also to some measures taken by Yugoslav authorities which made importing of goods easier. In 1970 a run of shoppers to Triest was caused by the decision that the inhabitants of Bosanska Krajina who were hit by an earthquake were allowed to import some technical and other products duty-free. Not used to shopping abroad, the Bosnians, were helplessly strolling around the town and asking where they could find shops with technical products. Afterwards they bought what the merchants recommended and praised to them.127 There was also a growing pressure to Triest from other Eastern European countries, so that it was no problem to exchange Hungarian (florin), Bulgarian (lev) or Romanian (lei) currency. In Slovenia, family and women magazines systematically compared the quality and price level of the goods in Italian and Slovene shops (i. e. Italian Standa and Slovene Maximarket). They did not hesitate to state that all the goods in the Italian shop were better, cheaper and above all, more fashionable.128 For the first time, Slovene women made acquaintance with specialised home sales, which were first introduced to the public by the magazine Teleks in 1978: “For some time now Slovene ladies come together at home tea parties where they are nibble on biscuits and sandwiches, drink juice and at the same time buy the ever so distinguished kitchenware called Tupperware which is otherwise only available across the border”.129 A Teleks journalist took the role of a potential customer; she organised the ‘household-commercial event’, paid for the kitchenware introduced by a lady who came from Triest and who later brought the ordered goods from there. Of course she wrote an exhaustive report in which she did not forget to mention that the well-known magazine L’Europeo only succeeded to discover this type of sale four months after Teleks. In the seventies, however, a major part of Slovene shoppers moved to the neighbouring Austria, which was – due to the worse traffic connections, high price level and poorer
What is supermarket? Gospodarski vestnik, 9 January 1960, p. 2 Gospodarski vestnik, 13 January 1962, p. 5 124 Tovariš, 6 July 1961, p. 8 125 Delo, 21 January 1965, p. 2 126 Primorski dnevnik, 4 March 1967 127 Trst has been experiencing a real boom for the past three months, Ljubljanski (nedeljski) dnevnik, 17 March 1970, p. 7 128 Jana, nr. 1, 29 December 1971 129 Teleks, 14 July 1978, p. 10
123 122

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supplies – not so frequently visited in the sixties. Similar as earlier in Italy, small villages grew to mass shopping centres. One of them was Lipica (Leibnitz). Ljubljanski dnevnik wrote in 1971 that it became a sort of suburb of the Slovene Maribor. At the beginning of the nineties an ideological and political clash took place in Slovenia, which resulted in the elimination of the “liberally oriented” leadership. However, this fact did not reflect in shopping trends, neither it did – apart from some exceptions - in the newspaper articles and commentaries on shopping tourism (which in the seventies extended widely and also spread to other directions, not just the neighbouring countries). The development is predominantly the result of the fact that Italy and Yugoslavia signed the so called Osimo agreement (treaty) in 1975. Free crossing of the border between the socialist Yugoslavia and the capitalist Italy became so to say a doctrinal matter, or, to put it ironically, a civil duty. Newspapers saw the reason for mass shopping sprees abroad in the higher price level of the domestic goods and in the fact that the offer in domestic shops was not sufficiently suited to the demands of the customers. Towards the end of the sixties, the buying power of Slovene (and Yugoslav) citizens was getting exhausted; due to the high inflation rate in the mid-eighties it could not keep up with the prices in Italy and Austria any more. Abroad, Yugoslav customers were only buying articles which were not available at home (coffee, washing powder). Even for the middle class textile, cosmetics and other products, which were earlier bought abroad, became almost inaccessible. The situation changed for a short time in 1990, when the Yugoslav premier Marković introduced a convertible dinar, but it could only be sustained for some months. During this time Yugoslav shoppers were clearing foreign shops again. Newspaper commentaries of that time concentrated on severe criticism of Yugoslav authorities for allowing impoverishment of the people; further on nostalgic memories of the good times of mass shopping abroad and on special “intermediary” status of Yugoslavia which was a consequence of the Block policy, and last but not least, on gloating commentaries about the neighbouring merchants whose shops remained without customers after the downfall of convertible dinar. To conclude: when writing about shopping tourism, the press basically followed the official policy. During the first post-war years it was distrustful and had ideological connotations, later it became stimulating: it supported gradual opening and rapprochement, but was also critical about excesses and negative occurrences. The needs of the readers started to prevail with the appearance of lighter press in the sixties and seventies: traffic information, information about the possibility of good purchase abroad, exchange of currency, fashion trends in shops where they could be followed. At the same time the press contributed to improvement of offer in domestic shops, to forming of consumer mentality (in the positive as well as in negative sense of the word), and to the protection of the customers. Apart from the first post-war years, and within the existent political framework, the press was relatively free when writing and commenting about shopping tourism. This was due to the fact that Yugoslav politics fostered and ideologically sustained political opening and was even able (particularly at times when Yugoslavs lived well) to turn it to its own profit. Confrontation of the two systems through shopping tourism was less dramatic as it appears at first sight. Firstly, because Yugoslav socialism gradually softened and took over elements of consumer mentality of the western world. And secondly, because the daily (or two-day shoppers) had neither the wish nor the possibility to penetrate deeper into the essence of the capitalist world into which they were bringing their socialist dinars. The influence of shopping tourism on the cultural and life style changes of the Slovenes (and even more so of the Yugoslavs) can therefore be thoroughly estimated only within the context of other western influences which formed the awareness/knowledge of the post-war generations.

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10. Liberalization of Slovene society in the late sixties130
After World War II Yugoslavia formally reinstated a multiparty system. This system was legalized by the Law on associations, commitees and public assembly prior to the first elections of August 25, 1945.131 Article 27 of the federal constitution of January 1946 included the right to political assembly. This regulation remained valid until the second constitution was ratified in 1963. The new constitution defined the leading role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.132 In 1965 also the legislation changed and indirectly introduced a one-party system.133 The leading role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was even more accentuated in the constitution of the year 1974.134 The classical multiparty system was replaced by the system of people's democracy. The central role in this system was played by the People's Front. While the Front did include political parties and mass organizations, the decisive role was in the hands of the Communist Party. The supposed purpose of such a system was to enable a peaceful transition into a socialist social order. The new government first did away with the opposition, which refused to join the People's Front, and later also with the individual parties in the Front itself. In 1949, the People's Front adopted the program of the Communist Party as its own program.135 Its constituent parties effectively lost their power and dissolved. After 1949 any organized opposition ceased to exist. Institutionally, opposition to the communist government was represented primarily by the Church (especially the Catholic Church). In Slovenia, the Liberation Front had already lost its coalition character during the war (the Dolomiti declaration of March 1, 1943). The only opposition movement worth mentioning was the so called Nagode group, which was active immediately after the war. It joined the Liberation Front at the beginning of the war, but later withdrew from it because of the conflict between its own liberal orientation and the dominant role of the Communist Party of Slovenia in the Front. During the election campaign after the war, its members tried to establish special organizational networks, but the authorities resorted to legal proceedings to frustrate the group's intention. Despite the absence of an opposition, and despite the drastic stifling of individuals and groups with alternative ideas, a critical attitude towards politics persisted throughout the post war period. This was particularly strong in the 1950's, especially among intelligentsia and cultural circles, which was a consequence of the partially liberalized situation. The strongest opponent of the Communist Party politics in the Liberation Front itself was Edvard Kocbek, who in 1940's acted on behalf of Christians. After the 1950's the opposition's views were mostly manifested through cultural disputes in certain journals (among the Slovene ones were Beseda in the beginning of the 1950's, Revija 57 at the end of 1950's and Perspektive in the first half of the 1960's).136 When, after a

Repe, Božo. The liberalization of Slovene society in the late 1960s. Slov. stud., 1994, 16, N. 2, p. 49-58. 131 Law on associations, committees and public assembly, Official Bulletin of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia no. 65 - a special supplement to the Official Bulletin no. 36 issued by the Slovene National Liberation Council and the National Govrnement of Slovenia (Ljubljana september 1945). 132 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, basic principles, article VI (Ljubljana, September 1945). 133 Basic Law on associations, Official Bulletin of the SFRY no. 16/65 The law speaks about associations and no longer about political parties but on the other hand, parties are not explicitly prohibited. 134 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, basic principles, article VIII (Ljubljana, 1974). 135 Vojislav Simović, Branko Petranović: Istorija narodne vlasti u Jugoslaviji (Savremena administracija, Beograd 1979); Božo Repe: Politična alternativa v Sloveniji n Jugoslaviji po 2. svetovni vojni, partijska in izvenpartijska opozicija (Povojna zgodovina na Slovenskem, Koro{ki pokrajinski muzek Slovenj Gradec, 1992). 136 Aleš Gabrič: Socialistična kulturna revolucija (Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1995).

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shorter or longer time periods, the authorities judged that these journals had overstepped the boundaries set by them, they banned them. From the end of the 1940's until the mid - eighties there was thus no organized opposition in Yugoslavia. Despite that, the authorities - especially after the 1950's-quietly supported pluralism in culture, arts, and partially in jurnalism and philosophy (with various interpretations of Marxism and other philosophical schools). This so called "quiet pluralism" was of course limited by the prohibition of political assembly and the "tolerance boundary," which was set at various times as the Party saw fit, and was not to be crossed. For this reason, the attitude towards the authorities - especially among the intelligentisa - depended on the circumstances in various parts of the country at various time periods, and vacillated between being less and more critical. Criticism remained limited to publishing articles in certain journals, however, and was supressed (by administrative and judicial measures) whenever it showed a tendency to escalate into a political movement. A group that met with a very wide response in the 1960's was the so called Praxis group. Its members supported various options, but did not deviate from the socialist vision. Owing to specific circumstances, an opposition or an "alternative" with any real potential in terms of power struggle, thus existed within the only and dominant party. The first ideological differences showed soon after Stalin's death, when Tito used his influence to slow down the democratization process. This was the period when there were fears of major anti-Stalinist movements in East European countries, which could potentially endanger socialism as a system. It was also the period when it seemed possible that Yugoslavia, after Stalin's death, might move closer to the Soviet Union again. It therefore took the Party only a couple of months to deviate from the guidelines adopted at its 6th congress in November 1952 in Zagreb. (At the congress, the Party explicitly renounced its direct operative ruling status in state organs, the economy and society in general, and changed its name to the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia).137 Deviation from the mentioned guidelines were at the same time expressed in the conflict with Milovan Djilas, the main author of the congress resolutions, who at the end of 1953 wrote a series of articles supporting the idea that Yugoslavia was gradually moving toward polarization into a new "bureaucratic" class on the one hand, and a new socialist left on the other. According to him, the possibility of forming two socialist parties should not be excluded. Djilas' influence was felt in Slovenia a few years later, especially in Revija 57.138 A partial liberalization of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia occured at the 7th congress, which took place in April 1958 in Ljubljana. This incurred severe criticism by the Communist Parties from the Soviet Union and other East European countries. The structural crisis in the economy, substantial differences within Yugoslavia which could be no longer controlled by the centralized system, and a more pronounced social differentiation, which was the consequence of the rising standard of living at the end of the 1950's and in the beginning of the 1960's, resulted in, among other things, worker's demonstrations, the first example of which was the strike in Trbovlje, Hrastnik and Zagorje in January 1958.139 The beginning of the 1960's saw the first public conflicts between the republics and the federation. These occured first in the economy (in 1962 the Slovene delegation walked out of the session about the Yugoslav economic plan held in the Federal Assembly).140 This was followed by cultural polemics with political implications (the polemics between the Slovene writer Dušan Pirjevec and the Serb writer Dobrica Čosić on the nature of Yugoslavness).141 The unity of the Yugoslav political leadership
137 Zgodovina zveze komunistov Jugoslavije (Komunist, Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 1986). 138 Božo Repe: Vpliv "djilasovščine" na Revijo 57 in Perspektive (Borec 535-537, Ljubljana 1995). 139 Martin Ivanič: Stavka v rudnikih Trbovlje, Hrastnik in Zagorje (Delavska enotnost, Ljubljana 1986). 140 Božo Repe: Utrinki iz bližnjega leta 1962 (Teorija in praksa 11 - 12 1989 and 1 - 2 1990, Ljubljana). 141 Božo Repe: Obračun s Perspektivami (Znanstveno in publicistično središče, Ljubljana 1990).

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weakened, which resulted in two movements with different developmental visions: one, already tested, was centralized, with a strong party, and a controlling, repressive apparatus; the other was more democratic, with tendencies to introduce self managment, decentralization and to take into account the reality and the laws of economic development. The second option was supported by Slovene politicians, who were, for the most part, also its initiators. Both movements counted on Tito's support. Formally, however, he did not take sides with either, thus effectivelly supporting the centralized one. Yugoslavia moved closer to the Soviet Union again. The political crisis was not addressed until mid 1960's, when Tito, for as yet unexplained reasons, allowed the federalization of the country and the formation of the Communist Union as proposed by the Slovene politician Edvard Kardelj (Yugoslavia as a union of states and not as a federal state, yet with control mechanisms which guaranteed the power of the center: a united party controlling all leading positions, a strong centralized and politically influential army, and Tito as an institution with the highest authority, combining the three most powerful functions in the country - that of the party, of the state and of the army).142 The new direction was first formulated at the 8th congress of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia in 1964, where it was admitted that the national problems had not been solved once and for all by socialism, then in the early stages of economic reform (1965), and also in the political conflict with Ranković (the Brioni plenary session in 1966). Normativelly, these changes were enacted by constitutinal amendments between 1968 and 1971, and finally by the 1974 constitution.143 The changes were accompanied by strong nationalist pressures and also by outbreaks of nationalism, such as that in 1968 in Kosovo and that in 1971 in Croatia. 144 They were also expressed trough the protest meetings of the intelligentsia in the 1960's and the student demonstrations in 1968. The changes were partially the consequence of political events abroad as well (the "Prague Spring" and the occupation of Czechoslovakia).145 The above mentioned processes strengthened the liberal forces in some republics (especially in Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia, and partly also in Macedonia). As for the Slovene "liberalism" 146 of the late 1960's, this meant more political pluralism between and within the existing political organizations - the Socialist Union of the Working People, the youth organization, and the trade unions. This "liberalism" also appealed for the continuation of economic reforms and was in favor of a combination of market economy concepts and the state's social corrective. It insisted on more independence for Slovenia within the federation, which should include the possibility of establishing direct international contacts with other countries, obtaining international loans, and the principle of fees for the maintenance of the federation. It wanted more independence in the defence policy (republican territorial defence, a right to serve military service in one's own republic or, where this was not possible, in nationally homogenous units, and the right to use one;s national language in the army). The economic concept of "liberalism" began to take its shape with the election of Stane Kavčič as the president of the Slovene government in 1967. He was the leading figure of Slovene "liberalism." Contrary to the previous policy of orientation toward heavy industry (influenced by ideological reasons),
142 Dušan Bilandžić: 1971 godina u Hrvatskoj, ljudi iz 1971. Prekinuta šutnja (Vjesnik, Zagreb, 1990). 143 Božo Repe: Slovenians and the federal Yugoslavia (Balkan Forum Vol 3 No 1, Skopje 1995. 144 Božo Repe: Das Besondere am "Titoismus" (Aufrisse No 2, Wien, 1992). 145 Božo Repe: Študentske demonstracije leta 1968 v zahodni in vzhodni Evropi in v Jugoslaviji (Zgodovina v šoli 3, Ljubljana 1995). 146 In post-war Slovene and Yugoslav history the term "liberalism" is used to denote the period between the mid-sixties and mid-seventies. It was the time when important democratic changes occured within the only and leading party, the CPY, which was also reflected in society. Party "liberalism" is in no way related to classic liberalism, except in a few fundamental democratic principles. The term is historical, it was used in sixties and seventies. Historiography accepted it, but usually it is used in quotation marks to make difference to classic liberalism.

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he foresaw the development of more dynamic branches (trade, banking, transport, tourism, services, consulting, engineering, and in the long run, also of information and computer sciences). Slovenia was to become a bridge between eastern and western countries and should follow primarily the example of the West (in its specific way by combinig the socially - owned property and market laws). It should encourage the development of "natural" resources (petrolium, gas nuclear energy). In terms of administration it should be policentric, but should have a uniform system of education, health care, research and scientific activities, and fiscal policy, directed from the center. The more conservative part of the leadership, which supported Edvard Kardelj, and operative core which included France Popit, chair of the Central Commitee of the Communist Union of Slovenia, and Sergej Kraigher, president of the Assembly, had already tried to get rid of Stane Kavčič and with the "liberals" in the time of the so - called "road affair" in the summer of 1969. That was the period of conflicts concerning the distribution of international loans for the construction of roads. The federal government (which was then headed by the Slovene Mitja Ribičič) left out two sections of Slovene roads, while considering the proposal for the distribution of the loans. The Slovene government's reaction was very sharp. Tito himself intervented in the "road affair" and Kavčič's adversaries managed to limit his influence considerably (he neverthless remained the most popular Slovene politician). The "road affair" was followed by some others. Among the most important is the so - called "affair of 25 deputies." In the summer of 1971 a group of republican deputies proposed, in addition to the official candidates, their own candidate for a member of the federal presidency (dr. Ernest Petrič). This was done in accordance with Assembly regulations, but without the consent of the Socialist Union of the Working People and the Communist Union. The deputies thus infringed on the Communist Party's monopoly in appointing high positions.147 The reaction was harsh: some deputies were stripped of their term of office, while others felt the consequences for years to come. The conservative group used its newly gained dominance to attack newspaper editors, intellectuals, liberal politicians at lower levels, pedagogues advocating an ideologically neutral school system, some university professors and others. In 1972 they attacked Stane Kavčič himself and his supporters in the Slovene political leadership. Kavčič was forced to resign and, until his death in 1987, never returned to politics.148 This attack was part of the Yugoslav attack on "liberalism," initiated and led by Tito. On September 18, 1972 Tito sent a letter to the members of the Communist Union in which he spoke about the Communist Union's resumption of indirect control and management of the society. In some cases (Croatia, Serbia) Tito also interfered directly in the conflict with the liberal movements. The constitution of 1974 guaranteed a direct leading role to the Communist Union of Yugoslavia as the only political power. It introduced a delegate system as a specific form of the self - management socialist democracy. "Classical" deputies were replaced by delegations, which hindered the system and eliminated the direct responsibility of individuals. The economy became regulated by the Associated Labor Law (1976), and the so-called agreement economy became the dominant form (a closed, uncompetitive system in which only export companies, which faced Western market conditions, could do well). The gap between Slovenia and its western neighbors, which had begun to diminish during the liberalization period, thus began to widen again.149 The period of "liberalism" in the second half of the 1960's and in the beginning of the 1970's was complex and contradictory, with a violent interruption of new economic and political processes. From the national point of view, Slovene "liberalism" was completley limited by Yugoslavia. Even the most radical ideas of this time (with the
147 Akcija 25 poslancev, Časopis za kritiko znanosti 101- 102 (Ljubljana 1987). 148 Stane Kavčič: Dnevnik in spomini (Časopis za kritiko znanosti, Ljubljana, 1988). 149 Božo Repe:""Liberalizem" v Sloveniji (Borec, Ljubljana 1992).

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exception of part of the political emigration) could not exceed the Yugoslav boundaries. Both the circumstances at home and abroad worked against it and there were no real chanches of its development. The "liberalist" movement started and developed in a socialist country and within a single party, which is why it was very specific. From today's viewpoint this "liberalism" was necessarily incomplete, inconsistent, marked by the ideology from which it originated and by the politics defining its space. It neverthless represented a significant beginning of pluralism in recent Slovene political history, which was marked by the rule of a single party. It was also an important experience which contributed to Slovenia's peaceful transition from a one - party system into a multiparty system at the end of the 1980's.150 It contained concepts of strategic economic directions, which Slovenia still largely wishes to implement today. Finally, the "liberalism" of the late 1960's significantly contributed to the strenghtening of Slovene self-confidence and to its ambition to create an independent state. SUMMARY The article discusses political life in Slovenia and in Yugoslavia in the 1960's and early 1970', i.e. in the period of so called "liberalism." The Slovene "liberals" assumed that persistent criticism could change the structure of the system. They thus remained within the socialist system and accepted the leading role of the Communist Union. However, simultaneously they strived for pluralism within existing political organizations, for various forms of property ownership (the prevailing form was social ownership of property), for acceptance of market laws and for greater autonomy for the individual republics in Yugoslavia. According to them Slovenia should establish closer economic ties with neighboring western countries, develop more dynamic economic branches (tourism, transport, trade, services) and become a bridge between the east and the West. The conservative group in the Communist Union first tried to do away with the "liberals" during various "affairs" (the so called "road affair" in 1969, the "affair of the deputies" in 1971). They finally succeeded in defeating the "liberals" in 1972, as part of the all Yugoslav supression of "liberalism". Slovene "liberalism" was incomplete and inconsistent, marked by the ideology from wich it orginated. It nevertheless represented a significant beginning of pluralism in recent Slovene political history. It was also an important experience which contributed to Slovenia's peaceful transition from a one party system into a multiparty system at the end of the 1980's.
150 Altough "liberalism" was defeated, economists continued to believe that the market economy was inevitable, this opinion was shared also by a part of the political top. The part of industry which exported its products to the West was used to competition; and a great deal of the Slovene managerial staff was spared in spite of political purges. Slovenia continued to develop economics contacts with Austria, Italy, Germany and some other countries; through its open borders it had steady contacts and a possibility of comparing with western systems. Aspirations for political pluralism arose from economic pluralism which was considered to be indispensable. Altough rejected by the political top, such ideas were expressed by some political scientists and sociologists even in the "leaden" seventies. Their considerations were (regarding the circumstances) above all oriented towards a pluralist scheme of Socialistična zveza delovnega ljudstva (The Socialist Alliance of the Working People) which was to comprise political groups of different world views. Such alliance was meant to be a sort of political opponent to the League of Communists. Edvard Kardelj first agreed with the concept, but then refused it in the seventies, although he acknowledged the necessity of political pluralism - a very special one, of course - he named it "pluralism of the self-managed socialist interests." Study on West Universities was not expect wit a pleasure by authorities, but mostly they tolerated it. Some intellectuals (Dimitrij Rupel, Peter Jambrek etc.) who studied in seventies in USA and in other countries became leaders of oposition in eighties. "Liberalism" was therefore - tough defeated - not without consequences. The conditions before the period of "liberalism" could not be completely restored. Different views were also preserved in The league of Communists. A part of "liberally" oriented politicians managed to keep their positions; some of them went to industry or business and tried to influence political circumstances from there. One of the politicians who stayed on this "march through institutions" was Milan Kučan. In the mid-eighties he became the president of the league of Communists of Slovenia. He reformed it, and included along with younger, unburdened politicians also a part of the "liberal" crew from the sixties to its executive bodies. Such political leadership was much more suceptible for political pluralism than the former on and it is well deserved for the evolutionary transition to the multiparty system.

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11. Titoism151
Definition Titoism is a term taken from the name of Yugoslavia’s president. It refers to that country’s brand of socialism which was developed after Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948. Two main features of titoism were worker’s self/ management and nonalignment. Self/management which went through various stages of elaboration / I will talk about them later/ was introduced in the early 1950s. Nonaligned brought Tito’s influence to the third World and it was formalized at the Belgrade conference of nonaligned nations in 1961. Titoism rejected the Western capitalist system, but also distanced Yugoslavia from Soviet model which was denounced as undemocratic. Titoism was an unsuccessful experiment to found a third alternative to development and modernization in the twentieth century. The birth of a new Yugoslavia During the Second World War Yugoslavia in fact ceased to exist. In Zagreb an » independent State of Croatia» under Italo/German protection had already been proclaimed with fascist Ustashe of Ante Pavelic in charge. It included Bosnia and Hercegovina but not a large part of Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands which were annexed by Italy. The ustasha regime took as its first task the ethnic and religious purification which meant the extermination of Serbs /15% of Croatia and a third of Bosnia population through forced conversions from orthodox to catolic religion and massacre. Slovenia disappeared from the map, part was annexed to Italy and Hungary and part to German Reich. Montenegro was declared a kingdom again, its crown united with Italian occupiers, the Kosovo region with its Albanian majority became part of an Albania which was under direct rule of Italy. The Bulgarians occupied and anticipated annexing Yugoslav Macedonia. The Hungarians annexed beside Prekmurje and Also Medjimurje, Barnja and Backa. Vojvodina was mostly directed direct by Volksdeutsch minority. Serbia was occupied by Germans and administered by local collaborater general Milan Nedic. Resistance was maintained in Yugoslavia by rival guerilla groups the serbian Chetniks under general Mihailovič and the communist lead partisans under Tito. Allied help, orginally given to Mihailovic was shifted to Tito because of the collaboration of Chetniks with the Germans. New Yugoslavia was born on November 29 1943 in the Bosnian town of Jajce. That happened in the midst of a holocaust of resistance, revenge and inter ethnic civil war. The event was the second session of an Anti/Fasisct Council of national Liberation of Yugoslavia /AVNOJ/. AVNOJ was the formally supreme political organ of a National Liberation Movement, it means partisans, created and led by the Communist party of Yugoslavia. AVNOJ had been established one year earlier, when 54 representatives of partisan movement from all regions exept Slovenia and Macedonia held first session at Bihac, another Bosnia town, to create a political organisation of liberation movement. In Jajce AVNOJ proclaimed himself as provisional parliament and established a national Committee of Liberation of yugoslavia as its executive organ with all the attributes of such a governement.. The head of the Committee was to be Josip Broz, called Tito 51 year Croat and partly Slovene origin. Tito in that time was supreme commander of the national
151

Repe, Božo. Das Besondere am "Titoismus" - seine Gewaltherrschaft und sein Zerfall. Aufrisse, 13 (1992), 3 "Flammenzeichen Jugoslawien"; p. 27-32.

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Liberation Army and seceretary general of communist party. AVNOJ also proclaimed him Marshal of Yugoslavia. AVNOJ proclaimed that the new Yugoslavia would be a federal State. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins should have a republic of its own. Bosnia and Hercegovina with mixed population of Serbs, Croats and Serbo/Croatian speaking Moslem Slavs would constitute a sixth republic. It was also confirmed proclamation of annexing Istria and Rijeka, Trieste, Goricia, Zadar and some Adriatic islands recently issued by the Liberation front of Slovenia and the regional Anti/Fascist Council of national Liberation of Croatia /that theritory belonged to Italy under treaties of 1920 and 1924/. King Peter was prohibited from returning to the country until post war plebiscite should determine the fat of monarchy, and the right of the Royal Governement in exile to represent Yugoslavia or to make international agreements in its name was denied. At the start of resistance movement in 1941 there was for several months sporadic co/operation and no clear line of demarcation between the two resistance movements, altough isolated clashes also occurred. Mihailovic who was official war minister of king’s governement in exile and Tito, leader of communist resistant movement met twice but they didn’t find common language, despite the pressure of British and Russians, on both to unified resistance front. The struggle between the two movements soon took precedence over the battle with the common enemy. By the winter of 1943/44 there were three orientations in Yugoslavia: those who identificate themselve with occupiers and Hitler’s new order in Europe, the chetniks, whose solution was the restoration of the old centralized Yugoslavia with the king and under Serbian domination and members of partisan resistance movement who were protagonists of a new, federal, but cleary Communist dominated Yugoslavia. Partisan movement was formally recognized by Allied forces on Teheran Conference, which was held the same week as Jajce meeting. Tito met the Churchill in Naples in August 1944 (also Stalin in Moscow in september 1944). After that Royal Government in exile headed by Croat Ivan Subasic was ready to recognise and deal with Tito. A new Yugoslav Provisional Govrnement was created on March 7, 1945. Tito became the last Royal Yugoslav prime minister and minister of defence and accepted Subasic and two other members of Government in exile in his cabinet. Yugoslavia again had a single Govrnement for the first time since Jajce. The partisan regime had achieved the international legitimacy. AVNOJ was enlarged with the members of last Yugoslav parliament from 1938 who were not compromised by collaboration with enemy. King was formally represented with Regency of three politicians. AVNOJ met for the third time in August 1945 and converted to Provisional national parliament. A Communist dominated People’s front (a peace time metamorphosis of the People’s Liberation Front, organization, created by communist’s during the last two years of war) won on elections for the Consituent Assembly. 95% of voters voted the single list presented by people’s front while prewar parties boycotted the elections (partly they were included in People’s front). Non comunist ministers had resigned to protest their exclusion from all effective decision making. On November 1945 Assembly abolished the monarchy and declared Yugoslavia as federal People’s republic. In new state due to the special position of Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the party mechanism called democratic centralism, was very effectivelly, though informally passed on to the rest of the society.This prevented everyone, except the most important party leaders, to start any public discussion about the relations among nationalities, and the relations to the centre respectively, for as long as the mid-sixties. The national question 67

was regarded as solved; some "deviations" were being treated by the highest state-party leadership. The internal borders were administratively drawn. In some cases they were discussed in the National Assembly (like in the case of dividing Sandžak) but mostly they were only discussed by individual politicians in telephone conversations (like in the case of some Macedonian, Bosnian and some other territories). Yugoslav stalinism The new regime had five sources of legitimacy: the first was power in Communist hands before the war ended. The second was international recognition and legal continuity with the old Yugoslav regime achieved with compromises with the Alies and the Government in exile. The third was partizan war. The fourth was won on elections: despite that they were undemocratic, people mostly supported communist party and people’s front. The fifth, relevant only for communists was historical imperative to achieve the last history step by marxistical theory: the rule of worker’s class incarnate in power of it’s avantgarda : communist party. The constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia adopted by the Constituent Assembly on January 31, 1946 was modelled on Soviet Constitution of 1936. Constitution formally institutionalised the six people’s republic promised at Jajce. It is also established within Serbia two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo (Kosovo was at first autonomous region with less rights than Vojvodina). With this there was imagination for many Yugoslavs and outside observers that the national question really had been solved. Despite federal constitution in legislation and practice in postwar Yugoslavia was centralised. Bicameral federal Assembly was composed of delegates from the republics and provinces, but most of effective legislative and executive powers were vested in the Assembly’s presidium and in the Govrnement. Really power was concentrated in the politbiro of central committee. Yugoslavia had suffered very much in the war, so the first goal of authorities was renovation and reconstruction of all infastructure. The second goal were agrarian reform (done before elections to acquire the votes of farmers and to award them for cooperation in resistance movement) and nationalisation. Most of Yugoslavia’s pre war industries and mines and a large part of the commercial and banking network had been foreign owned and by the end of war was in German hands. This property and property of collaborators (for this accusation was enough that they had kept their factories open and had sold the products to occupiers) was confiscated. Under decree issued in November 1944. Fully 80% of Yugoslav industry had already been nationalised before the first nationalisation law, whish passed in December 1946. A second Nationalisation Law was enacted in April 1948, affecting remaining industries, smaller enterpriesers etc (there was also third nationalisation of apartments in 1958). In early 1946 a decision had been taken to proceed with rapid and extensive industrialization on the Soviet pattern, complete with five years plan. The plan was officially inaugurated in April 1947, it was very ambitious. On the basis of 1939 levels it called for five times increase in total industrial output and electric power. It concentrated on basic industries like iron and steel and on big industries and big hydro and thermo/electrical plans, demand big investments on long period. The plan also placed the majority of project in the less developed regions, particulary in Bosnia/Heryegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. Authorities pledges to equalise prosperity and opportunities in all regions and provided jobs for all people. In that days the most important party’s ideologist Milovan Djilas said that Yugoslavia will catch up with England in per capita production of goods within in ten years. It was going for some sort ecstasy of big ideas and goals, for enthusiasm and voluntarism of leadership, but also for mass support of 68

which the regime boasted. Some sort of »attack on the sky«. »Heros of the struggle should be suceed by heros of the work, said Boris Kidric, the principal architect of Yugoslav economic policies in first afterwar years. This plan needed large and centralised apparatuses. With the reorganisation of federal, republican and local govrnement to cope with the five year Plan, the Yugoslav political/economic system came very close to its Soviet model and became a single, giant, countrywide and monopolistic trust. Yugoslav communistic system achieved a soviet organization of the society just in few years, much sooner than soviet model themselve after October revolution (as you know the industralization in Soviet Union was finished only in the middle of thirties. The break with Stalin The reasons for break were: • the uniqueness of Yugoslav revolution • Tito’s international ambitions, activities and initiatives which suggested that he was aspiring to become an autonomous veceroy of south/eastern Europe • Stalin;s decision to proceed equalizing (Gleichschaltung) of the East European people;s democracies and to produce of a monolithic socialistic block under Soviet control • the personal characteristics of Stalin and Tito First grievances had the roots even in war time. Partisans and Tito resented to Russians that they didn’t sent them material assistance in the early years of the war ( that was very depressing for partizans also because of their naive faith in Soviet power), than Soviet attitudes to the Chetniks and Royal govrnement in exile, Soviet contrairety to change AVNOJ in representative body of partisan movement. Soviet leadership also opposed to revolutionary ambitions of partisan movement (they were for example even against revolutionary symbols like red star with hammer and sickle which weared elite proletarian brigades in Yugoslavia. Tito also resented Stalin deals over Yugoslavia with Churchill in Moscow when he learned of it after the war and with Churchill and Roosvelt at Yalta. Tito ignored Stalin;s advises with which Stalin wanted to avoid damaging inter Allied relations because of using the war for revolutionary purposes. Tito also didn’t allowed to Red Army to stay in Yugoslavia after final operations in which it helped liberated Belgrade, Serbia nad some other places in Yugoslavia. Stalin;s resent ti Tito was also his independ internal policy, especially his independent intiative in meeting Churchill in Naples just before fifty/fifty agreement. After war Russians opposed Tito;s Trieste policiy because they were not ready to risk confrontation with the West and later his support to communist in Greece. Tito was very popular in the new countries of people;s democracies, on his travel in some of them he had been enthusiastic recepted. He had clear intention to unite Albania with Yugoslavia, he negotiated with Bolgaria about federation and wanted to create East European or Balkan confederation. Altough Stalin himself had initiated or approved plans of this kind his matter was different: to reach communistic empire with leading role of Soviet Union and uniform position of other countries and not independ subsystems with strong and popular leaders like Tito. Yugoslav communist after war were discovering the Soviet Union as an arrogant and imperialist great power rather than a comradely and Communist one. Such feelings were also provoked by arogant behaviour of the Red Army and Soviet military and tehnical advisers. Conditions offered by soviet side in negotiations about creation of Soviet / Yugoslav join/stock companies were intolerably exploitative. The basic issue in the great quarrel of 1948 was very simple: whether Tito and his Politbiro or Stalin would be dictator of Yugoslavia. 69

The ideological dimension of the quarrel was negligible. People’s democracy in Yugoslavia was confirm by Stalin and his ideologists and even more. It was an example for other East European communist parties how to achieve the power. Soviet side reproached to Yugoslav communists that they distributed land among farmers and didn’t collectivisate the countryside and also that they »hidden« Communist Party behind People’s front and continued to behave an illegal, conspiratorial organisation. But this reproach were generally irellevant and hypocritical. In the long respond of Yugoslav communists on Soviet reproach one setence was fundamental: «No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love his own country less.« Soviet Union wanted to disciplined Yugoslav communist party through international communistic organization named Informbiro. But they didn’t agree with that, Tito’s standpoint was that Soviet is attack the attack on independent state and not the question of ideological discerpancies among communist parties. The Yugoslav experiment with an independent and original road to socialism was born of necessity, not on conviction. (despite that you can find theories at some Yugoslav and also Slovenian historians, that self management started even during the second world war with creation of people’s committees). In 1948 and even latter the party elite could not imagine that socialism could be built in any way that differed essentially from the Soviet model. Even the break with Stalin did not seem to them at first to be hopeless. When they were forced to re/think their institutions and their ideology that was in large measure dictated by circumstances: isolation from Soviet block, economic blokade, political and military pressure, break down with domestic soviet economic machinery and later consequent dependence of western aid and trade for survival, what brought extensive contacts with Western ideas, tehnolocgy and institutions. Parallel with the criticism of Soviet regime and its ideology and efforts to distinguish new formated Yugoslav system from Soviet precendents Yugoslavia also kept the distance from Western system. On personal level this change was not easy. Two years from split with Soviet Union to start of introducing new system gave members of the elite to adapt themselves, psychologically and ideologically to new situation. Despite that the confusion, personal traumas and the continued dogmatism infected more or less all members of leading group. Even Tito, who was not very ideological person (his motto basically was to stay in power) with instinctual sense of danger and with experience of Soviet purges in thirties based on soviet experience. The fifth party Congress in 1948 (first after Dreseden in 1928) supported Tito, but opening and ending ceremony ended with chants Long live the fraternal Soviet Union, Long live the leader and teacher of progressive humanity Comrade Stalin, Long live the Great Soviet Union with the genius Stalin at his head. The Congress message to new elected central committee was to do everything in its power to liquidate the musunderstanding with the parties of Cominform. The intensity of the pshyological trauma was also manifest in the psychosomatic illness which Tito, Kidric and some other leaders suffered in that time. Hope was, that this nightmare will pass somehow. First reaction on this situation was that Yugoslav communist party became more stalinistic that Stalin. Collectivisation of agruculture was to proceed with more boldness and increased tempo. Even in 1952 Tito himself could still see no alternative to collectivisation in some form Yugoslav foreign policy also continued to follow the Soviet line. Purges, trials and isolation on Adriatic islands of so called »cominformists« it means people under suspicion that they are supporting Stalin, became epidemic. When Vladimir Dedijer later said once, that there was difference from Soviet Union in pressure and that 70

Yugoslavia didn’t have its own Siberia, Tito responded: »We don’t have a Siberia, but if we had one, we would have sent people there.« With help of American policy »to keep Tito afloat« start in 1950 Yugoslavia survived and even come close to Nato with Balkan pact in 1954 ( full military alliance with Greece and Turkey). Total help of american economic assistance was almos t six hundred dolars and official price of military help almost the same. The new relationship between Yugoslavia and the West politically ended the country’s isolation it soon leds to diplomatically useful contacts with the new states of third world and non alignet movement. The country avoid starvation, orient foreign trade from east to west. And this contacts had an important impact on institution and ideology. In 1949 at Yugoslav ideologists was luck of knowledge about alternatives. Ideology, like power remained highly centralised, in establishment of Titoism there was small group of men, personally recruted by Tito after 1937. They were connected very close, ideas bounced from one to another, so the original authorship of idea of self management is undiscoverable. One story is, that first initiator was Milovan Djilas, latter the famous Yugoslav disident. In the spring 1950 he find out, that Yugoslav communists are now in position to start creating Marx‘ s free association of producers. The factories would be left in the hands of workers. The issue was debated for months in close circles before it was presented by Kardelj and Kidrict to Tito in the lobby of federal Assembly. His first reaction was: Our workers are not ready for that yet.. Than Tito paced up and down, suddenly stopped and exclaimed: factories belonging to the workers, something that has never yet been achieved. A few months later Tito explained the worker’s self management bill to the National Assembly. Wether or not these details are strictly accurate, the changes started. Administrative socialism turn to self management one. New law on local government organs permitted people’s committees a modest degree of fiscal autonomy. Meetings of voters were another innovation, they could nominate candidatets for elections. In industrial enterprises worker’s councils were involved. Despite that effective control remained in the hands of directors and the State. The state administration was reorganized to reduce the number of federal bureaucrats: by July 1950 about 100 000 jobs in State and party bureaucracies had been abolished. The communist regime in Yugoslavia was no based on two untouchable founding myths: the partisan war and worker«s self/management. Market socialism and socialist democracy The dominant historic task of the regime for the next decades was to be search for appropriate and politically acceptable mechanisms capable to work in the praxis. The Soviet system of planning was abandonned, the enterpreised enjozed a certain degree of genuine autonomy. Materials and equipment would be bought and products sold competitively on the market, credits to be repaid with interests not grants. This last passed very hard, because some politicians in the top thouhgt that this is return to capitalism. In 1953 the economy escaped from he stagnation and economical boom gbeginning, which was to continued almost for decade. With the economic reform in 1953 the system of State determination of rates of accumulations and funds which replaced administrative socialism at star of the fifties was changed again with the system of profit sharing. Profit was enterprise net income after had been paid all costs, the taxes, social security etc. and it was share with the local commune. Also agriculture sector was reorganized and socialistic agricultural cooperatives were dissolved. Peasants could leave, taking their equipment and land with them.

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In 1953 constitution was changed or better said supplementing with constitutional law. The 1946 Constitution had assigned to the republics a large part of power. With the constitutional law from 1953 more prerogatives were given to local authorities and worker’s councils, associations of citiyens formed in sectors like education, culture, health services. At the federal level the Chamber of Nationalities of People’s Assembly in which the republics and provinces were directly represented, delegated by the republican and provincial assemblies, was absorbed into the Federal Chamber (in which representatives were voted directy, one on every 60 000 Yugoslavs). A primary aspect of federalism was degradate The second chamber in the federal Assembly was to be now a Chamber of producers in which people were voted indirectly by different associations. This system retain party control and abandonment the so called burgois concepts of political representation. In the next years also open the national question in Yugoslavia for which existed euphoric belief that really had been solved once for ever. With the constitutional law also the post of president of the republic was restore. In political life party formally wanted to separate itself from the state and from every day political decision making and only stay as »an ideological and political leading force.« It should influencing open and democratic on specific issues through education, propaganda and the active participation of individual communists in the life and politics of enterprises, worker’s councils, local government etc. In inner debates some leaders also considered reintroducing a multiparty system as part of democratization. That was always rejected and the same was with proposals to abandon communist party as political organization. Milovan Djilas, who leaded in criticism of system and also of his own colleagues because of their privileges was eliminated from political life and later inprisoned. Party as political organization kept insuperable advantage over the unorganized forces of the country’s non communists in election and in the people’s front. Party elite would continue to occupy the key posts in the people’s Front, trade unions, municipal governments, enterprise organs, management. So practically political reform consisted only of change of name from communist party to league of communist on the 6th Congress in 1952 and of some organizational changes inside league. Also people’s front changed into Socialist Alliance of the Working people. Despite that even this changes for some leading communists were too much, Tito was to declare two decades later, that he had never liked the 6th Congress. His emphasis was always on so called democratic centralism and party responsibility. But Yugoslav system after 1954 differed radically from that of 1949 when the first great debate about the nature of a socialistic State and economy began. The role of the state in the economy and of the party of the state were both indirect, there was no more monolithic global social system from 1949. All this changes not yet had much effect on real life of ordinary people, but slowly the standard also started to change. Economic growth, political stagnation and reopening the national question in fifties Two years after Stalin’s death in 1955 Khruschev came in Belgrade, excused Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia and relations between states and parties were normalised. Relations in fifties changes from the better to the worst, but basically position of Yugoslavia became very important in international relations ship Fundamental definition, that the national question in Yugoslavia was resolved by the revolution once and for all, first appeared in Program ZKJ /The Programme of Union of Communists/ in 1958, and it was kept on the doctrinaire level until the sixth Congress of ZKJ /Union of Communists of Yugoslavia/ in December 1964. 72

The consequences of centralism and Serb hegemonism - particularly towards national minorities - started to show towards the end of 1950 s. In 1959, the leadership ordered an analyses about the position of national minorities, and so indirectly admitted, that their situation was not satisfactory. On ground of that analyses, the national problem was discussed more extensively for the first time after the war. But decentralized selfmanaging mechanism involved in fifties could not replace the role of republics because communities had different functions. »Liberalism of sixties« Towards the end of 1950 s and at the beginning of 1960 s, when economic crises started to arise, the monolith era within Yugoslav political top came to an end. Two political lines with different visions about further development opposed each other: the centralist one, which promoted the idea of a strong party, of control and repressive apparatus; and the more democratic one, with tendencies towards self-management, decentralisation and paying attention to the laws of economy. As a matter of fact, the question about the position of individual federal units was raised with might and main. The burden of conflict with the centre at time was carried by Slovene politicians. They already engaged in public polemics with advocates of centralism; Slovene delegation refused to vote for the economic plan for the year 1962, it even left the session of federal assembly (this happened for the first time in the post-war parliamentary practice); demands for decentralisation of economy appeared; Slovenia opposed the tax on extra profit (tax on diligence, as it was called in Slovenia); the culmination of the conflict was the politically initiated public polemics about the nature of "Yugoslavism" between Dušan Pirjevec and Dobrica Čosić. The fight for linguistic and cultural rights, which were constitutionally guaranteed, started as well. In this struggle Slovene politicians joined up with Slovene cultural workers (artists), and this also was a novelty for Slovene conditions. Slovene politicians and cultural workers (artists) opposed the federal supreme court to issue their decisions only in Serbo-Croat, even when Slovene cases were involved; the exclusive use of Serbo-Croat language on border crossings; the signs at railway stations in both Latin and Cyrillic characters; the subtitles on films and television in Serbo-Croat and sometimes even in Cyrillic characters; the lectures of civil defence at the university held in Serbo-Croat; the rejection of Slovene candidates for the diplomatic service by the federal centre. Behind the centralist demands for unified text-books, unified curricula, unified federal funds for culture, centralised cultural exchange with foreign countries (all in the name of rationalisation and unified economy), was a tendency towards forming of common socialist culture as a sort of substitute for the non-existing Yugoslav nation. "Rationalisation" went so far, that they even tried to reduce state subsidy for the Slovene national minorities in Austria and Italy.The conflicts among nations and between republics and the centre respectively, started to turn up in other republics as well; in Serbia there were conflicts between autonomous provinces and the centre. The struggle for emancipation from the centre in Macedonia was - although slightly later - even stronger than in Slovenia and in Croatia. Tito tried to solve the arising conflict - the most serious one after Informbiro - by disciplinary measures of the leading republic politicians. (Sitting of the Executive Committee of CK ZKS, 14th - 16th May 1962). The sitting did not bring any solutions, the conflicts even deepened. The decision-making was therefore limited to Tito and to few people around him. Kardelj was not one of them; he was out of favour at that time. His removal was one of the aims of the centralists. The discussion on the new constitution, which had already been announced in 1960 was postponed for some time and the arrangements for it started a year later. The discussion was renewed a few months later, in spring 1961. Its initial position was narrowed because of the centralist 73

pressure. The constitution only included general principals about workers and social selfmanagement, about income, remuneration according to work, the system of local administration, as well as about the basis of political system. The defensive attitude of the reform group was reflected in the constitution; it provided a "general" decentralization on account of the federalism of republics and the status of autonomous minorities decreased; republics were given the possibility to establish their own autonomous provinces according to "specific" attributes of particular areas; national minorities became "nationalities". Republic constitutions had to be - according to internal agreement - adapted copies of the federal, although the Slovene committee for constitution had bigger ambitions. It proceeded from the standpoint that republics were the fundaments of state sovereignty, as well as of basic principals of the social system. Because of the balance of political power this course was, apart from some articles dealing with economy, not successful. On the whole it can be said, that regarding the 1963 Constitution, the centralists were more successful then the federalists; they managed to include more of their standpoints into it than the federalists. They also managed to redeem the demands for establishing Yugoslavia as a unionof nations and imposed - at least in main points - their concept of the state as a union of communities. On the economic level they retained - through federal funds - the power of the centre. But also the federalists had some success; if nothing else, they refused the theory about republics being territorial units. The most important achievement for the federalists was the fact, that the political climate at the top started to change in the following months and that TitoĆs views started to change in their favour. This could first be seen more distinctly two years after the constitution was adopted. During the 8th Congress in December 1964, the leaders carefully started a discussion about the national question. The decision about that was made in the last moment. In spite of simultaneous criticism of centralism and nationalism, the basic reaction was oriented against the ôgrand-Serbö thesis that it was a misfortune for Yugoslavia to be a multinational state, and also against the view point of some Yugoslav intellectuals (also of the circle around Praxis), that nations are actually an exploded, out of date formation. This theory, which was due to fast technological development and integration, was quite widely spread among a number of European intellectuals of that time. In any case, the congress opened an until then tabooed theme, although there was no reaction to the speeches of Tito, Kardelj and Vlahovič, the only ones, who spoke about the national question. Soon afterwards the decision to start an economic reform was reached. In behind-the-scene fights with Ranković, Kardelj, assisted by the Slovene political top and advocates of federalism in other republics, patiently built up his role of a chief Yugoslav ideologist. After he was secured the support of Tito and the most influential Croat politician Vladimir Bakarić, he presented his concept of the reform of federation at the sitting of Executive Committee of CK ZKJ (November 1965).According to Kardelj, there were three opposing basic orientations existing in Yugoslavia. The first one was - because of their own economic interest - supported by representatives of the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia). They expected the greatest possible help from the federation and therefore supported centralization of economy. Croatia And Slovenia were in favour of the second orientation. They wanted to get emancipated from the federation in every aspect possible. The third, hegemonic orientation found its advocates in Serbia. The centralist structure of power in Yugoslavia made Kardelj believe that the hegemonic concept had the most chances to be implemented, after the leading revolutionaries would be gone. Therefore he suggested republic should become states; the role of federation should be the one of a "green table" where the states could coordinate their politics, and a service, which would implement common functions and the agreed politics. At the same time he suggested to accelerate the reform of the economy. Yugoslav economic system was to be specific: based on social ownership (of means of production) it was to follow the principles of market economy. Yugoslavia being a socialist 74

federation, he also planned some security measures to secure the political power for the party (uniform army, uniform party which functions on the principle of democratic centralism and Tito as the highest authority, combining the three functions (state, party and military) in one person. The leading position of the working class and its avant-garde ZKJ (Union of Communists of Yugoslavia) was not to be changed and this was to enable existence of Yugoslavia in future (it was Kardelj’s belief, that Yugoslav federation was formed above all because of socialism). Resistance against the proposed reform was strong, (for the fear ZKJ could start to lose power because of it) there were doubts even among those, who at first supported it. It came into life after the plenum at Brioni and after Ranković was removed in July 1966. The first changes of the system which concerned the reform of the federation and which did away with the worst centralist anomalies were introduced as late as in June 1967, when federal assembly adopted constitutional amendments. In the next years they were followed - because of strong national and liberal pressure in some republics and also because of the nationalistic outbursts (for example in Kosovo in 1968 and in Croatia in 1971) - by additional amendments, which strengthened the autonomy of republics. The 1974 constitution (behind-the-scene struggle was much harder than the one for the 1963 constitution) did introduce a confederate model. In its essence, however, it was a compromise and inconsistent constitution. It offered national rights in exchange for democracy, not along with it; technically it confirmed the victory of the conservative orientation (constitutionally guaranteed leading role of ZKJ); it also provided the basis for the introduction of an ineffective economic system (economic reform was then stopped in 1971). Since there was no real democracy within republics, republic oligarchies sprang up with the federalization and within the competence gained, they could - without any control - manage affairs on their own. Apart from that, Serb leadership and the army never really accepted the new constitution and acted against it right from the beginning. The new constitution therefore never really worked, decisions were made beyond the bodies of the assembly and until Tito s death Yugoslavia functioned as a sort of semifederation. Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, the end of »titioism« The first post-Tito years were characterized by trying to keep a sort of balance and afterwards by a complicated and confused system of collective managing with short mandates and presidents on duty. From the mid-eighties on, strong centralist and hegemonic pressures along with conflicts among the nations (similar to those from the beginning of 1960’s) started again, and finally they lead to war and disintegration of Yugoslavia. In 1980 s, after Tito s death an unsuccessful period of "defending the constitution" started in Slovenia and some other republics. On the other hand, civil society and informal opposition with its own programmes and views about the position of Slovene nation, started to rouse. This was a new and fresh break-through within Slovene statehood. The most noticeable appreciation of the position of Slovene nation within Yugoslav federation, as well as the vision of the future development was published by Nova revija - a magazine of intellectual opposition - in its Nr. 57 at the beginning of 1987 (after the memorandum of Serb Academy of Sciences And Art became known in 1986, which strove for the implementation of the Serb national programme). Under the circumstances of strong polarization in 1988, federal constitutional reforms only comprised the economic part and the functioning of some federal institutions. The changes involved were on account of republic competencies, but they did not really affect their constitutional position. The opposition to constitution was due to the justified fear of renewed centralization as manifested in Serb demand for the so called third Yugoslavia. Slovenia started to change its constitutional status within Yugoslavia with its own 75

constitutional changes (Serbia did that earlier by degrading both autonomous provinces); the emancipation was in progress also in other areas; one of the crucial events was the parting of Slovene communists with ZKJ during the 14th congress in January 1990. With the formation of formal opposition towards the end of the 1980 s, three options existed within Slovenia at different times, within different contexts, and with different political forces: asymmetrical federation, confederation and independence. Opositional forces were more in favour of independence (disintegration), until they gained power in May 1990, whereas the socialist authority (which had to carry the burden of pressure from the centre) tried to find compromise solutions. Since the change of power, when former opposition was faced with reality (also of international relations and pressures from related parties abroad), most Slovene politicians were principally in favour of confederate model. At the same time the republic was preparing for the defense of the already achieved, and looking for allies abroad. Referendum results in December 1989 showed that most Slovene citizens voted for independent Slovene state (from the poll of 93,3%, 88,2 voted for independence). The plebiscite decision itself was not opposed to a loose connection with other republics (as in Benelux states and similar associations), but in spite of hard negotiations, there was no consensus for such solutions within Yugoslav top. An armed intervention of Yugoslav army in June 1991 whose aim was to prevent the independence of Slovenia, meant a final separation from Yugoslavia and at the same time a rapid disintegration of the state. After the process of Slovene emancipation was frozen for three months (as resolved in negotiations with federal authorities under the cover of European Community), with the adoption of a new constitution in December 1991 and simultaneous international recognition of Slovenia as well as with its admission to UN in May 1992, the Slovene history with Yugoslav federalism and also with »titoism« »came to an end. Slovenians believed in it for a long time and they invested a lot of energy in its planning and development. Nevertheless, Yugoslav federation was never able to function without compulsory cohesive measures from outside or inside factors in the course of its existence. When they fell away (the decline of socialism and lifting of the iron curtain, the disintegration of the party and of the army), it could not find a democratic alternative for its existence. It still remains to be seen in what way the newly established states on the territory of former Yugoslavia will regulate the relations among each other. Migrations in the territory of former Yugoslavia from 1945 until present time /today/152 Since the second half of the 19th century, migrations in the territory of former Yugoslavia were strong and frequent. Its reasons were of economic, political and religious nature. The most important economic reasons were economic retardation, agrarian overpopulation and the growing birth rate. Of the political and religious reasons the most important ones before 1945 were the change of the state format (i.e. the inclusion of Kosovo and Metohija into Serbia and later into Yugoslavia. The consequence was a mass migration of the Turks and also of the Albanians or the inclusion of the Bosnia and Herzegovina into Austria Hungary, which provoked similar processes among the Muslims. The unsuccessful rebellions against the Turks (i.e. the Ilinden rebellion at the beginning of the 20th century) can also be attributed to the religious and political reasons. Due to the new borders After World War I, there were further mass migrations which resulted in the emergence of numerous strong national minorities. Out of 300.000 of the Coastal Slovenians who became Italian citizens, over 70.000 migrated partly to Yugoslavia, partly to the overseas countries, predominantly the USA and South America. From the end of the 19th century until World War II there were also temporary migrations
REPE, Božo. Les migrations sur le territoire de l'ancienne Yougoslavie de 1945 a nos jours : predavanje : Séminaire européen d'enseignants "Etre migrant(e) en Europe", 6-9 mars 2002, Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, Université de Neuchâtel. Neuchâtel, 2002.
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due to seasonal work (falling trees, work in the fields), which usually lasted a few months. From the end of the 19th century until the beginning of World War II almost 1.000.000 people left the country for the USA, Canada, Australia, South America and several European countries (mostly France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany - above all Westfallen). World War II was characterised by refugees, mass – mostly forced - migrations (deportations), i. e. of the Serbs from Croatia or the Slovenes to Serbia, Croatia and Germany, and the colonisation of the evacuated territories by German population (in Slovenia this meant, that 15.000 members of the Götscher German minority were settled in the homes of the deported Slovenians in the Posavje and the Obsotelje region. After World War II, the first wave of emigrants from all republics consisted of political emigrants (members of collaborationist units and their families; people who could not accept communism). Most of them fled at the end of the war, however, the allies returned a part of them. An exact number of people who fled the country after the war has never been established, yet the estimations go up to several hundred thousands. A part of the emigration wave consisted of the members of the German and the Italian nationality. Almost all the members of the numerous German national minority emigrated after World War II (the reasons being mass nazification and the collaboration in the occupational apparatus during World War II). Based on the agreement between the Yugoslav and the Italian government on the possibility of the choice of citizenship, the majority of Italian population moved from Slovenia and Croatia; yet the Italian minority - contrary to the German - was preserved and eventually gained strong protection as a minority. Due to victims of war and post-war migrations, Yugoslavia is estimated to have lost between 2 1000 and 2 9000 of its inhabitants (the numbers were frequently a subject of political manipulations). After that, the population started to grow - from 15 million it grew to 22 million at the beginning of the eighties, which corresponds to the growth of 41,6%. The birth rate in the more developed parts of the country (i.e. Slovenia and Croatia) was 20%, whereas it amounted to 60% in the less developed parts and even to 116% in Kosovo. Until the beginning of the sixties, there had been no further mass migrations, which is among others due to the fact that Yugoslavia was a politically closed and isolated country (disputes with the western allies because of the border, disputes with the Soviet Union because of the Inform biro). The settlement of the border issues in the midfifties and the gradual opening of the country resulted in the increased wave of economic emigration. In the forties, the internal migrations were first caused by colonisation. From mountainous areas of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, people were moved to fertile Vojvodina, to the possessions, which previously belonged to Germans. These colonisations brought about numerous national and psychological consequences. People from the mountains were not used to the farming in the plain country; between them and the natives conflicts occurred even if they were of the same nationality - the cultural differences were simply too big. Another aspect of the migrations was that the authorities wanted to change the nationality structure, particularly in regard with the strong Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. The second wave of migrations was caused by the accelerated industrialisation in the mid-fifties, which was carried out in Yugoslavia according to the Soviet model. Several hundred thousands of mostly unskilled workers moved to the towns. Since the politically initiated industrialisation was not followed by setting up an appropriate infrastructure (flats, schools, kindergartens, shops, services, etc.), the settling was more or less carried out spontaneously, by erecting improvised housing units from which people only very gradually moved to the big, newly built residential quarters. 77

Slovenia turned to become the largest immigration area. In the mid-fifties, it was the first Yugoslav republic to change from a predominantly agrarian into a predominantly industrialised society, the consequence being a constant influx of people from other republics. On the whole, till 1990, over 289 000 people moved to Slovenia, as opposed to the 207 000 who left it (out of which over 70 000 went to western European countries; the rest of them either returned home to their respective republics, or moved elsewhere, mostly to the west). As you may know, Slovenia has a population of less than two million; according to the national census of 1991, 87,6% were of Slovenian nationality. In 1990, the total rise of the population due to immigration thus amounted to 140 000 people. In the period between 1960 and 1966, about 380 000 people moved from Yugoslavia to other countries; mostly due to economic reasons. In the mid-seventies when the emigration was at its peak and the needs for labour force in the Western-European countries the biggest, about 1 400 000 people used to be on the so-called "temporary labour" abroad. After that, the number began to fall gradually (about 400 000 returned home). In the mid-eighties it amounted to a million clear. In the first period, most economic emigrants came from Serbia (37% of the total number), later from Croatia (24%). In the eighties, however, there was an increased influx of emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the mid-eighties, 180 000 emigrants from this republic used to work in Western-European countries. For the former Yugoslavia economic emigrants was be a very special psychologicalsociologic phenomenon. On the one hand they presented a strong economic support for the country (most of them kept their money in Yugoslav banks, they built houses of their own, supported their relatives), yet on the other, they brought the market mentality into the socialist society, imported the most up-to-date domestic appliances and western cultural patterns. Particularly before the holidays, the mass migrations led to indescribable crowds of people waiting at the border crossings. The last wave of migration from Yugoslavia affected the country because of the political, the national and religious, and partly also because of economic reasons during the wars (1991 - 1996). During the war, a methodical ethnic cleansing was carried out. According to different sources, about three million people either emigrated or moved away. In 1994, there were almost 700 000 refugees from former Yugoslavia in various European countries. The ethnically cleansened areas were Bosnia and Herzegovina, the territories of Croatia previously inhabited by the Serb population, and to a large extend also Kosovo (as early as in the eighties, several tens of thousands Serbs moved away). During the 45 years of its existence, the second, socialist Yugoslavia thus went through numerous migration waves - both, internal and external. Whereas the politically motivated migrations took place during World War II, immediately after it and then again during the recent wars in the nineties, the economic migrations were going on in the fifties and the sixties of the previous century (the internal ones as a result of industrialisation and the external due to the surplus of the labour force), and partly in the nineties (i. e. from Serbia, from which about 300 000 young people moved because of poverty and hopelessness. Due to political and economic reasons, the newly established states in the territory of former Yugoslavia are more or less closed and the formerly strong migration currents thus interrupted (with the partial exception of returning of the refugees, which seems to be very slow). In the formerly more developed parts of the country, predominantly Slovenia, there is a new need to import labour force, partly for unskilled work and partly for the highly skilled one (i.e. doctors), for whom there is a major shortage in Slovenia. 78

12. Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia153
The four key elements of the 45 years long existence of Yugoslavia were: a) the communist resistance movement during World War II along with carrying out an authentic revolution (though under the Soviet influence); b) the reconstruction of Yugoslavia as a federative republic (and not as the pre-war centralised kingdom); c) the introduction of an alternative form of socialism (socialist self-management) after the break-up with the Informbiro in 1948; d) the bipolar division of Europe and indeed, of the world in which Yugoslavia found the so called "third" way (non-alignment) with the role of Josip Broz Tito as a charismatic leader who - possessing absolute and undisputed authority - functioned within Yugoslavia as a third "institution" (along with the Communist Party and the army). Tito's Rise, Charisma, and the Personality Cult Tito became a public figure as early as in the twenties when he was sentenced to several years of imprisonment in a court trial in Zagreb. In the second part of the thirties he became the organisational secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.154 The few members of the leadership he had appointed (though he removed some of them, for example Milovan Djilas and Aleksander Ranković in different periods) were then leading the Communist Party, the liberation movement, as well as the state for several decades. Nevertheless, it was the war, which helped Tito to transform from a secretary of a relatively unimportant Communist Party into a legendary leader of the Yugoslav partisan movement and a leader of Yugoslav state. With an extraordinary persistence he managed to bring together parts of the broken Yugoslavia. At that time neither Britain nor America, nor the Soviet Union believed Yugoslavia could ever be restored. With his motto about the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nations he tried to prevent the bloody fights between the Serbs, the Croats and the Moslems and at the same time connect the resistance with the revolution. Though maintaining a permanent contact to Moscow, he exhibited a great deal of independence and autonomy even at that time. In the spring of 1943 when the pragmatic Britains realised who was really fighting in Yugoslavia, Tito was given military missions, arms as well as international fame. Churchill didn't like him since he was a communist but he valued his contribution to the war and even sent his son to Tito's military headquarters. Even before the end of the war, when he got reconciled with the political development in Yugoslavia he admitted to the British Parliament that Tito was
Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Repe, Božo (not published): predavanje na konferenci Midnight Sun II, 26.-27. May 2000, Harstad College. Harstad, 2000. 154 Several tens of books in English and other languages were published about Tito, among others several biographies which presented him from different angles. In Yugoslavia, the first major work about Tito was published in 1953. Josip Broz -Tito. Contributions to the biography was written by Tito's official biographer Vladimir Dedijer, who then fell out of favour and lectured for several years at foreign universities. Numerous other books, presenting Tito as a revolutionary, statesman, hunter, etc. Towards the end of the seventies, The Complete Works of Josip Broz Tito started to appear which included virtually all the documents associated with his work. Over twenty volumes comprising the period from the mid-twenties till the end of World War II were published. Due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the collection ceased to appear. In 1981, after Titos's death Dedijer published New Contributions to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito. Discussing unpleasant details from Tito's life and diverse backgrounds of his decisions, the book provoked frantic reactions. With this book, Tito's myth gradually ceased to be seen as a taboo in Yugoslav historiography. Later several other books, describing single elements of Tito's life (i.e. his romantic affairs, memories of one of his personal doctors, etc.) were published. However, a critical biography by a historiographer from former Yugoslavia remains yet to be written.
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the undisputed ruler of Yugoslavia. Tito's charisma in the west during the war was rooted in his resistance which was urgently needed by the allies, after the Royal Minister and Draža Mihajlović had failed in this role, though the latter was persistently favoured by the West and Tito's military achievements were attributed to him. Western statement were much more reserved towards Tito on political level since they believed that he was under a strong ideological influence of Moscow. Apart form that, Tito didn't show much interest for the deals between the major powers. Without informing the allies, he convened the second meeting of the anti-fascist council of the national liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ)155 and proclaimed the new revolutionary government for the only legitimate government of Yugoslavia. Though Tito's popularity in the West was limited to his resistance, even during war, the "normal" charisma of a leader grew into a proper personality cult in the home country. This was not only due to a (though effective) systematic propaganda, it was also rooted in the spontaneous reaction of the people who needed a kind of a saver in the circumstances governed by the occupation of the country and religious massacres between the nations. "Beloved leader comrade Tito dear, unite us, make us strong and fierce" and "here he made an end to religious hate, instead he established the first proletarian brigade", were among the first of the numerous folk songs which expressed the emotions of the people for Tito, gradually creating a legend out of him. In the summer of 1942 when only burned houses and the bodies of the killed were left behind after the Kozara offensive, the cult song about "Tito's way" was created. Expressing devotion to Tito and his political ideas, its different versions were frequently sung even after the war (particularly in the moments of crisis). The song was written by the peasant woman Persa Ristić, from a village in the vicinity of the Bosnian town Bosanska Dubica. During the offensive she lost over 30 of her relatives and while collecting their bones, the following verses came to her spontaneously: "The wheat fields strewn with graves / Kozara swears to Tito / Comrade Tito we shall never depart from your course" 156 (free translation). Her surviving colleagues immediately adopted the verses. The end of the war found Tito as an undisputed Yugoslav leader. Although a follower of the Soviet Union (his unannounced visit to Moscow and his agreements with Stalin at the end of September and the beginning of October 1944 particularly annoyed the western allies), he understood to keep a certain distance to it. The Red Army didn't exceed its activities on the Yugoslav territory over the extend that was demanded and accepted by Tito, after that it had to withdraw. He was able to draw the maximum from the agreements with the emigrant government: he became the Prime Minister of the temporary government of the Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Further he
AVNOJ (the antifascist council of the national liberation of Yugoslavia) presented the central political and representative body of the national liberation movement of Yugoslavia. As a political body it was set up in November 1942 in Bihać (Bosnia). Its second assembly, which was held on 29 November 1943 and was attended by elected delegates of all the Yugoslav nations, proclaimed itself for the supreme legislative, executive and representative organ of the new Yugoslavia. The assembly concluded that the future Yugoslavia would be a federal state and that King Peter would be forbidden to return to Yugoslavia. The assembly further elected its government (The National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia) and appointed Tito for the president. By request of the allies gathered at the Jalta conference, AVNOJ had to be extended by the last pre-war members of the parliament and the representatives of political parties. A compromise was made between the Prime Minister of the royal government Dr. Ivan Šubašić and Tito. In August 1945 AVNOJ was renamed into a temporary national assembly in which Tito kept the "revolutionary" majority which made it possible to adopt the laws on agrarian reform, nationalisation and elections. The elections were then carried out in November 1945 (without the participation of the opposition which boycotted them) and were convincingly won by Tito and his People's Front of Yugoslavia. 156 Vladimir Dedijer: Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New Contributions to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito), Liburnija, Rijeka, 1982, p. 928-930.
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was the commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav Army, which arose from the former partisan army, and kept the majority in AVNOJ and then later in the temporary National Assembly. The People's Front, which he started to set up in the spring of 1944 as a beginning of the future people's front democracy, was the most numerous political organisation within Yugoslavia. His young, loyal political adherents who arose from the lowest working and farming classes were full of energy and political power and willing to "storm the sky". It was easy for them to do away with the fragmented opposition. In such circumstances it was possible for Tito to bring the revolution to an end157 after the war, which can to a greater extend be attributed to his intuition than to his modelling after the October revolution. The transitional phase between capitalism and communism was a short one; it took only a few years for the system of administrative socialism according to the soviet model to be fully functioning in Yugoslavia. However, repression, shortages and absolute party control caused the popularity of the new leadership and Tito to start fading (particularly in Serbia, where Tito had never been as popular as in other parts of Yugoslavia - a fact on which the British were counting unsuccessfully towards the end of the war. Since the country was formally a federation, its centralism led to a certain disappointment, though Tito maintained a national balance within the leadership. On the outside, this unpopularity could not be noticed, since the politics encouraged mass mobilisation for the reconstruction of the country, fast industrialisation and the building of socialism. In some parts of the country, particularly in Slovenia and in Croatia, Tito was highly esteemed also because of his determination to solve the questions of the frontier (although the allies made him withdraw from Triest and Carinthia). After the war Tito displayed another characteristics, which couldn't find expression during his leadership of the illegal party and only to a limited, extend during the war: namely his good feeling for the masses. He could easily establish contact with the masses, find the right words and fill his audience with enthusiasm. Mass meetings with tens of thousands and even several hundred thousand people became a part of the post-war political ritual, which was preserved until his late years. However, he was only able to use his intuitive contact and the ability to speak freely until the end of the sixties; later he lost them due to the burden of his age and the fact that his speeches were written in advance. The silent decrease of his popularity, which he must have noticed since he was always very well informed, was accompanied by the difficulties with Moscow. They were increasingly suffocating him, since they prevented him from spreading his ambitions, dating from the wartime, over the entire Balkan peninsula.158 On the contrary, in setting up Balkan associations, Stalin saw an opportunity to place Tito in the same line with other eastern European leaders who were mostly appointed by Moscow. Tito was further unnerved by the Soviet interventions into Yugoslav internal affairs. He attempted to preserve the autonomy without completely breaking up with Moscow to which he remained ideologically loyal. However, during the

On the founding congress of the Serb Communist Party, which was held in May 1945 in Belgrade Tito said, that there would be no "standard" second phase of the revolution according to the Russian model, because the circumstances in Yugoslavia were different from those in the Soviet Union. According to him it was not possible - due to the war - to develop clearly first the bourgeois and immediately afterwards the proletarian revolution. In spite of that "we are already entering this second phase so smoothly that it can hardly be noticed". (Hronologija ratne djelatnosti Josipa Broza Tita / Chronology of the war activities of Josip Broz Tito/, Export-Press, Belgrade, 1978, p. 92) 158 In the middle of 1943 Tito tried to established a joint Balkan headquarters which were meant to coordinate the liberation movements in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, however, his plan failed. At the end of the war he attempted to establish a federation with Albania (which was completely under Yugoslav control) and Bulgaria. Stalin first opposed the plan but then changed his mind and even demanded it to be carried out since he counted on Bulgaria to take the role of the Trojan horse through which he could discipline or even replace Tito. The Yugoslav side therefore gave up the plan.

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conflict with Informbiro159, Stalin who could never endure any competition, no matter how limited it was, forced Tito to make a drastic decision: either submission or resistance. Tito was well aware what resistance meant since he possessed several years of Moscow experiences. Apart from that, Stalin was rather popular in Yugoslavia (particularly within Serbia and Montenegro); his personality cult seemed to grow along with Tito's. The border disputes with the west (which hadn't been solved until the mid-fifties) presented another burden. However, his own rebellious nature and his ambition for power prevailed. The victories, which were by no means achieved softly, but moreover by applying Stalinist methods, brought him a new reputation in the west. For Yugoslavia they meant a specific form of self-managed socialism which was given the name "titoism" by the western sociologists. Titoism - a real or a fictitious difference? In the first years after World War II there were no major differences in the social order between Yugoslavia and eastern European countries (with Stalin's permission, eastern European countries even imitated the Yugoslav system of "people's democracy" - the transitional phase between the pluralistic and monistic political system.160 Hoping that the relations between the two countries would be based on equality of both partners, Yugoslavia was a most consequent ally of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia expected that the Soviet Union would offer protection to the socialist Yugoslavia and assistance with the industrialisation of the country. Some members of the Communist Party leadership even considered the possibility of Yugoslavia joining the Soviet Union. The beginning (and the core) of the quarrel with the Informbiro was the different comprehension of the equality of both states and parties and Yugoslav (Tito's) resistance to the hegemonic Soviet (Stalin's) policy. In Yugoslavia, the dispute provoked a critical analysis of the Soviet system which in consequence led to the development of an alternative model of the social development which was to be neither a capitalist nor a state-socialist one. It was given the name self - management. This new model originated from the Marx thesis on the union of the free producers and the Lenin thesis on self-management (which he elaborated in his book The State and the Revolution). Based on the evaluation which regarded the state ownership as a failure and the new bureaucratic class created by the party as dangerous, the decision about the introduction of self-management was made. The factories were to be managed (through workers' councils) by the workers themselves. The corresponding legislation was adopted in June 1950. In the changed circumstances, more attention was to be paid to the business independence and the mechanisms of the market, whereas the influence of the state planning was to be reduced. The role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was to be changed as well; it was to give up the immediate commanding and concentrate instead on the ideological function at planning the social development. This change was also demonstrated in renaming the Communist Party of Yugoslavia into the League of Communists of
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Informbiro (Informational Bureau of Communist Parties) was established on 30 September 1947 in Skljarska Polemba, Poland. The members were communist parties of the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, France, Italy and Yugoslavia. Informbiro was meant to replace the international communist organisation Komintern, which was abolished during the war. It was expected to serve the purpose of reinforcing the influence of the Soviet Union in eastern European countries as well as in Yugoslavia and at the same time through the strongest western communist parties (the French and the Italian) exert influence upon the turbulent, almost revolutionary conditions in those two countries. Such orientation quickly led to a conflict with the orientation of the KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia). Yugoslavia found itself on the verge of a war with the socialist countries. Yugoslavia was thus forced to come closer to the west. In accordance with the motto "keeping Tito afloat," the USA provided limited assistance, which helped Yugoslavia overcome the worst crisis. 160 Božo Repe: The System of People's Democracy in Slovenia and in Yugoslavia, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje (The Magazine for History and Ethnography), Maribor, Volume 69, Issue 2, p. 303-315.

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Yugoslavia (ZKJ). The change of the name was adopted on the 6th congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (2 - 7 November 1952 in Zagreb)161. Numerous members of the leadership opposed this decision and even Tito himself stated on several subsequent internal meetings that the 6th congress had been a mistake. The essential differences between Yugoslavia and the eastern European countries were the independent national liberation war and the authentic revolution (the only one carried out in Europe apart from the Soviet and the Albanian), as well as a relatively short postwar period of Stalinism (though its relapses continued to turn up until the mid-eighties). Yugoslavia was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, which allowed it a more independent search for alternatives. Since the sixties, other major differences had been in the decentralisation, in the introduction of the market economy, the existence of mixed ownership (though state ownership prevailed), orientation towards consumerism, certain forms of pluralism in economy, culture and even ideology of national parties, in relative openness of the information system and in free transition of people. The limitations of Yugoslav model were rooted in the prevailing way of thinking of the leading party cadres, which arose from the Comintern school as well as from the Leninist type of party and had a crucial role at planning the social order. Other common points with eastern European type of socialism further lie in the one-party system, the domination of political elite over other centres of power (i. e. economic), bureaucratic type of management, indivisibility of power, the dominating role of ideology in any kind of arbitration. Titoism thus appealed to the Marxist ideology, the power was seized through a revolution led by professional revolutionaries "in the name" of the working class, the leading role of the party was never questioned, though it formally renounced power. Yet, in terms of foreign policy, it insisted on the principles like respecting sovereignty, independence, integrity and equality, acknowledgement and development of the peaceful co-existence among the nations, regardless of their ideological differences - everything on the principle of mutual help and non-intervention in internal affairs of each country. The position of Yugoslavia in terms of international and inter-party relations was - due to "Titoism"- completely different from the position of other eastern European countries, which possessed only a limited sovereignty. Through the development of non-aligned movement, Yugoslavia was able to strengthen its foreign policy influence, which by far exceeded its territorial, economic and military power. In terms of internal policy it allowed decentralisation as well as a gradual appeasement of repression since the fifties. Further it introduced partial liberalisation of economy, approved increased production of consumer goods, which resulted in constant growth of the standard of living, and allowed partial democratisation. These processes were perceived as the reintroduction of the capitalist system by a part of the leadership. Whenever the party monopoly seemed to be questioned it was Tito himself who interrupted the process of democratisation. For the first time it happened in the mid-fifties when he rudely refused the suggestions according to which self-management should have been granted traditional middle-class rights, though with a socialist label (at the beginning of the fifties Milan Djilas namely suggested the introduction of a two-party socialist system). Further he retaliated the so-called "party liberalism" which advocated in favour of market economy in the mid-sixties. In spite of that, "titoism" was quite different from the system of the state socialism in eastern European countries, which was particularly the case in the sixties and in the seventies. In two decades Tito managed - though forcefully - to set up basic modernisation processes; something that the former political elite hadn't managed to achieve, namely: the agrarian reform, industrialisation, the separation of the church from the state, and - at least formally - the emancipation of women (in Yugoslavia women were
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The History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Komunist, Ljubljana, 1986.

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given the right to vote only after World War II). There was a major increase in the level of education; the nations, which previously hadn't possessed its own educational system at all, were able to introduce their own schools (including universities). However, there were still major differences between individual republics and provinces - from different reasons they were even getting bigger in the course of time. In terms of home style, clothing, arts (particularly music, theatre, film) as well as organisation of leisure time, people were imitating the west; in return they made use of the benefits of the socialist system like free education, good health care, full employment)162. For some time, the democratic processes in the east, particularly in Czechoslovakia, had been exercising a stimulating effect on Yugoslavia. Some politicians (Edvard Kardelj) even feared, that Czechoslovakia with its formula "socialism with a human face" could overcome Yugoslavia and its reforms and thus take away the primacy of "titoism" as relatively most democratic form of Leninist type socialism. The occupation of Czechoslovakia had a certain influence on restraining democratic processes in Yugoslavia. For the purpose of the state security, ZKJ (The League of Communists of Yugoslavia) started to curb the democratic rights and suppress the media again. The Yugoslav leadership was again in the position to determine by itself - without any competition from the other socialist states - what level of democratisation it would allow. "Liberalisation" of Yugoslavian society reached its peak in the end of the sixties but was defeated at the beginning of the seventies. Due to its extreme nationalism, it was first destroyed in Croatia, then in Slovenia, and finally in Serbia where the conflict was particularly serious so that Tito, using informal ways, had to intervene personally. Serbia had offered the strongest opposition to Tito. Some intellectuals had publicly opposed his lifelong presidency and demanded him to give up the power due to his old age. Conflicts appeared in other republics too (Macedonia). Along with the retaliation for the liberalism, the system of "self-managed agreements and social consultation" was introduced in Yugoslavia. Officially founded in the 1974 Constitution, the new system gave up the market economy and introduced the so called "economy by agreement" instead, according to which the companies were not to compete each other but negotiate about who would produce what and according to what price. The so-called policy of realistic socialism with its huge industrial complexes, unskilled working force, egalitarianism and emphasising the leading role of the party, prevailed again. The system was not in a position to survive by itself, without substantial financial support (cheap western loans in the seventies). Due to the blockades within the delegate system (in which elected delegates were increasingly replaced by combined delegations, which should have allowed maximal political involvement of the people), the mandates were increasingly taken over by the executive and managerial organs. A kind of "silent" centralisation carried out past the official system. The compensation for the resumed complete ideological and personnel control by the ZKJ (League of Communists) was a fictitious social peace. However, numerous achievements of "liberalism" were preserved, a complete return to the old positions was simply not possible any more. As long as it had existed, "titoism" had not renounced the leading role of the party and the small group of leading people respectively. It had therefore never managed to overcome the magic barrier between the attempts of "democratisation" and the real democracy. This was due to its strong ideological orientation, which didn't allow it to carry out the concept

For more information on the issue see: Božo Repe, Das Besondere an "Titoismus" - seine Gewaltherrschaft und sein Zerfall (The Special Characteristics of Titoism - its Tyranny and Decline), Aufrisse, Wien, Nr. 3/1992 in Božo Repe: Confini aperti e stile di vita in Slovenia doppo la seconda guerra mondiale (Open Borders and the Slovenian Style of Life after World War II) Qualostoria, Trieste, Anno XXVII, n) Giugno 199, p. 215-229

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of market economy (which was regarded as a restitution of capitalism by the leaders) and introduce political pluralism, which would have resulted in the loss of party monopoly.

The relations between the nations until Tito's death The relations between the nations were re-established during World War II. The centralist Kingdom of Yugoslavia only recognised the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes as the "three tribes of the same nation". The Macedonians, the Montenegrins and the Moslems were not acknowledged at all. The national minorities were being repressed and the country was constantly threatened to fall apart because of the national conflicts (particularly between the Croats and the Serbs). On the second meeting of AVNOJ (the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) which was held on 29 November 1943 (this day was later celebrated as the National Holiday of Yugoslavia), the representatives of Yugoslav nations (resistance movements) reached an agreement according to which Yugoslavia was to become a federative state, consisting of six republics, one autonomous province (Vojvodina) and one autonomous region (Kosovo and Metohija), both within Serbia. Many rejected this solution, but it had been preserved throughout the existence of Yugoslavia although numerous questions remained unsolved.163 Among others, the unsolved problems referred to the position of the Serbs in Croatia and on the territory of Sanđak (the territory predominantly populated by the Moslems, geographically situated in both Serbia and Montenegro). The communist leadership was of the opinion that the revolution would also solve the national question, either within Yugoslavia, or, as Tito hoped, within a Balkan federation or confederation respectively. After the war, the Serbs opposed the communist vision for the solution of the national question (federative regulation and acknowledgement by other Yugoslav nations) in the Constitutional Assembly, but they were too weak to prevent it.164 Federative regulation was declared by the 1946 Constitution, yet Yugoslavia was actually functioning as a centralist state until the mid- sixties. This constitution (and all the others that followed) acknowledged each Yugoslav nation the right of self-determination, including the right of separation. The leadership was convinced that the revolution had solved the national question forever. Towards the end of the fifties the unity of the Yugoslav leadership came to an end. The dispute did start on the issue of social questions (the first major post-war strikes of coal-miners in 1958 in Slovenia), yet it soon extended to the problems of relations between the nations.165 Tito somehow managed to calm it down, yet it broke out again at the beginning of the sixties, on the occasion of the discussions about the new constitution.166 The dispute between the centralist and the federalist line had not been solved until the mid-sixties. Edvard Kardelj, the Slovenian politician overtly said on occasion of a meeting of Yugoslav leaders, that there were three options for the future development of Yugoslavia, after the revolutionary generation ("the ten of us here") would be gone. The Slovenian and the Croatian would demand as much independence as possible; the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia would favour the centralist option, since
Especially the Serbs later opposed the decisions of AVNOJ. Due to specific circumstances (the prevailing influence of Chetniks), the Serb delegation for AVNOJ was not elected but appointed from military units. The Serbs therefore claimed that the new Yugoslavia was conceived without their participation and that the decisions of AVNOJ were detrimental to them (they were particularly referring to the formation of both autonomous provinces). 164 Slobodan Nešović: The Third Session of AVNOJ and the session of the temporary people's assembly of the Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 7 - 26 August 1945, Komunist, Ljubljana, 1975. 165 Dušan Bilanžić: Hrvatska moderna povijest (The Contemporary History of Croatia), Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 1999 p. 416 - 432). 166 Božo Repe: Some Thoughts about the year 1962, Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana, Volume XXVI, 1989, Issue 11/12 and Volume XXVII, 1990, Issue 1/2
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they expected advantages for themselves from transferring the means from the developed to the underdeveloped parts of the country, and finally, the hegemonstic Serb option. Kardelj believed that the Serb option was the one most likely to succeed and therefore wanted the individual republics to become rather independent actual states. According to him, the federation was to have the role of some kind of a "round table" where the republics could discuss common issues (the common economic and monetary policy, common defence and foreign policy). Tito agreed to that concept, because Kardelj has preserved the three main safety elements of "titoism" in it.167 The reform that followed led to the so-called party liberalism, which emerged particularly in the more developed republics. The republic leaders demanded a higher level of democracy (yet, within the socialist system), market economy (within a welfare state) and more independence for individual republics.168 Several national disturbances and conflicts with the federal centre started to appear (the demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, the so-called mass movement in Croatia in 1971, Slovenian demands for a radical reform of the federation). Tito assessed that the federation, the monopolistic position of the party, as well as his own position were threatened and therefore annihilated them. However, he did abate about the national question, which allowed individual republics to build up their own sovereignty within the Yugoslav federation (i.e. introduction of republic presidencies, republic governments had their own ministries for international collaboration and defence, as well as national banks). Since there was no real democracy within the republics, the federalisation led to the formation of republic oligarchies that were able to exercise unlimited power within the competencies they had achieved. The new constitutional order had therefore never really started to function and the decisions were mainly made outside the bodies of the republic assemblies. Yugoslavia after Tito's death - the Failure of the "After Tito - Tito" Policy When Josip Broz - Tito got seriously ill in 1980 and could not leave the hospital any more, the condition of the state he was the head of was hardly any better than his own, the only difference being that the latter had been held secret. However, hardly anyone would have approved with such assessment of the situation at that time. Yugoslavia gave the impression of a peaceful, stable state with a decent standard of living, solved national question and high level of international reputation which by far exceeded its economic power. Even foreign analysts were surprised by the peaceful transition and other statesmen gave Tito one of the most magnificent funerals of the 20th century. The great powers, particularly the USA and the western countries were interested in the further existence of Yugoslavia. In this terms democracy had a subordinate role. Upon his death Tito hadn't said anything in the style like "preserve me Yugoslavia" (words ascribed to the Yugoslav king Aleksander Karađorđević when he was dying upon his assassination in Marseilles in 1934). Neither had Tito left behind any kind of a political will (nor a personal one, for that matter, since he hardly had any personal possessions). Different statements that he had - often resigned because of his poor health and suspecting that the end was coming - made on several occasions for diverse delegations or individuals that had visited him towards the end of 1979 were afterwards pronounced as his political will.169 A fierce struggle for the change of the relations within the federation - yet from different angles - started immediately after Tito's death. Centralist oriented politicians, army
Dušan Bilanžić: Hrvatska moderna povijest (The Contemporary History of Croatia), Golden Marketing, Zagreb, p. 482 - 489. 168 Božo Repe: "Liberalism in Slovenia", Borec, Ljubljana, 1992. 169 The last delegation he had seen shortly before he was admitted to the hospital on 24 December 1979 was a Slovenian one. On that occasion he criticised excessive consumerism and expressed his preference for short, only one year long political mandates, which the Slovenians opposed on the grounds that they were irrational. (The discussion between president Tito and the Slovenian delegation on 24 December 1979, Slovenian Archives)
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leaders, as well as Serb intellectuals perceived the federalisation of Yugoslavia in the seventies as Slovenian construct. In the policy of Slovenian leadership they saw national pragmatism and a tactics of gradual, yet persistent realisation of its national objective: attaining of independent Slovenian state. According to the Serb author Dobrica Čosić, the Slovenians were applying methods that he called "intelligent machiavelism". As long as Tito was alive, the Serbs were reluctant to utter that publicly, although a silent agreement between some Serb politicians and the army was made in the seventies, according to which the 1974 Constitution was to be abolished.170 The Slovenians, and after them the Croats were also beginning to see the federation - though from different motifs - with mixed feelings. Their attitude was based on economic crisis, gradual dwindling of fear from former enemies (Germans and Italians) and the growing concern about the aggressive Serb politics. In the first phase, however, Slovenians restricted themselves to the protection of the constitution and thus Tito's heritage regarding the relations between the nations. Due to the political turmoil and the struggle for power within individual republics (i. e. in Serbia between Slobodan Milošević and Ivan Stambolić, the then head of the Serb presidency) there were hardly any major changes in the functioning of Yugoslav federation until the mid-eighties. The people who came to power after the socalled "party liberalism" had been destroyed in the seventies were rotating on the top state and party positions since then. Mostly these were the experienced, old revolutionary cadres whose biological strength was definitely in decline (in the first part of the eighties a joke about a politician was making rounds, who upon arriving to the airport, allegedly asked his companion: are we leaving somewhere or have we arrived?), and politicians of younger generation who had sensed in time who the winner would be.171 After Tito, there had been no other politicians with a Yugoslav charisma. This was also due to the system which didn't have any "exclusively" federal functions left, which would be occupied by people, not delegated by the republics. Obviously, the political and economical premises of "titoism" were officially not questioned in the first half of the eighties. The self-managed socialist system was described as being good; however it required consequent implementation. The controversy between the officially proclaimed socialist patriotism, brotherhood and unity (expressed through the motto "after Tito - Tito"), which remained a stable part of political programmes, party declarations, textbooks and celebrations, and the way Yugoslavia was actually perceived was enormous. Cultural and economic differences (7:1 between Slovenia and Kosovo), poor knowledge and stereotype ideas about each other seemed to have become even bigger in the eighties, in spite of several decades of life together. Informational systems were only functioning within individual republics; and economic agony became worse. The Rise of Nationalism After Tito's death, the balance between the nations as well as political balance within the federation became very fragile. The previously suppressed national (as well as nationalistic) demands were beginning to arise. In 1981 there was an uprising of the
Veljko Kadijević, the last Defence Minister of Yugoslavia explicitly admitted that in his memoirs with the title Moje viđenje raspada (How I See the Disintegration), Politika, Belgrade 1993. 171 Tito had to a large extend removed the "middle-aged technocratic" generation who did take part in the war and revolution, yet was not as burdened with ideological patterns as not to be able to see what major changes were going on in the world (the change of social structure of the society, gradual disappearance of the traditional working class and the growth of middle classes, emergence of "welfare state" in Scandinavian and western European countries, the transition to the post-industrial society). The members of the middle generation didn't manage to assert themselves against a too strong pre-war generation of revolutionaries and therefore perceived themselves as being "lost". In the seventies it was gradually replaced by the youngest generation of upstarts from the party and the state structures who on the one hand did appeal to the "revolutionary traditions", but had neither any emotional attachment to them nor did they want to change them in any way. They simply adapted to the situation, made a career for themselves and led a comfortable middle class life.
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Kosovo Albanians which seemed to be quite irrational, since the autonomous province possessed virtually the same rights as the republics (towards the end of the eighties another, this time justified rebellion took place, since the new Serb constitution abolished autonomous provinces). On the other hand, the centralist pressure increased. The 1974 constitution, which represented the culmination of Yugoslav federalism, was something between a federation and a confederation. The federal constitution didn't hold any superior position; it was more or less placed on an equal level with the constitutions of individual republics. Yet on the other hand - though acknowledging a high level of rights to individual republics - the federal constitution didn't fully observe the principle of authentic sovereignty of individual republics; Yugoslavia was not defined as a federation of states (confederation), but as a federal state (federation). As all the other post-war constitutions, it did recognise the right of self-determination, including the right of separation. However, there were no regulations about how the nations and republics respectively were to realise that right. Legal interpretations of that issue differed a great deal: some jurists thought that this particular right was exhausted with the foundation of the socialist Yugoslavia, whereas the others thought that this right was permanent and inalienable. The system based on the 1974 constitution could only function as long as all the three previously mentioned security mechanism continued to exist: the unified League of Communists was based on the principle of democratic centralism which spread its leading role to the other segments of society; unified army with Tito as the highest authority, Commander in Chief, the president of the state and the president of the League of Communists. In the second half of the eighties, the three options, announced by Kardelj as early as in the mid-sixties, became clearly crystallised: the demand for confederation (Slovenia, later followed by Croatia), a federal Yugoslavia with a strong centre which was to keep transferring money from the developed to the underdeveloped parts of the country (Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and as the third option, the centralised Yugoslavia under Serb dominion, the so-called Srboslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Serb intellectuals were the first in Yugoslavia to write a national programme - the socalled Programme of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAZU). The programme became public in 1986 when one of the newspapers (Večernje novosti - Evening News) published parts of the text. A complete memorandum was first published by the Serb Diaspora in the USA. A committee of 16 members of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences defined the situation of the Serb nation as catastrophic. According to the members of the Academy, the Serbs outside Serbia, particularly those in Kosovo, were undergoing a process of assimilation; in terms of economy they were completely subordinated to Slovenia and Croatia, they had no state of their own and they were losing their cultural identity because of communism. For the authors of memorandum, the solution was in the change of the 1974 constitution and in the introduction of the "democratic federalism", which basically meant abolishment of sovereignty of individual republics. They demanded a "total unity of the Serb nation"172, irrespective of the division of Yugoslavia into republics and provinces. This actually meant a unified Serbia (without autonomous provinces), the final consequence being the implementation of the "Great Serb" programme, according to which all Serbs should be living within the same state. In case Yugoslavia continued to exist, this would lead close to the concept of the three ban's dominions (provinces), i. e. administrative units that had already existed in the Kingdom Yugoslavia in the late thirties. This was not a realistic option, since the Slovenes and the Croats, as well as the Macedonians and the Moslems had already achieved much more than that. After the faction of Slobodan Milošević emerged victorious from the 8th meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in September 1987 the
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Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umjetnosti (The Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences), Belgrade, September 1986, Serbian Literary Association, New York.

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members of the Serb Academy supported the new Serb leadership (May 1988) which then started to implement the programme of the Academy, the first measure being the subordination of the Albanians in Kosovo, and of the autonomously oriented politicians in the second autonomous province of Vojvodina. The project was continued by replacing Montenegrin leadership and destabilisation of the conditions on the territories, populated by the Serbs (the Knin region in Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). To achieve this, Serb nationalists made use of the pressure from the street: they organised mass meetings, which forced politicians in certain areas to resign. The consequence was, that other republics started to protect their national interests as well (Slovenian intellectuals published their national programme in February 1987). The first conflict thus emerged between Slovenia and Serbia. More than a conflict between the two nations, it was a conflict between two different visions of the future development of Yugoslavia: the Slovenian, which was oriented towards market economy, scientific and technological development, European and global integration; and the Serb, patriarchal, inwards oriented, centralist society based on pre-modern patterns of the existing society. Whereas the Slovenians wanted to negotiate with the European Economic Community and adopt European criteria, the Serbs were convinced that the question of democracy was a Yugoslav internal affair and that Milošević would join the European Community with "beat of drum and flourish of trumpets". With energetic economical and political measures, Slovenians managed to defend themselves from the pressures of the Serbs, yet the conflict between the Croats and the Serbs was intensified. This was the first real conflict between the nations; the media and the political war gradually grew into a real war. Slovenia and Croatia carried out national referendums which resulted in their declaration of independence and consequently, in the war. Why Tito could hold Yugoslavia together and why it fell apart after his death After the war, Yugoslavia was going through periods of crises which - in the final consequence - could have led to the break up of the state: i. e. during the dispute with Stalin in 1948, further in the early sixties when the first serious national conflicts emerged which led to a deep crises within the leadership, and finally during the seventies when the liberally oriented communists in Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia were suppressed. There were also several occasions in which a foreign intervention seemed quite close, the first one emerging even before the end of the war (the question of Triest). Afterwards there was a risk of an attack from the Soviet Union on several occasions; at least twice Yugoslavia was immediately threatened: in 1948 and in 1968, after the suppression of the Prague spring. The political and the national structure within the socialist Yugoslavia could be preserved for over four decades. Firstly that was due to its international position which suited both blocks, secondly, due to the three internal pillars: the unified state Communist Party, the strong, centralised army which exercised a strong political influence and thirdly, due to Tito as the highest authority. Tito who held the three highest posts (the party, the state and the military) even enjoyed the support of Moscow after the reconciliation with the Soviet Union (1955 and 1956), with the exception of 1968 when Yugoslavia defended the "Prague spring" and thus jeopardised its own position. In spite of his independence, Tito seemed to be more acceptable for Moscow than any of the possible successors who could have brought Yugoslavia even closer to the west. Through occasional internal purges, Tito managed to preserve and control the process of democratisation and keep the republics under control, though the latter were governed by their own communist oligarchies. He never allowed the national demands to go beyond the limit, which could have jeopardised the very existence of Yugoslavia. With a mixture of his political and statesmanly skills, personal charisma and personality cult, demagogy, as well as with the 89

provision of a relatively good standard of living he managed to preserve affection of the people. The good standard of living in the last period of Tito's reign was not a result of economic effectiveness of the country it was rather a result of its specific median position, which provided the country with strong financial injections and cheap loans, while preserving an advantageous position within eastern markets. The internal and external conditions, which consequently led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, became synchronised for the first time when towards the end of the eighties socialism and along with it the Soviet Union with the entire socialist block fell apart. From the three "protective" mechanisms, Tito was the first to go; then the League of Communist fell apart (at the beginning of 1990) and finally, (after an unsuccessful intervention in Slovenia), the Yugoslav Army. The key question is, whether Tito and his actions had impeded a more successful course of development in terms of relations between the nations in Yugoslavia, or was it the other way around: had he "frozen" an inevitable catastrophe through his authority? At least theoretically, it would have been possible for the Yugoslav nations to regulate their relations on the grounds of common interests, instead of on insisting (on Tito's demand) on the - in the meantime empty - ideological motto about the "brotherhood and unity", dating from the wartime. As an optimal solution, this could have been a federation, based on the market economy and the welfare state. However, this wouldn't have been a socialist state any more; the revolution carried out during the war would have lost its sense and Tito his integrative function. There was no universal recipe according to the motto "after Tito - Tito" which could have prolonged the existence of Yugoslavia. Apart from that, there is a justified doubt whether a confederation could have existed over a longer period of time because of the huge cultural and economic differences. Political pluralism would have caused emergence of national parties, which would have - as it indeed happened in the early nineties - had a disintegrative role. "Titoism" could only emerge due to specific historic circumstances (both internal and external) after World War II and was a unique phenomenon. There was no universal recipe according to the motto "after Tito - Tito" which could have preserved Yugoslavia. Yugoslav nations should have found a different recipe for the post-communist period after the end of bipolarity in Europe, which they had failed to do. SUMMARY In his contribution the author reflects upon the reasons which made it possible for Yugoslavia to exist under Tito's leadership for over four decades and a half. He concludes that this was possible because of the international position Yugoslavia managed to obtain and which obviously suited both blocks, and because of the three internal columns: the unified communist party, the strong, centralised army with a major political influence and Tito as the highest authority. Tito who held the three highest positions within the state (the presidencies of the state and of the party respectively, as well as the command over the army) enjoyed the support of Moscow after his reconciliation with the Soviet Union (1955 and 1956). The exception was the year 1968 when Yugoslavia defended the "Prague Spring" and consequently jeopardised its own position. The Yugoslav system based on the same political premises as the state socialism in the east European countries (a single party system, predominance of ideological criteria within the society), yet it possessed a kind of semi-market economy and was open to the world. Through a mixture of his statemanly and political skills, personal charisma and personality cult, as well as through demagogy and a relative good standard of living, Tito managed to sustain the affection and the support of the people. 90

The key question to raise is, whether Tito had impeded a more successful course of development in terms of relations between the nations in Yugoslavia, or was it the other way around: had he "frozen" an inevitable catastrophe through his authority? Theoretically it would have been possible for the Yugoslav nations to regulate their relations on the grounds of their common interests instead of on insisting (on Tito's demand) on the ideological wartime motto of the "brotherhood and unity" which had lost its meaning in the course of time. As an optimal solution, this could have become a federation, based on market economy. However, this wouldn't have been a socialist state any more; the revolution carried out during the war would have lost its sense and Tito his integrative function. Apart from that, there is a justified doubt about whether - due to the huge economic and cultural differences - a confederation could have existed over a longer period of time. Political pluralism would have led to the emergence of national parties which would have played - as it indeed happened in the early nineties - a disintegrative role. Titoism could thus emerge as a consequence of specific historical circumstances (both internal and external) after World War II. As such it was a unique phenomenon. There had been no universal recipe according to which the motto - "After Tito - Tito" could have been prolonged and thus preserved the existence of Yugoslavia. For the time after the end of communism and bipolarity in Europe, Yugoslav nations should have found a different solution from "titoism", which they had failed to accomplish. ABSTRACT In his contribution, the author reflects upon the reasons which have made it possible for Yugoslavia to have existed under Tito's leadership for over four decades and a half. He concludes this was firstly due to the fact that the international position Yugoslavia managed to obtain suited both blocks and secondly, to the three internal pillars: the unified Communist Party, the strong, centralised army which also possessed major political influence, and finally due to Tito who held the three highest positions within the country (presidencies of the party and of the state respectively and the command over the army). "Titoism" offered no universal recipe, which could have prolonged the existence of Yugoslavia after Tito's death. Yugoslav nations should have found another solution for the time after the end of bipolarity and communism in Europe, yet they have failed to achieve that.

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13. Human rights and democracy in communist Slovenia173
In the communist Slovenia and Yugoslavia the understanding of democracy and human rights had changed several times. Apart from that, there was a major difference between the legislation and the declarative definitions on the one side, and the practice on the other. The period that immediately followed World War II was the so-called period of people's democracy.174 The term refers to the political regulation of Yugoslavia and other EasternEuropean states in the first years after World War II. The term had already been used during the war by some Soviet as well as by some other politicians (i.e. Eduard Benes)175. In the practice, the system of people's democracy was first and most intensively put into force in Yugoslavia. The focus was on the people (on the rule of the masses). The system of people’s democracy was a specific one: being different from the traditional bourgeois democracies, it - at least formally - preserved some elements of the classical parliamentary system. The Constitution, for example, guaranteed a multi-party system, however, in the practice it proved to be a kind of mixture between party monism and a multi-party system (this can be seen from the assessment of the parties, which of them were "appropriate" to resume their activities within the uniform programme of the Ljudska fronta (People's Front) which the parties were forced to adopt upon entering it; further, from the restriction of the activities of those parties which determined to act independently). However, the system of 'people's democracy' cannot be seen as a socialist system, although 'socialist society' was the main objective of the Communist Party. The system was theoretically not worked out in advance; it could be said that it was somehow 'brought about' by the circumstances of the second part of World War II when the international circumstances did not allow an immediate introduction of socialism. So it was a kind of "transition" from capitalism to socialism. The Soviet theory first faced the term 'people's democracy' in 1947 when its scientists began to research the new type of rule in eastern European states, whereby they came to the conclusion that it was a transitional system between the parliamentary democracy and the Soviet model of socialism.176 When the opposition in eastern European states was dealt with, when the power was taken over by the Communist Parties and the sovietisation carried out, and when it became evident that the 'people's front' model would not succeed in France and Italy where the communists represented a major political power, the
Repe, Božo. Relations toward Human Rights and Democratization in the Communist Party: predavanje na 5. Österreichischer Zeitgeschichtetag 2001, Demokratie - Zivilgesellschaft - Menschenrechte, Klagenfurt, 4. bis 6. Oktober. Klagenfurt, 2001. 174 More about the topic in: Božo Repe: Sistem ljudske demokracije v Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji (The System of people’s democracy in Slovenia and Yugoslavia), Časopis za zgodovino in etnografijo Journal for History and Ethnography, Volume 69, No 2, p. 303 - 315 175 According to some historians, in the Soviet theory the term 'peoples's democracy' was just a substitute for the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which - particularly in the conditions of war - and because of the relations with the allies - didn't seem appropriate. Analogically, the term people's republic was just another name for Soviet republic, which was allegedly obvious from the case of People's Republic of Mongolia (which received the name of people's republic as early as in 1921 - comment of the author) - see Marija Obradović: "Narodna demokratija" u Jugoslaviji ("people's Democracy" in Yugoslavia) 1945 - 1942, Inis, Beograd 1995, p. 17. 176 In spite of his tendency to imitate the Soviet model, Tito insisted that the specific Yugoslav conditions were to be taken into account at least in the transition period. Even during the war (according to the reports of the translator Olga Ninčič), Tito said - when asked in an interview with Churchill in Naples, whether Yugoslavia was to adopt socialism according to the Soviet model - that some of the Soviet experiences were useful for Yugoslavia, however, the situation in his country was different. (Vladimir Dedijer: Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New contributions to the Biography of J.B. Tito), Liburnija, Rijeka, Mladost, Zagreb 1981, p. 869 - 870.
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theoretical conclusion seemed to be evident: there was obviously only one, namely the soviet way to socialism. The concept of people's democracy grew from the tradition of the pre-war people's fronts, which seemed to be comparatively successful in the second part of the thirties (France, Spain, in part Czechoslovakia and some other countries), yet were not able to sustain. In Yugoslavia the people's Front was established through the fusion of the country (the republic) organisations in August 1945 in Belgrade. The programme of the People's Front was based on the premises, which were acceptable for all the classes: the territorial integrity, brotherhood and unity, reconstruction, the improvement of the living and working conditions.177 In fact, the general orientation of the People's Front served as a sort of cover for the implementation of the revolutionary programme of the KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia), whose aim was the implementation of the revolutionary measures and the transition to socialism, which aggravated the relationships within the People's Front. Within the People’s Front, the bourgeois parties represented a minority. Apart from the mass political organisations, numerous cultural, sports and other organisations were also admitted to the organisation. The People's Front won the election of November 11, 1945. Without a voice against, the first Yugoslav post-war Constitution was adopted in January 1946. A clear influence of the 1936 Soviet Constitution was evident. According to the constitution, the power was derived from - and belonged to the people. The most important means of production, as well as the entire foreign capital were declared to be national property; according to the agrarian reform, the land was either nationalised or awarded to those "who cultivate" it; however, unlike in the Soviet Union, collectivisation was not carried out. At least formally, the Constitution preserved the pluralism of property and a multi-party system, and federalisation in the field of the international (inter-republic) relationships - though not as consequently as in the Soviet Constitution according to which individual republics were allowed to establish international relationships and constitute their own army. The Constitution was thus a clear sign of the duality of the system. At least formally, it guaranteed the same privileges as any other bourgeois society, including the freedom of speech and the freedom of gathering. However, a thorough cleansing of the political opposition was carried out by 1948.178 On the other hand, the Constitution provided a framework for the adoption of revolutionary legislation, which allowed the Communist Party - "hidden" behind the People's Front - to implement the main revolutionary measures. By 1948 Yugoslavia was already organised according to the soviet model and there was no need for the system of people's democracy; however, the dispute with the Informbiro prevented its formal recognition. Although Yugoslavia went a different way than the other eastern European states after that, the need for the duality of the system ceased until the beginning of the fifties. The 1953 Constitutional law defined Yugoslavia as a socialist state; yet, the name Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was only adopted formally 10 years later, with the 1963 Constitution. After the withdrawal from the soviet model and the introduction of self-management at the beginning of the fifties, the so-called production or participative model of democracy came into the foreground in Yugoslavia. According to it, the workers themselves were to determine through the workers' councils and other bodies of management the
The basic programmatic principles of the Narodni front Jugoslavije (The National Front of Yugoslavia) and Osnovna organizaciona načela (the basic organizational principles) - The Statute - of the National Front of Yugoslavia, Petranović, Yugoslavia, .... p. 642 - 643 178 More about the topic in Božo Repe: Politična alternativa v Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji po 2. svetovni vojni (Political Alternative in Slovenia and Yugoslavia after World War II); the party and the out-of-party opposition in Božo Repe's Povojni sodni procesi (The post-war court proceedings; both in Povojna zgodovina Slovenije (The Post-war History of Slovenia), Koroški pokrajinski muzej Slovenj Gradec, 1992)
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development of their companies, the investments, the salaries, the distribution of the profit and all the other key matters. This self-management is not to be equalled with the workers' participation in the western countries; according to one of the authors of the system, Edvard Kardelj, it only started "where the private capitalist ownership ended and where the process of the liberation of work and the working people began.179 Selfmanagement spread from the factories over the entire society and the parliamentary (assembly) system was adapted accordingly. The National Assembly consisted of a number of individual assemblies into which representatives of diverse strata of working people and communities were elected according to the corporate principle (the chamber of economy, the educational - cultural chamber, the social and the health chamber, the organisational - political chamber). In the sixties, in the period of the so-called "party liberalism" there was a kind of withdrawal from this model and an approach to the classical parliamentary system. This was evident from the fact, that the candidates for political bodies could be proposed not only by the "Socialist Alliance of the Working People", which was authorised to carry out the pre-election proceedings, but also by the people gathered at the pre-election meetings. The candidates had to present their programmes publicly. Although all the assembly deputies were members of the Communist Party, they predominantly felt obliged to the voters, which led to diverse polemics and conflicts, some deputies were even eliminated from the political life.180 After the defeat of "liberalism" Edvard Kardelj developed a thesis on the pluralism of the selfmanaged socialist interests. According to him, "socialism couldn't be imagined without democracy. Socialism was not to advance if there were no democratic relations among the people. Yet, the socialist society needed democracy in socialism and not democracy as a weapon of the fight against socialism". Therefore it was necessary to insist on "the class nature of our democracy." This means, that an "undisputed leading role of the interests of working class, firmly associated with all the other working people"181 was to be guaranteed. The self-managed socialist system was proclaimed to be the best system in the world, better than the traditional parliamentary system, which, according to Kardelj, guaranteed only an "ordinary«, yet no "class" democracy. The condition, however, was, that the people stuck to the "rules of the play" of the self-managed socialist democracy. The self-managed corporativism even gained in power, so that there were no individually elected representatives with an immediate responsibility to the voters; there were only delegations. With minor changes, such a complicated system managed to be retained until the end of communism in 1990. The 1974 Constitution officially guaranteed the leading socio-political role of the Communist Party, which actually existed since World War II. Within the political system of self-management, the so-called socio-political organisations took over the role of the political parties. Apart from the Communist Party (the Association of the Communists), it further comprised the Socialist Alliance of the Working People, The Alliance of the Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, the Alliance of the Socialist Trade-unions and the Alliance of the Veterans. These organisations had their representatives in all the major representative and executive bodies. The most important of them all was the Socialist Alliance of the Working People, the successor of the Liberation Front. It was meant to unite the people of diverse beliefs, however, under the condition, that they accepted the socialist orientation. For some time after World War II, the Liberation Front managed to preserve its coalition character but lost it gradually. The communist authorities did not allow it to be re-established, despite the propositions that existed in that direction. It was
Samoupravljanje u Juguslaviji (Self-management in Yugoslavia) 1950 - 1976, dokumenti razvoja (the documents of the development), Privredni pregled, Beograd, 1977, p. 11 180 More about the topic in Božo Repe: Liberalizem v Sloveniji (Liberalism in Slovenia), Borec, Ljubljana 1992 181 Edvard Kardelj: Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialistilčnega samoupravljanja (The Directions of the Development of the Socialist Self-Management), Komunist, Ljubljana, 1977, p. 83
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not until the end of the eighties that - due to the demands for the restoration of the multiparty system - the authorities consented to the so-called non-party pluralism. According to it, all the organisations within the socialist union were to have an equal position (in the meantime other associations, the forerunners of the political parties had been established). Though the legislation, the executive and the jurisdictional authorities were formally independent, they were under the control of the Union of Communists, which ensured its influence with a careful cadre policy, according to which the influential positions were given to the communists. Since there were no political parties, the oppositional ideas were mainly expressed within intellectual circles gathered around diverse magazines (in the fifties this was the Revija 57 - The magazine 57, in the sixties Perspektive - The Perspectives and in the eighties the Nova Revija - The New Journal). The authorities occasionally initiated administrative or juridical actions against individual intellectuals; however, they had grown fewer and fewer since the fifties. A part of the oppositional ideas emerged even within the Union of Communists, or individuals or groups within the Union took over the ideas of the opposition. Also the repressive attitude against the Church had gradually softened in the fifties. In the sixties, when the concordat between Yugoslavia and the Vatican was concluded, the Church and the state reached a kind of a "silent" agreement about the "distribution" of competencies. Yet, it was still difficult for those who publicly displayed their belief to make a career within the public services and education. It was a little easier to do so in more neutral fields (i. e. medicine, research, and partly in business). Particularly since the sixties, the communist authorities were increasingly successful in providing a high level of social security and social standard (high standard of health care, free /including tertiary level/ education, a comprehensive network of child care institutions, etc.), emancipation of women and full employment. Slovenia and Yugoslavia were open countries; passport was available to virtually all the citizens with the exception of (few) dissidents. People were therefore not too concerned with the question of democracy and human rights. They took advantage of the "median« ideological and geostrategic position of Yugoslavia. They took from the system what it offered; the selfmanaged socialist rhetoric was perceived as a kind of necessity. In everyday life they followed the consumerism and the western patterns of life.182

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More about the topic in Božo Repe: Tihotapijo vse razen ptičjega mleka (There's nothing that's not smuggled but the elephants), Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 90 - 96

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14. The introduction of political parties and their role in achieving independence183
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION BEFORE 1988 There were no noticeable opposition movements in Slovenia in the early 1980s. The social calm of the 1970s bought through foreign loans was all but over and the population was faced with a serious economic crisis, but this did not trigger any significant social movements. In 1980, directly before and after Tito’s death, the repressive state apparatus kept a very careful watch on any potential opponents. There was very little room for expressing criticism of the government, mostly because during Tito’s illness and during the first months after his death such criticism was perceived as a highly unpatriotic act and as an attack on both Tito and the system which he had created. The polls in 1980 reflected the totally euphoric mood of the people or, as the researchers put it “the discrepancy between the declared and the genuine mood of the people is very little.” The student movement had disintegrated by the first half of the 1970s. Some of its leaders tried to spread their (fairly modified) leftist ideas through the Student Cultural Center.There were a few minor demonstrations and the authorities saw them as a continuation of the student movement. In 1977 the Association for Free Society was formed on Grega Tomc’s initiative. Its program supported human rights and liberties. The association failed to make any major impact and ceased to exist. Some intellectuals began to work toward publishing a new journal, (later named Nova revija). The government, though, was used to this as it was a well known game that had been played several times since the 1950s. On the other side, the authorities were very upset by the emergence of punk. This reached Slovenia relatively quickly, as early as 1977. Punk’s function was primarily to broaden the public arena, to introduce more freedom and to express the “other-ness” outside official institutions. Besides, the originators of punk never really intended to use punk to change the world. By the mid-1980s punk had already become part of the established youth culture, developed into a multi-media cultural activity and begun to receive public awards. As late as the spring of 1983 the authorities believed that despite the increasing criticism of the system no organized opposition yet existed. There was speculation, however, that this might happen because the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order at the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (P SRS) noticed some signs of the opposition groups trying to work together. The council saw the publication of the journal Nova revija (New Journal) as a “pure” opposition phenomenon. Nova revija was first published in 1982 on the initiative of Slovene intellectuals, after long discussions and resistance from the authorities. In the beginning the journal dealt primarily with issues related to literature and essay writing and advocated the independence of art from ideology and politics. In the mid-1980s, however, it became,
Repe, Božo. Formation of new political parties and their role in gaining independence: paper at the session Slovenia in the eighties: new research evidence: 30th national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boca Raton, Florida, 24-27 September 1998. Boca Raton (Florida), 1998.
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together with the Association of Slovene Writers, the main protagonist of the changed perception of national issues. The first signs of the emerging organized opposition noticed by the authorities were the attempts to introduce “political parallelism”. On the level of content that meant that social issues began to be dealt with “outside the established forms and options provided by our social system”, and on the organizational level it meant some resignations from the trade union and attempts to establish parallel trade union and youth organizations. Similar phenomena occurred a year later in certain professions, e.g. some journalists claimed that “freedom is the freedom of those who think differently. The game between the authorities and the opposition in the next two years thus revolved around the question as to how much freedom could be allowed in journalistic, publishing and cultural spheres. In the the mid-80s we can already detect increasing severity of the economic crisis. It was followed by increasing critical attitude toward those in power and partly toward the system. It means, that dissatisfaction was aimed primarly at the poor functioning of individual political and state institutions as well as at individual politicians who failed to provide a solution to the crisis. It only rarely turned against the system in general. As late as 1986 60 per cent of those asked, expressed confidence in the system of socialist selfmanagement. Two years later this figure dropped dramatically. Before the 1987 the State Security Service and the political leaders saw social (civilian) movements as much more influential than the circle gathered around Nova revija. They saw them as a threat to their own impact on an important part of the young and the population in general. Peace, ecological, feminist and other movements, which in the mid-1980s formed a strong civilian movement in Slovenia, originated mostly in youth alternative clubs and organizations such as the Center of Interest Activities for the Young (CIDM) and the Student Cultural Center - ŠKUC - Forum. In 1984 these clubs also provided the basis for the establishment of the lesbian section Lilith and homosexual section Magnus (the first associations of the kind in any socialist country). Until 1983 the movements were not organized. The youth congress in Novo mesto in 1982 gave support to the emerging movements and in the beginning of 1983 the Republican Conference of the Alliance of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS) founded the Coordinating committee of the working group for ecological and peace issues. ZSMS defended alternative movements, and was critical of socialist manifestations (especially of Tito’s rally) and of the repressive legislature. It gradually moved away from its role as the party’s offspring and a kind of a “hatchery” of party cadres. Youth functionaries no longer had guaranteed bright political future careers even though the organization remained institutionally tied to the state (membership in the SZDL, in various committees and commissions, also in governmental committees) as well as financially dependent upon it. During the whole of the 1980s the youth organization was thus somehow in between, partly participating in government and partly acting as opposition. In 1986 the popularity of alternative movements was nearing its peak. Over 75 per cent of those asked in a poll recognized them and over 45 per cent were willing to join them. 97

Regardless of the unfavorable view of the opposition, democratization in Slovenia reached a level where some “civil” rights became part of the general citizenship standard. Slovene authorities also avoided the use of the repressive Yugoslav legislature and as far as we can judge by the available archive sources they did not undertake any organized action against the opposition in the 1980s. The decision as to how to react in individual cases was mostly left to the police and prosecutors. This relatively “soft” attitude toward the opposition depended mostly on the tolerance level of the individuals in power combined with their willingness (and the possibilities open to them) to defend the existing level of democratization against the pressures from the center. In 1987 the impact of public opinion grew immensely. The public, as well as the assembly, addressed numerous demands to the government asking for clarification with regard to various privileges. There were demands that the secretary of the Interior should explain whose conversations were tapped by the police. In the beginning of 1988 they called for a special commission to be formed in the assembly to control the work of the Public Security Administration. A completely new dimension in the Slovene political arena was introduced by the No. 57 of Nova revija, which contained contributions for the Slovene national program. After the publication of the No. 57 of Nova revija in 1987 the authorities perceived alternative movements as a smaller “threat” than the so-called “bourgeois opposition.” With the 57th issue of Nova revija the initiative was in the hands of the opposition. The contributions met with an explosive reaction from the social and political organizations and a larger part of the press. After the Republican prosecutor refused to prosecute, the federal prosecutor wanted to do it himself (which triggered a conflict between the republic and the federation as to within whose competence in the field of jurisdiction this fell). Despite sharp criticism, which culminated in the hiring of a new editor, the Slovene authorities insisted unanimously that the authors could not be legally prosecuted. They acknowledged the relevance of the issue tackled by Nova revija, but did not agree with their interpretation of it. POWER STRUGGLE 1988 was the year that saw not only the beginning of political pluralism in Slovenia, but also the battle to seize power. In the period before the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and even later, the opposition was in an extremely vulnerable position as the constitutional and legal system did not allow political parties (they were introduced by law only at the end of 1989). This was the first stage of political articulation (the forerunner of the political parties was the Slovene Peasant Alliance (SKZ), which was established on 12 May 1988. It was still as a member of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SZDL) and declared itself primarily as a professional organization). In 1988 the reputation of the League of Communists reached its lowest point and the general feeling among the people was that they had no way of influencing politics. This was the year when the opposition’s power began to have an impact. This was clearly acknowledged by Milan Kučan at one of the meetings of the Presidency of the SRS in March 1988, even before the founding of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights. He said, “I don’t know whether or not you agree with me, but I feel that Slovenia has now entered a period that shows elements of a clear struggle for power, political power…” 98

In 1988 the League of Communists announced its “stepping down from power”, which in practice meant that it was giving up its constitutionally guaranteed leading role and was to become just one of the socio-political organizations which would present its views within the SZDL. The opposition was suspicious. On the other hand the leadership came under pressure from older communists who at best tolerated non-party pluralism and saw the emergence of the so-called alliances (forerunners of parties) as an abandonment of the revolutionary principle. In such circumstances the leadership insisted up until the fall of 1989 on non-party pluralism, even though it knew already at the end of 1988, when the initiative to establish the Social Democratic Alliance came about, that “all variants of political pluralism, multi-party included, were open.” The issue of Slovenia’s political system and of its position within Yugoslavia was thus focused on the problems of constitutional order. As early as 1987 this became the main battleground between socialist authorities on the one hand and part of a more critically oriented professional public and already more articulated opposition on the other. The Association of Writers and the Sociological association set up their own constitutional commissions. The opposition was in favor of the federal changes aiming toward a greater independence of the republics (confederation), a more relaxed private economy, the abolition of the Yugoslav League of Communists’ monopoly and the introduction of political pluralism (direct elections with several candidates). The federal assembly ignored the critical views coming from Slovenia In October 1988 the Federal assembly passed the final proposal of the amendments on Yugoslav constitution and this was also confirmed by the Slovene assembly. Slovene leadership came under strong attack from the public because of that, especially because of the so-called army amendment stating that the army is not funded from the budget but rather from a special sales tax (there were deviations from the 1974 constitution in the area of judiciary and foreign policy, all in the direction of greater centralization). The political balance of forces in Slovenia was changed by the trial against the four and by the establishment of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in early 1988. A very complex story, about which the details are still not fully known, began when the army stepped up its level of military preparation in Slovenia and when the military leaders began to prepare measures against Slovenia. On 31 May 1988 Janez Janša, Mladina’s publicist and a candidate for the president of the ZSMS, was arrested. This was followed by the arrest of Ivan Borštner - a JLA lieutenant, and David Tasić and Franci Zavrl, both journalists working for journal Mladina which published a series of articles against army). At the end of July 1988 the Yugoslav People’s Army staged a trial against the four accused in the military court in Ljubljana. They were formally accused of disclosing a military secret. (They had also foreseen a disclosure of a state secret as a possible charge - the illegal obtaining and possession of a confidential transcript of Milan Kučan’s discussion at the 72nd meeting of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the ZKJ on 29 March which was found during the search of Janez Janša’s office (on the session Kučan strongly warend about the impending danger of a state emergency in Slovenia and Mladina used the transcript as a basis for writing an article The night of long knives ). The latter version was not used because it would have to be brought before a civil court. On 3 June 1988 the Committee for the Protection of Janez Janša’s Rights was formed on the initiative of Igor Bavčar. It was later renamed the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and grew into the strongest organization of civil society during the socalled “Slovene spring.” The committee was first headed by a presidency made up of six members. On 16 June the presidency was broadened into a collective leadership and 99

consisted first of twenty and later of over thirty people. It organized various forms of demonstrations which culminated in a meeting of several tens of thousands of people on 21 June 1988 in Liberation Square in Ljubljana. The entire time that the trial was going on throngs of people marched continuously in protest in front of the military court in Roška Street. During the trial and in the months that followed (until spring 1989) Slovene politics was torn between daily pressures from the center, especially from the army, and the opposition (the pressure from the opposition became stronger after they had appointed a group of deputies in the assembly that was supposed to explore the background of the trial). Toward the end of 1988, when the trial against the four began to lose its political charge (the question of serving the sentence remained unresolved), the collective leadership of the Committee was faced with the question of whether or not to continue with its activities and if yes, in what manner. The Committee was divided on this question. Members of the collective leadership themselves in the next few months joined different political alliances which emerged in the first months of 1989, and in April 1990 the committee formally ceased to exist. The newly-founded alliances entered the political arena with very diverse programs. Some focused primarily on the issue of democratization, others gave priority to the national question and (or) built their image on the basis of anti-communism. On the opposition side, this initial division of Slovene political territory resulted in the greatest political influence of the SDZ. It gathered together a considerable section of the opposition intellectual potential and was led by Dr. Dimitrij Rupel. The restructured leadership of the League of Communists, which saw its future in a gradual social democratic orientation, reacted much more strongly with regard to the establishment of the competitive Social Democratic Alliance than with regard to the establishment of the Peasant Alliance and the SZD. The Yugoslav situation was such that on 27 February 1989 the opposition and the government decided to organize a common meeting in Cankarjev dom (a civic center) in support of the striking miners in Kosovo. The initiative for the support came from the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights . The meeting in Cankarjev dom was followed by an economic boycott of Serbia against Slovenia and for all practical purposes the cessation of political relations. The political consensus reached by the opposition and the government at the meeting was then formalized in the setting up of the Coordinating committee of the meeting’s organizers in Cankarjev dom. The first meeting was called on the initiative of Jože Smole, the president of the RK SZDL, on 3 March and at this meeting Dimitrij Rupel suggested that they should work on a common Slovene political program. By the end of March the working group of the Coordinating committee prepared the declaration, for which several names were suggested (Slovene declaration 1989, Declaration on Slovene national will 89, Declaration on Slovene political will 89). The Slovene Democratic Alliance especially thought that the draft of the declaration was not radical enough and its preparation too slow. Its Executive committee therefore passed its own declaration on 28 March. It was entitled the Slovene Declaration 89. That same day they presented it at the general meeting of the Writers’ Association. The “alternative part” of the Coordinating committee suggested that the coordinating committee accept this version. Jože Smole rejected draft as “completely unacceptable” saying that it was playing into the hands of those who accused Slovenia of separatism. On 8 May there were big demonstrations against the arrest of Janez Janša (his serving of the sentence) and document, whose co-authors were dr. Dimitrij Rupel and Dr. France Bučar, was publicly presented there as the so-called May declaration. They also began collecting 100

signatures for it. The authorities’ first reaction to the theses from the May declaration was that “they demand Slovene statehood without socialism, self-management and Yugoslavia.” More than by the May declaration, “which is in fact a result of the crisis, undefined relations between nations, and current pressures and threats against Slovenia”, the governing structures were upset by the anti-communist tone of the meeting and the assessments of some speakers that Slovene leadership are not legitimate and do not control the situation. The thesis that Slovene leadership had lost control of the situation and should be therefore brought down was also used by Milošević’s propaganda machinery of the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution. Despite Jože Smole’s assessment that the May declaration was unacceptable and the fact that it was already public, the work group of the Coordinating committee continued to work on it. Its sixth version was presented on 29 May under the title The Founding Document of Slovenia 89 and was passed on 22 June. On the insistence of the those in power (especially the trade unions) the Founding document still mentioned selfmanagement socialism, while the League of Communists wanted the inclusion of the notion “the supremacy of work” and believed that sovereignty could not be built on the Slovene nation alone, but on all of Slovenia’s citizens. The document still allowed for the option of Slovenes living in Yugoslavia on the condition that the latter democratizes. Compared to the May declaration the Founding document contained more compromises (owing to numerous coordinations and concessions) and in the then very heated political situation met with considerably less reaction. For various reasons it was signed by only some members of the coordinating committee. From April to June 1989 there was a public debate of the amendments to the constitution of the SRS, proposed by the constitutional commission. Its work was under considerable direct or indirect influence of the opposition;s Assembly for constitution, which sent its views to the commission on a regular basis and also encouraged public pressure. Constitutional amendments met with a strong resistance in federal governmental bodies as well as in the leadership of the ZKJ, who did everything in their power to prevent their adoption. The threat of introducing a state of emergency was in the air again, especially because the federal constitutional court declared that the amendments were not in accordance with the Yugoslav constitution. At the time the president of the federal presidency Dr. Janez Drnovšek was visiting the U.S. He later interrupted his visit to come to the Slovene assembly for the special ceremony in which the adoption of the amendments was formally declared by the parliament). The Slovene government held its ground despite the pressures (the meeting of the CK ZKJ at which they tried to force Slovene communists to prevent the adoption of the amendments lasted all night and was televized in its entirety). The amendments were passed in the Slovene assembly on 27 September 1989 (on a Yugoslav level, the Serbs were the first to change their republican constitution. On 4 February 1989 they abolished the autonomy of the Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces). The amendments allowed for a constitutional transition from a socialist to a market economy and from a one-party system to a multi-party democracy (the stipulation about the leading role of the League of Communists was removed. At the same time Slovenia assigned itself more competences in relation to the federation (especially in the field of economy) than was determined by the federal constitution. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE VICTORY OF THE OPPOSTION AT THE ELECTIONS The dialogue between the opposition and the government, who had presented their separate views in the May declaration and in the Founding Document, was resumed in September 1989. The Coordinating committee of the assembly in Cankarjev dom was 101

renamed the Round table of the politically active in Slovenia (usually referred to as Smole’s round table). The Round table discussed primarily the amendments to the Slovene constitution and their formulation, election-related legislature and the law on political assembly. The opposition was convinced that the government did not play fair in the round table. For this reason a section of the opposition prepared a statement entitled “What kind of election we want” in which they presented their views on elections. They also expressed their doubts in the good intentions of the government in the text “Why we no longer wish to participate in such a round table.” The authorities took advantage of the fact that the initiative was once again in their hands. The adoption of the amendments contributed to their public image, which was further strengthened by their banning of the rally that Milošević’s supporters had planned to bring to Ljubljana on 1 December 1989. SDZ, SDZS, Christian Socialist Alliance, and the Peasant Alliance had left the Round table, the Peasant Alliance, Social Democratic Alliance, Democratic Alliance and later also the newly-founded Christian Democrats started negotiations regarding the formation of a common pre-election coalition. After lengthy negotiations the coalition was first formed on 27 November 1989. The coalition was led by the presidency made up of two members from each party. Its president became a former dissident Dr. Jože Pučnik. Their program consisted of two basic points: sovereign Slovenia and parliamentary democracy. A large part of their campaign strategy was based on anti-communism. At the end of December 1989 the law about assembly and the election law legalized the right to political assembly (which in practice confirmed the existing state of affairs). The new election law was the result of a political compromise and was adapted to the threechamber assembly. It thus represented a combination of the majority (the chamber of associated labor, the chamber of municipalities) and the proportional systems (sociopolitial chamber?). The Slovene pre-election arena assumed its final shape in the beginning of 1990. Former alliances transformed into classical political parties. The same was true of the former socio-political organizations. The Slovene League of Communists went to the last, 14th congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (this was supposed to take place from 20 to 24 January 1990, but ended prematurely on 22 January), but walked out because their proposals on political pluralism, social reform and restructuring of the ZKJ into a union of independent organizations was rejected. This meant the disintegration of the last remaining all-Yugoslav organization (An attempt by the ZK to continue its work as a new party with the name ZK - Movement for Yugoslavia failed. The same fate befell the federal premier Ante Marković’s initiative to organize his own Yugoslav party as the federal elections never took place). The Former socio-political organizations in Slovenia never united into a single party or a united pre-election coalition even though some politicians such as Janez Stanovnik, the then president to the Presidency of the SRS wished they had. Stanovnik, whose political career was drawing to a close, also suggested that they should agree on candidacy for individual functions in advance. Cooperation between the SZDL and the ZK with at least part of the ZSMS would very likely enable the government to win the election. The degree of pluralization that the former socio-political organizations had reached, though, was too high for them to associate with one another in the absence of a strong authority. This could be achieved only by Kučan, but he decided to run for the presidency and was no longer interested in a function limited to a party. 102

It is evident from the stalling of the Round table negotiations as well as from some other sources that al least some Slovene politicians as late as at the end of 1989 believed that a transition to a classical parliamentary democracy was inappropriate and strove to achieve a two-to-four-year transition period hoping that by then other parts of Yugoslavia would have democratized as well. According to them, other parts of Yugoslavia and the army would find it very hard to accept an eventual victory by the opposition. They also thought that a transition period would allow for a clearer political structure of the newlyfounded parties. These prediction failed and, as is known, the April 1990 election was won by Demos. In the initial stage after the change over of power there was considerable mistrust between the government and the opposition. Some governing parties believed that they should carry out the “independence project” on their own, as the opposition parties (for the most part successors of the former socio-political organizations) were supposedly slowing down the independence process. Still, there were different views even within the governing coalition. Especially the government - when faced with the realistic state of the economy - was not eager to take any radical steps. They used the “transition” period as a convenient excuse for poor economic conditions and a drastic fall in the standard of living. They also claimed that owing to the chaotic Yugoslav situation it was impossible to improve the economy as they had promised during the campaign. The opposition was concerned that the independence-oriented policy might provoke the center to apply repressive measures. At the same time there was some “yugonostalgia” and fear of revenge. There was thus considerable tension in the assembly. Under the circumstances of ever growing political polarization it became clear to some influential Demos politicians and ideologues that the implementation of independence cannot be a project advocated by only a section of political forces. Instead it has to be a national project and if the government wishes to achieve effective independence it should have the support of the majority of political forces as well as of the population. The issue of constitution thus became prominent again. The constitution was passed in the parliament by a two-third majority vote. If the majority in the parliament voted for the constitution, they would then call a referendum and a positive referendum would indicate the wish of the Slovene nation to live in a sovereign state. But, after the opposition came to power, though, it showed little enthusiasm about adopting the new constitution. The adoption of a new constitution would mean a different structure of the state order, a dissolution of the parliament and calling up new elections, all of which resented because they had only just come to power. In addition there were different views within the coalition itself with regard to ideology and some other issues that should be included in the constitution (the separation of Church and state, the issue of abortion and others). Some politicians who just came to power also believed that they should first consolidate their power and intensify their political strength by creating an economic base (through privatization and denationalization). Only then would “real” independence come. Some intellectuals (who participated in the writing of the constitution) in Demos realized that under such circumstances the constitution could not be passed by 23 December 1990 as had been planned by the Demos leadership. They also saw that the process of independence might stop if it depended legally only on the adoption of constitution or even just legislature. This is why in November 1990 they revived the idea of a plebiscite (which had been unsuccessfully proposed in the parliament on 4 October by the opposition Socialist Party, the former SZDL). 103

Despite their differences the parties (Demos and opposition) managed to achieve a consensus on this issue. In assembly 203 deputies voted for the law on plebiscite, none was against and four were undeceded. But the differences between the Demos parties widened (there were many personal rivalries, too). Preparations for independence were slow (with exceptions in some areas) despite pressures from some “statehood” parties and individuals in Demos and also from the president Milan Kučan. Many doubted that Slovenia was capable of becoming independent in six months (especially in terms of economy). Despite doubts and difficulties on 25 June Slovena did declare its independence. This was followed by the army intervention, which followed the resolution of the federal government about the army and police resuming the control of the borders. The intervention was strong enough to homogenize the parties, but not too strong for Slovenia not to be able to resist it. The parties and the politicians were thus spared the disagreements with regard to (too many) casualties, damage and possible capitulation, all of which would have no doubt further divided them. Before the final withdrawal of the army there was in July 1991 an internal conflict in Demos and a new Prime Minister designate was proposed. The proposal failed. Demos lasted through the crucial Brioni declaration despite the fact that some of its minor parties claimed that it was a sign of capitulation and thus distanced themselves from it (the Brioni declaration was nevertheless accepted by the opposition as well). After that there were more and more internal differences within the Demos and at the end of 1991 it was dissolved. AN ATTEMPT TO EVALUATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE AND THE PARTIES IN THE 1980S AND THEIR CONRIBUTION TO THE DEMOCRATIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE 1. Political and social changes in the 1980s took place within the context of the global crisis of communism, an ending of the bipolar division of the world, disintegration of the Soviet Union and a deep political, national and economic crisis in Yugoslavia. It is likely that without external changes the process referred to as “Slovene spring” would have ended with a defeat of alternative movements and that the reform-oriented Slovene government would have been forced to leave the political arena. 2. It was typical of the Slovene situation that the political sphere was, owing to a more democratic form of socialism (self management), more open to the circulation of ideas and the meeting of the authorities and the opposition than in Eastern Europe. There existed the organizations “in between” which acted as a bridge between the opposition and the government (ZSMS, SZDL) and allowed for their representatives’ discussion of various professional issues (professional associations such as the Slovene Association of Writers, Sociological Association, Politological Association and in its specific way also the Marxist Center of CK ZKS). Some associations represented a kind of substitute party before real parties were actually formed. 3. By the mid-1980s various alternative movements contributed to the development of a strong civil society, which then played a pioneer role in the democratization process in Slovenia. 4. The press contributed a great deal to the dissemination of the public voice. Especially important in this respect were the youth journal Mladina, the student press and the opposition journals. 5. Ever since the mid-1980s on, the process of social democratization and of national emancipation were closely intertwined. The initiative for the articulation of the national program came from the opposition intellectuals who gathered around various journals and Nova revija in particular. 104

6. In the second half of the 1980s the reform-oriented movement prevailed in the League of Communists, which gradually adopted the opposition’s ideas. It tried to defend the opposition’s activities against intervention from Belgrade (thus also protecting themselves) and also to implement the basic items of the national program, which as far as Slovenia’s relation to Yugoslavia was concerned for both them and the opposition was limited mostly to the requirement of the confederation. Such policy allowed for a soft transition from one-party to a multi-party system and for a gradual preparation for independence. 7. The government followed the principle of legality (taking into account the valid legislature and trying to introduce changes merely by means of passing new legal instruments). The opposition claimed that the government was not legitimate (but legal), but the government in fact did act in a legitimate manner (except in the few cases such as the trial against the four). This allowed the rules of the game to be fairly clear. 8. The development of parties brought about the gradual disappearance of the civil society, which was at its strongest in the period of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights. 9. The opposition parties joined a pre-election coalition, but remained heterogeneous. There was no one political option that would be dominant as was the case in Croatia with its Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ). The government (former socio-political organizations) did not unite (as was the case in Serbia where the League of Communists and the SZDL joined together to form the Socialist Party) nor did it try to break up the opposition even though it possessed the means to do so. It is positive that also after the change in the government, pluralism was preserved and that parties were able to act uniformly in the crucial moments of the independence process. The negative aspects emerged after independence with individual parties putting their own interests before the national ones. In the 1990s this has led to a too strong emphasis on individual parties, which remains (similarly to the Italian situation) a basic characteristic of Slovene political life.

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15. Slovenia: from Communism toward Democracy (19802000)184
Slovenes are faced with two basic problems in modern history: the issue of democracy and the national issue (which political elites usually place in the foreground). The development of democracy was only partially determined by our own selves, in so far as its primary characteristic was the induction of mutual intolerance and the exclusion of those with different opinions.185 The position of the Slovene nation during the individual state formations was usually evaluated "in retrospect" from the standpoint of current political needs, while the newly formed situation was at the same time euphorically praised. This is how after World War I, Austria suddenly became "the jail of nations" even in the eyes of those Slovene politicians and intellectuals who, only a few years prior, claimed to be loyal to it. After World War II, a similar fate befell the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Naturally, a negative thought pattern developed concerning the former state; even after the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, which became synonymous with ‘Balkanism’, ‘Byzantinism’, etc. It was a state, which during the time of its existence, economically and politically limited the Slovenes and prevented their attaining independence, and in a cultural sense kept them on a lower cultural level, i.e. in a different cultural circle, one to which the Slovenes were not supposed to belong. This was all the easier since Yugoslavia was a communist, or rather a socialist state and thereby an excellent target for a double criticism: national as well as ideological. A selection of politicians and intellectuals today is especially concerned by the American way of understanding the position and role of Slovenia in the region; they see us as being "pushed" back to the Balkans. It was quite a shock when in the beginning of 1994, the special envoy of the American President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, who came to Europe to explain the initiative for a Partnership for Peace and classified Slovenia as a "Balkan democracy" together with Romania, Bulgaria and even Albania186. Since then, Ms Albright is more careful in her statements, which does not however, essentially change the global American view. The development of democracy does not always correspond with the current position of the Slovene nation; it often even stands in opposition to progress in resolving the national issue. Critical assessment of the two problems is slow in forming, and it is even slower in becoming a part of the historical consciousness. Here I am referring to the acknowledgement that Slovenes did not only suffer the negative sides, but were also faced with a positive experience. For example, in the multinational milieu of the Danubian monarchy they were able to form, besides the regional, also a national consciousness; Slovenes acquired political culture and, at least in limited form, became accustomed to parliamentarism; they achieved a sort of informal cultural autonomy in the Kingdom of
184 185

Repe, Božo. Slovenia: from Communism toward Democracy (1980-2000): [predavanje]. Denver, 2000. The Slovene political mentality developed in its basic elements at the end of the 19th century and grew from the fact that opponents have to be either totally subjugated or forced to be part of the national enemies' camp. This remains a basic characteristic in all three political camps (catholic, liberal and socialist or communist) throughout the political history of the 20th century. The exception is the period of attaining independence during the second half of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. As far as parliamentarism is concerned, only the "fragmentary" development of particular periods from the second half of the 19th century onwards can be discussed. The Slovene parliament, in the modern sense of the word (with a universal franchise and multi-party system), is in operation without intermission for only 10 years as of yet; this is also a time - probably the only one in Slovene history - of "absolute" independence, as before, it had only local significance or it was subordinate to bodies above the national level, as will also be repeated once incorporated in the European Union (more on the subject: Božo Repe: Pravne, politične podlage, okoliščine in pomen prvih demokratičnih volitev, Kolokvij Državnega zbora Republike Slovenije "Razvoj slovenskega parlamentarizma", Ljubljana, May 9th, 2000 (the compilation is currently in print). 186 Clintonova odposlanka Albrightova v Sloveniji, Delo, January 15th, 1984

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Yugoslavia, despite it being centralistic and non-democratic; communist Yugoslavia rendered it possible for the Primorska (coastal) region (i.e. one third of the Slovene population and more than a quarter of the territory) to be joined with Slovenia; and last but not least, Slovenes were given federal status, a constitution, their own national assembly and other state agencies, and under the specific circumstances of the Communist Party state, implemented the delayed processes of modernization that former elites either could not or wanted not to bring to effect, for example, the agrarian reform, industrialization, separation of Church from State, women's emancipation, a more balanced social structure.187 What differentiates the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s from the previous periods is the simultaneousness of the two processes, i.e. the gradual democratization (which ended in the installment of a multi-party system) and the fight for national emancipation (which ended with the formation of the Slovene state).188 Among the political elites and factors of development in the 80s there were, in fact, differences concerning priorities. The League of Communists, for example, was quick to find common ground with the opposition as regards Yugoslavia, but much slower as to the issue of democratization. The majority of alternative movements, in part also the League of Socialist Youths, placed democratic civil rights before the national issue. The Slovene Democratic Alliance and some other parties conceded the same importance to both issues.189 Differences were existent even after Demos (Democratic opposition) came to power in the spring of 1990, since it was evident that a part of the political forces primarily wished to consolidate their position in power, take control over the social capital, while independence would follow later. Nonetheless, it can be assessed that the political gravitation in Slovenia at the time leaned towards the simultaneousness of both processes. In Yugoslavia, generally speaking, a strong opposition to both processes is discernible; and as regards international circumstances, the western forces, especially the USA, supported democratization but were against secession190. The independent Slovene state was a result of political and social changes in the 1980s. These took place in the context of a global crisis of communism, disintegration of the bipolar division of the world, disintegration of the Soviet Union and a deep political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia, as well as a crisis in the relationships among the different nations within the state. Independence would not have been possible without these external changes and likewise, the internal process of democratization would also have been very different. Incorporated among the basic internal characteristics, upon which Slovenes themselves could influence, was a relatively open political scene which enabled a circulation of ideas and meetings between those in power and those in opposition, a strong civil society, supremacy of a reformist movement within the Communist Party and a high level of consent concerning basic national issues. The
More on the subject in abridged form: Božo Repe: Slovenci v XX.stoletju, Katalog stalne razstave Muzeja novejše zgodovine v Ljubljani, Ljubljana, 1999, pp.19-36. 188 Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, Aleš Gabrič, Božo Repe: The Repluratization of Slovenia in the 1980s (with an Introduction by Dennison Rusinow), The Donald W. Treadgold Papers No.24, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, February 2000. 189 Koga voliti? Programi političnih strank in list na pomladnih volitvah v Sloveniji, Ljubljana, March 1990, Jugoslovanski center za teorijo in prakso samoupravljanja Edvard Kardelj, Ljubljana, 1990. See also: Nastajanje slovenske državnosti, Slovensko politološko društvo, Ljubljana 1992. 190 The USA held this position until the final collapse of Yugoslavia, most decisively in the spring of 1991. American Secretary of State James Baker had, only a few days before the proclamation of Slovene independence in Belgrade on June 21, 1991, told Slovene representatives that the USA wishes to retain the unity of Yugoslavia and that they will not recognize the independence of Slovenia, nor would any other country do differently, but that they wish to help with the democratization of Yugoslavia (Note of the discussion between the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kučan and James Baker III, Secretary of State of the USA, Belgrade, June 21st, 1991, Arhiv Predsedstva Republike Slovenije, see also Warren Zimmermann: Origins of a Catastrophe, Random House, New York 1996, p.71).
187

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processes of social democratization and of national emancipation were tightly intertwined. This situation enabled a smooth transition from the one-party to a multi-party system and successful preparations for attaining independence. Consensus between the socialist government and the opposition was settled upon through a confederation status, a fact that is nowadays all too often forgotten. Even when Demos came to power the evaluation of a confederation as the maximum achievement possible under such circumstances did not alter. It was only after the Yugoslav National Army attacked Slovenia that the standpoint and situation shifted. The new political ideology, which developed following the proclamation of independence and is shared by the majority of the political parties, could be labeled as a "rush towards Europe". The course proceeds in accordance with the Latin proverb "more haste, less speed". Characteristically, it presents the so-called Europe as an internally non-differential notion, which can generally adapt to particular political interests (following a self-serving principle, for example, educational systems that correspond to a particular line of argumentation would be used, and the same holds true for the relationship between Church and State, etc.). In this "rush towards Europe" Slovene politicians are, as always throughout history, overly compliant, even servile, and agreeing to - albeit questionable - smaller (closing duty-free shops, instating visas for Balkan states) or larger concessions (the so-called Spanish compromise191) as a sign of "good will". Following the proclamation of independence, there was a continuance of shifts in the Slovene political sphere, polarization was re-established and parties continued to fall apart and merge. This process is ongoing already more than a decade. The 10-year economic balance demonstrates that, on the whole, Slovenia underwent a successful transition and it continues to make progress; although, at the price of high social differences and unemployment, which is turning increasing numbers of young people, educated people, into second-rate citizens, as well as many other side effects, all influencing the augmenting unbalanced social structure. One of the basic characteristics of Slovene society is its tendency towards ‘parti-cracy’, a growing ideological intolerance, and due to the small size of the country, the formation of clientages and clans. The once powerful civil movements have been sucked into the various parties and no longer play an important role. In psychological terms, self-assertion should be added, a belief in selfsufficiency and prejudices towards anything different, all of which only strengthened after attaining independence (it is easy to substantiate through historiography, how difficult it was for "the Carniolan mind" to get used to the "different" character of those people from the Prekmurje and Primorska regions, integrated into Yugoslavia after World War I and II; prejudices and stereotypes about regional affiliations proved to be one of the most persistent elements of the psychosocial make-up of Slovenes). Another discernible syndrome conditioned by history and arising from the lack of state tradition is "snitching" on the opposing political option abroad and the search for an external arbiter for internal conflicts. Where Slovene politicians previously turned to Vienna and Belgrade, they now turn to Brussels192
In 1993, Italy, as a condition for not impeding the signing of the Association Agreement between Slovenia and the European Union, demanded different concessions of Slovenia. The key one concerned the property issue of Italian refugees - after World War II - from Istria and the Slovene Primorska (coastal) region (this issue being already resolved with Yugoslavia). The direct Italian demands were initially comprised in the so-called Aquileia Agreement, signed by Secretary of State Lojze Peterle, but refused by the Slovene parliament. In a milder and more general version (the socalled Spanish Compromise, made after the Spanish Intervention), parliament passed the Italian demands in April 1996. Slovenia obligated itself to open the real-estate market after the ratification of the Association Agreement for all those citizens of the EU, who lived in the territory of Slovenia for at least three years (at any time in the past). Even though Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek, as well as President Milan Kučan, interceded on behalf of the Spanish Compromise, they later labeled it as an example of conditioning and extortion (Kučan even did so in his speech before the European Parliament).
192 191

The most recent instance, but not the only one, was the pursuit for arbitration with the so-called Venice Commission - the "Democracy through Law" commission of the European Council - concerning the election system just before the elections in October 2000. The conflict was instigated by the Prime Minister at the time, who did not agree with - an otherwise perfectly legal - decision of the Parliament.

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One of the consequences of the newly formed situation within the state was that Slovenes were again faced with dilemmas and situations from the turn of the century or even earlier; this is when they were marginalized, during either the Yugoslav or communist periods, and for which it had appeared that they would never need dealing with again. Incorporated among these is the extraordinary persistence of regional identities, which in many ways prevents the development of a nation; at the same time there is a revival of former regional centers beyond the present Republic of Slovenia (Graz, Klagenfurt, Trieste), which became gravitational points for a large part of the working force from bordering regions, having also a growing importance in education. Relations between the larger neighboring nations (Germans and Austrians, Italians, Hungarians) and Slovenes, which could be characterized as having been traumatic for the past centuries, are being established anew (or old models in new disguise). The transitional character of the country, its economic periphery, the influence of different cultures and a linguistic endangerment seem permanent features in the historical development.193 This demonstrates that the processes experienced in this state during the last decades are superficial and that the permanent features did not change in their essence after attaining independence. An evaluation of the formation and the 10-year existence of the Slovene state, as well as the democratic processes within, are for the moment only transitional, as were the estimates of past situations. A more objective evaluation can be established once Slovene society is integrated in the European Union; what the integration process contributed and how Slovenia will be able to handle the loss of a national state, while it is actually still enduring its puberty, shall only then be clarified. Doubtless, the Slovene State was a tremendous and necessary historical achievement, especially as regarded from the circumstances in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the fact remains that independence was achieved at a time when the classic national state, based on 19th century patterns of the national economy, defense system, foreign policy, proper currency and other attributes ranging to a legitimate aviation company, is in decline in Europe. This is also at a time when the (national) state, at least in the west, no longer represents the determining factor in protecting democratic rights, since these are of course becoming universal (correspondingly, the criteria of "non-interference in internal affaires" of a particular country is being abandoned). New solutions are needed for these new challenges, although it seems that this type of realization hardly affected Slovene social sciences. History is still in great measure evaluated from the viewpoint of a national state, arising from the belief that the Slovene state should be the ultimate goal of successive Slovene generations, even though historiography does not offer empirical proofs for such claims. Historians critical of this sort of approach are labeled as "a-national".194 This sort of claim is of course logical in a political sense, since it offers the possibility of appropriating the so-called "independence capital", be that in an historical sense (demonstrating the "far-sightedness" of particular political forces or individuals in various historical periods) or in view of the current political situation. Scientifically speaking it is also very convenient as it limits research to finding the earliest possible "proofs" justifying a Slovene state-forming mentality. There is no need to take much interest in the broader historical context, various sources can be interpreted "in retrospect", there is no need for comparisons with other and similar nations, and it is possible to avoid confrontation with the determinations of researchers concerned with the social sciences of other nations. However, this of course only occasions putting off a problem that will have to be faced sooner or later anyway.
Peter Vodopivec: Glavne poteze in stalnice v slovenskem zgodovinskem razvoju in poskus zgodovinarjevega pogleda v prihodnost, Slovenija po letu 1995, razmišljanja o prihodnosti, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana, 1995, pp. 30-37 194 The evaluation that there is "an extremely loud and influential a-national movement" present in Slovene science, was noted by Dr. Stane Granda), Zgodovinski časopis, 1999, volume 53, No.4, pg.612).
193

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16. International recognition of Slovenia (1991-1992): Three Perspectives; The View from inside: the Slovenes, the Federation and Yugoslavia's other republics195
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the attainment of independence of Slovenia, diverse internal and external factor intertwined and influenced each other. The disintegration itself was mainly caused by internal relationships: the economic crisis, the crisis of self-managed socialism and the crisis of the relations between the nations. However, without the external factors, namely the end of the bipolar division of the world and the specific role of Yugoslavia within it, and the reaction of some states (particularly of the European Union and Germany within it) during the period of disintegration, some former republics which strived for independence would have hardly been able – if at all – to attain it. The internal relations in Yugoslavia were legally determined by the 1974 Constitution, which granted individual republics (but not so the minorities) the right to selfdetermination, including the right to secession. The problem was that the Constitution did not determine the proceedings according to which such process was to be carried out. On the constitutional-legal basis, the conflict for changes within Yugoslavia (whose internal organisation seemed to suit no-one) was carried out between 1987 when the discussion on amendments to the Constitution (which were mostly about regulation of economic sphere and were adopted in 1988) started and 1989, when Serbia introduced Constitutional amendments with which it abolished the autonomy of the provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina and thus disrupted Yugoslav legal order, since the position of autonomous provinces was regulated by the federal Constitution. The fragile Yugoslav legal order, which was hardly taken very seriously by anyone, was thus ultimately destroyed. Slovenia was the first of the republics to protect itself against the Serb centralistic pressure by adopting amendments to Slovenian Constitution in 1989. Being convinced, that the next phase of the centralisation of Yugoslavia will be to reduce the rights of the republics, it prior to that attempted to prevent the elimination of autonomous status by supporting the Albanians in Kosovo. The resolution of the presidency of SFRJ (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), according to which Yugoslavia was to be transformed into a modern federation, which was adopted shortly afterwards (November 1989) had no influence on Yugoslav legal order any more. With the disintegration of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990 and the parallel emergence of national parties (first in Slovenia), Yugoslavia had no federal party with a Yugoslav programme, which could have a major influence on the entire territory of the federation. The attempt of the federal Prime Minister Ante Marković to influence Yugoslav public opinion through Yugoslav television and by founding of his own party failed. So was the case with the attempt of the army to prolong the existence of the Union of Communists through a party (Movement for Yugoslavia) under its control. The parties, which won the republic elections, all had national programmes. A change of the Constitution would have been required to carry out multi-party federal elections; however, the leaders of the individual republics were not able to reach a consensus about that, so they were not carried out. Slovenia and Croatia opposed the suggested changes since their motto was: one person, one vote that in Yugoslav circumstances would have led to Serb majority.

195

Repe, Božo. The view from inside: the Slovenes, the Federation and Yugoslavia's other republics: referat na 34th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 22. 11. 2002. Pittsburgh, 2002.

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The attitude of individual republics, federal bodies and the Yugoslav Army towards the future of Yugoslavia was formed at the end of 1990 and at the beginning of 1991. In the summer of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia brought in a bill on establishing a confederation. On December 23, 1990, Slovenia decided to become an independent state. Though attacked at home and abroad, the decision was neutral: it did not explicitly suggest secession; it also permitted transformation of Yugoslavia into confederation. After the plebiscite, the Slovenian leadership started to carry out negotiations about the Slovenian-Croatian model of confederation with the leaderships of other republics. They were unsuccessfully finished in February of 1991, and it was only then that the Slovenian leadership eventually decided that due to the circumstances the plebiscite decision in the sense of attaining independence from Yugoslavia was to be carried out.
However, another dilemma had to be solved: a separation based on agreement or a cessation? Slovenia started to make systematic preparations for the latter in all areas. Croatia verbally shared Slovenian viewpoints, yet it made no preparations for the separation. In view of its strong Serb minority, which started to offer resistance to Tudjman, a confederation seemed a dream solution for Croatia. With slight differences in their attitudes, the other republic, as well as the federal bodies insisted on federal status. Apart from being formally committed to federation, Serbia systematically prepared for the implementation of the concept of Great Serbia. Encouraged by Serbia, “referendums” on autonomy status, setting up of independent Serb authorities and rebellions had been going on since the summer of 1990, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia. The situation in Yugoslavia can best be seen from the following table:

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Criteria

Bih A common state as a union of sovereign republics with federal organs based on parity Both nations and republics have a sovereign status

MONTENEGRO Unified federal state of nations with an equal status with international subjectivity Only the nations, yet not so the republics have a sovereign status

CROATIA Confederation as a union of sovereign states

MACEDONIA

SLOVENIA

Future order in Yugoslavia

Union of sovereign Slovenia as an republics with federal independent state organs based on parity within a union with other republics Nations and republics have a sovereign status; Macedonia is a sovereign state of Macedonian nation ant its citizens The borders between the republics are of administrative nature Both the republics and the nations have a sovereign status

FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL Unified federal state A common minimum of equal nations with for functioning of the an international federation as long a subjectivity there is a mutual agreement The nations, not the republic enjoy a status of sovereignty Both the republics and the nations have a sovereign status

SERBIA

YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ARMY Yugoslavia as a federal, effective and democratic state Freedom and equality of citizens, sovereignty of nations and their respective republics Protection of external borders

Position of nations and republics

Republics – states have a sovereign status

Borders between the republics

The borders The borders between the between the republics are of republics are not administrative nature just of administrative nature and should be recognised Common foreign policy Common foreign policy

Both the internal and the external borders are unchangeable

The existing borders are to be respected

Borders between the republics are not state borders; they are of administrative nature and can be changed Common foreign policy

The eternal as well as the internal borders within Yugoslavia are to be respected Implementation of the agreed obligations within foreign policy

Foreign policy

Members of the union have to cooperate and harmonise their foreign policy, yet they strive towards international subjectivity

Regarding foreign policy, Macedonia will pay special attention to its minority in neighbouring states.

Own foreign policy which can be harmonised with other members of the union

Common foreign policy

Army

Common army, depoliticised army with a national balanced structure Common economic policy according to market principles

Common army

Own armed forces Unclear viewpoints as and joint contingents to the organisation of the army Common market, Common economic free transition of policy based on goods, capital and principles of the market people, customs and monetary union

Own armed forces and joint contingents Common market, free transition of goods, capital and people, a possibility of customs and monetary union Common currency

Common army

Implementation of the agreed obligations in the field of defence policy Unified yet open market, monetary policy and the role of the National Bank of Yugoslavia which allows the liquidity of the country towards other states Convertibility of the national currency the »dinar«

Economic policy

Common economic functions based on principles of the market

Unified economic functions based on the principles of the market

Unified armed forces for safeguarding of Yugoslavia and socialism Unified Yugoslav market, there is no return to capitalism

Currency

Common currency

Common currency

depending on agreement, own or common currency

Common currency

Common currency

Common Yugoslav currency

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In March and April, after the failed negotiations between the republics, the federal organs tried to take a leading role in solving the crisis again. However, the negotiations between the presidents of individual republics with the president of the federation and the ministry of defense within the federal presidency in March and in April of 1991 were not successful. In the end, Bosnia and Macedonia (Izetbegović and Gligorov) offered a kind of median concept between federation and confederation, yet, it found no support. Riots between the nations and national conflicts in Croatia increased. At the beginning of May, Milošević ultimately gave up the Yugoslav option, since the Yugoslav National Army did not carry out any of the negotiated plans according to which it should have introduced a state of emergency and seized power. Veljko Kadijević, the minister of defense and the leadership of Yugoslav National Army stepped over to the Serb side and agreed to the implementation of the Great Serb concept. The weapons and the military units were silently moved to the borders of “Great Serbia”. Through threats and pressures, international policy attempted to prevent the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Until the end it insisted on preservation of Yugoslavia. If possible, this was to be achieved by negotiations, but also a limited intervention of Marković and the army in order to discipline the two secessionist republics, which they perceived as more dangerous than Milošević seemed acceptable. Even until the end of May of 1991 European Union was willing to give Yugoslavia as much help as it asked for, it was further willing to write off a half of its debts and accept it - after the internal agreement and reform - as a full member of the Union. The intervention of the Yugoslav National Army in Slovenia after the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia and the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis in June of 1991 destroyed any possibility for an internal agreement. Internal relations only bore significance on one more occasion, namely during the negotiations in Brioni on July 7 and 8, 1991 where the representatives of the federation were present too. With his concept of returning to the positions before June 25 (the day on which Slovenia declared its independence), Marković succeeded only partly. The Brioni declaration was adopted, yet it allowed different interpretations as to what the return to the previous status actually meant. The toughest one meant the annulment of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Yet, the events that followed in summer and autumn of 1991 on the territory of Yugoslavia made such interpretation impossible. After the failed attempt of disciplining Slovenia, Serbia estimated that keeping Slovenia within Yugoslavia would only present an obstacle for the implementation of its option about Great Serbia, therefore a silent Slovene- Serb agreement in Brioni about the withdrawal of the federal army from Slovenia could be reached. The presidency of SFRJ, which was restored for the period of a three-month long moratorium, approved it formally on July 18, 1991. The war in Croatia buried all hopes for the implementation of the “tough” interpretation of the Brioni declaration according to the wishes of federal bodies and the majority of the European Union. A tiny last chance for an agreement between the Yugoslav representatives assisted by the international community was seen in the Hague conference, which started in September of 1991. On the conference, Bosnia and Herzegovina advocated for a confederation, the Macedonians had no clear picture about what they wanted, Croatia, already involved in war, allowed a possibility of a union of sovereign states, whereas Slovenia was only willing to negotiate international recognition and succession. Milošević insisted on “preservation of Yugoslavia”; Marković however was in favour of a reformed federation with certain competences for the federal government. On November 5, 1991 Milošević refused Lord Carrington’s compromise-proposal according to which the republics were to get international subjectivity, yet remain within the economic and customs union. Any further possibility for was thus gone. In December of 1991 Marković resigned. The 113

federal presidency, revived on the grounds of the Brioni declaration was incomplete since the Slovenian representative and shortly afterwards the Croatian too, did not take part in it any longer after the three month moratorium set up by the declaration was over. The Serb block tried to continue its activities within the presidency, however, international bodies denied its legitimacy. At the beginning of December 1991, the Badinter commission formed its final opinion according to which Yugoslavia fell apart and the republics, which so wished and met the required criteria, were to be recognised. After fierce battles behind the scene, European Union decided for recognition of the newly established states. Negotiations between the former republics became a subject of international relations and international legislation. In the context of subsequent wars (after Croatia there were wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia) the thesis was defended according to which the separation of Slovenia and Croatia along with (too early) international recognition of the former Yugoslav republics were to be blamed for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As regards Slovenia, this thesis neglects the fact that the war in Yugoslavia had been systematically prepared for a long time and that during the process of separation of Slovenia national conflicts had already been going on in Croatia. Slovenia couldn’t have prevented them, even if it had stayed within Yugoslavia. Another fact is that Slovenia did everything within its power to reform Yugoslavia and enter European Union as its integral part, before it finally made use of its constitutional right to gain independence. In the then circumstances, forcing Slovenia to remain within Yugoslavia meant nothing less than a demand that the existence and the future of one nation be sacrificed for the illusion that this would prevent fights between other nations. Among others, international recognition stands for the admission of the failure of such policy.

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17. Historical consequences of Yugoslavia over Slovene Society196

the

disintegration

of

Slovenes are faced with two basic problems in modern history: the issue of democracy and the national issue (which political elites usually place in the foreground). The development of democracy was only partially determined by our own selves, in so far as its primary characteristic was the induction of mutual intolerance and the exclusion of those with different opinions.197 The position of the Slovene nation during the individual state formations was usually evaluated "in retrospect" from the standpoint of current political needs, while the newly formed situation was at the same time euphorically praised. This is how after World War I, Austria suddenly became "the jail of nations" even in the eyes of those Slovene politicians and intellectuals who, only a few years prior, claimed to be loyal to it. Illustrations:

Repe, Božo. Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia for Slovene Society. Österr. Osth., 2001, jhrg. 43, hf. 1/2, str. 5-26. Ilustr. 197 The Slovene political mentality developed in its basic elements at the end of the 19th century and grew from the fact that opponents have to be either totally subjugated or forced to be part of the national enemies' camp. This remains a basic characteristic in all three political camps (catholic, liberal and socialist or communist) throughout the political history of the 20th century. The exception is the period of attaining independence during the second half of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. As far as parliamentarism is concerned, only the "fragmentary" development of particular periods from the second half of the 19th century onwards can be discussed. The Slovene parliament, in the modern sense of the word (with a universal franchise and multi-party system), is in operation without intermission for only 10 years as of yet; this is also a time - probably the only one in Slovene history - of "absolute" independence, as before, it had only local significance or it was subordinate to bodies above the national level, as will also be repeated once incorporated in the European Union (more on the subject: Božo Repe: Pravne, politične podlage, okoliščine in pomen prvih demokratičnih volitev" in: Razvoj slovenskega parlamentarizma", Državni zbor Republike Slovenije Ljubljana, 2000 page 26 - 69.

196

115

Fig. 1: The glorified page on Franz Jozef honor for his birthday (Tedenske slike- Weekly Pictures,, August 16, 1916). Picture with the grand- son and patriotic song Got live the Austria. It was similar in all newspapers in the long time of his regime. Till his death and even later – practically till the end of First World War, for the majority of the Slovenes Franz Josef was synonymous for so called “good old times.” - feeling otherwise spread through all empire. Loyalty to Hapsburg Monarchy was one of the basic characteristics of Slovene consciousness, especially expressed among politicians and clergy, but not less at ordinary people. It was systematically built through school system, public life, especially celebrations, holidays, anniversaries etc. 198

Fig. 2: Slovenes supported hardly Austro-Hungarian Declaration of War to Serbia and propaganda was very strong. Serbien muss sterbien, well known motto from postcards and cartoons (published in Hans Weigel, Walter Lukan and Max Peyfuss book Jeder Schuss ein Russ, Jeder Stoss ein Franzos, Edition Christian Brandstätter, Wien 1983). In Slovene oral version this motto was rather changed to even more cahuvinistic way : “Srbe na vrbe”, which means “Hang Serbs to willow trees” (Erhängen Serben um weiden). Such devices were latter in Yugoslavia the subject of many disputes and one of the proofs for Serbian side, that Slovenes were part of occupiers and Serbia with incorporation to The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a matter of fact saved them and of course, that they should be grateful for that, stay in silence and pay the price, economical and political one, for that.

198

Vasilij Melik, Božo Repe, Franc Rozman: Zastave vihrajo ( The Flags are Fluttering). Spominski dnevi in praznovanja na Slovenskem od sredine 19. stoletja do danes (selection of illustrations and subtitles Darja Kerec). Modrijan. Ljubljana 1999. The text was originally published in the book Öffentliche Gedenktage in Mitteleuropa, Böhlau Verlag Wien, 1997, edited by Emil Brix and Hannes Stekl).

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Fig. 3: When things changed during the war Austria and Hapsburgs slowly but certainly became antagonist and then the enemy. One of first signes is announcement that omnipotence German bridge to Adriatic coast is rocking. Caroon made my Hinko Smrekar, published in Kurent's album in 1918 shows Slovene farmer, tied like Gulliver, chained on the ground. Tied giant wants to stand up. Over him are passing troops of Germans and their adherents («nemškutarji«), but their carriages and coaches are folling down. The subtitle is: Roar, roar Adriatic see, you was and you will always be Slavic.

Fig. 4: At the same time you can notice removal from former idols. Slovene solder before the end of the war in 1918 far- sightednessed subtitled propagandistic postcard with portrets of Austrian millitary leaders with comment: “Greatnesses of former Austria« (Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 192. 117

Fig. 5: Very soon later triumphant and ironical feelings are shown like in this obituary, published in satirical journal Kurent in 1918, which says: “After a long, painful disease expired Austria it's dirty soul” Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 201).

Fig. 6: And variation on the same topic. Finnis Austriae. Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 201).

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Fig. 7: Pro - Austrian or pro- German feelings became shameful, slightingly named as “avstrijakarstvo” Slovene intellectuals were turned toward France, German language was almost no subject in schools between both World Wars. But on the other side - as shows this caricature from Hinko Smrekar made in 1921, when new, centralistic constitution was accept - expectations from new state were great, idealized and naive, there was little knowledge about Serbs and in general about South Slavic nations in new state.

Fig. 8: This simple mindedness passed quickly, as illustrate another caricature “United Yugoslavs” (Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 223). 119

After World War II, a similar fate befell the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although here situation was something different. Namely, resistance movement and also allies didn’t recognize dismemberment of Yugoslavia and annexation of occupying territories to enemy states, at the end of the war there was compromise between Tito and predsident of royal government Ivan Šubašič, so the criticism was turned toward inside problems - political system and national relation-ships. Naturally, a negative thought pattern developed concerning the former state; even after the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, which became synonymous with ‘Balkanism’, ‘Byzantinism’, etc. It was a state, which during the time of its existence, economically and politically limited the Slovenes and prevented their attaining independence, and in a cultural sense kept them on a lower cultural level, i.e. in a different cultural circle, one to which the Slovenes were not supposed to belong. This was all the easier since Yugoslavia was a communist, or rather a socialist state and thereby an excellent target for a double criticism: national as well as ideological.

Fig. 9: Poor, exploited Slovenia (Milan Maver newspaper Delo, September 29, 1986). Cartoon represented Slovenia as hen which would be beat from Yugoslav federation.

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Fig. 10: Because of geographical image of Slovenia hen is one of its symbols. You can explain it also as naive, a little slow mind, typical animal which is waiting for its destiny. This cartoon was created at the end of the eighties by Mat'kurja – one of the first domestic internet servers which is still operating on the web.

Fig. 11: Slovenia, stripped to the nakedness, rest just with coif (national cap) – Milan Maver, Delo, September 29, 1988.

Fig. 12: After national plebiscit in december 1990 discourse with Serbian (Yugoslav) solder is represented completely different as on the previous cartoon from the times of establishment of Yugoslavia when he was great deliverer of the Slovenes. Drunken, brutal solders says: “Lets, go home!” And Slovene girl answered: “Oh don’t be ridiculous!” (Franco Juri, Delo, December 24., 1990). 121

Fig. 13: Innocent Slovenia, supposed to be raped by Yugoslav soldier (Mladina, June 25, 1991)

Fig. 14: Oh, that Balkan, said Slovenia, self sufficient, clean and reborned girl and slammed the door behind her (Franco Juri, Delo, October 12, 1991). It is already forgotten, that Slovenes believed in Yugoslavia for a long time and they had invested a lot of energy in its planning and development. But on the other side, the Yugoslav federation had never been able to function in the course of its existence without compulsory cohesive measures from outside or internal factors. When these fell away (the decline of socialism and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, the disintegration of the party and of the army) it could not find a democratic alternative for its existence. From this experience is originate the fear and opposition against establishing any institutional ties with the Balkan states. It is general opinion that, such a process might cause the country to slip from its status of state “bordering on” the conflict area to the group of countries that constitute the conflict area. In any proposition (as for example 122

Stability pact) politicians see the aim that Slovenia has being "pushed" back to the Balkans to help to stabilize and democratize the region. It was quite a shock when in the beginning of 1994, the special envoy of the American President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, who came to Europe to explain the initiative for a Partnership for Peace, classified Slovenia as a "Balkan democracy" together - can you emagine - with Romania, Bulgaria and even Albania.199 Changes in Croatia and Serbia in the last time, accompanied with proposals of Western politicians about creation some sort of association of Balkan states caused new similar anxiety. In Slovenia, critical assessment of the national position in different periods slow in forming, and it is even slower in becoming a part of the historical consciousness. Here I am referring to the acknowledgement that Slovenes did not only suffer the negative sides, but were also faced with a positive experience. For example, in the multinational milieu of the Danubian monarchy they were able to form, besides the regional, also a national consciousness; Slovenes acquired political culture and, at least in limited form, became accustomed to parliamentarism. They achieved a sort of informal cultural autonomy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, despite it being centralistic and nondemocratic. Communist Yugoslavia rendered it possible for the Primorska (coastal) region (i.e. one third of the Slovene population and more than a quarter of the territory) to be joined with Slovenia; and last but not least, Slovenes were given federal status, a constitution, their own national assembly and other state agencies, and under the specific circumstances of the Communist Party state, implemented the delayed processes of modernization that former elites either could not or wanted not to bring to effect, for example, the agrarian reform, industrialization, separation of Church from State, women's emancipation, a more balanced social structure.200 What differentiates the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s from the previous historical periods is the simultaneousness of the two processes, i.e. the gradual democratization, which ended in the installment of a multi-party system and the fight for national emancipation which ended with the formation of the Slovene state.201 Namely, in earlier periods the development of democracy does not always correspond with the current position of the Slovene nation; it is often even stands in opposition to progress in resolving the national issue (as I mentioned before: in centralistic kingdom of Yugoslavia they have made enormous cultural progress including establishing first university which Austria didn’t allowed in all the time of its existence, communistic Yugoslavia successful solved the question of Western border etc). Among the political elites and factors of development in the 80s there were, in fact, differences concerning priorities. The League of Communists, for example, was quick to find common ground with the opposition as regards Yugoslavia, but much slower as to the issue of democratization. The majority of alternative movements, in part also the League of Socialist Youths, placed democratic civil rights before the national issue. The Slovene Democratic Alliance and some other parties conceded the same importance to both issues.202 Differences were existent even after Demos (Democratic opposition) came to power in the spring of 1990, since it was evident that a part of the political forces primarily wished to consolidate their position in power, take control over the social capital, while independence would follow later. Nonetheless, it can be assessed that the political gravitation in Slovenia at the time leaned towards the
Clintonova odposlanka Albrightova v Sloveniji, Delo, January 15 th, 1984. More on the subject in abridged form: Božo Repe: Slovenci v XX.stoletju, Katalog stalne razstave Muzeja novejše zgodovine v Ljubljani, Ljubljana, 1999, pp.19-36. 201 Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, Aleš Gabrič, Božo Repe: The Repluratization of Slovenia in the 1980s (with an Introduction by Dennison Rusinow), The Donald W. Treadgold Papers No.24, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, February 2000. 202 Koga voliti? Programi političnih strank in list na pomladnih volitvah v Sloveniji, Ljubljana, March 1990, Jugoslovanski center za teorijo in prakso samoupravljanja Edvard Kardelj, Ljubljana, 1990. See also: Nastajanje slovenske državnosti, Slovensko politološko društvo, Ljubljana 1992.
200 199

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simultaneousness of both processes. In Yugoslavia, generally speaking, a strong opposition to both processes is discernible; and as regards international circumstances, the western forces, especially the USA, supported democratization but were against secession.203 Choosing in between both processes they were prepare to sacrifice democracy for geostrategical interests and they allowed to Yugoslav president Ante Marković so called limited intervention with army in Slovenia (which changed to the real war). The independent Slovene state was a result of political and social changes in the 1980s. These took place in the context of a global crisis of communism, disintegration of the bipolar division of the world, disintegration of the Soviet Union and a deep political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia, as well as a crisis in the relationships among the different nations within the state. Independence would not have been possible without these external changes and likewise, the internal process of democratization would also have been very different. Incorporated among the basic internal characteristics, upon which Slovenes themselves could influence, was a relatively open political scene which enabled a circulation of ideas and meetings between those in power and those in opposition, a strong civil society, supremacy of a reformist movement within the Communist Party and a high level of consent concerning basic national issues. The processes of social democratization and of national emancipation were tightly intertwined. This situation enabled a smooth transition from the one-party to a multi-party system and successful preparations for attaining independence. Consensus between the socialist government and the opposition was settled upon through a confederation status, a fact that is nowadays all too often forgotten. Even when Demos came to power the evaluation of a confederation as the maximum achievement possible under such circumstances did not alter. It was only after the Yugoslav National Army attacked Slovenia that the standpoint and situation shifted.

The USA held this position until the final collapse of Yugoslavia, most decisively in the spring of 1991. American Secretary of State James Baker had, only a few days before the proclamation of Slovene independence in Belgrade on June 21, 1991, told Slovene representatives that the USA wishes to retain the unity of Yugoslavia and that they will not recognize the independence of Slovenia, nor would any other country do differently, but that they wish to help with the democratization of Yugoslavia (Note of the discussion between the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kučan and James Baker III, Secretary of State of the USA, Belgrade, June 21st, 1991, Arhiv Predsedstva Republike Slovenije, see also Warren Zimmermann: Origins of a Catastrophe, Random House, New York 1996, p.71).

203

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Fig. 15: Yugoslavia an orphan girl, poor child, is waiting before the draw breed of European fortress. (Milan Maver, Delo, February 20, 1989). General opinion at the end of the eighties in Slovenia was, that it will not be able to enter to European Community as a part of Yugoslavia. That was the point of quarrel with federal center and especially with Serbia. Conflict with Serbia was not conflict of two nationalisms, as it was usually interpreted, but split between two evolutional concepts: Slovenian towards Europe and modernization and Serbian, patriarchal, intorverted and turn to the past. In Brussels over Ljubljana and not over Belgrad was popular phrase at the end of eighties and start of ninghties.

Fig. 16: But all the others in Yugoslavia are chatching her foots when she is nocking ot the European's doors. (Milan Maver, Delo, May 25, 1989. Following the proclamation of independence, there was a continuance of shifts in the Slovene political sphere, polarization was re-established and parties continued to fall apart and merge. This process is ongoing already more than a decade. The 10-year economic balance demonstrates that, on the whole, Slovenia underwent a successful transition and it continues to make progress (nowadays bgp. for example, is more than 10 000 dolars, purchasing or buying power even more, about 14 000 at the end of Yugoslavia was in all country less than 3000 and in Slovenia about 5000), two third of former Yugoslav market was replaced with western markets etc. But there is the high price of social differences and unemployment (about 12%), which is turning increasing numbers of young people, educated people, into second-rate citizens, as well as many other side effects, all influencing the augmenting unbalanced social structure. One of the basic characteristics of Slovene society is its tendency towards ‘parti-cracy’, a growing ideological intolerance, and due to the small size of the country, the formation of clientages and clans. The once powerful civil movements have been sucked into the various parties and no longer play an important role. The new political ideology, which developed following the proclamation of independence and is shared by the majority of the political parties, could be labeled as a "rush towards Europe". But the course is directed by European Union and proceeds more in accordance with the Latin proverb “sestina lente” (eile mit Weile) "more haste, less speed". Characteristically, it presents the so-called Europe as an internally nondifferential notion, which can generally adapt to particular political interests (following a self-serving principle, for example, educational systems that correspond to a particular 125

line of argumentation would be used, and the same holds true for the relationship between Church and State – adherents of confessional religious subject in schools are alleging as European example which should be following Austria or Italy, opponents France, etc.). In this "rush towards Europe" Slovene politicians are, as always throughout history, overly compliant, even servile, and prepare to make smaller or larger concessions as a sign of "good will": closing duty-free shops, instating visas for Balkan states, signing of the so-called Spanish compromise204, indifference reaction to unofficial or half official demands from Austria about closing atomic nuclear power in Krško, recognizing so called Old Austrian minority, recalling of some AVNOJ decrees and codes or maybe even its basic resolutions and decisions on which federal Yugoslavia was created.

Fig 17. Proceeding from such situation there is also another perception toward European Union which is: persuasion that Slovenia experience unfairness waiting before Europeans door with no clear condition what she has to do enter. Slovenia feels like angranted lover (Amor), who will run out of arrows shooting in seductive EU (Marko Kočevar…

In 1993, Italy, as a condition for not impeding the signing of the Association Agreement between Slovenia and the European Union, demanded different concessions of Slovenia. The key one concerned the property issue of Italian refugees - after World War II - from Istria and the Slovene Primorska (coastal) region (this issue being already resolved with Yugoslavia). The direct Italian demands were initially comprised in the socalled Aquileia Agreement, signed by Secretary of State Lojze Peterle, but refused by the Slovene parliament. In a milder and more general version (the so-called Spanish Compromise, made after the Spanish Intervention), parliament passed the Italian demands in April 1996. Slovenia obligated itself to open the real-estate market after the ratification of the Association Agreement for all those citizens of the EU, who lived in the territory of Slovenia for at least three years (at any time in the past). Even though Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek, as well as President Milan Kučan, interceded on behalf of the Spanish Compromise, they later labeled it as an example of conditioning and extortion (Kučan even did so in his speech before the European Parliament). 126
204

One of the consequences of the newly formed situation within the state was that Slovenes were again faced with dilemmas and situations from the turn of the century or even earlier; this is when they were marginalized, during either the Yugoslav or communist periods, and for which it had appeared that they would never need dealing with again. Relations between the larger neighboring nations (Austrians - or Germans, Italians, Hungarians) and Slovenes, which could be characterized as having been traumatic for the past centuries, are being established anew (or old models in new disguise). Incorporated among these is the extraordinary persistence of regional identities, which in many ways prevents the development of a nation; at the same time there is a revival of former regional centers beyond the present Republic of Slovenia (Graz, Klagenfurt, Trieste, also Wienna in a broader context), which are slowly but reliably becoming gravitational points for a large part of the working force from bordering regions and also having a growing importance in education. The transitional character of the country, its economic periphery, the influence of different cultures and a linguistic endangerment seem permanent features in the historical development.205 In psychological terms, self-assertion should be added, a belief in self-sufficiency and prejudices towards anything different, all of which only strengthened after attaining independence (it is easy to substantiate through historiography, how difficult it was for "the Carniolan mind" to get used to the "different" character of those people from the Prekmurje and Primorska (Coastal) regions, integrated into Yugoslavia after World War I and II; prejudices and stereotypes about regional affiliations proved to be one of the most persistent elements of the psychosocial make-up of Slovenes).

205

Peter Vodopivec: Glavne poteze in stalnice v slovenskem zgodovinskem razvoju in poskus zgodovinarjevega pogleda v prihodnost, Slovenija po letu 1995, razmišljanja o prihodnosti, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana, 1995, pp. 30-37.

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Fig. 18: The map, made by caricaturist Marko Kočevar, ironically stressed this feeling with showing Slovenia as a center of the world. Another discernible syndrome conditioned by history and arising from the lack of state tradition is "snitching" on the opposing political option abroad and the search for an external arbiter for internal conflicts. Where Slovene politicians previously turned to Vienna and Belgrade, they now turn to Brussels.206 This demonstrates that the processes experienced in this state during the last decades are superficial and that the permanent features did not change in their essence after attaining independence. An evaluation of historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia over Slovene Society, the formation and the 10-year existence of the Slovene state, as well as the democratic processes within, are for the moment only transitional, as were the estimates of past situations. A more objective evaluation can be established once Slovene society is integrated in the European Union; what the integration process contributed and how Slovenia will be able to handle the loss of a national state, while it is actually still enduring its puberty, shall only then be clarified. Doubtless, the Slovene State was a tremendous and necessary historical achievement, especially as regarded from the circumstances in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the fact remains that independence was achieved at a time when the classic national state, based on 19th century patterns of the national economy, defense system, foreign policy, proper currency and other attributes ranging to a legitimate aviation company, is in decline in Europe. This is also at a time when the (national) state, at least in the west, no longer represents the determining factor in protecting democratic rights, since these are of course becoming universal.

Fig. 19: It is not possible to say, that in Slovenia is not such awareness and self irony. On this cartoon, titled »Famous« (Mladina…) Slovenia and Croatia are exposed in the time when they were togehther with Bosnia accepted in United Nations. It says: »Go on, numbers 176 and 177, Oh, good boys..« Cartoon also stress on the different psychosocial approach between Slovenia and Croatia - predsident Kučan with a small bench and predsident Tuđman with royal armchair.
206

The most recent instance, but not the only one, was the pursuit for arbitration with the so-called Venice Commission - the "Democracy through Law" commission of the European Council - concerning the election system just before the elections in October 2000. The conflict was instigated by the Prime Minister at the time, who did not agree with - an otherwise perfectly legal - decision of the Parliament.

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New solutions are needed for these new challenges, although it seems that this type of realization hardly affected Slovene social sciences. History is still in great measure evaluated from the viewpoint of a national state, arising from the belief that the Slovene state should be the ultimate goal of successive Slovene generations, even though historiography does not offer empirical proofs for such claims. Historians critical of this sort of approach are labeled as "a-national."207 This sort of claim is of course logical in a political sense, since it offers the possibility of appropriating the so-called "independence capital", be that in an historical sense (demonstrating the "far-sightedness" of particular political forces or individuals in various historical periods) or in view of the current political situation. Scientifically speaking it is also very convenient as it limits research to finding the earliest possible "proofs" justifying a Slovene state-forming mentality. There is no need to take much interest in the broader historical context, various sources can be interpreted "in retrospect", there is no need for comparisons with other and similar nations, and it is possible to avoid confrontation with the determinations of researchers concerned with the social sciences of other nations. However, this of course only occasions putting off a problem that will have to be faced sooner or later anyway.

The evaluation that there is "an extremely loud and influential a-national movement" present in Slovene science, was noted by Dr. Stane Granda), Zgodovinski časopis, 1999, volume 53, No.4, pg.612).

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18. Slovenians and the disintegration of Yugoslavia208
Along with other South Slav nations, the Slovenians settled in the Eastern Alps towards the end of the 6th and at the beginning of the 7th century.

Illustrations: The map of the Slovene (Slav) national territory. In the nationalist romantic imaginations it stretched as far as Vienna even in the seventies of the 20th century. From the early Middle Ages on, their identity was mostly formed within European West, but also by the Eastern- and South-European civilisation circle, which was due to their geographical position at the junction point with the Eastern and Southern Europe.

208

Repe, Božo. Slovenia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia: predavanji na Norwegian university of science and technology, za ISS 27. apr. 2004 in za PEECS 30. apr. 2004. Trondheim, 2004.

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The Freising manuscripts (9th century) were the first writings in ancient Slovene language as well as the earliest record of any Slavic language in Latin script. Three liturgical and homiletics scripts. Christianity was introduced by force, suppressing paganism after 745 when Karantania became an ally of Bavaria and the Franks. Christian religion came from diocese in Salzburg (Austria) and Aquilea (Italy) wit the help of Irish and other Western missionaires, but also from the East, from missionaires from Byzantium through Moravian state. Christianity for the Slovenians retained a firm Westrn imprint, the Westrn religious culture and art associated with it. Cyrillic alphabet did not prevail. First Slovenian book (The Catechism) was printed by protestants in 1551 and in 1584 the Bible was translated. Geographically, the Slovenian territory comprises the Alpine, the Pannonian and the Mediterranean world. The influence of all these cultures is extremely strong, which is evident from the division of Slovenian territory into different regions, from very diverse dialects and strong regional identities. Regions of Slovenia All that made it difficult to develop a unified literary language and a common national identity. In the north, Slovenian ethnical borders were formed within the relation to the Germanic world, in the east to the Hungarian, in the west to the Italian, and in the south to the Croatian world. Of course they were frequently changed (what actually meant that they were reduced): mostly in the north, a little less in the east and hardly at all in the south, where ethnical border remained almost unchanged for centuries. Due to different reasons, particularly economic ones, emigration, and the fascist oppression, the Slovenian population decreased constantly, particularly in the 20th century.209 Political (state) borders were never the same as the national ones. Individual Slovenian territories belonged to either German, Austrian, Hungarian or Italian state formations; during the time of Illyrian Provinces (1809–1813) Slovenian territories even belonged to France and from the year 1918 on also to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Yugoslavia, respectively. Ethnic Slovene Territory Slovenians in Austria-Hungary (1867-1918)

Illirian provinces
209

Slovenci skozi čas (Slovenians through time), Mihelač, Ljubljana 1999, Ilustrirana zgodovina Slovencev (Illustrated History of Slovenians), Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana 1999.

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There was a time, however, when all the Slovenes lived within one state; this was, when according to the Campformio Peace Treaty from 1797, Austro-Hungary got Venetian Slovenia inhabited by the Slovenes instead of Belgium, which the monarchy lost. In 1805, Napoleon annexed these territories to the Kingdom of Italy; however, Austria managed to get them back, but only to lose them permanently after the lost war with Prussia in 1866, which was later confirmed by the plebiscite. The fact that all the Slovenians lived within one state had no special influence on the formation of the national consciousness or the demands for independent national state until the mid 19th century. Only in 1848 a group of Slovenian intellectuals in Vienna expressed a demand to form a Unified Slovenia (an autonomous country within Austria) The map of Unified Slovenia They did not take into account the Venetian Slovenians in the most Westrn part of Slovenian national territory and the Prekmurje Slovenians (the Slovenians living along the river Mura); the latter belonged to the Hungarian part of the monarchy. Even after the World War I, hardly anyone in Ljubljana knew that these people were Slovenians. Some other territories were also missing in these maps (Bela Krajina and the Gorjanci Mountain Ridge) – the territories bordering to Croatia. It is true, however, that that in the first half of the 19th century Illyrism according to which the Slovenians were to abandon their own language and adopt a common South Slav language did not prevail. Some historical researches show that it was a French ambition during the time of Illyrian provinces to form a uniform south Slav (Illyric) nation.210 At the turn of the 20th Century Slovenes were faced with two basic problems: the issue of democracy and the national issue (which political elites usually place in the foreground). The development of democracy was only partially determined by our own selves, in so far as its primary characteristic was the induction of mutual intolerance and the exclusion of those with different opinions, especially in the field of so called »national enemy.211 Slovenian politicians in that time saw the solution of the national question in the so called trialism: the division of Austria Hungary to the German, the Hungarian and the south Slav part, within which the Slovenians were to have an autonomous unit together with the Serbs and the Croats. With the end of Austro-Hungary this idea was dropped. After a short-term, one month long transitional phase in which AustroHungarian South Slav states had their own small state with the seat in Zagreb, the Slovenians became a part of Yugoslavia, within which they remained for over 70 years. The position of the Slovene nation during the individual state formations was usually evaluated "in retrospect" from the standpoint of current political needs, while the newly
Slovenska zgodovina v besedi in sliki (Slovenian history in word and picture), Mladinska knjiga, Ljbljana 2003. 211 The Slovene political mentality developed in its basic elements at the end of the 19th century and grew from the fact that opponents have to be either totally subjugated or forced to be part of the national enemies' camp. This remains a basic characteristic in all three political camps (catholic, liberal and socialist or communist) throughout the political history of the 20th century. The exception is the period of attaining independence during the second half of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. As far as parliamentarism is concerned, only the "fragmentary" development of particular periods from the second half of the 19th century onwards can be discussed. The Slovene parliament, in the modern sense of the word (with a universal franchise and multi-party system), is in operation without intermission for only 10 years as of yet; this is also a time - probably the only one in Slovene history - of "absolute" independence, as before, it had only local significance or it was subordinate to bodies above the national level, as will also be repeated once incorporated in the European Union (more on the subject: Božo Repe: Pravne, politične podlage, okoliščine in pomen prvih demokratičnih volitev" in: Razvoj slovenskega parlamentarizma", Državni zbor Republike Slovenije Ljubljana, 2000 page 26 - 69.
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formed situation was at the same time euphorically praised. This is how after World War I, Austria suddenly became "the jail of nations" even in the eyes of those Slovene politicians and intellectuals who, only a few years prior, claimed to be loyal to it. Illustrations:

The glorified page on Franz Jozef honor for his birthday (Tedenske slike- Weekly Pictures,, August 16, 1916). Picture with the grand- son and patriotic song Got live the Austria. It was similar in all newspapers in the long time of his regime. Till his death and even later – practically till the end of First World War, for the majority of the Slovenes Franz Josef was synonymous for so called “good old times.” - feeling otherwise spread through all empire. Loyalty to Hapsburg Monarchy was one of the basic characteristics of Slovene consciousness, especially expressed among politicians and clergy, but not less at ordinary people. It was systematically built through school system, public life, especially celebrations, holidays, anniversaries etc. 212
212

Vasilij Melik, Božo Repe, Franc Rozman: Zastave vihrajo ( The Flags are Fluttering). Spominski dnevi in praznovanja na Slovenskem od sredine 19. stoletja do danes (selection of illustrations and subtitles Darja Kerec). Modrijan. Ljubljana 1999. The text was originally published in the book Öffentliche Gedenktage in Mitteleuropa, Böhlau Verlag Wien, 1997, edited by Emil Brix and Hannes Stekl).

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Slovenes supported hardly Austro-Hungarian Declaration of War to Serbiaand propaganda was very strong. Serbien muss sterbien, well known motto from postcards and cartoons (published in Hans Weigel, Walter Lukan and Max Peyfuss book Jeder Schuss ein Russ, Jeder Stoss ein Franzos, Edition Christian Brandstätter, Wien 1983). In Slovene oral version this motto was rather changed to even more cahuvinistic way : “Srbe na vrbe”, which means “Hang Serbs to willow trees” (Erhängen Serben um weiden). Such devices were latter in Yugoslavia the subject of many disputes and one of the proofs for Serbian side, that Slovenes were part of occupiers and Serbia with incorporation to The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a matter of fact saved them and of course, that they should be grateful for that, stay in silence and pay the price, economical and political one, for that.

When things changed during the war Austria and Hapsburgs slowly but certainly became antagonist and then the enemy. One of first signes is announcement that omnipotence German bridge to Adriatic coast is rocking. Caroon made my Hinko Smrekar, published in Kurent's album in 1918 shows Slovene farmer, tied like Gulliver, chained on the ground. Tied giant wants to stand up. Over him are passing troops of Germans and their adherents («nemškutarji«), but their carriages and coaches are folling down. The subtitle is: Roar, roar Adriatic see, you was and you will always be Slavic. 134

At the same time you can notice removal from former idols. Slovene solder before the end of the war in 1918 far- sightednessed subtitled propagandistic postcard with portrets of Austrian millitary leaders with comment: “Greatnesses of former Austria« (Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 192.

Very soon later triumphant and ironical feelings are shown like in this obituary, published in satirical journal Kurent in 1918, which says: “After a long, painful disease expired Austria it's dirty soul” Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 201). 135

And variation on the same topic. Finnis Austriae. Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 201).

Slovenian girl is enthusiasticly expects Serbian soldier as a liberator. Pro - Austrian or pro- German feelings became shameful, slightingly named as “avstrijakarstvo” Slovene intellectuals were turned toward France, German language was almost no subject in schools between both World Wars. But on the other side - as shows this caricature from Hinko Smrekar made in 1921, when new, centralistic constitution was accept expectations from new state were great, idealized and naive, there was little knowledge about Serbs and in general about South Slavic nations in new state. 136

In true, Slovenians did not only suffer the negative sides, but were also faced with a positive experience. For example, in the multinational milieu of the Danubian monarchy they were able to form, besides the regional, also a national consciousness; Slovenes acquired political culture and, at least in limited form, became accustomed to parliamentarism. Borders after WWI For the Slovenians, World War I proved to be catastrophic: according to the London treaty of 1915, Italy got the Slovenian coastal region and Istria for its joining the Entente forces; Slovenia thus lost a direct access to the open sea and the port of Trieste. According to the result of the plebiscite in 1920, Carinthia was granted to Austria. The only gain for Slovenia was the Prekmurje region in the east, which was mostly a result of the fear from spreading of bolshevist revolution, due to which the great powers allowed the Yugoslav Army to occupy Prekmurje.

Slovenes in the First Yugoslavia, the ban provinces in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The borders were of administrative nature; parts of Slovenian territory were included into the Croat (the Sava ban dominion) and vice versa, parts of Croatian territory were included into the Slovene (Drava ban dominion).

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Idealising of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia passed quickly, as illustrate another caricature “United Yugoslavs” (Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 223). The idea, according to which they were to become a part of a single Yugoslav nation with a single language, was done with at the beginning or the twenties. The Slovenians got schools in their own language, a university and a kind of non-formal cultural, yet no political autonomy. The change was not only as regards the state, but more so regarding the cultural framework: from the well organised and pedantic Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Slovenians joined another civilisation circle with a strong Balkan tradition, a heterogeneous national and religious structure, and a specific politics, which strived to preserve the Osmanali tradition of “outsmarting”. During World War II, Slovenia was divided among three occupants: the Germans, the Hungarians and the Italians. Occupational zones during WWII The Hungarians and the Italians formally annexed their occupational zones to their respective states. The Germans planned that parts of Slovenia should make a southern border of the Reich; the inhabitants of the frontier regions were deported; the territory was then colonised by the so-called Gottcher Germans. The German plan was that Slovenia should officially become a part of the Reich after it was completely germanised; yet it did not come to it because of the partisan resistance and technical problems.213 Due to the anti-fascist partisan movement, the border with Italy was changed after the war.214 Borders after WWII. Although it was not changed to the extend the Slovenians wanted, the Paris Peace Treaty from 1947 and after that London agreement were much more favourable to them than the agreements from the time after World War I.215 Due to the decisions of the
Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem 1941 – 1945 (Occupational systems in Slovenia 1941 – 1945), Modrijan, Ljubljana 1997. 214 Jože Pirjevec, Milica Kacin-Wohinz: Zgodovina primorskih Slovencev (The history of the Slovenians living on the Coast), Nova revija, Ljubljana 2002. 215 Pariška mirovna pogodba (Paris Peace Treaty), Peace Treaty with Italy, integral text, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana 1997. London agreement
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allied forces according to which Austria was to be preserved within the borders from the time before the Anschluss, Slovenia didn’t get Carinthia and nor did Trieste become the seventh Yugoslav republic, or as suggested by the French, the liberated Trieste region – a small buffer state under the jurisdiction of the United Nations.216 The new border in places where it did not exist before, led to a series of tragicomic situations: in the village Miren near Gorica, for example, the border divided the local cemetery into two halves. When a burial took place the relatives took leave of the deceased in the presence of the border guards by pushing the coffin from one state into the other. And, of course, after World War II, a similar evaluations as Austro-Hungary before befell the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The fact, that despite it being centralistic and nondemocratic in Kingdom of Yugoslavia Slovenians achieved a sort of informal cultural autonomy was forgotten.

Poor, exploited Slovenia (Milan Maver newspaper Delo, September 29, 1986). Cartoon represented Slovenia as hen which would be beat from Yugoslav federation. After disintegration of Yugoslavia and achieving independence a negative thought pattern developed concerning the former state. It was forgotten that Communist Yugoslavia as a winner in WWII made possible that Primorska (coastal) region (i.e. one third of the Slovene population and more than a quarter of the territory) to be joined with Slovenia;, Slovenians were given federal status, a constitution, their own national assembly and other state agencies, and under the specific circumstances of the Communist Party state, implemented the delayed processes of modernization that former elites either could not or wanted not to bring to effect, for example, the agrarian reform, industrialization, separation of Church from State, women's emancipation, a more balanced social structure.217 Socialist Yugoslavia became synonymous with
is international agreement by which the military administration was brought to an end in Zone A and Zone B of Free Trieste Territory. It was signed by the representatives of Italy, Yugoslavia, Great Briatin and USA on 5 October 1954 in London. Yugoslavia and Italy confirmed the existing demarcation, the Italian civil administration was extended throughout zone A, and the Yugoslav throughout Zone B. Guarantees were given for the unhindered return of persons who had formerly held domicile rights on the territories under Yugoslav or Italian administration, Special statute guaranteed for both sides the national rights of minorities. 216 Zbornik Primorske – 50 let (The Anthology of Primorska – 50 Years) , Primorske novice, Koper 1997. 217 More on the subject in abridged form: Božo Repe: Slovenci v XX.stoletju, Katalog stalne razstave Muzeja novejše zgodovine v Ljubljani, Ljubljana, 1999, pp.19-36.

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‘Balkanism’, ‘Byzantinism’, etc. It supposed to be a state, which during the time of its existence, economically and politically limited the Slovenes and prevented their attaining independence, and in a cultural sense kept them on a lower cultural level, i.e. in a different (eastern) cultural circle, one to which the Slovenes were not supposed to belong. This was all the easier since Yugoslavia was a communist, or rather a socialist state and thereby an excellent target for a triple criticism: national, economical and ideological. It was quickly forgotten, that Slovenes believed in Yugoslavia for a long time and they had invested a lot of energy in its planning and development. What were the reasons for such feelings? Slovenians articulated their wish for an independent state for the first time only the second half of the 20th century when the socialist Yugoslavia was about to cease to exist. At that time the centuries long fear from the German and Italian oppression had disappeared. Slovenians perceived the threat of Serb predominance as more threatening than the fear from the former traditional enemies. It is true, that without the external factors, namely the end of the bipolar division of the world and the specific role of Yugoslavia within it, and fall down of communism independence of Slovenia would have hardly been able, but basically the disintegration itself was mainly caused by internal relationships: the economic crisis, the crisis of self-managed socialism and the crisis of the relations between the nations which started in eighties after Tito's death.

Yugoslavia an orphan girl, poor child, is waiting before the draw breed of European fortress. (Milan Maver, Delo, February 20, 1989). General opinion at the end of the eighties in Slovenia was, that it will not be able to enter to European Community as a part of Yugoslavia. That was the point of quarrel with federal center and especially with Serbia. Conflict with Serbia was not conflict of two nationalisms, as it was usually interpreted, but split between two evolutional concepts: Slovenian towards Europe and modernization and Serbian, patriarchal, intorverted and turn to the past. In Brussels over Ljubljana and not over Belgrad was popular phrase at the end of eighties and start of ninghties.

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But all the others in Yugoslavia are chatching her foots when she is nocking ot the European's doors. (Milan Maver, Delo, May 25, 1989. The internal relations in Yugoslavia were legally determined by the 1974 Constitution, which granted individual republics (but not so the minorities) the right to selfdetermination, including the right to secession. The problem was that the Constitution did not determine the proceedings according to which such process was to be carried out. On the constitutional-legal basis, the conflict for changes within Yugoslavia (whose internal organisation seemed to suit no-one) was carried out between 1987 when the discussion on amendments to the Constitution (which were mostly about regulation of economic sphere and were adopted in 1988) started and 1989, when Serbia introduced Constitutional amendments with which it abolished the autonomy of the provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina and thus disrupted Yugoslav legal order, since the position of autonomous provinces was regulated by the federal Constitution. The fragile Yugoslav legal order, which was hardly taken very seriously by anyone, was thus ultimately destroyed. Slovenia was the first of the republics to protect itself against the Serb centralistic pressure by adopting amendments to Slovenian Constitution in 1989. Being convinced, that the next phase of the centralisation of Yugoslavia will be to reduce the rights of the republics it prior to that attempted to prevent the elimination of autonomous status by supporting the Albanians in Kosovo and also to prevent itself on economic field.

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Slovenia, stripped to the nakedness, rest just with coif (national cap) – Milan Maver, Delo, September 29, 1988. With the disintegration of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990 and the parallel emergence of national parties (first in Slovenia), Yugoslavia had no federal party with a Yugoslav programme, which could have a major influence on the entire territory of the federation. The attempt of the federal Prime Minister Ante Marković to influence Yugoslav public opinion through Yugoslav television and by founding of his own party failed. So was the case with the attempt of the army to prolong the existence of the Union of Communists through a party (Movement for Yugoslavia) under its control. The parties, which won the republic elections, all had national programmes. A change of the Constitution would have been required to carry out multi-party federal elections; however, the leaders of the individual republics were not able to reach a consensus about that, so they were not carried out. Slovenia and Croatia opposed the suggested changes since their motto was: one person, one vote that in Yugoslav circumstances would have led to Serb majority. The attitude of individual republics, federal bodies and the Yugoslav Army towards the future of Yugoslavia was formed at the end of 1990 and at the beginning of 1991. In the summer of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia brought in a bill on establishing a confederation. On December 23, 1990, Slovenia decided to become an independent state. Though attacked at home and abroad, the decision was neutral: it did not explicitly suggest secession; it also permitted transformation of Yugoslavia into confederation.

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After national plebiscit in december 1990 discourse with Serbian (Yugoslav) solder is represented completely different as on the previous cartoon from the times of establishment of Yugoslavia when he was great deliverer of the Slovenes. Drunken, brutal solders says: “Lets, go home!” And Slovene girl answered: “Oh don’t be ridiculous!” (Franco Juri, Delo, December 24., 1990). After the plebiscite, the Slovenian leadership started to carry out negotiations about the Slovenian-Croatian model of confederation with the leaderships of other republics. They were unsuccessfully finished in February of 1991, and it was only then that the Slovenian leadership eventually decided that due to the circumstances the plebiscite decision in the sense of attaining independence from Yugoslavia was to be carried out. However, another dilemma had to be solved: a separation based on agreement or a cessation? Slovenia started to make systematic preparations for the latter in all areas. Croatia verbally shared Slovenian viewpoints, yet it made no preparations for the separation. In view of its strong Serb minority, which started to offer resistance to Tudjman, a confederation seemed a dream solution for Croatia. With slight differences in their attitudes, the other republic, as well as the federal bodies insisted on federal status. Apart from being formally committed to federation, Serbia systematically prepared for the implementation of the concept of Great Serbia. Encouraged by Serbia, “referendums” on autonomy status, setting up of independent Serb authorities and rebellions had been going on since the summer of 1990, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia. The situation in Yugoslavia can best be seen from the following table: Positions of Yugoslav republics in negotiations In March and April, after the failed negotiations between the republics, the federal organs tried to take a leading role in solving the crisis again. However, the negotiations between the presidents of individual republics with the president of the federation and the ministry of defense within the federal presidency in March and in April of 1991 were not successful. In the end, Bosnia and Macedonia (Izetbegović and Gligorov) offered a kind of median concept between federation and confederation, yet, it found no support. Riots between the nations and national conflicts in Croatia increased. At the beginning of May, Milošević ultimately gave up the Yugoslav option, since the Yugoslav National Army did not carry out any of the negotiated plans according to which it should have introduced a state of emergency and seized power. Veljko Kadijević, the minister of defense and the leadership of Yugoslav National Army stepped over to the Serb side and agreed to the implementation of the Great Serb concept. The weapons and the military units were silently moved to the borders of “Great Serbia”. Through threats and pressures, international policy attempted to prevent the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Until the end it insisted on preservation of Yugoslavia. If possible, this was to be achieved by negotiations, but also a limited intervention of Marković and the army in order to discipline the two secessionist republics, which they perceived as more dangerous than Milošević seemed acceptable. Even until the end of May of 1991 European Union was willing to give Yugoslavia as much help as it asked for, it was further willing to write off a half of its debts and accept it - after the internal agreement and reform - as a full member of the Union. The intervention of the Yugoslav National Army in Slovenia after the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia and the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis in June of 1991 destroyed any possibility for an internal agreement.

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Innocent Slovenia, supposed to be raped by Yugoslav soldier (Mladina, June 25, 1991) Internal relations only bore significance on one more occasion, namely during the negotiations in Brioni on July 7 and 8, 1991 where the representatives of the federation were present too. With his concept of returning to the positions before June 25 (the day on which Slovenia declared its independence), Marković succeeded only partly. The Brioni declaration was adopted, yet it allowed different interpretations as to what the return to the previous status actually meant. The toughest one meant the annulment of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Yet, the events that followed in summer and autumn of 1991 on the territory of Yugoslavia made such interpretation impossible. After the failed attempt of disciplining Slovenia, Serbia estimated that keeping Slovenia within Yugoslavia would only present an obstacle for the implementation of its option about Great Serbia, therefore a silent Slovene- Serb agreement in Brioni about the withdrawal of the federal army from Slovenia could be reached. The presidency of SFRJ, which was restored for the period of a three-month long moratorium, approved it formally on July 18, 1991. The war in Croatia buried all hopes for the implementation of the “tough” interpretation of the Brioni declaration according to the wishes of federal bodies and the majority of the European Union. A tiny last chance for an agreement between the Yugoslav representatives assisted by the international community was seen in the Hague conference, which started in September of 1991. On the conference, Bosnia and Herzegovina advocated for a confederation, the Macedonians had no clear picture about what they wanted, Croatia, already involved in war, allowed a possibility of a union of sovereign states, whereas Slovenia was only willing to negotiate international recognition and succession. Milošević insisted on “preservation of Yugoslavia”; Marković however was in favour of a reformed federation with certain competences for the federal government. On November 5, 1991 Milošević refused Lord Carrington’s compromise-proposal according to which the republics were to get international subjectivity, yet remain within the economic and customs union. Any further possibility for was thus gone. In December of 1991 Marković resigned. The federal presidency, revived on the grounds of the Brioni declaration was incomplete since the Slovenian representative and shortly afterwards the Croatian too, did not take part in it any longer after the three month moratorium set up by the declaration was over. The Serb block tried to continue its activities within the presidency, however, international bodies denied its legitimacy. At the beginning of December 1991, the Badinter commission formed its final opinion according to which Yugoslavia fell apart and the republics, which so wished and met the required criteria, were to be recognised. After fierce battles behind the scene, European Union decided for recognition of the newly established states. Negotiations between the former republics became a subject of international relations and international legislation. 144

In the context of subsequent wars (after Croatia there were wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia) the thesis was defended according to which the separation of Slovenia and Croatia along with (too early) international recognition of the former Yugoslav republics were to be blamed for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As regards Slovenia, this thesis neglects the fact that the war in Yugoslavia had been systematically prepared for a long time and that during the process of separation of Slovenia national conflicts had already been going on in Croatia. Slovenia couldn’t have prevented them, even if it had stayed within Yugoslavia. Another fact is that Slovenia did everything within its power to reform Yugoslavia and enter European Union as its integral part, before it finally made use of its constitutional right to gain independence. In the then circumstances, forcing Slovenia to remain within Yugoslavia meant nothing less than a demand that the existence and the future of one nation be sacrificed for the illusion that this would prevent fights between other nations. Among others, international recognition stands for the admission of the failure of such policy. What were historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia over Slovene Society? Before the second half od eighties in 20th century Slovenians tried to find solution of the national question in alliance with other nations, particularly the South Slav ones. But on the other side, the Yugoslav federation had never been able to function in the course of its existence without compulsory cohesive measures from outside or internal factors. When these fell away (the decline of socialism and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, the disintegration of the party and of the army) it could not find a democratic alternative for its existence. The problem but also the challenge is, that the process of attaining absolute independence, that is a national state in the traditional sense of the word, was lived out during the past twelve years. The circumstances regarding sovereignty of the state in the fields of defence, the internal legal order, judicature, protection of human rights, protection of environment, etc. are now comprehended in a completely different manner than in the second half of the 19th century when the national states came into existence. But did this circumstances helped the Slovenians to overcome the national romanticism easier than they would have done it otherwise? The new political ideology, which developed following the proclamation of independence and is was shared by the majority of the political parties, could be labeled in three points: 1. Opposition against establishing any institutional ties with the republics of former Yugoslavia and Balkan states. It was general opinion that, such a process might cause the country to slip from its status of state “bordering on” the conflict area to the group of countries that constitute the conflict area. In any proposition (as for example Stability pact) politicians was see the aim that Slovenia has being "pushed" back to the Balkans to help to stabilize and democratize the region. It was quite a shock when in the beginning of 1994, the special envoy of the American President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, who came to Europe to explain the initiative for a Partnership for Peace, classified Slovenia as a "Balkan democracy" together - can you emagine - with Romania, Bulgaria and even Albania.218

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Clintonova odposlanka Albrightova v Sloveniji, Delo, January 15 th, 1984.

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Oh, that Balkan, said Slovenia, self sufficient, clean and reborned girl and slammed the door behind her (Franco Juri, Delo, October 12, 1991). 2. "Rush towards Europe". This course was directed by European Union and proceeded through all nienthis more in accordance with the Latin proverb “sestina lente” (eile mit Weile) "more haste, less speed". Characteristically in Slovenia it presented the so-called Europe as an internally non-differential notion, which can generally adapt to particular political interests (following a self-serving principle, for example, educational systems that correspond to a particular line of argumentation would be used, and the same holds true for the relationship between Church and State – adherents of confessional religious subject in schools are alleging as European example which should be following Austria or Italy, opponents France, etc.). In this "rush towards Europe" Slovene politicians were, as always throughout history, overly compliant, even servile, and prepare to make smaller or larger concessions as a sign of "good will": closing duty-free shops, instating visas for Balkan states, signing of the so-called Spanish compromise219, indifference reaction to unofficial or half official In 1993, Italy, as a condition for not impeding the signing of the Association Agreement between Slovenia and the European Union, demanded different concessions of Slovenia. The key one concerned the property issue of Italian refugees - after World War II - from Istria and the Slovene Primorska (coastal) region (this issue being already resolved with Yugoslavia). The direct Italian demands were initially comprised in the socalled Aquileia Agreement, signed by Secretary of State Lojze Peterle, but refused by the Slovene parliament. In a milder and more general version (the so-called Spanish Compromise, made after the Spanish Intervention), parliament passed the Italian demands in April 1996. Slovenia obligated itself to open the real-estate market after the ratification of the Association Agreement for all those citizens of the EU, who lived in the territory of Slovenia for at least three years (at any time in the past). Even though Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek, as well as President Milan Kučan, interceded on behalf of the Spanish Compromise, they later labeled it as an example of conditioning and extortion (Kučan even did so in his speech before the European Parliament). 146
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demands from Austria about closing atomic nuclear power in Krško, recognizing so called Old Austrian minority, recalling of some AVNOJ decrees and codes or maybe even its basic resolutions and decisions on which federal Yugoslavia was created.

Proceeding from such situation there was also another perception toward European Union which is: persuasion that Slovenia experience unfairness waiting before Europeans door with no clear condition what she has to do enter. Slovenia feels like angranted lover (Amor), who will run out of arrows shooting in seductive EU (Marko Kočevar… 3. In psychological terms, self-assertion should be added, a belief in self-sufficiency and prejudices towards anything different, all of which only strengthened after attaining independence (it is easy to substantiate through historiography, how difficult it was for "the Carniolan mind" to get used to the "different" character of those people from the Prekmurje and Primorska (Coastal) regions, integrated into Yugoslavia after World War I and II; prejudices and stereotypes about regional affiliations proved to be one of the most persistent elements of the psychosocial make-up of Slovenes). Even stronger feeling is toward people from the south, from former Yugoslav republics, relegious fears toward muslims etc.

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The map, made by caricaturist Marko Kočevar, ironically stressed this feeling with showing Slovenia as a center of the world.

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But on the other side, it is not possible to say, that in Slovenia is not such awareness and self irony. On this cartoon, titled »Famous« (Mladina…) Slovenia and Croatia are exposed in the time when they were togehther with Bosnia accepted in United Nations. It says: »Go on, numbers 176 and 177, Oh, good boys..« Cartoon also stress on the different psycho-social approach between Slovenia and Croatia - predsident Kučan with a small bench and predsident Tuđman with royal armchair.

Because of geographical image of Slovenia hen is one of its symbols. But You can explain it also as naive, a little slow mind, typical animal which is waiting for its destiny. This cartoon was created at the end of the eighties by Mat'kurja – one of the first domestic internet servers which is still operating on the web. As a matter of fact, on the whole, Slovenia underwent a successful transition and it continues to make progress (nowadays bgp. for example, is more than 15 000 dolars, Yugoslavia was in all country less than 3000 and in Slovenia about 5000), two third of former Yugoslav market was replaced with western markets etc. But there is the high 149

price of social differences and unemployment. One of the basic characteristics of Slovene society is its tendency towards ‘parti-cracy’, a growing ideological intolerance, and due to the small size of the country, the formation of clientages and clans. The once powerful civil movements have been sucked into the various parties and no longer play an important role. Fears and expectations from EU The result of the referendum about entering the European Union in 2003 (89,7%) shows that Slovenians strongly believe in their future in EU. With its strong national minorities in the neighbouring countries, Slovenia needs a Europe without borders. There are also economical, security and other reasons for entering. But on the other side Slovenians are again faced with dilemmas and situations from the turn of the 19 th century or even earlier; this is when they were marginalized and for which it had appeared during the Yugoslav periods,that they would never need dealing with again. Relations between the larger neighboring nations (Austrians - or Germans, Italians, Hungarians) and Slovenes, which could be characterized as having been traumatic for the past centuries, are being established anew (or old models in new disguise). There is, for example, a revival of former regional centers beyond the present Republic of Slovenia (Graz, Klagenfurt, Trieste, also Wienna in a broader context), which are slowly but reliably becoming gravitational points for a large part of the working force from bordering regions and also having a growing importance in education. 220 Slovenia will also present the southern border of the EU with Croatia. This is a territory, which was physically not divided by a border in the former Yugoslavia. When the border was finally set after independence, it was - by agreement of both countries - a soft one; now it will become the hard Schengen border. The transitional character of the country, its economic periphery, the influence of different cultures and a linguistic endangerment seem permanent features in the historical development of Slovenians and they will be faced with them in the future too.221 There is no concrere solution how to confronte this dilemmas, but gereall feeling (onestly more at political elites than ordinary people) that this will be done in EU easier as it was ever in history.

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Božo Repe: Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia for Slovene Society, Österreichische Osthefte, Heft.1/2, Wien, 2001, page 5 – 26. 221 Peter Vodopivec: Glavne poteze in stalnice v slovenskem zgodovinskem razvoju in poskus zgodovinarjevega pogleda v prihodnost, Slovenija po letu 1995, razmišljanja o prihodnosti, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana, 1995, pp. 30-37.

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19. Slovenians and the border question222
Along with other South Slav nations, the Slovenians settled in the Eastern Alps towards the end of the 6th and at the beginning of the 7th century. From the early Middle Ages on, their identity was mostly formed within European West, but also by the Eastern- and South-European civilisation circle, which was due to their geographical position at the junction point with the Eastern and Southern Europe. Geographically, the Slovenian territory comprises the Alpine, the Pannonian and the Mediterranean world. The influence of all these cultures is extremely strong, which is evident from the division of Slovenian territory into different regions, from very diverse dialects and strong regional identities. All that made it difficult to develop a unified literary language and a common national identity. In the north, Slovenian ethnical borders were formed within the relation to the Germanic world, in the east to the Hungarian, in the west to the Italian, and in the south to the Croatian world. Of course they were frequently changed (what actually meant that they were reduced): mostly in the north, a little less in the east and hardly at all in the south, where ethnical border remained almost unchanged for centuries. Due to different reasons, particularly economic ones, emigration, and the fascist oppression, the Slovenian population decreased constantly, particularly in the 20th century. 223Political (state) borders were never the same as the national ones. Individual Slovenian territories belonged to either German, Austrian, Hungarian or Italian state formations; during the time of Illyrian Provinces (1809 – 1813) Slovenian territories even belonged to France and from the year 1918 on also to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Yugoslavia, respectively. There was a time, however, when all the Slovenes lived within one state; this was, when according to the Campformio Peace Treaty from 1797, Austro-Hungary got Venetian Slovenia inhabited by the Slovenes instead of Belgium, which the monarchy lost. In 1805, Napoleon annexed these territories to the Kingdom of Italy; however, Austria managed to get them back, but only to lose them permanently after the lost war with Prussia in 1866, which was later confirmed by the plebiscite. The fact that all the Slovenians lived within one state had no special influence on the formation of the national consciousness or the demands for independent national state until the mid 19th century. Only in 1848 a group of Slovenian intellectuals in Vienna expressed a demand to form a Unified Slovenia (an autonomous country within Austria), whereby they did not take into account the Venetian and the Prekmurje Slovenians (the Slovenians living along the river Mura); the latter belonged to the Hungarian part of the monarchy. Even after the World War I, hardly anyone in Ljubljana knew that these people were Slovenians, which is also evident from the maps of the national territory dating from this time. Some other territories were also missing in these maps (Bela Krajina and the Gorjanci Mountain Ridge) – the territories bordering to Croatia. It is true, however, that that in the first half of the 19th century Illyrism according to which the Slovenians were to abandon their own language and adopt a common South Slav language did not prevail. Some historical researches show that it was a French ambition during the time of Illyrian provinces to form a uniform south Slav (Illyric) nation.224 At the turn of the century Slovenes were faced with two basic problems: the issue of democracy and the national issue (which political elites usually place in the foreground). The development of democracy was only partially determined by our own
REPE, Božo. Les Slovenes et la question des frontieres européennes. V: PÉCOUT, Gilles (ur.). Penser les frontieres de l'Europe du XIXe au XXIe siecle: élargissement et union: approches historiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, str. 341-346. 223 Slovenci skozi čas (Slovenians through time), Mihelač, Ljubljana 1999, Ilustrirana zgodovina Slovencev (Illustrated History of Slovenians), Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana 1999. 224 Slovenska zgodovina v besedi in sliki (Slovenian history in word and picture), Mladinska knjiga, Ljbljana 2003.
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selves, in so far as its primary characteristic was the induction of mutual intolerance and the exclusion of those with different opinions, especially in the field of so called »national enemy .225 Slovenian politicians in that time saw the solution of the national question in the so called trialism: the division of Austria Hungary to the German, the Hungarian and the south Slav part, within which the Slovenians were to have an autonomous unit together with the Serbs and the Croats. With the end of Austro-Hungary this idea was dropped. After a short-term, one month long transitional phase in which AustroHungarian South Slav states had their own small state with the seat in Zagreb, the Slovenians became a part of Yugoslavia, within which they remained for over 70 years. The idea, according to which they were to become a part of a single Yugoslav nation with a single language, was done with at the beginning or the twenties. The Slovenians got schools in their own language, a university and a kind of non-formal cultural, yet no political autonomy. The change was not only as regards the state, but more so regarding the cultural framework: from the well organised and pedantic Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Slovenians joined another civilisation circle with a strong Balkan tradition, a heterogeneous national and religious structure, and a specific politics, which strived to preserve the Osmanali tradition of “outsmarting”. For the Slovenians, World War I proved to be catastrophic: according to the London treaty of 1915, Italy got the Slovenian coastal region and Istria for its joining the Entente forces; Slovenia thus lost a direct access to the open sea and the port of Trieste. According to the result of the plebiscite in 1920, Carinthia was granted to Austria. The only gain for Slovenia was the Prekmurje region in the east, which was mostly a result of the fear from spreading of bolshevist revolution, due to which the great powers allowed the Yugoslav Army to occupy Prekmurje. During World War II, Slovenia was divided among three occupants: the Germans, the Hungarians and the Italians. The Hungarians and the Italians formally annexed their occupational zones to their respective states. The Germans planned that parts of Slovenia should make a southern border of the Reich; the inhabitants of the frontier regions were deported; the territory was then colonised by the so-called Gottcher Germans. The German plan was that Slovenia should officially become a part of the Reich after it was completely germanised; yet it did not come to it because of the partisan resistance and technical problems.226 Due to the anti-fascist partisan movement, the border with Italy was changed after the war.227 Although it was not changed to the extend the Slovenians wanted, the Paris Peace Treaty from 1947 and after that London agreement were much more favourable to them than the agreements from the time after World War I.228 Due to the decisions of the allied forces according to
The Slovene political mentality developed in its basic elements at the end of the 19th century and grew from the fact that opponents have to be either totally subjugated or forced to be part of the national enemies' camp. This remains a basic characteristic in all three political camps (catholic, liberal and socialist or communist) throughout the political history of the 20th century. The exception is the period of attaining independence during the second half of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. As far as parliamentarism is concerned, only the "fragmentary" development of th particular periods from the second half of the 19 century onwards can be discussed. The Slovene parliament, in the modern sense of the word (with a universal franchise and multi-party system), is in operation without intermission for only 10 years as of yet; this is also a time - probably the only one in Slovene history - of "absolute" independence, as before, it had only local significance or it was subordinate to bodies above the national level, as will also be repeated once incorporated in the European Union (more on the subject: Božo Repe: Pravne, politične podlage, okoliščine in pomen prvih demokratičnih volitev" in: Razvoj slovenskega parlamentarizma", Državni zbor Republike Slovenije Ljubljana, 2000 page 26 - 69.
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Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem 1941 – 1945 (Occupational systems in Slovenia 1941 – 1945), Modrijan, Ljubljana 1997. 227 Jože Pirjevec, Milica Kacin-Wohinz: Zgodovina primorskih Slovencev (The history of the Slovenians living on the Coast), Nova revija, Ljubljana 2002. 228 Pariška mirovna pogodba (Paris Peace Treaty), Peace Treaty with Italy, integral text, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana 1997. London agreement is international agreement by which the military administration was brought to an end in Zone A and Zone B of Free Trieste Territory. It was signed by the representatives of Italy, Yugoslavia, Great Briatin and USA on 5 October 1954 in London. Yugoslavia and Italy confirmed the existing demarcation, the Italian

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which Austria was to be preserved within the borders from the time before the Anschluss, Slovenia didn’t get Carinthia and nor did Trieste become the seventh Yugoslav republic, or as suggested by the French, the liberated Trieste region – a small buffer state under the jurisdiction of the United Nations.229 The new border in places where it did not exist before, led to a series of tragicomic situations: in the village Miren near Gorica, for example, the border divided the local cemetery into two halves. When a burial took place the relatives took leave of the deceased in the presence of the border guards by pushing the coffin from one state into the other. Slovenians did get the status of a republic in the new, federal Yugoslav state and along with it the right of self-determination, including the right of separation from Yugoslavia. This is what the Slovenians appealed to when they attained independence in 1991.230 In the neighbouring Italy, attainment of independence led to a wish for revision of the borders, however, the idea fortunately did not predominate. Another problem is the question of the border with Croatia – particularly at the sea – which still remains unsolved although both countries signed an agreement, according to which Slovenia was to get a free access to the open sea. For the time being the Croatian parliament rejects this agreement. Slovenians articulated their wish for an independent state for the first time in the second half of the 20th century when the socialist Yugoslavia was about to cease to exist. At that time the centuries long fear from the German and Italian oppression had disappeared. Slovenians perceived the threat of Serb predominance as more threatening than the fear from the former traditional enemies. Before that, they tried to find solution of the national question in alliance with other nations, particularly the South Slav ones. The belated process of attaining absolute independence, that is a national state in the traditional sense of the word, was lived out during the past ten years. The circumstances regarding sovereignty of the state in the fields of defence, the internal legal order, judicature, protection of human rights, protection of environment, etc. are now comprehended in a completely different manner than in the second half of the 19th century when the national states came into existence. In some way this helped the Slovenians to overcome the belated national romanticism easier than they would have done it otherwise. Also the result of the referendum about entering the European Union shows that. With its strong national minorities in the neighbouring countries, Slovenia urgently needs a Europe without borders. However, joining European Union brings new dilemmas and challenges. As regards the border, Slovenia will present the southern border of the EU until Croatia becomes a member too. This is a territory, which was physically not divided by a border in the former Yugoslavia. When the border was finally set, it was - by agreement of both countries - a soft one; now it will become the hard Schengen border. By abolishing other borders, it will be much easier to maintain contact with the national minorities, but at the same time the Slovenians will be confronted with the dilemmas they already faced at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century: namely, how to survive squeezed between the Germanic and the Romanic world and how to harmonize the regional identity, which will become increasingly important, with the national one and how to provide long term survival of the nation.231

civil administration was extended throughout zone A, and the Yugoslav throughout Zone B. Guarantees were given for the unhindered return of persons who had formerly held domicile rights on the territories under Yugoslav or Italian administration, Special statute guaranteed for both sides the national rights of minorities. 229 Zbornik Primorske – 50 let (The Anthology of Primorska – 50 Years) , Primorske novice, Koper 1997. 230 Od sanj do resničnosti. Razvoj slovenske državnosti (From dreams to reality. The development of Slovenian Statehood). Arhiv Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2001 (Božo Repe: Slovenia from Wartime federal Unit Over Post War Yugoslav Republic Until Independent State, page 121- 207). 231 Božo Repe: Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia for Slovene Society, Österreichische Osthefte, Heft.1/2, Wien, 2001, page 5 – 26.

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20. Slovenes and their national position in 20th Century232
Slovenes are faced with two basic problems in modern history: the issue of democracy and the national issue (which political elites usually place in the foreground). The development of democracy was only partially determined by our own selves, in so far as its primary characteristic was the induction of mutual intolerance and the exclusion of those with different opinions.233 The position of the Slovene nation during the individual state formations was usually evaluated "in retrospect" from the standpoint of current political needs, while the newly formed situation was at the same time euphorically praised. This is how after World War I, Austria suddenly became "the jail of nations" even in the eyes of those Slovene politicians and intellectuals who, only a few years prior, claimed to be loyal to it. Illustrations: After World War II, a similar fate befell the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although here situation was something different. Namely, resistance movement and also allies didn’t recognize dismemberment of Yugoslavia and annexation of occupying territories to enemy states, at the end of the war there was compromise between Tito and predsident of royal government Ivan Šubašič, so the criticism was turned toward inside problems - political system and national relation-ships. Naturally, a negative thought pattern developed concerning the former state; even after the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, which became synonymous with ‘Balkanism’, ‘Byzantinism’, etc. It was a state, which during the time of its existence, economically and politically limited the Slovenes and prevented their attaining independence, and in a cultural sense kept them on a lower cultural level, i.e. in a different cultural circle, one to which the Slovenes were not supposed to belong. This was all the easier since Yugoslavia was a communist, or rather a socialist state and thereby an excellent target for a double criticism: national as well as ideological. It is already forgotten, that Slovenes believed in Yugoslavia for a long time and they had invested a lot of energy in its planning and development. But on the other side, the Yugoslav federation had never been able to function in the course of its existence without compulsory cohesive measures from outside or internal factors. When these fell away (the decline of socialism and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, the disintegration of the party and of the army) it could not find a democratic alternative for its existence. From this experience is originate the fear and opposition against establishing any institutional ties with the Balkan states. It is general opinion that, such a process might cause the country to slip from its status of state “bordering on” the conflict area to the group of countries that constitute the conflict area. In any proposition (as for example Stability
REPE, Božo. Slovenes and their national position in the 20th century. Slovak foreign policy aff., Spring 2003, vol. 4, no. 1, str. 57-62. 23. REPE, Božo. Slovenia: from communism toward democracy 1980-2000. Slov. stud., 2000, vol. 22, n. 1/2, str. 91-100. 233 The Slovene political mentality developed in its basic elements at the end of the 19th century and grew from the fact that opponents have to be either totally subjugated or forced to be part of the national enemies' camp. This remains a basic characteristic in all three political camps (catholic, liberal and socialist or communist) throughout the political history of the 20th century. The exception is the period of attaining independence during the second half of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. As far as parliamentarism is concerned, only the "fragmentary" development of particular periods from the second half of the 19th century onwards can be discussed. The Slovene parliament, in the modern sense of the word (with a universal franchise and multi-party system), is in operation without intermission for only 10 years as of yet; this is also a time - probably the only one in Slovene history - of "absolute" independence, as before, it had only local significance or it was subordinate to bodies above the national level, as will also be repeated once incorporated in the European Union (more on the subject: Božo Repe: Pravne, politične podlage, okoliščine in pomen prvih demokratičnih volitev" in: Razvoj slovenskega parlamentarizma", Državni zbor Republike Slovenije Ljubljana, 2000 page 26 - 69.
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pact) politicians see the aim that Slovenia has being "pushed" back to the Balkans to help to stabilize and democratize the region. It was quite a shock when in the beginning of 1994, the special envoy of the American President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, who came to Europe to explain the initiative for a Partnership for Peace, classified Slovenia as a "Balkan democracy" together - can you emagine - with Romania, Bulgaria and even Albania.234 Changes in Croatia and Serbia in the last time, accompanied with proposals of Western politicians about creation some sort of association of Balkan states caused new similar anxiety. In Slovenia, critical assessment of the national position in different periods slow in forming, and it is even slower in becoming a part of the historical consciousness. Here I am referring to the acknowledgement that Slovenes did not only suffer the negative sides, but were also faced with a positive experience. For example, in the multinational milieu of the Danubian monarchy they were able to form, besides the regional, also a national consciousness; Slovenes acquired political culture and, at least in limited form, became accustomed to parliamentarism. They achieved a sort of informal cultural autonomy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, despite it being centralistic and nondemocratic. Communist Yugoslavia rendered it possible for the Primorska (coastal) region (i.e. one third of the Slovene population and more than a quarter of the territory) to be joined with Slovenia; and last but not least, Slovenes were given federal status, a constitution, their own national assembly and other state agencies, and under the specific circumstances of the Communist Party state, implemented the delayed processes of modernization that former elites either could not or wanted not to bring to effect, for example, the agrarian reform, industrialization, separation of Church from State, women's emancipation, a more balanced social structure.235 What differentiates the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s from the previous historical periods is the simultaneousness of the two processes, i.e. the gradual democratization, which ended in the installment of a multi-party system and the fight for national emancipation which ended with the formation of the Slovene state.236 Namely, in earlier periods the development of democracy does not always correspond with the current position of the Slovene nation; it is often even stands in opposition to progress in resolving the national issue (as I mentioned before: in centralistic kingdom of Yugoslavia they have made enormous cultural progress including establishing first university which Austria didn’t allowed in all the time of its existence, communistic Yugoslavia successful solved the question of Western border etc). Among the political elites and factors of development in the 80s there were, in fact, differences concerning priorities. The League of Communists, for example, was quick to find common ground with the opposition as regards Yugoslavia, but much slower as to the issue of democratization. The majority of alternative movements, in part also the League of Socialist Youths, placed democratic civil rights before the national issue. The Slovene Democratic Alliance and some other parties conceded the same importance to both issues.237 Differences were existent even after Demos (Democratic opposition) came to power in the spring of 1990, since it was evident that a part of the political forces primarily wished to consolidate their position in power, take control over the social capital, while independence would follow later. Nonetheless, it can be assessed that the political gravitation in Slovenia at the time leaned towards the
Clintonova odposlanka Albrightova v Sloveniji, Delo, January 15 th, 1984. More on the subject in abridged form: Božo Repe: Slovenci v XX.stoletju, Katalog stalne razstave Muzeja novejše zgodovine v Ljubljani, Ljubljana, 1999, pp.19-36. 236 Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, Aleš Gabrič, Božo Repe: The Repluratization of Slovenia in the 1980s (with an Introduction by Dennison Rusinow), The Donald W. Treadgold Papers No.24, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, February 2000. 237 Koga voliti? Programi političnih strank in list na pomladnih volitvah v Sloveniji, Ljubljana, March 1990, Jugoslovanski center za teorijo in prakso samoupravljanja Edvard Kardelj, Ljubljana, 1990. See also: Nastajanje slovenske državnosti, Slovensko politološko društvo, Ljubljana 1992.
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simultaneousness of both processes. In Yugoslavia, generally speaking, a strong opposition to both processes is discernible; and as regards international circumstances, the western forces, especially the USA, supported democratization but were against secession.238 Choosing in between both processes they were prepare to sacrifice democracy for geostrategical interests and they allowed to Yugoslav president Ante Marković so called limited intervention with army in Slovenia (which changed to the real war). The independent Slovene state was a result of political and social changes in the 1980s. These took place in the context of a global crisis of communism, disintegration of the bipolar division of the world, disintegration of the Soviet Union and a deep political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia, as well as a crisis in the relationships among the different nations within the state. Independence would not have been possible without these external changes and likewise, the internal process of democratization would also have been very different. Incorporated among the basic internal characteristics, upon which Slovenes themselves could influence, was a relatively open political scene which enabled a circulation of ideas and meetings between those in power and those in opposition, a strong civil society, supremacy of a reformist movement within the Communist Party and a high level of consent concerning basic national issues. The processes of social democratization and of national emancipation were tightly intertwined. This situation enabled a smooth transition from the one-party to a multi-party system and successful preparations for attaining independence. Consensus between the socialist government and the opposition was settled upon through a confederation status, a fact that is nowadays all too often forgotten. Even when Demos came to power the evaluation of a confederation as the maximum achievement possible under such circumstances did not alter. It was only after the Yugoslav National Army attacked Slovenia that the standpoint and situation shifted. Following the proclamation of independence, there was a continuance of shifts in the Slovene political sphere, polarization was re-established and parties continued to fall apart and merge. This process is ongoing already more than a decade. The 10-year economic balance demonstrates that, on the whole, Slovenia underwent a successful transition and it continues to make progress (nowadays bgp. for example, is more than 10 000 dolars, purchasing or buying power even more, about 14 000 at the end of Yugoslavia was in all country less than 3000 and in Slovenia about 5000), two third of former Yugoslav market was replaced with western markets etc. But there is the high price of social differences and unemployment (about 12%), which is turning increasing numbers of young people, educated people, into second-rate citizens, as well as many other side effects, all influencing the augmenting unbalanced social structure. One of the basic characteristics of Slovene society is its tendency towards ‘parti-cracy’, a growing ideological intolerance, and due to the small size of the country, the formation of clientages and clans. The once powerful civil movements have been sucked into the various parties and no longer play an important role. The new political ideology, which developed following the proclamation of independence and is shared by the majority of the political parties, could be labeled as a "rush towards Europe". But the course is directed by European Union and proceeds more in accordance with the Latin proverb “sestina lente” - "more haste, less speed".
The USA held this position until the final collapse of Yugoslavia, most decisively in the spring of 1991. American Secretary of State James Baker had, only a few days before the proclamation of Slovene independence in Belgrade on June 21, 1991, told Slovene representatives that the USA wishes to retain the unity of Yugoslavia and that they will not recognize the independence of Slovenia, nor would any other country do differently, but that they wish to help with the democratization of Yugoslavia (Note of the discussion between the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kučan and James Baker III, Secretary of State of the USA, Belgrade, June 21st, 1991, Arhiv Predsedstva Republike Slovenije, see also Warren Zimmermann: Origins of a Catastrophe, Random House, New York 1996, p.71).
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Characteristically, it presents the so-called Europe as an internally non-differential notion, which can generally adapt to particular political interests (following a self-serving principle, for example, educational systems that correspond to a particular line of argumentation would be used, and the same holds true for the relationship between Church and State – adherents of confessional religious subject in schools are alleging as European example which should be following Austria or Italy, opponents France, etc.). In this "rush towards Europe" Slovene politicians are, as always throughout history, overly compliant, even servile, and prepare to make smaller or larger concessions as a sign of "good will": closing duty-free shops, instating visas for Balkan states, signing of the so-called Spanish compromise239, indifference reaction to unofficial or half official demands from Austria about closing atomic nuclear power in Krško, recognizing so called Old Austrian minority, recalling of some AVNOJ decrees and codes or maybe even its basic resolutions and decisions on which federal Yugoslavia was created. One of the consequences of the newly formed situation within the state was that Slovenes were again faced with dilemmas and situations from the turn of the century or even earlier; this is when they were marginalized, during either the Yugoslav or communist periods, and for which it had appeared that they would never need dealing with again. Relations between the larger neighboring nations (Austrians - or Germans, Italians, Hungarians) and Slovenes, which could be characterized as having been traumatic for the past centuries, are being established anew (or old models in new disguise). Incorporated among these is the extraordinary persistence of regional identities, which in many ways prevents the development of a nation; at the same time there is a revival of former regional centers beyond the present Republic of Slovenia (Graz, Klagenfurt, Trieste, also Wienna in a broader context), which are slowly but reliably becoming gravitational points for a large part of the working force from bordering regions and also having a growing importance in education. The transitional character of the country, its economic periphery, the influence of different cultures and a linguistic endangerment seem permanent features in the historical development.240 In psychological terms, self-assertion should be added, a belief in self-sufficiency and prejudices towards anything different, all of which only strengthened after attaining independence (it is easy to substantiate through historiography, how difficult it was for "the Carniolan mind" to get used to the "different" character of those people from the In 1993, Italy, as a condition for not impeding the signing of the Association Agreement between Slovenia and the European Union, demanded different concessions of Slovenia. The key one concerned the property issue of Italian refugees - after World War II - from Istria and the Slovene Primorska (coastal) region (this issue being already resolved with Yugoslavia). The direct Italian demands were initially comprised in the socalled Aquileia Agreement, signed by Secretary of State Lojze Peterle, but refused by the Slovene parliament. In a milder and more general version (the so-called Spanish Compromise, made after the Spanish Intervention), parliament passed the Italian demands in April 1996. Slovenia obligated itself to open the real-estate market after the ratification of the Association Agreement for all those citizens of the EU, who lived in the territory of Slovenia for at least three years (at any time in the past). Even though Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek, as well as President Milan Kučan, interceded on behalf of the Spanish Compromise, they later labeled it as an example of conditioning and extortion (Kučan even did so in his speech before the European Parliament).
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Peter Vodopivec: Glavne poteze in stalnice v slovenskem zgodovinskem razvoju in poskus zgodovinarjevega pogleda v prihodnost, Slovenija po letu 1995, razmišljanja o prihodnosti, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana, 1995, pp. 30-37.

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Prekmurje and Primorska (Coastal) regions, integrated into Yugoslavia after World War I and II; prejudices and stereotypes about regional affiliations proved to be one of the most persistent elements of the psychosocial make-up of Slovenes). Another discernible syndrome conditioned by history and arising from the lack of state tradition is "snitching" on the opposing political option abroad and the search for an external arbiter for internal conflicts. Where Slovene politicians previously turned to Vienna and Belgrade, they now turn to Brussels or (in dilemma to join Nato or not) to Washington.241 This demonstrates that the processes experienced in this state during the last decades are superficial and that the permanent features did not change in their essence after attaining independence. An evaluation of historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia over Slovene Society, the formation and the 10-year existence of the Slovene state, as well as the democratic processes within, are for the moment only transitional, as were the estimates of past situations. A more objective evaluation can be established once Slovene society is integrated in the European Union (and perhaps Nato); what the integration process contributed and how Slovenia will be able to handle the loss of a national state, while it is actually still enduring its puberty, shall only then be clarified. Doubtless, the Slovene State was a tremendous and necessary historical achievement, especially as regarded from the circumstances in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the fact remains that independence was achieved at a time when the classic national state, based on 19th century patterns of the national economy, defense system, foreign policy, proper currency and other attributes ranging to a legitimate aviation company, is in decline in Europe. This is also at a time when the (national) state, at least in the west, no longer represents the determining factor in protecting democratic rights, since these are of course becoming universal. New solutions are needed for these new challenges, although it seems that this type of realization hardly affected Slovene social sciences. History is still in great measure evaluated from the viewpoint of a national state, arising from the belief that the Slovene state should be the ultimate goal of successive Slovene generations, even though historiography does not offer empirical proofs for such claims. Historians critical of this sort of approach are labeled as "a-national."242 This sort of claim is of course logical in a political sense, since it offers the possibility of appropriating the so-called "independence capital", be that in an historical sense (demonstrating the "far-sightedness" of particular political forces or individuals in various historical periods) or in view of the current political situation. Scientifically speaking it is also very convenient as it limits research to finding the earliest possible "proofs" justifying a Slovene state-forming mentality. There is no need to take much interest in the broader historical context, various sources can be interpreted "in retrospect", there is no need for comparisons with other and similar nations, and it is possible to avoid confrontation with the determinations of researchers concerned with the social sciences of other nations. However, this of course only occasions putting off a problem that will have to be faced sooner or later anyway.

The most recent instance, but not the only one, was the pursuit for arbitration with the so-called Venice Commission - the "Democracy through Law" commission of the European Council - concerning the election system just before the elections in October 2000. The conflict was instigated by the Prime Minister at the time, who did not agree with - an otherwise perfectly legal - decision of the Parliament. 242 The evaluation that there is "an extremely loud and influential a-national movement" present in Slovene science, was noted by Dr. Stane Granda), Zgodovinski časopis, 1999, volume 53, No.4, pg.612).

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21. The instruction of History and History Textbooks in Slovenian History243
The instruction of history and the history textbooks from Austro-Hungarian times till the socialist Yugoslavia (1774 -1945) History is, or better should be, one of the main school subjects. It should help young people to find orientation within time and place, give them knowledge about the life in different historical periods and thus help them create their national awareness and selfconfidence, which is particularly important for small nations. The instruction of history, and especially history textbooks as the most tangible evidence of what is being taught, also reflects the political and ideological state of each respective society (including the relations between the nations in case of multinational formations). Throughout its history, Slovenia changed several systems and states, whereby gaining its independence and the transition into a multi-party parliamentary system had the strongest impact upon its social structure. The purpose of this paper is to show how these processes influenced the instruction of history and history textbooks. Following the reforms of Maria Teresia, history was introduced as a compulsory subject into Slovenian schools during the 1770s, however, it lost a great deal of its importance during the 19th century when it was usually taught together with geography. The AustroHungarian authorities feared liberal ideas might enter the school through teaching of history, therefore “the choice of historical subjects taught in schools was strictly controlled from the top.”244 During the time of the so-called Illyrian Provinces, history enjoyed a more important role: the first history textbooks, though in German, appeared (one of the very first authors was the Slovenian historian and dramatist, an adherent of the Slovenian circle of Enlightenment Valentin Vodnik who for some time taught history in the grammar school in Ljubljana). It was not until the mid-fifties of the 19th century that the first history textbooks in Slovenian language were published. Until 1918, history was taught together with geography; its content was based on the history of the dynasty and glorification of the Habsburg monarchs, as well as on political and military history. The textbooks had to be approved by the imperatorial Ministry for the Worship of God and Instruction and were published by publishing houses and associations. 245 In 1918, when the short-lasting (only one month long) transitional state formation of AustroHungarian South Slavs, called The State of the Slovenians, the Croats and the Serbs was founded, the principle was introduced according to which the “sole language of instruction in all primary and secondary schools is to be Slovenian. In case there are enough children of other nationalities required to attend school, minority schools will be established, with the state language as a compulsory subject”.246 A general network of
The instruction of History and History Textbooks in Slovenian History (Studia Historica Slovenica, 1 2005 - in print). 244 Janja Bizjak, Primerjava učbenikov zgodovine za osmi razred osnovne šolein četrti letnik gimnazihe (A Comparison of History Textbooks for the 8th Grade of Primary School and the 4th Grade of Grammar School during the Post-war Period (1945 – 1985), Department for History, Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana, 1998) 245 The last textbook before World War II (and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary) for the senior classes of secondary schools was published by the Društvo slovenskih profesorjev (The Association of Slovenian Professors) (F. Komatar, M.Pirc: Zgodovina novega veka od westfalskega miru do današnjih dni - History of the New age from the Peace of Westfall till the Present Time), Ljubljana, 1912 246 A decree of the Commission for Education and Religion, Official Gazette of the National government of SHS in Ljubljana, Volume 1, No 20, November, 1918
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the new educational system (and within it, the instruction of history) was formed in the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes and later in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. A transition from lower elementary to either higher elementary school (leading to diverse vocational schools) or secondary modern and grammar school was possible. Secondary modern schools graduates were able enrol into technical faculties, whereas grammar school graduates were able to enrol into any faculty.247 Established in 1919, the University of Ljubljana introduced history as one of its fundamental studies at its very beginning. This fact allowed for the scientific and professional development of history and a continuous education of numerous generations of Slovenian historians, which consequently led to a change of instruction of history in schools. The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenians laid down the general conditions for the culture and education and among others determined that “all schools were to give moral education and develop civil awareness in the sense of national unity and religious tolerance” and that “throughout the state, the instruction is to be based on the same foundations, whereby it should be adapted according to the local circumstances.”.248 This way the authorities of the Yugoslav kingdom attempted to create a uniform Yugoslav nation. The attempt failed in spite of the strong centralist pressure.249 Slovenia managed to acquire a kind of informal cultural and to certain extend educational autonomy. In spite of that, the new ideological issues (Jugoslavphilia and the new dynasty of Karadjordjević) had to be celebrated by the school system and instruction of history in schools too. The former Germanophilia was replaced by the Jugoslavphilia; history (and geography) in schools paid a lot of attention to the history of the South-Slav nations. Within this framework a rise of the Slovenian (often mythological) history which followed the development of Slovenian historiography between the two wars could be observed. The most noticeable foreign influence was that of France (with emphasis on sociological issues); the consequence was that more information on economy and social circumstances was included in the instruction of history. It was also modernised didactically; a number of new history textbooks appeared which could be compared to those from other, more advanced European states. Brotherhood and unity, the class awareness and Yugoslav socialist patriotism through the instruction of history and history textbooks in the People’s and Socialist Republic of Slovenia (1945 - 1985) During World War II, two of the three occupying forces (the German and the Hungarian) attempted to carry out a quick magyarisation, whereas the Italians allowed the use of Slovenian language for instruction for a transitional period, yet its contents had to be adapted to the Italian fascist system. During the war, the partisan authorities started to build up a new educational system, including a new assessment of history and its instruction. The post-war education was based on the partisan tradition.250 Not only did history become one of the basic universal education subjects, it was also the most important subject – apart from Slovenian
Ervin Dolenc, Bojan Godeša, Aleš Gabrič: Slovenska kultura in politika v Jugoslaviji (Slovenian Culture and Politics within Yugoslavia), Historical Resources, Modrijan, Ljubljana 1999 p. 14. 248 Constitution of the Kingdom SHS (adopted on St. Vitus Day on June 21, 1929, Official Gazette of the provincial government for Slovenia, No 87/192. 249 For more information see: Charles Jelavich., South Slav Nationalism, Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914, Columbus, Ohio: OSU Press, 1990 (the Serbo-Croat edition by Globus, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1992) and Ervin Dolenc: Kulturni boj : slovenska kulturna politika v Kraljevini SHS 1918-1929 (The Cultural Battle: Slovenian Cultural Politics within the Kingdom SHS 1918-1929). Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1996. 250 Aleš Gabrič: Slovenska agitpropovska kulturna politika (The Slovenian Agitprop Cultural Policy) 19451952, Borec 7/8, p. 504.
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Language – influencing the formation of national awareness, as well as the formation of the new Yugoslav socialist patriotism, most frequently expressed through the slogan “brotherhood and unity.” Not only the instruction of history, the entire school system, as well as the Pioneer and the Youth Organisation as a part of it were used to create the personality cult of the new Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. So for example the first letter to be taught to children in the post-war reading books was T for Tito, which was only then followed by vowels. The entire concept was based on presenting the national liberation fight, the suffering and heroic deeds of the children during the war. A new ideological orientation was only given to the contemporary history, whereas the instruction, the curricula and the textbooks for older periods of history remained unchanged until the beginning of the seventies.251 Until the mid-seventies, a lot of attention was also paid to the social, economic and cultural issues.252 During the seventies, after the defeat of the party “liberalism”, the winning political forces increased the pressure on the school; they needed the instruction of history to prove the correctness of “Tito’s way” since the end of the war on. Ideologisation of instruction and of history cannot be proven only by the textbooks and the curricula, it is also evident from the school celebrations and the established school rituals (the Relay of the Youth, the Mail of the Little Courier), further from the names of schools which were called after important events or personalities from the national liberation war and revolution and who all the pupils had to know well.253 According to Dr. Peter Vodopivec, “the Yugoslav and the Slovenian authorities were more than ever before changing the history in schools into an instrument of ideological and political indoctrination with the consequence that discrepancy between the quality standard of history in schools and professional historiography was bigger than at any other time after World War II.”254 The teaching contents was generalised beyond recognition into sociologised patterns and definitions about the battle between social classes. The underlying principle was the theses according to which one should in advance identify the laws of the society to be then able to change the society accordingly (theoretical foundations came from the classics of Marxism: Marx, Engels and Lenin, history was being changed by the working class and its avant-garde, the Communist Party). On the other hand, history as a unique and unrepeatable “story” about a certain time and place with all its coincidences and controversies was almost completely neglected. “Directed education” in the eighties, failed attempts of centralisation of Yugoslav education, reduction of the Slovenian and an increased amount of the Yugoslav topics in the programmes of school history At the beginning of the eighties, the so called “directed education” was introduced into Slovenian schools (after the war, extensive school reforms or “reforms of the reforms” were quite common, virtually every generation experienced at least one in the course of their schooling). The purpose of directed education was to reduce the differences between the schools, particularly between vocational and technical schools and grammar schools, which had a kind of bourgeois stigma. Through the reform, the former two were united into one type of school. Among other measures aiming at equalisation was also the abolishment of the secondary school final examination (the Matura). These
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Roman History for example was covered by an excellent textbook by Leopold Petauerj (History I for Grammar and Similar Secondary Schools, Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 1969) 252 Božo Repe: Nekaj pogledov na prenovo kurikulov pri pouku zgodovine (Some Observation on the Renovation of History Curriculum), Zgodovinski časopis, 1996, No 2, p. 291. 253 Franc Rozman, Vasilij Melik, Božo Repe: Zastave vihrajo. Spominski dnevi in praznovanja na Slovenskem od sredine 19. stoletja do danes, (The Flags are Fluttering, Memorial Days and Celebrations in Slovenian Territory from the mid-19th Century till Present Time) Modrijan, Ljubljana 1999. 254 Peter Vodopivec: Ob predlogu novega programa pouka zgodovine v gimnazijah (Comments on the Suggested Curriculum for History in Grammar Schools) , Zgodovinski časopis 1994, No 2., p. 253-258.

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changes also affected the instruction of history. Towards the end of the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties, a draft for a new history syllabus designed by the academician Bogo Grafenauer was rejected. Based on the classical grammar school curricula, it promoted a more neutral and balanced presentation of history in schools. The whole scope of consequences of this reform for the grammar schools and also for other levels of education became evident at the beginning of the eighties. Due to the introduction of new subjects into the curricula, as well as because at that time a five day week was introduced into schools, the number of hours for history was reduced. In vocational schools, the number of hours for history was reduced too. A further reduction of hours for history and also for other humanistic subjects happened in 1990, when secondary technical schools and vocational schools were separated again. History as a separate subject completely disappeared from vocational schools; instead an integrated subject “social studies” was introduced. The new subject was an extremely awkward combination of selected (mostly political) topics and was taught by teachers with different qualifications. In education, the eighties were characterised by a huge conflict between Slovenia and Yugoslavia, caused by the renewed attempts for centralisation of educational system. This was the second attempt (after the one in the sixties) for uniform regulation of the Yugoslav school system. There were several reasons for that: one was the wish of a part of Yugoslav political leadership (particularly the Serb one) to reinforce the Yugoslav idea, particularly in view of the fact, that the 1974 Constitution granted more competences to individual republics and common education lent itself for this purpose most suitably. Another reason was that through the common educational foundations, the Serb authorities tried to get the education in Kosovo under their control again (in 1987, when the common educational foundations were partly or completely adopted by other republics, they partly succeeded in this attempt). The third reason was completely rational and was supported by the most influential Yugoslav scientists (i.e. the worldfamous physicist Pavle Savić who publicly attacked the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts): according to them, a somewhat transparent and unified school system allowing greater mobility of pupils between the republics and modernisation of instruction should be set up. However, according to Leopoldina Plut – Pregelj,255 the pedagogical aims, the needs of the children, the transformation of traditional schools into modern ones, individualisation of instruction, the development of critical thinking, and encouragement for permanent learning were neglected. In the introduction to the draft of the common core curriculum, the following aims were stated: education for brotherhood and unity and for a life together within the self-managed, socialist Yugoslavia, Marxist-based education whose result was to be a many-sided developed socialist personality; the development of the Yugoslav socialist patriotism; the care for the revolutionary traditions of the national liberation fight and also the regard for the cultural heritage of the Yugoslav nations and nationalities. Many of the above stated objectives were to be implemented through the instruction of history in schools, but there was hardly any discussion on this issue. It was the instruction of literature that caused opposition against the common core curriculum. The common core curriculum was based on the views of the ZKJ (Union of Communists of Yugoslavia), particularly the 11th congress held in 1978. A newly established Conference for Advancement of education in SFRJ (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) started to prepare the common core curriculum through the republic and provincial Institutions for Education and diverse boards and commissions. The common
Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, et.al, The Repluralisation of Slovenia in the 1980s, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers, The Henry M. Jackson School of International studies, University of Washington, Seattle 2000, p.66 (in further text: The Repluralisation of Slovenia in the 1980s)
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core curriculum was to be prepared for the pre-school education, for the primary school and for the first two years of the secondary school. The corresponding activities started in November 1980, when the proposal was discussed by the Board of Education of SRS (Socialist Republic of Slovenia), and were finished in 1986. In the meantime, five different proposals for the common core curriculum (of which not all have been entirely preserved) were prepared.256 Up to the forth version, the proposals were mainly discussed by the experts; the corresponding articles were published in specialist journals. In 1983 however, the fourth version became a subject of public discussion in Slovenia which was then followed by a heated polemics in the rest of Yugoslavia. The public discussions carried out on the common core curriculum so far showed there were some reservations about it, yet, neither the experts nor the specialist bodies refused it explicitly; they were willing to agree to it if certain corrections were undertaken.257 In April and May of 1983, the daily papers reported on the topic, including the negative standpoints of individual commissions.258 In spite of the reservations, the interrepublic/provincial commission for the education reform adopted the proposal for the common core curriculum on 8 July (whereby there was no explicit opposition of the Slovene representative in the commission). A report about that, which was brought by the daily newspaper Delo,259 caught the attention of two eminent Slovenian poets, Ciril Zlobec and Janez Menart. Whereas Menart started to gather information and materials, Zlobec reacted immediately by criticising the common core curriculum for literature for not including enough Slovenian literature. According to him, the proposal was “anti-cultural, antieducational and anti-ethical”260 (in the journal Sodobnost he later published the entire syllabus with the titles of literary works the pupils were supposed to learn about). After Zlobec, another Slovenian author Tone Partljič publicly announced a discussion about the common cores in the Slovenian Association of Authors (DSP); in September Menart presented an even more critical analysis of the common core curriculum for literature and compared it with the then existing curriculum. His analysis showed that 70% of available time would be spent for teaching Yugoslav literature and only 30% for Slovenian literature what he named forced assimilation.261 The article provoked violent reactions and polemics. On its gathering in September 19, the DPS (Association of Authors of Slovenia) addressed a protest statement to the Central Committee of the ZKS (Union of Communists of Slovenia) and the representatives of the media. The authors assessed the proposal as an expression of centralist and unitarian tendencies whose purpose was to interfere with the rights lying within the exclusive jurisdiction of individual nations and republics, thus presenting the first step towards further centralisation of education. They demanded The Republic Committee for Education should break off the negotiations and the process of harmonisation of the common core curriculum; instead, special interdisciplinary commissions for the areas covered by the core curriculum
For more information on this topics see Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj in the chapter Slovenia's Concerns About the Proposed Yugoslav Core Curriculum in the 1980s ( The Repluratization of Slovenia in the 1980s); Nevenka Sreš, Skupna programska jedra (Common Educational Core (Graduation theses, University of Mariboru, Faculty of Pedagogics Maribor, Department of History), Maribor 1996 (further: Sreš, Skupna programska jedra – Common Core Curriculum); Janez Menart, Slovenec v Srboslaviji (A Slovenian in Srboslavia), Knjižna zadruga, Ljubljana 2001 (further Menart, Slovenec v Srboslaviji). 257 It was not until March 1983 that the Expert Board of SRS for Education expressed a more negative attitude, saying it would not agree to the common cores if its suggestions would not be considered. 258 Naših razgledi (24 June 1983, p. 310--312) published a negative opinion of the subject comissiona and of the evalvation commission for the Slovene language and literature for the primary and secondary schools. 259 There are still a number of open issues regarding common education 8, Delo, 9 July, 1983, p. 3 260 My breath was taken away too, Delo, Književni listi, 11. 8. 1983, p. 7. 261 Skupna programska jedra in slovenstvo (The Common Core Curricula and the Slovenian Identity), Delo, 1. 9. 1983, p. 7-9; Menart, Slovenec v Srboslaviji (A Slovenian in Srboslavija).
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should be established; further they demanded Slovenia should call off its cooperation in the Conference of Institutions for Advancement of Education within SFRJ.262 Other associations of specialists and artists (ranging from i.e. Association of Archaeologists to diverse institutions and organisations including the University expressed their protest. At the end of September, also the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SAZU) adopted a protest statement, but according to Menart it was so moderate that people hardly noticed it.263 In spite of that the SAZU declared that it completely “rejects the proposed common core curriculum in its present form.”264 On 10 September, the Slovenska matica (Slovenian Literary Society) called in a special meeting, although it also had other topics on the agenda.265 As a consequence of the protest of authors and of the general public, as well as of diverse polemics (in the following months about 250 articles on the common core curriculum appeared, a number of round tables and meetings were held on different levels), but also due to severe attacks on Slovenia from other Yugoslav settings, the Slovenian official policy gradually started to change its initially favourable and later neutral position. At the beginning there was another inconvenience regarding the relations with Belgrade. The impression Zlobec gained in a discussion with a member of the Presidency of SFRJ Sergej Kraiger shortly after the publication of his letter was, that the politicians became somehow reconciled with the common core curriculum. Allegedly, the latter said to him: “Why are you raising this issue? As if Belgrade didn’t condemn us as nationalists because of the finances and the economy anyway!”266 Following the statement of the authors, the meeting called in by the member of the Central Committee Andrej Marinc adopted a statement, according to which the warnings against the impending centralism expressed by the authors were justified. The meeting also suggested the discussions between the republics were to be continued, but they were to be tolerant and conducted in such a way that it would not cause misunderstandings and doubts regarding constitutional rights of each individual nation regarding education.267 In an interview for the Belgrade TV in November, Marinc defended the right of each republic to control its educational system, in particular as regards history and literature. A Similar viewpoint was taken by the president of the Republic Committee of the SZDL (Socialist Association of the Working People) Franc Šetinc. 268 The Slovenian Executive Council assured it would persist on the standpoint according to which education was in charge of each individual nation (yet it did not oppose a further discussion on the common core curriculum and at the same time assured it would not allow any nationalistic outbreaks). Slovenian politics obviously accepted and to some extend approved of the policy towards Belgrade, yet it also regarded it as being too emotional; at the same time it was against the removal of Slovenian representatives from the discussion on the common core curriculum. In May 1984, the other republics and provinces declared their views on the common core curricula. They all approved of them (except for Kosovo, where the curricula for mother tongue with literature and music were refused). Only in Slovenia, the Board for
Protestna izjava (Protest Statement), enclosed to: Sreš, Common Core Curriculum, also published in Menart: Slovenec v Srboslaviji A Slovenian in Serboslavia), p. 102--105. 263 Menart, Slovenec v Srboslaviji (A Slovenian in Srboslavia), p. 109. 264 The SAZU standpoint on the common core curriculum for education in the SFRJ. The Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit II (the fund of RK SZDL). 265 Tine Hribar, Slovenci kot nacija (Slovenians as a Nation), ČZP Enotnost, Ljubljana 1994, p. 246, 247. 266 Menart, Slovenec v Srboslaviji (A Slovenian in Srboslavia), p. 84. 267 Informacija s pogovora o problematiki programskih jeder vzgoje in izobraževanja v SFRJ, 26. 9. 1983 (Information on the discussion on common core curriculum in SFRJ). The Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, the dislocated unit I (fund: CK ZKS – Central Committee of the Union of Communists). 268 A Discussion by Franc Šetinc in the meeting of the Presidency of the federal conference SZDL (Socialist Association of the Working People) of Yugoslavia on 3 November 1983,when the common core curricula for the primary and secondary (directed) education were discussed. The Archives of RS, the dislocated unit II (the fund of RK SZDL).
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Education refused them on the grounds it had no “legal basis” to adopt them. In spite of that it was concluded that the work would be continued in the fields where no agreement could be reached, which particularly applied to the group responsible for mother tongue and literature.269 As it proved, the story about the uniform educational system (uniform instruction and within this context also the patriotic education and instruction of history) ended as a failure, as did the one between the two world wars. Seven years prior to the disintegration of Yugoslavia it showed how little the Yugoslav nations had in common. Paradoxically, it was history in schools which in spite of the failure of the common core curriculum implemented its main aims (education for the brotherhood and unity and life together within the self-managed, socialist Yugoslavia, Marxist oriented education, development of the Yugoslav socialist patriotism, preservation of the revolutionary traditions of the national liberation war) most faithfully. As will be proven later, the authors of history textbooks also implemented the concept of reduction of Slovenian history for the benefit of the Yugoslav.

History textbooks and their contents Following the publication of history textbooks from World War II till the 1980s it can be established, that until the end of the eighties, the system of publishing textbooks in Slovenia used to be similar as in other parts of Yugoslavia and also in other socialist countries. The concept was: one textbook for one subject. The textbook was more or less a practical implementation of the curriculum; the number of the hours in the class matched the number of the topics the teacher was supposed to discuss in one lesson. Special bodies appointed by the expert councils for education270 assessed the suitability of a textbook according to the professional, ideological, and other aspects. The main difference between Slovenia and the other republics of former Yugoslavia lied in the fact, that in Slovenia even in that time the textbooks were published by several different publishing houses, however, most of them by the publishing house Državna založba Slovenije.271 In the 1980s, the publishing houses gradually started to take over the incentive regarding the contents of the textbooks, but on the other hand there were suggestions according to which such development was to be stopped, and the publishing of the textbooks centralised and supervised. Even the then Assembly (the Parliament) of the Republic of Slovenia discussed this issue in 1987 but refused the centralistic suggestions. Immediately after World War II, no textbooks for contemporary history of the nations of Yugoslavia were available at all (the textbooks covering earlier periods were not as problematic for the authorities, so they were only gradually replaced by newer ones – some of them were used until the beginning of 1960s – when the last of those were finally replaced too). The authorities considered the pre-war textbooks on contemporary history as useless; in spite of that the temporary materials produced after the war were based on the pre-war textbooks, though the ideological concept was a different one: the stress was on equality of all Yugoslav nations and not like before the war, on “the three
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Branimir Nešović, Jedra lahko razumemo tudi drugače 8 (The common core could be interpreted in a different way), Delo, 19. 5. 1984, str. 10. 270 The parameters assessed included the »compliance of the textbook with the curriculum, scientific accuracy of the contents, ideological aspect in the interpretation, methodical-didactical presentation, appropriate language and terminology; in Pravilnik o pripravi in potrjevanju učbenikov in učil (Regulations on preparation and approval of textbooks and other means of instruction), Uradni list SRS, (Official Gazette SRS No 36, September 19, 1986) 271 Apart from Državna založba Slovenije, the textbooks were also published by the publishing houses Mladinska knjiga, Cankarjeva založba, Obzorja, Tehniška založba Slovenije and possibly by some others.

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different tribes of the same nation” (the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenians). For the general history, translations of the Russian textbooks were used. The first translated textbook was The History of the New Age 1798 – 1870 (A. V. Jefimov, Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana, 1946). The textbook deals with the history of Europe and Northern America towards the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the period around the Vienna Congress until the March Revolution of 1848, as well as the political development of Europe (including its colonies) in the second half of the 19th century. According to the criteria of general historiography, the book is not bad at all, yet it cannot be classified as a typical textbook. After the introduction of the eight year compulsory school272, the first complex textbook for general history for the 8th class of primary school appeared only in 1958.273 Within the range of one hundred years, the general history was dealt with in chronological order: the revolutionary year of 1848 in Europe and the Yugoslav nations, the revolutionary era of 1849-1870, the era of imperialism and the Yugoslav nations, the time between the two world wars, the national liberation fight of Yugoslav nations and the building of socialist Yugoslavia. The textbook ends with a chapter on the formation of the socialist Yugoslavia, the nationalisation, the first five-year economic plan, the Inform biro and the description of the role of Yugoslavia in the world, particularly in view of its endeavour for peace. More than 70% of the textbook is devoted to Yugoslav history and the national liberation fight of the Yugoslav nations (of which 19, 6% was devoted to Slovenian history). 274 Based on the amended syllabus, the second version of the textbook was published a decade later. It dealt with the 1950s (though the last decade was handled very briefly).275 The textbook had five chapters (The Storm of World War I, In the Shadow of the Paris Treaty, Fascism Getting Ready for a New War, World War II, and In the Sign of the Nuclear Force). The concept was the same as in the first textbook (chronological order of events, and a combination of the world, the Yugoslav and the national history, ending with anti-colonial and non-aligned movements, and on national level with the adoption of the 1963 Constitution). 65% of the contents was devoted to Yugoslav and only 5, 4% to the Slovenian history.276 The first comprehensive textbook for contemporary history for the 4th grade of grammar school was only published in the second half of the 1960s, although the draft materials277 were used several years earlier. Its concept was similar to the textbook for primary schools, yet with somehow greater emphasis on the general history of (34% was devoted to Yugoslav history, out of which 14% dealt with Slovenian topics). All of the

In 1946, a uniform seven year compulsory school was introduced in Jugoslavia. For most Yugoslav republics this was a progress, but not so for Slovenia who had an eight year long compulsory school – though not a uniform one – before the war. They only gained what they already had before in the 1950s. 273 Ferdo Gestrin, Jože Hainz, dr. Metod Mikuž, Zgodovina za VIII. razred osnovne šole (History for the 8th Grade of Primary School), Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana 1958 (The cover of the book showed a picture of the partisan painter France Mihelič, titled the Partisan Camp). 274 Janja Bizjak, A Comparison of History Textbooks fort he 8th grade of Primary School and the the 4th Grade of Grammar School in the Post-war Period (1945-1985), Department of History, Faculty of Arts,Ljubljana 1998), p. 15. 275 Dr. France Škerl Zgodovina 8 (History 8), Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 1966 (the picture on the cover shows a painting by the partisan painter Andrejević – Kun Đorđe from 1946, titled Kolona) 276 Janja Bizjak, Primerjava učbenikov zgodovine za osmi razred osnovne šole in četrti letnik gimnazije v povojnem obdobju (1945-1985) (A Comparison of History Textbooks for the 8th Grade of Primary School and the 4th grade of Grammar School in the Post-war Period 1945-1985) , Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana 1998), p. 20. 277 Dr. Metod Mikuž: Zgodovina za četrti razred gimnazij (History for the 4th Grade of Grammar School), Ljubljana 1967 (picture on the cover: Božidar Jakac: Slovenski delegati odhajajo v Jajce (Slovenian delegates leaving for Jajce)).

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textbooks mentioned above were rather boring; their emphasis was mainly on political and military history, and even more on the history of national liberation fight. During the seventies, a new textbook Zgodovina 8 (History 8) appeared. It was also used during the 1980s.278 The textbook covered the October revolution, as well as the world and Yugoslav issues until the 1970s. The proportion between the history of Yugoslavia (and within it that of Slovenia) and the general history was approximately 60% to 40%; the emphasis was evidently on the common Yugoslav history. Didactically, the textbook was far more advanced than the one from the sixties (it had marginal notes, illustrations underlying the text, glossary of terms), but the print was black and white. The textbook was divided into subchapters, one for each lesson. The well-worn concept of ideological-political history emphasising the labour and revolutionary movement, the national liberation fight and revolution reached its peak. The textbook for secondary schools published in the 1980s was written in a similar way,279 the difference being that the move towards Yugoslav history was even more obvious, since it contained only about 7% of Slovene history.280 Instruction of history and textbooks after the introduction of multi-party system and attaining of independence of Slovenia After elections in 1990, the new Demos authorities were also inclined towards centralisation and supervision of the textbooks through one or at most two publishing houses281, yet it was not possible to stop the process started in the eighties, among others because of the pressures from the existing publishing houses and the quick emergence of some new ones, which saw a good opportunity to earn money through publishing textbooks. Yet in spite of that, it still took »five years for the Slovenian textbook market to develop.« For the first time, the supply of the textbooks exceeded the demand in 1986, »when for a change no article could be found in Slovenian newspapers, complaining about the fact that the textbooks for some subjects were sold out even before the beginning of the academic year. Only two years earlier, the publishers publicly swore it did not pay to reprint the textbooks in September for the few hundred pupils who remained without them. «282 In the past academic year most teachers could choose between at least two alternative textbooks for each subject and class; some subjects even had more than two to choose from. The changes in the field of textbook publishing followed the school reform which started in the first half of the nineties. Even after the changes were introduced, the textbooks had to (and still have to) be approved by a special body: the Council for General Education, which has special commissions for textbooks.283 The expert council is not a state body, it is the highest expert body for education in the country and it includes
Branko Božič, Tomaž Weber, Zgodovina za osmi razred (History for the 8th Grade), Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 1977 (the painting on the cover: Ismet Mujezinivić: Vstaja – the Uprising). 279 Marija Kremenšek-Štefan Trojar, Zgodovina 4 (History 4), Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 1984. The textbook had a neutral cover, however, this fact did not reflect its true content. 280 Janja Bizjak, Primerjava učbenikov zgodovine za osmi razred osnovne šole in četrti letnik gimnazije v povojnem obdobju (1945-1985) (A Comparison of History Textbooks for the 8th Grade of Primary School and the 4th Grade of Grammar School between 1945-1985), Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana 1998, p. 20 281 Ranka Ivelja: Šola - velike in pomembne spremebe (School - Big and Important Changes); an interview with the Slovenian Ministry of Education Dr. Peter Vencelj, Dnevnik, September 17, 1990. 282 Dr. Miha Kovač, Dr. Mojca Kovač Šebart: Učbeniki v globalni družbi: nekaj nastavkov k metodologiji primerjalnega raziskovanja (Textbooks in Global Society: Some Thoughts on the Methodology of Comperative Research), typescript, p. 27 283 The last regulations on approval of textbooks came into force in 2002.
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representatives of all institutions concerned with education. Before they are approved, the textbooks have to undergo a reviewing procedure in order to establish whether they comply with the curricula, whether they are didactically suitable and illustrated accordingly. The school reform brought an end to the principle of the subject teaching orientation and introduced the principle of aim orientation. The teachers and also the textbook authors were given a greater freedom regarding the extend and the emphasis they wanted to give to individual topics. Pluralisation in the field of the textbooks was followed by the emergence of numerous small and middle large publishing houses, which started to publish textbooks. Apart from the textbooks, a series of additional materials were produced (i. e. diverse teaching aids, additional exercises, transparencies, video cassettes, atlases, teacher handbooks, etc.), which were according to certain criteria included into the list of the so called recommended literature. Some of them did not get any formal approval and just tried to gain their place in the market.284 With the introduction of the secondary school leaving examination (Matura), the publishing of textbook literature and handbooks started to expand. Not only publishing houses, also the pupils themselves and individual schools started to publish them. At the moment we can speak about a real hypertrophy of the textbooks in Slovenia. A keen competition in this market is above all to the detriment of smaller publishers, since the big publishers, which arose from the former state publishing houses used to have a monopolistic position and still possess a network of bookshops which presents a big advantage for them. In spite of the price limitation, the textbooks are still very expensive. The Ministry of Education tries to relieve the financial pressure for the parents by introducing the so called textbook funds, first for the primary and then for the secondary schools. The Ministry thus finances the purchase of textbooks for schools, which in return lend them to pupils for a small fee. The advantage of such book funds is that the financial burden of the parents is reduced, and the disadvantage that the textbooks in such funds are not replaced fast enough, i. e. after five years or even at longer intervals. The consequence is that the textbooks of lesser quality remain in use for a long period of time although better ones exist in the market. Another disadvantage is that the pupils have to return the textbooks after the end of the academic year, which does not allow them to make use of one of the basic pedagogic principles, namely putting additional notes in the textbooks, underlining, etc. As to the changes in the contents of the textbooks, I will try to illustrate them on the example of the subject history since I took part in the process of changing the curricula for primary and secondary schools as the head of the corresponding commission. In addition I am the author of some history textbooks. In terms of ideological pressures by the new political forces which came into power after 1990, history was probably the most exposed subject of all. Also the experts themselves displayed a strong will for change; so the reform was started as early as in 1990. However, the pressure from the outside, also from the teachers themselves, was strongly simplified: the former class contents (the history of labour movement, the history of the liberation war and of social revolution) were simply to be replaced by a story on »Slovenian national rise«, a story about the tortured Slovenian nation, oppressed by everyone, always striving to establish its own state, yet prevented to do so until 1991.

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Another pressure was to replace the former »partisan« truth by the »home-guard« truth, without any attempt to balance the historic account of what happened in the past. The third pressure came from the Catholic Church (when preparing new history textbooks, we had some wearisome meetings with its representatives; till the last moment they tried to prevent the approval of the new history curriculum for the grammar schools, which followed the principle of lay school). This pressure was a result of the Church’s aspiration for the recatolisation of Slovene society, in accordance with the belief that only a Catholic can be a good Slovenian and that the Church is to have a special role in state schools. Consequently, the history is to be interpreted as the Church sees it. The fourth pressure from the side of the public and some teachers was to expunge or at least restrict the »unpleasant« episode of the Yugoslav idea and state, to reduce the contents on the history of other South Slav nations and Russia, which should bring Slovenia back to the »civilised« environment of the Middle and Western Europe, where Slovenia had allegedly belonged in the past. My personal view is that none of the above mentioned tendencies prevailed, although several other interest groups (the home-guard, The League of Combatants, members of the revolutionary organisation TIGR, survivors of the concentration camps and others) tried to influence the contents of the textbooks. After the break-through with the new curricula, the situation became easier for the textbook authors too, although they were often subjected to public criticism, even in the Parliament. There are no major differences between diverse textbooks, apart from different stresses in the contents (in some of them cultural issues are more emphasized, in others there is more stress on political and military history, etc.). The first textbook of contemporary history based on the new syllabus and modern concepts was published in 1993.285 It was printed in colours and luxuriously produced; following the syllabus, it brought more life and culture, also humour (for example caricatures). For the first time the issues of collaboration during the war, the revolution and post-war events (particularly the liquidations of home guards, which the earlier textbooks did not mention at all) were treated in a more differentiated way. Other textbooks adopted a similar approach.286 A comparison with the textbooks of western European countries and USA textbooks show, that Slovenian history textbooks (and textbooks in general) do not lag behind
Branimir Nešović, Janko Prunk, Zgodovina za 8. razred osnovne šole (History for the 8th Grade of Primary School), Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 1993 (By that time DZS had already been transformed into a joint-stock company with private capital, yet it still retained its former priviledged status at publishing textbooks). 286 Božo Repe, Naša doba (oris zgodovine 20. stoletja) (The Present Time – An Outline of History of the 20th Century), history textbook for the 4th grade of grammar school, DZS, Ljubljana 1995 (reprinted in 1996); Božo Repe: Sodobna zgodovina: zgodovina za 4. letnik gimnazij (Contemporary History: history for the 4th grade of grammar school) Modrijan, Ljubljana 1998 (second edition in 2000, third edition in 2002); Ervin Dolenc, Aleš Gabrič. Zgodovina : učbenik za 4. letnik gimnazije (History: textbook for the 4th grade of grammar school), DZS, Ljubljana 2002; Ana Nuša Kern, Dušan Nećak, Božo Repe:Naše stoletje: zgodovina za 8. razred osnovne šole (Our Century: History for the 8th Grade of Primary school), Modrijan, Ljubljana 1997 (six reprints until 2003, the last one for the nine-year primary school); Ervin Dolenc, Aleš Gabrič , Marjan Rode, Koraki v času : 20. stoletje : zgodovina za 8. razred. DZS, Ljubljana, 1997 (Steps in Time: 20th Century: History for the 8th grade). (reprint in 1998, 1999, 2002 – for the nine-year primary school).
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them. Another interesting point is that we managed to move into the markets of former Yugoslavia, both as renovators of the curricula and as printers of the textbooks. A question remaining open is to what extend the textbooks influence a better quality of instruction. According to researches conducted about the formation of historical conscience, not very much: most influential is the oral (family) tradition, which is followed by the word of the teacher, and then by diverse biographic books and films and then finally by the textbooks. It is our estimation that after ten years of changes and the new generation of textbooks and other resources, the quality of history instruction has improved, though not very much.

Conclusion: In spite of the strong centralistic tendencies, Slovenia managed to secure its own educational system. Giving most emphasis to the socialist patriotism, brotherhood and unity, the national liberation fight and the revolution, the instruction of history and the textbooks followed the general Yugoslav patterns; due to its self-managed socialism and non-alignment, Yugoslavia was presented as the state with the allegedly best system in the world. The consequence was the pupils were instilled with a biased view of the world. It was not that Slovenian history was not neglected, but some issues were not given enough emphasis. In the ten odd years of Slovenian independence, the instruction of history and history textbooks came closer to the more developed European states. However, a tendency towards an uncritical and isolated presentation of the Slovenian history as a continuous yearning for its own state, “the Slovenian national rise” which reached its culmination with attainment of independence could be observed. By joining European Union, Slovenia is facing a new question which the school historiography has not yet thought about much, namely how after the Austro-Hungarian, the Royal Yugoslav, the socialist Yugoslav and finely the “pure” Slovenian identity to impart the new European identity to pupils.

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22. The impact of historical enemy images within education287
In East and South-east European textbooks there is a strong presence of stereotypes and matrices about historical enemies. Although research results show that the formation of collective memory and enemy images is most strongly influenced by the personal and family experience, by the media and only then by the school (teacher instructions, textbooks), they have a particular important role in education, especially in teaching subjects like history, sociology, ethics and society, and also literature. The History Education Committee,288 led by dr. Christina Koulouri organized seven regional workshops289 , each with a different location and theme, to analyze and compare school history textbooks and curricula. The content of the textbook workshops consisted partially of responses to a questionnaire290 that was circulated prior to the workshop.291 Preliminary analyses 292 of textbooks (particularly of the ones used in history classes) shows that, “it will require years, if not decades, of dedicated work to combat the damage done by historical stereotyping, to establish the values of democracy, tolerance and open-minded historical enquiry, and to achieve reconciliation in those places where today hostility and misunderstanding prevail.”293 The presentation of enemy and of the "other" side is particularly rude and awful in Serbia, where the textbooks create the image of Serbia as being a nation which has been constantly suffering injustice. A similar approach can be found in some Croatian textbooks, particularly in those published in Tuđman's time. However, the situation there is more complex than that, since Croatia is the country with far the greatest number of alternative textbooks in the region. Hardly any different approach can be found in Turkish textbooks when writing about the Greeks and vice versa. On average, the most negatively described nation in the textbooks of the whole region are the Turks. The
REPE, Božo. Who is the "Other"? The Impact of Teaching History on the Development of Enemy Images: Workshop Enemy Images/Feindbilder, 5. Österreichischer Zeitgeschichtetag 2001, Demokratie Zivilgesellschaft - Menschenrechte, Klagenfurt, 4. bis 6. Oktober 2001. Klagenfurt, 2001. 288 The History Education Committee is a part of Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, a non – profit, non-governmental organization founded in 1988 in Holland. It begum groundbreaking work in the field of historical research and history teaching in Southeast Europe in 1988 In the framework of Southeast European Joint History project seven regional workshops, each with a different location and theme were organized. Eleven countries (Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and Yugoslavia) are involved in this project. 289 Hungary and Hungarians, Cyprus, Macedonia and Macedonians, Albania and Albanians, Balkan Empires, Greece and Greeks, Turkey and Turks, Yugoslavia, Yugoslav nations and successor states and the problem of religions were evaluated in this workshops. 290 The firs part of questionnaire is general (In which grades is history taught? How many hours per week? Which historical periods per grade? Are other history subjects taught besides national history? What are the proportions between national, European and world history? What is the system of autharization, publication and distribution of textbooks? The second part of questionnaire is devoted to individual countries, i.e. how the Turks and Turkey is treated Greek textbooks and vice versa (historically evaluation, heroes and anti-heroes, negative stereotypes, controversial issues etc.). 291 The participants submitted their answers to the questionnaire, and these answers were distributed to the participants, presented and discussed at the workshop. 292 Processing of data and final analyze is still going on and it will be publish in English and in languages of participating states in the first half of year 2002. 293 Costa Carras, Joint History Project rapporteur, Teaching The History of Southeastern Europe , Center for democracy and reconciliation in Southeast Europe (edited by Christina Koulouri), Thessaloniki, Greece 2001 page 13.
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image of their medieval campains of conquests is still negatively engraved in the collective memory of the nations (including Austria). The temptation of succombing to national myths, stereotype images about other nations, and glorification of one's own history is present in school lessons of all the countries of southeastern Europe. It frequently presents the foundation for (often uncritical) patriotism. The attitude according to which "the others are mean and do us wrong" is particularly evident from the official textbooks (and until recently in Serbia there were no others). It has been applied to the entire history, in Yugoslavia however, especially so for the period of World War II. In most countries taboos or better to say firmly established images about one's own history exist which are difficult to overcome. The instruction of history mostly reflects what politics desires and what on the other hand, is a part of the collective historical awareness. In different textbooks the treatment of some persons is diametrically opposed to each other. In Serb textbooks, for example, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić is presented a "hero", whereas one of the Croation textbooks desribes him as the beginner of the Serb hegemonism, because - according to this textbook - he wanted to "submit" the Croats to Serbia. Some people, previously treated either as national or class traitors remain to be seen that way, whereas some others have been turned to "heroes" after the national states had been constituted (i. e. cardinal Stepinac: in Serb textbooks he is described as an enemy who encouraged the genocide over the Serbs, and violent rechristening from the Orthodox into the Catholic religion, whereas some Croat textbooks see him as a hero). The same approach can be observed with Tito: in some of the former Yugoslav republics he is now perceived as an enemy and a negative person, whereas in others (the Muslims) his positive reputation has even increased. In the recent years yet another stereotype has emerged and become stronger, namely the stereotype according to which there is a dividing line between the nations belonging to "Europe" and those belonging to the "Balkans". In this context an interesting turnover can be observed in Slovenia during the disintegration process of Yugoslavia in the eighties. According to the opinion polls, the Germans (the Austrians) and the Italians used to be percieved as the main enemies of the nation, which can be contributed to the negative historic experience. However, due to the internal conflicts in the eighties, these traditional enemies have been replaced by the Serbs. The Germans (and Austrians) were suddenly seen as friends, particularly because they helped Slovenia in the process of attaining independence. After all the pressures and obstacles Slovenia has experienced in its attempt to enter the EU from the first Berlusconi government, as well as from the present Austrian administration, the affection for them has declined, which can be observed in public life, in education, as well as in other forms of daily life.

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23. National holidays (Slovenia)294
In the 20th century the Slovenians lived within three states: Austro-Hungary (until 1918), the Kingdom Yugoslavia (until 1941) and the socialist Yugoslavia (between 1945 and 1991). After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, they attained their individual, independent state. The national celebrations were influenced by the respective conditions and the political system within which they were living at the moment. In the times of Austro-Hungarian monarchy people used to celebrate birthdays of the respective emperors (particularly Franz Joseph whose reign extended itself over a very long period between 1848 and 1917), and the Catholic religious celebrations. In the period between the two world wars, the Habsburg Monarchy was replaced by the Dynasty of the Serb kings Karadjorjević, whereas the religious celebrations remained untouched. During World War II the celebrations depended on the occupier. There were three of them in Slovenia: the Germans, the Italians and the Hungarians. Within each occupation territory the occupiers determined the holidays that were to be celebrated. They used to be connected to the fascist and the nazi ideology and to the national holidays of Germany, Italy and Hungary respectively. Though limited and controlled, the Slovenian collaborationist authorities used to celebrate some of their own holidays, whereas the partisan resistance movement established its own holidays, which were based on the resistance, the Yugoslav state tradition and the Slovenian culture, but also on the Soviet Union and the October Socialist Revolution, since the resistance movement was led by the Communists. After World War II, the national holidays were set anew and they were based on important dates associated to the resistance, the setting up of the new socialist Yugoslavia and the international Communist and Socialist movement. A very important role fell to the leader of the Resistance and the new Yugoslavia Josip Broz - Tito. After Slovenia had gained its independence the holidays were completely changed again: the only two that remained from the previous period were the Day of the Resistance and the 1st May - the Labour Day, all others were changed or abolished. The newly introduced holidays are connected to the attainment of independence of Slovenia and the Catholic Church holidays. Another typical feature of Slovene holidays is a strong link to artists, particularly poets and authors. This can be referred to a lack of statesmanship tradition, whereas writers were seen as the upholders of the Slovene language and identity. The most famous Slovene poet France Prešeren who lived in the first part of the 19th century has been celebrated by the Slovenians of all generations, strata and beliefs, regardless of their political orientation. Prešeren rewards, which have been awarded to the artists in different fields for the past fifty years, are considered to be the most prestige cultural awards in Slovenia. Thus the main celebrations in the 19th and the 20th century in Slovenia were the following: the birthdays of the members of the Habsburg dynasty, particularly Franz Joseph and later the Serb dynasty of Karadjordjević; further celebrations in the memory of the merited personalities from different fields of activity, anniversaries of important military victories (however few the Slovenians themselves had reached till World War IImoreover the victories of Austro-Hungary and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were celebrated), and diverse political celebrations. Since Slovenia had a rather strong socialist movement, other dates like the 1st of May (Labour Day) and the 8th of March
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National holidays. For: Nations and States in Southeast Europe. Workbook 2. Teaching Modern Southeast European History. Alternative Educational Materials. Theassaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, 2005, p. 104-105.

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(International Women's Day) - though not official holidays - were celebrated. After Slovenia had become occupied people were forced to celebrate days like the birthday of Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini, further the annexation day of parts of Slovenia (Štajerska and Gorenjska) to Germany, of Prekmurje (over Mur region) to Hungary or the central part of Slovenia (the Province of Ljubljana) to Italy. These holidays were then replaced by the socialist holidays, the most important being - the Veterans' Day (4th July) which stood for the beginning of the armed resistance against the occupiers of Yugoslavia; - 29th November as the day when the representatives of resistance movements from different parts of Yugoslavia adopted a resolution on setting up a new, federative Yugoslavia in the Bosnian town of Jajce in 1943; - 25th May as the Youth Day and at the same time Tito's birthday (it turned out to be one of the most cult celebrations) - 8th March (Women's Day) - 22nd December (the Day of the Yugoslav National Army) as well as some other holidays. The holidays used to follow a certain ritual. So for example, a relay was organized for the Youth Day: young people used to carry a relay baton all over Yugoslavia; the Women's Day used to be celebrated in companies - women were given carnations and other gifts, whereas the occasion used to be intensively "celebrated" by men in diverse inns and restaurants. During the process of attaining independence, a kind of "holiday mess" used to govern Slovenia: nobody really knew whether the old holidays were still valid or not. After fierce discussions, the parliament adopted a new calendar of celebrations. The former Catholic Church holidays were reintroduced and added to them was the 31st October as the Protestant Day. This is the day when Martin Luther publicly announced his theses in 1517 (Protestantism had a strong cultural tradition in Slovenia; the first Slovenian book was namely written by the Protestants in the mid 16th century); 27th April remained in the holiday calendar as the Resistance Day (on this day the Liberation Front of the Slovenian Nation was established in 1941). Another holiday that was preserved was the 1st May. However, new holidays associated to the Slovenian independence were introduced: 26th December (the day when in 1990 the results of the plebiscite for Slovenian independence were announced) and the 25th June, the Day of the State (to commemorate the day when the independence of Slovenia was declared in 1991). Fierce political debates regarding the celebrations in Slovenia have been going on during the past years. Politicians attend the celebrations, which suit them: a lack of statesmanlike attitude can be observed. Only the cultural holidays, above all the formerly mentioned Prešeren's Day manage to unite the politicians. However, even here the poet's death is celebrated - a fact, that seems to be in accordance with the Slovenian introvert character and its tendency to self-pity and even suicide.

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24. Slovenia (Chronology)
250,000 BC: The first evidence of human habitation on the territory of the present-day Slovenia 120,000 to 33,000 BC: Remains from the early Stone Age - the Palaeolithic; among them the oldest musical instrument in the world, found in Slovenia 5,000 BC: Remains found as evidence of a hunting and gathering way of life 3,900 BC: Pile dwellings on the Ljubljana Marshes 1,300 BC: Urnfield culture 8th to 7th century BC: Bronze and Iron Age fortifications 4th and 3rd century BC: The arrival of Celts; the Noricum kingdom circa 10 BC: The Roman Empire; the appearance of the first towns 5th and 6th century AD: Invasions by the Huns and Germanic tribes after 568: Dominance of Slav people on the territory of Slovenia 7th to 11th century: The Duchy of Carantania, the oldest known independent Slavonic state in this area 8th century: The start of the conversion to Christianity 9th century: The spread of the Frankish feudal system and the beginning of the formation of the Slovene nation 10th century: The appearance of the Freising Manuscripts , the earliest known text written in Slovene

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11th century: The beginning of the development of the Carniola, Styria, Carinthia and Gorizia regions, and intensive German colonisation 11th to 14th centuries: The development of medieval towns in Slovenia 14th to 15th centuries: Most of the terri-tory of Slovenia including all its hereditary estates is taken over by the Habsburgs; in 1456, the Celje counts become extinct - this was the last Slovene feudal dynasty 15th century: Turkish invasions begin 15th to 17th centuries: Peasant revolts 1550: Protestantism; the first book written in Slovene 18th century: Enlightenment and compulsory universal education 1809-1813: Illyrian Provinces 1848: Unified Slovenia, the first Slovene political programme 1918: The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs; the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1945: The end of the Second World War and the formation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1990: Plebiscite on independence 25 June 1991: Proclamation of the independent Republic of Slovenia 1992: International Recognition, memebership in UNO april 2004: member of NATO 1. May 2004: member of EU 176

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Title: Slovene History – 20th Century. Selected articles by dr. Božo Repe

Author: dr. Božo Repe

Editor: dr. Danijela Trškan Copied by Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

Copyright © Department of History First edition

Ljubljana 2005

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