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of SITU/SOC 77/12/BABIL/SG 5

BATTLE OF SAN CARLOS, FALKLAND WAR,1982

References: A. B. EX BABIL General Instruction for Squadron Officer Course Serial 77/12. PPB MAL 100, Volume 1 Service Writing.

AIM AND SCOPE

1.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Black Buck Operation conducted by Royal

Air Force (RAF) during Falkland War that erupted from 1st May 1982 to 12th June 1982 between Great Britain and Argentina. The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis was applied in order to identify the Principal of War involved, specifically focusing on the tactical level of the operation. This study intent to highlight the approaches that were carried out as well as the impact of the operation from both forces in order to extract the relevant lessons and suggests recommendations concerning the battle in modern environment.

BACKGROUND

2.

The Falkland Island is situated 300 miles (480km) to the east of Argentine. There are

two main islands, East and West Falkland and also 200 groups of small islands, which form an area of approximately 4,700 square miles of the island. Port Stanley is the only town and 1 EX RESTRICTED

EX RESTRICTED capital in the islands. The Islands has been ruled by the British Government since World War II ended.

3.

The Falkland War is also known as the Malvinas War began with the successful

invasion by Argentinean forces on April 2, 1982 and ended with their surrender to Great Britain forces on June 14, 1982. An invasion by the Argentinean to the Falkland has led to the conflict that enforced British to take harsh action to recover the island. A task force of 30 warships plus auxiliary and transport vessel, including the corvertte cruise liner SS Canberra and 6000 troops was launched by British.

4.

The British Government had decided to launch a series of air raids known as Black

Buck Operation. The operation is staged from the British Royal Air Force (RAF) port, Ascension Island, 4000 nautical miles (nm) away from the Falklands. The operation consisted of seven series of extremely long range ground attack mission by RAF using two Avro Vulcan bombers and eleven Victor Tankers against Argentine in the Falkland Island. Five from the seven series of the above mentioned attacks succeed its mission.

5.

The first surprise attack known as Operation Black Buck 1 attempted before dawn on 1 st

May 1982 by two RAF Vulcans that took off from the Ascension Island. The main objective was to deny Argentinean jet fighters from using the runway at Port Stanley Airfield. Two Vulcan (tail number XM 598 and XM 607), each carried war load of 21 general purposes 1000 lbs free falls bombs flew across the line of the runway and were released to the target. The Vulcan, supported by the 10 Victor tankers had demonstrated the air refueling capability for long duration flight operation.

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EX RESTRICTED 6. The second mission on 4th May 1982 was conducted to damage aircraft parking area and

stores at Port Stanley airfield. This mission was successful and managed to force the Argentine to withdraw their fast jet back to the mainland.

7.

On 13th May 'Black Buck 3' was called off due to poor weather.

8.

The 4th series of Black Buck was conducted on the night of 28th- 29th May. The aim

was to strike Argentinean radar sites around Port Stanley by using the AGM-45A Shrike antiradiation missile. Unfortunately, the mission was ordered to return back to Ascension five hours after take-off when the tankers refueling drogue failed.

9.

For Black Buck 5 (30th - 31st May 1982), the mission was accomplished as the Vulcan

successfully strike off the anti-aircraft radar.

10.

On 2nd 3rd June 1982, the mission Black Buck 6 was carried out with Shrike-armed

XM597, and had successfully attack the Argentinean Skyguard Fire Control Radars. However on the return leg, the Vulcan was having problems when its refueling drogue was broken during final refueling. The fuel was not enough to make it to the Ascension and the pilot decided to divert the aircraft to Rios Galeao Airport at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

11.

The final stage of attack saw a return of strikes on Port Stanley airfield. The mission

was taken up on the 12th June 1982 by XM607, carrying war load of mix iron and anti personnel bombs. There were a number of successful hits of the equipment on the airfield.

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EX RESTRICTED 12. The Black Buck Operation is an evidence of the vital role of air superiority that This exercise laid out some

significantly contributed to the success in the war battle.

comparisons of the relative strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threat of the belligerents position of both forces i.e. RAF and Fuerza Area Argentina (FAA) (Argentinean Air Force) by using the principles of war as the basis of discussion.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR APPLIED USING SWOT ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (RAF) AND FUERZA AREA ARGENTINA (FAA)

13.

The following SWOT analyses are conducted for two parties. The first analysis is from

the RAF perspective while the second analysis is from the FAA perspective. The Principles of War that had been applied by the RAF according to the SWOT analyses are discussed below.

STRENGTH

14.

Surprise. Surprise leverages the security principle by attacking at a time, place, or in a

manner for which the enemy is not prepared.

a.

The tactic used by RAF which utilized the combination of Vulcan and Victor

aircrafts had given a significant impact towards the overall operation. The attacks phase was planned at night and it used the element of surprise. First, the aircrafts flew at high altitude and then descended to low level when they are 250 miles from Port Stanley airfield in order to stay below the cover of Skyguard Early Warning Radar. Then they popped up (in a rapid climb) to 10000ft to start the run in. They delivered the bombs

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EX RESTRICTED successfully and climbed back to high altitude for home base return. The Vulcan and Victor aircrafts managed to stay undetectable and FAA labels them as invisible force.

WEAKNESS

15.

Mass. Mass is an effect that air forces achieve through efficiency of attack by referring

to the quantity of forces and material committed.

a.

In each of the missions, only 2 Vulcan were assigned. These aircrafts used the

outdated H2S radar and ground position indicator for navigation system. As a result, the raids were less aggressive hence did minimal damage to the runway and radar. The overall target effect of raids on this operation is difficult to determine. OPPORTUNITY

16.

Security. The principle of security requires that friendly forces and their operation to

be protected from enemy action thus could provide the enemy with unforeseen disadvantages.

a.

The Royal Navy provides sufficient support and full protection to the Vulcan in

its areas of responsibilities. The Royal Navy and RAF utilized their advanced aircraft equipped with air to air refuelling capability (i.e. Sea Harrier and RAF Harrier) to execute Combat Air Patrol (CAP). Such flexible application of combat power between the Royal Navy and RAF has provided additional security to the RAF. Furthermore, the situation had intensified the capability of the RAF to conduct Black Buck raids repeatedly and degrade the Argentine capabilities in the Falklands.

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EX RESTRICTED THREAT

17.

Manouver.

The principle of manouver calls for action to place the enemy in a

position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. In this case, it refers to the lack of capability of the Vulcan to fly in the long range operation and also the challenge to face bad weather factor.

a.

Distance. RAF faced the constraint and problem associated with range, payload

and suitable aircraft due to the issue of distance. The Vulcan was designed for operation with a maximum range of 2500 miles. The round trip over the Ascension Island to the Falkland and back was 8000 nm. Therefore, the Vulcan needs to be supported by aircraft tanker in order to carry out the mission as planned.

b.

Weather. The harsh South Atlantic weather condition was a big challenge for

Black Buck Operation. During Black Buck 1, the violent tropical storm had affected the continuity process of the Air to Air Refueling (AAR) and disturbed the original plan of the mission. In Black Buck 3, strong headwinds have made the mission extremely difficult resulting in fatigue among the Vulcan bomber's crew. The mission had to be cancelled due to this factor.

18.

For Fuerza Area Argentina (FAA) (Argentinean Air Force), Principles of War that had

been applied according to the SWOT analyses are listed below. STRENGTH

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EX RESTRICTED 19. Mass. The principle of mass calls for concentrating combat power at a decisive time

and place. Mass is not based only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed, but mass is also an effect instead of just overwhelming quantity.

a.

The FAA had an advantage by having large forces of fighter jets around less

than 500 nm from Falklands to counter air strike operation conducted by RAF. The fighter aircrafts were located at four main bases such as Rio Grande (10 x Daggers, 4 x Super Etendards and 8 x A-4Q Skyhawk), Rio Gallegos (24 x A-4Bs and 10 x Mirages), San Julian ( 10 x Daggers and 15 x A-4Cs) and Comodoro Rivadavia (Mirage IIIs

and Pucaras). Therefore, the FAA thought that they are strong enough to secure and prevent Falklands from being approached closely and attacked by the RAF.

WEAKNESS

20.

Unity of Command. Unity of command ensures the focus of effort for every purpose

under the responsibility of one commander.

a.

Argentina junta set up a complicated arrangement of commands to direct combat

operations. Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo was appointed as a Theater command, South Atlantic Theater of Operations (TOAS). He was responsible to command Argentine naval units and the Falklands garrison. Meanwhile Brig Gen Mario Benjamin Menendez was to command 10,000 men consist of army, air force, and navy units deployed to the Falklands. Meanwhile, the Argentinean Southern Air Force was led by Brig Gen Ernesto Horacio Crespo and his primary mission was to attack on British fleet. 7 EX RESTRICTED

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b.

The FAA was outside the authority of the theatre commander and had to report

directly to the junta. This command arrangement was ineffective because the junta made strategic and operational decisions throughout the campaign without authorization from its senior service commanders. Co-ordinated strategic planning can only be achieved when there are co-operation amongst fleet, under a single commander authority to direct and employ all forces in pursuit to achieve one common objective.

OPPORTUNITY

21.

Offensive. This principle refers to the act rather than react and dictation of time, place,

purpose, scope, intensity and pace of operation. The FAA has opportunity to defend Falklands Island due to distance factor (i.e. speed and range).

a.

The advantages of distance for Argentine are used appropriately in this war as

an opportunity for them in order to protect Falkland Island from the British. The FAA had 4 bases at mainland that can be used as an attacking force where there are closed to Falklands Island compare to RAF. The 4 bases at the mainland equipped with fighter aircraft such as Skyhawk, Mirage, Dagger and Super Etendard that can be deployed at anytime to Falkland if they realized the present of RAF Vulcan.

THREAT

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EX RESTRICTED 22. Maneuver. The speed with which air forces maneuver in three dimensions allows them

to achieve mass faster than surface forces. The principal of maneuver calls for action to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

a.

The FAA was put in a very strenuous situation as they were threatened by the

attack of both RAF and Royal Navy combat power. The CAP activities conducted by the Royal Navy were a vivid threat for FAA, adding difficulty for them to counter the Black Buck mission. As a result, they had major air losses (26 Mirages and 31 Skyhawks) because the Sea Harrier had advance weapon system as compared to FAA aircraft fighter.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE BATTLE OF SAN CARLOS

23.

Based from the SWOT analyses, there are number of valid lessons to be drawn from

this battle:

a.

Consideration on Weather Condition. The bumpy weather condition had

created major difficulties for RAF during Black Buck 3. The RAF lack considerations with regards to the impact of the weather and ways to deal with the weather condition.

b.

Morale Booster. The British forces were in a war, over 8,000 miles from

home. However, the coordinated strategic planning between the RAF and Royal Navy provided not only military strength but also the much needed confidence for the British troops. There were no factions; theirs was a united effort.

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EX RESTRICTED c. Preparedness. The Argentines were over confident given the location of the

islands which is nearby to their homeland, as well as their ability to send a large number of troops in a short time. Nevertheless, they lack in defensive strategy and had to perform an unrehearsed set of tactics that had no specific strategy other than to try to inflict as much damage to the British fleet as possible. As for the RAF, the Black Buck Operation would have lesser hiccups if the Vulcan pilots are more proficient in both aerial refuelling and bombing.

d.

Co-ordination. Effective co-ordination is important in providing the much

needed strength for the forces. The absence of unity of command at the Argentine side resulted in no coordinated effort between the FAA and other Argentine forces leaving the FAA with no external support and little defensive strength.

CONCLUSION

24.

The present study on Black Buck Operation has shown that the principles of war are

still valid in contributing to the failure and success of an air campaign. Case studies and implementation of principles of war from previous wars have become valuable resources in providing guidance to the commanders at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

25.

The success of the missions shows the capabilities of the bomber, the Victor tankers and

the crews involved. In retrospect, the effort expended to mount the operation was quite out of proportion to the physical damage inflicted on Port Stanley airfield. Yet, as is often the case in aerial warfare, the raid on Port Stanley airfield had a psychological effect on the enemy that was also out of proportion to the physical damage caused. The attack had demonstrated to the 10 EX RESTRICTED

EX RESTRICTED FAA High Command the fact that RAF has the capability to strike at targets on the Argentine mainland, if it decided to do so.

26.

Finally, Black Buck Operation demonstrated the complexity and difficulty of projecting

air power over huge distances. Yet its success also proves to the entire world, just what could be achieved with limited resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS

27.

This paper would like to recommend the following:

a.

Readiness and Preparedness is very important towards achieving the RMAF

vision and mission. In any condition, every RMAF personnel be it the pilot as well as the supporting crew must maintain a high degree of readiness. It is crucial for the ground support crew to be highly skillful in handling the air assets. The readiness and preparedness of the personnel can also be enhanced by utilizing the simulation through the war gaming system. Through the war gaming system, the RMAF personnel are able to conduct a large number of rehearsals and do modeling, simulating and analyzing.

b.

Command structure enhancement is important to ensure the effectiveness of

the operation in achieving its goal. A review on the RMAF command structure in accordance with the present situation will enhance the effectiveness of command and control especially when there are joint forces command and control structure.

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EX RESTRICTED c. Applying the flexibility and versatility such as having various types of assets

will enhance the capability and responsiveness of the force and provide various options in achieving its mission objective. The RMAF should uphold appropriate selected air superiority through latest technology and equipment to provide substantial security to the national air space.

d.

RMAF should be looking seriously into Information Warfare (IW). The IW is

a development that expanded the degrees of freedom in operating spectrum. It gives benefit to RMAF at strategic, operational and most importantly to tactical level. (2662 words) Sept 12

RYAN MACKEITH STEVENSON MAJ RAMF SYNDICATE LEADER SG 5 SOC 77/12

Annexes: A. B. C. Map of Falklands Island (Area of Operation). Air to Air Refueling Plan. Port Stanley Airfield (damage).

BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES 12 EX RESTRICTED

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Jay Myers, THE ROYAL AIR FORCE Volume Five, Air Power Review, Summer 2002. Sir Peter Squire, ROYAL AIR FORCE, Spirit of the Air, Aurum Press. Christopher Chant, Air War In The Falklands 1982, Osprey Aviation. Lawrence Freedman, The War Of The Falklands Island 1982, Foreign Affair. David Tothill (2001), In Argentina at the Time Of Falklands War 1982, Diplomacy & Statecraft Duncan Anderson (2002), Essential History The Falklands War 1982, Opsrey Publishing.

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