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• Condition of pension: If they reach the age of 60 and served for 20 years. • In 1945 the BOD adopted a resolution discontinuing the pension plan – some retirees did not get the pension because they did not satisfy the conditions. • PLDT argued that employees cannot compel them to continue program when it was based on expectancy. Issue: WON the pre-war employees are entitled to the pension. Held: Yes. But with the exception of those who died or left before the outbreak of the war. The pension plan was not a gratuity but an inducement for employees to continue indefinitely in service. The plan ripened into a binding contract upon its implied acceptance of the employees. Acceptance is inferred from their entering the employ of the company and staying after the plan was made known. PLDT argues that it can only be held liable under the conditions expressly set in the pension plan. But the Court held that the Company that violated the contract with its employees, by discontinuing the plan without their consent, is not in the position to insist upon the terms of the very contract they have breached. PLDT vs. Jeturian—Pension bago gera. PLDT adopted in 1923 a Plan for Emloyees Pension. In 1945 the BOD adopted a resolution discontinuing the pension plan. Hence this action of Resp. Issue: WON the pre-war employees are entitled to the pension. Held: Yes. But with the exception of those who died or left before the outbreak of the war. The pension plan was not a gratuity but an inducement for employees to continue indefinitely in service. The plan ripened into a binding contract upon its implied acceptance of the employees. Acceptance is inferred from their entering the employ of the company and staying after the plan was made known. PLDT argues that it can only be held liable under the conditions expressly set in the pension plan. But the Court held that the Company that violated the contract with its employees, by discontinuing the plan without their consent, is not in the position to insist upon the terms of the very contract they have breached. PLDT vs Jeturian Policy that employees who serve 20 years and reaching 60 yrs old. shall get a retirement benefit was abolished. Employees who waited to be retired will not receive the benefit. The trial court said it is a form of Constructive fulfilment. PLDT said that the right was only an expectancy.
According to the SC there is an action to preserve the right in a suspensive condition situation. --- Subsequently, or on December 22, 1951, Crispin Jeturian and about sixty-three (63) other persons, who had served the Company as its prewar employees, instituted in the Court of Industrial Relations a proceeding for the collection of their proportionate shares in said Employees' Pension Plan, which had been discontinued by a resolution dated November 6, 1945, unilaterally taken by the Board of Directors of the Company, to be effective retroactively as of January 1, 1942. In due course, a decision was, on February 23, 1954, rendered in said proceeding, docketed as Case No. 639-V of the Court of Industrial Relations, directing payment to the petitioners therein of their respective proportionate shares in the aforementioned Employees' Pension Plan, as well as — to those who had not received their 30-day notice of dismissal from the service of the Company before the resumption of its business operations in 1946 — a severance pay equivalent to one month salary. With a slight modification, immaterial to the case at bar, said decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. Jeturian, et al., G.R. No. L-7756, decided on June 20, 1955.
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Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995 246 SCRA 511 FACTS: In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the following conditions: a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college; b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party; c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from that land shall be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”. However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter. Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed. On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with the conditions of the donation and declared it null and void. The court a quo further directed petitioner to execute a
it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and. However. namely. private respondents herein. 93 Phil. it failed to do so. the donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished. Hence. (b) in holding that the issue of prescription does not deserve "disquisition. Inc. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome. But. the appellate court rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision and remanding the case to the court of origin for the determination of the time within which petitioner should comply with the first condition annotated in the certificate of title. 1181. INC. when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature & circumstance it can be inferred that the period was intended. 2 ISSUE: 1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES 2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO HELD: 1) Under Art. it failed to do so. The appellate court also found that while the first condition mandated petitioner to utilize the donated property for the establishment of a medical school. there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits. Hence. Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action. Inc. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case. Thus. presented a claim before the Court of First Instance in her testate proceeding. to make the donation in its favor forever valid. the Quezon College." and. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. she died and as no payment appears to have been made on the subscription mentioned in the foregoing letter. by means of reconveyance. Hence. TRILLANA VS QUEZON COLLEGE. private respondents herein. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to decree recission. hence. petitioner could not be considered as having failed to comply with its part of the bargain. the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled. when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one.deed of the reconveyance of the property in favor of the heirs of the donor. 383 Page | 2 FACTS: Damasa Crisostomo wrote a letter to the Quezon College. unfortunately. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 18 June 1993 ruled that the annotations at the back of petitioner's certificate of title were resolutory conditions breach of which should terminate the rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable. 1191. this general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately. for the collection of the said sum of money. for the subscription of shares of stock of the said college wherein payment was to be made through money she was going to generate from fishing. However. there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits. Thus. on conditional obligations. revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor. the obligee may seek rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. 2) Under Art. when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him. (c) in remanding the case to the trial court for the fixing of the period within which petitioner would establish a medical college. until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition. Under Art. the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith & such period has arrived. The claim was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the subscription in . 1197. Petitioner now alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that the quoted annotations in the certificate of title of petitioner are onerous obligations and resolutory conditions of the donation which must be fulfilled non-compliance of which would render the donation revocable. for all purposes. the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
1948 The BOARD OF TRUSTEES Quezon College Manila Gentlemen: (Sgd. and outstanding balance of the respondent would be considered as capital which the respondent would pay in sugar. that had not ripened into an enforceable contract.question was neither registered in nor authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission. was essential. RAMA JOHNSON. and as a special security. Inc. the relation between Damasa Crisostomo and the Quezon College. The contract was signed by 2 witnesses. in view of the proposal of Damasa Crisostomo to pay the value of the subscription after she had harvested fish. In the letter actually sent by Damasa Crisostomo. Later(no date given) the said Agustina Rafols ceded to the present plaintiff all of her right and interest in said contracts. she would give her house in Pagina. as in the present case of acceptance by the Quezon College. of the counter offer of Damasa Crisostomo. The respondent also promised that she would sell to Don Osmeña all her sugar that would be harvested. and the P70 would be paid in sugar. -27 Oct. In other words. -Some time after the execution and delivery of the above contracts. was written on a general form indicating that an applicant will enclose an amount as initial payment and will pay the balance in accordance with law and the rules or regulations of the College (babayaran kong lahat pagkatapos manghuli ng isda). therefore. FORM: June 1. appealed. Inc. Inc. Inc. Don Osmeña died. including interest. under article 1115 of the old Civil Code (1182 of NCC). I further submit myself to all lawful demands. From this order the Quezon College." The acceptance of Quezon College. Inc. In the settlement and division of the property of his estate the above contracts became the property of one of his hieirs. The application sent by Damasa Crisostomo to the Quezon College. Agustina Rafols. Inc. 1891: Defendant asked a further loan from the Don of P70. and as security. Inc. rendering the obligation void. if ever the Doña could not pay in full. September 9. she pledged all her present and future property. a relation in the absence. a condition obviously dependent upon her sole will and. because it would be unfair to immediately obligate the Quezon College.) DAMASA CRISOSTOMO Signature of subscriber Nilagdaan sa aming harapan: JOSE CRISOSTOMO EDUARDO CRISOSTOMO OSMEÑA VS. . showing the amount outstanding at the end of each June. FACTS -15 Nov 1890: Doña Rama executed and delivered to Victoriano Osmeña a contract (EXHIBIT A) which stated that she received P200 in cash from Don Osmeña which she would pay in sugar in January/February the next year at the price on the day of delivering the sugar into the Don’s warehouses + Interest w/ rate of half a cuartillo per month on each peso from Nov 15 to the day of the settlement. a balance shall be struck. Page | 3 RULING: No. under Damasa's promise to pay the price of the subscription after she had caused fish to be caught. but stated that "babayaran kong lahat pagkatapos na ako ay makapagpahuli ng isda. 1909 NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. P50 of which would be loaned to Don Peñares. Enclosed you will find (Babayaran kong lahat pagkatapos na ako ay makapag-pahuli ng isda) pesos as my initial payment and the balance payable in accordance with law and the rules and regulations of the Quezon College. Very respectfully. decisions or directives of the Board of Trustees of the Quezon College and all its duly constituted officers or authorities (ang nasa itaas ay binasa at ipinaliwanag sa akin sa wikang tagalog na aking nalalaman). The need for express acceptance on the part of the Quezon College. imperative. had only thus reached the preliminary stage whereby the latter offered its stock for subscription on the terms stated in the form letter. I hereby agree to shoulder the expenses connected with said shares of stock. ISSUE: Was Damasa Crisostomo liable for the claim made by Quezon Colleges. and Damasa applied for subscription fixing her own plan of payment. she not only did not enclose any initial payment. facultative in nature. Inc? Please enter my subscription to dalawang daan (200) shares of your capital stock with a par value of P100 each.
The cause of action to claim rescission arises when the fulfillment of the obligation became impossible when the court declared that the sale was null and void. Dispositive We are satisfied. HELD: Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that an injured party may also seek rescission if the fulfillment should have become impossible.The said judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court and had attained finality. Due to the failure of the defendants to deliver the said lots. Meanwhile. Ratio A condition imposed upon a contract by the promisor. therefore. until the said sums were paid. Civil Code. 1890. Porciuncula’s successor in interest sought for the annulment and cancellation of the sale which the court a quo favorably ruled. petitioner filed another civil case for the rescission of the contract. CFI deci judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P200 with interest at the rate of 18 3/4 per cent per annum. AYSON-SIMON VS. in accordance with the provisions of article 1115 of the Civil Code. from all of the evidence adduced during the trial. and the prayer for a judgment for the amount due on the said contracts. As a result of the sale of the lot to said defendants sppellants being null and void. -26 June 1906: Doña Tomasa did not pay the amount due so the plaintiff commenced this action in CFI Cebu. and for the sum of P20. from the 15th day of November. (Art. So ordered. is void. (own testimony – I don’t know if Agustina is a guy – my copy said “the plaintiff himself”) Defendant’s defense general denial and setting up the special defense of prescription. and is. the successors-in-interest of the latter filed Civil Case No. 174 for annulment of the sale and the cancellation of TCT No. purchased two lots forming part of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City. 174. the latter then seek the rescission of the contract plus damages. L-39378 AUGUST 28. The trial court rendered judgment to petitioner’s favor. from the 27th day of October.) The acknowledgment. 69475. Nicolas Adamos and Vicente Feria defendantsappellants herein purchased two lots from Juan Porciuncula. she imposed the condition that she would pay the obligation if she sold her house. it was a condition which depended upon her exclusive will. If that statement found in her acknowledgment of the indebtedness should be regarded as a condition. 1115.The defendants-appellants contend that Generosa’s action had prescribed. from Juan Porciuncula. the proof presented is sufficient. defendants-appellants sold to Generosa Ayson Simon the lots in question. However. Due to the failure of defendants appellants to comply with their commitment to have the subdivision plan of the lots approved and to deliver to deliver the titles and possession to Generosa. ADAMOS AND FERIA G. provided that she imposed the condition that she would pay her debts upon selling her house? HELD YES. 1984 FACTS: Defendants. 1891. petitioner filed a civil case for specific performance.R.-( my copy is missing some paragraphs. (no evidence presented) ISSUE WON the proof presented during the trial in CFI is sufficient for the lower court to recognize the debt of Doña Rama. The Generosa cannot be assailed on the ground that she slept on her rights. Reasoning It was suggested during the discussion of the case in this court that. The Court rendered a Decision annulling the sale. NO. defendants could not deliver the said lots because the CA had already annulled the sale of the two lots in Civil Case No . with interest at the rate of 181 per cent per annum. the performance of which depends upon his exclusive will. 1943.800. the latter filed suit for specific performance. Page | 4 AYSON-SIMON VS. FACTS: On December 13. Thus. Thereafter. ISSUE: Whether or not the action to rescind the obligation has prescribed. considering that she had only four years from May 29. was an absolute acknowledgment of the obligation and was sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from barring the action upon the original contract.00 plus Php800. ADAMOS 131 SCRA 439 . which had been issued to defendants-appellants by virtue of the disputed sale. during the pendency of the case above. 1946 to rescind the transaction. void.In the meantime during the pendency of the above mentioned case. can’t find a copy in the internet so just look at your copies for the periods between the death of Don Osmeña and March 15) -15 March 1902: Doña Rama recognized her obligations in the said contract with Don Osmeña. and the failure to pay on the part of the defendant. stating in the contract she executed (EXHIBIT C) that if her house in Pagina would be sold she would use the money to pay for her debts. Nicolas Adamos and Vicente Feria. in the acknowledgment of the indebtedness made by the defendant. therefore. there is impossibity that they can comply with their commitment to Generosa. Plaintiff’s Claim the execution and delivery of the above contracts. the demand for payment.00 for facilitating the issuance of the new titles in favor of petitioner. that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. defendants sold the said two lots to Petitioner Generosa Ayson-Simon for Php3.
00 which they received from plaintiff to expedite the issuance of titles but which they could not secure by reason of the decision in Civil Case No. But plaintiff had to wait for the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. and plaintiff having chosen fulfillment in Civil Case No. Only that portion relative to the payment of damages remains in the dispositive part of the decision. Since the two lots sold to plaintiff by defendants form part of the land involved in Civil Case No.600. it became impossible for defendants to secure and deliver the titles to and the possession of the lots to plaintiff. The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation. even though petitioner can choose to rescind the contract." The action for rescission must be commenced within four years from that date. 174. and (2) that even if plaintiff could seek rescission the action to rescind the obligation has prescribed. because it has already prescribed. the fulfillment has become impossible. and legal interest on the P800. 1967.600. 69475 issued to them.00 from May 29. No.Defendants were contending that petitioner cannot choose to rescind the contract since petitioner chose for specific performance of the obligation. 174. 69475 issued to them. 4 Page | 5 . 174 declared the sale of the land to defendants by Juan Porciuncula a complete nullity and ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. the four year period within which the action must be commenced had not expired. The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation. The next question to determine is whether the action to rescind the obligation has prescribed. she cannot now seek rescission. Article 1191 allows the injured party to seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment. According to the certification of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Exhibit "E-2"). the decision in Civil Case No. if the fulfillment should become impossible. May 3. 1967 of the Court of Appeals. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the injured party may also seek rescission. the four year period within which the action must be commenced had not expired. but since defendants cannot fulfill their obligation to deliver the titles to and possession of the lots to plaintiff. as follows: Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation in reciprocal ones are alternative remedies. reiterated in the assignments of error on appeal. 174 became final and executory "as per entry of Judgment dated May 3. if the fulfillment should become impossible. The cause of action to claim rescission arises when the fulfillment of the obligation became impossible when the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. as in this case. applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment. the fulfillment has become impossible. Yes. Can petitioner choose to rescind the contract even after choosing for the specific performance of the obligation? 2. the portion of the decision requiring them to fulfill their obligations is without force and effect. 174.7525. correctly resolved the issues. ISSUES: 1. later Court of Appeals Associate Justice Luis B. when they received the same from plaintiff. 174 declared the sale of the land to defendants by Juan Porciuncula a complete nullity and ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 174. it would not be possible. 2. May 3.00 representing the purchase price of the two lots. and cannot have both. RATIO: The appeal is without merit. Since the two lots sold to plaintiff by defendants form part of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q. the decision in Civil Case No. The first contention is without merit. Article 1191 3 allows the injured party to seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment. But plaintiff had to wait for the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. The Trial Court presided by then Judge. According to the certification of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Exhibit "E-2"). 1968. Had the option to rescind the contract prescribed? RULING: 1.00 from August 1. Reyes. it became impossible for defendants to secure and deliver the titles to and the possession of the lots to plaintiff. 1968. and the amount of P800. 1967 of the Court of Appeals. when they received the amount upon the execution of the deeds of sale. 1967. since in either case (fulfillment or rescission) defendants may be required to pay damages. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the injured party may also seek rescission. Since the complaint for rescission was filed on August 16. If. 1946. The cause of action to claim rescission arises when the fulfillment of the obligation became impossible when the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Defendant has to pay interest at the legal rate on the amount of P7. Also. If. 1966. Defendants have the obligation to return to plaintiff the amount of P7. and cannot have both. as in this case. 174 became final and executory "as per entry of Judgment dated May 3. 174." The action for rescission must be commenced within four years from that date. 7275 the Court already rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff. True it is that in Civil Case No. Since the complaint for rescission was filed on August 16. applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment.
As mentioned. 9. w/whom they had a contract to buy & sell. the appealed judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Manila. Inc. 1965. Contract was signed on Feb. 1960: UP & ALUMCO (Associated Lumber Mfg.. This does not contradict previous SC rulings declaring that judicial action is necessary for the resolution of a reciprocal obligation. 1965) on top of the outstanding balance from Dec. UP’s unilateral rescission w/o court order was invalid. collect & remove timber from the land grant & payment to UP of royalties. Co. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES. etc. Inc. Injured party need not always resort to the court for rescission of contract. Clara Lumber was directed to refrain from exercising logging rights. 1191 & Froilan v. petitioner. Quezon City CFI Judge. 1964-July 15. 1124 (similar to CC Art. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES. 6. 1965 & if they fail to do so.00 for liquidated damages. But either party can consider the contract as rescinded if their agreement provides for such. UP then instituted a complaint against ALUMCO to collect aforementioned sums of money. there was grave abuse of discretion since it decided w/out first receiving evidence . 31. Court granted an order restraining ALUMCO from continuing its logging operations.WHEREFORE. ALUMCO specifically allowed UP to rescind the contract if it fails to pay not later than June 30. until Dec. UP has the power to consider the agreement rescinded w/out need of any judicial suit & UP shall be entitled to P50. ALUMCO then executed an instrument. WON a final court decree is necessary before UP can rescind the contract. only final judgment of the court will finally settle whether rescission was proper or not. 2. 4. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. 1969. Order was received on Feb. Clara Lumber Co. – NO. 1965: UP informed ALUMCO that it has considered as rescinded & of no further legal effect the logging agreement. 1964: ALUMCO incurred unpaid account of P219. UP sent ALUMCO a notice to rescind/terminate the agreement. 1964. 2. 1. Prior to the court’s order. Dec. Clara Lumber Co. – NO. ALUMCO filed a petition enjoining UP from conducting the bidding w/c led to the issuance of the following Court orders: UP enjoined from awarding logging rights to any other party. 1966. Clara was signed. 8. UP’s supervisor did not allow them to cut new logs unless the logs cut during Guy’s management were sold. WON 1st court order enjoining UP from awarding logging rts to another party was proper. it should be made known to the other party & it is always subject to the scrutiny & review by the proper court. Meaning. CC Art. dated June 7.) entered into a logging agreement granting ALUMCO exclusive authority to cut. 2. Of course.94 w/c they failed to pay despite several demands. UP’s supervisor stopped all logging operations on July 15. July 19. respondents  Act 3608: public land was given as a Land Grant to UP as endowment to raise additional income for its support Nov. 1966. the party who deems the contract violated may consider it rescinded & act w/o previous court action BUT IT PROCEEDS AT ITS OWN RISK. is hereby affirmed in toto. 5. forest fees.362. Since only the final judgment of the corresponding court will conclusively & finally settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in law. 2. Issues & Ratio: 1. Branch XX. et al. Logging operations continued but ALUMCO incurred more unpaid accounts w/c amounted to P61. however it’s subject to judicial invalidation. Rule requiring judicial action won’t be rendered nugatory since the other party can always resort to the courts in case the rescinder abuses its power or commits an error. 25.000. 1191): resolution of reciprocal/synallagmatic contracts may be made extrajudicially unless successfully impugned in court. manager Cesar Guy in not turning over management thus rendering it unable to pay. vs. UP advertised an invitation to bid to take in a new concessionaire to replace ALUMCO w/c was subsequently awarded to Sta. Failure to pursue the manner of payment was caused by rotten logs w/c could not be sold to Sta. Supreme Court of Spain interpretation of Spanish Civil Code Art. 3. 73942. 16. “Acknowledgement of Debt & Proposed Manner of Payments” stipulating that outstanding balance shall be paid in full no later than June 30. It proposed several offers to resume operations but UP did not reply. UP’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 3.: the law does not prohibit parties from entering into an agreement that violation of the terms would cause cancellation of the contract even w/o court intervention. in Civil Case No. 1965 & extendible for 5 yrs by mutual agreement. 1965 in the “Acknowledgement of Debt & Proposed Manner of Payments” it executed. Page | 6 1.74 (Dec. 8. UP was held in contempt of court & Sta. ALUMCO’s defense/contentions: It blamed former gen.133. after contract w/Sta. Costs against defendants-appellants.
00 as deposit and the further sum of P740.. to cut. which.R. If the other party denies that rescission is justified. 3. for a period starting from the date of the agreement to 31 December 1965.00. L-28602 September 29.362. Issue: Whether or not petitioner U. Respondent ALUMCO contended that it is only after a final court decree declaring the contract rescinded for violation of its terms that U. In addition. which are corner lots. which expressly states that. the subject with Lots 4 and 12. 1970 Facts: On November 2. 1954. upon default by the debtor ALUMCO. 2 and 9." In connection with Article 1191 of the Civil Code.94. on the issues & it subsequently refused to dissolve the injunction. it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. after due hearing. plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement of sale covering Lots 1. that ALUMCO cut and removed timber there from but. being ever subject to scrutiny and review by the proper court. it was agreed that the purchase price of these two lots would . considered as rescinded and of no further legal effect the logging agreement that they had entered in 1960. the creditor (UP) has "the right and the power to consider. 1965. as of 8 December 1964. can treat its contract with ALUMCO rescinded and may disregard the same before any judicial pronouncement to that effect. De Los Angeles G. Block 1.00 per square meter.” It must be understood that the act of party in treating a contract as cancelled or resolved on account of infractions by the other contracting party must be made known to the other and is always provisional. September. respectively. being corner lots. Excuses/defenses offered are not sufficient excuse for nonpayment. defendant requested plaintiff that he be allowed to abandon and substitute Lots 1. of said property.” ALUMCO continued its logging operations. Whatever prejudices ALUMCO may suffer is susceptible of compensation in damages. and the consequent indemnity awarded to the party prejudiced. On January 24. the creditor (UP) has “the right and the power to consider the Logging Agreement as rescinded without the necessity of any judicial suit. In other words. UP and ALUMCO entered into a logging agreement under which the latter was granted exclusive authority. collect and remove timber from the Land Grant. even without court intervention.P. but again incurred an unpaid account. decide that the resolution of the contract was not warranted. The evidence discloses that defendant proposed to plaintiff modification of their previous contract to sell because he found it quite difficult to pay the monthly installments on the three lots. the Logging Agreement as rescinded without the necessity of any judicial suit. Pan Oriental Shipping Co that “there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof. extendible for a further period of five (5) years by mutual agreement. payable in 120 equal monthly installments at the rate of P16. University of the Philippines v. despite repeated demands. LAPUS 96 SCRA 741 FACTS: Sometime in 1964. ALUMCO profited from its operations previous to the agreement. 1960. and besides the two lots he had chosen were better lots. in consideration of payment to UP of royalties. which was approved by the president of UP. upon default by the debtor ALUMCO. and bring the matter to court. No. could disregard ALUMCO's rights under the contract and treat the agreement as breached and of no force or effect. 2 and 9. Block 2 of the Rockville Subdivision. UP made out a prima facie case of breach of contract & defaults in payment by ALUMCO as proven by a court order stopping ALUMCO’s logging operations. ALUMCO executed an instrument. it had incurred an unpaid account of P219. Then. in the contrary case. the Court stated in Froilan vs. Holding: 1st court order granting ALUMCO’s petition for injunction set aside. and October." dated 9 December 1964. 1955. August. entitled "Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments. etc. P15. petitioner UP informed respondent ALUMCO that it had. defendant paid to plaintiff the sum of P150. it had failed to pay. as of that date. Page | 7 ROQUE VS.56 to complete the payment of four monthly installments covering the months of July. the resolution will be affirmed. Issue WRT contempt of court was not discussed since such was pending w/ the Court of Appeals. In accordance with said agreement. should the court. it is free to resort to judicial action in its own behalf. Remanded for further proceedings. to which request plaintiff graciously acceded. that after it had received notice that UP would rescind or terminate the logging agreement. Held: UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the "Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" that. the responsible party will be sentenced to damages. On July 19. UP filed a complaint against ALUMCO for the collection or payment of the herein before stated sums of money and it prayed for and obtained an order for preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction restraining ALUMCO from continuing its logging operations in the Land Grant. forest fees.P.
(Record on Appeal. Moreover.000. under the new contract to sell. defendant occupied and possessed Lots 4 and 12.000.000. which takes the case out of the application of Page | 8 .000. p. Plaintiff demanded upon defendant not only to pay the stipulated monthly installments in arrears.00 per month from August. and enclosed them. 1191.00 for the two lots.00 per month from August. Thereafter.be at the uniform rate of P17. but defendant refused to comply with plaintiff's demands. To allow and grant respondent an additional period for him to pay the balance of the purchase price. which motion was denied by the court. Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan of the Rockville Subdivision) rescinded. resolved and cancelled. (b) Ordering defendant to vacate the said lots and to remove his house therefrom and also to pay plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60. Roque filed the complaint against defendant Nicanor Lapuz for rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale between them involving the two lots in question and prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale.00. and (c) Condemning defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2. and to pay the sum of P2. Plaintiff filed his Answer to the Counterclaim and denied the material averments thereof. costs of the suit and award such other relief or remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.00 and P15. petitioner Felipe C.00 a month from August 1955 until such time as he shall have vacated the premises.000. 118) The Court of Appeals rendered its decision that the defendant Nicanor Lapuz is granted a period of ninety (90) days from entry hereof within which to pay the balance. payable at any time within ten years. However. which balance is about 92% of the agreed price. (Record on Appeal.00. defendant filed his Answer alleging that he bought three lots from the plaintiff containing an aggregate area of 1.00. defendant failed to make any further payment on account of the agreed monthly installments for the two lots in dispute. this appeal. he must first comply what is incumbent upon him. as follows: (a) Declaring the agreement of sale between plaintiff and defendant involving the lots in question (Lots 4 and 12. and that the action being based on reciprocal obligations.56.00. New Civil Code. plaintiff and against the defendant. 118) (a) Declaring the agreement of sale between plaintiff and defendant involving the lots in question (Lots 4 and 12. (b) Ordering defendant to vacate the said lots and to remove his house therefrom and also to pay plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60. before one party may compel performance.00 per square meter payable in 120 equal monthly installments. with interest at 8% annually on the balance unpaid. RTC Judgment in favor of plain.00 per month from August. Hence. security and obligatory force of contracts. he suffered moral damages in the amount of P200. 1955.325. resolved and cancelled. respectively.000.44 with interest due on the purchase price of P12. meters and previously known as Lots 1. p. 1955 until he shall have actually vacated premises. NCC Having been in default and acted in bad faith. not merely casual. On or about November 3. for the fixing of period RULING: No. 1955 until he shall have actually vacated the premises. and (c) Condemning defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2.434.00 as attorney's fees. that no demand for payment of the balance was ever made.00 as attorney's fees. P15. defendant alleges that because of the acts of the plaintiff. he is not entitled to the new period of 90 days from entry of judgment within which to pay petitioner the balance of P11. Pursuant to this new agreement. as well as the costs of the suit. 1957. Respondent as obligor is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 3 of Art. 2 and 9 of Block 1 of Rockville Subdivision at P16. As counterclaim. Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan of the Rockville Subdivision) rescinded.00 and the amount of P740. but also to make upto-date his payments. that the present action for rescission has prescribed. aside from the deposit of P150. he lost two lots containing an area of 800 sq. with barbed wires and adobe walls.00 and incurred expenses for attorney's fees in the sum of P5. he suffered moral damages amounting to P100. as well as the costs of the suit. would be tantamount to excusing his bad faith and sanctioning the deliberate infringement of a contractual obligation that is repugnant and contrary to the stability. defendant alleges that the complaint states no cause of action. the defendant to vacate the two parcels of land and remove his house therefrom and to pay to the plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. including the portion where his house now stands. ISSUE: Can private respondent be entitled to the Benefits of the third paragraph of Article 1191. On January 22. which were paid under their previous agreement. plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate the lots in question and to pay the reasonable rentals thereon at the rate of P60. respondent's failure to pay the succeeding 116 monthly installments after paying only 4 monthly installments is a substantial and material breach on his part. that due to the filing of the present action. 1960.00 as attorney's fees. Defendant admits having occupied the lots in question. meters and as a consequence.200 sq. As affirmative and special defenses.
J. Ramon B. A motion to reconsider this decision was denied and thereupon defendants presented a petition for relief. sentencing defendants Concepcion Mining Company and Jose Sarte to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the amount of P7. New Civil Code. Gustavo Victoriano.00 exclusive of all costs and fees allowed by law as stipulated in the contract of real estate mortgage. claim should be also against the estates of such. the following rules of construction apply: xxx xxx xxx (g) Where an instrument containing the word "I promise to pay" is signed by two or more persons. Legarda should have been included as a party-defendant and his liability should be determined in pursuance of the provisions of the promissory note. 1955 until respondent shall have actually vacated the premises. INC. as a special defense. The court in its decision ruled that the inclusion of said defendant is unnecessary and immaterial. Sarte" Upon the filing of the complaint the defendants presented their answer in which they allege that the co-maker the promissory note Don Vicente L. 1946 and his estate is in the process of judicial determination in Special Proceedings No. By: (Sgd.. they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. HELD: The defendants move that since their co-makers have died.26 with interest up to September 29. plaintiff-appellee. Legarda be included as party-defendant. Art. vs. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. asking that the effects of the judgment be suspended for the reason that the deceased Vicente L. plus 10% of the amount as attorney's fees. .. The present action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover from the defendants the face of a promissory note the pertinent part of which reads as follows: Manila. Legarda died on February 24. I promise to pay to the order of the Philippine National Bank . This motion for relief was also denied. petitioner is entitled to rescission with payment of damages which the trial court and the appellate court. and costs of this suit. — Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous or there are omissions therein.00 as attorney's fees. The demand made against one of Page | 9 . 1954 NINETY DAYS after date. in accordance with the provisions of Article 1216 of the Deny Civil Code and section 17 (g) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. In case it is necessary to collect this note by or through an attorney-at-law. Jose S. March 12. and as the promissory note was executed jointly and severally by the parties. INC. plus a daily interest of P1.) VICENTE LEGARDA (Sgd. 1191. CONCEPCION MINING COMPANY. hence defendant appealed to this Court. 1216. Full Text PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK. 1191.00 per month from August. On the basis of this allegation it is prayed. defendants-appellants. they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon.C. LABRADOR. The Court also sustained the right of the petitioner to the possession of the land. granted in the form of rental at the rate of P60. 1959. by the court. .) VICENTE LEGARDA President (Sgd.3698 thereafter up to the time the amount is fully paid. Section 17 (g) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides as follows: SEC. PNB vs. This was denied Where an instrument containing the words “I promise to pay” is signed by two or more persons. 17. 29060 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court affirmed the same to be fair and reasonable. . plus P2.C. Pursuant to Art. the payee of the promissory note had the right to hold any one of the them responsible for the payment of the amount of the note. for value received. Demetrio Miraflor for defendants-appellants. N. the makers and indorsers shall pay ten percent (10%) of the amount due on the note as attorney's fees. Hon. (Purpose — mining industry) CONCEPCION MINING COMPANY. de los Reyes for plaintiff-appellee.. which in no case shall be less than P100.the benefits of pa paragraph 3. And Article 1216 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also provides as follows: ART. Holder may accept partial payment reserving his right of recourse again each and all indorsers. in the latter's original decision. By virtue of this provision found in Section 17.197.: Appeal from a judgment or decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. ordering thereby respondent to vacate the same and remove his house therefrom. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some of them simultaneously. presiding.) JOSE S SARTE "Please issue check to — Mr. ET AL.000. Demand and Dishonor Waived. that the estate of said deceased Vicente L. Concepcion Mining FACTS: A case for collection of a sum of money was filed against defendants in connection with a promissory note they issued with others.
the payee of the promissory note had the right to hold any one or any two of the signers of the promissory note responsible for the payment of the amount of the note. The attorney for the defendants Atty. said amount representing premiums and documentary stamps on the surety bond Exh. She contends that appellee’s claim should have been presented according to Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court and its failure to do so operates to bar its claim forever. for the benefit of Felicisimo V. if there be any. 2. namely. Sarte himself and he should be held primarily responsible for the correctness of the record on appeal.000 and P40. Evidently. herein defendant-appellant. A motion to dismiss was filed by the appellant on the ground the plaintiff’s cause of action.00 it had executed jointly and severally with them in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines. 500. So ordered. the brief of appellee on page 4 sets forth said name of Jose S. 1. jointly and severally to assure indemnification of the latter of whatever liability it may incur in connection with its posting the security bonds to lift the attachments in 2 civil cases instituted for the amount of P60.33 annually for a period of 4 years from June 29.. Sarte as one of the co-maker of the promissory note. November 21. After trial. Sarte is no one of the co-makers. 1962 representing premiums and documentary stamps on the Homestead Bond Exh. In view of the above quoted provisions. 000 under the surety bonds and arrears in premiums thereon. Jose S. Legarda as a defendant in the action. representing 20% of the principal claim of plaintiff. to pay the plaintiff under the first cause of action. DAVID 133 SCRA 317. executed 2 indemnity agreements in favor of appellee The Imperial Insurance Inc. first.00. 000 and P40. and a further sum of P1. when it should. have been barred for its failure to file its claims against the estate of the deceased Felicisimo V.00 annually from June 20. to pay the plaintiff under the second cause of action.000.000. Our attention has been attracted to the discrepancies in the printed record on appeal. Reyers and his wife Emilia T. as two defendants are named in the complaint and the only defense of the defendants is the non-inclusion of the deceased Vicente L. "C-1" with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until full payment is made. that the names of the defendants. We note. Under the law and well-settled jurisprudence. His wife qualified and took her oath of office as the administratix of the said intestate estate. Fortunately.” commenced. and Vicente L. Inc.00 with interest at legal rate from the filing of the complaint until fun payment shall be effected. Sarte to explain why in his record on appeal his own name as one of the defendants does not appear and neither does his name appear as one of the co-signers of the promissory note in question. Page | 10 IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. Concepcion Mining Company. Inc. said amount representing premiums and documentary stamps in the surety bond. This judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. Legarda and Jose S. Reyes. "B". 1984 FACTS: Felicisimo V. order the said Atty. 1961 until termination of this case. and a further sum of P1.000.522. the amount of P40. Reyes.50 annually from June 20. therefore. We also note that the copy of the promissory note which is set forth in the record on appeal does not contain the name of the third maker Jose S. there is an attempt to mislead the court into believing that Jose S. 3. the amount of P60. with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until full payment is made. 1961 until termination of this case. with interest at legal rate from the filing of the complaint until full payment is made. plus cost. 4.105. who are evidently the Concepcion Mining Co. and as the promissory note was executed jointly and severally by the same parties. do not appear in the printed record on appeal. Meanwhile. "B". David. executed another indemnity agreement in favor of appellee to assure indemnification of the latter under a homestead bond for the sum of P7. Sarte. Exh. to pay the plaintiff under the third cause of action the amount of P153. Appellee made demands on Emilia David to pay the amounts of P60. judgment was rendered in the two Civil Cases against the spouses. Felicisimo later died and Special Proceedings . to pay the plaintiff in concept of attorney's fees the sum of P20. 39-40. Rollo) ISSUE: Can the creditor choose to proceed against the surviving solidary debtor instead of bringing an action in accordance with Rule 86 (sec. Jose S. The spouses jointly and severally. The title of the complaint set forth in the record on appeal does not contain the name of Jose Sarte. Sarte. the court rendered judgment against the herein appellant Emilia T.them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others so long as the debt has not been fully collected. 5) of the Revised Rules of Court? RULING: Yes.000. David.00 with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until full payment shag be made. We. VS. and Jose S. (pp. Sarte. entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Felicisimo V. Reyes in due time.
Moreover. “Where the obligation assumed by several persons is joint and several.” There is nothing improper. Villarama.” Article 1216 of the Civil Code also states that. as held in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. the latter may demand from either of them the whole obligation. As distinguished from a joint obligation where each of the debtor is entitled only for a proportionate part of the debt and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit. in the case of Philippine International Surety vs. as a consequence. Page | 11 . The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others. in a solidary obligation the creditor may enforce the entire obligation against one of the debtors. each of the debtors is answerable for the whole obligation with the right to seek contribution from his co-debtors. In the case at bar. the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the deceased debtor wherein his claim would be filed.when the obligation is a solidary one. “The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. appellant signed a joint and several obligation with her husband in favor of herein appellee. so long as the debt has not been fully collected. Gonzales. vs. in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtor alone.
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