IBP 2071_12 CAN OIL BE RESPONSIBLE?

ASSESSING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR Botelho, Tatiana1

Copyright 2012, Instituto Brasileiro de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis - IBP Este Trabalho Técnico foi preparado para apresentação na Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012, realizado no período de 17 a 20 de setembro de 2012, no Rio de Janeiro. Este Trabalho Técnico foi selecionado para apresentação pelo Comitê Técnico do evento, seguindo as informações contidas no trabalho completo submetido pelo(s) autor(es). Os organizadores não irão traduzir ou corrigir os textos recebidos. O material conforme, apresentado, não necessariamente reflete as opiniões do Instituto Brasileiro de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis, Sócios e Representantes. É de conhecimento e aprovação do(s) autor(es) que este Trabalho Técnico seja publicado nos Anais da Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012.

Resumo
Os produtores de petróleo e gás figuram entre as maiores empresas a nível mundial por valor de mercado (Financial Times, 2011). Há um consenso que a demanda mundial por petróleo vai continuar a crescer, e que combustíveis fósseis serão extraídos aplicando tecnologias cada vez mais complexas em lugares com crescente dificuldade de acesso. Investidores tradicionais e socialmente responsáveis seguraram uma parcela significativa de empresas petrolíferas. O aumento dos riscos que essas empresas estão tomando pode ser uma ameaça financeira para os gestores de investimentos. O objetivo deste estudo é fornecer uma visão geral do estado atual das avaliações de sustentabilidade de empresas de petróleo e gás e verificar a previsibilidade de derramamento de óleo de um determinado índice. Há grandes disparidades entre os índices analisados, especificamente em termos de empresas do ranking. O Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) foi cuidadosamente selecionado para um exame mais aprofundado, porque foi o primeiro índice global, divulga regularmente e, até 2010, informações sobre a composição dos membros estava disponível publicamente. Dois indicadores que medem derrames de petróleo foram selecionados: número de derrames e quantidade derramada. O teste z foi aplicado para verificar se os membros DJSI derramam menos que as empresas não membros. Nossos resultados são consistentes com a literatura que a sustentabilidade corporativa não é bem definida e suporta a hipótese de que as metodologias atuais não identificaram adequadamente o desempenho social e ambiental e exposição ao risco das empresas de petróleo, resultando em índices distorcidos. No entanto, não foi possível testar se os critérios de DJSI "para as libertações para o ambiente", que incluem vazamentos de petróleo, identifica corretamente as empresas mais propensas a derrames de petróleo. A literatura e os nossos resultados preliminares deixam claro a necessidade de definir adequadamente a sustentabilidade empresarial e escolher melhores métricas e procedimentos para avaliar o desempenho social e ambiental.

Abstract
Oil & gas producers are consistently figured among the largest firms globally by market cap (Financial Times, 2011). There is consensus the world´s demand for oil will continue to grow, and fossil fuel will be extracted applying ever more complex technologies from increasingly remote places. Mainstream and socially responsible investors hold a significant portion of international oil companies (IOCs) and some publically traded national oil companies (NOCs). The upsurge in risks these companies are taking can be a financial hazard to investment managers. The purpose of this study is to provide an overview of the current state of sustainability ratings of oil &gas firms and verify the predictability of a selected rating in terms of oil spill. There are considerable disparities among the indexes analyzed, specifically in terms of ranking companies. The DJSI was carefully chosen to be further scrutinized because it was the first global index, it reports regularly and, until 2010, information on member composition was publically available. Two metrics that measure oil spills were selected: number of spills and amount spilled. A z-test was applied to verify if members of DJSI spill less than non-members. Our results are consistent with the literature that CSR in ratings is not well defined and supports the hypothesis that current methodologies haven´t adequately identified social and environmental performance and risk exposure of oil companies resulting in skewed benchmarks. However, it was not possible to test if the DJSI criteria for “releases to the environment”, which include oil spills, identifies correctly the companies most prone to oil spills. The literature reviewed and our preliminary results make clear the need to adequately define corporate sustainability and

______________________________ 1 Aluna de Doutorado, Programa de Planejamento Energético, COPPE, UFRJ

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 choose better metrics and procedures to evaluate social and environmental performance. This is true weather investors want to reduce risk exposure, in case of ESG investing, or want to promote a behavior that will yield in a more sustainable society.

1. Introduction
Oil is the world’s most widely used source of energy having a 34% market share in 2010, and is, by far, the most traded energy resource (BP, 2011). Traditionally, oil companies are powerful players in national and international political economy as their revenues have been regularly higher than many medium sized countries. Currently, five of the top ten largest publically traded companies in the world by market cap are the oil & gas producers (Financial Times, 2011). Since the renowned geologist, M. King Hubbert, was able to predict the peak of US oil production, the academic and business worlds have been debating the end of oil. Albeit this ongoing discussion, Tsoskounoglou et.al. (2008) assures there is consensus that the world´s demand for oil will continue to grow and fossil fuel will be extracted applying ever more complex technologies from increasingly remote places. In all scenarios foreseen by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010), petroleum remains a crucial source of energy by 2035. The exploration and production (E&P) process often brings negative impacts to the people and the environment in the areas of production, as exemplified in the Niger Delta, Gulf of Mexico and Alberta Oil Sands (Taylor et.al., 2004; Akpan, 2006; Oil Spill Commission, 2011). The escalation in extraction and refining complexity will be accompanied by an increase in potential hazards. Despite high revenues, many studies question the contribution this activity brings to producing regions. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), statistical data indicate that developing countries rich in petroleum have not had the capacity to convert the wealth into citizens’ wellbeing, also called "Paradox of Plenty" (Skjærseth et.al. 2004). Often time governments, even those of developed nations, establish policies which can lead to inadequate incentives for firms to prevent accidents with disastrous consequences (Cohen, 2010). For example, Cohen (2010) explains that policy makers could justify inadequate penalties for oil spill to stimulate domestic offshore drilling because of energy security. Mainstream and socially responsible investors hold a significant portion of International Oil Companies (IOCs) and some publically traded National Oil Companies (NOCs) (Steverman, 2010; FT, 2011; Shapiro and Pham, 2011). The upsurge in risks these companies are taking can be a financial hazard to investment managers. BP stocks, which were trading at near US$60.00 a share, fell to US$27.00 during the Deepwater Horizon Accident, have not fully recovered. Under this scenario, investors are increasingly looking at sustainable indexes for performance measures and risk reduction (UKSIF, 2010). Fund managers have a limited ability to analyze information about social and environmental performance of companies, therefore, demand tools, such as ratings and corporate reports, which deliver information in a format to facilitate decision making (Avetisyan, 2010). Just as credit ratings “enhance transparency and efficiency in debt capital markets by reducing information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders”, social ratings aim to provide social investors accurate information that makes transparent the extent to which firms’ behaviors are socially responsible (Mc Daniel, 2007 apud Chatterji et. al. ,2009). Investors may have different definitions of corporate social responsibility; nonetheless, a common ground is the involvement in major accidents, frauds and corruption. Chatterji and Levine (2007) argue that regardless of the motives of investors, “all desire predictive validity for social ratings”. However, current methodologies haven’t adequately identified social and environmental performance and risk exposure of oil companies resulting in skewed benchmarks. For example, before the Gulf of Mexico accident, BP had a better reputation than its peers in terms of social responsibility, despite a history of accidents in its American operations (Steverman, 2010; Freeland, 2010). When the accident occurred, BP was part of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and the FTSE4Good. In 2007, the British major was listed in first place in the most responsible companies ranking developed by Fortune magazine and AccountAbility. In 2009, the consultancy Management & Excellence considered it the most sustainable among its peers, and in 2010 Tomorrow's Value placed BP on the top spot. Rogoff (2010) highlights a few characteristics that make it difficult to assess the social responsibility of O&G firms: the promise of innovation, unfathomable complexity, lack of transparency, and the wealthy and politically powerful lobbies that pressure even the most robust governance structures. Moreover, large oil corporations, NOCs and IOCs alike, are viewed by governments as agents of energy security (Jaffe and Soligo, 2007), operate in regions of social conflict, and have a potential to cause irreversible damage to the environment. At the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident, SRI funds and indexes held millions of dollars in BP shares (Steverman, 2010). There seems to be a general lack of literature determining how social and environmental factors must be considered to assess the sustainability performance of oil firms. With an adequate model to evaluate CSR, either IOCs or NOCs, investors can both reduce their exposure to inadequate environmental and social behavior and influence 2

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 practices in these firms. Thornley et. al. (2011) presents energy as one of eight key areas of impact identified by investors, thus confirming the relevance of studying this sector in the socially responsible literature. The purpose of this study is to provide an overview of the current state of investment sustainability ratings of Oil & Gas firms and verify the predictability of a selected rating in terms of oil spill. The first part was an exploratory review of all investment indexes which contemplated global O&G and performed a social, environmental and economic analysis of the members. In the second part, a simple statistics test was applied to verify if companies listed in the selected index were less likely to have oil spills than non-members in the period of 2002-2009. The paper begins with a literature review of socially responsible investment ratings followed by behaviors and CSR strategies of oil corporations. Then, a few selected rating are further scrutinized, a statistics test is applied to verify the ability of one index to list companies with lower spills. Finally, some preliminary findings are summarized.

2. Literature Review
The roots of socially responsible investors (SRI), also called ethical or sustainable investing (Renneboog et al., 2008) are religious, dating back many centuries (Statman, 2010). This movement, however, gained momentum over the past decade as evidenced by membership of 855 institutions, representing around U.S. $ 30 trillion in assets, to the Principles Responsible Investment of the United Nations (UN PRI, 2011). The concept of socially responsible investment is growing in popularity, and thus, gaining an increasing interest from academia in recent decades (Van den Brink and Van Der Woerd, 2004; Zorraquin and Schmidheiny 1996, O´Rourke, 2002; Fowler and Hope, 2007; Ziegler and Schröder, 2010). Using a categorization the responsible investment (RI) literature, Hoepner (2007) showed that the largest amount of studies was found for “Financial Performance” with 166 papers. Although there is a large amount of literature seeking to establish a link between social and environmental performance with financial returns, there is still uncertainty about the significance of this relationship (Margolis et. al, 2007). Critics of the SRI movement suggest that SRI funds have been “very sloppy and often flat out wrong in identifying ‘doing good’” (Jon Entine, 2006 apud Chatterji et. al., 2009). Defining corporate sustainability, selecting indicators and weights that adequately reflect social and environmental performance seems to be the biggest challenge faced by these ratings. The O&G sector is essentially different than other industries and must be looked at considering its specific challenges. For some critics, given that oil is not a sustainable energy source and the risks inherent in their exploration, production and consumption are high, these companies should not be part of social responsibility funds (Sverjensky, 2010). In fact, oil companies are consistently named among the least trusted corporations, and survey findings suggest that the oil industry ranks foremost in the public mind as needing more regulation (Corso, 2009 apud Spangler and Pompper, 2011). On the other hand, many in the sustainability field see SRI to have the potential to shift corporate behavior towards more sustainable patterns of production and consumption (O´Rourke, 2003). Sustainability ratings can create a healthy competition among the companies, which could lead to a greater overall improvement in industry standards. In addition, oil companies are enjoying record profits with high oil prices, consequently are preferred by pension funds and institutional investors who seek to benefit from the increase in share value (Shapiro and Pham, 2011). Slack (2011) highlights that, although there is no standard definition of CSR in the sector, industry associations, such as International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), has been active in defining elements and best practices. Dahlsrud (2005) found to be a high degree of collaboration and information sharing among the four firms studied, corroborating with the theory of institutional isomorphism in the O&G industry. The author points to the need for further research to clarify whether CSR is used for competitive purposes and how the implementation of similar strategies yields different performances. Pegg (2011) dares even further into the isomorphism theory in respect to CSR, claiming that Chinese companies are not “significantly different in their actions from the western oil majors.” Pegg (2011) claims that “western oil company rhetoric on the significance of CSR commitments often greatly exceeds the empirical reality found on the ground…” and that there are “distinct and narrow limits to the kinds of CSR actions these firms are willing to undertake.” The institutional isomorphism is significant because it would make the differentiating the companies significantly more challenging. Investors and other stakeholders who rely on social ratings to identify target companies might be misallocating resources, if these have not been able to identify the best performance on sustainability. When metrics used are invalid, none of the hypothesized benefits of SRI can occur (Chatterji and Levine, 2007). To bring some light to the issue, four recent studies have attempted to scrutinize the rating process and some have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness. Fowler and Hope (2007) performed a critical review of sustainability ratings, focusing on the Dow Jones Sustainability Rating (DJSI). The authors found that DJSI favors large companies. 48.3% of companies in the DJSI had market cap over E$50 billion, whereas the Dow Jones Global Index (DJGI), the pool used to extract firms that make up DJSI, largecap composes 29.6% of the index. 3

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 In the second study, Chatterji and Levine (2007) explore the theoretical perspectives explaining the convergence and predictive validity of Calvert, KLD, FTSE4Good, DJSI and Innovest sustainability investment ratings. The fundamental question behind the paper is whether commonly used indicators of social responsibility are valid measures of corporate sustainability performance, and thus, corroborating the benefits of SRI. The SRI raters were found to have overall low convergent validity even after adjusting for explicit differences in methods and goals. The ability of social metrics to predict major scandals in the near future was measured by the involvement of companies in major scandals, such as fraud against investors, killing of nearby residents and destruction of ecosystems, within a window after being listed in the rating. The results showed the social ratings have a low predictive validity, with 35% of scandals firms and 36% of control firms are in the Domini 400. The results led to the inference that the current diversity in social ratings reflects inconsistent definitions of social responsibility coupled with measurement error. Furthermore, they conclude that the results mean that “most SRI ratings are not measuring “true” social responsibility.” Since they make no claim on what “true” might be, it cannot be determined which rating applies the best metrics. Chatterji, Levie and Toffel (2009) further analyze KLD ratings. They argue that investors seek ratings for a combination of past performance and potential future exposure. The study revealed that KLD´s total environmental concern, as well as the variables that integrate it, reflect past outcomes adequately. The net environmental score and the total environmental concern also predicted future pollution level. However, the total environmental strengths did not reflect subsequent environmental performance. These results indicate that simple autocorrelation has a substantially higher predictive ability of over sophisticated judgment models. The performance evaluation of fifteen firms of the chemical sector vis-à-vis their rating at KLD is analyzed by Delmas and Blass (2010), the fourth and last work to be described in this paper. Not surprisingly, firms with higher toxic release tended also to have lower compliance levels. Remarkably, however, companies with better reporting scores also correlated with lower levels of compliance. The results indicate clearly that companies can perform well in some criteria and poorly in others. When analyzing KLD scores, companies with highest number of environmental concerns also had high score for environmental strengths. Overall, better reporting and advanced management systems were correlated with high levels of toxic releases and less compliance. This result further corroborates Chatterji, Levie and Toffel (2009)’s conclusion that researchers and stakeholders alike still need to find better measures to qualify environmental management.

3. Overview of O&G Sustainability Ratings
The exploratory research for agencies that rate the O& Gas sector began by establishing the following selection criteria:     Analysis segregated by industry specific criteria, in this case, oil and gas sector. Inclusion of companies from a global based pool. Evaluate social, environmental and governance issues. Target audience mainly investors and companies. Well known and respected ratings, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, were excluded due to their focus on one issue, in this case, climate change. In addition, ratings that compare companies from different industries were excluded, such as Forbes' 100 Most Trustworthy Companies. Also, a global scope was important, thus KLD whose parent index is MCSI USA or Corporate Sustainability Index of Bovespa, which only includes Brazilian listed companies, were also not contemplated. The next step was to gather methodology, members and selection process for the following selected ratings/indexes: Dow Jones Sustainability Index developed by Sustainable Asset Management (SAM); GS Sustain developed by Goldman Sachs; Oekom Industry Focus - Oil & Gas developed by Oekom research AG; Tomorrow's Value Rating (TV) developed by Two Tomorrows; World’s Most Sustainable Oil Companies developed by Management & Excellence (M&E); FTSE4Good ESG developed by EIRIS. The comparison between the ratings of the classification is complicated primarily because of lack of regularity and transparency. Table 1 presents the latest available ratings of companies from 2002-2010. Total is the only company included in all indexes, followed by a strong presence of Shell, Repsol, Petrobras and ENI. Of those, Petrobras is the only nonEuropean. Note the low membership of American companies. Table 1. Company Rankings in Sustainability Ratings Year Rating BG Group BP BHP Billiton 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 DJ DJ DJ GS DJ GS ME DJ GS ME L L 8 1 3 L 1 L 1 L 1 L 1 3 L 5 2 4 2007 2008 DJ ME DJ ME L L L 4 L 3 2009 2010 DJ ME DJ OE TV L L NA L 1 9 1 NA 4

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 Cairn Chevron Conoco P. CNOOC EnCana ENI ExxonMobil Gazprom Lukeoil Marathon MOLHung. Nam Rete Gas Neste Oil Nexen L L Norsk Hydro L Occidental OMV PEMEX PDVSA Petrobras Petrochina Repsol YPF RD Shell 1 L Santos Sasol ltda Saudi Aramco Sinopec S-OIL COR Statoil L L Suncor Energy L L Total AS Woodside L Source: Developed by Author 9 14 NA NA NA L L NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 NA NA NA 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 10 NA 3 NA

7 11 17 9 4 22 14 19

6 14

6

8 10 L L

7 L 1

9 10 L L

4

7 4

L 12 5 2 9 13 10 12 11 21 12 9 14 13

6

6 16 14 13

5 6 9

6 3 8

10

L L L 7 15 8 10 7 5 1 11 L L L 6 24 17 2 13 3 6 1 L L L 7 8 9 2 5 1 L L L L 19 8 20 1 17 7 5 L L L L

L 5 13 10

L 7

L

L

16 18 15 2

9

L L L L

2 10 7

L L

9 2

L

8

1 8

20 1 L L L 3 6 L L L L 2 4 4 1 L L

26 3 8 16 4 5 1 L L L L 3 L L 3 2 L 1 L

8

L L 3 L L

5

There are considerable disparities in the position each member occupies in the respective indexes. For example, BG is ranked in eighth place in the GS in 2004 and in the following year it the industry leader in the DJSI. In the same year, BP is first in Tomorrow´s Value and ninth in Oekom. OMV, which is not listed in any of the DJSI years, is first place for Oekom. Sasol, the industry leader for the Dow Jones in 2010, is not present anywhere else. In order to share some light into the process of these valuations, the DJSI is studied with more detail below. The DJSI was carefully chosen because it was the first global index, it reports regularly and, until 2010, information on member composition was available on the internet. Studies have demonstrated a negative stock price effect after oil or chemical spills (Cohen, 2010), unlike most social and environmental aspects where results are inconclusive. Since stock prices are representative of future profitability, the ability to select a company that spills less oil seems to be one priority for a rating agency. Another metric that could have been used is regulatory actions or fines. However, these vary significantly in every country and the companies comprehended in these studies operate all over the globe. Thus, the next section presents in more detail the DJSI process and our methodology to analyze how it performs in selecting firms that spill less.

4. Case Study: Dow Jones Sustainability Index
Sustainable Asset Management, the agency responsible for the DJSI, seeks to provide and “Integrated assessment of economic, environmental and social criteria with a strong focus on long-term shareholder value.” It applies consistent rules-based methodology; primary research is a direct contact to companies in the form of a questionnaire. About 40% of the criteria are industry specific, and the rest are a general issues that apply to all the sectors evaluated. SAM also balances the weights of the criteria equally among economic, social and environmental issues. The 5

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 data for each individual company is not available, thus it cannot be assessed how each performed for spill vis a vis their score. But it can be verified if DJSI members have lower spills than non-participants. metrics that measure oil spills were selected, the number of spills and the amount spilled. As discussed above, the literature questions the ability of ratings to select the more sustainable companies. Furthermore, specifically O&G CSR leaders have been subject to extensive criticism for practices not aligned with their rhetoric. Therefore the following hypothesis were formulated: H0 = The DJSI is not able to predict companies that spill more frequently, hence, members and nonmembers will have, on average, the same volume and number of spills. Ha= The DJSI is able to predict companies that spill more frequently, hence, members will have on average lower spill volume and numbers than non-members. Fowler and Hope (2007) reported above that DJSI favored large companies and these are also the most likely to report CSR results. Thus, this study used companies listed on October 25, 2011 in the DJ Sector Titans Oil and Gas Industry and Super Sector, as a pool to select the firms to be analyzed. The O&G Titans comprised of 60 companies, however we were interested only in Oil and Gas Producers, as per the DJSI sector, therefore we excluded service, distributors and refiners. The oil spill data was collected from publically available data at each company´s website or CorporateRegister.com, a website that hosts a comprehensive directory of corporate non-financial reporting.

5. Results and Discussion
The null hypothesis, i.e., the DJSI is not able to predict companies that spill more frequently, was rejected once, for the normalized number of spills at a confidence level 95% (α =0,1 and α=0,05), as per table below. The tests for total spill number and volume and normalized volume confirmed the null hypothesis with a 99% confidence (α =0,01), as can be seen in the table below. Table 2. Statistical Results Total Spill Number Sample size Control 43 DJSI 40 z= 0,03978697 Total Spill Volume Sample size Control 57 DJSI 56 z= -0,0003604

Sample Mean 349,12 234,30

Sample Standard Deviation 350,14 219,27

Sample Mean 14.276,12 16.516,00

Sample Standard Deviation 18.818,75 18.772,69

Normalized Spill Number Sample size Sample Mean Control 56 0,486 DJSI 35 0,355 z= 2,313 P Value =

Sample Standard Deviation 0,500 0,307 0,0104

Normalized Spill Volume Sample size Sample Mean Standard Deviation Control 62 39,815 72,872 DJSI 51 45,091 99,831 z= -0,0529567 Source: Developed by author. In fact, the z values for total spill volume and normalized volumes are negative, but very small, implying a weak selection capability of the DJSI for companies with low spill levels. Our results are consistent with the literature that CSR 6

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 in ratings is not well defined and supports the hypothesis that current methodologies haven´t adequately identified social and environmental performance and risk exposure of oil companies resulting in skewed benchmarks. However, it was not possible to test if the DJSI criteria for “releases to the environment”, which include oil spills, identifies correctly the companies most prone to oil spills. It probably does, as was found in Chatterji and Levine (2007) in the case of KLD, but other factors balance the poor scores, and the overall score can be high. When analyzing sustainability, long run aspects are important, such as climate change. However, ratings, such as the DJSI, update and renew members annually. Therefore, critical impact indicators should be equally relevant, if not more so, to investors. Among short term environmental indicators, oil spill was chosen as our metric not only because it was easiest to measure, but more importantly, for the impact in the loss market value and reputation (Cohen 2010 and Harlow et.al. 2010). It is not clear how to trade off long run versus short run, or how progress on global warming compensates a poor record on worker injuries. However, some minimum standards may be necessary in order for investors to maintain confidence in the rating process. A further in-depth analysis to corporate sustainability in oil production is necessary.

5. Final Remarks
Hydrocarbon exploration is a polluting and potentially corrupting activity. Diminishing conventional sources brings new challenges to environmental protection and social wellbeing. All exploratory sites demand innovative approaches to a responsible exploration: shale gas requires more care to avoid groundwater pollution; tar sands must overcome biodiversity degradation, GHG emissions and water usage; the inherent risk and lack of access in the Arctic and ultra-deepwater sites challenge containment and contingency; Nigeria with terrorists attacks, and so forth. The limits to CSR and what is expected of these corporations must be clearly defined. When evaluating CSR in oil firms, the resource extraction site is also of significant, in addition to company’s policies and practices. The literature reviewed and our preliminary results make clear the need to adequately define CSR and choose better metrics and procedures to evaluate social and environmental performance. This is true weather investors want to reduce risk exposure, in case of ESG investing, or want to promote a behavior that will yield in a more sustainable society.

7. Acknowledgments
I thank Professors Alessandra Magrini, Roberto Schaeffer and Alexandre Szklo. I also thank ANP and FAPERJ for supporting my studies.

8. References
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