Proofs that p

Davidson's proof that p: Let us make the following bold conjecture: p Wallace's proof that p: Davidson has made the following bold conjecture: p Grunbaum: As I have asserted again and again in previous publications, p. Putnam: Some philosophers have argued that not-p, on the grounds that q. It would be an interesting exercise to count all the fallacies in this "argument". (It's really awful, isn't it?) Therefore p. Rawls: It would be nice to have a deductive argument that p from selfevident premises. Unfortunately I am unable to provide one. So I will have to rest content with the following intuitive considerations in its support: p. Unger: Suppose it were the case that not-p. It would follow from this that someone knows that q. But on my view, no one knows anything whatsoever. Therefore p. (Unger believes that the louder you say this argument, the more persuasive it becomes). Katz: I have seventeen arguments for the claim that p, and I know of only four for the claim that not-p. Therefore p. Lewis: Most people find the claim that not-p completely obvious and when I assert p they give me an incredulous stare. But the fact that they find not- p obvious is no argument that it is true; and I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare. Therefore, p. Fodor: My argument for p is based on three premises: 1. q 2. r and 3. p From these, the claim that p deductively follows. Some people may find the third premise controversial, but it is clear that if we replaced that premise by any other reasonable premise, the argument would go through just as well. Sellars' proof that p:

But it is a model theorem that p -> p. and which are completely unrelated to any criticisms that have appeared in the literature (or that I have seen in manuscript).Unfortunately limitations of space prevent it from being included here. Therefore p. Therefore. Also. Plantinga: It is a model theorem that p -> p. But none of them seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case. But the argument can easily be reformulated in a way that avoids employing such an inference rule. It will be noted that the present version of the argument seems to presuppose the (intuitionistically unacceptable) law of double negation. then there is a model for p. Therefore p. Therefore p. Thus p. Surely its possible that p must be true. . all such criticisms misconstrue my argument. . the claim that not-p is false.at the editor's insistence -from a taped manuscript of a lecture. I hope to expand on these matters further in a separate monograph. but which I can't discuss here. Goodman: Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false. Therefore p.for I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. Since I was not even given the opportunity to revise the first draft before publication. But these so. the argument now seems to me to have problems which I did not know when I wrote it. I cannot be held responsible for any lacunae in the (published version of the) argument. Routley and Meyer: If (q & not-q) is true. or for any fallacious or garbled inferences resulting from faulty preparation of the typescript. but important parts of the proof can be found in each of the articles in the attached bibliography. In each such space-time. p. Earman: There are solutions to the field equations of general relativity in which space-time has the structure of a four. _________________ (1) This outline was prepared hastily -. on the basis of alleged counterexamples.dimensional Klein bottle and in which there is no matter. Outline Of A Proof That P (1): Saul Kripke Some philosophers have argued that not-p.called "counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that pin a way that it was obviously not intended -.

if we are to be consistent.  Therefore  p. what? q maybe? More  Proofs  that  P     Anselm:   I  can  entertain  an  idea  of  the  most  perfect  state  of  affairs  inconsistent   with  not-­‐p.   Feyerabend:   The  theory  p.   and  "rationally"  adhered  to.   Churchland:   Certain  of  my  opponents  claim  to  think  that  not-­‐p.  but  all  of  these  critics  have  understood  my  thesis  in  a  way   that  was  clearly  not  intended.Chisholm: P-ness is self-presenting.  so  the  state  of  affairs  inconsistent  with  not-­‐p  obtains. p. PHAEDO: By all means.  Therefore  p. Socrates.  though  "refuted"  by  the  anomaly  q  and  a  thousand  others. PAUSANIAS: Quite so.  For  did  not  the  most  "absurd"  of  theories. THRASYMACHUS: Yes.   may  nevertheless  be  adhered  to  by  a  scientist  for  any  length  of  time.  for  an  obtaining  state  of  affairs  is  better  than  a  non-­‐obtaining   one.  stage  a  come-­‐back  after  two  thousand  years?  And  is  not   Voodoo  now  emerging  from  a  long  period  of  unmerited  neglect?   Goldman:   Several  critics  have  put  forward  purported  "counterexamples"  to  my   thesis  that  p.   heliocentrism. ALCIBIADES: Certainly.  therefore  it  is   proved.  but  it  is  precisely  my   thesis  that  they  do  not. ERYXIMACHUS: The argument certainly points that way.   Plato:   SOCRATES:  Is  it  not  true  that  p?   GLAUCON: I agree. Socrates. PHAEDRUS: What you say is true. POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily. CEPHALUS: It would seem so. ARISTOPHANES: Assuredly. Therefore. Morganbesser: If not p.  since  I  intended  my  thesis  to  have  no   counterexamples. Socrates.  etc. .  If  this  state  of  affairs  does  not  obtain  then  it  is  less  than   perfect.

 I  won't  even  waste  my  time  arguing  for  it  any  further. [John Searle] 10. [Charles Siewert. [Brian Loar] 8. Therefore P. [various] 4.  as  a  result  of  being  closet   Marxists. [Bill Lycan] MORE PROOFS THAT P . [various] 5. Therefore P. Only philosophers would think that not-P." where I argued for P.   and  several  by  people  who  aren't. Not-P entails that there are sense-data. 1. P is a bold and controversial claim that shatters common-sense intuition.  I  shall  label  this  phenomenon  "the  blithering  idiot  effect". You don't think that phenomenology supports that P? Look haaaarder! Therefore P..   While  everyone  knows  deep  down  that  p. Therefore P.Smart:   Stove:   Dammit  all!  p. Therefore P. To think that not-P is to over-intellectualize. Therefore P.  which  everyone  knows  deep  down   anyway. Representationalism entails P & not-P.  As  I   have  shown  that  all  assertions  of  not-­‐p  by  anyone  worth  speaking  of.. Therefore P.  are  due  to  the  blithering  idiot  effect.   there  remains  no  reason  to  deny  p. others] 2. Not-P is true from the transparent perspective. But I take the oblique perspective. [Brian Loar] 3. Therefore P. I know that P is true because I teach it to my undergraduates. Therefore P & not-P.     TOP TEN ARGUMENTS FOR P HEARD AT THE NEH INSTITUTE (T-shirt list. with attributions to arguer added). See my ". It's completely implausible and a violation of common-sense intuition to think that not-P. [various] 7. Aaron Zimmerman] 6. [Galen Strawson.  some  philosophers  feel   curiously  compelled  to  assert  that  not-­‐p. [Bill Lycan] 9. Therefore P.

[Susan Hurley] P gives me an "aha!" reaction. [attributed to Frank Jackson] P* and representationalism holds. I'm beginning to lose my grip on what it means to say that not-P. [Susanna Siegel] Not-P? That just doesn't work for me. [Frank Jackson] Sellars has established to McDowell's and my satisfaction that P. Therefore P. Therefore P. and I'm way too old for that. [John Searle] I've considered and rejected one possible defense of a key premise in one possible argument for not-P. Therefore P. [Brad Thompson] I have a lot of arguments for P. Therefore P. Therefore P. [by Amy Schmitter. Therefore P. [Charles Siewert]   . attributed to unnamed presenter. Sellars argues that not-P. and I want to get the credit. though none of them are very good. [Bob Brandom] Sellars argues that P.) Therefore P. [Colin McGinn] Anyone who says that not-P is using the terms differently from me. but that was wearing his black hat. [by Becko Copenhaver. Therefore P. Therefore P. But I just called them "the folk".] These considerations tend to suggest something in the vicinity of the ballpark of P. [Susan Hurley] Someday someone might discover that P. Therefore P. Therefore P. Therefore P.No amount of tub-thumping by dualists (including my past self) carries any weight in establishing that not-P. attributed to unnamed presenter] The folk think that not-P. Therefore P. I went surfing. (Actually. [Galen Strawson] The argument for not-P has seven steps. Therefore P. Therefore P. [Amy Schmitter] I'm tired. [David Chalmers] Now that I've taken you on this little journey. therefore P&~P. [Bob Brandom] Most philosophers think it is a priori that not-P.

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