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1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; : Medina vs Greenfield GR No.

140228 November 19, 2004 Topic: Concept of Possession (not really an issue in this case) Facts: On June 5, 1962, Pedro, his brother Alberto Medina and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Alberto's daughter) executed a notarized Contract to Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield Development Corporation over a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City, then in the Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 100177 (Lot 90-A) and measuring 17,121 square meters. A notarized Deed of Sale covering said property was subsequently entered into on June 27, 1962, in favor of respondent, and this time signed by Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz, as vendors. Thereafter, a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage was executed on September 4, 1964 in favor of respondent over Lot 90-B covered by TCT No. 100178, measuring 16,291 square meters. Signing as vendors were Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz. By virtue of these sales, respondent was able to register in its name the title to the two parcels of land with TCT No. 100578 covering Lot 90-A and TCT No. 133444 covering Lot 90-B. These properties were consolidated with other lots and were eventually registered on July 19, 1995, in the name of respondent under TCT Nos. 202295, 202296 and 202297. On November 6, 1998, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 98-233, an action for annulment of titles and deeds, reconveyance, damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order, against respondent and the Register of Deeds of Makati. Included in the complaint are the heirs of Nazaria Cruz, as unwilling co-plaintiffs. Petitioners allege in their complaint that they are co-owners of these two parcels of land. While the titles were registered in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and Gregoria, all surnamed Medina, they alleged that they were recognized as co-owners thereof. In support of their case, petitioners maintain that the deeds of sale on these properties were simulated and fictitious, and the signatures of the vendors therein were fake. On July 13, 1998, petitioners caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the titles. After discovering the annotation, respondent constructed a fence on the property and posted security personnel, barring their ingress and egress. Thus, petitioners sought, among others, the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent and its agents and representatives from preventing petitioners to exercise their rights over the properties. Issues: 1. The propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (Branch 276) in Civil Case No. 98-233. (sole issue) 2. WON the GREENFIELD was in constructive possession of the subject premises notwithstanding that petitioners are in actual possession thereof. (for the topic) Ruling: The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites: (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Hence, petitioners' entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the properties subject of the present dispute. The Court notes that the present dispute is based solely on the parties' allegations in their respective pleadings and the documents attached thereto. We have on one hand, petitioners' bare assertion or claim that they are co-owners of the properties sold by their predecessors to respondent, and on the other, respondent's claim of ownership supported by deeds of conveyances and torrens titles in their favor. From these alone, it is clear that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. Petitioners also claim that they are in actual possession of the property. As alleged in their complaint, they instituted Santos Arevalo, a co-petitioner, as caretaker. They also alleged in their petition filed before this Court that Balbino and Yolanda Medina and their respective families are still residing on a portion of the property. Respondent belies their claim, declaring that it employed Arevalo as caretaker. Respondent presented a notarized Receipt and Quitclaim dated April 26, 1994, signed by Arevalo, who attested that he was employed by respondent as caretaker and that his stay on the property was a mere privilege granted by respondent. Possession and ownership are two different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. Even assuming that petitioners' allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in the case at hand because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already deemed equivalent to delivery of the property to respondent, and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred." Possession is also transferred, along with ownership thereof, to respondent by virtue of the notarized deeds of conveyances. In sum, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals was correct in nullifying the same. Possession CHARLES L. ONG, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and

Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

xxx. As correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. [19] Alconaba: The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.

The Trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers, viz: The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants. Respondents appealed to CA and CA reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject lot. No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions. Petitioners predecessor-ininterest, Tony Bautista testified that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997. Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.


FACTS: ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023. Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 216, Quezon City, a case for Recovery of Possession against petitioners, claiming ownership of the property subject of dispute located in E. Rodriguez Avenue and La Filonila Streets in Quezon City, by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41698 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 10, 1958. Respondents alleged that on various dates in 1973, petitioners entered the property through stealth and strategy and had since occupied the same; and despite demands made in March 1993, petitioners refused to vacate the premises, prompting respondents to file the action Petitioners denied respondents' allegations. According to them, respondent Luis Miguel Ysmael (Ysmael) had no personality to file the suit since he only owned a small portion of the property, while respondent Cristeta SantosAlvarez (Alvarez) did not appear to be a registered owner thereof. Petitioners also contended that their


Heirs of De Guzman. RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. thus: In the more recent case of Carandang v. Petitioners claim that they are lawful lessees of the property. while Alvarez is already the beneficial or equitable owner thereof. Nevertheless.D. BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO. the National Mapping Resource Information Authority. by their respective contractual commitments. De Castro. reasserted the rule that any one of the coowners may bring any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.D. All told. they failed to prove any lease relationship or. since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. and the Land Management Bureau. the Court finds no reason to grant the present petition. 2005. any one of them may bring an action. 2016 prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/ occupants. The Ysmael Heirs are merely naked owners of the property.. Therefore. the Court. 2016. Finally. or those whose possession is under litigation. extend only to landless urban families who are rightful occupants of the land and its structures. thus: In sum. A contract of sale has the force of law between the contracting parties and they are expected to abide.occupation of the property was lawful. and dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the program there is no showing that the property has already been acquired by the local government for this purpose. for all intents and purposes. i. to wit: conduct an inventory of all lands and improvements within their respective localities. those who enter the land by force or deceit. RULING: Petition is not meritorious.. were able to prove their right to enjoy possession of the property. only one of the co-owners. or that petitioners have duly qualified as beneficiaries. acquire the lands. all co-owners are real parties in interest. which prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/occupants. 1517 (The Urban Land Reform Law) and Republic Act (R. However. is only for convenience.A. identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas. is an indispensable party thereto.D.) No. a Memorandum of Agreement dated May 2.. The Court also stressed that Article 487 covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession. In Wee v. the present petition for review. Article 1358 of the Civil Code which requires the embodiment of certain contracts in a public instrument. and later on from Alvarez. clearly do not qualify as "tenants" covered by these social legislations. 1517 and 2016.D. No. petitioners. whereby all three apportioned parcels of land allocated to Alvarez under the RTC Decision dated August 30. Block 4. dismissed their appeal and affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. at the very least.this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment. D. vs. and the right to the gains. and non-compliance therewith does not adversely affect the validity of the contract or the contractual rights and obligations of the parties thereunder. Hence. Thus.D. namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property. petitioners' claim that they are entitled to the protection against eviction and demolition afforded by P. while Section 2 of P. for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence. PDNo. rewards and advantages generated by the property pertains to her. 1517. but it covered only Lot 6. and does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract. . in a Decision dated March 14. ISSUES: may a co-owner file an action for recovery of possession without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs since the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all? Does Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P. reinforced by P. ordering the petitioner and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same to the plaintiffs. in suits to recover properties. No. which prohibits the eviction of lawful tenants and demolition of their homes. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR. 1991 was subsequently entered into by the Ysmael Heirs and Alvarez. 2016 (Prohibiting the Eviction of Occupant from Land Identified and Proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development (APD) or as Urban Land Reform Zones and Exempting such Land from Payment of Real Property (Taxes). 1974. forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal). No. Lastly. show with whom they entered the lease contract. Section 6 of P. the subject property was already owned by her. having leased the same from the Magdalena Estate. which. Nos. pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence. the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Evidently. were finally sold. INC. (Emphasis supplied) 11 A Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1985 was later executed by the Ysmael Heirs in favor of Alvarez. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).) No. any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). recovery of possession (accion publiciana). however. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. transferred and conveyed to her. Nos. on the other hand. However.e. and in coordination with the National Housing Authority. 7279 (The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) is not plausible.(Bomedco/BOMEDCO) petitioner. for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation. petitioners asserted that the property has already been proclaimed by the Quezon City Government as an Area for Priority Development under P.. whose occupation of the subject property by mere tolerance has been terminated by respondents. They are not even necessary parties. citing Article 487 of the Civil Code. while the title was yet to be registered in the name of Alvarez. 1517 grants preferential rights to landless tenants/occupants to acquire land within urban land reform areas. and registration of the instrument only adversely affects third parties. 7279 provides for the procedure to be undertaken by the concerned local governments in the urban land development process. in good faith. respondents. Respondents.

In support of the complaint. also testified for the plaintiffs during the trial. thus.. 1937. When Magdaleno Valdez. Instead of indicating ownership of the lot. the entire length of the land from north to south was already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. Sr. an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. While it is true that. a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years. Lot Nos. ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DISMISSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT. 1935. together with a person’s actual and adverse possession of the land. It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands.. something on his property. 954 and 955. constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another. The entire subject land was divided into three.*G. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. in 1935. or must allow someone to do. they immediately demanded the legal basis for Bomedco's claim over Cadastral Lot No. . under Article 620 of the Civil Code. It consequently reversed the trial court. located in Barrio Dayhagon. Sr. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. in 1935. these receipts showed that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it. prior to the sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez. The tracks were used for hauling sugar cane from the fields to petitioner’s sugar mill. before she sold the land to Valdez. 34 ares and 16 centares. Lot No.R. It also contended that plaintiffs’ claim was already barred by prescription and laches because of Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of the property for more than 50 years. No. petitioner unequivocally declared the property to be a “central railroad right of way” or “sugar central railroad right of way” in its real estate tax receipts when it could have declared it to be “industrial land” as it did for the years 1975 and 1985. 953 and 955 remained in the name of private respondents. he respected the grant. 954. Sr. unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. (hereafter Bomedco). Sr. tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him. Therefore. An easement or servitude is a real right. 09491[12] dated 1963 in the name of Magdaleno Valdez. herein private respondents inherited the land. the narrow lot where the railroad tracks lay. it had already acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code. on December 9. 2003+ FACTS: Magdaleno Valdez. The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s possession into an adverse one. for the years 1930. We cannot disregard the fact that. The trial court held that Bomedco had been in possession of Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded. by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing. for the benefit of another thing or person. Teresita Argawanon-Mangubat and Daylinda Argawanon-Melendres (hereafter the heirs). father of herein private respondents Sergio Valdez.[3] He took possession of the property and declared it for tax purposes in his name. Cadastral Lot Nos. Santillan granted Bomedco. was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared for tax purposes in its name. 3935 dated 1922 in the name of Graciano de los Reyes. 3935 with an area of one hectare. 954. Sr. Cebu. July 31. since all the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his general right of ownership. Bomedco’s principal defense was that it was the owner and possessor of Cadastral Lot No. as was their subsequent demand for payment of compensation for the use of the land. acquired the land. this legal precept does not apply in cases where the property is declared to be a mere easement of right of way. 953. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the land. 954 in good faith for more than 10 years. Through their lawyer. Angelina Valdez-Novabos. The right of way expired sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using the land because one of them was then an employee of the company. 1962 and 1963. and Real Property Tax Receipt No. Prior to the sale. Respondent heirs filed a “Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property and Damages with Application for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction” against Bomedco before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and alleged that. having allegedly bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929. we are inclined to believe the version of respondent heirs that an easement of right of way was actually granted to petitioner for which reason the latter was able to occupy Cadastral Lot No. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title. However. 1949. However. Certainly an owner would have found no need for these phrases. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right. purchased from Feliciana Santillan. 1935 to evidence the sale of the land to Magdaleno Valdez. a parcel of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration No. Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of Medellin. 954. When Valdez. they presented an ancient document ― an original copy of the deed of sale written in Spanish and dated December 9. husband of Feliciana Santillan. unknown to them. HELD: After a careful review of the records. Inc. petitioner would not have consistently used the phrases “central railroad right of way” and “sugar central railroad right of way” in its tax declarations until 1963. It ruled that Bomedco only acquired an easement of right of way by unopposed and continuous use of the land.. however. passed away in 1948. several original real estate tax receipts including Real Property Tax Receipt No. The Court of Appeals found that Bomedco did not acquire ownership over the lot. Sr. Cebu in 1965. Sr. Medellin. 124699. A person cannot have an easement on his own land. namely. Jr. Magdaleno Valdez. but not ownership. in 1929.

petitioner. the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements. The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner ordering defendant Felipe Carino to vacate and/or surrender possession to plaintiff Manotok Realty Inc. its possession of the lot can only be presumed to have continued in the same character as when it was acquired (that is. it filed the reivindicatory action against the respondent. Carillo’s evidence shows that he acquired the lot in dispute from a certain Delfin Dayrit on September 25. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent.50 per month from January 21. and. no matter how long.. Block 2 of the subdivision plan Demands to vacate and to surrender possession of the property were made by the Manotok verbally and by publication and by circulars served to Carillo.In the absence of an express grant by the owner. Acquisition of Easement of Right of Way By Prescription Under Art. or conduct by petitioner sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be implied. THE HON. 1962. But when is a party deemed to acquire title over the use of such land (that is. but could not take possession because the whole area is occupied by several houses among which is the one belonging to Felipe Carillo. that Dayrit in turn had acquired the property from the late Carla Tambunting by virtue of a Contract of Sale on Installment Basis. The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land.00. and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man. or was by mere license or tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs). it tenaciously insists on ownership thereof despite a clear showing to the contrary. free of rent. In other words. Thus. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons. Lot 143. being the highest bidder in a sale conducted by the Probate Court After having acquired said property. refused to receive any payment for the same and that it was only lately. then leaving an unpaid balance of Pl. 1954. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement. 1985 GR L-39044 FACTS: Manotok Realty is the registered owner of a parcel of land acquired the aforementioned property from the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. or. for which receipts were duly issued. when Dayrit conveyed the lot to appellant Carillo. In spite of such demands. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE CARILLO. title over the easement of right of way)? In at least two cases. insofar as consistent with this rule. more specifically on September 25. that Dayrit had religiously paid the monthly installments as they fell due. that Dayrit could not continue paying the succeeding installments as they fell due because Vicente Legarda. respondents. upon demand by said heirs in 1989 for the return of the subject land and the removal of the railroad tracks. payment of compensation for the use thereof. INC. in the alternative. The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised. considering the importance of the railway tracks to its business. and . 620 of the Civil Code Under civil law and its jurisprudence. the Carillo continued to occupy the disputed lot and refused to surrender possession. the surviving spouse of Clara Tambunting. vs. an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's property. like the easement of drainage. we held that if: (a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs for the continued use of the land under the principles of voluntary easements or (b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal easement of right of way under Article 629 of the Civil Code. 954 came to be by mere tolerance of the respondent heirs. of the parcel of land and to pay plaintiff the sum of P75. his last payment being on May 25. Furthermore. a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements. until reimbursed by the petitioner for the necessary and useful expenses introduced on the land. its occupation and use of Cadastral Lot No. payment of proper indemnity. petitioner Bomedco which had no title to the land should have returned the possession thereof or should have begun paying compensation for its use. 1961 up to the time he actually surrenders possession The CA reversed the lower court decision and held that Felipe Carillo a builder in good faith with the right to remain in the questioned premises. while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent To be sure. Thus. The petition is DENIED CASE TITLE: MANOTOK REALTY. Jan 31.It is a fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the owner. not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. then title over the use of the land is deemed to exist. it is unlawfully occupying and using the subject strip of land as a railroad right of way without valid title yet it refuses to vacate it even after demand of the heirs. an easement is continuous if its use is. After the petitioner Manotok failed in its attempts to take possession of the lot. the Manotok subdivided it.00 when the said parcel was conveyed to defendant Carino. The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 629 is subject to proof of the following: (1) (2) (3) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway. 1962. but rather the manner of exercise thereof. incessant without the intervention of any act of man. or may be.*43+ None of the above options to acquire title over the railroad right of way was ever pursued by petitioner despite the fact that simple resourcefulness demanded such initiative. that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous. Thus.306. pursuant to a deed of assignment. in the sum of P200. like the easement of right of way. do not start the running of the period of prescription (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. No doubt. it possessed the land only by virtue of the original grant of the easement of right of way). beginning 1959 when the original 30-year grant of right of way given to petitioner Bomedco expired. the distance from the dominant estate to the highway is the shortest. the isolation is not the result of its own acts.

Demontano v. . therefore. the land was already registered in its name. April 7. The complaint alleged that petitioners were the registered owners of a parcel of land in Quezon City. that they later found out TCT No. Therefore. The records show that when Dayrit executed the deed of' assignment in favor of the respondent. Laureta.. Binondo. 64578. (See Garcia v. for his part. 644). Three months later. Thus. and then claims that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. claimed in his Answer that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. 2009 TOPIC: Possession in Good Faith FACTS: Spouses Villamil represented by their son Winfred Villamil. A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. reconveyance. despite the fact that his transferor. Spouses Tolentino and Villarosa null and void. not having been paid. 351553.00 as consideration for the purchase of the land and the payment having been received and acknowledged by Mateo Tolentino. No. if for some reason or other the purchaser cannot pay a certain installment on the date agreed upon. Lazaro Villarosa and the RD of Quezon City. . although no personal notice was served on either of the latter. the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 37 Phil. and injunction against the SpousesTolentino. having paid P276. filed a complaint for annulment of title. a circumstance which should have put him upon such inquiry or investigation. that a Deed of Assignment was likewise executed by Paterno in favor of the Spouses Tolentino. the trial court declared all the TCTs of Paterno. No. Such an act of registration served as a constructive notice to the whole world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including Dayrit and herein respondent. reinstated. and that if the respondent were really acting in good faith. never showed him any title thereto. any tenant or prospective buyer would be unaware that the petitioner acquired the estate as highest bidder at the sale ordered by the probate court. he should have verified from the Register of Deeds of Manila who was the registered owner of the land in question. CASE TITLE: Villamil vs. and. TCT No. which was subsequently acquired by appellee. the property. Civil Code).000. 81 SCRA 286). One who acquires real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein. Considering the facts. Villarosa. that Juanito Villamil Jr. The said contract specifically provides that ". His failure to exercise that measure of precaution which was reasonably required of a prudent man in order to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes him from claiming possession in good faith. (Caram v. the decision of the trial court appears to be correct and is. damages. he had notice of the ownership by the petitioner over said lot. FL Strong Machinery Co.In this petition. was issued in the name of Paterno. reverted to Clara Tambunting and therefore formed part of her estate. 1962—or eight (8) years after the default—the latter had no more right over the same. that on the basis of said document. It is also unthinkable that in the big Tambunting Estate beset with one of the most serious squatter problems in Metro Manila. Bello. 50 Reina Regente St. it is hereby agreed that said purchaser will be given a maximum limit of two months' grace in which to pay his arrears. to construct a residential house on the subject lot. that petitioners proceeded to the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify their title. Manila. the disputed lot was already registered and titled in the name of the petitioner. the Spouses Tolentino executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Villarosa who secured a TCT in his name. the petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in considering the respondent a possessor and builder in good faith. Spouses Villamil asserted that the Deed of Sale in favor of Paterno is a falsified document because they did not participate in its execution and notarization. covered by TCT No. after which the property will revert to the original owner hereof: the Clara Tambunting Subdivision. 13 SCRA 769. Villarosa GR. that petitioners visited the lot and found that a residential house was being constructed by a certain Villarosa. 1954. It argues that at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment in favor of the respondent. Furthermore. On 12 June 2003. the respondent did not even bother to inquire about the certificate of title covering the lot in question to verify who was the real owner thereof.: 177187 RULING: We agree with petitioner. and equities of this case. 526. 351673 was issued in the name of the Spouses Tolentino. Dayrit. ISSUE: Whether or not Carillo is a possessor in good faith WHEREFORE. therefore." The subsequent installment after August 9. that they discovered a Deed of Sale which they purportedly executed in favor of Cipriano Paterno. P. Court of Appeals. 22361. recovery of possession. and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard.. applicable law. .I. when appellant purchased the parcel of land in question from Dayrit on August 25. Art. the presumption of good faith in favor of the respondent cannot apply because as far as the law is concerned. (See Leung Yee v. asked permission from his parents. 103 SCRA 7.

Villarosa then secured the transfer of title in his name. we found that Villarosa had successfully discharged this burden. When dealing with land that is registered and titled. Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary. Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the . embraced in Transfer Certificate of title No. there were no traces of bad faith on Villarosa’s part in acquiring the subject property by purchase.00 from plaintiff and so he required William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale on November 5. Indeed. 1991 Topic: Constructive Delivery (Possession) Plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation. which was then under the name of Spouses Tolentino. The appellate court ruled that the circumstances surrounding Villarosa’s acquisition. Giger.1973 at Davao City before Notary Public. Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the title to be authentic.500. ownership of the property. Good faith. L-50264 October 21. Therefore.00. LUCAS D. 354675 issued in his name is declared valid. Villarosa was then given a copy of the title. TCT No. IGNACIO WONG vs. in 1973. No.. the property was released from mortgage and a deed of sale was executed. He did not have to scrutinize each and every title and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino. This principle does not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. He also found out that the property was mortgaged under the name of Mario Villamor. In 1972. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.On 12 September 2006. who turned out to be the employer of Tolentino. and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. he inquired from Mateo Tolentino about the unfinished structure and was informed that the latter allegedly ran out of money and eventually lost interest in pursuing the construction. In the instant case. He went to the Register of Deeds and was able to verify the authenticity of the title. indicate that he is a purchaser for value and in good faith. A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has already been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger. (T-4244) T-972 from William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3. When he visited the site. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property.00. The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on inquiry.500. The Decision of the CA is affrirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not Villarosa is a purchaser for value and a possessor in good faith HELD: The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who asserts that status. Villarosa redeemed the title from Express Financing Company. the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa. HON. as in this case. He examined the transferor’s title. CARPIO and MANUEL MERCADO G. plaintiff paid the taxes on the land for Mr. Upon reaching an agreement on the price of P276. William Giger again asked an additional amount of P2.R. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title.000. In sum. Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate of title. the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. Then. Thereafter. requires this well-founded belief. or any encumbrance thereon. Villarosa merely responded to a newspaper advertisement for the sale of a parcel of land with an unfinished structure located in Quezon City. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title. Villarosa was able to establish good faith when he bought the subject property. buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face.

computed as follows: Petitioner refused to refund the said amount to respondent. 2009 Topic: Constructive Delivery Facts: Petitioner. Consequently. Civil Code of the Philippines.014. Issue: WON private respondent Mercado has not established prior possession It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. the pacto de retro sale could not be registered. each reversing the decision of the former. . On September 27. the one longer in possession. Respondent. That was the time the matter was brought to the attention of the police of Sta. The price for the parking slot is P240. however. 538. 1976. Civil Code). if the dates of possession are the same. in relation to Articles 1539 and 1542 of the Civil Code. He knew defendants' laborers were in the land in suit as early as August. Arbiter dismissed the case saying that respondent’s action had already prescribed pursuant to Article 1543. HELD: It has not prescribed. On October 10.378. Petitioner then sent to respondent.50 representing excess payments for the 6 difference in the area. Municipal Court favort herein petitioner (defendant Ignacio Wong.655. in relation to Articles 1539 and 1542 of the Civil Code. paid P2.362. Cebu Winland Development Corporation. documents denominated as Deeds of Absolute Sale for the two condominium units. Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name. 7 . 173215 May 21.95. There were several appeals to the Board of HLURB. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession. II. 1989 Ed.70 per check for the balance of the purchase price in the total amount of P5. and if these conditions are equal." (Art. CA found that the only issue is a pure question of law. if there are two possessions. Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case. 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do anything to stop them. Maria. Mr. defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela. Before July. the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art. If. notwithstanding the execution of the instrument. or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. is the owner and developer of a condominium project called the Cebu Winland Tower Condominium. plaintiff Manuel Mercado again went to the land in suit to make copras. He tried to register the pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the registration fee but due to some technicalities. Ong Siao Hua. v.s. .430. which practically fixes a prescriptive period of such actions to 6 months from date of delivery. After the purchase price was fully paid with the last check dated January 31.he went periodically to make copra but he never placed any person on the land in litigation to watch it. for the latter’s signature. The Court finds the private respondent have taken possession of the property earlier in point of time and Wong is an intruder and mustnreturn the possession of the land. the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself. respondent filed a Complaint on August 7. 1997. respondent was distressed to find that the stated floor area is only 127 square meters contrary to the area indicated in the price list which was 155 square meters. The defendant Wong placed laborers on the land in suit. the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent. . So.R. (Paras. spouses William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed a case for reformation of instrument with the CFI against plaintiff Mercado.385. During the pendency of this instant complaint for forcible entry. 1998 in the Regional Office of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will. 2406. On November 29. Upon examination of the deed of absolute sale of Unit No. unless there is stipulation to the contrary . The area per condominium unit as indicated in petitioner’s price list is 155 square meters and the price per square meter is P22. 2405 and the identical document for Unit No. in July. Inc. Villareal. it is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro. Vol.298. 1976. Rizal Cement Co.. is a buyer of two condominium units and four parking slots from petitioner. defendant received a copy of plaintiff's complaint for forcible entry with summons to answer which is the case now before the Court. because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he is in actual possession. and accordingly. Neither did he reside on the land. Davao del Sur and the incident entered in the police blotter. 135 SCRA 15 *1985+). the Office of the President and to the CA. ISSUE: WON respondent’s action has prescribed pursuant to Article 1543. the present possessor shall be preferred. No.08 as down payment and issued 24 postdated checks in the amount of P223. 531. respondent requested petitioner for the condominium certificates of title evidencing ownership of the units.105. 1996. built a small farm house after making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. Title: Cebu Windland Development Corp. defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation to find out if there were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner and he found none.000 each. vs. and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. possession of the subject properties was turned over to respondent. Respondent caused a verification survey of the said condominium units and discovered that the actual area is only 110 square meters per unit. 400).) CFI reverse the decision and ruled in favor of herein private respondent. (T-4244) T-974 in the name of William Giger. Defendant Ignacio Wong asked for the delivery of the title to him and so he has in his possession TCT No. Respondent.19. Civil Code. Ong Siao Hua G. then delivery has not been effected. therefore. the one who presents a title.. Respondent demanded from petitioner to refund the amount of P2. 1976. 1976. p.

should this be not possible. unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated. delivery means something in addition to the delivery of property or title. The rescission. 1998 has already prescribed. if the vendee would not have bought the immovable had he known of its smaller area or inferior quality. in this case. ARTICLE 1496. The obligation to deliver the thing sold includes that of placing in the control of the vendee all that is mentioned in the contract. if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract. Respondent. the vendor shall be obliged to deliver to the vendee. the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said boundaries. in the latter case. if any part of the immovable is not of the quality specified in the contract. provided that. even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the contract. Article 1498. Under the Civil Code. (n) ARTICLE 1497. the concept of "delivery" was explained as follows: Delivery has been described as a composite act. In the Law on Sales. counted from the day of delivery. Thus. if the latter should demand it. (1472a) [Emphasis supplied] Petitioner argues that it delivered possession of the subject properties to respondent on October 10. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501. that Article 1498 does not say that the execution of the deed provides a conclusive presumption of the delivery of possession. in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number. Inc. (1462a) ARTICLE 1498. should he not be able to do so. the vendee may choose between a proportional reduction of the price and the rescission of the contract. when the inferior value of the thing sold exceeds one-tenth of the price agreed upon.ARTICLE 1539.. and the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same. although there be a greater or lesser area or number than that stated in the contract. in conformity with the following rules: If the sale of real estate should be made with a statement of its area. Article 1497 above contemplates what is known as real or actual delivery. its area or number should be designated in the contract. It confines itself to providing that the execution thereof is equivalent to delivery. made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number. but. however. shall only take place at the will of the vendee. The thing sold shall be understood as delivered. It should be noted. respondent’s action filed on August 7. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver. ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery. It is an act by which one party parts with the title to and the possession of the property. Inc. on the one hand. there shall be no increase or decrease of the price. The same shall be done. Nevertheless. xxx Under the Civil Code. refers to symbolic delivery by the execution of a public instrument. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on the obligation of the vendor to deliver the object of the sale provide: ARTICLE 1495. hence. when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. he may rescind the sale. Mayfair Theater. the purpose of delivery is not only for the enjoyment of the thing but also a mode of acquiring dominion and determines the transmission of ownership. According to Tolentino. In Equatorial Realty Development. In its natural sense. the lack in the area be not less than one-tenth of that stated. all that may have been stated in the contract. but if. he shall suffer a reduction in the price. even when the area is the same. (1471) [Emphasis supplied] ARTICLE 1543. In the sale of real estate. The actions arising from Articles 1539 and 1542 shall prescribe in six months. or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. and. 1996. when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. which means that the presumption therein can be rebutted by means of clear and convincing evidence. a thing in which both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. contends that his action has not prescribed because the prescriptive period has not begun to run as the same must be reckoned from the execution of the deeds of sale which has not yet been done. on the one hand. the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver the thing which is the object of the sale. the birth of the real right. When the sale is made through a public instrument. besides mentioning the boundaries. it means transfer of possession. at the rate of a certain price for a unit of measure or number. The resolution of the issue at bar necessitates a scrutiny of the concept of "delivery" in the context of the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 of the Civil Code. the presumptive delivery by the execution of a public instrument can be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single price. The delivery under any of the forms provided by Articles 1497 to 1505 of the Civil Code signifies that the transmission of ownership from vendor to vendee has taken place. which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate. v. (1469a) [Emphasis supplied] ARTICLE 1542. delivery may be .

C. that is. the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of Nazalio Crisostomo.T. Following case law. because of MERALCO’s open. In the case at bar. that there has been no true possession in the legal sense of the . hold that the transfer of possession of the subject properties on October 10. Partial Stipulation of Facts. not even the extraordinary. quoted in CA Decision. or which are due to his license (Civil Code. 24. 4416. No. covered by O. situated in Cainta. RULING: MERALCO claims that in the absence of a grant or contract to support its title to the grant. Upon the death of both. the property was inherited by the LEYVAs who were the children of Bibiana. The lower court decided in favor of the LEYVAs and was affirmed by the respondent court upon appeal by the petitioner. 3. Title: MERALCO vs IAC and the LEYVAs G. and the assumption of the same by the vendee In light of the foregoing. the LEYVAs sued MERALCO for damages and sum of money with prayer for attorney's fees and exemplary damages for its continued use of the LEYVAs' property. Rollo). it nonetheless acquired title by prescription because it had been in possession of the property since 1930 or for over 43 years. 792-793) it was held: It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are 'merely tolerated' by the possessor.105. This is true whether the prescriptive acquisition be of a fee or of real rights. or of an easement of right of way nor that it began under the assertion of a right on its part. no encumbrance was annotated thereon. On August 4. but both forms of delivery contemplate "the absolute giving up of the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor. Clandestine…. Arts. LEYVAs’ complaint is deemed barred by description and laches. June 28. de Eladio Leyva. for a perpetual easement of right of way for the erection and operation of the transmission steel towers for which it had paid Crisostomo the sum of $12. In 1931.. and uninterrupted enjoyment enjoyment of the easement for a period of 43 years.either actual or constructive.T. Benedicto (37 Phil. Prior to the issuance of OCT 4416. but to the prescription of right in rem. the mere transfer of the possession of the property subject of the sale is not the "delivery" contemplated in the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 of the Civil Code. We. In Cuaycong vs. MERALCO erected thereon two transmission steel towers numbered 86 and 87. But respondent court correctly ruled out that: There being no evidence that the original use of the property in question by Meralco was based upon any express grant of a fee to the said property. it is evident that they can produce no effect with respect to prescription. later renumbered 76 (situated in Lot 1-K which is owned in common by the LEYVAs and covered by TCT No. if acts of mere tolerance produce no effect with respect to possession. for the same reason holds in one and the other case. (par.216. it appears that respondent was already placed in possession of the subject properties. the action filed by respondent has not prescribed.C. it is evident that the parties did not intend to immediately transfer ownership of the subject properties until full payment and the execution of the deeds of absolute sale. which is also owned in-common by the LEYVAs and covered by TCT No.R. FACTS: Nazario Crisostomo and Maria Escusar owned a parcel of land with an area of 5. Rizal at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and the road leading to the town center of Cainta. in conformity with Article 444 of the same Code. 444 and 1942). in the name of Nazario Crisostomo between 1929 and 1930.40. However. p. This principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole. It follows that since there has been no transfer of ownership of the subject properties since the deeds of absolute sale have not yet been executed by the parties. This fact shows that ownership of the said properties was withheld by petitioner. 338524). it is crystal clear that the deeds of absolute sale were still to be executed by the parties upon payment of the last installment.60 square meters. when O. whether ordinary or extraordinary. This is the rationale behind the jurisprudential doctrine that presumptive delivery via execution of a public instrument is negated by the reality that the vendee actually failed to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale. Palanca Yu-Tibo (2 Phil. as that article provides.014. Ultimately. but by agreement of the parties ownership of the same is retained by the vendor until the vendee has fully paid the price. Nazario Crisostomo. the property passed on to their daughter Bibiana Crisostomo Vda. therefore. Petitioner is ordered to refund the amount of (P2.50). 4416 was issued. 1989 Topic: Tolerated Possession. MERALCO claimed that it had acquired grant from the original owner of the land. 781. In the same vein. And even without a grant of perpetual easement. 39. over subject property. 1973. claiming that the property became off limits because of the high voltage of electric current running in the cable lines. Consequently. ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acquired a perpetual easement of right of way. 71393. "delivery" as used in the Law on Sales refers to the concurrent transfer of two things: (1) possession and (2) ownership. In the case of Cortes vs. continuous. whose title was evidenced by TCT 8144. issued in 1931. 1996 to respondent cannot be considered as "delivery" within the purview of Article 1543 of the Civil Code. 38) the Court said: Without it no kind of prescription is possible. if the vendee is placed in actual possession of the property. there is no "delivery" to speak of in this case since what was transferred was possession only and not ownership of the subject properties. 297168) and 77 (situated in Lot 2-V-6. Consequently. Rep.

” (citing Roxas vs. a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. They hiked to Mt. and a building permit and sanitary/plumbing permit issued for the construction of his house thereon. the case was brought before the SC. nevertheless. the LEYVAs must be compensated and awarded temperate damages. Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a parcel of land located at Upper Kalaklan allegedly evidenced by a certification from the said bureau dated April 10.. In his answer. Fernandez And per petitioners cutesy act of consigning to banks its supposed “rentals”. judgment was reversed. petitioner wrote to the respondent advising him to stop construction of the building that he was putting up within the parcel of land in question. CA) 1961." Ruling: Impressed with demerit! Brief recital of facts by the Court of appeals: Topic: Tolerated Possession Facts: Fernandez. the only legal implication is that their possession thereof is by mere tolerance… A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission. Issue: W/N the CA erred in holding that "the instant petition must be resolved on the all important issue of priority of possession instead of the issue as to who is the legal possessor of the lot subject of the litigation. (See also Ayala de Roxas vs. one of the registered co-owners of a parcel of land. he discovered that petitioner was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof. petitioners claimed that they have been paying rent to another co-owner (named de Venecia) for 50-plus years. while visiting the property. Ordinary Residence Permit No. served upon the petitioning spouses Llobrera—in possession of the said lot—a written demand to vacate. However. Olympus. the petitioner filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to purchase it under Miscellaneous Sales Application. as supposedly evidenced by a certification from the latter 18 dated April 10. attorney's fees and annual compensation for the loss of use and deprivation of opportunity to profit and benefit from their lands. is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand. 1979. alleging that in1980. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño and such possessory acts. Hence. The MTC dismissed the complaint. However. it is clear that MERALCO never acquired any easement over the LEYVAs' property to construct and operate the steel towers.word. it must be adverse. they failed to present the receipts supposedly issued them for the payments. no matter how long so continued. 24 Phil. Municipality of Nueva Caceres vs. 745.. without his knowledge and consent. 1979. When they were formally sued. In 1977. to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right. without any contract between them. 1675 was issued by the Bureau of Forestry authorizing the petitioner (herein respondent Chua) to occupy four hectares of public forest land situated in Sitio Upper Kalaklan. Hence. upon appeal to the CA. The spouses clung on persistently to the soil and ignored the ultimatum laid down by Fernandez. Director of Lands and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres. Ruling: The gods took just 10 seconds to resolve the issue. 485) Possession. under the Civil Code. Based on the foregoing. and that the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him for the years 1970 to 1979. “From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for petitioners’ possession of the subject premises. chua filed the case for forcible entry petitioner claims that he entered into and took possession of the contested lot in 1970 pursuant to a permit granted to him by the Bureau of Forest Development. do not start the running of the period of prescription. 8 Phil. failing which. must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueño) or to use the common law equivalent of the term. Rep. blaming a 1996 fire. . when the co-owners refused to accept the same: “…the alleged consignation of the P20. Petition DENIED Llobrera vs. having been declared alienable and disposable. the latter has no obligation to receive any payment from them…” Gabriel Elane vs.00 monthly rental to a bank account in respondent’s name cannot save the day for the petitioners simply because of the absence of any contractual basis for their claim to rightful possession of the subject property…the possession of the property by the petitioners being by mere tolerance as they failed to establish through competent evidence the existence of any contractual relations between them and the respondent. CA & Chua Topic: Priority of possession Facts: Chua filed an action for forcible entry for the eviction of petitioner Gabriel Elane. having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow. which the RTC affirmed. that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970. in effect alleging that they were in possession by virtue of a contract of lease. Maglonso. Consequently. Rep.

The CA decided for Lourdes Alonte. imputing as cause for the loss of her original copy of the title a 1988 fire that ravaged the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (where her OCT was kept). Obviously. Aenlle (1924) Digester: angelo Facts: Lourdes Alonte filed a Petition for the Reconstitution of an Original Certificate of Title and the Issuance of the Corresponding Owner's Duplicate thereof. How then can it be correctly concluded that based upon such certification and permits. The Court rebuffed its attempt to nullify the findings of fact made by both the RTC and the CA. meters. Indeed. Her petition apparently in conformity with the requisites of the whole process and backed by ample evidence (tax declarations. its jurisdiction being limited to errors of law. Since the decisive issue is priority of possession and private respondent had been in actual and continuous possession of the land since August 16. the Regional Trial Court granted respondent Topic: Effects of possession Facts: Don Ramon Martinez de Viademonte. the good Republic. And the building and sanitary/plumbing permits (Annexes B and C to answer) could not have established his possession of the parcel of land since 1970 because aside from the fact that they bear no date of actual issuance. . he remained in physical possession thereof. the right of possession over the land reverted to the Bureau of Lands thereby vesting in said entity the sole right to institute any forcible entry case over the land in question. declared in the name of Lourdes Alonte. One of the Republic’s primary contests against Alonte’s petition was her lack of actual possession of the property. as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. had been paid. Viademonte sold to plaintiff’s grantors another tract of land about 3. We likewise reject this submission. sufficient citation of the names of all adjoining owners. and was contiguous to. Article 524 of the New Civil Code provides that possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.This is inaccurate.” Most importantly. which adjoined.000 sq. she moved to the United States. filed a timely Notice of Appeal.194. The respondent court expressly observed that while private respondent's permit to occupy the land may have expired in 1969. Petitioner argues that by reason of the expiration of said permit. testified that it is she and her family who are residing on the subject lot does not negate the statement in the petition for reconstitution that it is respondent who is in possession of the lot. which prompted the RTC to refer the issue to the Court of Appeals. Also from his original land. “The fact that Editha Alonte. 1979. given the fact that less than a year after she instituted the action. a technical description of the property approved by the Land Registration Authority. sold to defendant Aenlle a total of 3. After all. Ana. It merely certified to the fact that the parcel of land in question was found to be Alienable and Disposable Land.” that conclusions per facts made by the lower courts “generally become conclusive upon the Court. respondent's attorney-in-fact. however. exception Wolfson vs. This is supported by the Certification from the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City which states that the real property taxes on said property. the land of the defendant. Her Owner’s Duplicate likewise was lost. the respondent Elane had entered into and had taken possession of the parcel of land in question since 1970? Under these circumstances. However.77 square meters in two purchases of land from his (Viademonte) 3 ½ hectare hacienda. and its non-renewal. they were accomplished by the applicant whose residence certificate appears to have been issued only on January 5. Said permits were not actually introduced in evidence by the respondent Elane in support of his allegations and defenses. Republic vs. Editha Alonte. the one who has possessed the property thenceforth was her attorney-in-fact. his material possession must be protected in this ejectment case until a competent court in an appropriate case determines which of the contending parties has the better right of possession. Petitioner. We are convinced that private respondent has priority of possession over petitioner whose entry into the subject lot may be reckoned only as of 1979. et cetera). 1961. submits that the expiration of private respondent's permit in 1969. deprived the latter of his possessory right over and the corresponding right to eject petitioner from the subject lot. for which she accordingly filed an affidavit with the Registry. Manila. it ruled that respondent Alonte does not have to actually possess the lot in order to be considered “in possession”. Alonte Alonte’s petition. Ruling: A slip by the good Republic. owner of land about 3 ½ hectares known as Hacienda de Namayan in Sta. reiterating the ever-reliable principle that the SC is “not a trier of facts. Editha Alonte was exercising possession over the land in the name of respondent Lourdes Alonte.” Topic: Rule regarding possession as a fact.

is defendant Aenlle’s possession can be characterized as adverse to plaintiff Wolfson? 2. and the adjoining owner is ignorant of the encroachment. — The general rule is that where one in ignorance of his actual boundaries takes and holds possession by mistake up to a certain line beyond his limits. and that most of it was taken from the 3. After 1910 the defendant's possession of the land in dispute could not be adverse to plaintiff's claim until after the cadastral survey was made. through ignorance. . In such a case the intent to claim title exists only upon the condition that the line acted upon. respondents.52 square meters of land was in excess of what appears in his deeds of sale. or mistake. informed plaintiff Wolfson that his land in Sta. Katigbak. acquiring it by prescription. and defendant claims only what is stated in area in his deeds of sale as gleaned from the conversation of the parties ---“"Let us wait for the cadastral survey. and hostile to the true owner's title and to the world at large. but has no intention to claim title to that extent if it should be as certained that such line is on his neighbor's land. I think SC in this case is referring to the 10 year ordinary acquisitive prescription] the belief that it is the true line. notorious. meters. the holding is not adverse. Sometime in 1909. but with the intention to claim only to the true line wherever it may be. CHUA. . The theory on which these decisions proceed is that in cases of mistake as to the true line between adjoining lands the real test as to whether or not a title will be acquired by a holding for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations is the intention of the party holding beyond the true line.000 sq. and unintentionally puts a wall a few inches over the division line between his and the adjoining lot. Later when the cadastral survey was made. upon the claim and in . meters of land of plaintiff. to acquire "title by possession" up to that line. 1920 filed in CFI Manila an action to recover the land in question about 1. according to the great weight of authority. meters of land pertaining to the 3000 sq. it was established that defendant did have about 1. Discovering this. It cannot be said that there is an intention by defendant to claim title to the disputed property adverse to plaintiff because of the fact that the cadastral survey must be awaited. His adverse possession resumed when the cadastral survey revealed that he encroached plaintiff’s land but plaintiff at the same time filed this present action ending an almost perfect mode of acquiring the property by prescription [3 years nalang unta]. and. Nevertheless. for the whole period prescribed by the statute.000 sq. In 1903. Can defendant acquire the land in dispute (1. and thus.A surveyor of Viademonte surveyed the land defendant purchased for purposes of defining its boundaries and found that about 1. but provisional. and. the true line. such possession. View That Possession without Intent to Claim Is Not Adverse. defendant was not able to complete the period required for adverse possession for purposes of acquiring the disputed property --. cease of intention to claim title by defendant on the disputed property from the time the conversation was made [see conversation] Ruling Case Law and Corpus Juris cited: In order to bar the true owner of land from recovering it from an occupant in adverse possession and claiming ownership through the operation of the statute of limitations. . the possession is not adverse.52 sq. SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIA APOSTOL.300 sq. on the other hand. petitioners. — Statement of Rule. I am going to return it to you everything over and in excess of what appears in my title (the conversation)" Such conversation was deemed by SC to happen about 1910. Plaintiff on May 20. whether it eventually be the correct one or not. the possession is not adverse. and if it established by that survey that I am holding any part of your property I will return to you all of that portion which may be in excess of what appears in my title. It is not merely the existence of a mistake but the presence of absence of the requisite intention to claim title that fixes the character of the entry and determines the question of disseizin. When Wolfson suggested that the matter be resolved by a survey and Torrens title be secured by the parties. with the intention to claim title. Intention to Claim to True Boundaries.635 square meters of land which in excess than what is described in the deed from which plaintiff deraigns title. The intention is not absolute. Defendant now refused to deliver the strip of land in dispute. . Defendant purchased the land and took possession under his deed in 1903 and that enlightening conversation took place about seven years later in the year 1910. where the occupation of the land is by a mere mistake and with no intention on the part of the occupant to claim as his own land which does not belong to him.635 square meters. Thus.762. . Aenlle said that the situation does not necessitate such actions and said to Wolfson: "Let us wait for the cadastral survey. This rule recognizes the intention as the essential element. at that time the statute of limitations could not have run for more than seven years. thus where the owner of a city lot builds a house thereon.762. actual.” 2. but only about 1. having the requisite duration and continuity. open. occupies up to a given line beyond his actual boundary. will ripen into title. defendant took possession of the land he bought and the one in dispute (1. the possession must have been.635 square meters upon which plaintiff deraigns title) by prescription [more than 10 years of adverse possession][Note: the lands here were untitled. if it comes out that I am holding any part of your property. without any intention to assert any title thereto. consequently. Defendant alleged in his answer that he has been in undisputed and adverse possession of it for more than sixteen years. In other words. Ana did not have an area of 3. is in fact.he merely was able to get about 7 years of adverse possession. inadvertence. and the defendant had refused to abandon his claim for the excess. . if necessary. Mr. a party. vs. But if. There must be an intention to claim title to all land within a certain boundary. Ruling: 1. visible. an indispensable element of adverse possession in wanting. Issues: 1. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L. engineer of Manila City. meters. For purposes of acquiring the disputed property by prescription. Wolfson went to Aenlle to verify the matter with him. continuous. meters of which plaintiff deraigns title). because he believes it to be the true line. It is also essential that the possession must have been held under claim of right or color of title. Not adverse anymore.

and the Register of Deeds in the RTC of Quezon City. the complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners should be dismissed for lack of merit. a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the petitioners. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer. and. Under Section 48 of PD 1529. hence. 1983 for lack of interest to prosecute. the RTC did not thereby collaterally attack the title of the respondents over the property. Luz Pascua filed a complaint against the petitioners in the RTC for rescission and damages. Jimenez. on May 20. The CA held as follows: The RTC erred in dismissing the action for unlawful detainer on the sole ground the purchase of a parcel of land. On the basis of the said deed. except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The following issues are the subject of Civil Case No. as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. the Spouses Chua. the petitioners alleged that Luz B. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.R. Luz Pascua died on December 2. the respondents were issued a TCT over the property on June 8. In the meantime. thus. Paulo Pascua filed a similar complaint against the petitioners in the RTC but the same was. A person who has a torrens title over the property. No. and for reconveyance with damages. Finally. She sold a portion of the property to the petitioners on July 8.(a) their possession of the property since 1976 preceded the sale of the property to the private 2004 Jun 17 G. as alleged in their answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer. Paulo Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-adjudication over the property on the basis of which he was able to secure. (2) the validity of the deed of absolute sale over the property The SC’s Ruling: The petition is DENIED. assert the following: whether the respondents were buyers in bad faith.000. Such allegation does not help their present recourse. the petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the property. be dispossessed of the same. the Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the improvements thereon in favor of the respondents for P1. stating that they could not cause the registration of the said deeds because the owner’s duplicate of the TCT was in the possession of Teresita B. dismissed. much less in an action for unlawful detainer. 125375 respondents. the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents. that they had contracted with the Spouses Paulo and Georgina Pascua for (c) in declaring that the petitioners had priority of possession of the property on the sale thereof by Luz Pascua and Paulo Pascua way back in 1976 and 1977. the Spouses Pascua. Despite demands. 1993. who were present during the negotiations. 1984 but Paulo Pascua did not inherit the property from her because the same had already been sold to the respondents.000. 1993. Thereafter. for annulment of deed of sale and the new TCT. but the same was dismissed on December 19. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 1980. is entitled to the possession thereof. 1993. Pascua was the owner of the parcel of land. Topic: Holder of a Torrens Title/ Right to Possession Facts: Respondent Chuas alleged. The subject property is registered under the Torrens System in the names of the petitioners (respondents herein) whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked. likewise. on May 15. On June 7. . so that the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners. The petitioners claim that. the petitioners refused to vacate the property. Petitioner Apostols. an inflexible adherence to the proscription against a collateral attack of a torrens title may result to gross injustice. According to the petitioners. Q-94-19352 before the RTC of Quezon City: (1) The Present Petition: The petitioners Apostols. In their answer. Moreover. 1976 and thereafter. such as the respondents. a former co-owner of the property. that they had been in possession of the property since 1973. The presumption of ownership granted by law to a possessor in the concept of an owner under Article 541 is only prima facie and cannot prevail over a valid title registered under the Torrens System. The registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their favor. (b) the respondents were purchasers of the property in bad faith. the respondents’ title over the property is a nullity. that the private respondents (herein petitioners) are possessors in the concept of an owner of the subject premises and cannot. the fact that the respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment. the petitioners alleged that the Spouses Pascua’s possession of the property after the sale thereof to the respondents was by mere tolerance. 1979. a new TCT. a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. modified or cancelled. 1979. On June 20. however. SC agreed with the CA. It cannot be altered. verbally assured the respondents that they would vacate the property within ten (10) days from the execution of the sale. The petitioners then acknowledged that their stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners. The petitioners alleged. their adverse claim over the property was annotated on June 20.

. Respondents attached. covering Lot Nos. petitioner and Virginia filed an appeal with the RTC of Roxas City. the Court did not delve into these issues. and that petitioner's possession of portions of the disputed properties is merely upon tolerance of respondents.s. to wit: that respondents' predecessor. Respondents counter that the Decision of the MCTC is based on the titles over the disputed lots which they presented in evidence. and who represented herself as the owner of the said lot. that. On her part. 1997. Villa v. Heirs of Altavas Topic: Holder of torrens Title. the husband of Virgina. Facts: The heirs of Enrique Altavas (respondents) filed a Complaint for ejectment with the MCTC against Dr. it appearing that the same were already conveyed by the original owners during their lifetime. the Original Certificates of Title in the name of Enrique. 2816 in favor of petitioner Villa. 2817. they persisted in continuing their illegal possession of the premises. however. as annexes to their Complaint. Enrique Altavas.executed by the Spouses Pascua in favor of the respondents. overseer and representative. was not divested of his ownership of the subject lots. However. who have been in actual possession through their administrator. Right to Possession Aggrieved by the Decision of the MCTC. and respondents have no cause of action against her. Petitioner argues that respondents have no cause of action against her as they are not lessors. that the titles over the subject properties remain in his name. express or implied and that respondents failed to aver facts constitutive of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. but despite said demands. After the death of Mussolini. not being the owner or administrator of the said lots. was dismissed because of her withdrawal of her appeal. and (3) the validity of the title issued to and in the names of the respondents. 2816 and Lot No. the late councilor Mussolini C. and that the award of damages is supported by the stipulations in the Lease Contract entered into between petitioner and Virginia. Petitioner’s claim over the subject property has no leg to stand on. Respondents are the heirs of the deceased Enrique. as they (respondents) are no longer the owners of the said lots. in fact. respectively. respondents through counsel formally sent demand letters to Virginia and petitioner to vacate the respective portions occupied by them. on the other hand. the MCTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. As such. as there was still a pending case in court involving the ownership of the properties in question. the registered owner of two parcels of fishpond designated as Lot No. she is a possessor in good faith. The CA sustained the following findings of the MCTC. 2816 and 2817. later declared the respondent heirs as rightful owners and legal possessors of the lot in question. without any right whatsoever to do so. Bermejo. Virginia has no right to enter into any contract for the lease of the said properties. 2817. and that petitioner has a valid contract of lease with Virginia which entitles her to the possession of Lot No. they have not proven that they are the owners of the said properties. Petitioner avers that respondents failed to establish that they are in actual possession of the lots in question. Lorna Villa (petitioner) together with Virginia Bermejo (Virginia). The court. Issue: Who has the right to possess the property? Ruling: On October 21. the RTC dismissed the appeal of petitioner for her failure to file her appeal memorandum. petitioner contended that: she is in lawful possession of the area possessed and developed by her as lessee. and the complaint was premature. as evidence of their ownership and right to possess the disputed properties. Hence. that. the subject lot was leased to her by a person who was in actual possession thereof. vendors or persons with whom petitioner has a contract. Virgina took over the possession of the premises in question without the consent or permission of respondents and leased a portion of about five hectares of Lot No. Virginia's appeal.

in the light of the provisions of Article 16 502 of the Spanish Civil Code. including the tolls collected by him from the passing vehicles. which according to the trial court amounts to P25. it is necessary. By reason of such withdrawal. And that Comintan and Zamora should reimburse jointly Ortiz’s the improvements he has introduced on the whole property coz Ortiz was declared as a possessor in good faith. according to Scaevola. pursuant to Article 546 of the New Civil Code. in favor of another person. In other words.632. This right of retention of the property by the creditor. until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful expenses made by him on the property. Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases. Issue: w/n this contention is correct: since judgment declared the petitioner a possessor in good faith. Ruling: fail… Ortiz vs. and Ortiz’s opposition was dismissed. One thing led to another.00. all the fruits that the possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in court. in accordance with the decision itself. even after his good faith ceases. must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor. Despite the objection. particularly the portion awarded to Comintan. being a mere lessee. but as a means of obtainitig compensation for the . to concede to the creditor the right to secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the principal of the debt while he remains in possession. belongs to petitioner and not to defendant/private respondent Quirino Comintan. filed for Homestead Application over the land now in controversy. she is bound by the findings of the MCTC. it appeared that Ortiz collected tolls (fees sa mga sakyanan nga moagi sa road) on a portion of the propertv in question wherein he has not introduced anv improvement. Kayanan (respondent judge) & Comintan and Zamora Topic: possessor in good faith. he can appropriate for his exclusive benefit all the fruits which he may derive from the property. Hence. There is no question that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the 11 possession is legally interrupted. without however filing any application to acquire title thereon. plaintiff's(Ortiz’s) ward. he is entitled to the payment of the value of the improvements introduced by him on the whole property However. such as those for the preservation of the property. through lease. half of the land was issued in favour of Comintan.000. Virginia later withdrew her appeal filed with the RTC. petitioner contends that so long as the aforesaid amount of P13. Years passed. Virginia. which decreed that the fruits of the property shall be in lieu of interest on the amount to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for improvements. We find this contention untenable. plaintiff who continued the cultivation and possession of the property. which instead found that she was not the owner of and had no right to possess the disputed property or to transfer possession of the same. in order that this right to retain may be useful. This right of retention has been considered as one of the conglomerate of measures devised by the law for the protection of the possessor in good faith. or for the enhancement of 15 its utility or productivity. However. the possessor in fact can still retain the property. Ortiz then opposed alleging that he should be given preference to purchase the lot inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has been in continuous possession of the same since 1931. or when he answers the complaint.Moreover. and Dolorico relinquished his rights over the property in favor of defendants Comintan and Zamora. fruits It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the property. by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court 12 by the true owner for the recovery of the property. However. Virginia's claim of ownership was not sustained by the MCTC. It permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the possession for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. Said judgment then became final and executory. Its object is to guarantee the 14 reimbursement of the expenses. without any obligation to apply any portion thereof to the payment of the interest and the principal of the debt. until the case reached the Supreme Court. depriving him temporarily of the enjoyment of the fruits of his property. The Homestead Application was then cancelled and both Comintan and Zamora filed for respective sales applications. Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor. It is accessory to a principal obligation. petitioner steps into the shoes of her lessor. is considered not a coercive measure to oblige the debtor to pay. who died in 1931. The CFI then rendered judgment awarding ½ to Comintan while giving due course to Zamora’s sales application on another portion of the property. The principal characteristic of the right of retention is its accessory character. Facts: Martin Dolorico II.00 decreed in the judgment representing the expenses for clearing the land and the value of the coconuts and fruit trees planted by him remains unpaid.

Carbonell's lawyer prepared an adverse claim for petitioner. spending P1. Both petitioners Rosario Carbonell and respondent Emma Infante offered to buy the said lot from Poncio. in the presence of a witness. Infante started erecting a wall around the lot with a gate. in a contract of antichresis. 1955.00.357. 5040 and subject to a mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank for the sum of P1. Poncio admitted Mrs. and also from the Batanes Islands. petitioner appealed to SC which ruled: that the Statute of Frauds. the latter paid Bank the mortgage indebtedness of P1.50/sq. owner of the land through which the toll road passed. after deducting petitioner's expenses for administration. Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The right of retention in this case is analogous to a contract of antichresis and it cati be considered as a means of extinguishing the obligation. income. Carbonell. inasmuch as the right to retain the thing lasts only for the period necessary to enable the creditor to be reimbursed from the fruits for the necessary and useful expenses. and that he could not withdraw from his deal. the creditor shall compensate what he receives with those which are owing him. who advised her to present and adverse claim over the land in question with the Office of the RD Rizal.500. Infante spent for the house the total amount of P11. Garcia actually sent a letter of inquiry to the RD and demand letters to private respondents Jose Poncio and Emma Infante. The mortgage on the lot was eventually discharged.00. with Infante still assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor of Bank in the amount of P1.554. As amply observed by Manresa: (Spanish crap omitted) In a pledge. Mrs. The order appealed from was thus reversed. on the condition that from the purchase price would come the money to be paid to the bank. and thereafter to the principal 21 of his credit. the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to payment of the interest.48. that the disputed tolls. Atty.177. being applicable only to executory contracts. made and executed a document : "CONTRACT FOR ONE HALF LOT WHICH I BOUGHT FROM JOSE PONCIO” Infante took immediate possession of the lot and built therein a wall and gate.500. Poncio. and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings .00" In a private memorandum agreement. 1976. Petitioner and respondent Poncio. Petitioner then consulted her attorney. . We hold.+ Facts: Respondent Jose Poncio. Informed that the sale in favor of respondent Emma Infante had not yet been registered.929. In the same manner. having an area of some 195 square meters. if owing. Infante was registered and a TCT was issued to her but with the annotation of the adverse claim of Carbonell. if the thing pledged earns or produces fruits. was the owner of the parcel of land herein involved with improvements situated in San Juan.00 and on the same date. No. praying that she be declared the lawful owner of the questioned parcel of land.debt. excluding the house wherein respondent lived. Poncio executed the formal deed of sale in favor of respondent Mrs. lived in the adjoining lot. The debtor can not reacquire enjoyment of the immovable until he has actually paid what he owes the creditor. 20 dividends or interests. belong to Quirino Comintan. more or less. accepted the price proposed by petitioner. January 26. thru counsel. The deed of sale in favor of Mrs.00. the property for the sum of P2. She contracted the services of an architect to build a house. Infante improved her offer and he agreed to sell the land and its improvements to her for P3. Rosario Carbonell. Rizal. Petitioner accepted the offer and proposed the price of P9. a native of the Batanes Islands. because he had already even the lot to Emma Infante. Poncio approached petitioner and offered to sell to the latter the said lot. CA *G. Carbonell vs.00. filed a second amended complaint against respondents.R. Poncio told petitioner that he could not proceed with the sale.52.500. Infante in the total sum of P3. further considering that the same was on portions of the property on which petitioner had not introduced any improvement. In all of these cases. m. L-29972. a cousin and adjacent neighbor of Poncio. but the construction of the same started only in 1959 — years after the litigation actually began and during its pendency. respondent Poncio indeed bound himself to sell to his co-respondent Emma Infante. covered by TCT No.535. In his answer to the complaint. On February 2. does not apply to the alleged sale between petitioner and respondent Poncio. the right of retention is used as a means of extinguishing the obligation. therefore. From the order of dismissal.

good faith must characterize the prior possession. that mandate does not render an oral sale of realty invalid. “Contract for ½ lot…” not in the purview of Statute of Frauds. the second paragraph directs that ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of one “who in good faith first recorded” his right. Under the first and third paragraphs. 10. Knowledge of this should have put Infante on her guard and should have compelled her to inquire from Poncio whether or not he had already sold the property to Carbonell 5. recites “If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees. (5) In his answer to the complaint filed by Poncio. Facts showing bad faith Bad faith arising from previous knowledge by Infante of the prior sale to Carbonell is shown by the following facts: (1) Infante refused to see Carbonell. the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith. legally as well as from the viewpoint of equity. should have compelled Infante to inquire from Poncio why he was no longer in possession of the mortgage passbook and from Carbonell why she was in possession of the same . New Civil Code. 11. if it should be movable property. Carbonell’s prior purchase of the land was made in good faith. a decision was rendered declaring the second sale by Poncio to his Infante null and void. it tends to show that the sale of the property in favor of Carbonell is already an accomplished act.m. The identity of the parcel of land involved is sufficiently established by the contents of the note. Hence. the Infantes cannot recover the value of the improvements they introduced in the lot. She is entitled. the document effectively transferred the possession of the lot to the vendee Carbonell by constitutum possessorium. By the very contents of the memorandum itself. This statement of the principle is correct. indicates sale as an accomplished act From the terms of the memorandum. 8.” 2. in the absence thereof. which offers he rejected as he believed that his lot is worth at least P20 per sq. Oral contract does not invalidate sale but merely incapable of proof Even if the document was not registered at all. provided there is good faith. there is a sufficient description of the lot referred to as none other than the parcel of land occupied by Poncio and where he has his improvements erected. (3) The fact that Poncio was no longer in possession of his mortgage passbook and that the said mortgage passbook was already in possession of Carbonell. Double sale.26 allegedly made by Carbonell to Poncio on account of the price of his land. and reiterated that the private memorandum is a perfected sale. as a sale is consensual and consummated by mere consent. or whether there is any relation between the P247. Good faith essential in registering deed of sale It is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the second paragraph of said Article 1544. (4) Carbonell registered on 8 February 1955 her adverse claim.. perfected by mere consent . 1. not a contract of sale. who wanted to see Infante after she was informed by Poncio that he sold the lot to Infante but several days before Infante registered her deed of sale. One-half lot clearly the parcel of land occupied by Poncio and where he has his improvements erected The one half lot was mentioned in the document because the original description carried in the title states that it was formerly part of a bigger lot and only segregated later. 1358). Under the New Civil Code. Carbonell entitled to introduce parol evidence The Court would not know why Poncio’s bank deposit book is in Carbonell’s possession. because thereunder the vendor Poncio continued to retain physical possession of the lot as tenant of the vendee and no longer as owner thereof. CA entered another judgment affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Article 1544 Article 1544. the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession. which is decisive of this case.m. There was a partial performance of the verbal sale executed by Poncio in favor of the Carbonell. 6. Which reversed the decision of the trial court. and. Contract of Sale not in the purview of Statute of Frauds as it is partially performed Because the complaint alleges and the Carbonell claims that the contract of sale was partly performed. in considering the time value of the contents of the document. it is evidenced by a memorandum. a contract sale is consensual. it cannot therefore. while a sale of an immovable is ordered to be reduced to a public document (Art. but where already wholly or partly executed or where even if not yet.26 entry therein and the partial payment of P247. he alleged that both Infante and Carbonell offered to buy the lot at P15 per sq. Should it be immovable property. The trial court granted a new trial at which re-hearing only the respondents introduced additional evidence consisting principally of the cost of improvements they introduced on the land in question . . Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544. Carbonell’s prior purchase and registration in good faith When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on 27 January 1955. Infante not entitled to recover value of improvements introduced in the lot The bad faith of Emma Infante – from the time she enticed Poncio to dishonor his contract with Carbonell. Poncio did not remain owner by possessing the lot Being a valid consensual contract. 1357). to an opportunity to introduce parol evidence in support of the allegations of her second amended complaint. but upon a motion for recon. it was a valid contract nonetheless. she was the only buyer thereof and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated thereon. which accord preference to the one who first takes possession in good faith of personal or real property. Perfected sale: In his dissent concurred in by Justice Rodriguez. the trial court rendered a decision. and instead to sell the lot to her (Infante) by offering Poncio a much hinger price than the price for which he sold the same to Carbonell – is clear. Under the second paragraph. then the oral sale becomes perfectly good. Contract is consensual. if the Court does not allow Carbonell to explain it on the witness stand. when Poncio sold the lot to Infante. and is binding on and effective between the parties.26 to the Republic Savings Bank on account of Poncio’s mortgage indebtedness. Should there be no inscription. when the latter paid P247. but even to enforce the contract in its entirety (Art. Under the law. to the person who presents the oldest title. reversing its decision Carbonell appealed to CA. be considered to be the memorandum which would show that a sale has been made by Poncio in favor of Carbonell. Carbonell was not aware of any sale to Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. in any case where evidence to further demonstrate is presented and admitted. 4. but merely incapable of proof. Bad faith of Infante. good faith must characterize the act of anterior registration 3. After the re-hearing. Where still executory and action is brought and resisted for its performance.After trial in the court a quo. Justice Gatmaitan maintains his decision of 2 November 1967 as well as his findings of facts therein. and becomes a good cause of action not only to reduce it to the form of a public document. 7. Such explanation is tenable. 9. the same is removed from the application of the Statute of Frauds and Carbonell should be allowed to establish by parol evidence the truth of her allegation of partial performance of the contract of sale. 12. Being guilty of bad faith. Her good faith subsisted and continued to exist when she recorded her adverse claim 4 days prior to the registration of Infante’s deed of sale. both in taking physical possession of the lot and in recording their deed of sale. (2) Carbonell was already in possession of the mortgage passbook and Poncio’s copy of the mortgage contract.

only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership. unless Carbonell chooses to pay for their value at the time Infante introduced said useful improvements in 1955 and 1959. for they add to the value of the property 16 Article 546 and 547. building a wall around it and installing a gate and P11. Moreover. this petition. Possessor in good faith entitled to right of retention of useful improvement and right to a refund for useful expenses. Hence. furniture and fixtures brought in by him. should be allowed to remove the improvements. Ruling: (procedural issue was not included: the issue in this petition was raised the first time.000. the Infantes. because they have been enjoying such improvements for about 2 decades without paying any rent on the land and during which period Carbonell was deprived of its possession and use. as a matter of equity." As a builder in bad faith. possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255. plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another. Neither may the decision in the case of Carbonell vs. notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith.500. the First Division of this Court reversed the decision of the CA and declared petitioner Carbonell to have the superior right to the land in question. Infante’s expenses Their expenses consisting of P1. although possessors in bad faith. 15. Inc. which Infante paid to the Republic Savings Bank to redeem the mortgage. books. he is not entitled to any right regarding the useful expenses. . she must however refund to Infante the amount of P1. Implies contrary to possessor in bad faith Under the second paragraph of Article 546. Yap (13 SCRA 190) cited by petitioner does not support its stand. he cannot recover its value because the construction was done after the filing of the action for annulment. but as a matter of equity allowed them to Facts: The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA). planted or sown without right to indemnity. vs. it is clear that a builder or a possessor in bad faith is not entitled to indemnity for any useful improvement on the premises. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure. 14. In fact. Infante cannot claim reimbursement for the current value of the said useful improvements. On the contrary. both the trial court and the CA found that respondents Infantes were possessors in good faith. municipalities and provinces without just compensation. the possessor in good faith has also the right to remove the useful improvements if such removal can be done without damage to the land. as he alleges. Under Article 547. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs." What this Court allowed appellant Yap to remove were the equipment. 17. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the City on the basis of a stipulation of facts. under Article 546 of said code. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it. thus rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of reimbursement. only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses.500 for draining the property. also cited by petitioner. the possessor in good faith can retain the useful improvements unless the person who defeated him in his possession refunds him the amount of such useful expenses or pay him the increased value the land may have acquired by reason thereof. Under Article 546 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellant. because they were outside of the scope of the judgment and may be retained by him. Carbonell liable to refund amount Infante paid the bank to redeem the mortgage While Carbonell has the superior title to the lot. and under Article 547 thereof. be invoked to modify the clear provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines that a possessor in bad faith is not entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses or to removal of useful improvements. Equity.A. On appeal. In said case. however the Court proceeded to resolve the same) Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful improvements? The answer is clearly in the negative. are useful expenditures. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds. NCC The Infante spouses being possessors in bad faith.929for erecting a bungalow thereon. loses what is built. the owner shall be entitled to all of the useful improvements without any obligation on his part. He shall not have any right whatsoever. this Court ruled in said case that "if the defendant constructed a new building.13. On the question of whether or not respondents Infantes were possessors in good faith four Members ruled that they were not. These provisions seem to imply that the possessor in bad faith has neither the right of retention of useful improvements nor the right to a refund for useful expenses. provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession. unless the person with the superior right elects to pay for the useful improvements or reimburse the expenses therefor under paragraph 2 of Article 546. NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R. The decision in the case of Mindanao Academy. NAWASA appealed to the then CA and argued in its lone assignment of error that the City should have been held liable for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System. their rights to the improvements they introduced on the disputed lot are governed by Articles 546 and 547 of the New Civil Code.00. for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Issue(s): 1. CA and City of Dagupan The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and ruled that the useful expenses were made in utter bad faith for they were instituted after the complaint was filed and after numerous Supreme Court decisions were promulgated declaring unconstitutional the taking by NAWASA of the patrimonial waterworks systems of cities. CA (69 SCRA 99). now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). Whether or not it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks System. Article 546 and 547. Consequently. Infante’s right of remotion or the value of the improvements (not current value) if Carbonell appropriates for herself the improvements If the lawful possessor can retain the improvements introduced by the possessor in bad faith for pure luxury or mere pleasure only by paying the value thereof at the time he enters into possession (Article 549 NCC). filling it with 500 cubic meters of garden soil.

1924. writ of injunction and to put Mendoza in the possession of the land. or crops he has gathered from it. December 16. and with special reference to the decision appealed from. MAX B. Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing. During the pendency of the case. Judge of First Instance Gloria rendered judgment declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the intervenor Bernardo Solis have the right to collect from the plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2. 1928 -November 6.000. and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P666. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion. No. little time need be taken to discuss the points of law.. A decree of registration has been issued on said land 3.046 as compensation for the necessary and useful expenditures in the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman and 80 per cent for Bernardo Solis. and (c) decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. Mendoza was in fact put in possession of the property. With respect to the fruits received by the defendant while the land was in his possession. Moreover. the finding in the trial court is correct.CATALINA VILLANUEVA. 1924. In brief. Inasmuch as only four Members concurred in ruling that respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two Members ruled that they were possessors in good faith said decision does not establish a precedent. until said possession was transferred to de Guzman. (b) require the defendant to render an accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits be applied to the payment of the necessary and useful expenses. 3003 January 2. De Guzman presented a motion requesting the issuance of a writ of possession for lot No. the piece of land above-mentioned was identified as lot No. that De Guzman. However. may be deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective dates of their purchase. Since then De Guzman has had dominion over the land. Defendant filed an answer in the form of a general denial with special defenses and appended a counter-claim and crosscomplaint." the amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code. This petition was granted by the trial court. 6. we may say that we are content to make the findings of fact and law of Judge Gloria in the lower court the findings of fact and law in the appellate court. Martin Mendoza possessed it until June 25. 1924. which in the present case is the amount of the necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. the equitable consideration present in said case are not present in the case at bar. Judgment appealed from will be affirmed. Defendant has made improvements on said land be planting coconut trees. By virtue of this judgment. vs. until June 25. who is not exactly a possessor in good faith with in the meaning of the law. When the case was called for trial. asked leave to intervene. defendant de Guzman is the one who has been in possession and enjoyment of the land from June 25. the defendant and intervenor were ordered to deliver the land and its improvement as soon as the plaintiffs have paid the difference. and the argument of counsel as addressed to the decision in the lower court and the assignment of errors.93 per annum from June 25. one-fifth of this amount to be paid by Manuel de Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. the parties entered into the follwing stipulation: 1." However one may speculate as to the true meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity. production. Justice Munoz Palma dissented on the ground that since both purchasers were undoubtedly in good faith.000 was asked. without special pronouncement as to costs. plaintiff-appellee. 687 in his favor which was granted. -In the cadastral proceedings. G. in which a total of P6. By virtue of this order. namely petitioner Carbonell as the first buyer and respondents Infantes as the second buyer. the amount that the plaintiffs were required to pay to the defendant and intervenor exceeded the amount that the latter were to pay the former. among other things. as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost. CASE TITLE: LORENZA ALBURO. Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation. L-28721 October 5. when de Guzman obtained the writ of possession. 4. acquired it from the other plaintiff Martin Mendoza. therefore. Mendoza and Enriquez began an action requesting the court to (a) fix the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel de Guzman in introducing the improvements. we have at last determined that we would not be justified in changing the value per tree of P2 as fixed in the trial court. 5. 687. up to the present time by virtue of a writ of possession obtained from the Court of Land Registration. this lot was adjudicated in favor of Mendoza and Enriquez in equal parts pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part of de Guzman until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. etc. -Being unable to come to an agreement to the amount for the improvements made on the land. by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his favor who. With the facts as above indicated. Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist. Solis. From the time Solis spouses and de Guzman who was working on the land. the trial judge issued an order requiring the provincial sheriff immediately to dissolve the prel. Justice Teehankee concurred on the same premise as the dissenting opinion of Justice Munoz Palma that both the conflicting buyers of the real property in question. 1920. as those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded. Plaintiffs are the owners and proprietors of the land in question 2. 1927. ISSUE: W/N the amount to be paid as "indemnizacion" in the form of necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. the errors assigned on appeal. respondents Infantes' prior registration of the sale in good faith entitled them to the ownership of the land. seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures. in turn. one of the persons who was ejected from the land. After trial. Judgment was rendered in that case absolving Mendoza from the complaint. and this judgment was subsequently affirmed by SC.remove the useful improvements they had introduced on the land. that is on September 23.R. 1916. SOLIS. As on the date when this judgment was rendered. everything considered. HELD: An examination of the evidence shows that these findings are fully substantiated.R. fruits. In the decision rendered in the cadastral case. were ejected therefrom. the subject matter. upkeep. Our only doubt has been as to the just value for each coconut tree now found on the land. defendant-appellant G. it is only just that he should account to the owners of the estate for any rents. 1924. MANUEL DE GUZMAN. alleging. Enriquez has been in possession and enjoyment of a portion of the land. Mendoza is the one who has been in possession and enjoyment of said property and its improvements since . 1916. 1907 MARTIN MENDOZA and NATALIO ENRIQUEZ vs. in consideration of the sum of P5. from March 20. When the case was remanded to the court of origin. had transferred all his rights in the improvements and in the lot to him with the exception of 200 coconut trees. Solis Spouses brought an action in the CFI of Tayabas against Mendoza for recovery of a certain piece of land. No.

seem to provide for such cases. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. at the cost of the owner. is by demand for the annulment of the contract and indemnity by way of damages or without demanding annulment of the contract by demand for damages for negligence on the part of the landlord. and in any event we do not think that the filling in and improvement of a lot can be brought under the head of necessary expenses (gastos necesarios) as used in this connection. with the privilege of renewal for a second term of six years. but this on the ground that "he had acted by virtue of the social duty of mutual aid and assistance. Manresa in his commentaries upon this article says that gastos necesarios are no others than those made for the preservation of the thing upon which they have been expended. and the chapter wherein it occurs. The defendant having refused to surrender the lot in question of the expiration of the rental term. or planting. by written contract. as Manresa points out. The trial court authorized the removal of the house. provided he does not alter the form and substance of the thing rented. though he can take away such improvements if it is possible to do so without injury or damage to the thing rented. The filling in of a vacant lot can not be regarded as a repair as the word is used in this article. this article is strictly limited in its effect to repairs necessary to preserve the thing rented in a condition suitable to the use agreed upon ( para el uso pactado). to be reimbursed for expenditures in filling in and leveling the lot. or if this be denied. sowing. In support of her claim for reimbursement for expenses in filling in and leveling the lot. unless the new thing be in substitution of something formerly in existence and is added to preserve the original status of the subjectmatter of the repairs. as he considers advantageous. the remedy of the tenant under the provisions of article 1556. . wherein it is provided that — The owner of the land on which building. came into possession of the lot by virtue of this rental contract. wherein it is provided that the landlord is obliged "during the lease to make all necessary repairs in order to preserve the thing rented in condition to serve for the purpose to which it was destined. or to oblige the person who has built or planted to pay him the value of the land. having previously paid the indemnity mentioned in articles four hundred and fifty-three and four hundred and fifty-four. Defendant had her husband expended a considerable sum of money filling in and leveling the lot and that they built a house of hard materials thereon. or planting is done in good faith shall have a right to appropriate as his own work. this action was brought to recover possession thereof and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. doing only that which is required by the force of circumstances and no more. vol." (Manresa. who is the wife of the said Goenco. Defendant. except when it is a matter of the most urgent necessity (reparacion urgentisima) "where the slightest delay would involve grave damages. and that the rental contract. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the record in this case be remanded to the court of its origin for execution. when the landlord fails to make necessary repairs. we are not authorized to review his action in this connection. The right of a tenant in regard to improvements (mejoras) is expressly provided for in article 1573 read in connection with article 487. for a term of six years. defendant relies on the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 1554 of the Civil Code. and even though it could be so considered. and to have the benefits of the provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code. while it expressly permitted the tenant to build upon the lot. 473.FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of a certain lot of land in the city of Manila. 1892. 10. p. however. and the tenant is not authorized to make such repairs at the expense of the landlord. reserving to the defendant the right to remove the house from the lot. Counsel for the defendant contends that she is entitled to a renewal of the rental contract for a third term of six years." when the tenant may take the absolutely necessary means to avoid the loss. either useful or convenient. A repair implies the putting of something back into the condition in which it was originally and not an improvement in the condition thereof by adding something new thereto. is silent as to the disposition of the house at the expiration of the rental term and makes no express provision as to improvements to be made upon the land by way of leveling or otherwise. apparently relying on the provisions of this article. whether the "possessor" referred to in this provision can be said to include one who stands in relation of tenant to his landlord." It may be doubted. The contention that the defendant is entitled to the benefits of the provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code can not be maintained because the right to indemnification secured in that article is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds or sows or plants an land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title and not to lands wherein one's only interest is that of tenant under a rental contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing in of the rented land is a necessary expense that entitles defendant to be reimbursed RULING: The contract is clear in its terms that no renewal for a third term was intended. to one Antonio Susano Goenco. sowing. but since no objection was made by the plaintiff in the court below.) It has been suggested that the claim of the defendant for compensation for the filling in and leveling of the lot may be based upon article 453 of the Civil Code which provides that "necessary expenditures will be repaid to all persons in possession (los gastos necesarios se abonan a todo poseedor). which. for the above-cited article 1554 of the Civil Code. wherein it is provided that the tenant may make such improvements." But. with the costs of this instance against the appellant. was rented on the 23d of January. but that he will have no right for indemnification therefor. otherwise it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property.