Let's 'do philosophy' like an Academic Pyrrhonian
“Nothing in the world is difficult; it's just our thoughts that give the things this appearance.” - from Arabia Since the publication of the 'Philosophical Investigations' (PI), different writers have tried to comprehend this complex work of philosophical endeavour. Scholars within the domains of sociology, politics, language analysis and philosophy have been busy interpretating Witgenstein and looking at the consequences which should be taken from this work. Although the variation between these domains and within these interpretations is interesting enough on its own, the stakes became even higher as scholars tried to place the PI within a complete conception of Wittgenstein's work and often extrapolating these conceptions into more claims. The fact that these debates exist, however, isn't entirely uncontroversial. Most of the critique on these debates, as formulated by e.g. David Stern, is aimed against the reductionistic feature of the analyses done by scholars. They find that Wittgenstein's thought is reduced to an argument for scientists and philosophers own insights and theories. An example of this is the sociological theory of Peter Winch. Instead, Stern argues for an interpretation 'at face value', which is to read Wittgenstein as attempting to either destroy or to reform philosophy. Stern argues for the first position. These two readings regarding destruction and reform are called 'Pyrrhonian' and 'non-Pyrrhonian' readings; a distinction named after Pyrrho, a Sceptic from ancient Greece. Pyrrho himself believed that both traditional sceptics, whom were called Academics, and traditional philosophers, whom were called Dogmatists, were both erroneous, since both attained the dogma that they believed in a form of certain knowledge, the first being that certain knowledge is impossible, the second that certain knowledge is possible1. In the light of the and debates the between the 'face value interpretation' there is one Wittgensteinians Academics, via 'reductionist' Hume Wittgensteinians,
particular philosopher who has an interesting position. Beginning with the Descartes, and Kant, Neil Gascoigne positions Wittgenstein as a sceptic in the tradition of the Academics and precisely Carneades. This type of scepticism wants to expose the underlying dogmatic
1 (Gascoigne, 2002), p32-35.
To understand Gascoigne's conception of scepticism in which Wittgenstein is placed. This form of scepticism is called both mitigated scepticism and ´dialectical scepticism´ as it involves positioning two positions against each other in order to attain a less foundational position. I will argue that the apparent differences between these two philosophers aren't that big as they position themselves. In recent years. to solve the philosophical problems by experiencing the solution to them in ordinary life. Also. I will follow his historical argument for this conception. However.assumptions in order to stress the importance of another. as said above. destroy philosophy is certainly an aspect on which Gascoigne and Stern overlap. What makes a comparison between these two interpretations more interesting but also more difficult is that we can distinguish at least two different versions of both Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism. using ordinary language. Arguing for the similarities will require a positioning of the analyses of both Gascoigne and Stern in the Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian debate. His main argument consists of an analysis of the three different 'voices' which are portrayed within the PI: the 'traditional philosopher'. Gascoigne takes into account the OC as well. Wittgenstein will eventually be positioned as such a mitigated sceptic. Stern will apply a systematic approach to also conclude a dialectical position in Wittgensteins work. but actually had an anti-foundational attitude regarding higher order (philosophical) propositions. where Stern argues only from the PI. Gascoigne argues that the Academic sceptics weren't as dogmatic as the Sceptic Sextus Empiricus has expressed. I think a comparison between the two will shed a new light on Wittgenstein's work. the 'academic sceptic'
. What the Academic Wittgenstein tries is. Arcesilaus and Carneades. basis. Moreover. the differences between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism have therefore been debated (Thorsrud. they both link this to a different ancient sceptical tradition. less fundamental and more pragmatic. Stern argues that it is meant to destroy philosophy all together as the theory proves philosophy to be inconsistent. Still. This intuition is based the two representatives of the Academic Sceptics from the last two centuries AD. The positions regarding Wittgenstein's devotion to. 2004). in some form.
3.g. the role of philosophy is that of the Tractatian ladder. For both. the first two voices are positioned against each other by the third voice. e. 2. the well-known “cogito ergo sum”.
The therapeutic reading of Academic scepticism
In his book Scepticism.and the 'Pyrrhic' voice. the allegory between philosophy and a cure.The justification leads to a regressus ad infinitum. which we can throw away when we are finished.e. Gascoigne distinguishes two sceptical arguments. i. According to Stern. together with the general tendencies explicated by a number of remarks throughout the PI. This argument is due to Rene Descartes. one can think of a little child constantly asking 'why' questions. The Agrippan argument concludes that justification is always charged with on of three fallacies: 1. because I don't know for certain that I'm not dreaming3. will at one moment say 'That's why' (arbitrary stipulation) or will refer back to an argument already used (circular reasoning).The justification leads to an arbitrary stipulation of an argument which doesn't have to be justified (foundationalism). To understand the basic intuition underlying this argument. This argument is probably the oldest sceptical argument and is intended to challenge the arbitrariness of foundational arguments2. The first argument is the Agrippan Argument.
. This argument is casting doubt by suggesting that I haven't got any adequate argument to rely on the status of my perceptions. The second argument is the called the 'Argument from ignorance'.The justification leads to a circular reasoning. then. To understand why Gascoigne places Wittgenstein in the tradition of the
2 (Gascoigne 2002). p9. 3 Ibid. who used this demon in his search for a stable basis for further enquiries. following our main source for scepticism Sextus Empiricus. p18-p19. This. The parent will either have to continue this 'why'-game infinitely. lets him conclude the Pyrrhonian Wittgenstein.g. e.
p33. namely to use a form of 'deconstruction' i.Academic Sceptics as he perceives them. life.
Meaning of Philosophy in Ancient Greece
Scepticism is. especially within the analytic tradition. according to the Stoics. p34 (Emphasis by Gascoigne). it is necessary to understand his historical arguments for this unusual notion of philosophy and of scepticism as Gascoigne argues was the case in Ancient Greece.e.
. without some 'real theories'. Gascoigne calls this the 'Essential Problem'. In Ancient Greece.”4 Knowledge as seen by the Greek philosophers is an essential requirement in order to obtain a good life.
4 (Gascoigne 2002). bounded to the study field of epistemology. these two were a lot more interwoven: “It is important to recall that central to Greek Philosophy is the concern with living a good. where person A is experienced enough to see a cow clear and distinct and person B isn't experienced enough. scepticism couldn't exist. Then. As a last remark before I lay out Gascoigne's argument. His argument against the Stoics is a thought experiment: suppose there are two people seeing a cow. 5 Ibid. defined as higher-order (philosophical) knowledge5. virtuous or tranquil – that is to say. happy. The knowledge that the Dogmatist philosopher seeks is not therefore to be equated with the narrowly theoretical conception […]. it is useful to realise that scepticism always has been seen (and criticised) as a reactive method: as some have remarked haughty. Gascoigne argues. is possible. since it wouldn't have anything to react to. while some other philosophers focus on the subject of living happily. It is important to realise what type of knowledge is meant here. What type of knowledge can help us achieve the goals of a Dogmatist philosopher? According to Gascoigne. Gascoigne proposes to read his arguments from a dialectical point of view as he sees Arcesilaus as trying to expose the dogmatic assumptions underlying the Dogmatist theories. Arcesilaus attacks all the Dogmatist theories in a similar way. Let us then look at the first of the Academics. searching for a situation in which the theory can and should give two opposing answers. Dogmatists and Academics discussed whether p-knowledge. called Arcesilaus.
In recognition of the holistic character of impressions. It is through this Socratic dialogue with the Stoics that Carneades comes to something I think we could call pragmatism. 8 Ibid. how could person B know that he didn't see the cow clear and distinct. […] Finally.person A has knowledge. but now based on the 'subjective conditions of judgement'8. according to Sextus Empricus' reading of Carneades. but instead opts to show the inconsistency in the Stoic thought. As Gascoigne notices:”The general criterion of judgement is the convincing expression that is clear and distinct (or 'fully manifested'). He isn't claiming that knowledge isn't possible. or what we would call contextually justified. they have to keep their proposition that knowledge also is determined by the wise versus the ignorant. the first of these refers to the 'undiverted nature of an impression'. p55. Since this criterion is compatible with the falsity of the impression. however indeed a positive reading. we still can judge whether one of our beliefs is stronger or weaker.”9 This step removes the requirement of truth and replaces it with a criterion of judgement. […] This generic fallibilism is then reinforced by two further 'criteria' of convincingness. but person B doesn't. while person A did? Still.
Towards a therapeutic and mitigated scepticism
Arcesilaus' scepticism isn't actually being 'dogmatic' as Sextus Empiricus described him. Where we recognise that our judgements can be false. and thus strengthen our conviction that the cow is alive) and we can
6 (Gascoigne 2002). p52-p53. 7 Ibid. There was. 9 Ibid idem. However. with this his theory is lacking any practical guidance (remember that philosophy had as its task to practically guide practitioners to a good life) and is therefore indeed negative7. that we perceive a cow walking. it is fallible and not a criterion for truth. because we can look whether our sensations fit our earlier sensations (e. But how then could the cognitive impressions be the sole criterion of truth? After all. since this is their only way to explain how people can make mistakes6. or what we might call its 'contextual consistency'.g. a belief is still more credible if it is 'fully explored'.
to be able to give a criterion which isn't susceptible to the Agrippan argument is to get away from the theoretical notion of truth.
Wittgenstein on rule-following
In Gascoigne's analysis.
. I will only briefly discuss the point made in the OC and show the relation between the PI and the OC. the Academic Scepticism of Carneades isn't vulnerable to the Agrippan Argument since it denies the necessity of truth for its practical guidelines. he uses Saul Kripke's analysis of the private language argument and Kripke's interpretation of the private language argument as basically being a variation of his Wittgenstein's comments on rule-following.
Wittgenstein as a 'Therapeutic Sceptic'
In his analysis of Wittgenstein. As we now have a workable definition of what Gascoigne sees as therapeutic or mitigated scepticism. as if each one contented
10 (Gascoigne 2002). Gascoigne makes a statement regarding the theoretical attitude and its vulnerability to the Agrippan argument. which leans heavily on §201: “It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another. there is one important last thing to note. Therefore. However. since in a certain sense we can speak of a 'scepticism-light'. it is now time to look at his arguments for reading Wittgenstein as a therapeutic sceptic. e. According to 'Kripkgenstein'.g. for Gascoigne the latter book is a continuation of the PI. p65-66.do some extra tests. Regarding the first book. Wittgenstein tries this when he is talking about rule-following. a scepticism with space for conditional judgements. the focus of the Agrippan argument on justification of knowledge doesn't have any target10. According to his analysis. He also calls it mitigated scepticism. This gives us practical guidelines for living our lives without making the principle move of calling these methods true and Gascoigne therefore calls this type of scepticism 'therapeutic scepticism'. In his vision. Therefore. try to feed the cow and see whether it reacts. an explication based on the so-called hinge propositions functioning as a rule for a language game. As I will argue below. Gascoigne looks at both the PI and OC.
This knowing as understanding is referring to the knowing a rule as in understanding how one uses it. 14 (Gascoigne 2002). For Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein begins to relate the hinge propositions to these rules in language games.us at least for a moment. p129. See also (Gascoigne 2002). but something which is a feature of our culture and our social and institutional practices. Within the OC. p128-130.
. in which Wittgenstein distinguishes between knowing a disposition and knowing as in understanding or mastery of a technique. as we do
11 (Wittgenstein. since the sceptic can still make a move outside of the practices and ask how these practices are related to 'the way things really are'13. p131. Moore claimed to know all sorts of things. as these rules cannot be privately created. However. it isn't able to refute the Agrippan argument directly. 1963). which isn't anything private. it tries to put us in engagement with common life. where these rules don't need any form of justification14. Instead. p130. 12 (Gascoigne 2002).12 This is also linked to §150. 13 Ibid. these 'hinge propositions' aren't cases of knowing at all. until we thought of yet another standing behind it. but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. When we are talking about habits. when we try to perceive this rule-following argument as 'therapeutic'. However. The idea of a 'hinge proposition' is largely based on Moore's anti-sceptical argument. For him. it affirms the sceptic attack against an internalist justification such as Descartes' prove of the external world from inside and it's foundationalistic tendencies (“I think. ”11 Following a rule in this interpretation is exerting a habit and rule-following is the concept by which we understand making judgements. we are talking about 'doing' something'. this is a form of the 'mitigated' or 'therapeutic' scepticism. meaning that we cannot really claim to 'know' them. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation. these 'stand fast' for Moore and Wittgenstein. In this way. According to Gascoigne. the fact that we are following rules presupposes an external world. such as “I know that the earth existed long before my birth” and “I know that I have never been on the moon”. therefore I am” and the existence of God are non-refutable arguments). §201.
e. as Gascoigne agrees with Wittgenstein.. Instead.e.]. it is our acting. which have “[. p146. not a logical truth)16. which lies at the bottom of our languagegame. That these hinge propositions are contingent is expressed in §204.”18 I'll come back later to Gascoigne's interpretation of Wittgenstein when I discuss both Gascoigne's and Stern's reaction to Fogelin's interpretation of Wittgenstein. these propositions have a similar status as the impressions (or seemings). where he states: “Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?”. even if they are outside of the framework and even if they are contingent facts (i.not see them as cognitive achievements15. it is not a kind of seeing on our part. 17 (Wittgenstein. n.
15 Ibid. 16 Ibid idem.. emphasis by myself.but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true. since where rules can be neither true nor false.. . Interestingly.
. but instead opt for one who is 'in control' of his material and tries to trick his opponents into a discussion in order to prove his own point. Both do not want to see a struggling Wittgenstein. i. Instead.. this isn't the case with these special empirical propositions: we do think they are true.”17 Here. 18 (Gascoigne 2002).). where he states: “[. Gascoigne and Stern react the same to Fogelin's suggestion of Wittgenstein having both Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian interpretations. this cannot be the case. comes to an end. justifying the evidence. Wittgeinstein's anti-foundational tendencies become quite explicit: he does not accept the Cartesian clear and distinct propositions: the fact that we feel these are true isn't because they have some special property ('truefulness') of which we have ways to determine them. their role is like those of the rules for a game.d. However.] normativity 'built in' (in the form of an ability to participate in the enquiry) and which is therefore not vulnerable to the sceptics doubt. p144-145. He even goes further in OC §309.
Stern's rule-following paradoxes
Stern describes three dominant theories regarding rule-following: the Kripkgenstein against which he places struggling Wittgenstein. the other aims at doing away with them altogether. 20 (Stern 2004). Stern argues. p153. but each of them gives us a Wittgenstein who was much more single-minded and doctrinaire than the books he actually wrote. Stern confirms Gascoigne's therapeutical interpretation of Kripke's work:"So Kripke’s Wittgenstein gives a ‘sceptical solution’: he concedes that the sceptic is right. however.Stern's rehabilitation of the Philosophical Investigations
In the beginning of his book on the PI. seeing Wittgenstein as an adept neo-Pyrrhonian who sets out against all forms of 'Dogmatism' to conclude that we cannot really say anything regarding the world. he seems to advocate a strong Pyrrhonian vision on the chapter of rule-following. although Stern's one is even more focussed on the sceptical tendencies. that a more reasonable interpretation would be to interpret 'blindly' using the metaphor of
19 Ibid. but the unresolved tension between two forces: one aims at a definitive answer to the problems of philosophy. he still maintains that our ordinary practice is. The Kripke-Wittgenstein is quite similar to the Kripke interpretation by Gascoigne. in a sense. he is quickly to note that this is partly based on an according to him falsely interpreted §219. for it does not require the kind of justification tihe sceptic has shown to be untenable. Stern gives expression to a feeling of reductionism of Wittgenstein's work in a lot of the secondary literature:"There is some truth in all these approaches.
the Winchgenstein and Fogelin's
. justified. Despite this."20 However."19 In the end of the chapter regarding rule-following. Where the word 'blindly' always is associated by interpreters as meaning ignoring any form of reason. p36-37. together with Baker and Hacker. What is really interesting about both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations is neither a metaphysical system nor a supposedly definitive answer to systembuilding. when he discusses the differences between Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian readings of Wittgenstein.
22 (Wittgenstein 1963). something which we do follow. more than just a blindfold. §224. 23 Ibid. and my spade is turned. But a convention is typically something arbitrary.” (Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content. 24 Ibid.the blindfold of Justice21.]”24 The underlined part suggests that. but that we didn't require for ourselves the ultimate level of justification. emphasis added. Wittgenstein is talking in the Kripkean sense about following a rule blindly. 25 Ibid. It isn't implied that we have that devotion that Stern
21 Ibid. we often didn't put much thought in it. but of their form. when we are asking for a very high degree of justification. This doesn't mean that we didn't have any justification upon making a decision. the narrator and the interlocutor discuss how a rule can be followed about the analogies between following a rule and obeying an order. §211. Let us look at the PI itself for a moment here and take a look at the preceding and succeeding paragraphs.. a devotion of not willing to stray from the laid down path. This relates to perhaps the most important passage regarding this discussion. §217 however seems to argue against the idea of an authoritative argument: “ “How am I able to obey a rule?”[…] If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock. §217. Stern associates this with a form of 'obedience'. Here. when we interpret the "someone whom I am afraid of"23 as the law or governmental system. without reasons”22.
. p155. it also seems to have the properties of a social convention in it. One simply continues to interpret the rule one was following: “My reasons will soon give out. but not because it is laid upon us as a law. Wittgenstein relates the word 'rule' and the word 'agreement' to each other. which is after the passage itself. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do. And then I shall act. §212. The next paragraph §212 could be read as an authoritative argument.25 So. [. When we look at §211..
is better understood as a matter of different voices within the dialogue setting out opposing philosophical views. arbitrary. 27 Ibid. p162. the arbitrariness in a social convention has something in common with the satisfying lower level of justification which I attributed to §217.suggests. within an argument that is in service of a Pyrrhonism about philosophy.e. Stern continues by looking at the sociological interpretations of Wittgenstein. Moreover. he is showing far more 'sceptical tendencies' than those he expressed when he discussed Kripke:"But what looks to Fogelin. while the theories are “counterpoints” (i. interdependent). convention. Wright. but we still take a lot of definitions for granted (e. specifically Winch's argument for “a conception of practice as a system of rules”. in the passage where he seems to create his own theory regarding Wittgenstein's sceptical tendencies. Kripke circumvented the discussions regarding some problematic parts in Winch's theory 26. we often ask about the information in the small print.
The aftermath: Wittgenstein staying in control
After probing with seeing Wittgenstein's rule-interpretation via a holistic interpretation. This idea is mainly based on Wittgenstein's use of 'forms of life'. Here. Kripke's idea of following the rule in blind fate becomes far more attractive than Stern is arguing for. Stern discusses quietism (the vision that Wittgenstein at all doesn't have anything to say about the relation between language and the world) and Fogelin's struggling between Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian readings. and many other readers like an author who’s not entirely in control of his material."27
26 (Stern 2004). whether I am writing in Dutch or in Flemish (which has quite a lot of different meanings and connotations different) or in the same language whether I use the same meaning with a ambiguous word).g. p170.
. If a rule is indeed such a social. oscillating between global statements of a Pyrrhonian method and endorsing particular non-Pyrrhonian philosophical views. His main argument here is that. Many philosophers found this theory to endorse a strong verificationism. When we engage in a social convention. of which one of the proponents is Peter Winch (hence the Winchgenstein).
i.].”. 29 Ibid.e. For it cannot give any foundation either. 28 However. where Stern argues that Wittgenstein is a Pyrrhonian because he opposes the views of both Sceptics and Dogmatists against each other. While the method is quite similar with both theories. Stern states we should: “[R]ather than construing the author of the Philosophical Investigations as genuinely conflicted between quietism and substantive philosophical views […] approach him as a quietist who sees that any attempt to explicitly articulate quietism will lead to
28 (Gascoigne 2002). p 150. offering an excavation of our concepts. To be more precise.g. he complements Fogelin for the adequacy of its theory.. Stern describes how Wittgenstein's voices try to use one of the strategies as described by Sextus Empiricus: to position both types of 'dogmatic philosophies'. we can now look at the purpose of this dialectical move. he argues that to make some general remarks about philosophy as Wittgenstein e. Gascoigne argues that Wittgenstein is an Academic Sceptic because he opposes the views of both Pyrrhonians and Dogmatists against each other. Wittgenstein is a 'therapeutic' (mitigated) sceptic. After describing Fogelin's argument for a Wittgenstein with both positive (a contextualist. and playing them out against each other.. holistic framework. then.”29 Gascoigne claims many interesting things here. Continuing this sceptical Pyrrhonian argument.Gascoigne also wants to get rid of the internal conflict. p 149. does when he says that “Philosophy may not interfere with the actual use of language. On this interpretation. in Sextus' case the Dogmatists and the Academics. one might suggest an alternative: that it is not the neo-Pyrrhonians that are the model for his method but the Academic Sceptics. he cannot hold a purely Pyrrhonian standpoint as he is clearly making positive statements. It leaves everything as it is. language games) and destructive tendencies (dogmatic thoughts). he quickly adds: “[R]ather than a conflict in Wittgenstein's thought. dialectically playing off dogmatist against sceptic (the two strands) [. it can in the end only describe it.
. So. but most important of all he claims that Wittgenstein was an academic sceptic because he wasn't a fullfledged Pyrrhonian.
dogmatism of one kind or another. but as it were revealed ('deduced'. 32 (Gascoigne 2002). he clearly doesn't. Therefore.. The problems of philosophy then become 'pseudo-problems'. In this sense. p170. Now of course this Wittgenstein faces a dilemma. It suggests that Wittgenstein didn't at all want to tell us something about the relationship between the language and the world.”30 In this citation.. even) dialectically about common life as one 'returns' to it. as he talks about 'revealing' 'non-Pyrrhonian elements'. since he presumably needs 'philosophical' arguments in order to prove that we do not need philosophical arguments. This is. p169. This is what has been called the position of quietism. Stern suggests that Wittgenstein wasn't really interested in philosophy at all. which is a contradiction in terms. and that therefore the best way to advocate quietism is to write a genuinely conflicted dialogue in which nonPyrrhonian participants play the leading roles. but the author regards the argument as a ladder that we should throw away after we have drawn the Pyrrhonian moral.” 32 Gascoigne isn't entirely clear here about whether Wittgenstein wants to get rid of philosophy. 31 Ibid. which only exist because we ask ourselves the wrong questions. he states that one gets these 'non-Pyrrhonian elements' revealed by
30 (Stern 2004). On one hand. The Wittgenstein Gascoigne portrays uses the dialectical method “[. p149.] in order to draw the public nature of our commitments in the way that Carneades brought out the idea of the 'convincing' in our thinking. the nonPyrrhonian elements are not dogmatically imposed on the space of philosophizing.
. he uses the dialectic to prove that those questions are useless and then throws away the ladder itself. after all. Wittgenstein would then still be trying to get some useful answers by using philosophy and therefore would still try to make a philosophical point. however. the classically Pyrrhonian way out of the dilemma presented by the anti-Pyrrhonian philosopher: the text really does contain philosophical argument. On the other hand.31 It would therefore be better to abandon philosophical arguments.
we should realise that philosophy only delivers the Sternian ladder which can be thrown away when we realise that these problems are of no importance. What we should see when we 'return to common life' is that the philosophical problems are only existent when we take a stance outside of the language-game. Gascoigne's mitigated sceptic does want philosophy to end. Wittgenstein introduces the public nature of commitments.'returning to common life'. As I showed above. However.e.
Academic / Pyrrhonian (circle which is applicable)
Can we speak of Wittgenstein as either an Academic or as a quietistPyrrhonian Sceptic? It seems to me that answering this question will often tell more about the person arguing for one of these interpretations than that it would give new insights on the debate about Wittgenstein's goals while writing the PI. language-games). What is more. But the stance outside of the language-game isn't our stance in common life.
. Now remains the question what this 'public nature of commitments' would mean. The playful element of a game (or 'play'. And I think also Stern would acknowledge that one of the main reasons that Wittgenstein doesn't need philosophy is because of the language-game. Here. but maintaining that we do have the possibility to judge events and phenomena when we remove the criterion of truth. Gascoigne's earlier discussion about language-games comes into play. so why should we bother with these problems in the first place? In other words. as the German word 'Spiel' encompasses both) is that one is able to find creative ways to deal with problems. this would be short-sighted. Instead of the Carneadian alternative criterion of truth. but finds ways to deal with it in common life. This mitigated scepticism is meant as a full scepticism against philosophical knowledge. where the quietist Witttgenstein does not at all want to prove anything but the pseudo-state of philosophical problems. the whole point of this argument is to place Wittgenstein in Gascoigne's framework of mitigated scepticism. One could argue against this that the Academic Wittgenstein lays a great emphasis on the mentioned public commitments (i. in other words that we aren't sceptical of other forms of knowledge such as scientific knowledge.
218). (1996). He would have acknowledged that. Wittgenstein. (J. (G.johnkeane. N. Thorsrud. as long as we wouldn't think to deeply. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. On Certainty. Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm. Gascoigne. R.
. (2002). he would look at how language works in the ordinary games and outside of the philosophical spectrum.).I therefore guess that Wittgenstein would have endorsed the motto which has been described at the first page of this essay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shand) (p. Retrieved from http://www. Chesham: Acumen Publishing. 34-58).net/pdf_docs/teaching_sources/wittgen/wittgenstein_on. Stern. johnkeane. Philosophical Investigations/Philosophische Untersuchungen.edu/skepanci/. Ancient Greek Scepticism. G.d. thereby showing their dogmatic positions. L. Scepticism. Wittgenstein's critique of philosophy. Anscombe(Translator). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Wittgenstein..net.(Fogelin. 1996)
Fogelin. (n. placing all the different versions of 'old philosophy' against each other. (2004). L. The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (2 ed. pp. After showing the inconsistencies of all these foundationalists.p df. In H. we wouldn't have to cure so many philosophical problems. H. Sluga & D. (1963).