You are on page 1of 2

Art. 252 34. UFE-DFA-KMU v. Nestle Phils. Inc. 35. UST Faculty Union v. UST Art. 253-A 36.

FVC Labor Union- Phil. Transport and General Workers Association v. SANAMAFVC-SIGLO, Art. 254 37. Ando v. Campo Art. 256 38. Picop Resources Inc. v. Dequilla et al.

PAQUITO V. ANDO v. ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL., G.R. No. 184007 February 16, 2011 FACTS: Petitioner, Ando, was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers. In June 1998, respondents were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with NLRC-RAB. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents. PACSI and petitioner were directed to pay respondents’ separation pay. Petitioner and PACSI appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the decision. Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property of Ando. He then filed an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the issuance of a TRO before the RTC. Ando claimed that the property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latter’s properties. The RTC denied the prayer for a TRO, holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Despite lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits of the case. Petitioner did not file an MR of the RTC Order. Instead, he filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He contended that, pursuant to a ruling of this Court, a third party who is not a judgment creditor may choose between filing a third-party claim with the NLRC sheriff or filing a separate action with the courts. The CA affirmed the RTC Order in so far as it dismissed the complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case, and nullified all other pronouncements in the same Order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He now filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: HELD: (1) NO. Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the DOLE. It is the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body. It defines a thirdparty claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property levied upon. It also sets out the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim. Petitioner may indeed be considered a “third party” in relation to the property subject of the execution vis-à-vis the Labor Arbiter’s decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Cabato: x x x x the subject matter of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional trial courts. x x x. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance an execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.x x x x The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. (1) Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. (2) Whether the execution of judgment against Ando’s property is proper.

FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) (Petitioner) v. Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO) (Respondent) G.R. No. 176249 November 27, 2009 J. Brion FACTS The petitioner was the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of FVC Philippines, Inc.. Pursuant to their CBA, at the end of the third year in their five-year term, petitioner and FVC renegotiated and extended the life of the CBA by four months. Nine days before the expiry of the original period, respondent filed a petition with the DOLE for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the CBA. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that petition was filed beyond the 60-day freedom period, specifically 60 days before the expiration of the amended CBA. The Med-Arbiter decided in favor of petitioner, was reversed by DOLE Sec., then reinstated upon Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals eventually ruled for respondent, reasoning that although the parties may renegotiate the economic and noneconomic provisions of the CBA, the five-year representation period of the original CBA is not affected. The CA concluded that the reckoning point for the freedom period was the expiration of the original CBA. ISSUE The issue was whether the extension of the life of the CBA extended the exclusive bargaining representation status as well. RULING NO. By the express provision of Article 253-A of the Labor Code, the exclusive bargaining representation status of a union in a CBA cannot go beyond five years. The renegotiation and extension of the CBA does not bring with it the extension of the exclusive bargaining status. Thus, the freedom period to file a petition for certification election is reckoned from the expiration of the original five-year period, regardless of any extension of the CBA. The respondent’s petition was filed within the proper period. Nevertheless, the certification election in this case could not be enforced as the respondent already desisted from contesting the petitioner’s status.

There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegal dismissal. The subject matter of petitioner’s complaint is the execution of the NLRC decision. Execution is an essential part of the proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated,[27] and there can be no end to the controversy without the full and proper implementation of the commission’s directives. Further underscoring the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint is Article 254 of the Labor Code, to wit: ART. 254. INJUNCTION PROHIBITED. – No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code. (2) NO. The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation. In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition. Execution of Personal Property is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

election" is different from an actual "Petition for Certification Election." It is clear that the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed only on May 18, 2000. Thus, it was within the ambit of the freedom period which commenced from March 21, 2000 until May 21, 2000. Strictly speaking, what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. This is not the situation in this case. If at all, the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for certification election, or an exercise of respondents’ right to self-organization 2. YES. Petitioner insists that it is Article 253 that applies in this case. Article 253 of the Labor Code provides that the terms and conditions of a CBA remain in full force and effect even beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA has yet been reached. PICOP claims that private respondents violated this provision when they campaigned for, supported and signed FFW’s petition for certification election on March 19 and 20, 2000, before the onset of the freedom period. It is Article 256 that applies. Based on the provision, it can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for certification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers as to which labor organization would represent them. Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented, or compromised. Time and again, we have ruled that we adhere to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers. Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining representative is of paramount importance. The fact that there already exists a bargaining representative in the unit concerned is of no moment as long as the petition for certification election was filed within the freedom period. What is imperative is that by such a petition for certification election the employees are given the opportunity to make known of who shall have the right to represent them thereafter. Not only some, but all of them should have the right to do so. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned.

PICOP RESOURCES INC. V. DEQUILLA (2011) PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI), Represented in this Petition by MR. WILFREDO D. FUENTES, in his capacity as Senior Vice-President and Resident Manager, Petitioner, vs. RICARDO DEQUILLA, ELMO PABILANDO, CESAR ATIENZA and ANICETO ORBETA, JR., and NAMAPRI-SPFI, Respondents. Facts: Private respondents were regular rank and file employees of Picop Resources and members of NAMAPRI-SPFL, a duly registered labor organization and existing bargaining agent of the PICOP rank and file employees. The company and the union had a CBA. Atty. Fuentes, the National President of the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor, advised PICOP to terminate about 800 employees due to acts of disloyalty, specifically, for allegedly campaigning, supporting and signing a petition for the certification of a rival union, the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) on March 19 and 20 of 2000, which was before the 60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Based on the CBA, the freedom period would start on March 22, 2000. Their acts constitute an act of disloyalty against the union which is valid cause for termination pursuant to the Union Security Clause in the CBA. Thus, PICOP issued a memorandum directing the employees concerned to explain within 72 hours why their employment should not be terminated due to alleged acts of disloyalty. Upon receiving their letters, PICOP endorsed them to Atty. Fuentes who then requested the termination of 46 employees found guilty of disloyalty. PICOP served a notice of termination due to acts of disloyalty to 31 out of the 46 employees. Private respondents were among the employees dismissed. They filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and attorney's fees. Issues: 1. WON the act of signing an authorization for certification election before the freedom period is an act of disloyalty 2. WON Article 256 of the Labor Code applies in the case. Held: 1. No. The acts of private respondents are not enough proof of a violation of the Union Security Clause which would warrant their dismissal. The mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for certification election before the freedom period does NOT necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty, considering that the petition for certification election itself was filed during the freedom period. We are constrained to believe that an "authorization letter to file a petition for certification