INTRODUCTION 1. Military doctrine is the fundamental principle by which military forces guide their actions to attain the objective.1 In the mid of 1990s the Draft Operations of War, Volume One came into being to provide Bangladesh Army’s own war fighting doctrine and ideas to give a functional shape to warfare. This is yet to be finalized and accepted as a doctrine. 2. Bangladesh has to maintain an army to protect territorial integrity and national sovereignty. But our economic constraints restrict us having a sophisticated and large army. Though our Army’s standard of training is comparable to any modern army of the world, yet we lack in equipment and weapons. Formulating and implementing a suitable defence plan for Bangladesh is a nightmare of any military strategists. The legacy of serious mistakes by British during formation of India and Pakistan basing on religious faiths forsaking the defence consideration is still borne by Bangladesh. Having a strong regional superpower in all sides, Bangladesh thus faces a serious predicament. With developing economy and poor resource base, many adverse factors of the security of small states are common in our country. 3. Again, we have to ensure our security within available resources. Hence, we need to strike a balance between the demand and resources and defend our motherland. The situation may seem bleak but we have many advantages, too. With a vast homogenous population, we have a reasonably strong professional military force. Integration of these two vital components can overcome many odds and achieve wonders. Our Liberation War is a glaring example in this context. Once adequately motivated and suitably trained, Bengali soldiers can be as courageous as any other martial race. The Indo-Pak war in 1965 and our glorious war of liberation in 1971 bear the testimony. Not many countries in the world earned a new flag through armed struggle. Moreover, history possesses examples where combined might of military and people routed superpowers. All we need is a concerted effort of all sections of society to evolve a plan and a devoted nation to prepare and execute those with commitment and determination. 4. To achieve our aim after striking a balance between two conflicting factors, our design of operations should envisage a concept of blending Conventional Warfare (CW) and the Unconventional Warfare (UCW) against any potential aggressor. " In future conflicts Bangladesh Army must be prepared to blend conventional and unconventional warfare in the implementation of national strategy"2…“Unconventional Warfare is not regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war, rather should be waged simultaneously with conventional war. In fact, the campaign plan should conceive the operational
1Draft Operations of War, Volume One, (Dhaka: Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate, 1997), p. 1-1. 2Ibid, p. 2-6


RESTRICTED employment of the Unconventional Force as one of its major operations or battle and establish its relationship with other component parts".3 5. This Blending of CW and UCW is not a new concept. As a doctrine, the simultaneous prosecution of CW and UCW in our war fighting strategy is under active consideration. It has been used in the past in various forms and intensity. But we should not mix up the concept of Total People's War and the concept of blending. Total People's War is the concept to be adopted at the last stage when conventional fighting will no more be possible or practicable. Our proposed blending CW and UCW aims to avoid slipping down to that dangerous stage. Total People's War is a protracted war where Conventional Force (CF) will adopt 'Descending Transformation' to fight as guerrilla force in order to gain time for future 'Ascending Transformation', aiming at a counter offensive to obtain a decision. Such transformations are: Mao's Long March and the final overthrow of Chiang Kaishek's forces, Indo- China wars fought by the Viet Mins and the Viet Congs.4 6. The blending is based on a concept of force multiplier, where the UCW components would act as the compounding force to conventional component. Our adversary is superior to us militarily in terms of manpower and assets. We lack in geographical depth to fight a pure conventional war for a long time. CW simultaneously with UCW at operational and tactical levels, from the very beginning throughout its length and breadth, will help in compensating for adversary's numerical superiority and own inadequate geographical depth. 7. The above concept obviously would call for conducting battles behind the enemy line and destroying logistic bases. The modern concept of conducting a deep battle will play an important role in shaping the battle in our advantage, so that our main effort can strike the enemy at our desired time and place. We assume that this concept is the cornerstone of our future doctrine. However, before a concept can mature into a doctrine it involves a process of research, tests, trials and analysis. This research work is one such step in our effort towards crystallization of the future doctrine of war for Bangladesh Army. This paper will discuss a few conceptual and relevant issues including historical perspective, terrain and threat analysis. The concept of blending will then be discussed. Finally, the paper will suggest methods of training and recommendations to implement the concept. AIM 8. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of blending CW and UCW and suggest measures for implementing the concept in Bangladesh.

3ibid. 4Quamruzzaman, Mohammad, psc, Lieutenant Colonel, Blending of Conventional and Unconventional Warfare - My Experience at Destranor Division, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.



Definitions 9. CW. Operations, which are conducted by CF i.e. Army, Navy, Air, auxiliary and para military forces following established doctrine and principles of war, are termed as CW. These forces wear uniform during operations and are subjected to Geneva Convention.5 10. Unconventional Force (UCF). ‘It is a significantly large and organised force operating behind the enemy lines with well established chain of command within the framework of a well conceived plan. Though they generally merge with the population and operate in small groups to avoid physical destruction, they are capable of rapid concentration when large tasks are contemplated. This means that unconventional war involves both major and minor actions deep inside enemy line with the purpose of creating a significant impact on the conduct of campaigns and battles along the traditional front’... ‘They usually concentrate on key enemy capabilities such as his C2 centres, fire support systems, air bases, logistic installations, lines of communication, air defence equipment.’ 6 11. UCW. Operations, which are conducted by forces other than CF, are known as UCW. These forces normally do not wear uniform during operations, live off the ground/mass population and are not subjected to Geneva Convention. It involves a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held/ controlled or politically sensitive territory. UCW includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine in nature. Predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by external source during all condition of war, may prosecute these interrelated aspects of UCW collectively.7 12. Guerrilla Warfare. Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. It complements, supports, or extends conventional military operations or to wear down his resistance. 13. Total People’s War. Total people’s war means all conventional and UCF of a nation fighting unconventional form of warfare against the enemy. It means complete utilization and mobilization of all resources available to a nation, i.e. economic, political and social to the war effort. In other words, the entire population is drawn or involved in the war effort in some form or the other and the nation is unable to defend itself with conventional form of war.

5AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Independent Infantry Brigade. 6Draft Operations of War, op cit. 7Draft Operations of War, op cit.


RESTRICTED Historical Perspective 14. Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts and struggle of the Vietnamese for their Independence which world has seen since 1945. This 30 years war ended with disastrous defeat firstly to French Army and then to the US Army. Both the mighty armies were defeated by a comparatively lightly armed Vietminh guerrilla force, who fought mostly unconventional war. According to Jone Pimiott 8 there were mainly two reasons; Firstly, the ability of the Vietminh ground force to operate effectively in extreme terrain and climate condition and secondly, French and US Army fought against a highly motivated nation. Americans followed piece meal offensive against the guerrilla force where they suffered heavy casualty. General Giap the commander of the Vietminh force, forced both the armies to fight isolated battles. He did it by unconventional operation before he launched conventional offensive. Both French and Americans had superiority in technology but they could not protect themselves from unconventional threat posed by the Vietminh force, which led them into defeat. 15. Afghan War. On 27 December 1979, Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan, which was well planned, organized and prepared against a weak opposition9. The resistance offered by the Afghan guerrilla who fought against a conventional and superior Soviet Army became a history. Soviet armed forces were trained and conditioned to fight against sophisticated enemies on European battlefield. In Afghanistan, they faced tremendous difficulties due to the mountainous, rocky and barren terrain. Soviet Army used to avoid direct confrontation with the Afghan Mujahideen. Whereas the Afghan resistance fighter laid ambush and attacked on the Soviet led forces and thus forced them to be sufficiently dispersed before launching any conventional operations. Soviet lines of communication were never secure. At one stage Soviets had to invite insurgent warfare experts from Vietnam to Afghanistan to learn the counter resistance tactics. 10 But Soviet ground forces retained their conventional tactics as far as possible. On 14 February 1989, the last Soviet column left Afghanistan. 16. Liberation War of Bangladesh. The people of Bangladesh started the bloody war to establish their freedom, right and independence against the occupant Pakistani Army after the fateful night of 25 March 1971. Initially resistance was from the brave Bengali defence members. But after 17 April 1971, under General M A G Osmani, Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters) started guerrilla war operating in 11 sectors. Freedom Fighters were the regular and irregular forces; people from different sphere of life joined voluntarily and formed about 100,000 irregular fighters. After organizing Mukti Bahini into different sectors, regular infantry brigade was formed to conduct conventional battle. 11 Initially the freedom fighters fought unconventional war all along the border areas and carried out deep operation inside Bangladesh. They could successfully soften up the occupant army and made them vulnerable, which could finally create favourable condition for joint conventional offensive on 21st November 1971. Battle of Belonia Bulge, Kamalpur, Attack
8Author of Vietnam the Decisive Battle first published in Great Britain, 1990. 9Edgar O’Balance , Afghan Wars :1839-1992, First English edition 1993, p89. 10Ibid, p101. 11Major General Imamuzzaman, Bangladesh War of Liberation ,Second edition, 2002, p.22.


RESTRICTED on Nakshi, Akhaura, etc. are the example of simultaneous joint offensives blending CW and UCW. Terrain Analysis 17. Bangladesh is a low-lying country traversed by numerous rivers and has a coastline of about 710 kilometres12. In Bangladesh, rivers are prominent features of the landscape. Two important rivers Ganga and Bramhaputra originate from Indian Territory. There are number of other important rivers, which actually create separate segments of the total land in Bangladesh. Other than rivers there are number of bills and marshy areas found in southeast and north-west region of the country, which varies from restricted to severely restricted areas. Small and scattered hills lie along the eastern and northern borders with India. Most important are Chittagong Hill Tracts, covered with thick forest and present a difficult terrain. There are forest areas also, namely Sundarban the largest mangrove in the south-west part of Bangladesh. Whole Bangladesh is criss-crossed by rivers, roads and railways. The numerous rivers of Bangladesh provide good communication facilities from almost all direction. Rivers are integrated with overland road and railways network. Presently there are number of high-speed mobility corridors available which facilitate all types of movement from the border areas into the capital city. Threat Analysis 18. External Security includes preservation of sovereignty that means free from external aggression. Though Bangladesh did not face any significant military or territorial threat, yet it does not mean there is no potential threat for Bangladesh. 13 Bangladesh has common boundary with India and Myanmar. Basing on the geo-strategic location and present global situation India and Myanmar are the likely military threat to Bangladesh. Threat may be limited from both India and Myanmar or in particular, an all out offensive from India. a. Threat from India. India dominates economic and military power in south Asia, which influences Bangladesh also. Geo-strategically Bangladesh is located in the South Asian region almost sand-witched by Indian territories on three sides. A number of high-speed mobility corridor from India lead into the centre part of Bangladesh. Sea outlet is vulnerable to the hegemony of powerful navies in the area. All major rivers of Bangladesh that sustain her ecology and agricultural economy originate from India. This tyranny of geography is a great source of threat to the national interest of Bangladesh.14 India has bilateral dispute with all her neighbouring nations. Unresolved border demarcation is a long issue between India and Bangladesh, which made the relation strained. Padua and Raumari incident in 2001 is the testimony of such relation. India has problem with Srilanka, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan. Bangladesh would always have supreme effort to safeguard her economic, political and military power from such threat to deter any aggression.
12Kausher , Climate Change and Sea-level Rise: the Case of the Coast, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), Dhaka, 1993, p-1. 13Brigadier General Saifuddin, psc, Evaluation of Threats to National Security and Interests, Bangladesh Army Journal. 14th issue, June 1989. 14Brig(Now Major general) ATM Zahirul Alam ,psc and Lt Col Abul Kalam Md. Humayan Kabir, psc have discussed on Military Threat on Security’ in Bangladesh Army Journal, 28 th issue, January 2000.


RESTRICTED But possibilities of Indian aggression cannot be ruled out. Military intellectuals think this type of offensive against Bangladesh might be of limited offensive.15 Because now superpowers are trying to use the concept of limited offensive as their power projection. Threat country may also try to capture the whole territory in order to establish their control in Bangladesh. b. Threat from Myanmar. Southwest tip of Myanmar border with Bangladesh is infested with protracted activities of insurgents, which Myanmar may exploit to move her regular force in our border areas. In 1978, the refugee problem started and in the process in 1991, Rejupara incident took place16. Until today good number of Rohingya refugees, wait to return to Myanmar. This would continue to strain the relation between the two countries. But military intellectuals think a conventional military threat is less likely, but border skirmishes or low intensity conflict is most likely. c. Analysis. Any confrontation with our potential enemy will have the following implications for Bangladesh, which must be kept in mind: (1) Bangladesh will be deprived of sanctuary outside its border, a muchneeded support, to conduct and continue a war against a superior enemy. Vietminh had China and Afghans had Pakistan as their sanctuaries for their struggle against USA and the then USSR respectively. (2) Bangladesh will face difficulty in procuring war materiel from abroad. Potential aggressor borders Bangladesh on three sides, and can effectively block air and water routes as well. The only possibility is through Myanmar, if diplomatic plot can be won. (3) The threat is likely to dominate air space throughout that will hinder the movement and operations of own CF. (4) The threat will have overwhelming superiority in terms of CF ratio as well as resources including long range weapons. NEED FOR BLENDING CW AND UCW Existing Concept 19. Our existing battle plan involves fighting a delaying battle in phases up to the riverbanks around Dhaka known as ‘Dhaka Bowl’. Formations thereafter will switch to 'Total Peoples War'. It is envisaged that participation of general mass in this phase will create a situation where the occupation army will be forced to withdraw. Mobilisation of international community to defuse the tension until mediation of a cease- fire will be tried throughout. The present conventional concept outlines for a defensive battle for a period of 30 days by formations. Formations will fight from series of lines of defence in their own area of operations. After defending own areas for approximately 21 days the formations
15AHQ project Study Paper, Joint Training System In Bangladesh Armed Forces And Modalities To Improve Inter Services Interaction Through Training And Other Activities presented by 9 Infantry Division, p.6-7. 16Major Majibur Rahman, Blending Conventional and Unconventional Warfare, Group Research Paper(GRP), Staff course-25, November, 2000, p.7.


RESTRICTED will enter into their 4 th phase of operation. Another 9 days will be fought for the retention of Dhaka. 20. Weaknesses of the Existing Concept. The plan has few serious drawbacks as follows17: a. The plan accepts defeat and aims at only delaying it.

b. It leaves the population of the occupied territory at the mercy of the invading force. c. It expects popular support to remain even after loosing the battle, which is less likely. d. It is passive in nature.

e. It is dependent on international community and expects them to solve the problem. f. ‘Total Peoples War’ remains an ad-hoc arrangement and the plan would be effective after the battle has already been lost. g. The invader may achieve her political objective before the plan of 'Total Peoples War' could be effective. h. The plan will impose a prolonged war on to the nation without a safe sanctuary. j. The invader may turn the ‘Total Peoples War’ into civil war.

21. Viability of Present Concept. Identifying the weaknesses of the existing plan, we can conclude that people of the country would not accept any defeat from the military. Therefore, at the beginning of the ‘Total Peoples War’ phase, when the military will need the popular support, they might find a population, which is hostile. Because of our small country and huge population, our operational depth and manoeuvrability are restricted. Due to existence of number of mighty rivers, switching of forces from one sector to the other will be hazardous. Perforce we may have to plan our battles sector wise. In case of enemy's aggression, it is for sure that we will have to face enemy's major thrust from all sides of our border following all major approaches. As such, Bangladesh Armed Forces need the concept of blending the CW with the UCW. 22. The Core Issue. The great Prussian strategist Karl Von Clauswitz enumerates five general conditions for successful irregular warfare in coordination with operations carried out by a regular army. These are: a. The war must be carried out in the interior of the country.

17The Strategic Implications of Unconventional Warfare, Lieutenant Colonel Abu Sohel, psc, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.


RESTRICTED b. c. d. e. The war cannot hinge upon a single battle. The theatre of war must extend over a considerable area. The national character must support the war. The terrain must be irregular and difficult.

Outcome of Blending CW And UCW 23. A Synergetic Effect. Modern battles are combined arms operations that involve synchronization of various Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). Since Bangladesh has less war resources, therefore to produce battle-winning effect for decisive result we need to blend unconventional effort with other conventional BOS.18 Unconventional effort with conventional war will engage enemy force throughout their length and breadth for making them paralyse of taking correct and timely decisions. That will create opportunity to defeat enemy by conventional war. 24. Creating A Fluid Situation. Making the battlefield fluid is an important factor for an inferior force (in comparison to threat capabilities) like Bangladesh. Unorthodox and non-linear engagement of the threat force by employing unconventional means of war can make the battlefield fluid. Fluidity can be made by spreading the fighting throughout the length and breadth of the battlefield by blending conventional and UCF. Fluid condition forces the enemy commander to take the wrong decision. 19 This will also diffuse his evil intention and disrupt his rear areas. 25. Conservation of Fighting Power in Defensive Campaign. Future battlefield is likely to be intense, technology based, multi-dimensional and costly affair. 20 Because of the strategic policy Bangladesh will conduct a defensive campaign. For Bangladesh it will be difficult to continue long time such type of operation in future battlefield scenarios, because of the limited national resource. This actually suggests the conservation of limited resources for opportune moment while enemy will reach his culmination and prolong the battle until the international communities react. It will be possible provided UCF operates taking the full advantages of friendly terrain and weather condition in conjunction with conventional efforts. 26. To Increase the Depth21and Reduce the Inter-formation Gaps. Due to the geographical reason, the strategic depth is very less from international boundary to the centre of the country. In defensive campaign attacker must not be allowed to by pass the defence. It is suggested that theatre forces should always be echeloned in depth to frustrate enemy victories and contest every inch of ground by constantly mounting losses on enemy forces. Maintaining large reserves will also assist commanders to achieve the required depth. In operational level, deep operation in defensive campaign is possible by
18Draft Ops Of War, volume one, p. 3-25. 19Ibid, p. 3-6. 20Ibid, p. 1-6.1-7, 1-8 & 1-9. 21Joint Warfare-13, Joint Warfare –A3 précis, DSCSC, Mirpur Cantonment, p. 13-3 & 13-4.


RESTRICTED aircrafts and long-range weapons in the preparatory phase for disrupting enemy’s rear. But in Bangladesh, military hardware is limited. The Area of Responsibility (AOR) of all the formations is vast in comparison to their strength. Therefore, the gap produced within and between the formation to be plugged in order to deter any outflanking, infiltration or bypassing the defensive position. However, UCF and their operation inconformity with the conventional war can increase the depth and reduce the gaps. 27. Integrating Populace as A Force Multiplier. National will can be principal wining factor in case of Bangladesh as we have witnessed in 1971 during our Liberation War. Bangladesh offered galvanised resistance against the Pakistani occupant army for its survival.22 People of Bangladesh are highly patriotic and motivate. The population is now about 133 million and it will increase in future. This highly motivated population is an asset or force multiplier for the nation as well as for the campaign planners. The people’s participation in our overall war effort can be materialised by blending conventional and UCW. 28. Cumulative Effect. The cumulative effects of innumerable small tactical initiatives can become a major factor in changing the overall military posture of enemy. It can be done through UCF especially the guerrillas in conjunction with the operations of friendly CF. The psychological effect of the real damage stemming from the activities by the UCF and the concurrent conventional military pressure may compel enemy to turn his posture from strategic offensive to strategic defensive. ‘To shield themselves from the multiple pinpricks and bee stings inflicted by the guerrillas, conventional forces are forced to allocate more and more of their effort to defence.’23 In Bangladesh, suitable environment is available for adopting the concept of blending CW and UCW as per above theory. Having identified the requirement it is time to explain what the concept is and how to implement the concept. CONCEPT OF BLENDING CW AND UCW Proposed Concept 29. Simultaneity of operations throughout the depth of the battle space creates fluidity that helps in retaining initiative to simulate fog and fear for the enemy commanders. Right from the outbreak of hostility the battle must be taken to enemy territory to initiate dissatisfaction amongst the people of enemy so that they go against their government’s decision. The basic vulnerabilities of our country originate from the lack of depth and the concept of blending intends to increase it by the operation of UCF in the rear of the enemy, even in her territory. When CF will fight the battle in and around the international boundary, an UCF would operate at the rear of the invading force by carrying out minor operations (Raid, Ambush, Spoiling Attack, Sabotage, etceteras). Numerous non-linear actions by the UCF will overwhelm the Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) of the invaders.
22Draft Ops Of War , op cit, p.1. 23Trevor N. Dupuy, International Military and Defense Encyclopaedia, Volume 6, (Washington,

New York: Brassey’s (US) Inc. 1993) p. 2811.



30. The concept envisages that in future conflicts, Bangladesh Army must be prepared to blend CW and UCW in achieving national goal. This denotes that UCW is not to be regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war rather should be waged simultaneously as an adjunct to the conventional war. For effective implementation and synchronisation with all sister services, organisational set up, Command and Control (C2) arrangement must be worked out in detail well before the outbreak of war. Role and Employment of UCF and CF 31. The UCF will be employed to carry out operations at the rear and flank of the advancing enemy. At the same time they may also be employed to provide early warning to the CF. The targets for deep operation may be selected at Army, Division or at Brigade level basing on the situation templates. Those targets to be selected which will help in shaping the battlefield to own design. UCF will hit High Value Targets (HVTs) and sometimes strategic targets creating disorder in their civil and military activities. As a result, at the very outset of the war enemy will be concerned about his rear area security and employ more troops to protect those. 32. While selecting targets for UCF, their capabilities will also have to be kept in mind. Capabilities pertinent to availability of forces, logistic support, fire support, intelligence, etceteras will predominantly outline the criterion for target selection. However, there are some other noteworthy factors like indigenous support, which, when integrated properly with the unconventional operation effort would substitute many shortfalls and augment the operational capability. Basing on the capability of the UCF they may be employed for following tasks: a. Destruction of command and control centres, fire support system, air bases, logistic installations, lines of communications, air defence equipment, mobility assets, troops and armour concentrations. b. c. d. Interdiction to enemy follow up echelons. Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. Forward air controllers for directing friendly aircraft on HVTs.

e. Reduction of enemy war effort by hitting the strategic targets to play havoc and create chaos within civil population. f. Laying ambushes and conduct raids on enemy’s route of movements and flanks. g. Destruction of bridges, choke points and defiles.


RESTRICTED 33. The CF of respective divisions will deploy in their AOP as per the operational plan. As the battle situation develops, they should be able to identify the main effort of the enemy and concentrate forces accordingly keeping strong mobile reserve. Different layers of defence to be prepared prior to initial engagement. While the UCF gradually cause attrition to enemy war potentials, the CF will engage the enemy’s forward elements at the decisive time and place.

End State of Blending Conventional and UCW 34. Blending of conventional and UCW will facilitate to achieve greater degree of success in terms of neutralising and annihilating the adversary’s Centre of Gravity (CG). By continuously destroying his HVTs, he will be brought to a culmination point and will be forced to abandon the invasion. However, even after that if the enemy continues with aggression, a situation will be created to go for a protracted war. Bangladesh in turn will try to get the international opinion in her favour, so that the invader pulls out her forces under international pressure.

Possible Ways of Force Generation 35. Option – 1. In this option, platoon size strength from an infantry battalion may be shed to organize, train, provide leadership to the UCF and conduct unconventional operation. This platoon size regular force will organize a company size UCF to operate within a battalion Area of Interest (AOI). The UCW company will be commanded by a field officer and platoons will be commanded by captains. Sergeants will command sections. The company will operate under direct command of the Battalion Commander of the battalion in whose area it will operate. They should be strongly equipped with small, portable but effective weapons. For this, it is suggested that each section should posses minimum two light machine guns, one rocket launcher, one grenade firing rifle and maximum possible sub machine guns. There should be a 60 mm mortar platoon in each UCF company. (Diagrammatic Layout as at Annex A) 36. Option – 2. In this option, an UCW battalion will be organised by shedding troops from a conventional brigade. The way of force generation will remain same. The UCW battalion will operate within the AOI of the conventional brigade. Three UCW companies will be located in the regular battalion’s AOR but brigade headquarters through the UCW battalion headquarters will centrally control their operation. An UCW company will remain as a brigade reserve (brigade UCW reserve). Brigade headquarters will select targets and task the UCF. UCF battalion commander will act as an advisor to the brigade commander. (Diagrammatic Layout as at Annex A) 37. Option – 3. In this option a brigade sized UCF will operate in each division AOI. The UCF will be generated and organised by the troops of conventional brigades. They will operate under direct control of Division Headquarters. (Diagrammatic Layout as at Annex A) 11 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 38. Integration of Special Force. In all the options, Division Headquarters will centrally control and task the special force (elements of para commando battalion) that is likely to be received from Army asset for deep special operations. 39. An Analysis. a. A close study at the options shows that the way of force generation is almost same in all the options. What is different from one to another is the C2 aspect and the level at which the UCF is going to operate. In option - 1, UCF will operate in a company concept with orders from regular battalion commander. In option –2, UCF will operate in a battalion concept with orders from brigade headquarters. In option – 3, the division will fight with 4 brigades (three conventional and one unconventional brigade). b. In option – 1, brigade commander himself has very less scope to influence the UCW, because, UCF are fighting under command of the regular battalions. Again, regular battalion commander within his means has scanty scope to foresee the battle in deep areas and across the border, whereas, brigade commander is in a better position to foresee and control the battle in a particular sector including deep operation. In this aspect, though division commander will be in even a better scenario of the total battle area, but in option – 3, the UCW is going to be too much centralised. Therefore, considering the aspect of “leaving initiative to the subordinate headquarters” and better flexibility in UCW we feel that option – 2 is suitable for us. Command, Control and Communication (C3) Arrangement 40. In the blending scenario, a superior aggressor has to be dealt with creative tactics and operational art. This will warrant a flexible C2 set up for effective direction and guidance. A viable plan will be executed by the UCF under a well laid out chain of command. The control arrangement will be such so that small groups can be tasked for independent mission and concentrate again for a major operation with minimum delay. The CF commander will be the overall commander of any particular sector or area within which both CF and UCF will operate. For purpose of control, there could be two options; the UCF may be directed to every target by the CF headquarters or mission type orders can be given to the UCF commanders and the UCF commander then make detail plans and task the subordinates. According to the proposed option we feel that the second option is better. However, there is then a great need for coordination between the CF headquarters and the UCF. 41. Communication will play a vital role in control and coordination of operation in such an unorthodox approach. For functional C2 system a good communication network must be set up before committing troops for operation. It is felt that communication should be 12 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED provided up to platoon level. The means of communication between the UCF and CF could be wireless, mobile telephone, walkie-talkie set or any other means. However, indigenous ideas for evolving suitable means of communication may also be worked out for effective control and coordination. Fire Support for UCW 42. Fire support of the UCF during their operation will mainly be originated from portable support weapons (like mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, etceteras), artillery and air. Unlike conventional warfare, artillery will be employed with in a very narrow spectrum to support the operation of the UCF. Both medium and field artillery may be employed to support the operations. Medium guns may be deployed in such a manner so that their range covers the areas of operation of UCF. In case of field artillery, option may be to group small detachments of field guns (a section) with the UCF who can also infiltrate deep inside enemy territory. For this, 105 mm Pack Howitzer is a good option. Because, this gun can be dismantled and carried man packed or mule packed. However, in all cases the UCF should be allotted with artillery observers with good communication facilities. Here one point may be mentioned that if we share presently held scanty artillery resources for UCF operation, then our CF are likely to run out of fire support. Few individuals from the UCF should also be trained in the procedure of calling for artillery fire. The aspect of air support may also be coordinated while conducting the UCW. Targets for battlefield air interdiction may well be conforming to the targets for UCW. Logistics for UCW 43. Simultaneous application of both conventional and unconventional method of warfare requires related logistic support system capable of meeting the demand of fluid battle condition. The conventional logistic support system relies on better-established line of communications and a set pattern of logistic train. Hence, the major drawback of conventional logistic support system is its inflexible nature and reliance on the central base for replenishment. Such a set pattern of logistic support system will be unable to provide necessary support to UCF. To ensure requisite supply to UCF’ operation conventional supply and transport infrastructure to be augmented by indigenous resources. In most cases UCF will have to live off the land. But in all cases arrangements must be made to supply ammunition, mines and explosives to UCF. When operating across the border, UCF will be given foreign currencies for their sustainment. At the strategic and operational level, logistic plan may cater for building up of stocks at the selected places.


RESTRICTED 44. The dimension of battlefield and nature of conflict is continuously changing. Accordingly, operational doctrine also needs to be changed or modified to meet the requirement of time. Being a developing third world country, it becomes very difficult for us to keep pace with the modern hi-tech battlefield, but our task of defending the country is unchanged. Therefore, evaluation and modification of operational doctrine is particularly required for us. 45. The proposed concept allows us to engage and hit the enemy from all the sides as against that of hitting his head only with our limited conventional combat resources by using conventional tactics. This concept is expected to confuse, bleed, attrite and slow down the enemy. Enemy will be forced to divert their attention towards their rear. A successful “Deep Operation” when the enemy is preparing for launching offensive or at any critical point in the front can seriously jeopardize his mission / task / operation in front and upset his time plan. 46. However, the success of this concept will greatly be influenced by the fact that how quickly the integration can be done. As in the proposed concept it was suggested that UCF will be comprised of regular, Para Military (BDR, Ansar and VDP), retired personnel and civilian volunteers, therefore, it is assumed that maximum effort will be required to organize and integrate the civilian volunteers only. The total process of integration should not take long time, because, most of these elements had been a part of a conventional / semi-conventional force. Organizing them along with other civilian volunteers would not be very difficult. The concept of blending are now being practiced / exercised in various forms in all formation’s collective exercises. The feed back of the exercises show encouraging signs towards adopting it as a doctrinal concept in our operating policy. 47. We talked about lack of geographic depth of our country. The lack of geographic depth can be compensated by adoption of UCW by the blended / integrated force, which is not possible by only a pure CW by the regular forces. This doctrine, if adopted officially, will definitely deprive our adversary in any future war against us from achieving a quick culmination they hope for. 48. The idea of complete switching over to Total People’s War i. e. UW by all of the regular forces may not be a desirable concept for us. In that case, enemy may take the advantage of absence of visible presence of the CF and may try to install a puppet government and force the country into a civil war. What can be done in blended scenario is after the third phase of battle, in fourth phase the intensity of unconventional operation by regular force may be undertaken intensively. Battalions and brigades will shed more number of regular troops for organising and conducting UC operations. 49. Proposed concept does not involve extra expenditure. Extra expenditure every year will be incurred mainly due to arrangement of training and accommodation for a short period and arrangement for daily allowance for non-regular forces for the exercise / training duration. However, in case of war higher monitory benefit may be thought of for the UCF. This will encourage people to participate in UCW. As C2 structure of the UCF will remain with regular forces, it will help to organize, train and conduct the operation in a perfect way. 14 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 50. According to the draft operations of war, “the true UCF is a significantly large and organized force operating behind the enemy lines along a well established chain of command with in the framework of a well conceived plan. Though they generally merge with the population and operate in small groups to avoid physical destruction, they are capable of rapid concentration when large tasks are contemplated. This means that UCW involves both major and minor actions deep inside enemy line with the purpose of creating a significant impact on the conduct of campaigns and battles along the traditional battlefront. The golden rule is to have an UCF of the same size of a conventional force. If the former can be made stronger, so much the better”. Here they hinted to have a battalion size UCF operating in a battalion Area of Operation (AOP). But we proposed a company size UCF to operate in a battalion AOP under brigade control. This was done keeping in mind the peacetime training, management of forces and requirement of regular force to be shed by the battalions to conduct the UCW. It was felt that shedding one platoon strength from a regular battalion to organize the UCW will not hamper the task of the battalion. But to organize UCW of a battalion strength in a battalion AOP, approximately a company or company minus regular force will be required to be spared which is likely to hamper the task of a battalion in the present scenario. However, an option may be kept to arrange a company plus (approximately 200 – 250 persons) strength UCF basing on the development of the battle, training standard of the UCF and task of the battalion. TRAINING 51. Our auxiliary forces are not trained in line with regular forces and retired personnel will be semi-trained. It will necessitate refresher training at some intervals for the UCF. The District Armed Forces Board will organise training for the UCF once in two years in co-ordination with the local division headquarters. The training team will impart training on field craft, weapon handling, minor tactics, explosive handling and combat intelligence. The duration of this training should be of four weeks. For this prior co-ordination with all agencies is essential. 52. Transition from conventional to unconventional footing by the regular force would necessitate a corresponding change in both mind and attitude of our soldiers. Troops should be trained to operate in small groups. Junior leaders must be trained to lead their under commands independently. 53. The soldiers will need to overcome psychological barrier of integrating unconventional warfare. This will need extensive training during peacetime so that the blending takes place as natural as transition from one operation of war to the other. 54. Bangladesh Navy and Airforce should include UCW training for all their personnel during peacetime. They should also organise refresher training annually. 55. All second and third line forces, i.e. Bangladesh Rifles, Bangladesh Ansars, Village Defence Party, Bangladesh National Cadet Corps and Armed Police Battalions of Bangladesh police should train all their personnel on UCW during the peacetime. 15 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 56. Training on UCW shall mainly comprise minor operations, that is raid, ambush, patrolling, tank- hunting, hideout, guerrilla warfare, use of mines and explosives, sabotage, small scale attacks, field craft and training on small arms including firing. 57. Compulsory military training may be introduced for all able-bodied male personnel who are seeking higher education after intermediate, both at home and abroad or taking public or private jobs. This training can be organised annually for duration of 4 weeks in each district headquarters by each Area Headquarters. This training can be open to all civilian volunteers as well. 58. Training on UCW should also be organised by each Area Headquarters in their respective districts as soon as the government orders general mobilisation. This training should continue throughout the war for all civilian volunteers who would join the unconventional war. 59. Training may be provided to the reservists, paramilitary forces, BNCC, and civilian volunteers as a continuous process. Formations may arrange training camps once in every 2 years for all reservists under that formation AOR. The reservists can be trained as a full-fledged reserve unit in the operational role. A joint exercise may be conducted every year. 60. The commander of the UCF receives mission type orders from the overall commander. Fire support is vulnerability for the UCF. A significant portion of UCF should be trained in engineering tasks so that they do not rely solely on CF support. 61. Joint exercises involving CF, UCF and civil administration may be conducted to bring in cohesiveness, co-ordination with a view to pursuing a common cause during national crisis. The exercise may be organised once in every 3 years. Such exercise will help to identify the training requirements, feasibility of logistic system, areas of coordination between armed forces, civil administration and mass population. CONCLUSION 62. The prime task of the CF is to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. For conducting such operations, special equipment like aircraft, long-range artillery, missile systems and information technologies are essential elements. To overcome this deficiency we need to look for other options, like blending of conventional and UCF. Countries mentioned in historical perspective have successfully blended CW and UCW and achieved their desired goal against superior adversaries. 63. The barriers mentioned strongly suggest the adoption of a new concept that blends CW and UCW. In the history of warfare, there are many examples of blending conventional with the UCF. Well-organised US force with sophisticated equipment could not withstand the cumulative outcome of Vietnamese conventional and UCFs' operations during the Vietnam War.


RESTRICTED 64. Bangladesh should resort to this concept because it is a concept of fighting war against an adversary who enjoys numerical and technological superiority. The terrain of Bangladesh is mostly suitable for the conduct of UCW yet it offers the conduct of limited conventional operations. The marshes, rivers, green hills and forests offer a considerable restriction on large-scale CF’ manoeuvre. But these can be of significant importance to the CF operations if the operation of UCF forces can be blended together. Blending of CW with UCW is likely to induce hope instead of fighting hopelessly out numbered. 65. Here UCW is not to be regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war, rather should be waged simultaneously as an adjunct to the conventional war. The harmonious actions of both conventional and UCF can bring dividend in neutralising enemy’s centre of gravity and destroy high value targets. The main components of this force are regular and unconventional forces. The UCF could be comprised of auxiliary forces, reservists, BNCC, VDPs, Ansars and trained populace. 66. This concept helps in shaping the battlefield to own requirements. In other word the unconventional operations multiplies the combat effectiveness of conventional operations. Many reasons can be drawn to blend these two types of operations. But the most significant reasons are to reduce the expenses of prolonged war, to overcome the difficulties of maintaining large CF during peace time. The foremost factor is the integration of these two types of forces for accomplishing the assigned mission. The conduct of these types of operation should aim at breaking enemy forces' cohesion and creating a diversion in the enemy commanders' mind. 67. The blended conventional and UCF needs an integrated organisational structure as well as a C2 set up. This force is composed of three elements; these are the regular forces, the auxiliary-paramilitary forces and the trained segment of population. The regular forces form the nucleus of this blended force. The success of this force will depend on the concurrent operations of both forces. At the strategic level, the enemy’s centre of gravity consists of the military, the government and the will of the people.24 Exposing and attacking enemy's centre of gravity remains important in these types of operations. While the enemy HVTs and terrain features are identified in conventional war, breaking enemy's will to fight becomes the principal focus for all UCW. The logistic plan must cater for building up stocks at selected places in these levels. The key concept of logistic support in such types of operation is based on correct assessment of logistic needs and the duration of the operation.


24Referred to collectively as Clausewitz’s ‘trinity’.


RESTRICTED 68. The detailed study on the blending CW and UCW put forward the following recommendations: a. The highest level of command should conceive the concept of blending and formulate required policies, issue directives to achieve the desired end state at all levels. b. Attitudinal change is a prime requirement. We should understand the concept properly and change our mind already set on Total People’s War. c. The field formations should generate UCFs for conducting such operations. The overall C2 should be vested on these formations to carry out UCW in their own Area of Responsibility. SCT and WCT Exercise should be the tool for reviewing the concept periodically. d. UCF should be organised on AOR basis. Respective formation headquarters should organise and prepare UCF during peacetime. The formations should also arrange training for these forces and issue guidance on their possible employment during emergency. e. The organisational structure of such forces within the formations should be based on headquarters, where the regular battalion headquarters will command the unconventional company size force and the regular brigade headquarters will command a battalion UCF and so on. f. Once the people has been sufficiently motivated, trained and integrated, the implementation must be relentlessly pursued. At national level, the mobilisation should get its share of budget and allocation of resources. g. Logistic requirement of these forces are the responsibility of respective formations during peacetime training and war. h. All arms course should include UCW in their course curricula. All aspects of UCW including the role and effect in various operations may be published as a General Staff Training Pamphlets (GSTP). Current series of publications may be modified to incorporate a chapter on UCW. j. A telescopic research on training, logistics, C2, force generation should continue for necessary modifications.



Mirpur Cantonment

November 2002 Annexes: A. Force Generation.

MOHAMMAD ALAM TAREQUE Major Group Leader, Sub Syn 7A Student Officer 27th Army Staff Course

Distribution: Sponsor Directing Staff Defence Services Command and Staff College Mirpur Cantonment, Dhaka


RESTRICTED 1. Imamuzzaman, Major General (Retired) Bangladesh War of Liberation, Second Edition, UPL, 2001 2. Mahindra, Major General S, Terrorist Games Nations Play, Lancer Publishers Pvt Ltd. 3. Palit, Major General D. K. The Lightning Campaign the Indo-Pakistan War 1971, New Delhi: Thomson Press (India) Limited, 1972. 4. Rashid, Haroon, Geography of Bangladesh, Dhaka: The University Press Limited 1991. 5. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift - Thoughts on Twenty First Century Warfare, Brassey's, London, 1994. 6. Safiullah, Major General K M, Bangladesh at War, Academic Publishers, Dhaka, 1989. 7. Sarkesian, Sam C, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, Greenwood Press, London, 1993. 8. Shaikh, Lieutenant Colonel A M, India's Victory in Bangladesh, Army Publishers, Delhi, 1982. 9. Singh, Major General Luchhman, Victory in Bangladesh, Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers 1981. Journals 10. Ahsan, Monowar, Captain, Improvised Training for Unconventional Warfare, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6. 11. Chengappa, Bidanda M, Senior Fellow, IDSA, Pakistans Compulsions for the Kargil Misadventure, Collected from 12. Haque, Major Md Fayzul, Bangladesh : A Geo-political Study, Bangladesh Army Journal, 13th Issue, December 1988. 13. Hazary, Chowdhury Mohammad Azizul Haque, Organisational Structure of Unconventional Force, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6. 14. Mahmood, Lieutenant Colonel Tahir, Being Unconventional in Conventional Environment, The Citadel, No. 3/95. 15. Quamruzzaman, Mohammad, psc, Lieutenant Colonel,Blending of Conventional and Unconventional Warfare - My Experience at Destranor Division, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6. 16. Rahman,Mir mushfiqur, Major, Interdiction by Unconventional Forces- A method of Planning and Execution,Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6. 17. Sohel, Abu,Lieutenant Colonel , psc, The Strategic Implications of Unconventional Warfare, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6. 18. Wadud, Alauddin Mohammad Abdul , Lieutenant Colonel, BP, psc, Military Theory and Doctrine-An Analysis of Their Relationship, Bangladesh Army Journal, 22nd Issue, June 1994. 20 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 19. Yussuf, Ashraf Abdullah,psc, Lieutenant Colonel, Command and Control Setup in the Blending Environment, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6. Project Study Period Papers 20. Blending Conventional and Unconventional Methods of Operations is one of the Battlefield Imperatives. How Can Bangladesh Army Fit in this Imperative in Our Fighting Concept? Presented by 46 Independent Infantry Brigade 1998. 21. Offensive Operation is the Key to Success in War. How Bangladesh Armed Forces Can Cope With this Requirement With Modified Doctrine? Presented by 19 Infantry Division. Training Manual 22. Draft Operations of War, Volume One, Dhaka: Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate, 1997. 23. FM 100 – 5, Operations, US Army Command and General Staff Collage, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993. Group Research Papers 24. 25. 26. 23 Staff Course, Momen, Anwarul, Major, Group Leader. 25 Staff Course, Rahman, Majibur, Major, Group Leader. 26 Staff Course, Islam, Salahuddin, SM, Major, Group Leader.

Interview 27. Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Quamruzzaman, psc, Member of The Concept Writing Board, Military Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters.


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