This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
THE NEED FOR DEVELOPING A POSITIVE LEADERSHIP CULTURE FOR BANGLADESH ARMY
Major Mohammad Alam Tareque, psc, E Bengal “A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient". - Gary Klein Introduction 1. The future war would be very complex which is likely to begin at short notice. The type of war that Bangladesh Army is expected to be involved in is a “limited war in nature”. 1 The limited war is of short duration and being fought at high tempo and intensity. It would involve lethal weapons thus requiring great dispersion across the engagement area. In future conflicts, at the very outset, advanced fighting forces would try to upset the chain of command of the enemy by disrupting communications. This may be achieved by the use of electro magnetic pulse, by employing conventional Special Forces or by using unconventional forces. The battlefield situation will be very fluid where psychological warfare coupled with the media would aim to propagate rumour to confuse commanders at all levels. The increased reach of integral firepower and surveillance resources including space-based systems will make the area of operation deeper and wider. There will be non-linear operations and threat from enemy special forces to rear areas which will necessitate earmarking of troops to provide security to lines of communication. All these will perforce and necessitate decentralisation of command and control as much as possible. 2. Our present doctrine is: “To blend the conventional with the unconventional warfare from the very beginning of the break out of the hostilities”.2 According to our present doctrine, the Unconventional Force commander will receive mission type orders from the overall commander. The Unconventional Force will also require breaking up in small groups. Junior leaders will have to lead the Unconventional Force independently and in isolation. The Unconventional Force commander will be responsible for planning, execution, and improvisation to achieve the mission.3 In the perspective of future conflict, considering these above mentioned attributes of our new doctrine, it is obvious that any sub unit level commander has to adapt his unit to fast moving fluid situations. Employing the sub unit or a unit is much easier under the instructions from higher headquarters but what will happen when the communication is lost and the sub unit commanders (say lieutenants and captains) need to act without detailed orders from superiors? 3. “Command is based on task and situation. The task lays down the aims to be achieved, which the commander charged with achieving it must keep in the forefront of his mind. Task and situation give rise to the mission. The mission must be a clearly defined aim to be pursued with all one's powers[...] The commander must leave his subordinates’ freedom of action, to the extent that doing so does not imperil his intention.” 4 The quoted statement summarises what a commander
Operations of War - Volume One, GSTP 0032, Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate, April 2006, p 1-4.
Ibid. Ibid, pp 32-33.
Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London, 1985, p 228.
must do in case of not receiving any further instructions from superior as a result of lost communication. GSTP 0032 states further: “he (commander) must not go into such details that the initiative of the subordinates is curbed. The answer is Auftragstaktik.” 5 Thus, this specifies the necessity of adopting Mission Tactics. The term Mission Tactics has been derived from the German term “Auftragstaktik” (German word ‘Auftrag’ means task/mission and ‘taktik’ is tactics). This term defines the essence of mission oriented tactics: “the commander only tells subordinates what tasks to accomplish, but not how to accomplish.”6 Therefore, adopting this approach requires a deliberate training and a command climate based on mutual trust. If Bangladesh Army is to adopt Mission Tactics then it needs to generate a new positive leadership culture vis a vis a culture of initiative, hence we must begin by creating the right frame of mind in our troops and officers. The question is “are we preparing for that?” 4. The paper will discuss and examine the need for developing a leadership culture of initiative for Bangladesh Army with a view to adopting the Mission Tactics. I would, therefore, explore than define the significance of leadership based on initiative for adopting Mission Tactics and relate it to the perspective of Bangladesh Army. In doing so, First, I will present the concept of Mission Tactics and then I will list down the constraints of the Bangladesh Army’s Leadership that need to be scored to cope with the demand of Mission Tactics. Second, I would propose how we can inculcate a positive leadership culture based on initiative to overcome those constraints and facilitate adopting the Mission Tactics concept for Bangladesh Army. My intent in writing this essay is to stir debate on this important issue. Frankly, I do not have all the answers, just a number of questions for those of us in Bangladesh Army to grapple with. If this paper causes other officers to think about our lack of a positive leadership culture then I would think myself successful. Aim 5. The aim of this paper is to analyse the need for developing a positive leadership culture based on initiative for Bangladesh Army with a view to adopting Mission Tactics. Scope 6. The paper will only discuss the mission tactics i.e. tactics carried out with mission oriented command and control and to adopt this approach why we need to develop a positive leadership culture based on initiative. We believe that the adoption of Mission Tactics is already settled in GSTP 0032 therefore, the debate whether or not the Mission Tactics is relevant for Bangladesh Army is beyond the scope of this paper. The Concept of Mission Tactics 7. The term Mission Tactics, which is developed from German term “Auftragstaktik; is also adopted by advanced armies of the USA, the UK, and Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). “Auftragstaktik” was officially incorporated in German “Warmest” manual in 1888 though its origin can be traced back to “Prussian Military Reforms” that began in 1808.7 Out of necessity, the Prussian Army studied the problem to rectify their acknowledged deficiencies in decisionmaking at the lower echelons. The Prussians then commissioned the Drill Regulations of the Infantry (1888). It stipulated that commanders should give subordinates general directions of what were to be done allowing them freedom to determine how to do it. That was the start of allowing decision making at the lower levels in the Army. It encouraged commanders to be
GSTP 0032, Op Cit, p 5-2.
John T Nelsen II, Auftragstaktik: A case for Decentralized Combat Leadership, The Challenge of Military Leadership, p 29. 7 H W Koch, A History of Prussia, pp 180-187.
"thinking leaders" who can make tactical judgments on their own and who would also be less likely to "freeze up" when faced with new situations without formal instructions. This tactics was practiced and advocated by two most successful commanders of German Army: Guderian and Rommel. The German Army regulations describe “Auftragstaktik” as a command and control procedure within which the subordinate is given extensive latitude, within the framework of the intention of the individual giving the order, in carrying out his mission. The missions are to include only those restraints which are indispensable for being able to interact with others, and it must be possible to accomplish them by making use of the subordinate's forces, resources, and the authority delegated to him. Mission oriented command and control requires uniformity in the way of thinking, sound judgment and initiative, as well as responsible actions at all levels.8 8. One must be curious to know why this term “Auftragstaktik” is adopted as Mission Tactics/Directive Control by armies like the USA, the UK, and the IDF despite the fact that Germans lost World War II. One of the reasons may be that the combination of ‘Auftragstaktik’ and ‘Blitzkrieg’ let the Germans win many battles fought being outnumbered. For the IDF the reason is: “At the primary or individual level there are other factors that provide IDF soldiers with high levels of morale and combat motivation. These are, “for each soldier, a goal, a role, and a reason for self-confidence.”9 “Indeed, the IDF’s traditional emphasis on Mission Tactics gives subordinates right down the chain of command the greatest possible freedom of action.” 10 The IDF practiced successfully this approach of Mission Tactics in two of the Arab-Israeli lightning wars, in 1956 and 1967. In Mission Tactics, the military commanders give its subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission) and the forces need to accomplish that goal with a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leader then implements the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, initiative and a freedom, which enables flexibility in execution. Mission Tactics frees higher leadership from tactical details. Thus, the word is something of a misnomer. It is not a tactic per se (and certainly not limited to the tactical level). It is more of a method of leadership. So far as the leader character is concerned, initiative in a leader flows from his willingness to step forward, takes charge of a situation and acts both promptly and completely on his own authority, if necessary. Mission Tactics, Its Components and the Role of Leadership 9. Mission Tactics is a decentralised command and leadership philosophy that demands decisions and action at the lowest level of command where there is an intimate knowledge of the situation and the commander's intention from the beginning of an operation. The mission order is merely a technique that is used to implement and execute mission oriented command. Mission oriented command is based on a belief in the ability of an individual's creative action to solve a problem without taking recourse to higher authority; the mission order is only the small component of Mission Tactics that we see in the field. But there are other components of Mission Tactics listed as following: a. Mutual trust among leaders based on each leader's intimate personal knowledge of the capabilities of the others. b. Training and organisation in everything the army does to reinforce the primacy of the judgment of the man on the scene (decentralisation).
The German Army's Mission Oriented Command and Control, Armor, 90th Edition, January-February 1981, p 12.
Frederick J. Manning, Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps, Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. Reuven Gal and David A. Mangelsdorff, Chichester, England, John Wiley & Sons, 1991, pp 453-454.
Richard E. Simpkin, Concept of “Directive Control” or “Mission-oriented Control”, Command from the Bottom, Infantry, March-April 1985. RESTRICTED
c. A willingness to act on the part of all leaders and those who aspire to be leaders. d. Simple, commonly accepted and understood operations’ concepts. 10. Mission Tactics is a style of command that holds that command. At the same time, control needs to be structured so that the leaders of small units are given the freedom to respond to fast changing tactical situations and challenges. Furthermore, the leaders are able to seize unforeseen opportunities and to act, even without orders, to achieve favourable results. 11 With Mission Tactics, a commander in the midst of fast changing operations and pressed for time will reduce his “orders” to the essentials only. An order for a major operation might fit on one page and would never exceed three or four pages. They must not be cluttered with intelligence and logistic details that could be dealt with through staff channels. They set out clearly and simply the commander’s intention, his subordinates’ tasks, the resources available to them, and the constraints they must observe.12 The subordinate leader then considers these in the context of Mission Analysis, which is a process whereby the subordinate leader is forced to consider the Directive in relation to the Main Effort and the commander’s intent. The subordinate leader’s Mission Analysis takes place in presence of his commander to gain a clear mental picture of what must be done.13 Mission Tactics, therefore, demands that all leaders possess flexibility of mind and courage to act decisively even without direction. By stressing command over control, Mission Tactics endeavours to maximize the effect of the leadership and tactical skills of junior leaders. Missions are thus conducted by the junior leaders “themselves reading the instantaneous local situation and reacting to it with their understanding of the aim and plan.”14 The real basis of Mission Tactics is “an unbroken chain of trust and mutual respect running from the operational commander to the section commander.” 15 This chain leaves the subordinate free to act as he sees fit in the furtherance of his superior’s intention and assures him of support even if he makes an error of judgment.16 Its three most important components are: a. The issuing of Directives by commanders. b. The designation of Main Efforts by commanders. c. The conduct of Mission Analysis by subordinate leaders.17 Positive Leadership Culture and Our Situation 11. Having discussed the above concept of Mission Tactics, it is needless to put more arguments in favour of a positive proactive leadership that is a must for adopting the concept. Positive Leadership Culture can be defined as “the ability to adapt the army to a decentralised command structure that favours the use of initiative”. B H Liddell Hart says: “. . . any approach to war fighting is highly dependent upon leadership […] Mission Tactics is the ‘cultivation” of ‘intelligent initiative’ by junior leaders.” The Bangladesh Army has already taken the bold step to adopt a new doctrine of blending conventional with the unconventional warfare in its training.
Capt. I. A. Hope, Directive Control and Mission Analysis: Keys to Manoeuvre Warfare at Company Level, Infantry Journal, Vol. 31, Spring 1997.
R. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, London: Brassey’s, 1985, reprinted 2000, p 57. Hope, Op Cit, p 11. Simpkin, Op Cit, p 23. Ibid, p 230. Ibid, p 239.
Mark Gaillard, Second Lieutenant, Their Intelligent Initiative and Its Cultivation: A New Leadership Doctrine for Manoeuvre Warfare, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol-3, Number 4, Winter 2000/2001, pp 8-10.
Both the concept and philosophy are slowly evolving in the doctrinal manuals. The Germans took almost a century to change and over 56 years they were successful in applying their ideas to war. Hence, to effectively blend conventional warfare with the unconventional warfare with an approach to Mission Tactics, we need to start on the right footing. What is the right footing? The answer lies in two very important points that we can learn from the German experience: a. A positive leadership culture that fits Bangladesh Army officers, warrant officers and soldiers. b. The need to inculcate initiative through the ranks. These two points are related: to practice ‘Mission Tactics’ we need a leadership culture that is undoubtedly based on initiative. 12. The Bangladesh Army has long been operating using the traditional authoritarian approach requiring strict obedience to orders to accomplish the mission. We have the knack for long and detailed orders even before executing the mission. Now for the requirement of blending conventional and unconventional warfare, the environment has become more conducive for mission accomplishment. A key tenet of blending conventional and unconventional warfare: commanders equip themselves to accomplish their assigned missions according to the commander's intent. The value of decentralised command lies in the fact that it treasures the initiative of subordinates striving to harness their creative energies towards simultaneous problem solving at all levels. The desired effect is speed in operations based on the ability to make sound judgments develop through trial and error. Adequate, not perfect, solutions are sought. Leaders involved in carrying out mission type orders make a rapid estimate of the situation, adopt a sound course of action as feasible and execute it decisively. In this view, speed is more essential than precision; a decent plan carried out immediately is expected and superior to a superb plan carried out much later. 13. Our leadership culture today suffers from the stigma of “loss of face”. There is always the fear that mistakes by subordinates will be seen as a failure on the part of the commander's ability. “Losing face” at a field training exercise, in a major inspection, is not easy to accept. During a setback, commanders look for scapegoats to pay the price for the mistakes. We need to change this frame of mind and understand that this is a major obstacle in developing initiative in the officers and men alike. ‘Mission Tactics’ emphasises trust between the superior and his subordinates. Over controlling or playing safe is a reflection of the commander's insecurity. William S Lind, a renowned warfare theorist, advised to be able to fight the enemy, you need a command and control system based on leadership and monitoring ... Both leadership and monitoring are valueless without trust... trust by the commander that his subordinates will understand him while carrying out his desires, and trust by those subordinates that they will be supported when exercising their initiative. The question is, “are we allowed taking initiative and making mistakes?” Certainly not, if it was so, then buzz words like: “zero error syndrome”, “spoon feeding”, “over supervision”, “over ensuring”, “super imposing of commanders” etc would not be so much familiar to Bangladesh Army. 14. As mentioned, the newly introduced doctrine of blending conventional with unconventional warfare for meeting the new challenges in the battlefield, our officers and men are being trained to embrace this new approach to war. Our training environment is slowly changing to accommodate the Mission Tactics approach to warfare. We should train to create a frame of mind in our officers and men that allows them to think and act aggressively. Thus the emphasis is on independent decision making, accepting responsibility, and taking the initiative; and all these should include training to fight battles, not merely training for the sake of training. The junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers (JCO & NCOs) are very important leaders for any army. Our army had been lacking in this aspect and we had also been late to 5
realise this. However, the recent measures of introducing sergeants’ course and platoon leaders’ course to train the JCOs and NCOs are certainly an encouraging step. But, mere training them in training institutions would not make them capable of executing missions after receiving mission type orders; they also need to be tested and most importantly allowed to make mistakes in field training exercises. Positive Leadership Culture for Bangladesh Army: the Way Ahead 15. General Franks’ “right command climate,” the psychological manifestation of the chain of mutual trust and respect, is the sine qua non of Mission Tactics leadership. To create and sustain this, the commander must be able to decentralize his command and control with trust. 18 We should get into the culture of issuing general instructions relying on subordinates to get the job done within a broad guideline. On the other side, one important caveat to this is that subordinates must first be professional in getting the job done in the most efficient manner without his superiors having to supervise it. This is how the two ways traffic is completed, earning the trust of the superior commander by making oneself competent enough. The junior leaders must have the necessary experience to do things right. Plans must be viewed as provisional with the understanding that no plan is ever implemented exactly as envisioned. Commanders must think on their own feet, always aggressively analysing, recommending, anticipating, and adjusting. Thus, initiative, if it is to be encouraged in the army, must be supported by a positive leadership culture, a viable command and control system and mutual trust at all levels. 16. The effective application of Mission Tactics is dependent on individual willingness and capability to apply non conformist and unique solutions when crisis arises. The readiness of all ranks to depart from "the plan" once it no longer supports the Commander’s desired end state is essential and must be assumable by each level of command. The Army must accept and continue teaching its officers, JCOs, and NCOs that illogical obedience to issued tasks/orders is rigidity and no longer acceptable because it does not support an evolution to Mission Tactics. We often say while teaching tactics, “to think out of the box,” but do we really patronise our junior leaders to do so? An army survives and grows, physically, intellectually, and spiritually through its risk takers. However, we do not here support the breaking of regulations or the placing of soldiers in training under unnecessary or unjustifiable risk. We should, however, find out the edge of the allowed envelope to take prudent risk. Take, for example, the Army we have now over the years, many of us who avoid anything to do with training involving risk, especially the live fire training of soldiers in tactical scenarios. We avoid the challenge not because of the risk to the soldiers, but because of the perceived risk of our own careers—if something goes wrong. Therefore, we prefer security and safety and play it safe at the cost of the standard of training. Risk takers challenge the comfortable warmth of the status quo; they are willing to trade their potential within the hierarchy for accepting a degree of responsibility the bureaucracy has decided to find distasteful. Even legitimate risk takers disturb the hierarchy because they refuse to "stay in the box” and there is no risk-taking, in the box. We preach them to think out of the box but prefer to stay in the box. This contradiction must be settled. 17. We must provide both training and the environment for initiative to develop. The starting point is to delegate more responsibility to our junior commanders and soldiers. It requires giving them authority and responsibility and giving them the implicit trust to get the job done. This, however, does not mean that standards are lowered or that mistakes are not corrected. Junior leaders should be allowed to make mistakes but not blunders. They need to do it first, know what is wrong, and then correct their mistakes. They need to gradually be given more latitude to shoulder heavier responsibilities. Each leader and soldier will begin to invest more effort and
J. Shaw, Examining the Mechanics of Change: How We Can Create Manoeuvre Warfare, British Army Review, Vol97, April 1991, p 20.
pride in ensuring that the best is exacted from their respective section, platoon, company, and unit. A culture of independent thinking and aggressive decision making for peacetime training is crucial in developing initiative. Commanders and soldiers need to be encouraged and trained to make decisions at short notices. Unit commanders at all levels must move away from the insecurity complex. Change, if managed well, is for the good of the Army, not the individual. People are unwilling to change or make partial changes only to find faults and then revert to the old ways of doing things. The famous saying: "the army is going round in circles" is a symptom of this insecurity complex. Our attitude should be to “Find fault with the logic used to select the approach and correct it through training, but never blame the soldier’s willingness to try.” 18. Mission tactics benefits the senior commanders by freeing time to focus on higher level concerns rather than looking after the detail of subordinate’s execution. The senior prescribes the method of execution on only to the degree that is essential for coordination. The senior intervenes in a subordinate's execution only by exception when things go hundred and eighty degree opposite. Because, “The advantage, which a commander thinks he can attain through continued personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it, he assumes a task that really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fulfil the whole of them.” 19 Thus initiative allows continuing the speed (high tempo) of operations that we desire. Uninhibited by excessive restrictions from above, subordinates can adapt their actions to the changing “fluid” situations. They inform the commander of what they have done, but they do not wait for permission. Mission Tactics serves as a contract between senior and subordinate. The senior agrees to provide subordinates with the support necessary to help them accomplish their missions but without unnecessarily prescribing their actions. The senior is obligated to provide the guidance that allows subordinates to exercise proper judgment and initiative. The subordinate is obligated to act in conformity with the intent of the senior. The subordinate agrees to act responsibly and loyally and not to exceed the proper limits of authority. Mission Tactics requires subordinates to act with "top sight"—a grasp of how their actions fit into the larger situation. In other words, subordinates must always think above their own levels in order to contribute to the accomplishment of the higher mission. It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity or focus on various efforts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek unity not principally through imposed control but through harmonious initiative and lateral coordination within the context provided by guidance from above. Conclusions 19. The concept of Mission Tactics is a necessity for conducting war following the new doctrine of blending conventional with unconventional warfare. Mission Tactics does not mean merely decentralization of control; rather, it is the freedom of action delegated to junior leaders to achieve the mission ordered by superior commanders. Commanders at all levels must be accorded considerable freedom for initiative. Such latitude can generate the speed of response that is critical to battlefield success. The fog and friction of war may invalidate the carefully wrought plans of higher authority leaving the individual commander the best judge of the immediate tactical situation. Mission Tactics demand junior leaders to think aggressively, make independent decisions, assume responsibility of being in charge of the situation, showing initiative, boldness and get prepared to take prudent risks. 20. Risk taking stems from initiative. What is different about risk taking in this context is the importance attached to making an independent decision when circumstances dictate. An incorrect but earnest decision is far preferable to lack of action. A "zero defects" mindset tends
Helmuth Von Moltke, Prussian Field Marshal, Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Command and Control, Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office [GPO], Final Draft, August 2000, p 1-14. RESTRICTED
to discourage subordinate’s initiative. The other important factor is understanding commander's intent by the entire command and control process. Commander's intent binds together various tasks and defines the desired end state. In determining the prudence of their decisions, subordinates should assess their projected initiatives in accordance with the commander's intent. They must act within the commander's intent to ensure unity of effort. 21. Finally, superior subordinate relations must be characterised by mutual trust. Such trust furnishes the subordinate with the confidence to exercise initiative without concerns about reprimand for error or bad judgment. Likewise, superiors have confidence that subordinates will carry out orders and exercise their initiative consonantly with the superior's intent. Mutual trust is thus a manifestation of superior subordinate professionalism. Mutually trusting individuals, moreover, are those who are most likely to anticipate one another's actions to understand intuitively as to how the others are thinking, hence setting in train of harmony of minds whereby detailed instructions are unnecessary. Recommendation 22. An integrated theory of the nature of war is needed to fight in the near future in addition to desirable character and leadership attributes, command and control, senior subordinate relationships, application of tactics, acquisition of new knowledge, education and training. The move towards this positive leadership culture is ultimately to develop a new frame of mind which is the crux of the Mission Tactics concept. Therefore, Bangladesh Army must change the existing leadership psyche to facilitate moving forward to a positive leadership culture based on initiative.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. H W Koch, A History of Prussia.
2. Capt. I. A. Hope, Directive Control and Mission Analysis: Keys to Manoeuvre Warfare at Company Level, Infantry Journal, vol. 31, Spring 1997. 3. John T Nelsen II, Auftragstaktik: A case for Decentralized Combat Leadership, The Challenge of Military Leadership. 4. J. Shaw, Examining the Mechanics of Change: How We Can Create Manoeuvre Warfare, British Army Review, Vol-97, April 1991. 5. Frederick J. Manning, Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps, Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. Reuven Gal and David A. Mangelsdorff, Chichester, England, John Wiley & Sons, 1991. 6. Mark Gaillard, Second Lieutenant, Their Intelligent Initiative and Its Cultivation: A New Leadership Doctrine for Manoeuvre Warfare, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol-3, Number 4, Winter 2000/2001. 7. Operations of War - Volume One, GSTP 0032, Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate, April 2006. 8. Richard E. Simpkin, Concept of “Directive Control” or “Mission-oriented Control”, Command from the Bottom, Infantry, March-April 1985. 9. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London,1985.
10. The German Army's Mission Oriented Command and Control, Armor, 90th Edition, January-February 1981.
Military Biography Major Mohammad Alam Tareque, psc, East Bengal is the General Staff Officer Grade 2 (Coordination), of Tactics Wing, School of Infantry and Tactics. He is an infantryman who belongs to 19th BMA Long Course. He was born in Charging Nine and was later assigned to 27 and 51 Infantry Regiments at various capacities. Major Tareque is a distinguished instructor of Bangladesh Military Academy and School of Infantry and Tactics. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and holds a masters degree in Defence Studies, a masters in English from National University, an MBA from Bangladesh Institute of Human Resource Management (BIHRM) and a Diploma in UN Peace Support Operations from United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR), New York. He had tour of duties with the United Nations in 1992-1993 and in 2005-2006 as a member of United Nation’s Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Nation’s Operations in Western Sahara (MINURSO) respectively.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.