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Akhtar, Shazad, "The Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty's Semi-Naturalistic Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology" (2010). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 65. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/65
THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAUPONTYSSEMINATURALISTICCRITIQUE OFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY
Milwaukee,Wisconsin December2010
ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A. MarquetteUniversity,2010 ThisdissertationdealswithMerleauPontyscriticaltransformationofHusserls phenomenologythrougharethinkingoftheconceptofnature,whichHusserl, MerleauPontyargues,failstointegrateorexplainsuccessfullyinhisphilosophical system.ThefirstchapterreconstructsHusserlstranscendentalphenomenological projectinIdeasI,whilethesecondwidenstheinvestigationtocoverthe ontologicallycenteredIdeasIIandIII.Inmythirdchapter,IchartwhatIcall MerleauPontysorganicappropriationofHusserlandtheuniquehermeneutical challengesitposes.HeretheambiguityofIdeasII,whichbothgroundssubjectivity inthelivedbodyandseparatesnaturefromspirit(Geist),playsacrucialrole.The fourthchapterconcentratesontheMerleauPontyslatermeditationsonthe ontologyofnatureandsubjectivity,particularlyinhisrecentlytranslatedNature lecturesof195961.Finally,thefifthchaptercomparesandcontrastsHusserland MerleauPonty,intermsofbothsubstanceandmethod,throughadetailed examinationoftheirdifferentnotionsof(andwaystoaddress)paradox.Ishow howMerleauPontysparadoxicalthinkingstemsnotfromchanceormere temperamentbutafundamental,systematiccommitmenttotheselfcontradictory (ordialectical,butinamodifiedsense)natureofbeingandtruththemselves.
i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.
Iowetheconceptionandfruitionofthisprojectabovealltomydirector,Pol
iii TABLEOFCONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..................................................................................................................i INTRODUCTION..1 I.PresentStatusoftheProblem A.MerleauPontysInterpretationofHusserlandHusserlsConception ofNature..4 B.MerleauPontysLaterOntologyandConceptofNature..6 C.IdeasIandII7 II.SummaryoftheDissertation A.ChaptersOneandTwo...8 B.ChaptersThreeandFour...11 C.ChapterFive...15 III.Conclusion.17 CHAPTERONE:HUSSERLSTRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGYINIDEASI:THE BASICPOSITION...19 I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology...19 II.EpochandPhenomenologicalReduction A.Introduction..24 B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes26
iv C.PhenomenologicalEpoch.32 D.PhenomenologicalTranscendentalReduction(s)34 E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction.38 III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction..40 A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence.43 B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical49 C.TheChargeofDualism52 D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandtheWorldAnnihilation Experiment..55 E.HusserlsFinalPosition:TranscendentalIdealism60 IV.ConcludingReflections..65 CHAPTERTWO:THECONSTITUTIONOFNATURE,BODY,ANDSPIRITIN HUSSERLSIDEASII73 I.Introduction79 II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III A.Introduction..79 B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality 1.MaterialNature82 2.AnimalNature,ortheBodyandSoul85 3.Ego...91 4.Spirit...93 III.Analysis:PhilosophicalDifficultiesofIdeasII/III A.Introduction:PhenomenologicalMonism,OntologicalDualism..99
v B.HusserlsNaturalism.102 C.ThePriorityThesis.108 D.SpiritandConsciousness110 E.TheQuestionoftheBody114 IV.Conclusion..118 CHAPTERTHREE:MERLEAUPONTYSORGANICAPPROPRIATIONOFHUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY I.Introduction.122 II.MerleauPontysRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewand Critique A.Introduction127 B.TheStrongView:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras.129 C.WeakandMixedViews:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal.130 D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo...133 E.ConcludingThoughts.140 III.MerleauPontysHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText A.Introduction141 B.HusserlinPP..143 C.HusserlinMerleauPontysLaterWork146 IV.MerleauPontysHusserlianPhenomenology:ByTheme A.ThePhenomenologicalReduction152 B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction.158 V.ConcludingReflections.161
vi CHAPTERFOUR:MERLEAUPONTYSMATUREONTOLOGYOFNATURE I.Introduction.166 II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLectures A.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andthe ProjectofOntology..168 B.DefiningNature174 C.NatureandtheSciencesofLife...181 III.TheNatureLecturesandTheVisibleandtheInvisible:TowardsaNewDialectical OntoPhenomenology A.Introduction190 B.Reversibility191 C.Flesh.196 D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleau PontysDialectic.200 IV.Conclusion..205 CHAPTERFIVE:MERLEAUPONTYANDHUSSERLONTHEQUESTIONOFTHE PARADOXOFSUBJECTIVITYANDNATURE I.Introduction.....207 II.MerleauPontysPhilosophyofParadox A.OverviewofMereauPontysReferencestoParadox....211 B.ParadoxandthePerceptualFaith.217 C.ParadoxandPhilosophy..220 III.HusserlandParadox221 IV.TheParadoxofReflection
V.MerleauPontysParadoxicalThinkingInRelationtoOtherStylesofThinking: Dialectic,Skepticism/Quietism,andMysticism A.MerleauPontyandHegelianDialectic...234 B.MerleauPontyandSkepticism/Quietism237 C.MerleauPontyandMysticism.240 VI.Conclusion.244 CONCLUSION I.MerleauPontyvisvisHusserl.....247 II.MerleauPontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers..251 III.ThePersonalisticAttitudeandtheLimitsofReflection253 IV.PhenomenologyasParadox254 V.Naturalism...255 BIBLIOGRAPHY I.PrimaryLiterature(HusserlandMerleauPonty) A.Husserl...257 B.MerleauPonty...258 II.SecondaryLiteratureandOtherWorks A.BooksandMonographs...259 B.Articles,BookChapters,andVolumeIntroductions..262
viii C.Miscellaneous.268
Introduction
Thecentraldynamicofthisdissertationisthecreativeencounterbetween MauriceMerleauPonty(19081961)andEdmundHusserl(18591938),twoofthe mostimportantphilosophersofthetwentiethcentury.Iexplorethisencounteran encounterbetweentwophilosophiesasopposedtotwophilosophers,asthetwo thinkershadneverformallymetandareseparatedbymorethanageneration withrespectprincipallytotheontologicalissuessurroundingtheclassicaldivision ofnatureandspirit.Butinthecaseofphenomenology,ontologicaland epistemologicalissuescannotbecleanlyseparated.Thusmajorquestionsof epistemologicalsignificance,suchasthoseofidealismandthenatureofreflection, arealsoaddressedandrelatedtothequestionofwhatitmeanstodo phenomenologyandevenphilosophyitself.Phenomenology,ontology, epistemologyallofthesetermsarenegotiatedandrenegotiatedinthecourseof MerleauPontyssustainedhermeneuticsofHusserlswork,ahermeneuticsthat opensupontoahiddenworldofpossibilitieslatentinthe(ostensibly)simple phenomenaofsensing,seeing,speaking,andreflecting. MerleauPontysinterpretationofHusserlhasbeencommentedonbefore. However,oneoftheuniquecontributionsofthepresentresearch,Ibelieve,isitsuse oftheconceptofnature,afundamentalconcernofboththinkersbutinvery differentways,togototheheartofthequestionsofphenomenologicalmethodand therelationshipofhumansubjectivitytotheworld.Thischoiceallowsusto appreciatethemotivationsofMerleauPontysrethinkingofphenomenology,
2 puttingasideitschallengetoclassicalmetaphysicalbinariessuchashuman animalandnaturespirit,inthecontextofawiderphilosophicalontological tradition(thoughstillverymuchamodernone,forthemostpart).Merleau PontyscritiqueofsomeelementsofHusserlianphilosophyclearlybelongstohis generalcritiqueofmodernismand,inturn,blendharmoniouslywithhispositive appropriationofHusserlianphenomenologyasakindofunifiedfieldtheoryof Being,oncecleansedofitsCartesianpresuppositions.1 InHusserl,natureappearsprimarilyinthreeguises:asthenatural attitude;astheregionaldomainofthenaturalsciences;andastheonticnoematic correlateofspiritintherealmofworldly(nontranscendental)reality.For MerleauPonty,ontheotherhand,naturecomestoemergeasacomplexand nuancedothernessattheheartofsubjectivity,manifestingitselfmostdirectlyin therealmoflife,especiallyanimality,andyetalsohauntingconsciousness,or spirit,withitspresencebyabsence,itsimpenetrableoriginality.Itis,as Schellingsays,awildBeinguntamedbythought,yetalsountamable,forthere couldbenothoughtwithoutahorizon,andthathorizonalityisthedepththat cannotbeknownwithoutmyvanishingfromtheworldaltogetherandsomehow seeingitfromaboveanimpossibilityevenforaGod,however,since,asboth HusserlandMerleauPontyremindus,visionisacorporealact. Inmyinterpretation,NatureandthenBeing,andstillagain,the fleshcome,inMerleauPontystreatment,toquietlydisplacethetranscendental egoofHusserl,itselfaholdoveroftheCartesianepistemologicalprioritizationof
1
Itisinthislight,too,thatwecanappreciateMerleauPontysendorsementoftheworkofLeibniz, Hegel,andBergson,ontheonehand,andhisrejectionof(muchof)KantandSartreontheother.
3 theinnerovertheouter.Natureisambiguouslybothinnerandouteran interiorityquaexteriority,likethelivingorganism,whoseoutwardbehaviorcan onlybeunderstoodaslivingoutwithintheinternalhorizonofanUmwelt.The organism,mostevidentlyinthesimpler(butnottheverysimplest)forms,likecrabs orworms,isradicallyselfcentered(initsownworld)atthesametimethatit lacksacenter,anegothatcandifferentiateitselfabsolutelyfromaworldapart fromitsinteriority.Theanimalisitsworld.Thelivingbeinginitsunitywithits worldservesasareminderoftheprereflectivelifeofconsciousnessthat underliesandchallengesfromwithinthedualismsofreflectivethought, includingthatofthenaturalandspiritual,thecentraldivisionofHusserlsIdeas II.2 Whileremainingaphenomenologisttotheend,MerleauPontyrejectedboth Husserlstranscendentalidealism3aswellasthelattersimplicit(andironical) collusionwithnaturalscienceoveritsdefinitionoftheessenceofnature.Itisnot onlyinresponsetoHusserlorIdeasII,ofcourse,thatMerleauPontydevelopedhis ideasofnature;afterall,hehadbeenatworkontheontologicalimplicationsof animalityevenbeforehebecameacquaintedwithHusserlsworksinaseriousway, startingwithhisfirstmajorworkTheStructureofBehavior(1942).4Nonetheless,in IdeasIIheseesHusserlstrugglingwiththeconsequencesofdividingtheworldfrom consciousnessandnatureandanimalityfromspirit,andhisarticulationofan
2
MerleauPontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:Kluwer AcademicPublishers,2002.OthergoodarticlesincludethosebyTaylorCarmanandAnthony Steinbockforinstance,whichbothcompareHusserlianandMerleauPontianphenomenologiesofthe body,amajorthemeofIdeasII;CarmanevenexplicitlydiscussesMerleauPontysreadingofIdeasII, thoughonlyinpassing.Thismaterialis,however,onlypartiallyrelevantforourpresentpurposes. See:Carman,Taylor.TheBodyinHusserlandMerleauPonty.PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2, Fall1999(pp.205225);Steinbock,Anthony.SaturatedIntentionality.InTheBody.Ed.Donn Welton,Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,1999(pp.178199). 6 AnexceptionisStephenCrowellsessayTheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwo FacesofNature.PrintedinIssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree. Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996.(pp.81106)Thisessayalsocontainsmuch extraneousmaterial,forourpurposes,onthephilosophyofmythology.
MerleauPonty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollgedeFrance.Compiledandwithnotes fromDominiqueSglard.Trans.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois, 2003. 8 Carman,Taylor.TheBodyinHusserlandMerleauPonty.PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall 1999,p206. 9 Ibid.,p.208 10 FranoiseDastur,acarefulandrelativelynonpolemicalreaderofbothHusserlandMerleauPonty, agreeswiththelatterthatHusserlisbasicallydualistic.SeeDastur,Franoise.Husserlandthe ProblemofDualism.SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(Analecta Husserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.6577).Merleau Pontyisroutinelyreadasazealousantidualist,aclaimIwillpartiallychallengeinchapters4and5.
6 Husserlhasplentyofdefenders,ofcourse,someofwhom,likePanos Theodorou,takeissuewiththewidespreadreadingofIdeasIIthatunderstandsitas validating,essentially,thenaturalscientificviewofnature.11J.ClaudeEvansagrees thatthisreadingismisleading,andgoesevenfurther,arguingforthesuperiorityof HusserlsaccountofnatureandscienceinIdeasIIoverhislaterreflectionsonthe lifeworld,definitelyaminoritypositionforthoseconcernedwiththisproblem.12 WithinHusserlianscholarship,atleastasevidencedbyMerleauPontys ReadingofHusserl,achiefquestionliesinjusthowfarMerleauPontydivergesfrom Husserl.Fordiametricalpositionsonthisquestion,seeforexampleSeebohmsand Zahavisarticlesinsaidvolume.13 B.MerleauPontysLaterOntologyandConceptofNature InrecentyearstherehasbeenaspateofliteratureonMerleauPontyslater philosophyandhisgeneralontology.Theseincludeseveralbooklength treatments,forexamplebyDillon(1998)andBarbaras(2004)14twoofthebest availableaswellasmanyarticles,interestinglylargelyinEnglish.(MerleauPonty hasproventobepopularinAmericaespecially,thoughoneshouldnotfailto
11
Theodorou,Panos.PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserlsAnalysisofNatureThingin IdeasII.InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophyVolume5,2005. Eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell,165187.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005. 12 Evans,J.Claude.WhereistheLifeWorld?PrintedinIssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.Thomas NenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996. 13 Seebohm,ThomasM.ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau PontyandHusserl.InMerleauPontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree. Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.5170);Zahavi,Dan.MerleauPontyonHusserl:A Reappraisal.InMerleauPontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht: KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.329). 14 Barbaras,Renaud.TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trans.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor. Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004;Dillon,M.C.MerleauPontysOntology.Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,1988
7 mentionthatthereisalsoaJapaneseMerleauPontyCircle).Oneofthesearticles,by Geraets,dealswiththethemeofnatureexplicitly,15whileothersdealmorewiththe fleshandotherrelatedtopicsfromthelaterphilosophy.16Acomprehensive treatmentofMerleauPontysphilosophyofnature,onelongoverdue,hasbeen recentlyauthoredbyTedToadvine.17 C.IdeasIandII RegardingHusserl,thereareinnumerableworksdealingwiththecentral conceptsoftranscendentalidealismandwithIdeasI18,asatext,inparticular indeed,virtuallyeveryintroductorytextorstatementonHusserlhastotakethis seminalworkintoaccount.Myrelianceonsecondaryliteratureforthesectionon IdeasIisminimal,however,fortworeasons.First,Iexpoundonlytheworksmost basicthemesepochandreduction,noesisandnoema,thetranscendentalego,etc. Second,althoughthesenotionsthemselvesareallcontroversialandcontested throughouttheHusserlliterature,myaimisnottogiveadefinitiveinterpretationof them,onlytofacilitatethroughmytreatmentofthemacomprehensiblediscussion ofMerleauPontysgeneralappropriationsandcriticismsofHusserlian phenomenology.
15
Geraets,ThodoreF.MerleauPontysConceptionofNature.InSoulandBodyinHusserlian Phenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka. Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.301312). 16 SeeforexampleDastur,Franoise.World,Flesh,Vision.InChiasms:MerleauPontysNotionof Flesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(pp.23 50). 17 Toadvine,Ted.MerleauPontysPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress, 2009 18 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy, FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoaPurePhenomenology.Trans.F.Kersten.Dordrecht:Kluwer AcademicPublishers,1983
8 WorkonIdeasIIisfarlessextensivethanthatonIdeasI,buttherehasbeen somenoteworthysecondaryscholarshipinthelastdecadeonIdeasII,someofit includedinthevolumeIssuesinIdeasII19,whichdrawstogetheranumberofessays onvariousaspectsofthework.Otherpenetratingreadingsincludethoseof Rockstad20andthealreadymentionedEvansandTheodorou.IdeasIIhasofcourse beenwrittenaboutbymajorphenomenologists,includingRicoeur21,Landgrebe22, and(obviously)MerleauPontyhimself.Ihavefoundthatthese,alongobviously withtheprimarytext,arestillthemostvaluableelementsinIdeasIIscholarshipat thepresenttime. II.SummaryoftheDissertation A.ChaptersOneandTwo InChaptersOneandTwo,IsketchapictureofHusserlofIdeasIandII,the idealistHusserlwho,inthelatterofthesetwoworks,neverthelesslaysthe foundationsofmostofwhatMerleauPontywillforgeintoanewvisionof
19
IssuesinHusserlsIdeasII,eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic Publishers,1996. 20 Rokstad,Konrad.TheHistoricityofBodyandSoul.InPhenomenologyofLifeFromtheAnimal SoultotheHumanMind:BookI:InSearchofExperience,ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.(pp.127159). Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2007;also,Rokstad,Konrad.Nature,SubjectivityandtheLife World.InAnalectaHusserliana:TheYearbookofPhenomenologicalResearchVolLXXVII,ed.Anna TeresaTymieniecka.(pp.4159).Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishing,2002. 21 Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLester Embree.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1967(Thirdchapter:HusserlsIdeasII:Analyses andProblems,pp.3581). 22 Landgrebe,Ludwig.ThePhenomenologyofEdmundHusserl.Ed.DonnWelton.Ithaca,NewYork: CornellUniversityPress,1981.
9 phenomenologyandthenaturespiritrelation.Asjustalludedto,thefirstchapteris adetailedoverviewofHusserlstranscendentalphenomenologytheeideticand transcendentalphenomenologicalreductions,thenaturalandtranscendental attitudes,noesisandnoema,intentionality,thetranscendentalego,constitution,and thelike.23Thepurposeofthischapterismostlyexpository(someinterpretationis involved,ofcourseasanygenuineexpositioninfactrequiresanyway);the demandsofexplainingHusserlsphilosophicalsystem,however,alsohappento makeitthelongestchapterinthiswork. ThesecondchapterisadetailedexpositionandreadingofIdeasII24,witha focusonitsontophenomenologicalmeditationsontherealmsofmaterialnature, bodyandsoul,andspirit,alongwiththequestionoftheenigmaticrelationof theseconstitutedrealitiesandthetranscendentalsubjectivity(orsimply consciousness)ofthetranscendentalreductionformallyexpoundedinIdeasI.
23
ANoteontheChoiceofText:Husserlwasconstantlyintheprocessofreinventinghimself;IdeasIis onlyoneofmanypossibleintroductorytextstousetopresentHusserlstranscendentalversionof phenomenology(CartesianMeditationsandtheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciencescomemostquicklyto mind,buttherehasevenbeenabooklengthintroductiontoHusserl,byKockelmanns,basedonhis EncyclopediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenologysee:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserls Phenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994).WhychooseIdeasI?Asidefromthe reasonthatIdeasIandIIbelongtogetherbytheirtitles(IdeasIIhadbeeninitiallyplannedasa sequelandfurtherexplicationofthethesismaintainedinIdeasI),itisalsotruethatIdeasIis sufficienttointroducemostofthefundamentalplanksofHusserlianphenomenology.Whetherornot Husserleventually,inthe1930s,shiftedhisbasicpositiontoamoreexistentialand detranscendentalizedformofphenomenology,orwhetherthelatergeneticphenomenologyis notmerelyanextensionofthephenomenologyoftheIdeasbutratherafarreachingradical rethinkingofit,arequestionsIwillnotandneednotdealwithhere.Foritwouldsuitmypurposesif theHusserl/sofIdeasIandIIareregardedasjustone(ortwo)ofmanyactualorpossibleHusserls, onlybecausethepointsIwillbetryingtomakearebasicallysystematicones,whichthetextsathand bringoutsufficientlyontheirown. 24 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy, SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trans.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer. Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989.TheyearofpublicationoftheoriginalGerman languageeditionwas1952.
10 InIdeasII,Husserlpresentsapictureofnatureasathelifeless,meaningless (Sinnlos)substrateofreality,abarephysicalthinghoodthatdistinguishesitself fromlife(soul,Seele),ontheonehand,andmind(spirit,Geist),ontheother.The livedbody,aspresentedbyHusserl,istheunityofmindandmatter,but, importantly,itisdistinguishablefromthepureformsofeither.Whatshields HusserlfrombaldfacedCartesiandualismishisclaim,announcedalreadyinIdeas I,thatpureortranscendentalsubjectivityandherehefollows(roughly)Kant, whoseCopernicanturnhebroadlyendorsescannotbereducedtothinghood orobjectivityofanykind.Puresubjectivityismorefundamentalthananyobject, sinceitistheveryconditionforthepossibilityofobjectivityinthefirstplace. Husserlsprioritizationoftranscendentalsubjectivityoverempiricalsubjectivity radicalizesthisdifferencebyplacingempiricalsubjectivitysocompletelyinthegrip oftheobjectiveandevenlifelessworldofphysicalnature,thatweareforcedto seethatsubjectivitystrictly(orpurely)speakingcannotbeoftheworld,literally. Thisisnottosaythatitcanexistwithoutit,butitcertainlycanbeconceivedtodo soasdemonstratedinafamous,and,tosome,infamous,passageinIdeasIthatis echoedinlaterwritingsaswell.ThatHusserlwasinterestedinmakingsuchan underlyingpointisclearfromIdeasIIanditsother,complementaryarguments againstmindbodyreductionisminthattext.25
25
11 IdeasIIwasunpublishedinHusserlslifetimebutreadandstudiedclosely byMerleauPonty,whosepositiveappropriationofthatworkliesmostlyinthearea ofthephenomenologyofthebody(thelivedbody,orLeib).26MerleauPontys reservationsregardingtheworkasawhole,however,andinparticularonwhathe regardedasitsunderlyingconceptualconfusions,wereconsiderable.Andthe questionofnaturewhatitis,andhowhumanbeingsaretobeunderstoodin relationtoitoccupied(aswehaveseen)greatdealofMerleauPontysmature thought,whosegeneralthrustgoesagainstthegrainofHusserlsfindingsinIdeasII. HusserldoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensionsinIdeasIIasfundamental onesorrealizethatnatureposesaradicalproblemforthetranscendental phenomenologicalmethoditself.Wemightputitthisway:whereasforHusserl naturehastobeexplainedintermsofitsconstitutionintranscendental consciousness,forMerleauPonty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichwouldneed explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe livedbody,whichisitselfanemblemofnature. B.ChaptersThreeandFour ChapterThreeaddressesMerleauPontysspecificformofphenomenologyin relationtoHusserlsown.Itessentiallyrepresentsmytakeonthedecadesold questionofhowbesttounderstandMerleauPontysoftencontroversialreadingof Husserl.Theissueiscomplex,butafterthoroughlydocumentingMerleauPontys
thenaturalisticphysicalisticoptionleft,adisastrousoption.Hencethereistheneedtorethink phenomenologyinawhollynewlight(thoughstillrootedinperception,asHusserlhadit). 26 SeeforexampleMerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.InSigns.Trans. RichardM.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964
12 reenvisioningofclassicphenomenologicalmotifssuchasthephenomenological andeideticreductionsfromthePhenomenologyofPerceptionthroughTheVisible andtheInvisible,IarguefinallythattheFrenchphilosophersmannerof appropriationofHusserlispersuasivebutalso,moreinterestingly,highlyorganic. IusethistermnotonlyinthesensethatitdrawsonHusserlinanaturalmanner,so tospeak,butmoreparticularlyinthesensethatitembodiesorinstantiates MerleauPontysstyleofphilosophyandevenhisownontology.Forexample, MerleauPontysownnotionsofambiguity,reflection,andparadox,amongothers, actuallyprovetobethekeytounlockingthesecretofhisHusserlreading.Butthis alsomeansthattheextenttowhichoneagreeswithMerleauPontysreading correlatessomewhattothedegreetowhichoneacceptshisoverallphilosophical vision,somethingthatmayaccountforatleastsomeofthedoggedoppositionto himfromcertainmembersofthestrongHusserliancamp,atleast.(Merleau PontysreadingofhisownreadingofHusserlhisviewofthedegreeofhisown faithfulnessorunfaithfulnesstothesource,forexampleisalsoherelargely confirmedthroughtheprismofhisowndialecticalviewsandhermeneutics.) ThefourthchapterplumbsMerleauPontyswritings,mostparticularlythe Naturelectures,toconnecthisreadingofHusserlandexistentializationof phenomenologytohisnewlydevelopingconceptionsofnatureand,accordingly,the natureofhumanityaswell.TheNaturelectureseriesisanexcitinglydetailedand densetractoforiginalresearchandtextualandscientificinterpretationthat MerleauPontygaveastheheadoftheCollgedeFranceoveraperiodofseveral years,between1958and1961,shortlybeforehisuntimelydeath.Hedelivered
13 thematthesametimehewascomposinghisunfinishedmasterpieceTheVisibleand theInvisible,alsoatextIwillalsoheavilyrelyoninbothChapters4and5(itis effectivelyMerleauPontysmostsignificantworksincethePhenomenologyof Perception). MerleauPontysexpressaiminthelecturesistoinitiateaprojectof ontologystartingfromtheideaofnatureasitappearsinthehistoryofWestern philosophyandscience,particularlyinthemodernperioddowntohisownpresent day.Thisisasurprisingchoiceforaselfidentifiedphenomenologist,butitis consistentwithMerleauPontysownfamousassertionthatthephenomenological method,includingthephenomenologicalandeideticreductions,areradically incompleteandthus,oneissafetoconclude,unabletosealconsciousnessofffrom theempiricalrealminthewayHusserl,theprogenitorofthemethod,hadintended. (Thisisnottosaythatnaturalmeansempirical,onlythatthereisafamily resemblancebetweendoingexistentialphenomenologyandanarchaeologyof nature,therootofourlivingexistence.) WhereasinTheStructureofBehaviorandPhenomenologyofPerceptionthe focushadbeenonanimalityandthelivedbodythesignificanceofwhichremains inthelaterphilosophy(whichIdonot,asdosomeothers,readintermsofabreak withtheold,ratheronlyadeepeningthatoccasionallypromptsacorrection), MerleauPontynowbroadenshisinquirytoBeingasawhole,therebyfinding himselfinquiringintonatureasafieldoflifepriortothedivisionofsubjectand object.NatureturnsouttobenothinglikeeithertheobjectiveNatureof scientistsorthenoematicpoleofHusserliantranscendentalconsciousness,since
14 itis,inaprofoundsense,foreverbeyondanypowersofconstitution.Remarkably andimportantly,MerleauPontydoesnotabandonthephenomenologicalattitudeor standpointofreflectivethoughtinfavorofaholisticimmersioninprereflective life.Hisvisionisoneofthehumanbeingsinevitablebelongingnessandalienation fromnaturethatis,fromhimself/herself.Humanexistenceisthereforeself interrupting,thoughnottothepointofrealizingaSartreandisconnectionfromthe wholespectacleofBeing,inwhoseinternalfoldhumanconsciousnesstakesits rightfulplace.Itis,however,aconditionedconsciousness,justasfreedomfor MerleauPontyisaconditionedfreedom.Ineithercase,onecanputtheemphasison eitherthefirstorthesecondtermandfind,ineachcase,animportantnuancethat illuminesauniquesideofexistence. MuchofthemostinterestingmaterialintheNaturelecturespresentsthese ideasindirectlythroughMerleauPontysoriginalinterpretationsofsuch philosophicalfiguresasDescartes,Spinoza,Kant,Schelling,andBergson,aswellthe findingsofcontemporaneousscientists.MerleauPontyslaterconceptionofnature, andanewontologicalvocabularytogowithit,hadbeengestatingforalongtime, sincehisfirstworksinfact.Nature,aswehavealreadyseen,comestotakeonthe meaningofwhatSchellingcalledthebarbarousprincipleofthereal,oragainwild Being,whichcannotbebroughtinatransparentwaywithintheorbitofreflection. MerleauPontyscritiqueoftranscendentalphenomenologyisapparenthere(much asSchellingcriticizedthereflexivityofHegelandidealismgenerally).Itseemsas thoughMerleauPontysnatureisonewhichsomehow,fromwithinitself,gives risetosubjectivityandreflectionandtherebytranscendsitselfwhileremaining
betweenHusserl(andperhapsthevastmajorityoftraditionalphilosophy)and MerleauPonty,anditpertainstotheirapproachtophilosophyandthought itself.Isphilosophybestappreciatedasaproblemsolvingenterprise,asHusserl believes,orratherasameditationonparadoxes,themselvesbeyondanysimple solution?MerleauPontyfindstheultimatetruthofthehumanconditiontoconsist inacertaindialecticalcontradictionwhich,however,unlikeHegelsversion,does notfindaresolutioninsomethinghigher,suchasanabsolutestandpoint. MerleauPontyisultimatelyaphilosopherofparadox,whichiswhatexplainsthe titleofthepresentdissertation,TheParadoxofNature...Itisregardingthe problemofnatureatoncethehomeofhumanspirit,aswellasitspermanent otherthatMerleauPontyfindsoneofhismostfruitfulapplicationsofwhathe callsinTheVisibleandtheInvisiblethemethodofinterrogation.
27
16 Ofcourse,Husserlhimselfmakesparadoxacentralpartofthediscourseof phenomenologyinthenarrowsensethatheneverceasesfirstofalltoemphasize theuttercounterintuitivenessoftherevolutionaryperspectiveoftranscendental phenomenology,oftheenormouseffortittakestooverturn(para)thecommon view(doxa)thatplacessubjectivityatthemercyofthespatiotemporalcausal world,ratherthanviceversa.YethealsospeakseloquentlyintheCrisisaboutwhat hecallstheparadoxofsubjectivityparadoxheremoreinthemoreMerleau Pontiansenseofantinomynamelytheparadoxthatsubjectivityisatonceapart oftheworld(initsembodiedform,inindividualconsciousnesses),evenasitisthe transcendentalconditionfortheverypossibilityoftheworld(whatHusserl controversiallycallsabsoluteexistenceasopposedtotherelativeexistenceof theworld).Inanimportantway,this,too,isaparadoxofnature:fortheworld natureisboththeconditionofthepossibilityofconsciousness,evenas consciousnessistheconditionforthepossibilityoftheworld.ButHusserloffersa solutiontotheparadoxbymakingadistinctionbetweentwotypesofsubjectivity, andofferingonepriorityovertheother.Aswehavealreadyseen,suchasolution willnotdoforMerleauPonty.Andintheend,Husserlisnolesssympatheticto antinomiesthanmostofthecanonicalthinkersoftheWesternphilosophical tradition,fromAristotle(Metaphysics,BookIII)onward.
17 III.Conclusion InHusserl,thethematicofnatureinitiallyassertsitselfinthatphilosophers famous(thoughclearlyambiguous)rejectionofthenaturalattitudeandhisstrong distinctionbetweenworldandconsciousness,anditextendsinMerleauPontys worktothelattersfinegrainedattempts,throughhislifelongstudiesofbiology andpsychology,tonegotiatebetweenthissortofdualismandtheequaldanger,in hiseyes,ofapurelyscientificnaturalism.MerleauPontyeventuallysettlesonan interpretationofthephenomenologicalreductionasadeepeningofthenatural attituderatherthanaflighttopureconsciousnessor,asMerleauPonty paradoxicallystatesit(inHegelianterms),itisonlyadeparturebywayofreturning toourselves.Inthisway,MerleauPontyslecturecourseonnatureafocaltextof thisdissertation,alongwithIdeasIandIIandTheVisibleandtheInvisiblecanbe seentobetheculminationofanongoingcritiqueofHusserliantranscendental phenomenologyinfavorofamoreexistentialnaturalisticatonce phenomenologicallythickandscientificallyinformedvariety,whichplaceshuman subjectivityattheheartofnature,orBeing,ratherthanoutsideoraboveit.The consequenceisthatforMerleauPonty,phenomenologyisnotanewscienceora magickeytounlockphilosophicalpuzzlesonceandforall;rather,itisthe witnessingofthemiraculouscoherenceofcontradictorytruthsinthespectacleof existence. Fromthebeginning,MerleauPontyrefusestoadoptamethodthatwould allowfortheworldsthoroughgoingconstitutioninthemind.Atthesametime,he
18 explicitlyprioritizedwhatwemightcallthefirstpersonalityofthe phenomenologicalmethodoverthenaverealistmethodofmostsocalled naturalists.ThenaturalisticmethodMerleauPontyandHusserl(nottomention Heidegger)opposeisthatoftakingtheworldassomethingfirstselfconstituted,so tospeak,andthenlaterexperiencedornotexperienced,dependingoncausal conditionsthatobtainbetweensubjectsandtheworldasobject.InMerleau Pontyswayofthinking,humansubjectivity,orspiritbroadlyspeaking,bearsan intrinsicrelationwiththeworlditlivesthrough,perceives,andunderstands,butat thesametime,itisalienatedfromthisworldatalevelwhichsuggestsatwistingor breakingapart(dehiscence)attherootlevelofbeingitself.MerleauPontysanalysis ofnatureandphenomenologymarksaturntowardswhatIcallMerleauPontys seminaturalisticversionofthephenomenologicalproject;naturalisticbecause itsituateshumansubjectivityorspiritintermsthatinscribeitinalargermatrixof being,butonlyseminaturalisticbecauseitisnotthefullblownorreductive naturalismofakindthat,onceagain,bothHusserlandMerleauPontyvigorously opposed.
19 I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology IdeasIdemandsourattentionbothfortheboldnessandoriginalityofits
ChapterOne:HusserlsTranscendentalPhenomenology inIdeasI28:TheBasicPosition
Philosophy(FirstBook).IwillrefertoitthroughoutthistextasIdeasIforshort,asiscommon practice. 29Brentano,Husserlsteacher,revivedthemedievalnotionofintentionalityandpracticeda rudimentary(andarguablypsychological)formofwhathetermedphenomenology,butHusserls LogicalInvestigationsandIdeasIaregenerallycreditedforinitiatingtheschoolknowntodayas phenomenology,thoughHeideggers1927workBeingandTimealsocontributedstronglytothe waytheideaofphenomenologyeventuallycametobereceivedandinterpreted. 30Husserlsometimesmakesastrongdistinctionbetweenthephenomenologicalandthe transcendentalreductions,whichissomethingIwillbringupagainbelow(IID)withrespectto HusserlsfamousEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenology.ButinIdeasI,hetreatsthem ashavingthesameextension,onlyreferringtodifferentaspectsofasingleprocess.Thushe distinguishesthemasfollows:...weshall,onmostoccasions,speakofphenomenologicalreductions (butalso,withreferencetotheircollectiveunity,weshallspeakofthephenomenologicalreduction) and,accordingly,fromanepistemologicalpointofview[myitalicshere],weshallreferto transcendentalreductions.(IdeasI,66)Inotherwords,thedistinctionasgivenhereismerelyoneof perspective,andaccordinglyIwilloftenusethetwotermsphenomenologicalreductionand transcendentalreductioninterchangeably,exceptwhentheexpositiondemandsthatthey temporarilybeunderstoodasdistinct.(Whatgoesforthereductioninthiscasegoesfortheepoch aswell,fortheyarecompanionconcepts.)
20 phenomenologyasdistinctfromothersciences(naturalandhuman)andthe introductionoftheterminology(noesisandnoema,naturalandtranscendental attitudes,constitution)socharacteristicofHusserlssubsequenttechnical phenomenologicaldiscussions.Itis,then,easilyonparinimportancewithHusserls earlierandsimilarlypathbreakingLogicalInvestigations.31 YetevenincomparisontootherpublishedtextsbyHusserl,IdeasIisnota particularlyeasytexttounderstandorunpack.Itishighlyabstractandrarely pausestoexplainthesignificanceorphilosophicalcontextofitsanalyses,takingthis backgroundmoreorlessforgranted.AsPaulRicoeurpointsout,themotivationsof thework,rootedinaconfrontationwithskepticism,arebestdiscernedthrough unpublishedtextsandlecturesfromtheperiodbetween1905and1913,aswellas withthehelpofthewritingsofHusserlsremarkableassistantEugenFink.32Indeed, theactualtextofIdeasIreadsattimeslikeastarterstrainingmanual,inthiscase forthepracticeofanewphenomenologicalmethodofthinkingandanalysis.Yetthe manualisalsoarecordofselfdiscoveryandhasthefeelofaworkinprogress,as Husserlwashimselfworkingthroughmanyofitsideasandtheirimplications,not allofwhich,asisclearfromhislaterintroductorytexts,arefullyworkedoutinits pages.
31Husserl,Edmund.LogicalInvestigations.Trans.J.N.Findlay.London:Routledge,1900/01(2nd,
revisededition1913)(HereafterLI)
32InRicoeurswords:Finally,itmustbesaidthatIdeasIisabookwhosemeaningremains
21 ItwouldbeimpossibletocondenseallofIdeasIinthespaceofonechapter, letalonetoshowhowitbuildsonHusserlsconsiderableoutputbeforeits publication,orforthatmatterhowhisstilllaterthinkingrelatestoIdeasI.Indeed, IdeasIiswrittenwithreadershipoftheLIlargelybeingpresumed.Certainofthe lattersideasarerevisitedanewintentionality,forexamplewhileothersare enfoldedimplicitlyintothesubstanceofnewerreflections.33Itisnecessaryforthe purposesofthepresentworkforustosketchoutIdeasIsmainargument(ifthisis therightword)anditsbasicorientationtowardssomeofthefundamentalquestions itposestoitself,concerningespecially:thenatureofconsciousnessandthe relationshipofconsciousnesstotheworld;thedefinitionofphenomenologyasa transcendental(aswellaseidetic)sciencethateschewsthenaturalattitude whileseekingtoexplainitscontents;theideasoftranscendenceand immanence;andthequestionofthescopeandmeaningofthephenomenological epochandreduction,thelatterquestionbearingofcourseonthecentralissueof thephenomenologicalmethod.Theseareallinterrelatedquestions;indeed,one mightevengosofarastosay(inHeideggerianstyleperhaps)thattheyarethe samequestion.Forroughly,theyallconcerntheunderlyingrelationshipof consciousnesstoworldor,putinanotherway,subjectivityandnature.Wecannot
33Forexample,inIdeasIHusserltakesforgrantedthenotionthatphenomenologydealswithacts
34Thisquestionhasbeenwrittenaboutendlessly,especiallyincontextofthedebatebetweenthose
whointerpretthenoemaaspercept(Gurwitsch,Cairns,etal.)andthose,leadchieflybyFllesdal, whointerpretitasavariantofFregesSinn.Foranicerecapofthedebate,see:Solomon,RobertC. HusserlsConceptoftheNoema.InHusserl:ExpositionsandAppraisals,FrederickA.Ellistonand PeterMcCormack,eds.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977(pp.5469).Solomon beginshisessaybynoting:Itisgenerallyagreedthattheconceptofthenoemaisoneofthethemes, ifnotthecentraltheme,ofHusserlsphenomenologicalphilosophy.J.N.Mohantyisseeminglyin perfectagreementwhenhemakesapassingreferencetotheallimportantideaofnoemaand noeticnoematicstructure,regardedbymanyasconstitutingthemostimportantandoriginalpartof [IdeasI].(Mohanty,J.N.ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl:AHistoricalDevelopment.NewHaven: YaleUniversityPress,2008,p.372)Anothertopicwewillhavetoleaveout,thoughinthiscase becauseitisalmostwhollyabsentfromtheIdeasitself,isthetopicoftimeconstitution,whichlater figuresdeeplyinallofHusserlsmostadvancedanalyses. 35Foranexcellentsummaryofthedebate,seePolVandeveldesintroductiontoKey(pp.1620).Also ofnoteisRicoeursremark,inspiredalsobythedifficultiessurroundingthenoema,andquotedby Vandeveldeintheintroduction,thatthus,realityalwaysseemstoescapetranscendental constitution.
23 thelifeworldphilosophy,bestknownthroughtheCrisis.36Givensuchviews,why notreviewHusserlslaterreformulationsofmuchofthismaterial?Moreover,as mentionedabove,Husserlhimselflateradmitstothedisadvantagesthoughnot necessarilyinadequaciesoftheCartesianwaytothereductionpresentedherein. Healsodevelopedanewformofphenomenology,geneticordynamic phenomenology,whichsupplements(andsomesaysupplants)thestatic phenomenologyofIdeasI. Thefactremains,however,thatHusserlhimselfnevertotallyabandoned eitherthestaticortheCartesianphenomenologicalmethod.Regardingthelatter, forexample,nolessthantheauthoroftheheterodoxtextTheOtherHusserl,Donn Weltonnotesthat[t]heexistenceoftheCartesianMeditations,andthefactthat [Husserl]recommendeditsFrenchtranslationtoreadersaslateas1933evenashe begandevelopingthetextoftheCrisisconvincesusthat[theCartesianwaytothe reduction]wasneveroverthrown.37Furthermore,Husserlneverabandonedthe basicframeworkoftranscendentalsubjectivityanditswhollynonnaturalistic essence.IdeasIpresentsabroadlyfaithfulpictureofthebasicthrustof transcendentalphenomenology,andthisfact,combinedwithitshistorical importanceandthefactthatitistheprequeltoIdeasII,atextequallyifnotmore vitalforourtask,are,Ibelieve,enoughtorecommenditfordetailedinvestigationat thepresenttime.
36SeeMerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:
24 II.EpochandPhenomenologicalReduction A.Introduction TheheartofIdeasI,andprobablythesignatureofphenomenologyitselfasit ispopularlyknown,isthephenomenologicalreduction.Itisallbutimpossibleto giveabriefdefinitionofit,butanyaccountmustbeginwiththeconceptofepoch orthesuspensionorbracketingofallonesbeliefsregardingexternalexistence oftheobjectsofperception(andofcourseofanyothermentalact).Throughthisall importantsuspension,oneeffectsaradicallynewattitude,thephenomenological attitude,accordingtowhichtheworldisseentobeasitisfortheconsciousness,or subjectivity,thatbeholdsit.Inthisway,allobjectiverealityisreducedtoits significanceforconsciousnessor,alternately,toitsmeaningfulnessasa noematiccorrelatetothenoeticactsofaconsciousnessinwhichtheworldis constituted.38 Thejargonladendefinitiongivenabovemust,however,becarefully
38Thislanguagewillbeexplainedbelow(IVA).Notethatthetermreductiondoesnothavethe
25 cannotbedeniedthatHusserldidinsomesenseprioritizesubjectivityoverobjective reality.Husserldidnotdenytheexistenceofsuchareality,butaswewillsee, underthereductionitacquiresawhollynewsensenamely,thatofbeingthesense mindindependentreality(alongwithinnumerableothersenseswhichgivethe worlditsintelligibility).Toputitanother(unHusserlian)way,whilewecansay thatthereisaworldthattranscendsthemind,itonlydoessoforthemind,39 acquiringitsmeaningfulnessassuchatranscendentbeinginthiswayalone.Thus,it caninacertainwaybecalledindependent(initsexistence,orthatness)fromthe mindinonewayandyetwhollydependentonit(foritsmeaning,orwhatness)in another.Consciousnessitselfinitspurifiedandtranscendentalformis,by contrast,dependentonnothing.Anditissolelybecauseofthisasymmetry,andnot becauseofsomesupposednonexistenceofexternalreality,thatHusserlcalls consciousness(asopposedtothetranscendentworldassuch)absolute.Allof thesenotionswillbefurtherexploredindividually,however,inPartIVbelow. Inthesectionsthatfollow,Iwillproceedtodescribethereductionasitis outlinedinIdeasI.Alongtheway,Iwillbeflaggingsomeofthemostsignificantand controversialissuesofinterpretation,aswellaspossibleinconsistencies,mysteries, orambiguitiesinHusserlsaccount,whichcanbe(andusuallyalreadyhavebeen) raised.Indoingso,itisinevitablethatsomecommentarybemixedwithpure description(contrarytothespiritofHusserlsownmethodology!)evenbeforethe
39Iwillattimesusethewordmindforconsciousness,despitethepotentialhazardsthatcome
40Ofcourse,whatispossiblymostcontroversialaboutthereductionishowitcanbebegunatall, 41ThispictureofattitudeswillbecomeimportantlyexpandedandenrichedinIdeasII,inwhichthe
butwewillcometothatlater(PartV).
naturalattitudeisdividedintopersonalisticandnaturalisticforms.Thesewillbediscussed closelyinthenextchapter.
Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1999(p.157).HereafterCM.
28 aliveandawake(andmaybeasleepanddreamingaswell),inwhichweperceive theretobeobjects,aswellaspeopleandvaluecharacteristicsofthings,toexist outsideusandonhand.Husserlstressesthattheworldasweknowitinthe naturalattitudeisnotsimplytheworldofscienceoramaterialworld;thuswe naturallyperceiveaworldofobjectswithvalues,aworldofgoods,apractical world46Intermsofmaterialobjects,weperceivenotsimply(orvirtuallyever, unlesswearescientistsinascientificattitude)matter,butthingsliketables andpianosobjectswithculturalmeaningaccretions.Thenaturalattitudeisalso oneinwhichwethinkandcogitate,atleastintheeveryday(non phenomenological!)way.47Butmostpertinentlywithregardtothe phenomenologicalepoch,inthenaturalattitudeweaccepttheworldasafactually existentactualityandalsoacceptitasitpresentsitselfto[us]asfactuallyexisting.48 Empiricalscienceanditsmodeofcognitionpertaintothisworld,preciselytakenas existentinthesenseoutlined.Hencescience(asanactivityandaformofthought) itselfbelongstothenaturalattitude,afactHusserlnevertiresofexploitingtothe advantageofphilosophyasheconceivesit. Husserlregardshisdescriptionofthenaturalattitudeaspretheoretical;that is,itisnotaconstruct,butsimplywhatisdirectlyintuitedtobethecaseabout natural,nontranscendentalexperience:
29
Whatwepresentedasacharacterizationofthegivennessbelongingtothenaturalattitude,and thereforeasacharacterizationoftheattitudeitself,wasapieceofpuredescriptionpriortoany theory.49
Hethennotesthatbytheorieshemeanspreconceivedopinionsofeverysort. Husserlclaimstokeeptheseatadistancestrictly,astancehemaintains throughouthiscareer,inkeepingwithhiscommitmenttogotothethings themselvesandbypassthecorruptinginfluenceofpresuppositionsofanykind. (Hencehisfamousandfamouslyimperileddreamofdevelopinga presuppositionlessscience.)ButwhileHusserlsdescriptionofthenaturalattitude maybepretheoretical,itismorethanapparentfromitthatwe,insofaraswedwell inthenaturalattitude,areallatypeofnaverealist,tousethemodernparlance. Thus,Husserlsunderstandingofthenaturalattitudemaybestbeunderstood throughasimpleconsiderationofwhatsomebodyunbiasedby,say,fancy metaphysicaltheoriesunderstandshimselftobeexperiencingeveryday,inthemost thoroughlyordinarysenseimaginable,asalivinghumanbeing.Itisthis thoroughgoingaverageness,thebasicmediocrityofexistence,thatHusserl continuallycontrastswiththedisconcertingandvertiginousheightsofthe transcendentalattitude.ItisnotasthoughHusserldismissesnaturalexperience;to thecontrary,thewholepurposeofphenomenologyistounderstandit.Itisjustthis embraceoftheordinarythatdistinguishesphenomenologyfrommorespeculative sortsofphilosophicalendeavors.Andyetthereisatranscendental,noetic noematicdimensionofmeaningconstitution,arealminwhichordinaryexperience becomesclarifiedintermsofitssourceandtruemeaning.Itisthrough
49Ibid.,p.56
Hefurtherexplains:
Thedistinctionofdoxaandepistemetranslatedintothisconceptionmeans:Philosophythat believesitcanoperateonarealisticlevelisboundtothenaturalattitudeanditcannotbecriticalin thetranscendentalsense.ThisisnotonlyHusserlscritiqueofpretranscendentalphilosophybut especiallyofhispupilswhoneglectedtopursuethetranscendentalpaththathehadtakenupwith IdeasI(1913).50
50Luft,Sebastian.HusserlsTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLifeWorldand
Cartesianism.InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.204)Hereafter,Luft.
31 Letusfirstreturntotheinitialquestionofwhatanattitudeissupposedto beinthefirstplace.IfwetakeHusserlforhisword,anattitudecannotbe explainedmerelyasapsychologicalstate,astheword(inEnglish)isroutinelytaken todenote.Afterall,onlythenaturalattitudeproperlydeservestobecalled psychological,asHusserlhimselfonoccasiondoescallit.51Anattitude,then,I propose,mightbestbedefinedastheorientationinwhichtheparametersof experiencearedelimitedanddefined.Inthenaturalattitude,theseparametersare defined,sotospeak,bytheinternalandexternalhorizonsoftranscendentthings (andthehalosthatformthebackgroundinwhichweperceivethem),bypeople andlivingbeings,byvariousactsoffantasyandmemory,andtoanextentbyour selfperception(andhenceourownegos).Butinthetranscendentalattitude,these parametersshifttosomethingnew,afieldofconstitution,aswellastothe transcendentalegoorpureconsciousnessinwhichallworldlybeings,including theempiricalego,arethemselvesconstituted(inwhichtheycometobeing).52A shiftinattitudeisthusashiftoftheentirematrixofintelligibilityofthingsa prefiguring,perhaps,ofHeideggerslaterconceptofworld.53
51Ibid.,p.126:Inourcasewehave,accordingly,ontheonehand,thepsychologicalattitudeinwhich
ournaturallyfocusedregardisdirectedtomentalprocessese.g.toamentalprocessofrejoicing asasequenceofmentalstatesofhumanorbeast.Ontheotherhand,wehavethephenomenological attitude(Husserlsitalics)Seealsop.172forfurtherclarificationofwhatthepsychological attitudeinvolves. 52ItistruethatHusserldoesnotrestrictthetermattitudetothecontrastofnaturaland transcendentalattitudes:healsospeaksoftheeideticattitude,thenaturalscientificattitude,etc.. Onemaystillapplyourdefinition,however:forexample,intheeideticattitudetheparametersof experienceareessences,ratherthanfacts.(Itneedstobeunderstood,ofcourseasIwilldiscuss belowthatthetranscendentalattitudepresupposestheeidetic,whilethenaturalmayormaynot overlapwitheideticattitude.) 53IamindebtedtoDr.PolVandeveldeforthislanguageofparametersandintelligibility,aswell astohisunderstandingofHeideggersconceptionofaworld,thoughIwouldnotpresumetosayhe wouldendorsemyapplicationoftheseconceptsunderthesecircumstances.
32 C.PhenomenologicalEpoch Husserlbeginshisshiftintothenewattitudebynoticingthat,contrarytoits spiritoftotalselfconfidence,thenaturalattitudehassomeansweringtodo.For therearepresuppositionstoitspsychologicalexperience54thatremainsofar unexploredandunknown(tonaturalconsciousnessitself).Husserlwantsto investigatethese.Herenowaradicalalterationiscalledfor:anewstyleof attitudeisneededwhichisentirelyalteredincontrasttothenaturalattitudein experiencingandthenaturalattitudeinthinking.55Inordertodemonstratethis transformation,HusserlcallsfatefullyupontheexampleofDescartesandthelatters MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.Subsequently,thewaytothereductionoutlinedin IdeasIistypicallycalledtheCartesianway.Husserlcertainlybelievedthat Descarteshadopenedthewaytoawhollynewfieldofbeing,whichHusserlhimself callstranscendentalsubjectivity,buthealsobelievedthatDescartesdidnot properlyunderstandhisownachievementandhencefellawayfromthenewperch almostassoonashereachedit,aswewillseebelow. HusserlexploitstheCartesianmethodofdoubtinanewandoriginalway. Throughhisownconfrontationwithskepticism,Descartesenactedthisfamous methodinordertoreachthefoundationofknowledge,theselfcertainIthink,I am(cogito).Husserlnowpracticesavariationofthismethodinordertoreacha similarlyselfevidentsphere,somethingheisabouttocallasphereofpure consciousnessorimmanence.ButHusserldoesnotwanttoactuallydoubtanything, certainlynottheindubitableexistenceoftheworld(whichisalwayspresupposedin
54IdeasI,xix 55Ibid.,xix
33 consciousnessasitsultimatehorizon).Whatheisinterestedinistheattemptat doubt.Forwhilewecannotdoubtcertainthings,wecanattempttodoubtanything whatever,nomatterhowfirmlyconvincedofit,evenassuredofitinanadequate evidence,wemaybe.56Thenatureofsuchanact,theattemptatdoubt,isto hypotheticallyplacetheexistenceofthatwhichisdoubtedintometaphorical bracketsorparentheses.Iteffectsacertainannulmentofpositingandprecisely thisinterestsus.Thereisnoquestionofnegatingthatwhichexists,i.e.denyingits existence.Butthereisasuddenneutralitywithregardtothisentirequestion somethingwhollypeculiar.57Thequestionoftheexistenceofthingsissuddenly putoutofaction,andinmywords,intoakindofpurgatorialmaybethat neverthelessallowsonetofocusonsomethingelseinthiscase,onthemannersof givennessofthings.Thisnewfocus58automaticallyimplicatesthemasexperienced bysomeone,i.e.,showsthemintheirselfgivenness. Aswehavesaid,theparenthesizingofpositingsofexistenceiswhatis calledtheepoch.Morespecifically,thereareseveraltypesofepoch.Whatisat issuenow,however,isnot,forexample,thekindofepochonespeaksofinregards tothebracketingoffeaturesunrelatedtothestudyathand(forexample,a scientistbracketsallvaluepredicatesofphysicalobjectsandfocusesontheir spatiotemporaldeterminationssolely,aphenomenologicalpsychologistbracketsall materialorbiochemicalaspectsofanlivingorganism,etc.),butratherthefulland
Husserltocapturetheradicalityofthenewattitude,sinceitisitselfborrowedfromexperience withinthenaturalattitude.
34 totalbracketingofthequestionofexistence(ornonexistence)oftheentireworld (includingevenoneselfinsofarasoneispartoftheworld,thoughthiscomes later)thethesisoftheworld(Weltthesis).Butcanweeffectaglobalepochof thissort?Canweputthewholeofrealityinbrackets?Thisisaquestionwewill comebacktoattheendofthischapter. D.PhenomenologicalTranscendentalReduction(s) ThebracketingoftranscendentthingsisnotforHusserlsufficient,however, toreachthetranscendentalego.59Itonlygoesasfarassealingthepsycheofffrom whatmightbecalled(fromanaturalattitudinalstandpoint,anyway)theexternal world.ItisherethatHusserlmakesanotherinterestingdeparturefromDescartes. Theego,too[is]arealObjectlikeothersinthenaturalworld.60Thisisnottrue onlyinthesensethatIhaveaphysicalbody,butalsointhesensethatIeffect cogitationes,actsofconsciousnessinboththebroaderandthenarrowersenseand theseacts,asbelongingtothehumansubject,areoccurrenceswithinthesame naturalactuality.61(Thisprincipleofthenaturalityofpsychicasopposedto transcendentalconsciousnesswillonceagainbecomeacentralthemeinIdeasII.) Inlaterwritings,Husserldistinguishesbetweenthephenomenologicalreduction andthetranscendentalreduction,characterizingthelatterasafurtherstep beyondtheformer,preciselyintermsofthefurtherbracketingoftheego.The phenomenologicalreductiononthisunderstandingeffectsauniversalepochonthe
Andso,
Accordingly,theconsistentreflectiononconsciousnessyieldshimtimeaftertimetranscendentally puredata,andmoreparticularlyitisintuitiveinthemodeofnewkindofexperience,transcendental innerexperience.62
62ThesequotesarefromHusserlsEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleof1928(trans.RichardE.
HusserlunderstandsDescartestohavecorrectlydiscoveredtheabsolute egoastheindubitableultimatumoftranscendentalinquiry,onlytohavethen misinterpretedhisowndiscoveryinanimportantway.Inparticular,hefailedto properlygraspthenatureoftheIoftheselfcertainIthink,Iam.66TheIin questionisnotme,Descartesorevensomepossibleindividualempiricalego,atleast notquapsychophysicalbeing,butrathertranscendentalsubjectivitynota thinkingsubjectbutthethinkerassuch,transcendentallyconsidered,forwhomand inwhomanentireworldisconstitutedand,hence,availableinfullselfevidence formyknowingregard.Furthermore,whileHusserlendorsesDescartesthesisthat theIisinsomewaymorecertainthantheveryquestionoftheexistenceofthe world,helamentsthelattersfailuretoseethattheworldisstillpreservedasa phenomenoninthereduction.WhatDescartesfundamentallymisunderstoodisthat theindubitableselfisnotthemereegopoleofconsciousnessorevenpsychic empiricalconsciousnessitself.Itistranscendentalsubjectivity.67
37 Yetwhatremainsafterthereductionisnonethelessastreamofmentallife. Isthisthenotorioustranscendentalego?JustwhatHusserlmeansbythe transcendentalegoisoneoftheverydifficultproblemstosolveinHusserl scholarship.AccordingtoDavidBell,thetranscendentalegoisnothingbutthe ordinary,commonorgardenmind,albeitviewedfromwithinaphilosophicalor transcendentalperspective.Insupportofthisthesishecitesthefollowingpassage fromtheCrisis:Astranscendentalego,afterall,Iamthesameegothatinthe worldlysphereisahumanego.WhatwasconcealedfrommeinthehumansphereI revealthroughtranscendentalenquiry.68Inthisspirit,wewouldperhapsnotdo badlytounderstandthetranscendentalegoofIdeasIastheselfquatranscendental sphereofnoeticnoematicconsciousness,withallofitsactsandintentionalobjects included,andunderstoodtoconstituteitselfthroughthelawsoftemporality (thoughHusserlelaboratesonthislastpartlater).Ofcourse,thisdefinitionmight seemtoconflictwithHusserlsenigmaticpostIdeasIclaimthatthemeaningof transcendentalsubjectivityistranscendentalintersubjectivity.69Butwewillhaveto presentlyleavethatcomplexissueaside.
68Bell,David.Husserl.NewYork:Routlege,1990(p.207),hereafterBell;theHusserlquotecanbe
foundinCrisis,p.264
69ThesubtitleoftheFifthMeditationoftheCM(p.89)statesthepointdirectly:Uncoveringofthe
SphereofTranscendentalBeingasMonadologicalIntersubjectivity.Therecanbenoquestionbut thatHusserlviewsintersubjectivityhere(andfortherestofhiscareer)astheauthenticmeaningof transcendentalsubjectivity.Thetranscendentalegoisnotayouorme,butneitherisitanempirical community(asthiscouldleadtorelativism,oneofHusserlsavowedenemies),butsomehowanI thatisaweinatranscendentalregister.WecannothererehearsethestepsofHusserlselaborate descriptionofthemannerinwhichthebeingofotheregosisevincedandverifiedintherealmofthe transcendentalego.(p.90)ForadetailedexpositionandinterpretationofHusserlsviewsee: Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponsetotheLinguisticPragmatic Critique.TranslatedbyElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001.(Seeespeciallypp. 15966).
38 E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction Beforefurtherexploringthephilosophicalandontologicalimplicationsofthe reduction(seePartIVbelow),wemightatthisstageaskwhatactuallymotivatesit inthefirstplace.Sofar,wehavepresentedthereductionlargelyasHusserl(inIdeas I)himselfdoes,namelyasaprocedureforgettingatthetruthofexperienceandthe world.ButwhatmakesHusserlthinkthisparticularmethodisnecessary,asopposed toothers?HereitisimportanttounderstandthatHusserlfitsintoaveryold traditioninphilosophy,namelythequestforwhatmightbecalledrealandsecure knowledge.Alongtheselines,thephilosopherspeaksoftheelementalquestfor freedominthiscasetheepistemicfreedomthatcanalsobedescribedasthe freedomfromerrorandbias,illusionandemptyabstraction.Foritisthepursuitof certainty,clarity,andfreedomfromprejudicethatconspiretoproducetheprecisely HusserlianversionofphenomenologythatburstsforthoutofIdeasI.See,for example,Husserlsreferencetogenuinefreedomfromprejudice70inthefirstpart, orHusserlsowndeclarationthatthegoalofthephenomenologicalreductionsisto reachthefreevistaoftranscendentallypurifiedphenomenaand,therewith,the fieldofphenomenologyinourpeculiarsense.71 Whatwecangather,then,isthat(transcendental)phenomenologyis motivatedbyathirstforacertainfreedom,inparticularafreedomfrom presuppositions.Butiffreedomfrompresuppositionsmotivatesthereduction,what isthissupposedtobeafreedomto?Inshort,Husserlwasinsearchofthe foundationofknowledge.Wemustbefreefrombiasinordertogainaccesstoa
70IdeasI,p.36(myitalics) 71Ibid.,xix
39 securezoneofknowing,adirectaccesstoreality.Logic,science,andmathematics makethemostvigorousclaimstoknowledgeinourandHusserlsera,butHusserl becameconvincedthateventheyneededsecuringonamorefundamentalbasis.But Husserlwasnotsimplyametascientist.Insteadofbeingmerelyfixatedongiving thesesciencesafoundation,hecamealsotobefascinatedforitsownsakewiththe realmofmeaningsinwhichconsciousnessrevealedallthingsintheiressence.He cametoregardphilosophyunderstoodinanewandnondogmaticwayasthe indispensablescienceandthefoundationofallknowledge.Italonebearsthe customaryroleandtheresponsibilityofansweringtheskepticwhodeniesthe possibilityofknowledge,andhedoesthisbyshowingthewaytoanindubitable, undeniablesourceofapodicticevidence.Husserlsstrivingforknowledgeissodeep andthoroughthatheiswillingtorevisehimselfruthlessly.Husserldidnotthink philosophywasascienceamongsciencesi.e.,asjustanotherformalor materialontologythatmakesclaimsandargumentsaboutacertainregionof reality.Sounlikepreviousphilosophers,HusserlinlargeagreementwithKant,his transcendentalistancestorplacedallhistrustnotinsomerealmofmetaphysical truths,intuitedorlearnedthroughrevelation(suchasPlatonicForms,God, AbsoluteSpirit),fromwhichtoderiveandsecureothers,butsimplyinexperience. Philosophysroleistodrawitsevidencefromthewellofexperienceactsof consciousnessandthethingsofwhichitisconscious(egocogitocogitatum) throughamethodinwhicheverythingbutthispurifiedexperientialityissuspended indefinitely,andputoutofactionforthetranscendentalgaze.
40 InthiswayHusserlsphilosophicalorientation,broadlyconstrued,is radicallyepistemological.ButthisdoesnotmeanHusserlwasconcernedwith epistemologyinthenarrowsenseinusetodayHusserlwasnotoverlyconcerned withdefiningknowledgeasjustifiedtruebelieforsomethingelse,forexample. Andheisnot,onceagain,obsessedwiththesubjectivesideofknowing(noetic phenomenology)inthewaytraditionalepistemologyis(exceptingthecausaland externalistmodels,ofcourse),ashegivesampleattentiontothevariousobjects thatareknown(noematicphenomenology).Itdoesmean,however,thatfor Husserl,todiscoverhowknowledgetakesplaceisbothanecessaryandasufficient taskforphilosophyassuch,regardedinitspurestessence. III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction Besidesthephenomenologicalreduction,thereisanother,nolessimportant
41 Thereis,forHusserl,afundamentaldividebetweenmattersoffact(in muchtheHumeansense)ontheonehandandessences(oreid)ontheother.72 Overlappingwiththisdistinctionisthatbetweenreality(thereal,whichistosay factical)ortheempiricalontheonehand,andessentiality,ontheother.What exactlyisaHusserlianessence,oreidos?Isit,forexample,auniversal?Sucha questionmaynotbeterriblyhelpful,giventhecontestednessofthequestionof universalsitself,butHusserlianessencesareuniversallikeinthattheyare multiplyinstantiableandnonparticular.Thatis,theyarenotsingularintheway existentparticularsare.However,itisnottechnicallytruetosaythattheyare outsideofspaceandtime;theydonotsubsistlikePlatonicFormsinasupra spatiotemporalorder,asHusserlforcefullyunderscores.73Essencesarealso ontologicalinastrongsensethatis,theyarenotpurelylinguisticor conventional.Wedonotdecideasacommunitywhatisorisnotanessence,at leastaspertainstothenaturalandspiritualfurnitureoftheworld;wediscoversuch essences. Thecleargraspofessencesisachievedthroughamethodknownas imaginativevariation.Intheeideticreductionwhichistobeperformedbefore thephenomenologicalreductiononeistobracketoutallparticular,factical,and contingentfeaturesofthingsperceived(orremembered,imagined,etc.)andtoseize onlythosefeaturesthatbelongtotheobjectnecessarilyi.e.,thatmaketheobject whatitis.Inotherwords,theeideticreductiondistillsthosecategorialformsthat weintuitinthings.Yethowdoesoneclearlydistinguishbetweentheessentialand
72Ibid.,pp.78 73Ibid.,pp.4042
42 inessentialaspectsofthings?Thisiswhereimaginativevariationasamultiply repeatableexercisebecomescrucial:wearetoimaginethethingsinmanydifferent circumstancesandundergoingmanychanges.Ineachchangeofcircumstance,some featureorpropertyofthethingisaltered.Doestheobjectsurviveasjusttheobject thatitisevenafterthisalteration?Thenthepropertyalteredmusthavebeen inessential.Aftervaryingtheobjectenough,itistobecomeapparentwhatthe essentialfeaturesoftheobjectare. Hence,inkeepingwithatraditioninauguratedbytheGreeksandsustained bythescholastics,essencesrevealthewhatofthings(andpeople),theessential natureofthings,and,tothisextent,theirbeing.Allthesame,therearetwodistinct sensesofthewordbeingessenceandexistence.74Itwouldseemthattheessence ofathingcannotexistwithoutthereexistingthingsthatinstantiatethatessence.75 Thereare,then,atleastthesetwooptionsforthetheoreticalregardofan objectorreal(athingorstateofaffairs,forexample):toviewitasfactualand spatiotemporallylocated,ortoviewitinitsessentiality,i.e.intermsoftheessences itinstantiates.Thedistinctiondoesnot,however,correspondtothatbetweenthe naturalandtranscendentalattitudes;fortranscendentalreflectionisnottheonly sciencedoneintheeideticattitude.Essencesarenottheprovinceonlyof phenomenology.Phenomenologyisaneideticscience,butnotalleideticsciences e.g.,logicandmathematicsarepersephenomenological.Phenomenology,in Husserlsconception,isthereforeoneofmanyeideticsciences.(Tobemoreprecise
74Ibid.,p.12
75Attimes,itdoesseemasthoughHusserlgoesevenfurther:Positingofessencesimpliesnotthe
slightestpositingofanyindividualfactualexistences;pureeidetictruthscontainnottheslightest assertionaboutmattersoffact.(IdeasI,p.11;Husserlsitalics)
43 still,onemightsaythatthereisnothingphenomenologicalintheeidosofthe eidetic,butverymuchsomethingeideticintheeidosofthe phenomenological.) Husserlmakesmuchdependnotonlyontheeideticreduction,butalsoon thestrictandabsolutedifferencebetweenfactsandessences,theempiricalandthe eidetic.EssentialismalsobecomesextremelyimportantforHusserlspurposesin termsofhisdistinguishingbetweentheessencesofmentalprocessesontheone handandphysicalthingsontheother.76ThusitwillbecentraltoHusserls delineationsoftheessencesofconsciousnessandreality,aswewillseebelow. IV.ConsciousnessandWorld A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence ForHusserl,asforhisteacherBrentano,themostfundamentalfactabout
77Ibid.,pp.735 78See,forexample:Russell,Matheson.Husserl:AGuideforthePerplexed.ContinuumBooks.New
York:2006(p.47).HereafterRussell.Theconceptisalsopresentinmedievalwriters.
44 thatisoutsideofitouter.Forintentionalityrevealsanintimate,indeed unbreakablebondbetweenanactofconsciousness(noesis)ontheonehand,and anintentionalobject(noema,vaguelyakintoKantsphenomenological objectGegenstand)ontheother.Onemightatfirstbetemptedtosaythatsucha relationshiptakesplacewithinconsciousnessitself,butconsciousnessshouldnow beseenasanequivocalterm.Consciousnessasintentionalityhousesbotha subjectivepoleaswellasanobjectiveone;consciousnessinthissenseisnot meresubjectivity.Whilethisisnotsomuchaproofthatthereexistsanoutside world,sincethisisbuiltintotheverydefinitionofexperience(atleastforHusserl), itisafundamentalproblematizationoftheveryinner/outerdistinction philosophyhadbeentakingforgrantedprephenomenologically(orprecritically intheKantiansense).Thereissimplynosenseintheideaofaconsciousness essentiallyunrelatedtoanintendedworld,horizon,orobject. Mostcommentatorshavegenerallyfoundthereferentofthetermnoesisto beunproblematictograsp,butnotsonoema.Asmentioned,thetermnoesis referstointentionalactsofconsciousnessandnoematotheobjectssointended (andquaintended).InHusserlswords:
CorrespondingineverycasetothemultiplicityofDatapertainingtothereallyinherentnoetic content,thereisamultiplicityofData,demonstrableinactualpureintuition,inacorrelative noematiccontentor,inshort,inthenoematermswhichweshallcontinuetousefromnow on.79
Husserlgivesanexample,pertainingtotheexperienceofseeingatree:
thetreesimpliciter,thephysicalthingbelongingtoNature,isnothinglessthanthisperceivedtreeas perceivedwhich,asperceptualsense,inseparablybelongstotheperception.Thetreecanburnup,be
79Ibid.,p.214
45
resolvedintoitschemicalelements,etc.Butthesensethesenseofthisperception,something belongingnecessarilytoitsessencecannotburnup;ithasnochemicalelements,noforces,noreal properties.80
However,thenoemaisnotforHusserlareallyinherentpartofconsciousness.The noematree,saysHusserl,isnomorecontainedinherentlythanisthetreewhich belongstoactuality.81 Hencethenoemaofaperceptionissimplytheperceivedasperceived.This wouldapplyacrosstheboardtoallthevarioustypesofact:thenoemaofa recollectionistherecollectedasrecollected,thenoemaofafantasyisthefantasied thingasfantasied,etc.Husserlalsocallsthenoemaornoematiccorrelatethe senseofanact.Howthisdefinitionofitmatchesupwiththefirstisadeepsource ofdebate,butitcannotbefurtheredaddressedhere.82 Ashintedatalready,thenoeticnoematicbifurcationallowsHusserltoclaim thatphenomenologyisnotmerelyaboutconsciousnessinthenarrowsenseof subjectiveconsciousnesssincethisisonlythenoeticpoleofexperiencebut alsoabouttheobjectsexperienced(asexperienced)thenoematicpole.Every consciousexperience,withoutfail,hasbothanoeticandanoematicside.Itmakes nosensetoisolatetheconsciousnessoffromthatofwhichthereis consciousnessapointMohantymakeseloquentlyinspeakingoftheirreducibility ofthephraseconsciousnessofsomething:
somethingisnoematicinsofarasitisanimmanent,butnonrealcontributoryfactorinthe possessionbyanactofsignificanceormeaning.(Bell,p.180)
46
Consciousnessisacorrelationbetweennoeticactsandnoematicmeanings.Theworldisa structureandinterconnectednessofsuchmeanings,andisthecorrelateofconsciousness.Thetwo, consciousnessandworld,together,intheircorrelation,constitutetranscendentalsubjectivityThe truetranscendentalfoundationis:consciousnessoftheworld.Realismdeletesthehyphensbutit cannotinfactdoso.Iwanttokeepthemtiedtogether.83
Ifconsciousnessitselfhasaninnerandouter,ahereandthere,a subjectandobject,thenitisalready,inasense,selftranscending;andso immediatelyonecanseehowtranscendencebecomesafundamentalthemeinthe structureofconsciousness.Husserlgenerallyspeaksoftranscendenceinthe contextofthetranscendentintentionalobject,including,mostimportantly,the necessarytranscendencethatbelongstotheessencephysicalthing.Butitis importanttoseethatbecausetranscendenceisfirstpredicatedonintentionality, andintentionalityisastructuralfeatureof(noeticnoematic)consciousnessassuch, thetranscendenceoftheworld,whateverformitwilltake,willbesuchasnotto leaveconsciousnesstrappedinaskepticalimpasseorlockedintotheprivate theaterofthemind.Onceagain,Husserlstheorycouldbeseenasanadvanceover lesssophisticatedmoderntheoriesofmindandworld. ButwhatexactlyisHusserlsconceptionoftranscendence?Itisimportant heretotracetheexactsenseinwhichHusserlemploystheterm,forthiswillhave enormousconsequencesforthegeneralphilosophicalimplicationsofHusserlsfinal transcendentalphenomenologicalposition.Tobeginwith,Husserldeniesthe
83Mohanty,J.N.MyPhilosophicalPosition/Response.InTheTranscendentalandtheEmpirical.Ed.
47 Kantiandistinctionbetweenthephenomenonandthenoumenon.84Thethingin itselfisnotunknowablepreciselytheopposite.Buthowcanitbeknowable,ifitis alsotranscendent?Itisknowableindegreesoradumbrationstheprofilesof thingsasseenfromdifferentangles;henceitisknown,inHusserlsterminology, inadequatelyandnotjustforfiniteobserversbutforanyobserverwhatsoever, includingGod.(Thisreflectstheintrinsicnatureofperception,understoodasa generalrelationshipofconsciousnesstoextraconsciousreality).Hencethethingis transcendentonlyafterapeculiarwaynotwhollyotherthanoraliento consciousness,butinawaythatbelongstoitnoeticallynoematically,through adumbrations,yetnotwithrespecttothewholeoftheobjectallatonce.Thingsare encounteredastranscendenttheyhavethismeaningbutsuchtranscendence amountsonly,ultimately,toakindofregulativeIdea(roughlyintheKantiansense) ofadequateobjectivitytheinfinitelimitoffull,adequategivennessoftheobject inallofitsprofilesatonce.Transcendenceisthusnotapropertyofthingsbutthe ideaofacompleteunityofadumbrations,thesumofprofilesofathing.Warnsand clarifiesHusserl:
onemustnotletoneselfbedeceivedbyspeakingofthephysicalthingastranscending consciousnessorasexistinginitself.Thegenuineconceptofthetranscendenceofsomething physicalwhichisthemeasureoftherationalityofanystatementsabouttranscendence,canitselfbe derivedonlyfromtheproperessentialcontentsofperceptionorfromthoseconcatenationsof definitekindswhichwecalldemonstrativeexperience.Theideaofsuchtranscendenceisthereforethe eideticcorrelateofthepureideaofthisdemonstrativeexperience.85
84See,forexample:Husserl,Edmund.Kantandtheideaoftranscendentalphenomenology,trans.
48 Fundamentaltothispictureisthenotionofgivenness.Inthewordsofone commentator,thegiven...includesnotonlythatwhichisimmanentinarealsense butalsothetranscendent,providedthatitisgiven.86ThisalsoallowsHusserlto convertalltranscendenceintowhathecallsimmanenttranscendency.With respecttophysicalthingsthistermdenotesthat...thetranscendencybelongingto thephysicalthingasdeterminedbyphysicsisthetranscendencybelongingtoa beingwhichbecomesconstitutedin,andtiedto,consciousness...87 Yetinthiscase,onemightsuspectthatHusserlhassecuredaccesstothe thingsatabitofanunfairprice.Suchacriticismmightrunasfollows:Either thingsarenottrulytranscendent,ortheyarenotnecessarilyknownunliketheir phenomenalappearance,whichmay,afterall,withKant,beconditionedbyourown cognitiveapparatus.ButHusserldespisesbothsubjectivismandconstructivismas equallyunbearableconcessionstotheskeptic(orthestrictKantian),sothese optionsareclosedbyhim.Husserlwantsapuretransparencyofbeingapure knowingaswellastheotherness,sotospeak,ofthisbeing,ortheobject.Butcan hehavethis? Husserlwouldprobablyarguethatthecounterargumentsketchedabove restsonafalsedilemmathattranscendentalphenomenologymovesbeyond.The criticdoesnotseeathirdpossibilitybetweentranscendentalrealismand skepticism,namelythepossibilityofatranscendentallevelatwhichtheworldis revealedtobeintegrallyunifiedwithconsciousness.Thisisbutabriefpresketchof
86DeBoer,Theodore.TheDevelopmentofHusserlsThought.Trans.TheodorePlantinga.TheHague,
theNetherlands:MartinusNijhoff,1978,p.314
87IdeasI,p.123
B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical HusserlsquasiCartesianismdoesnotendwiththeCartesianwaytothe reduction.Itisalsoevidentinhisefforttodistinguishtheessencesofthemental andthephysicalonseveralgrounds.Forinstance,itbelongstotheessenceof mentalphenomenathattheyareindubitable,ofphysicalphenomenathattheyare not.Everyperceptionofsomethingimmanent[i.e.,inthesphereofconsciousness] necessarilyguaranteestheexistenceofitsobject.88However,[a]ccordingto eideticlawitisthecasethatphysicalexistenceisneverrequiredasnecessarybythe givennessofsomethingphysical,butisalwaysinacertainmannercontingent.89 WhatHusserlisindicating,ofcourse,isthatIcannotbewrongaboutthe existenceofsomethingsappearingtomeassuchandsuchthing.Forexample, whileIcanbewrongthatamonsterisstandinginfrontofme,Icannotbewrong thatitappearsasthoughonedoes.EventhePyrrhonianskepticswereindeed comfortablewiththismuch.Butdoesthisrevealsomethingaboutthementaland thephysical,ormerelyourcognitiverelationtoourselvesontheonehandand transcendentrealitiesontheother?Thisquestionreachesbacktothequestionof whetherDescartesownrealdistinctionisinvalidonthegroundsthatheconfused theepistemologicalpropertiesofthemindwithrealpropertiesofmindsand
88Ibid.,p.100 89Ibid.,p.103
50 extendedthings.ButinHusserl,asopposedtoDescartes,thisquestioncannotarise, becauseafterthephenomenologicalreductionandovercomingofthenatural attitude,itmakesnosensetospeakofanythingbutmeanings.Tospeakofthingsas beingtotallydisconnectedfromconsciousnessis,aswehaveseen,meaningless;so wehavetotakethemannerofgivennessofobjectsinperceptionasrevealing somethingessentialabouttheseobjectsthemselves,andnotonlyastellingusabout ourselvesasperceivers.90 Physicalthings,bycontrasttomentalprocessesandappearances,are,aswe havealreadyseen,transcendent.Thatis,themeaningphysicalthingcontainsthis transcendence.Astranscendent,physicalthingssomehowdonotpossessthesealof selfevidentnessofimmanentmentalphenomena.Forthisissomethingthatbelongs essentiallytothenatureofthephysical.Insum(noticethecontinuousemphasis):
Overagainstthepositingoftheworld,whichisacontingentpositing,therestandsthenthepositing ofmypureEgoandEgolifewhichisanecessary,absolutelyindubitablepositing.Anythingphysical whichisgiveninpersoncanbenonexistent;nomentalprocesswhichisgiveninpersoncanbenon existent.Thisistheeideticlawdefiningthisnecessityandthatcontingency.91
designatingessentialtypes.
51 muchabouttranscendentobjects:theyarealwaysgiveninadequately.Wenever haveatotalisticperceptionofanobject,butjustastruly,objectsdonotgive themselvesinfulladequacy.92Bycontrastwithphysicalobjects,purecogitataand mentalappearancesaregivenadequately.Forexample,Idonotconceiveofa triangleinitsadumbrations,butadequatelyandallatonce.Husserlgeneralizesthe pointtoincludeallmentalprocesses,93concerningwhichheremarks,Where thereisnospatialbeingitissenselesstospeakofaseeingfromdifferentstand pointswithachangingorientationinaccordancewithdifferentperappearances, adumbrations.94 HerewithHusserlonceagainestablishesthatthereisanessential differencewithechoeshereagainofDescartesrealdistinctionbetween consciousnessandreality.Consciousnessisasphereofimmanence,inwhichthe objectsofthoughtaregivenadequately,whereas(physical)realityisasphereof transcendenceunqualifiedtranscendence,tobeprecisewhoseobjectsaregiven toconsciousnessinadequately.Husserlactuallymakestwoimportantrelevant essentialdistinctions:betweenthatofperceptionandnonperceptualmental processesontheonehand,andbetweenperceptionanddepictivesymbolic objectivation,or,moresimply,signconsciousness,ontheother.95Inthisway, Husserltriestosetphenomenologyapartfromthefollowingalternatives,long familiarfromtraditionalormodernepistemology:pureidealism(whichwould
92Thisdoesnot,bytheway,meanthatweonlyperceivepartsofobjectswhenweseethemwe
Owingtohismaintenanceofanessentialdistinctionofconsciousnessandreality, nottomentionhisowninvocationofDescartes,Husserlcouldeasilybesuspectedof espousingatthispointaCartesiandualismaswell.Wewilllookatthischarge below.Toseefullyhowhewoulddistinguishphenomenologyfromthatdeadend, wewilleventuallyhavetoturntohisargumentsabouttheprimacyofconsciousness overreality,inthesubsequentsections.Suchanasymmetry,ifsuccessful,would definitivelyrendertheimpossibilityofCartesiandualism.Inthemeanwhile,Iwill trytodispelthespecterofstraightforwardCartesiandualismbelow. C.TheChargeofDualism ThechargeofdualismcouldsuperficiallybeleveledatHusserl,butifwhat ismeantbythisisCartesiansubstancedualism,itisclearlyunfair.Husserl decisivelyrejectsthissortofdualism,anditisalreadyclearfromhisownanalysis thatheneverregardsexternalrealityastrulyandabsolutelyexternal.How
96Ibid.,p.93
53 couldweknowitinthefirstplace,orperceivetheworldititselfinactsof perception,ifthiswerethecase?ThissortofcomparisontoDescarteswouldbe especiallyirresponsiblegivenHusserlstrenchantcritiqueofthatphilosophers view,alreadypartiallylaidoutabove(IIB). WhateverHusserlspositionwithrespecttohisargumentfortranscendental phenomenology,itshouldbeclearbynowthathehasrejectednaverealism, Kantiandualism,representationalism,andCartesiandualismalike.Indeed,itis bettertostartonhisowntermsthatis,intermsoftranscendentalidealism. Consciousnessistranscendentalinthatitmakesbothexperiencenatural experienceandtheworldsoexperienced,possible.Transcendentalityisnot, however,asufficientconditionfortheexistenceoftranscendentobjects.Husserl doesnotdenytherealityofnatureofarealmofpurelytranscendentbeing(albeit definedunderconditionsinwhichsuchtranscendenceobtainsinnecessarilyco subjectiveterms). Noneofthisistodeny,however,thatHusserlcansoundlikeadualistmuch ofthetime.Withthetranscendentalreduction,Husserlfreestranscendental consciousnessfromtherealworld.Thushespeaksoftheessential detachablenessofthewholenaturalworldfromthedomainofconsciousness97and proclaimsthataveritableabyssyawnsbetweenconsciousnessandreality.98His wordshereadmittedlyconcernnotnaturalconsciousnessorthehumanor animalpsychebutpureconsciousness.Yetevenso,theyraiseconcernsabout thepossibilitythatHusserlhasdescendedintoaCartesianstyledualism.Husserl
97Ibid.,p.104 98Ibid.,p.111
54 himselfseemstorelishemphasizingtheabsolutedistinctnessoftranscendental subjectivityandNature:
Everythingwhichispurelyimmanentandreducedinthewaypeculiartothementalprocess, everythingwhichcannotbeconceivedapartfromitjustasitisinitself,andwhicheoipsopasses overintotheEidosintheeideticattitude,isseparatedbyanabyssfromallofNatureandphysicsand nolessfromallpsychologyandeventhisimage,asnaturalistic,isnotenoughtoindicatethe difference.99
Buthow,wemightwonder,wouldanondualisticviewlikethisreallywork? Andhow,asHusserlclaims,cantherebeanyformofconsciousnessessentially disconnectedfromthehumanego,thelatterofwhichnowrelegatedtotherealor naturalworld?Ifthispossibilityisdenied,Cartesianismmightbeseentobethe inevitableresult.ButHusserlisnotonetohedgehisbets;everythingrestsonthe possibilityoftranscendentalsubjectivityinthestrict,irreal100senseinwhichhe understandsit.Husserlsenterpriseinitsradicalityofpurposewouldbecompletely misunderstood,inmyview,byonewhosoftensorblursthisemphasisonthis radicalseparabilityofconsciousnessandworld.Foritispreciselytheinversionof thenaturalisticprioritizationoftherealoversubjectivitythatneedstobeeffected, inHusserlsview,beforephenomenologyisevertocomeintoitsownandappearas itself,andhesaysthisrepeatedlythroughouthiswork.101Aphilosophythatdoes notcrossthethresholdoftranscendentalconsciousness,makingacleanbreakonce andforallfromnaturalism,issimplyaformofpsychology.Itdoesnotrecognize
anunnaturalone,placesthegreatestconceivabledemandsuponphilosophicalresolveand consistency.Thissoundsexactlylikeaconversionexperience.
55 theautonomyofthesubject,andhenceitisdestinedtoremainenthralledby scienceandscientism.102 D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandtheWorldAnnihilationExperiment Husserlsultimatecontentionwithrespecttotherelationshipof consciousnessandrealityisthatthebeingofconsciousnessisabsolutewhereas thebeingoftheworldismerelyrelative(namely,toconsciousness).ThusHusserl isnotcontentwithmerelymakinganeideticdistinctionbetweenthementaland thephysical.Healsoexplicitlyassignspriority(inasenseyettobedetermined)to theformeroverthelatter,atleastwhenitcomestotranscendentalconsciousnessin itsrelationtothematerialworld(andthosestratapsychical,forexample,that arefoundeduponit).Wehavealreadyseenthatfromthepointofviewof experienceand,importantly,thereisnootherpointofview!theworlds existenceisnot,strictlyspeaking,necessary,buttheexistenceofconsciousnessis. Yes,perceptualconsciousness,inwhichwearecontinuallyenmesheddirectlyor indirectly,isconsciousnessoftheworld;butperceptionsmaybemerelyfantasies.
102Howeveraccurateormisguidedthispositionmaybe,itispowerfulenoughtoexertconsiderable
56 Forwithanygivencaseof(possible)perception,thepossibilityofthenonbeingof theworldisneverexcluded.103Oragain:
Whathoversbeforeonemaybeamerefigment;thehoveringitself,theinventiveconsciousness,is notitselfinventedandtherebelongstoitsessence,astoanyothermentalprocess,thepossibilityofa perceivingreflectionwhichseizesuponabsolutefactualbeing.104
Besides,theexistenceofexternalobjectsisestablishedonlyonthebasisofcoherent patternsofexperienceoverextendedperiodsoftimebutwhatifthesewereto dissolveintofullblownincoherence,i.e.chaos?Theworldwouldnotnow exist,butconsciousness(ofarealorimaginedworld)nonethelesswould. ThislatternotionfeaturedinHusserlsworldannihilationexperiment isperhapsthemostradicalthoughtinalloftheIdeasI,aswellasperhapsitsmost contested,evenbymanyHusserlians.Thethoughtexperimentisdesignedtoshow theultimateasymmetryofconsciousnessandworldandsubsequentlytolend furtherproofoftheindependenceoftranscendentalphenomenologyfromthe empiricalsciencesofthenaturalattitude.Husserlobservesthatthemeaning worldisestablishedasacertainharmonyofappearances.Thatis,physicalthings canbydefinitionneverbecomecompletelyimmanent,andhencewecannotknow themabsolutelyanddirectly.Sotheonlywaywecometounderstandthemtoexist transcendentlyisthroughtheregularwaysinwhichtheyappeartous.Itisonthe basisofappearancesorpresentationsofthingstoconsciousnessthatweposit(asit were)theexistenceofatranscendentworldonlythendoesitsmeaningas
103IdeasI,p.103 104Ibid.,p.101
58 orperception(esseestpercipi).Hispointisthatwewouldhavenoreasontoposit theexistenceoftranscendentthingsinthefirstplace,wereitnotforthe deliverancesofconsciousnessintheformofadumbratedappearanceperceptions. Yetinitsreflexivemomentofselfperception,thesamecannotbesaidof consciousnessitself:itcanbesureofitsexistence,anexistencethatistherefore,in thissense,absolute.Anditcanseeselfevidentlythatitexists,evenifthereisno maturelyformedegotheretobeabletoarticulatethis.ThismuchoftheCartesian legacysurvivesinIdeasI.110ForHusserl,consciousnessknowledgeofitself,atsome deeplevel,isabsolute.Thisisenoughtogroundtranscendentalphenomenology namelyonapurelevelofexperienceinwhichallobjects,onthenoematicside,as wellasallperceivingsandthinkings,onthenoetic,areconstituted. Todenythatthissortofasymmetryexistsmightbetempting,butonwhat groundscouldwedosoaftertheepoch?Certainlytherearenogroundstospeakof acausallynecessaryrelationshipofworldtoconsciousness,foritispreciselyany possiblecausalrelationbetweenthetwothatHusserlpurposefullybracketsand
110ItistruethattherefollowsfromHusserlsviewthedistinctpossibilityofsolipsism,atleastofa
transcendentalsort:OnlyforanEgo,orastreamofmentalprocesses,inrelationtoitself,doesthis distinctivestateofaffairsexist;herealonethereis,andheretheremustbe,suchathingas perceptionofsomethingimmanent.(italicsadded)TheproblemofsolipsismisoneHusserltackles memorablyinlaterworks,particularlytheCartesianMeditations,thoughtoquestionablesuccess. Theproblemisroughlythis:Doesthereductionrevealthenecessitysolelyofmyselfas transcendentalego,inthesensethattheworldisthetranscendentalphenomenon(Husserlsterm) formytranscendentalego?Thiswouldindeedbeadisastrousconsequenceforthetranscendental reduction,ifitweretrue.ItisintheFifthMeditationoftheCartesianMeditationsthatHusserlfinally revealsthattranscendentalsubjectivityresolvesintotranscendentalintersubjectivity,whichalready presupposesamultiplicityofegosand,subsequently,theworldofObjectiveNatureasdecisively sharedbytheseegosinacommonspaceandtime.(CM,p.130)Itisonlywiththeintroductionof transcendentalintersubjectivitythatonecananswerinafullandpositivewaythechargethat transcendentalphenomenologyisaformoftranscendentalsolipsismthatcollapsesthebeingofthe worldandofotherpeopletoakindofabsolutetranscendentalintrasubjectivity.Nonetheless, Husserlssolutionisstrictlytranscendentalandneverpresupposestheactualexistenceofanyone atall.Comparewithhisremarksonthetreethatneednotexistinbeingperceived(IVAabove)and theworldthatneednotexistformetohaveconsciousexperience(presentsection).
59 ignores.Buthowarewetoavoidtheconsequenceofacompletecollapseinto idealismtoanembraceofthepossibilityofaselfsufficientEgo,inwhichthe worldassuchfindsitstruehome?Hereitmightseem,inotherwords,thatthereis nowaytoproveortodiscoverinthefirstplacejustwhattheworldislike,asa transcendentworld,apartfromitsmannersofgivennesstoconsciousness,sothat,if wearetorejectsubjectiveidealism,weseeminglymustgranttheexistenceofa transcendentworldonlyasamatterofprejudice.Butthisisnotacceptable, certainlynotforHusserl.Thissortofprejudiceorblindassumptionisexactly whatHusserlwantstoavoid,anditiswhyworldlyexistencemustproveitself throughexperience,andnotviceversa. Husserlsexperimenthasnotbeenconvincingtomanypeople,butitshould
probablybeviewedasaperfectlyreasonableillustrationofthemorebasic Husserlianprinciplenamelythepossibilityofaglobalepochandtranscendental reduction.Thatis,ifwewishtoquestiontheworldannihilationexperiment, perhapsweneedfirsttoquestionthispossibilityofaglobalepoch.Itisprecisely overthispointthatthephenomenologistJanPatcka,totakeoneprominent example,takesHusserltotask,arguingthatabracketingoftheveryexistenceofthe worlditselfisimpossible,forwecanonlydothisforasubsetoftheworld.Moreover, Patckaarguesthattheexistenceoftheworldissomethingwecouldnevereven attempttodoubt.InhisbookonHusserl,hebeginsbypointingoutthattheworld asawholeiseverpresent,presentasahorizon;thishorizonalgivennessis somethingoriginal.Forthehorizonisneitheraparticularperspectivenoran
60 anticipation.Perspectivesandanticipationsarepossibleonlyonthebasisofit.111 HethengoesontodisputeHusserlsequationofachaoswiththeabsenceofa world:Achaos,though,issomethingdifferentthannoworldatall;itisprecisely anunorderedworld.Anunorderedworlddoesnotmeanthenonexistenceofthe whole,onlythenonexistenceofawholeofacertaintype.112InthiswayPatcka correctlyconnectstheworldannihilationexperimentdirectlywiththenotionofa globaltranscendentalepoch,regardingtherejectionoftheoneasentailingthe rejectionoftheother.113 E.HusserlsFinalPosition:TranscendentalIdealism IfHusserlisnotasimpleCartesiandualist,thenwhatishe?Firstofall,he
CourtPublishingCompany,1996.(p.105)HereafterPatocka.
112Ibid.,p.105 113Patockasconclusionisthatthethesisoftheworldasawholedoesnotinprinciplereduceto
61 namelytoconflateexperiencewiththatwhichisexperienced.Indeedthe philosopherJ.N.Findlay,EnglishtranslatoroftheLogicalInvestigations,rejected Husserlslaterphilosophyinpartbecauseofjustthisturntowardsidealism.114 Andthisiscomingfromanselfavowedrationalmystic!Butthesamewastrueofa verydifferentgroupofthinkers,Husserlsownsometimefollowersincluding AlexanderPfnder,AdolfReinach,andJohannesDaubertofthesocalledMnich schoolofrealistphenomenology.Dauberthadwrittenadetailedcommentaryon IdeasIinshorthand,onlyrecentlytranslated,againtakingissuewithitsidealism.115 (Daubertarguesfortheprimacyoftherealandforconsciousnessasamere functionofreality.)HusserlhimselfrarelyusesthetermidealisminIdeasI,but thereisnodoubtthatthetextembracesakindofidealism,whichwewillinvestigate below,inhisefforttosecureforphenomenologythepositionoffirst philosophy.116 InHusserlsaccount,consciousnessisnotclosed,butopentotheworld.The meaningtheworldverymuchbelongstoconsciousexperienceasanintegraland necessarypartofitandcertainlyinactsofsenseperception,inwhichthe intentionalobjectsarethingslikechairsandcats,encounteredphysically transcendentlybutalso,lessdirectly,inallotheracts.Husserlwasthusnota
114See,forexample:Findlay,J.N.TheDisciplineoftheCave.NewYork:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1966,
p.162:ThisiswhyadeeplyreflectivethinkerlikeHusserl,whosewholetraininginthethoughtof Brentanomadehimwaryofallthemorefacilesnaresofidealism,nonethelessveeredtowards idealisminhislaterphenomenology.(myitalics)SeealsotheinterestingarticlebyDavidCarr entitledFindlay,Husserl,andtheEpoch(Ch.5ofStudiesinthePhilosophyofJ.N.Findlay,eds. Cohen,Martin,andWestphal,Albany:SUNYPress,1985),esp.pp.1545 115ThecodebreakerwasKarlSchuhmann.SeetheessaybySchuhmannandBarrySmithentitled AgainstIdealism:JohannesDaubertvs.HusserlsIdeasI.ReviewofMetaphysics38(1985),pp.763 793. 116Ofcourse,therearescholarswhowoulddisputeeventhisclaim.DallasWillardinsiststhat Husserlisinfactarealist,forexample.ButsinceHusserlcalledhimselfatranscendentalidealist,it seemstobehooveusatleasttounderstandinwhatsensehemighthavetakenhimselftobeone.
62 subjectiveidealist,certainlynotbydesign.117Forhim,theworldexistsverymuch independentlyofparticularactsofconsciousness.Theaprioricorrelativity(ashe wastolatertermit)ofworldandconsciousnessisamatteroftheworldsgiving itselftoconsciousnessincertainfixedanduniformmanners,whicharethemselves anchoredincertainessentialtypesofsubjectivityandsubjective accomplishment.118Inotherwords,itistosaythatwecannotmakesenseofa worldthathasnointrinsicconnectiontoapotentialoractualsubjective experiencingofthatworld,justasthereisnowaytounderstandsuchan experiencingwithoutaconcomitantprincipleofanobjectiveornoematicpole throughwhichtheworldbecomesmanifestandgiveninitsactualityinperceptual experience. ButoneoftheconsequencesofHusserlsidealismisthedenialthatthereis anymeaningfulsortofreality,suchasphysicalreality,thatcanbecomedecoupled fromthemindatalllevels.Husserlswayofputtingthepointisasfollows:
thewholespatiotemporalworld...hasthemerelysecondarysenseofabeingforaconsciousness....It isabeing...determinedandintuitedonlyassomethingidenticalbelongingtomotivatedmultiplicities ofexperience:beyondthatitisnothing.119
orwhichsaysthesame,thenaturalattitudeisalreadytranscendental,yetwithoutknowingit.The
63 (becauseitisfreerofpresuppositions),itfollowsthatweshouldobeyitsauthority whenitrevealsthattheessenceofworldlybeingistobedependentonanother,ina waythatdoesnotapplysymmetricallytoconsciousnessitself.Wearestillnot talkingaboutexistentialcausaldependence,however.Wearenotclaimingthatthe worldisafictiongeneratedbytheimagination,orthatitismerelyavariantof consciousnessitself.Afterall,becauseconsciousnessisinherentlyintentional,itis alwaysalreadyaconsciousnessofthings,ofitssurroundingworldwhich Husserlalsomakesclearisaconstantgroundinawaythatimaginedand rememberedworldsarenot.Sotheworldcannotbedismissedorsubjectivized;but itcanberevealedasabeingdependentforitsmeaningonanother,andthisis consciousness. Yetcanwenotturnthisargumentback,andarguethatconsciousnessis similarlydependentforitsmeaningasconsciousnessontheworld?Notfor Husserl,crucially.Thereasonisremarkablysimple:acertainsortofprimordial subjectivityremains,asaresidue,afterallotherthingsallexistentialclaimshave beenbracketed.Actsofconsciousnessremain,andtheyremainintuitively accessibleasjustwhattheyare,withouttheinterferenceofanypresuppositions. Theexistenceofconsciousnessisnotsomethingweclaim;itthetranscendental egoisthebasisforthemakingofanyvalidclaimswhatsoever.Itistheultimate, timeless,andprimordialsourceofmeaning.Husserldoesnotclaimforitthestatus
64 ofagodhead,however.Strictly,itisneitherhumannordivine.(!)Yetitcertainly isselfcontained:
[C]onsciousnessconsideredinitspuritymustbeheldtobeaselfcontainedcomplexofbeing,a complexofabsolutebeingintowhichnothingcanpenetrateandoutofwhichnothingcanslip,to whichnothingisspatiotemporallyexternalandwhichcannotbeaffectedbyanyphysicalthing...121
Nowironically,thissortofremarkhaspreciselytheeffectofcircumventingthe possibilityofdualism.ForwhatHusserlistellingusisthat(pure)consciousnessis notsomethingonthesamelevelaseitherphysicalthingsormentalones(non purifiedsubjectivethingslikeparticularhumanegosandtheirreal components),andthatitisnotindeedathingatall,butthebasisonwhichallthings becomeknownanddefined.Whetherweagreewithhimornot,wemusttake seriouslyhisownclaimtoberevealinganundiscoveredcountry,asitwere,whose terrainhasneverbeforebeenseen.ItisasiftosaythatHusserlclaimstohavefound (orrediscovered,afterDescartesandothers)theaccesspoint,itselfneitherpartof theworldnorotherthanit,tothecomprehensibilityofthatworld(anditself).This structureistheultimateconcernofphilosophy,nowunderstoodas transcendentalphenomenologythestudyoftheunderlyingstructures,oragain theoriginsof,122experienceandexperienceablereality. WemightendthissectionwithanextendedquotefromHusserl,inwhichhe
himselfneatlysummarizesthebulkofhispositioninIdeasI.Hopefully,bynowthe readerwillbefamiliarwiththeconceptsdiscussedherein:
121Ibid.,p112 122Ibid.,p.131
65
Therealmoftranscendentalconsciousnessastherealmofwhatis,inadeterminedsense,absolute being,hasbeenprovidedusbythephenomenologicalreduction.Itisprimalcategoryofallbeing(or, inourterminology,theprimalregion),theoneinwhichallotherregionsofbeingarerooted,to which,accordingtotheiressence,theyarerelativeandonwhichtheyarethereforeallessentially dependent.Thetheoryofcategoriesmuststartentirelyfromthismostradicalofallontological distinctionsbeingasconsciousnessandbeingassomethingwhichbecomesmanifestedin consciousness,transcendentbeingwhich,aswesee,canbeattainedinitspurityandbe appreciatedonlybythemethodofthephenomenologicalreduction.Intheessentialrelationship betweentranscendentalandtranscendentbeingarerootedalltherelationshipsalreadytouchedon byusrepeatedlybutlatertobeexploredmoreprofoundly,betweenphenomenologyandallother sciencesrelationshipsinthesenseofwhichitisimplicitthatthedominionofphenomenology includeinacertainremarkablemannerallothersciences.123
Ofparticularnotehere,forourpurposes,istherepeateddeploymentofvariantsof beingandontological,aswellasthenotionofarealmoftranscendental consciousness.Transcendentalphenomenologyisbothanepistemologyaswellas akindofhigherorderontologyascience,tomodifyAristotle,ofbeingqua known. IV.ConcludingReflections PartofthedeepappealofHusserlsphenomenologyisitsappealtointuition, toexperience,andtoevidence.Thisevidentialism(myword)givesphilosophya mandatetoberesponsibletothefacts,sotospeak,andaccordinglytothethings themselves.ItiswhyHusserlcouldspeakofphenomenologyasthegenuine
123Ibid.,p.172
Husserlmakesknowledgeamuchmoredemocraticenterprisethanwasever beforeconceivedallintuitiveevidenceofanykindcantakeoncognitivevalidity. Atthesametime,Husserlforcesthephenomenologisttobedisciplinedby remainingtruetothisevidenceandonlythisevidenceinmakingknowledgeclaims. Butifthisisallthatphenomenologyconsistsinevidentiaryrigoranda widescopeforcognitionthenitisunlikelyHusserlwouldhaveattractedsomuch oppositionbylater(andcontemporary)phenomenologiststhemselves.To understandthisreactiononemustturntotheboldandchallengingformof intentionalidealismthatIdeasIerects.Itis,essentially,anexplanatoryframework forthepossibilityofknowledgeinlightoftheseeminggulfbetween,asMcDowell
124Ibid.,p.39 125Ibid.;Husserlsitalics
67 hasmemorablyputit,mindandworld.126Husserlshowsusthatinfact,thetwo areintertwinedatalllevels,eventhougheideticallydistinct.Buthowisthis possible?Howcantherebeaworldthatgivesitselftousevenwhilethisgivennessis subjecttostrictrulesgovernedbythelifeofanessentiallyunworldlyEgo?Howis thisnottobethoughtofasanythingmorethananarbitrarypositingofaquasi Leibnizianpreestablishedharmony?Whatistheessential,innerlawthatwould makethefusionoftherealandtheidealanactuality,andnotablindhope? ItwouldseemthatHusserlstranscendentalegodoesnotsomuchoffera solutionasitliterallygivesanametojustthishopeitisapromise,anearnest, ratherthanasolution.ItdoesnotimproveonHegelsAbsoluteSpiritandinfact lacksthelattersunivocal(inthiscase,ideal)nature.Husserlstheoryasksfora separationofessencefromfact,realfromideal,transcendentalfromnaturalall thewhileinsistingthatnosuchcleavagescompromisehisvisionofpureanddirect cognitionofthethingsthemselves.Thisisatoughsell.Foristherenotan unavoidabletensionbetweenanyformoftranscendentalidealismandthenotionof transcendentthings?Solongasthesearemerelyimmanenttranscendencies, doesnotHusserlspositionveerprecipitouslytowardssubjectiveorabsolute idealism,albeitclearlyagainsthisownintentions?Itisinfactthelatterhidden possibilitythepossibilityofanabsoluteidealismthathoversconstantlyover hisworkintheidealistphase.Yetthereareevendeeperreasonsreasonsthatthe structureofHusserlsownsystemprovidesuswithtobelievethatHusserls transcendentalidealismisintrinsicallyorientedtowardsabsoluteidealism,by
126McDowell,John.MindandWorld.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity,1994
68 tendencythatis.Thiscanbeseenthroughtheinevitablelogicofattitudesthat Husserlleavesforthemostpartinexplicit. Husserliantranscendentalidealism,aswehaveseen,dependsonthecrucial distinctionofthenaturalandtranscendentalattitudes,andhenceonthepossibility ofatranscendentalreduction.Inthisrespectitisexceedinglyimportanttoregard thetwoattitudesnaturalandtranscendentalasbeingatdifferentlevels.Thatis, thenaturalattitudeisnotmerelyreplacedbythetranscendental;fromthenatural attitude,wetradeuptothetranscendentalattitude.Onitsown,thenaturalattitude isfalse,sinceitmakesassumptionsabouttheindifferenceofmindandworldthat arethemselvesfalse.Thenaturalattitudehastobeovercomeandreplacedbythe transcendentalifwearetodorealphilosophyandhenceknowtheworldaround us.Somuchismerelyreview.Thetranscendentalattitudeistheoneinwhichreality isknownasitreallyis;thenaturalattitudeisbutaprelude.Yet,doweeverstop beingnaverealists?Istherenotaneverydaynessthatpervadeseventhe transcendentalphilosophersexistence?ItisimpossibleinHusserlssystemtohave bothattitudesatonce,however,sincethenaturalattitudecontainscommitments thathavetobegivenupinthetranscendentalattitude;theyaremutuallyexclusive. Yetiftheyweremerelyincommensurable,onecouldnotbecalledsuperiorto another,andtheresultwouldbeaformofrelativism.Butsincethetranscendental attitudeisclearlysuperiorforHusserl,whowasstronglyantirelativistwemight add,itwouldseemtomethatitisonlylogicaltoconcludethefollowing:thatthe transcendentalattitudeisatahigherlevelthanthenatural,butalsocontainsallthe truthandlegitimacy(basically,therawintuitivity,withoutforexamplethemistaken
69 theoreticalassumptionsregardingtherealexistenceofintuitedobjects)ofthe former,andinsuchawayastosublateit.Thuswecanstillexperiencethenatural attitudelegitimately,solongaswesubordinateittothetranscendentalassoonas weareinapositiontobegintotrulyunderstandwhatweexperiencenaturally. Thetranscendentalattitudeisthusanimprovementoverthenaturalattitude;itisa cleareyedviewofthebilateralconstitutivenexusofexperienceandthatwhichis experienced,groundedinintuitiveevidencewhichcomestousnaturally.Andso thenaturalattitudeisthusovercomebythe(phenomenological)philosopher,who goesbeyonditwhileretainingthefirstorderexperientialdata,morphicandhyletic, disclosedinitsdomain. Whatdoesthispicturetellus,finally?ItexplainsexactlyHusserlsown convictionthatthetranscendentalattitude,whichisitselftheattitudeof transcendentalconsciousness,disclosesaselfstandingrealmofbeingthatincludes butovercomesthebeingofNature,whichismerelydependentonthepureBeing ofConsciousness.Externalexistenceinthenaverealistsense,sotospeak,is revealedtobeafictionnativetothenaturalattitude.Itisnottobetakenseriously bythosethatknowbetter,namelythatexternalexistenceisitselfonlyameaning generatedinandthroughconsciousnessnamelyperceivingconsciousness.Icall thisabsoluteidealismnotsimplytoechoHegelortheGermanIdealistsbutto drawonHusserlsownlanguagehehimselfusesabsolutetodescribethebeing ofconsciousness(quaphenomenologicalresiduum).Thephenomenological reductionisthusakintheopeningofaneye,adeliveryfromdarkness.Itisnomere modificationofthepsycheindeed,itleavesthepsycheitselfbehind!
70 Thereisapressinggeneralquestion,therefore,regardingthebracketing procedure,oratleastthewayHusserlemploysitinIdeasI,namelywhetherit necessarilyentailsasortofsubjectivismfromwhichthereis,properly,noreturn. Husserlstranscendentworldispreservednominallyafterthereduction,butonlyas ameaning.Husserlsunderstandingoftranscendenceiscomplex,anditmay legitimatelybewonderedwhetherhehastrulyrepelledtheghostofsubjectivism fromenteringhissystem.Thishasbeenperceivedasalackofappreciationofthe depthofthealterityofthings,muchinthewayHusserlhasbeensimilarly criticizedfornotsufficientlyexplainingtheothernessofotherpeople. AnotherquestionthatarisesinreadingHusserlregardstheverypossibility oftranscendentalphenomenologyinthefirstplace.Thisisthesourceofoneofthe greatpuzzlesandchallengesoftranscendentalphenomenology.Thatis,howcanwe overcomethenaturalattitude,asHusserlinsiststhatwemustinordertoenterinto knowledge,ifitisalreadysosuccessful,byitsverynature,inbindingustoitsdoxic spell?Husserlframesthetaskofbreakingfreeasamatterofbeingdisciplinedand rigorous,butthequestionreallyhasmoretodowithprinciplethanwithdegree.For justhowisitthatitisevenpossibletoknowonesexperientiallifeasitislived withoutremainingsomehowinthatveryexperientialitythatis,inthenatural attitude?Thisisnotmerelyaquestionofthepossibilityofreflexivity.For reflexiveconsciousnesscanstillbeexplainedwithinthenaturalattitude:Icanthink aboutmythinking,treatingitasanobjectlikeanythingelse.Thetranscendental attitudeinvolvesmorethanthis;itinvolvesareflexivityblendedtogetherwitha thoroughgoingbracketingofthewholeworldItakeforgrantedineverydaylife.It
71 involvestherejectionofnaverealisminthemostcategoricalofterms.Sohowis transcendentalphenomenologyitselfpossible? Itisinconnectionwiththisquestionthatwecometoacharacteristic hermeneuticdifficultyinIdeasIandtranscendentalphenomenologygenerally.127To beabletoseethenaturalattitudeassuch,tobeabletoformtheessentialconceptof itandmakeitathemeofreflection,istohavetopresupposetheselftranscendence ofthenaturalattitude.Oneisalreadyinthetranscendentalattitude,inotherwords, fromtheverybeginningofthetextofIdeasIoratleast,onehastobethereto properlygraspitscontents.Yethowarewetogetthere,withoutfirstusingthe phenomenologicalmethod,thatis,withoutfirstbracketingourownassumptions, etc.? Thephenomenologicalreductionhasadistinctdoublemeaning.Thereisan obviousandimportantsenseinwhichtheepochinvolvesakindofwithdrawal fromtheworld.Itisanexclusion,orbracketing,ofthenaturalfactualworld,a flighttoalevelofpureinsight.Buttranscendentalphenomenologyisalsoamove awayfromthetheoriesdevelopedinthenaturalattitudeandhenceareturntoa moreprimordialandauthenticlayerofexperienceofthenatural,factualworld!To overemphasizetheformeraspectisofcoursetopushHusserlintomysticism,while thelatterpresseshimtoodeeply,potentially,intothebowelsofnature,thedreaded zoneofopaquefact.Yetunlessweacceptastoryofsublation,inwhichHusserl comesdangerously(tohismind)closetoabsoluteidealism,therewouldseemtobe anunresolvedtensionbetweentranscendentalsubjectivityandthenaturalorder
127ThiswasalreadypointedoutastutelybyRicoeur.SeeKey,p42&pp.489
73
ChapterTwo:TheConstitutionofNature,Body,and SpiritinHusserlsIdeasII129
129IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:
StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:Kluwer AcademicPublishers,1989.(HereafterIdeasII.)ThepresentchaptercoversbothIdeasIIandIdeas III.(IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,ThirdBook: PhenomenologyandtheFoundationsoftheSciences.Trans.TedKleinandWilliamE.Pohl.TheHague: MartinusNijhoffPublishers,1980.HereafterIdeasIII.)ButIwilltalklessfrequentlyofthelatter, owingtoitsbrevityandrelativelackofsubstance,ascomparedtoeitherofthefirsttwovolumes.It does,however,containsomeusefulmaterialforourpurposes.Briefattentionwillalsobegivento oneofHusserlslecturesfrom1919.(Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaMaterialienbnde,BandIV.Natur undGeist:VorlesungenSommersemester1919.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic Publishers,2002.HereafterHusserl1919.) 130MerleauPonty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollgedeFrance.Compiledandwithnotes fromDominiqueSglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003 (p.79) 131Itisofcoursethemiddle,muchlongeranddensertextthatistheprimarysubjectofthischapter.
74 lattertwovolumespresupposeapriorperformanceoftheepochandreduction, alongwiththetranscendentalidealisticturnthatgowiththem.ThisallowsHusserl todiveintotheburningquestion,leftwideopenafterIdeasI,astojustwhatthe worldissupposedtolooklikeoncethereductionhastakenplacenotonlythe world,ofcourse,buttheworldoccupyingselfwho,initstranscendentalguise,has madethesenewvistaspossible. IdeasIIisthusbothanextensionaswellasadeepeningofitsnominal predecessor,thoughitstruethatthetwotextshardlyhaveacomparablehistoryof development.Althoughmuchofitwaswrittenaroundthesametime(19121915) asIdeasI,IdeasIIwasbeingrevisedthroughoutHusserlslife,andhewasnever satisfiedtohaveitpublished.132IdeasIIIalsoremainedunpublishedinHusserls lifetime,butitwasrevisedhardlyatallbetweenthetimeitwasfirstdraftedand Husserlsdeath.133ThepublishedandauthorendorsedIdeasIwashugely influential,bothpositivelyandnegatively,butamazingly,sowasthelong undergroundIdeasII.NolessthanHeideggerandMerleauPontywereshaped decisivelybythework,whilemanyothersAlfredSchtz,PaulRicoeur,etc.felt compelledtocommentontheworkandrespondtoitsremarkablecontents.134As
132SomemakemuchofthefactthatEdithSteingaveagooddealoftheshape(andoveralltitle)tothe
workinher1918redaction.Iwilladdressoneparticularscholars(ElizabethBehnkes)thoughtson thematterinthenextchapter. 133FordetailedinformationonthepublicationhistoryofIdeasII,seetheTranslatorsIntroductionto theEnglisheditionofthework(IdeasII,xiixvi). 134ThecaseofMerleauPontyisclearandobviousfromhisownwritings,aswewillseeinthisand subsequentchapters.AsforHeidegger,NenonmakesaconvincingcasethatHeideggerwasdirectly andimmediatelyinfluencedbyHusserlsnotionsofthepersonalisticattitudeandUmwelt.(See: IssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic Publishers,1996,p.x.VolumehereafterreferredtoasIssues.)Luckily,alengthysynopticstudyhas beendonebyPaulRicoeur,whosenumerousjudiciousobservationswewillhavemultipleoccasions toconsultandinterpretinthecourseofthepresentstudy.See:Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisof HisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLesterE.Embree.Evanston:Northwestern
75 fortherelativedearthofliteratureonthebookanditsringsofinfluence,inthe wordsoftheeditorsofarecentcollectionofessaysonthework,thereisanalmost inverseproportionbetweentheinfluencethatHusserlsIdeasIIexercisedon importantphilosophicaldevelopmentsinthiscenturyandtheattentionithas receivedinsecondaryliterature.135 ThefactisthatIdeasIIisanamazing,aswellasfearsomelycomplex,foray intoalargearrayofproblems,amongthemthemindbodyproblem,thesocalled problemofthehumansciences(whattheyareandhowtheydiffermethodologically andregionallyfromnaturalsciences),theproblemofpersonalidentityand motivation,andmanyothers,allunitedintenuouswaysunderthebannerstudies inconstitution.IdeasIIcomplementsIdeasIbutalsogoeswellbeyonditinmany regards.Itcanfruitfullybereadasasupplementtoorforeshadowerofallphasesof Husserlslaterthought.Forexample,itanticipatesandevenpartiallydevelopssome ofthemainthemesoftheCartesianMeditations(intersubjectivity,empathy, monadology)aswellastheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciences(thelifeworld,or,asit were,thesurroundingworldUmwelt),andwhilemostlystatic(likeIdeasI),it beginstoincorporateelementsofgeneticphenomenologyaswell,atleastinits thirdpart.Itstandsonitsown,however,aswell.Itfeaturesthemostdetailed examinationofthebodyHusserleverproducedthisbeingtheprobablerootofits singularimpactonsubsequentContinentalthought.Itisalsothesourceof
76 numerousinsightfuldistinctionsbetweennature,soul,spirit,Ego,andperson thoughtheseareoftenimpossibletoreconcilewithoneanotherharmoniously,as wewillsee.Forultimately,IdeasIIissimplytoostuffedwithgoodideastomakea singleconsistentargument(or,phenomenologicallyspeaking,aconsistentsetof eideticdescriptions),whichmaybeoneofthereasonsHusserlwasneverfully satisfiedwithit.Indeed,muchthatisintroducedandpartlydevelopedinIdeasIIis notdevelopedalltheway,evenbyHusserlsstandards.Thehistoryofthetextand itseditingbymultiplehands(Husserl,Stein,Landgrebe)alsomeansthatitishighly unevenanddisorganizedinplaces,andcanhardlybesaidtohaveaconventionalor evenlogicallysoundstructure. Itiswisethen,ontheonehand,nottotreatIdeasIIasaunifiedwholeso muchasacollectionofinvestigatorystrains.Ontheotherhand,theskeletonofIdeas IIasatextistheclosestwewillcometoaglimpseofwhatmightbecalleda completeHusserlian(regional)ontology.136Husserlsconstitutionalanalyses, takenattheirfacevalueasgroundedintuitively,aremeanttorevealtousthebeing ofthewholeworldofpositivebeing,ofwhatis(pantataonta),fromthelowestor mostfoundationalstratum,thatofphysicalisticnature,tothehighest,the reflectingpersonal(orspiritual)Ego,alongwithitscollectiveculturalformations (personalitiesofahigherorder).Andallofthishasintrinsicphilosophicalinterest foramyriadofquestionsusuallyunderstoodasmetaphysicalmaterialismand
136Husserldistinguishesbetweenformalontologyandregionalontology.Inthischapterweare
77 themindbodyproblem,forexampleinthesameway,perhaps,thatthe phenomenologicaltheoriesofintentionalityorperceptionaddressclassical questionsofepistemology.AsIwillargueinthischapter,Ireadthetexttobea continualbalancingactwhichresemblesmoresoaseesawbetweennaturalistic andantinaturalisticstrainsinHusserlsphilosophy,bothofwhicharestronglyon displayinthetext.ThecontradictionsofthetextareusefulforthestudyofHusserl generallybecausetheyarereflectiveofthedeepestunderlyingtensionsofhis phenomenologicalsystem.Theygototheveryissuesthenatureofidealismand thetranscendentalego,thenaturespiritdivideandthedivisionofnaturaland humansciencesintheirrelationtophenomenologythatoccupiedHusserl,and remainedunresolved,untiltheendofhislife. Ofcourse,thesearealsotheveryissuesthatconcernusinourstudyof HusserlandMerleauPontyonthequestionofthemeaningofnatureanditsrelation tospiritandconsciousness.IdeasII(andIII)teachaconfusingdoublelessonon theonehand,thespiritualityofnature(asHusserlputsitinanothertext137), particularlyintheformoftheliving,feelingorganismasliving;andontheother hand(andthisiswhatdominatesHusserlsaccount,allthingsconsidered),thestrict bifurcationofnatureandspirit,notnecessarilyintermsofdistinguishingthe transcendentalego(consciousnessinitsirrealiridescence)fromreality,butin termsofcarvingouttwoseparateontologicalorderswithintherealmofthereal itself(andwithinwhichthebodyfiguresverydifferentlyineachrespective sphere).Combinedwiththesedifficultiesistheequallycentralconfusionbetween
137Husserl1919,186
78 thenatureofspiritvisvisthatofconsciousnessortranscendental subjectivity,thelatterofwhichofcoursefiguressoubiquitouslyintheschemeof Husserlsprojectasawhole.Thisparticularissuegoestotheheartoftheambiguity betweenHusserlsdistinctionbetweenontologyandphenomenology,therealand thetranscendental,and,inadditiontothepriorambiguitiesaboutnatureandthe body,makeitpossibletoseewhereHusserlstranscendentalphenomenological projectstartstounravelsomewhatfromwithin.Ormorecharitablyspeaking,these problemsseemtocallforatransformationofHusserlianphenomenologicalproject inamoreunifieddirection,oneofwhichhappenstoinvolveamoreimmanentized andembodiedconceptionoftheego(whichoughtnotbeentirelyalooffrom ontology)andamoreecstatic,enworldedconceptionofthebody(whichoughtnot tobeentirelyalooffromtheego).ThisisthedirectionultimatelytakenbyMerleau Ponty,forwhomthetranscendentalegomustsituateitselfsomehow(andnever whollycomfortably)innatureitself,namelyasapoweroffinitereflection,capable ofacertaineideticseeingbutincapableofabsolutetransparencyorafinalvictory overitsalltoonaturalGrund.Thus,MerleauPontysentireoriginalproject,one mightsay,isfirstmadepossiblebythevolatilerupturesofIdeasII.138Butwewill havetowaitbeforeweexaminethissecondhalfofthestoryinmoredetail,in Chapter3(andbriefly,intheconclusionofthepresentchapter). InpartIIofthischapterIwillprovideadetailedoutlineofthegeneral ontologicalmatrixsketchedoutbyHusserlinIdeasII(andcontinuedinIII),
138Ofcourse,hereitiswelltokeepinmindVoltaireshighlyappropriatemaximaboutthemistakes
oftruegenius:Cestleprivilgeduvraignieetsurtoutdugniequiouvreunecarrire,defaire impunmentdegrandesfautes.(SicledeLouisXIV,ch.32)
79 accompaniedbysomecriticalcommentary.Then,inpartIII,Iwillproduceatextual analysisinwhichIbothlayoutwhatItaketobethemostinterestingproblemsin boththeneutralandpejorativesensesofthetermsofHusserlspresentation.Iwill concludewithsomereflectionsonIdeasIIand,asmentionedabove,somethoughts onhowMerleauPontysphilosophycanbeunderstoodasaresponsetoand developmentofthethemes(andtensions)oftext.UltimatelyIwillarguethatwhat emergesfromHusserlsontologicalmatrix(incombinationwiththeposition alreadystatedinIdeasI)isacomplex,andfinallyselfinconsistent,combinationof ontologicaldualismandphenomenologicalmonism,inspiteofanotherwise promisingforayintothehybridityofthelivingbody. II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III A.Introduction Aswehavealreadyindicated,IdeasII/IIIconcernstheconstitutionof reality.Inthewordsofonecommentator,IdeasIIcanberegardedastheattemptto regain[afterIdeasI]realitybycatchingitupinthesamenetwithpure consciousness.139Thatis,whereasthesubject(inthesenseoftopic)ofIdeasIis consciousnessanditsgeneralintentionalstructure,thatofIdeasIIisthereality
139Tymieniecka,AnnaTeresa.FromHusserlsFormulationoftheSoulBodyIssuetoaNew
80 constitutedinconsciousness,arealitywhichhasitsownvariouskinds,strata,and typesofgivennesstobedistinguishedandrelated.Inthisway,reductionand constitutioneventuallyemergeastwocomplementarypolesofphenomenological method140,andtheyhaveremainedsoeversince. Butwhat,precisely,isconstitution?Definingitisabittricky.AsDermot Moranexplains,itismoreofanoperativeasopposedtothematicconceptin Husserl,andthusittypicallyremainsundefinedbyhim.141Onecould,however, defineitroughlyintermsofthespontaneousproduction(inthesenseofmaking available,notcreation)ofobjects.Onespeaks,forexample,ofconsciousness constitutionofthematerialworld,forexample,oragainofotherpeople(inthe senseofintersubjectivity)inthesensethatconsciousnessmakessuchbeings available.Thus,thenotionofconstitutionemphasizestheobjectiveaspectofthe correlationalaprioriofconsciousnessandobject,whilereduction,bycontrast, emphasizesthesubjective,orconstitutingaspect.Nowtheprincipleof constitutioniswhatallowsustospeakofHusserlsontology,thatis,ofthebeing ofthingsinthemselves,intermsofwhattheyfundamentally(essentially)are,so longasweremember,inthewordsofCobbStevens,thattranscendental philosophyrefusestobeabsorbedeitherbyasociologyofpersonalreciprocityora philosophyofobjectivespirit.142 Thatis,wecanspeakofHusserlsunderstanding ofthebeingofthings(broadlyspeaking)butonlyintermsoftheirnoematic
Phenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka. Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.(p.252)HereafterCobbStevens.
143Thuswhilenaverealismisdestroyedthroughthereductionandthetransitiontothe
transcendentalattitude,itisimportanttokeepinmindthatphenomenologyisnotphenomenalism; itdoesnotreducerealitytoappearance,itstudiesrealityinitsappearing(aswellasthesubjectivity towhichrealityappears,whichcaninturnbestudiedforitsownsakeaswell). 144AmoretechnicaldefinitionofconstitutionisofferedbyRicoeur:Toconstitutesignifiesonlyto interrogateasensebyexplicatingthesignificationalintentionstowhichthesensecorrelates.Hence, thejobofconstitutionremainsbelowthelevelofinterpretation.(Ricoeur65)Overgaardoffers perhapsthesimplestwaytounderstandtherelationbetweenreductionandconstitution:the actualrelationbetweenconstitutionandtranscendentalphenomenologicalreductioncanbe describedasonebetweenwhatwewanttounderstandandthemethodbywhichweareableto understandwhatwewanttounderstand.See:Overgaard,Sren.HusserlandHeideggeronBeingin theWorld.Dordrecht:Springer,2004(pp.5960)HereafterOvergaard.Gadameroffersthis: Constitutionisnothingbutthemovementofreconstruction[Wiederaufbaubewegung]that followsafterthereductionhasbeenperformed.(CitedbywayofOvergaard,59.) 145Butallclarifyingontologicalinsightexecutedintheframeworkofaxiomaticclaritythatisnot directlyphenomenologicalbecomessuchbyamereshiftofview,asconverselyinthewholeof phenomenologicalinsightstheremustbethosewhichbecomeontologicalthroughamereshiftof view.(IdeasIII,90) 146Althoughthisisnotdiscussedinasmuchdetail,consciousnessalsoconstitutesitself,insofarasit makesitselfanobjectofobservationand(self)perception. 147Seefn27,below.
82 manyparadoxesofthetext.148Itisalsoimportanttonotethatfromthevery beginningofthetext,Husserlsexaminationofontologicalregionsiscorrelatedwith atypeofscientificortheoreticalactivityforexample,purenaturewithphysics, thesoulwithpsychology,thelivingbodywiththe(seeminglyinvented)scienceof somatology,etc.aswellas,inmostcases,anattitude,anothercentralbut operativeHusserlianconceptordevice,alreadydiscussedinourchapter1(pp.8 11.)Theontologicalregionofspirit,studiedbythehumansciences,iscorrelated withthepersonalisticorspiritualattitude,andtheregionsofmaterialand animalnaturewiththenaturalisticattitude.AsHusserlnowputsitinIdeasII,A changeinattitudemeansnothingelsebutathematictransitionfromonedirection ofapprehensiontoanother,towhichcorrespond,correlatively,different objectivities.149 B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality 1.MaterialNature RicoeurremarksthatHusserlsgestureinthereductionofIdeasIistoreject natureasalien,asanotherbeing.150Itdoesthis,ofcourse,tomakewayfora senseofconsciousnessnotreducibletothatofnaturetoeffectaKantian Copernicanturn,sotospeak.InIdeasII,Husserlsoftenstheothernessofnature bygivingbothamaterialaswellasanimaldimension.Thustherearethesethree
148Itcanactuallybeexplained,however,intermsofwhatIwilllatercallHusserlsnaturalismhis
implicitacceptanceandadoptionofthemodernscientificconceptionofnature.
149IdeasII,221 150Ricoeur,57
83 divisionsofthetext:materialnature,animalnature,andspirit.151Alreadyfrom thisitisclear,however,thattheunderlyingdichotomyinHusserlsconstitutional analysisinIdeasIIisthatofnatureandspirit.Husserlhimselfconfirmsthe impressionwhenheannounces:wehavetwopoles:physicalnatureandspirit and,inbetweenthem,Bodyandsoul.152 ButwhatdoesHusserlmeanbythetermnatureornatural153?Husserl speaksofnatureinadoublesense,154itsreferringontheonehandonlytothe physical,andontheotherhandtoboththephysicalandpsychicasasinglereality (thepsychophysical,livingensouled,etc.).Theformerisnatureinthefirstand originalsense.155Inthelattercase,thepsychicstratumisfoundedonthemore basicmaterialsubstratum.ThispointiscentraltoHusserlsontologyandis stressedbyhiminthefollowingquote(fromIdeasIII):
151Husserladdressedthenature/spiritdividerepeatedlyinhiswork,fromhislectureLogikals
TheoriederErkenntnis(1910/11)tohislastfullwork,theCrisis(1936),usuallyinthecontextof thequestionoftherelationsbetweenthenaturalandhumansciences,andbetweenallsuchsciences andphenomenology.ForanoverviewofhistreatmentsofthesetopicsseeMichaelWeilersextensive EditorsIntroductionto:HusserlianaXXXII,GesammelteWerke:NaturundGeist:Vorlesungen Sommersemester1927.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2001,pp.XVIL. (VolumereferredtohereafterasHusserl1927.) 152IdeasII,298 153Atthispoint,afurtherterminologicalnoteisinorder.Severalterms(andtheircognates)mustbe distinguishedfromeachother,namelynature/natural,physicalormaterial,andreal.Husserl assignsthesetermsmoreorlesstechnicalmeanings.Wemaythusregardtherelationshipbetween nature,reality,andphysical(ormaterial)inthefollowingway:natureinthefirstsenseisthe purelyphysicalormaterial;natureinthesecondsenseistherealmofanimalityorembodiedness andensouledness;nature,takeninitstwosensestogether,isstillnotallofreality,forreality encompassesnatureandspirit,which,takenbyitself,isstrictlynonnaturalinHusserlssense.Thus forHusserlthereisadistinctionbetweenallthereisthetotalityofworldly(orintramundane, byanotherlocution)realityandnatureasthefieldoftranscendentspecifically,spatiotemporal realitiesthatisnature.(IdeasII,3).Allofthesedistinctionswillcomeintoplayabundantlyaswe proceed. 154Husserlsexpression:Ibid.,145 155Ibid.,171.Compare:thesoul,too,isofcourseapersistentbeing.Butthispersistentbeingisno nature.(IdeasII,355)SeealsoHusserlsremarkthatrealityistobespokenofinthefirstplaceas nature(IdeasII,420)Healsoreferstotheformersenseofnatureasthestrictsense.(See Husserl1919,pp.1367)Unlessotherwisespecified,Itoowillusethetermnature,inreference specificallytoHusserlsviewsthereof,inthisstrictsense.
84
psychicrealityisfoundedintheorganismalmatter,butthisisnotconverselyfoundinthepsyche. Moregenerallywecansay:thematerialworldis,withinthetotalObjectiveworldthatwecallnature, aclosedworldofitsownneedingnohelpfromotherrealities.Ontheotherhand,theexistenceof mentalrealities,ofarealmentalworld,isboundtotheexistenceofanatureinthefirstsense,namely thatofmaterialnature,andthisisnotforaccidentalbutforfundamentalreasons.Whiletheres extensa,ifweinquireofitsessence,containsnothingofmentalnessandnothingthatwoulddemand beyonditselfaconnectionwithrealmentalness,wefindconverselythatrealmentalnessessentially canbeonlyinconnectiontomaterialityasrealmindofananimateorganism.156
Husserlalsoregardsnaturetobe(asisstatedalreadyinthefirstlineofthework!) theobjectofthenaturalsciences.157Suchanearlyandexplicitinvocationofnatural science,perhapsseeminglyinnocuoustosome,infactrepresentsahugeandfateful concessiontothemodernphysicalisticworldview,whichHusserlwillbeatpainsto reverseinwaysthatcompoundthelatentdualistictendenciesofhisthinking.Allof thiswillhopefullybecomeclearerasweproceed,especiallyinpartIII.158 Husserlsnotionofnatureisthusatoncescientific,inthesenseofGalilean Newtonian,aswellasbroadlyKantian.Natureisbyitsessenceextended,hasa definitespatiotemporallocation,isgovernedbythelawofcausality,isinitself devoidofsecondaryqualities,etc.159Thoughaspeciesofthenaturalattitude,the naturalscientificornaturalisticattitudeinvolvesakindofepochandreductionof itsown,abracketinginthiscaseofallaxiologicalandpracticalpredicates.160Inthis
plusthatisappresentedinsomephysicalthings,towhichbelongsthenewsense oflivingbeings(orbodies),somethingmorethanmeremateriality,though somethingthatis,again,alsodependentonmaterialityasitssubstratum.163 HusserlgenerallytreatstheBody164(Leib)inconjunctionwiththesoul(Seele, Psyche).However,itisimportantforustodistinguishthispsychophysical composite,i.e.,thelivingensouledorganism,fromthebodyregardedasadouble reality165i.e.,asthatwhichiseitherbody(Krper,bodything,Ding)orBody (Leib,livingbody).Infact,therelevantdistinctionstomakeareatleastthefollowing five: a)ThebodyasaJanusfaceddoublereality,towhichpertaintwolinesofreal circumstances,materialandpsychic.(Iwillrefertothisassimplythebody.)
conditionedbythevagariesoftheepoch.Instead,hepresentsitasatimelessattitude,whicheven theancients,forexample,mayhaveperformed,butsimplydidnothavetherightinformationtodo. 161PerhapsintheSartreansenseofabsurdlybeingthere,detrop?ThiswouldhelpexplainSartres owndualisticappropriation(initselfandforitself)ofHusserlian(bywayofHegelian) phenomenology. 162Seefn106,below,andalsofn107. 163IdeasII,9799 164IamfollowingtheusefulconventionoftheEnglishtranslatorsofIdeasIIofsignifyingLeibwith Bodyandotherreferencestothebodywiththelowercasebody.(IdeasII,XIVXV) 165Ibid.,297
86 b)Thebodyasbodything,orslabofmatterinspaceandtime,subjecttoforcesof naturalcausality.(bodywhenthecontextisclear,otherwiseKrperorbody thing) c)Thebodyasathinginsertedbetweentherestofthematerialworldandthe subjectivesphere;166alsoownbody d)ThebodyasLeib,thelivinganimateorganism,oranimal,whichpossessesa psychicalorsoulishstratum,appresentedwithitsmaterialsubstantiality. e)Thesoulorpsycheitself,whichformstheupperstratumoftheLeib,thelower stratumofwhichismaterialNature. Ofcoursethepictureisstillmorenuanced.Forexample,thereisatthelevelofthe Bodythelevelofsensations,includingkinaestheticsensations,whichisthe aesthesiologicalbody,whileatahigherlevelthereisthevolitionalbody,which isresponsibleforactinginthesenseofwillingandactingontheIcan.167 Husserlstreatmentofthebodysoulrelationisveryinteresting.Thesouland theBodyareintertwined.Thusinthisrespect,HusserlsideswithAristotle,soto speak,ratherthanPlato:thesoulisindeedeveronewiththeBody.168Therecan indeedneverbeaseparationofsoulandBody,apointHusserlmakesdramatically throughadetaileddiscussionoftheapriorieideticnecessityforevenaghostto haveaBody.Withoutabodyofanysort,noghost,herebydefinitionaphantomin Husserlsuniquesense,couldbeperceivedorapperceived(orforthatmatter hallucinated);appresentationofthepsychealwaysoccursthroughperceptionof certainkindsofbodies.169Thissortofdiscussioninfactraisestheinteresting counterimagetothatofthemindasaghostinthemachine.Forinthecaseof
166Ibid.,169 167HusserlspeaksoftheIcanasapracticaltobeabletothatispriortodoing(e.g.,Ibid.,273),an
87 Husserl,theimagecouldntwork:fortheghost,beingalreadyembodied,couldnot besaidtoneedyetanotherbody(machine)tobein.Inthiswayitbecomes obviousthatHusserlsconceptionoftheleibischseelischbeing,thepsychophysical organism,cannotbeidentifiedwith,say,PlatosorDescartesexplicitremarkson theseparabilityofmentalandphysicalsubstances,ifwemeanbythiswhatHusserl callssoulandBody.170 ButdoesHusserlactuallygotoofarinthedirectionofantidualismofBody andsoul?Thereisasense,forexample,inwhichHusserlsviewis epiphenomenalistic.171Remarkingforexamplethatthethingandthewholeof naturearesealedoff,hegoesontoargue:Psychicalconsequencesarejoinedto naturalprocesses,justaspsychicalcauseshaveconsequencesinnature,butthey aresuchthatintruththeyhavenoinfluenceonnature.172Husserlseemstosealthe dealashedescribesthenatureofcausalityitself:Itisclearthatcausalityof physicalnaturehasinfactapreeminentsense.Thiscausalityisaconstitutiveidea fortheideaofnature,fortheideaofaphysicalthingForreasonsofprinciple,the psychicisoutsidethisnexus.173
170WehavealreadyseeninthepreviouschapterhowHusserldepartsfromDescartesinthisrespect;
aswewillsee,however,Husserlsissueswithontologicaldualismremain,nowwithrespecttoan alternatedichotomyofnatureandspirit.ThusHusserlclosesonedoortodualismonlytoopen another.Ricoeurputsitwell:thepsycheanimatingthebodyisnotequivalenttotheculturaland communalrealizationsofman.Inreintroducingthedimensionofpersonandthatofcommunity Husserlcompletestheegopsychepolaritywithanewschemawherespirit(Geist)isnotthe empiricalcounterpartofthepuresubjectofphenomenologybutisratherasortofculturalequivalent muchmoreawkwardtosituateinthephenomenologicalstructure.(Ricoeur,689) 171Cf.Ricoeur,67 172IdeasII,355 173Ibid.,353.Seealso:thesoulisabeingthatisrelatedconditionallytoBodilycircumstances, relatedinaregulatedwaytocircumstancesinphysicalnature.(IdeasII,356)Nonetheless, epiphenomenalismisnottheonlypossibilityforwhatHusserlisdescribing,whichisalso,for example,consistentwithakindofLeibnizianparallelism.
88 ButbeforewefurtherinvestigateHusserlsnotionofthesoul,letuscome backtothebodyas(a),asdoublereality.Alreadyatthelevelofitsmaterial thinghood(b),thebodyisspecial.Thatis,ithasaparticularlyhighvalueandcentral importancefortheanimalorhumansubject.Itis,firstofall,centraltoperception.It governsthesystemofunfoldingofadumbrations,forexample,dependingonits positioninspaceandtime,thepositionoftheeyesandlimbs,andsoon.Asathing perceived,theownbodyiscertainlyathingofauniquetypeforexample,as beingthecenter,ortheNullpunkt,oforientation,inreferencetowhichallother thingsareconstitutedintermsoftheirnearnessorfarness,abovenessor belowness,rightnessorleftnesstomyabsolutehere.ThesubjectoftheBodyis ofcoursealwayshereandinthecenter,evenasthebodyasmaterialthingis constantlyinmovement.174Furthermore,becauseIdonothavethepossibilityof distancingmyselffrommyBody,ormyBodyfromme,subsequently,thebodyisfor me,perceptuallyspeaking,aremarkablyimperfectlyconstitutedthing.175There arepartsofthebodythatIcannotsee,some(suchasmyeyes,ormyback)evenin principle.Thereisnootherpossiblematerialobjectofwhichthismaybesaid.As myKrper,then,theownbodyishighlyunique.Andthisisofcoursetosay nothingofitsaxiologicalandpracticalimportancetous,matterswhichare bracketedinthenaturalisticattitude.Itisnotathingjustlikeotherthings,even insofarasitismerelyathing. Aslivingbody(d),however,thebodyisnotathingatallitsessenceis whollyotherthanthis.Becausethelivingbodyandthesoulareintertwined,itis
174Ibid.,166 175Ibid.,167
89 possibleandevenpropertospeakofmyselfasalivingbody.(Iamhurtnot thislegisimpaired,butIamokay.)Aswehaveseen,whatdistinguishestheliving bodyfromthesenseofmaterialthingistheelement,orstratum,ofsoul.Howissoul firstconstituted?Essentially,itisfirstconstitutedbythesolipsisticsubjectwith respecttotheownbodyand,onlylater,extendedthroughempathytoother Bodies.Thequestionoftheconstitutionofthesoulsofothersisessentiallythesame questionasthatofintersubjectivity,whichwastobedealtwithmorememorably andextensivelyintheCartesianMeditations(andtheIntersubjektivittHusserliana volumes).176 Thewayweexperiencetheownbodyinitspsychicalaspect(indeedasones own)isthroughthebodysbeingthelocalizedbearerofsensations.177Thisis essentiallytheexperienceoftactility.Thusitisonmyhand,hereinthisspotthatI canfeelthewarmthofaglowinglightbulb,orbackthereinthemiddleofmyback thatIcanfeelthistwingeofpain.Inthisway,Icometoknowmybodyasafeelerof sensations,andthroughthesesensationsincludingkinaestheticsensationsIcan infactexperiencemyselfasbeinginspace,occupyingthisorthatregion,myfingers beinginsuchandsuchposition,etc.Inthisway,theBodyis,inthefirstplace, mediumororganofperception.178Equally,however,mybodyistheoneand onlyObjectwhich,forthewillofmypureEgo,ismoveableimmediatelyand spontaneouslyandisameansforproducingamediatespontaneousmovementin
176Ofcourse,Husserlsnotionsofempathyvary.ButinIdeasII,theemphasisonmethodological
90 otherthingsHenceHusserlsdefinitionoftheBodyasfreelymovedtotalityof senseorgans.179Inanycase,allofthesedefinitionsareultimatelytobe(ineffect) subordinatedtohowtheBodyisconstitutedforconsciousnessinthespiritual attitude,specificallyastheexpressionofspirit. SincesomuchinthedistinctionofKrperandLeibturnsonthesoul,wemust ask,whatexactlyisthesoul?Asaregionofrealityorobjectivity,wehavealready seenthatitisinseparablefromtheBody.Butitisalso,Husserlsays,astratum foundedonmaterialnature,andintheclassicalGreeksenseitiswhat animatesthismatterandinvitesustoapperceiveamotivatingagentbehindit. Husserlhimselfdefinesitformally(butcircularly)asthebearerofapsychiclife togetherwiththesubjectivepossessionsofthatlife,andassuchitisaunity extendingthroughtime(thesametimeinwhichtheBodyendures).180Ricoeur crypticallydescribesHusserlspsycheasaconstitutedrealitywovenintothe surroundingworldofthepureego,181whichistosay,thatitisnottobeconfused withtheegoorthepersonalspirit.Afterall,eventhelowestofanimals(Husserl saysremarkablylittleaboutplants)hasasoulbutnoegoorGeistigheit.182Yetapart fromitsinterrelatednesswiththeBody,thestatusofHusserlssoul,atleastin IdeasII,ismorethanalittlemurky.183
179Ibid.,61
notneedtohaveselfconsciousness.(Ibid.,361)
183Ricoeur,too,seesabasicambiguityinthesoul(myletterdesignationsofdifferentmeaningsof
91 3.Ego Thequestionofthepsycheisinseparablefromthatoftheego,especiallyin humansubjects.184AsweknowfromtheturntowardstheegoaftertheLogical Investigations,theegohasbeencentraltoHusserlsphenomenologicalconcerns.In IdeasII,Husserlarguesthattheegocannotbethoughtofassomethingseparated fromlivedexperiences,fromitslife,justas,conversely,thelivedexperiencesare notthinkableexceptasthemediumofthelifeoftheEgo.185Husserlsegoisalso describedasarulingpartofthesoul.186Itwouldseem,then,thattheEgobeing discussednowisthemundaneone,theempiricalegoasopposedtothe transcendentalone.Thisiscertainlytrueofthefollowing:Wecanalso understandthatinconstitutednature,theBodyandtheBodysoulunityare constitutedandthattheempiricalEgoistheEgoofBodilypsychicnature.TheEgo isnotitselftheBodilypsychicunitybutlivesinit.ItistheEgoofthesoul187 ButtheentirediscussioninIdeasIIoftheegoassuchis,infact,framed aroundwhatHusserlcallsthepureego.Andthepureegois,Husserlexplains, immutable,188beingclearlyunlikeeitherthesoulortheBody.Muchofwhat HusserlsaysaboutintheegointhisveinisfamiliarfromIdeasI,exceptthathere,in IdeasII,itis,again,thepureegoratherthanthetranscendentalegothatisunder
grouped.(Ibid.,64).Husserlseemstobeawareoftheambiguityinsofarasheassignsthebodya quasinatureandquasicausality.(IdeasII,145,356) 184theexplorationofthepsychicapperceptiveEgoisonlyonelevelofthegeneralinvestigationof thepsyche.(IdeasIII,17) 185IdeasII,105 186ThepersonalEgofunctionssotosayastherulerofthesoul.(Ibid.,150) 187Ibid.,350 188initselfthepureEgoisimmutable.(Ibid.,110)Theimmutabilityoftheegohasnothingof coursetodowithimmortality,butmeansratherthatinsteadofgeneratioandcorruptio,tothe pureEgotherepertainsonlytheessentialpropertythathasitssteppingforthanditsreceding,thatis beginstofunctionandholdswayactivelyandthatitceasestodoso.(Ibid.,110)
93 upinpartIIIthequestionoftherelationofthetranscendentalego(consciousness) withournextconcepttheme,spirit. 4.Spirit SuddenlyinIdeasIIHusserl(or,ifwelike,thenarrator)signalsaradical shiftinperspectivethatwillusherinthethirdsectionofalreadyexhaustingly demandingwork:theanalysisof[materialandanimal]natureinourconsideration ofnaturethusprovestobeinneedofsupplementation.Itharborspresuppositions andconsequentlypointsbeyondtoanotherrealmofbeingandofresearch,i.e.,the fieldofsubjectivity,whichnolongerisnature.195Thus,weenterintotherealmof spirit,homeofthehumansciences,culture,personhood,andeverythingthat,inthe classicalhumanistphilosophicaltradition,makeshumanbeingssupposedlystand outfromnaturequanature,materialoranimal.AccordinglyHusserlsaysofthe distinctionofsoulandspiritthatitisthefundamentaloneinthisentiregroup.196 Thisatfirstsurprisingremark(isnotthedistinctionofnatureandspiritinfact themostimportant?)ismotivatedbythefactthatthesoul,whilecertainlynota thinginthenarrowestsense,isstillenvelopedintheclosedcircuitofthenatural order.Thesoulisstillanaturalbeing. Relatedtothisisthepersonalisticattitudeasavariation,orrathera
Husserladdsimmediatelythatthispregivenworldisinvestigatedfirst[myitalics] withrespecttonature.Thenanimaliahavetheirturn,humanbeingsbeforeall others.Bethatasitmay,thescientifictheoreticworldofblosseSachenisitself reducedoutoftherawmaterialoflived,personalandinterpersonal,functionally andaxiologicallymeaningfullife,alifelivedinwhatHusserlnowcallstheUmwelt (surroundingworld).198 Itisevidentfromvarioussupplementalsections199thatinIdeasII,Husserlis developinghisnotionofspiritthroughathinkingthroughofthedistinctionof naturalandhumanthatis,culturalsciences.Husserlssotosayconcessionto naturalscience,grantingitfreereignoverthehumansoulintheformsofbiology andpsychology,hasseeminglytriggeredacertainneedtoregainforhumanitya dignityandsingularity.Afterall,itiswewhodophenomenologyor,itisinusthat
197Ibid.,219.GivenHusserlspositionthatboththenaturalandhumansciencesaretheoretical,and
95 phenomenologyoccurs.Inasmuchasitisregardedasafoundedstratumofthe Body,itselfadoublerealitywhoseaspectasmaterialthingplacesitsquarely withinthecausalnexusofnature,thehumanbeingisanobjectofnatural science.ButHusserlwantstoaddtothispicturebyarguingthatthereisanother sensetothehumanbeing,anonnaturalisticsense,thatregardshim/heras subjectofaction,feeling,valuation,andsoon,ratherthanas,say,thingoranimal. Butonceagain,Husserlprobablygoestoofarintheprocessofcompensation(ifthat iswhatheisdoing).Forfromtheperspectiveofthehumansciences,naturalscience isitself,asawhole,nothingbutaculturalachievement,anaccomplishmentof personsactinginconcert.Husserlnowcompletelysupplantstheindependent integrityofthenaturalsciences,whichheelsewhereseeminglystrugglesto maintain,and,aswewillseebelow,fallsintoapuresubjectiveidealism. Aswehavealreadyseen,Bodyandsoul,andhenceanimality,areexcluded fromtherealmofthestrictlyspiritual.Admittedly,Bodyandsoularenaturein thesecondsenseproperlyspeakingonlyaccordingtothesideturnedtoward physicalnature.200Onthesideturnedtowardspirit,Bodyisinfactthe expressionofspirit,likethemeaningofawordthatisexpressedbytheletterson apage.Butjustasidealityisnotsimplylocatedinthewords,neitherisspirit located,asisthepsyche,inthelivingbody.Itiskeytorealizethatwhenwediscuss spirit,wearealreadyinthepersonalisticattitude.Thisiswhy,asCobbStevensputs it,spiritisnotsimplygraftedonsoul,likesoulonbody.201Spiritisnotsimply anotherfoundedstrataonmaterialandpsychicnature,inthesensethatto
200Ibid.,298 201CobbStevens,2523
97 graspsthehumanityofahumanbeing,thepersonthere,whodances,laughswhen amused,andchattersAnditisnottheapprehensionofaspiritfastenedtoa Body,buttheapprehensionofthepersonthroughhisbody.204ThusIcansayof man,inthisattitude,thathehasaCorporeality,[he]hasabodywhichisaphysical thingwithsuchandsuchqualitiesSometimesitisnotclearwhetherHusserlis speakingofsoulorspirit,asinanearbysectionhespeaksofthefactthateach movementoftheBodyis,asBody,filledwiththesoulthroughandthroughBodyis fullofsoul.Husserlspointisthatapersonalityemergesthrough,say,aparticular Bodysmovements.Husserlpointsoutthatthisistruenotonlyofthecorporeal Bodybutofanybodyormaterialthing,suchastexts,whicharecultural expressionsofauniquelysignificantkind.205Thisisausefulcluethattherelationof BodyandspiritthatHusserlisoutlininghereisinfactarelationofspiritandbody as(a),namelyasbothKrperandLeib.Thatis,spiritisrelatedtothematerialityof thebodyaswellastoitssoulishaspect,asLeib.Thebodyascomplexdualityin unityistransformedfromanaturalcomplextoaspiritualonethroughachange inattitude,butineithercase,itretainsitsJanusfacednature.206
personalitiesofahigherorderor,whatamountstothesamething,collectivespirits,suchas nations,clubs,churches,families,andthelike.(Seeforexample:IdeasII,377;or,forparalleltalkof individualandcollectivesubjects,seesHusserl1919,135.)ThisresemblestheHegeliannotionof objectivespirit,butforHusserl,communalsubjectivityisfoundedontheinteractionsofindividual subjects.Outoftheseinteractions,emergentlyperhaps,higherwholesororganicunitiesthat deservethenameofpersonsappear.Husserlseemstobasethisonthefactthatwecommonly speakofthewill,desires,attitudes,etc.,ofgroupsofpeopleorganizedincoherentwholes,notonlyof individuals.Thisisnotmerelyanalogousorfigurativelanguageforhim.Nowiftrue,itwould radicallyalterourconceptionofwhatcountsasapersonandcouldhavereallegalramifications. ThiswouldberelevanttothecurrentdebateovertheU.S.SupremeCourtsrecentrulingonthelegal rightsofcorporationsundertheU.S.Constitution.(See:CitizensUnitedv.FEC)
Whatthisindicates,perhaps,isthatBodyandspiritareoneonlytotheextentthat thelatterisapperceivedthroughtheformer,namelyviatheBodysappearingasan
investigationtounfolditsfullpowerandreceiveitsfullcertainty.Butphenomenologyismore fundamental,andowesnothingtoontologies!
100 isnotapartoftheworldatagendlikeDescartesnontranscendental cogitoandthereforecannotbeunderstoodintermsofanontologicalmonism. TherealmofworldontologyremainsrelativelyunderthoughtinHusserl,and thoughnosingleconsistentpositioncanbeteasedoutofIdeasII,inmyviewthetext comesclosertoaformofontologicaldualismthanHusserlwouldhavewantedto admit.Someoftheevidenceforthisviewhasalreadybeenfurnishedabove,but morewillbeprovidedbelow.Muchoftheremainderofthischapterisdevotedto discussingsomeoftheunderlyingphilosophicalissuesandpressureswhichleadto thedualisticposition,aswellassomeofthewaysinwhichHusserlstextseemsto veerawayfromsucharesult,generallywithoutsuccess. ThechargeofdualismisanoldoneasappliedtoHusserl,anditshouldnot bebandiedaboutcarelessly.Foronething,thereisacertainnebulousnessinthe questionofHusserlsdualismbecauseofthequestionofwhichdualismoneis referringto.Inmyview,thekindofdualisminHusserl,atleastinIdeasIIII,isthat specificallyofnatureandspirit,not(forinstance)ofbodyandsoul,orof consciousnessandreality.WehavealreadyseenhowinseparableBodyandsoulare fromoneanother;indeed,Husserlstressesthepointwhenheclaimsthatwhatwe havetoopposetomaterialnatureasasecondkindofrealityisnotthesoulbutthe concreteunityofBodyandsoul,thehuman(oranimal)subject.216Noweventhis dichotomy,thatbetweenthingandanimalincludinghumanbeingas
216IdeasII,146.Thiswouldseemtoruleoutaseparablesoulsubstance,butHusserldoesnotallow
101 psychophysicalcompositeisnottechnicallyadualism,becausethingand animalbothgounderthegenus,sotospeak,ofnature.Finally,consciousness andrealitydonotcompriseadualismforthereasonsalreadyindicated;thefirstis thegroundofthesecond,andthustheyhavenoparity.Thereisnorealityorworld withoutconsciousness;butthereisatleastconceivablyconsciousnesswithout realityorworld(cf.theworldannihilationexperiment,whichHusserlupholdsinno uncertaintermsinbothIdeasIIandtheEpiloguetotheIdeasvolumes).217 Rather,natureandspiritaredualisticbecauseneithercanbeexhaustively explainedthroughtheother,andtheydonotoverlap.Theyarebothabsolutes, correlatedtoalternativeversionsofthenaturalattitude,eachretainingprideof placeinitsrespectiveattitude.218Thisisnottosayonecannotfindtalkofanoverlap betweennatureandspiritinHusserl;butwhenHusserlspeaksofthis,ofa spiritualityinnatureforexample,heistypicallyreferringtoanimalnatureand doesnotlosesightofthefactthatsuchanimalityisafoundedstratumonmaterial nature,or,moreimportantly,thatsuchspiritualityisfundamentallyoutsideofthe realmofcultureorthepersonalisticattitude,inwhichthebodybecomesmere
217IdeasII,303.FromtheEpilogue(writtenaslateas1930/31):thenonexistenceoftheworldever
remainsthinkable(IdeasII,420)Husserlheredrawsthefamiliarlessonfromthis:thebeingof transcendentalsubjectivityhasthesenseofabsolutebeing,thatonlyitisirrelativewhereasthe realworldindeedisbuthasanessentialrelativitytotranscendentalsubjectivity,due,namely,tothe factthatitcanonlyhaveitssenseasbeingonlyasanintentionalsenseformationoftranscendental subjectivity. 218ToclaimthatHusserlisaphenomenologicalmonistissimplytoaffirmthefactthatHusserlwas neverunclearabouthisprioritizationoftranscendentalorphenomenologicalorpure consciousnessoverreality,which,takenonitsownsotospeak,lacksallsenseandbeinginthe fullestsense,andishenceconsciousnessdependent.Husserlscommitmenttotranscendental subjectivity,whichwasfirstformallyintroduced(inprint)inIdeasI,neverwavered.ButforHusserl, ithadalwaysbeensomehowpreortransontological;ontologycomestohavearestrictedsensein Husserl,alreadyprefiguringHeideggersdistinctionbetweentheontic(beings)andontological (forHusserl,somethingliketranscendentalconsciousness,thesourceofallmeaningthough fallingshortofBeinginHeideggerssense).
speakofhisviewsasnaturalistic?Theanswerhastodoultimatelywiththe parallelismofphenomenologyandontology;allthatdifferentiatesthemistheshift ofviewthatisbroughtaboutthroughtheepochandphenomenologicalreduction. ThusitisentirelypossibleinHusserlsframeworktoacceptthemeaningscience givestonature,itsobjectofstudy,whilealsoclaimingtofindthesourceofthis meaningintranscendentalsubjectivity,whichisrevealedthroughthe phenomenologicalreduction.AndthisisjustwhatHusserldoes,asIwillnowtryto show. AsmentionedinpartIIofthischapter,oneoftheimportantfeaturesof Husserlsconceptofnatureisitstacitacceptanceofthedefinitionofnaturegivenby thosewhocouldbedescribedasscientificnaturalists.InDasturswords,[In] IdeasIIscienceisconsideredasadefinitivethoughindirectcontinuationof perception.219AsOvergaardnotes,moreover,Husserlclaimselsewhere220thatthe
219Dastur,Franoise.HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.SoulandBodyinHusserlian
Yetinperhapsanevenstrongerstatementthanalloftheabove,Husserlsdeclares:
Butitmustbeunderstoodfromwithin,fromphenomenologicalsources,thatthisabstractionfrom predicatesbelongingtothespheresofvalueandpracticeisnotamatterofanarbitraryabstraction, itsownproperbeing,whereasthesubjective,inthelifeworld,isdistinguishedinallrespects preciselybyitsbeingactuallyexperienceable.(Crisis,127) 220Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXIV,GesammelteWerke:ZurPhnomenologiederIntersubjektivitt. TexteausdemNachlass.ZweiterTeil.192128.Ed.IsoKern.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1973(p. 278) 221Overgaard,Sren.HusserlandHeideggeronBeingintheWorld.Dordrecht:Springer,2004 222IdeasII,34 223Ibid.,305
104
lefttoonesowndiscretion,forassuch,itwouldinfactproducenoradicallyselfenclosedideaofa scientificdomainandthusalsonoideaofascienceselfcontainedapriori.Yetwedogainsuchana prioriclosedideaofnatureastheideaofaworldofmerethings224
seeinginchoatelyallalong,namelytheimplicitlynaturalisticbentinHusserl himself.Indeed,considertheallencompassingextensionassignedbyHusserltothe conceptofmaterialnature:Natureinitsformsofspaceandtime,encompassesall factualrealitiesbutalsoincludes,obviouslyonessentialgrounds,allaprioripossible realitiesaswell.226Andagain:WhatwehavehereistheoneObjectiveworld, withtheonespaceandtheonetime,inwhicheverythingisorderedpersonsas well,who,inunionwiththeirBodies,leadtheirpersonallives.227Becauseall realitiesareconstitutedashigherstrataofmateriality,whosebasiccausal commercedefinesthenaturalandanimalworlds,natureinthepure,physicalistic sensehasthesenseofbeingthesubstrateofanyothertypeofbeingwhatsoever.
224Ibid.,27 225Husserl1919,132.Thereis,admittedly,somedissentonthequestionofhowcloselyHusserl
adherestothescientificnotionofnature.ThusTheodorou,inarecentarticlearguesthatinIdeas II,naturethingsaredescribedfromaphenomenologicallylegitimatetheoreticalattitudethatdoes notnecessarilyadopttheverdictsofnaturalscientifictheoriesaboutwhatismerenature.See: Theodorou,Panos.PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserlsAnalysisofNatureThinginIdeas II.InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,Volume5,eds.Burt HopkinsandStevenCrowell.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005(p.169)Astheauthorfullyadmits,however, Husserlisunclearfromthebeginningaboutthisquestion,andpresentlythisisthemoreimportant fact. 226IdeasII,30;emphasisadded 227Ibid.,219;emphasisadded
105 Naturehasthesenseofbeingthegroundofallthatisbecauseofthefactthat anythingelsethatisperceived,coperceived,orapperceivedmustbeahigher stratumofarealitythatmustbe,atitsmostbasiclevel,naturalinthesenseof material.Andagain,whatiskeyhereisasymmetry.Therecannotbeapurely spiritualbeing,withnomaterialsubstrate,buttherecanbeandofcourseare materialthingswithnohigherstratum.Allofthiswillmakeitveryhardto understandHusserlssuddendeclarationoftheontologicalpriorityofspiritover nature(thePriorityThesisasIwillbecallingitforshort). YetHusserlwouldsurelyrespondthatallofthisissupposedtobepredicated
Andagain:
Itisnotthenaturalsciencesbutthehumansciencesthatleadintothephilosophicaldepths;forthe philosophicaldepthsarethedepthsofultimatebeing.230
228SeealsoHusserl1927,1925 229IdeasII,374 230Ibid.,376
triumphofethicalthinking.StatesCrowell:CriticsofHusserl(e.g.MerleauPonty) havesuggestedthatthemeaninglessnatureofthenaturalisticattitudeisan
231Melle,Ullrich.NatureandSpirit.InIssues,p.34 232Dodd,James.IdealismandCorporeity:AnEssayontheProblemoftheBodyinHusserls
Phenomenology.Dordrecht:Kluwer,1997(p.119)
107 abstraction,thatgenuinenatureistheprimordialrealmofanoriginarylogos,the originofmeaning.Tothissensibility,Husserlsrathertraditionalgnosticismseems outofplace.ButperhapsHusserlisrightHusserlscriticsseektoreviveamythical conceptionofnature233CrowellcriticizesMerleauPontyforsuppressingthe absolutismofrealityandheopposeshimunfavorablytoLevinas,whothankfully vindicatesthedisenchantmentofnaturefoundinHusserl!234Crowellinterprets MerleauPontytobearguingforaviewofnaturesuchthatnaturealreadyharbors acertainsensuousmeaningfulness,acertainmythicalfulnessthatenrapturesand fascinatesandisnotatallamerethingexperience235Hethenobservesthat MerleauPontysviewisincompatiblewithHusserlsphenomenologicalaccountof natureinmostofIdeasII,whichitselfsignifiesabreakwiththemythicalfulness ofmeaningadumbratedinthesensuous.Again,forCrowell,thisbreakis necessitatedbythediscoveryoftheethical,whichitisLevinasgreatachievement tohaveremindedusof:ForHusserl[asforLevinas]itisthedestinyofthis separationtoleavenaturebehindaltogether,andsoitisimportanttoaskwhether whatliesatitsoriginthereversibilityoftouchissufficienttoaccountforthe
233Crowell,StevenGalt.theMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.In
Issues,p.82.ArticlehereafterreferredtoasCrowell.Crowellmeanssomethingspecificby mythical.Themythicalisborneoutofadesiretosuppresstheabsolutismofrealitythatforces itselfuponusashumanbeings.(Crowell,84) 234Ibid.,85.Crowellgoeson:MerleauPontysoughttotracetheoriginofmeaningtotheelement. Hiselementalnatureaswildmeaning,anidealitythatisnotalientothefleshevincesa mythicalimagination.(Crowell,94)ItisinterestingtonotethatRicoeur,whodisagreedwith MerleauPontysexistentialappropriationofIdeasII(seeRicoeur41,69),wouldnot,withhis characteristicsenseofmoderation,gothisfar.IncontrastingIdeasIandII,Ricoeurstates,thestyle ofIdeasIrequiressubordinatingtheunionofconsciousnesswithrealitythroughincarnation[which iswhatisdoneinIdeasII]toitsunionwithrealitythroughperception.(Ricoeur,55)Ofcourse,the unionthatRicoeurspeaksofmayjustbebetterspokenofasadisjunctionthatis,IdeasI providesuswiththedisjunctionofsubjectiveimmanenceandobjectivetranscendence,IdeasIIand IIIwiththatofnatureandspirit.ButthepointisthatRicoeurseesanattemptatafusionthatiscloser towhatMerleauPontyhasinmindthanwhatCrowelldoes. 235Crowell,945
108 radicalityofthebreak.MerleauPontymakesmuchofsuchreversibility,aswe willseeinsubsequentchapters.Healsowilltrytoaccountfortheradicalbreakin termsthatcannonethelessexplainhowitispossibleinthefirstplacetohave identifiedwithnature;onecannotbreakfromthattowhichoneisnotalready attached.MerleauPontysuseofparadoxicalthinkingwillultimatelybeemployed intheserviceofthisdifficultproblem. C.ThePriorityThesis ThePriorityThesisisoneofthemostproblematicpositionsadvancedby Husserlinthetext.Thepriorityofspiritovernaturefollowsfromtheprivilegingof thepersonalisticattitude,andwhileitcertainlycircumventsdualism(bydintofits verytitle),itraisesotherperplexities.Foronething,itsquaresbadlywiththenotion thatspiritissomehowitselfdependentonrealityasdeterminedprimarilyby materiality.HusserlcanmaintainthispositionorthePriorityThesis,butnot,Ithink, both.Considerthefollowingclaim:Initsspiritualacts,thespiritisdependenton thesoulThespiritualEgoisdependentonthesoul,andthesoulontheBody. Consequentlythespiritisconditionedbynature236Husserlevengoessofarasto stateoutrightthatspiritbelongstonature,thoughwhathemeanshereisnot clear,ashealsoreferstonatureandspiritastworealities.237 AsecondreasonanddeeperreasontosuspectthePriorityThesisisthatit wouldappeartocommitHusserltoanontologicalmonismofahighlysubjectivistic sort.Husserlsownwordsmakethedangersimmediatelyevident:
236IdeasII,295 237Ibid.,296
109
Therealmofnatureistherealmofthephenomenal;thatmeansheretherealmoftherealunities constitutedinorbymeansofpresentation.Therealmofspirit,however,istherealmoftherealities giveninabsolutemanifestation(selfmanifestationandmanifestationthroughcomprehension), realitieshavingbehindthemselvesonlythepureEgoastheirreal,absolutesubstrateofall manifestationsofreality.238
Itisverypossiblethat,assomewritershavecommented,Husserlhasinmind somethinglikeamodified(transcendentallypurified)monadologicalidealismalong thelinesofaLeibniz,whoseveryideaofthemonadheadopts,atleastinpart,not onlyinIdeasIIbutmostmemorablyintheCartesianMeditations.Butthepassage justquoteddoesnotpresentuswithatranscendentalidealism,insofarasitstresses therealmofspirit;here,weareonlyatthelevelofthenaturalattitudeand, correlatively,reality.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthedogmaticidealismofthe LeibnizianvarietyandthetranscendentalidealismHusserlisaimingaretwo radicallydifferentthings,atleastfromHusserlsstatedperspective.Thefinal referencetothepureEgoisitselfunclear,duetotheambiguitiesinthisvery concept,discussedalreadyabove. ArelatedconfusionarisesoverhowHusserlinterpretsthesuperiorityof spiritinthefollowingquote:
Natureisafieldofrelativitiesthroughout,anditcanbesobecausethesearealwaysinfactrelative toanabsolute,thespirit,whichconsequentlyiswhatsustainsalltherelativities.Thatistosay,if wecouldeliminateallthespiritsfromtheworld,thenthatistheendofnature.Butifweeliminate naturetherealwaysstillremainssomething:thespiritasindividualspirit.239
238Ibid.,337 239Ibid.,311
110 Heissayingnowofspiritasectorofconstitutedrealitywhathenormallysays onlyoftranscendentalsubjectivity,forexampleintheworldannihilation experiment.Iwillfurtheraddresstheseunsettlingconflationsbelow(sectionD). AsidefromtheotherproblemswithHusserlsargument,thebasicmysteryat theheartofhisviewasstatedinthePriorityThesisisthis:howareweto understandhowscientistscouldhavearrived,simplyfromthespiritualattitude,at naturalisticconceptionsofnatureandmatteranditsabsolutestatusunlessthey weresimplywrongaboutthis,sayoutofacertainarrogance?Bydefiningthe essenceofnatureaspurelymaterial,andnatureasthebasisofreality,Husserl himselfhasensuredthatthescientificconceptionofnaturecouldnottrulybe supplantedbyanother,exceptbyrecoursetotheseeminginventionofanewand differentnaturalattitudeabifurcationthatreinforcesratherthansoftenshis dualisticstand. D.SpiritandConsciousness ThePriorityThesisissoflawed,infact,thatitsveryexistencepresentsa
111 iseasy,infact,toseeHusserlsIdeasIIconceptsofthepersonalisticattitudeand Umwelt240ascrucialanticipationsofthelifeworldandlifeworld phenomenology.241Thetrouble,however,isthatinHusserlsownview,ahugegulf separatesphenomenologyfromothersciences,i.e.,fromreality.Strugglingwiththis problem,Ricoeuroffershisbestattempttoreconcilespiritandtranscendental consciousness:Geistis[perhaps]nothingotherthantheegoofphenomenology, butwithoutthelightofthephenomenologicalreduction.242 Butiftrue,thiswould haveseriousconsequences.Firstofall,Husserlinfacttakespainstodistinguishthe humansciencesfrom(transcendental)phenomenologythroughouthiswritings.If spiritandtranscendentalegoareroughlyequivalent,thenthenaturalattitude wouldnothavetwosubspeciesnaturalisticandpersonalisticbutwouldbe univocal.Atleast,thepersonalisticattitudewouldhavetobesubdividedinto naturalandtranscendentalaspects.Butasthingsstand,theformeroptionwould concedethenaturalattitudeentirelytothenaturalsciences,giventheauthority Husserlcedesthemoverthenaturalworld,whilethelatter,moreplausibleoption wouldnonethelessmakethetheneedforthereductionhardtounderstand.Doesnt thepersonalisticattitudealreadyinterprettheworldasaworldofsense,rather
240ThomasNenonconcurs:theIdeasIIshows[sic]thattheconceptofUmwelt,whichwouldbe 241ThewordLebensweltcan,surprisingly,befoundinIdeasII.See,forexample:IdeasII,187.Inthe
replacedbythatofthelifeworldinthe20sand30s(Issues,x;emphasisadded)
112 thanofmerethings?Ultimately,thenaturalattitudeitselfisinneedofaradical rethinking.243 Thefundamentalandwellknownambiguitiesofthelifeworldarerooted intheambiguitiesofthespiritualattitudeandthenotionofspirititself.Spiritisa realmofreality,therealmofpersons,culture,andsocietiesorsocialstructuresas wellastheirhistorical(diachronic)dimension;consciousnessinthe transcendentalandphenomenologicalsenseisnoneofthese.ThepureEgoof IdeasIInowappearstobealmostpurposefullyambiguous:atoncehavingafootin personhoodandanotheroutsideit.WehavealreadyaskedwhetherthepureEgo isthesameasthetranscendentalEgo,asconstitutingconsciousnessitself,and decidedthatitprobablyhastobe.Ontheonehand,onewantstoinferthatwhenthe phenomenologistcomesuponthepureEgo,he/shecomesuponhimself/herself,as transcendentalego,intheactofselfconstitutionandselfreflection.Thiswould essentiallycompriseaperformanceofthereduction.(Husserldoesafterallcallthe pureEgotheirreal,absolutesubstrateofallmanifestationofreality.244)Butaswe haveseen,HusserldescribestheEgointermsofspirit,andastherulerofthesoul, forexample,soitsroleasarealcomponentoftheobjectiveworldsitsuneasily(or tooeasily)alongsideitstranscendentality.
243IsuspectthatthisiswhyDavidCarr,inhisTranslatorsIntroductiontotheCrisis,distinguishes
113 Alifeworldconnectiondoes,however,allowustoreinterpretHusserls PriorityThesisengenderedspiritualmonisminthesafer(ormorefamiliar) directionoftranscendentalmonism,thestandardHusserlianpositionthatallreality isconstitutedinandbytranscendentalconsciousness,thesourceofallmeaningand being.Underthisinterpretation,then,inelevatingthehumansciencesabovethe naturalsciences,whatHusserlisinfactdoingisimpreciselyexpressinghis convictioninthesuperiorityofphenomenology,asthestudyofconsciousness,tothe studyofreality,which,Husserlseemstofeel,hasbeenmonopolizedbythenatural sciences.Theelevationofthehumansciencescanbeseenasaprotestagainstthis naturalisticbias,buttothatextentitoverstatesthecaseandultimatelymakesallof perceivedmaterialrealitytheprovinceofsubjectiveUmwelten,whichcannothave beenHusserlsintention.Itbecomesincreasinglyapparentthattheproblemofthe naturalandhumanscienceswasonethatbecamegraftedontophenomenology afteritbecameknowntoHusserlthroughcontactwiththeworksofDilthey.Itturns outtobehardtosynthesizetheseverydifferenttypesofdiscourseinasingle framework.245 Thusinlightoftheforegoing,theCrisisinvestigationsintothelifeworld
maynowappearinanewlight,namelyasanattempt(itselfadmittedlygroping)ata finalsolutiontotheambiguityofspiritandconsciousness.Thetranscendental
245Whatisatstakeinallofthisismorethanjusttheparadoxofsubjectivity,thatis,whatHusserl
114 reductiontothelifeworldpreserveswhatwascrucialinIdeasIIsdiscussionofthe Umweltandthepersonalisticattitude,namelyitsinvolvementintheaxiologicaland practicalspheresofmeaningeveninassigningthempriorityoveraconceptionofa purelymeaninglessnature.246 E.TheQuestionoftheBody Husserlsdepictsthelivingbodyoranimalorganismasitsownontological region,distinctfrompurematerialityontheonehandandpurespiritualityon theother.Husserlelsewherecallsthebodyaconnectingbridgeinthisrespect.247 However,thesecouldactuallybeseentorepresenttwoverydifferentclaims,which cannonethelessbeeasilyconflated.Thisisexactlywhatoccursinarecent (schematic)attempttodeveloparecentunifiedinterpretation,byLuisRabanaque, ofHusserlsideaofthelivingbody.RabanaquedrawsonbothIdeasIIandHusserl 1919248toarguethatthebodyinHusserlcanbeunderstoodasathirdnoematic regionbetweennatureandspirit(orculture).Onitsownthisisnotcontroversial (depending,crucially,onhowoneunderstandstheinterrelationsoftheregions,as Iwilladdressbelow),butthepaperequallydrawsontheconnectingbridge metaphorbetweensubjectivityandphysicalthinghood.ThefullquotefromHusserl, inwhichthismetaphorisused,goesasfollows:
246Butwhereexactly,then,doesthelifeworldleavetheroleofthehumansciencesandthespirit
115
Weseetherebyalreadythat,phenomenologicallyconsidered,subjectivity(soulishspirit)inthe worldandphysicalthinghoodintheworldarenottwoseparateandexternallyrelatedgroupsofreal occurrences,butratherthatthereisproducedintheformofCorporeality,whichinitselfhasitsown deepestlayerofbeinginsensibilityandfreemobility,aconnectingbridge,which,throughthe singularspiritualityinnature,canhaveapositionintherealmofphysis.249
Themetaphorofabridgeinthiscontextisapowerfulonebecauseitseemstooffer apossibilityofresolvingoratleastsofteningtheotherwisestarkdisparitybetween physicalthinghoodandhumanspirit.ItisnotsurprisingthatHusserlshouldlookto animalitytofilltheroleofmissingrungintheGreatChainofBeinglikeladderhe hasbuilt.ButinRabanaquesreading,thebodyquabodyisathirdnoematic regionthatcannotbeassimilatedtoeithernatureorspirit.Inotherwords,the bodyissomehowdifferent,inanirreduciblemanner,fromegoicconsciousnessas suchandphysicalthinglinessassuch.Firstofall,Husserlhimselfstatesquitetothe contrarythatthebodyisapartofnature(animalnature,natureinthesecond sense,etc.).Andsecondly,Rabanaqueseemstohavetacitlycombinedthenotions ofapluralityofnoematicregionsontheonehandandanintegrated(hisword) totalitywiththebodyasmidpointbetweenextensioandcogito,sharingin featurescommontoboththelowerandupperregionsontheother.Indoingso heprovesofcoursethedictumthatitispossibletobetoofaithfultoatext.Forthe ideaofthebodyasabridgebetweennatureandspirit,anditsbeinganirreducible thirdnoematicregioninadditiontothenaturalandthespiritual,areobviously twoverydifferent,andmutuallyincompatible,claims.Inthefirstcase,wemight haveacaseofontologicalmonismaslidingscaleofbeing,perhapsfromthemost
249Husserl1919,p.186(mytranslation)
116 inerttothemostenspirited.ThiswouldbereminiscentoftheNeoplatonism tingedontologyofsomeGermanRomantics,orperhapsdistantlyofSpinozism.But ifspiritualityandphysicalityfuseorblendinthemiddleinthebodyasmidpoint ofextensionandthought,inRabanaquesimagethenitwouldseemthatthenotion ofnoematicregionsinthepluralmustbedispensedwithaltogether.Forinthat casematerialthinghoodandpsychicegoitywouldnotbetwodistinctnoematic regionsatallinthefirstplace,letaloneleavingroomforathird,thebody. Thefirst,monisticviewsuggestsakindofvitalism,orpanpsychism,that HusserlexpresslyrejectswithrespecttoLeibniz(andBruno).250Furthermore,this wouldbeacaseinwhichLeiblichkeitwoulddefinethewholecontinuumofwhich extensionandthoughtaremerelypolesoneitherend.Yetthiswouldclearlybe unacceptabletoHusserl,asitwouldcallintoquestionthefoundingfounded relationshipofthephysicalandpsychical,thelatterofwhichbeingfoundedonthe former,aswellasremovetheprivilegedperchoftheCartesianIthink.Thefactis thatHusserldidpositmultipleirreducible(thePriorityThesisaside)ontological regionstwoinparticular,natureandspirit.Thebodyfallsintheformercolumn. Ofcourse,thereisonemoreprovocativethoughtexperimenttoconsider.Intalking abouttherelationbetweenthepsycheandthebody,Husserlinvokesthefollowing image:
Letusimagineaconsciousnesswhichwouldstandinrelationtoalocomotive,sothatifthe locomotivewerefedwaterthisconsciousnesswouldhavethepleasantfeelingthatwecallsatiety;if thelocomotivewereheated,itwouldhavethefeelingofwarmth,etc.Obviously,thelocomotive wouldnot,becauseofthemakeupofsuchrelationships,becomeanimateorganismforthis consciousness.If,insteadofthethingthatIatthetimecallmyanimateorganism,thelocomotive
250Ibid.,132
117
stoodinmyconsciousnessasthefieldofmypureEgo,thenIcouldnotcallitanimateorganismalso, foritsimplywouldnotbeananimateorganism.
Notmerelyconnectionbutunity.Thisseemsaverystrongstatementindeed.An animateorganismisalreadymorethanamaterialthinginitsessence.Ithasa stratumofthepsychic,belongingtothewholeoftheorganismfromtheoutset. Butreally,allthismeansisthattheanimateorganismissuchthatinit,itsBodyand soulareone.Wehavegonethroughallofthisalready.Inspiteofthisunity,there isalso,still,afoundedfoundingrelationbetweenthefirstandsecond(psychic) stratum;theyrenotequal,inthissense.ThisiswhatallowsHusserltospeakofthe bodyasasensingphysicalthingthatiscoveredorfilledwithfeelings.252Its materialityisprimary,itspsychicdimensionanaddon,albeitonewovenintothe essenceofsomebeings,theanimateones.Sounfortunately,theunityofBodyand soulfailstoprovidetheneededevidenceofeitheraradicalunionoforamiddle regionbetweennatureandspirit.253Indeed,itisarguablethatHusserlstreatment
disciplineinIdeasIII,forexample.
ofmaterialnatureastheabsolutebasisofreality,thesubstrateuponwhichhigher strataofrealityarefoundedinaunidirectionalway,hassevereconsequencesthat reverberatethroughouttheIdeasseriesandmaybeHusserlsphilosophyasawhole. Itpushesthebodyandlivingnatureintothepurviewoftheinherentlyreductive naturalsciences,allthewhileprecipitatingacrisiswherebyspiritmustbe rescuedfromtheclutchesofbrutematerialismandhencemustbedualistically sealedofffromnatureitself.Husserlsworldisbifurcatedinsuchawaythatthe unityoftheworldcannotbefoundinit,butonlyinthefactthatbothsetsofrealities areconstitutedincommonthroughthetranscendentalego,i.e.,phenomenologically. Ifthetranscendentalegoandphenomenologicalmonismfail,theworlddoesnot havetheresourcestomaintaininternalcohesion.ThisviewishighlyPlatonicina certainveryspecificsense,thatis,inreferencetoasplituniversewhoseunityis
254TaylorCarmanarguesthattheKrper/Leibdistinctionisdualistic.(See:Carman,Taylor.theBody
119 providedbysomethingfromabove,participatinginwhatisbelow.InHusserls case,thetranscendentalegoisnotathingliketheForms,itisratheranattitude,a kindofconsciousness.ButtocallHusserlsviewtranscendentalPlatonism,while beingmoreaccurate,doesnotdrainthecomparisonofitspresentrelevance. ButifIdeasIIpromisesmorethanHusserlhimselfdelivers,thatisalso becauseitpromisessoverymuch.Itharborsthesortsoffertileambiguitiesthat haveledquitenaturallytotheontologicalshiftinphenomenologythattookplace throughHeidegger,Sartre,andMerleauPonty,amongothers.AndovertheCrisis andotherlater(atleastamongpublished)writings,geneticorstaticorboth,ithas theadvantage,ironically,ofgreaterinconsistencyandthusagreatersenseof possibility.MuchofthispossibilityarisesoutofHusserlsjustlyinfluentialtreatment ofthebody.ThebodyhadalreadybeenamajorconcernofContinentalphilosophers likeBergson,Marcel,andScheler(whowasinfluencedbyHusserl,albeit),but throughthevehicleofIdeasIIitsplaceinthehorizonoffoundationalphilosophical problems,atleastintheContinentaltradition,waspermanentlyestablished. Inallofthis,Husserlofcoursedoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensions inIdeasIIasfundamentalonesortorealizethatthequestionofnatureposesa radicalproblemforthetranscendentalphenomenologicalmethoditself.Aswehave seen,hepresentsakindofontologicalgambitdirectedagainstthenaturalisticor physicalisticphilosopher.IfHusserlsgambitfails,itwillhaveintheprocess concededsomuchtonaturalscienceand,inthewakeofthefailureof transcendentalphenomenology,therewouldbeonlythenaturalisticphysicalistic optionleft.Somethinghasclearlygonewrong.Atitsbest,theexaminationofthe
120 bodyinIdeasIIraisesthepossibilityofarethinkingofphenomenologyandthe naturalattitude,anuncoveringofevidencethatshowspowerfullythatthereisa kindofdeepinterconnectivityandoverlapofnatureandspirit.Thereisacertain volatilityinHusserlshandlingoftheseconcepts,avolatilitythatreappearsin intermittentburststhroughoutIdeasII.Thus,likeintentionalconsciousnessitself, IdeasIIasatextpointsnecessarilybeyonditself. Forhispart,MerleauPontyadoptsmanyofHusserlsinsightsashisownbut goeswiththeminadifferentdirection.Wemightputitthisway:whereasfor Husserlnaturehastobeexplainedintermsofitsconstitutionintranscendental consciousness,forMerleauPonty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichneeds explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe naturallivedbody.Thebodybecomesthesiteofaparadoxthatwillneverbe resolved,becauseitisdefinitiveofthehumancondition.Ontologically,thebodyas Leibblursthelineofsubjectivityandobjectivityinawayevenmoredecisivethan (theoretical)intentionality,sinceithasnodirectionality,anditisnotsimplythe bodysubject(asMerleauPontyhimselfcametorecognize)butsomethinglikethe crisscrossingorintertwiningofbeingwithitselfaknotattheheartofthe universe.Theintimacyofnatureandspiritallowsphilosophy,andnotjustnatural science,tohaveasayindefiningwhatitis,evenwhileitselfbeingsusceptibleto havingtoreviseitsownbeliefsinlightoftheseexplanations.InMerleauPonty, naturalismisdefeated,paradoxically,bybecomingtransformedthroughamuch morerobustdefinitionofnaturethanscientistshavetraditionallypermitted.This isnovictoryofahigheridealismorspiritualism.Contrarytowhatsomehave
122
ChapterThree:MerleauPontysOrganicAppropriationof HusserlianPhenomenology
I.Introduction Thequestionofwhatphenomenologyisandwhatitsultimatetasksare hasneverceasedtobeposedeversinceitsinception.Naturally,peoplehavelooked toHusserl,theeffectivefounderandpioneerofthisphilosophy,foranswerstosuch questionsbutwhilesomefindthemhere,othersseeonlymorequestions. MerleauPontywasunique,inthisregard:hefoundananswer,butithappenstobe onethatcontinuestosurpriseusbecauseofitscounterintuitivity.OnMerleau Pontysreading,Husserlsquestionsareultimatelythoseofhumanexistence,the paradoxesofincarnatesubjectivity,thefinitudeofhumanknowledgenoneof whichthetextbooksatfirstsuggesttobecentraltotheGermanphilosophers agenda.Nevertheless,itisundeniablethateversinceMerleauPontyintroducedhis Husserltotheworld,phenomenologyhasnotbeenabletostopwonderingoverthe enigmathatistheMerleauPonty/Husserlrelationship.
255MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.(HereafterPS.)InSigns.Tr.Richard
WeknowthatHusserlnevermadehimselftooclearonthesequestions. MauriceMerleauPonty255
M.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(p.165)
Therearemany,particularlyontheHusserlianside(hopefullythissortoflabel willmeanlessbytheendofthischapter),whoshareEmbreesdisenchantmentwith whattheyperceivetobeMerleauPontysmisappropriationofHusserlian phenomenology.257TherearealsothosefromtheMerleauPontysideofthings wholamenttheFrenchphilosophersconstantreferencestoHusserl,findingthem unnecessaryandmisleadinggiventheultimatelytransphenomenologicalnature, theyclaim,ofMerleauPontysundertaking.Others,ofcourse,stresstheindissoluble linkbetweenthetwophilosophers. Itiscertainlyhardtodenythatasignificantlinkexists,buttheprecise relationbetweenMerleauPontyandHusserlisanuncannilydifficultcodetocrack. DoesMerleauPontygetHusserlright?isjustthefirstofmanyquestionsthatarise. Othersinclude:IstherearightHusserlatrueHusserl,atall?ShouldMerleau PontysselfdescribedfidelitytoHusserlsideasbetrusted?ShouldweseeMerleau PontyasakindofHusserlian,finally,andevenHusserl(oroneofpossiblyseveral Husserls)asaprotoMerleauPontian?
256Quotedin:Bernet,Rudolf;IsoKern;andEduardMarbach.AnIntroductiontoHusserlian
124 Tostartattheendandworkbackwards,sotospeak,myquickanswersto thesequestions,respectively,wouldbe:yes,MerleauPontygetssomething profoundlyrightaboutHusserl,thatisaparticularstrainofhimthatmustbe separatedcarefullyfromtherest;no,thereisnotrueHusserl,sincemanylive possibilitiesremainopeninhiscavernousthought;yes,MerleauPontysself understandingasaphenomenologistofaHusserlianveinisgroundedintruth;and finally,yes,thereisasenseinwhichHusserlandMerleauPontyarereciprocally intertwined,suchthat,tousethelatterswordswhenspeakingofhimselfand Husserl,itisnotpossibleeveninprincipletodecideatanygivenmomentjustwhat belongstoeach.(PS159) Thisisalottoshow,however,inadissertationchapter,soIhavelimitedmy goalspresentlytothesefour:First,tobrieflysketchthehistoricalbackgroundofthe relationship;Second,toprovideanoverviewandcriticalassessmentofavarietyof positionstakenonthisrelationshipintherecentsecondaryliterature;Third,to show,throughastudyoftherelevanttexts,howIunderstandMerleauPontytoread andappropriateHusserl;andFourth,tosuggestwaysinwhichhisrelationship258to HusserlexemplifiesandembodiescertainMerleauPontian(butalso,implicitly, Husserlian)figuresofthought.Thatis,Iwillwantultimatelytoshowandhereis atleastoneclueastowhysomereadersdontacceptMerleauPontysreadingof HusserlthatMerleauPontysinterpretationofHusserlfollowsthesamepatternas
258HusserlandMerleauPontydidnothaveapersonalacquaintance,sobyrelationshipIhaveof
coursebeenreferring(andwillcontinuetorefer)throughoutthischaptertotherelationship betweentheirphilosophies.
125 hisgeneralphilosophy,suchthattoacceptoneis,toalargedegree,toacceptthe otheroratleasttobepreparedtodosomorereadily.259 MerleauPontydidnotbeginhisphilosophicalcareerstrictlyasa phenomenologist,buthegraduallygrewintotherole.Hewasinterestedin Husserlasearlyas1934,butevenaslateashisfirstbook,TheStructureofBehavior, hisprimaryfocusseeminglylieselsewhere.However,readingHusserl(orabout him,asthroughEugenFinksimportantKantstudienarticleof1933260)evidently hadagreatcumulativeimpactonhim,suchthat,asonechroniclernotes,[his] attentiontoHusserlincreasesratherthandiminishesoverthecourse261ofthe progressionfromThePhenomenologyofPerception(PP),hiswellknown1945 masterpiece,toTheVisibleandtheInvisible(VI),whichwasleftunfinishedatthe timeoftheauthorsuntimelydeath.UnlikeEugenFink,MartinHeidegger,Aron Gurwitsch,andotherstudentsofHusserls,MerleauPontydidnothaveapersonal relationshipwithHusserl,althoughhemayhaveattendedatleastoneofhis lectures.262Complicatingmattersfurther,Husserlwasclearlyonlyoneofmany influencesonthespongelikeFrenchthinker.ThisisbecauseHusserls
259Animportantbutdeliberateomissionfromthisdiscussionisanyextendeddiscussionof
hermeneuticsforitsownsake.Forexample,Itouchonlyindirectlytheperennialquestionofwhether thereisinfactsuchathingasacorrectinterpretationofawork,orevenwhetherthereissucha worktobeginwith.(Besides,MerleauPontysisacaseinwhichitisnotthemeaningofindividual textsthatareusuallyatstakebutthetendenciesandinnerlogicofthethinkerscorpusasawhole, anevenmoreelusiveanimal.)Thesearesurelyquestionsthatdeserverepliesandwouldhave significantbearingonthepresentinquiry,buttheyalsoliejustoutsideitsnecessarilyrestricted scope. 260See:Fink,Eugen.DiephnomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsindergegenwrtigen Kritik.In:Fink,Eugen.StudienzurPhnomenologie19301939.TheHague,Netherlands:Martinus Nijhoff,1966 261ThechroniclerisTedToadvine.SeeMerleauPontysReadingofHusserl:AChronological Overview.In:MerleauPontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht: KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.228).HereafterToadvine.(Theessaycollectionasawholeis referredtohereafterasReading.)Toadvineschroniclehasbeenextremelyusefulforthissection. 262Ibid.,pp.22733
126 phenomenology,largelythroughtheinfluenceofSartre,wasonlyoneofmany dominantphilosophicaloptionsin1940sFrance,whenMerleauPontyforgedthe coreofhisphilosophicalvision.263 Nevertheless,Husserlsinfluenceturnedouttobethemostdecisiveinthe end.InthePrefaceofPP,MerleauPontyadoptedthefundamentalHusserlian insightsandconcepts,workingthemintohisownbrandofexistential phenomenology,andhewasthefirstsocalledoutsidertobegrantedprivateand indepthaccesstoHusserlsarchivesinLouvain,whichwereatthattimefilledwith reamsofunpublishedmaterialthatMerleauPontyhappilydevouredand communicated,fragmentarily,toawidercircleofscholarsandintellectuals.264 MerleauPontysreadingofHusserliscriticalofsomeofHusserlstendencies, particularlywhathavebeenvariouslylabeledandidentifiedashisrationalism, idealism,essentialism,andfoundationalism.MerleauPontydislikedeachofthese stylesofthinking,butheclearlyregardedHusserlasmorethanthesumofthese philosophicalparts.Itisalsotrue,however,thateachoftheabovelabelscanbe challengedasoverlysimplisticstereotypeswhenappliedtoHusserl,astheyall applychiefly(thoughbynomeansexclusively)totheearlypublishedworksof Husserlduringhis,primarily,staticphenomenologyperiodmostespecially,
263Forexample,AlexandreKojvehadmemorablyreintroducedHegeltoFrenchstudents,including
MerleauPonty.HeideggerandSchelerandtheircriticismsofHusserlwerealsoinfluentialto MerleauPonty,aswereSartresexistentialism,Bergsonianism,(eventually)Marxism,andother philosophiestosaynothingofthecentralimpactofGestaltPsychologyontheyoungthinker.Onthe (mostly)negativeside,theinfluenceofFrenchNeoKantianismshouldbementioned.Iwillfurther addressMerleauPontysconsistentoppositiontoKantianisminlatersections. 264AccordingtoDanZahavi,itwasinfactIdeasII,thethenunpublishedsequeltoIdeasI,thathad hadthegreatestimpactonMerleauPonty.(Zahavi,Dan.MerleauPontyonHusserl:AReappraisal. InMerleauPontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:Kluwer AcademicPublishers,2002.(p.6hereafterZahavi.)Thisideaissupportedindirectlybytheway MerleauPontyessentiallyreconstructshisownphilosophyonthebasisofsomelinesofIdeasIIin PS.
127 HusserlsIdeasI,whichwehaveexaminedinthefirstchapter.MerleauPonty recognizedinHusserlsthoughtovertimeadistinctphilosophicalmaturation,as wellasamovementawayfromthestyleofIdeasI.MerleauPontythusdivides Husserlsthoughtintothreedistinctperiods:logicist,idealist(orsimplymiddle), andexistentialistphases.265MerleauPontysideswiththethird,existentialist phaseinHusserlsthought,butthefactisthatheneverdeniedthecomplexityand evencontradictorinessofHusserlsphilosophyevenattheendthoughgivenhis temperamentandpenchantforlambiguit,healmostcertainlyadmiredHusserlall themoreforthisthannot. II.MerleauPontysRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewand Critique A.Introduction ToraisethequestionofMerleauPontysrelationshiptoorreadingofHusserl
istodosoagainstthebackdropofalivelyandvigorousdebate,onethatbegins early266andcontinuestothisday.HereIwillexaminetheparametersofthisdebate,
265TwodistinctplacesinwhichheadvancestheideashowhowenduringitwasinMerleauPontys
mind:PP,p.317,fn274;and,muchlater,PSM46and48.Seealsofn46,below.
266Asof1964,EdiereportsaccusationsagainstMerleauPonty,forexamplebyMauriceNatanson,
128 beginningalso,throughacritiqueofsomeoftheextantliterature,tooffermyown interpretation.ThepositionsIwilladdresscannotnecessarilybeplacedonasingle spectrum,sincethereisnosinglequestionthattheyalladdressinthesameway. Someauthors,forexample,discusstheextentoftheinfluenceofHusserlover MerleauPonty,whileothersconcentrateonthefidelityofMerleauPontytoHusserl ongivenissues(orasawhole).Butmygoalisnottoanalyzethisdiscussioninto theirindividualcomponentsbuttoprovideamoreorlessholisticoverviewofthe discussionitself,forallaspectsofitarerelevanttoanygeneralassessmentof MerleauPontysrelationshiptoHusserl. Ihavedividedvariousviewsaseitherstrongorweak.Weakviews,on
129 B.TheStrongView:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras DanZahavi,whileacknowledgingdifferencesbetweenthetwothinkers, surprisingly(givenhisstrongHusserliancredentials)stressesthecontinuity betweenthemandarguesthatMerleauPontysreadingofHusserlisinmanyways prescientandaheadofitstimes.268Forhispart,A.D.SmitharguesthatMerleau PontysideasinPParefundamentallyHusserlian,thoughstatedwithadifferent emphasisandthroughdifferentrhetoric.HealsoarguesthatHusserlhasthe resourcestoaccountforthespecialsignficanceaccordedbyMerleauPontytothe bodilyschema,againsttheviewofShaunGallagher,forexample.269BothZahavi andSmithhaveincommonavastcommandovertheHusserlianaarchives,and hencecalluponmaterialthatcannotbeexpectedtobeknownbyevensome advancedphenomenologists.ThepivotalIdeasIIhascometobeincreasinglywell known,ofcourse,butthereareonthisfrontdetractorsoftheSteinandLandgrebe editedvolumewehavebeforeustoday.270 InadditiontoZahaviandSmith,whowriteprimarilyonHusserl,thereisalso thecaseofaMerleauPontianwhofullyacknowledgestheprofundityofthelink betweenthetwophilosophers,namelyRenaudBarbaras.Thusintheconclusionof hisbookDeltreduphnomne,Barbarasstates:MerleauPontysontologydoes
268TextcitedaboveasZahavi.Foraninstanceofhisspiriteddefenseoftranscendentalsubjectivity
inHusserl,seeforexample,Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponseto theLinguisticPragmaticCritique.Tr.ElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001 269Smith,A.D.TheFleshofPerception:MerleauPontyandHusserl.InReadingMerleauPonty:On thePhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.122)Notein particularthesummaryremark,IhavesuggestedthatthereisnothingradicallynewinMerleau Ponty,ascomparedwithHusserl.Theyoccupythesameterraininphilosophicalspace.(p.20) 270Seeforexample:Behnke,Elizabeth.MerleauPontysOntologicalReadingofConstitutionin Phnomnologiedelaperception.InMR,p.34;hereafterBehnke.BehnkearguesthatSteinhad alreadysteeredIdeasIIinarealisticdirection,onemorecongenialtoMerleauPontysintentions thantoHusserlsown.
130 notbreakwithphenomenology;itisratherphenomenologysmostsignificant achievement271Ofcourse,LeonardLawlorandTedToadvine,inthe IntroductiontotheirEnglishtranslationofthebookdescribeitashavingasoneits mainaimstoconfrontHusserlsphenomenologyandthatitconcernsthe transformationofMerleauPontysphenomenologyintoontology.Importantly, however,theseremarkspertaintoBarbarashimself,ratherthantoMerleauPonty. ForBarbarastacitlyadmitsthatMerleauPontydidnotfullyeffectthedesired transformationhimself,andhasbenefitedfromhisowneffortstofinallydoso.272 C.WeakandMixedViews:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal. Notwithstandingthepositionsofthethreeeminentscholarsjustmentioned,
271TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trs.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.Bloomington:Indiana
UniversityPress,2004(p.312)Barbarasfullquotebearsalmostexactresemblancetosomething MerleauPontyhadwrittenbefore.Barbaras:Also,MerleauPontysontologydoesnotbreakwith phenomenology;itisratherphenomenologysmostsignificantachievement.Itaimstorecognize whatHusserlhadforeseen,namely,atypeofbeingwhichcontainseverything;itaimstomakea returnfromanobjectiveworldtoaLebensweltinwhosecontinualfluxareborneNatureandthe objectsofperception,aswellasconstructionsMerleauPonty,fromalectureonthelifeworld: thereturnfromanobjectiveworldtoaLebsenweltinwhosecontinualfluxareborneNatureand theobjectsofperception,aswellastheconstructionsthroughwhichwegraspthemwithCartesian exactness.(MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollgedeFrance19521960. Tr.JohnONeill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970,p.108.Hereafter Themes.) 272Ibid.,ix 273See:Lefort,Claude,Surunecolonneabsente:EcritsautourdeMerleauPonty(Paris:Gallimard, 1978)andRichir,Marc,LesensedelaphnomnologiedansLevisibleetlinvisible,inEsprit,no.66 (June1982),p.125.IgetthesecitationsbywayofBettinaBergosPhilosophyasPerspectiva Artificialis:MerleauPontysCritiqueofHusserlianConstructivism.PrintedastheAfterwordof: MerleauPonty,Maurice.HusserlattheLimitsofPhenomenology.Ed.LeonardLawlorwithBettina Bergo.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2002,p.178.Thisarticleisreferredto hereafterasBergo.
131 MerleauPontyside(sotospeak),therearethecasesofGaryMadisonandM.C. Dillon,bothofwhomunderplaytheroleofthephenomenologicalreductionin MerleauPonty.274ForDillon,eventheearlyMerleauPontyuncritically appropriatedHusserlianterminologyfordifferentpurposes.275Suchsentiments arecommonamongMerleauPontyscholars.InhisbookonMerleauPonty,for example,LawrenceHassarguesthatMerleauPontygoesbeyondHusserldefinitely fromphenomenologytoexpression276,whileHubertDreyfuscommentsthat MerleauPontysantidualismconflictsdirectlywithwhatmakesthetranscendental reductioninHusserlpossible277.TaylorCarmanandFranoiseDastur,bothfrom verydifferentperspectives,bothagreeonacertaindualisminHusserlwhich clasheswithMerleauPontysantidualistagenda.ArguesCarman,forexample:
UnlikeHusserl,butlikeHeidegger,MerleauPontylooksbeyondthesubjectobjectdividetotryto gaininsightintotheconcretestructuresofworldlyexperienceIndeed,takingtheproblemof embodimentseriously,asMerleauPontydoes,entailsaradicalreassessmentoftheveryconceptual distinctionsonwhichHusserlsenterpriserests.278
Forhispart,XavierTilliettereinforcesthisdividewhenheremarksthat
HusserlwasnotaninstructorofMerleauPontyasmuchasaninitiatoranda
274GaryMadison,ThePhenomenologyofMerleauPonty:TheSearchfortheLimitsofConsciousness
(Athens:OhioUniversityPress,1981),1945and3323,andMartinDillon,MerleauPontysOntology (Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988),712,120(hereafterDillon).Citedbywayof:Sara Heinmaa,FromDecisionstoPassions:MerleauPontysInterpretationofHusserlsReduction. (HereafterHeinmaa.)InReading(pp.127148) 275Dillon,p.83.Dillondoeshowevernoteonp.87theusualwayinwhich,almostasakindof modusoperandi,MerleauPontypicksupanddevelopsaseminalthoughtofHusserls. 276Hass,Lawrence.MerleauPontysPhilosophy.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2008(pp. 1989) 277Dreyfus,Hubert.MerleauPontysCritiqueofHusserls(andSearles)ConceptofIntentionality. InRereadingMerleauPonty.Amherst,NewYork:HumanityBooks,2000(p.37) 278Carman,Taylor.TheBodyinHusserlandMerleauPonty.PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall 1999,p206.ForDasturssimilarbutslightlymorenuancedposition,see:HusserlandtheProblem ofDualism.InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana, Vol.XVI),ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983(pp.6577).
132 revealer,goingontoaddthatMerleauPontyhastracedoutnewfurrows, concernedtofreeuptheimplicitHusserlwhoresembledhimlikeabrother,279an interestingtwistofcourseinwhichHusserlissaidtoresembleMerleauPonty,as opposedtheotherwayaround!280Tillietteisambiguous,however,abouttheissue ofMerleauPontysoriginality,aswhenhewrites,Inreality,[MerleauPonty]did notcarryoutdetailedpioneerwork,butratherpickedoutpassagesandformulas thatelectrifiedhisownmeditation.Hewasnotanddidnotwanttobeascholiast norevenanhistorianofphilosophy.Didhecarryoutpioneeringworkordidnthe? Inarecentessay,StephenWatsonofferssomethinglikeanintermediary
Smithetal.NewJersey:HumanitiesPress,1992(p.162)
280Wealsomustbecarefulinfollowinghimashecontinuesthispassage,however:Heapproached
Husserlwithulteriormotives,knowingbydivinationwhathewouldfindthere(Citedbywayof LesterEmbreesPrefacetoReading,p.xiii)Tillietteadmitstohaveacquiredthislatterinsight secondhandfromaformercolleagueofMerleauPonty,whoknewhimasof1938.Hisbeliefthat MerleauPontychieflybroughtoutthehiddenimplicationsofothersthoughtsisnotincorrect,but ifonedoesthisatamasterlyenoughlevel,itbecomesunclearwhoismoreresponsibleforthefully developedthoughttheoriginalauthororthecommentator. 281Watson,StephenH.MerleauPontysPhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituated Knowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNottosingtheWorld.JanusHead,Winter/Spring Issue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications.(pp.535549) 282Ibid.,544 283Ibid.,545
133 original,morepositivisticversionofphenomenologythatHusserlhadlaidout.We mustconcludethatonitsownphenomenologyisnotexplanatory[intheway Husserlhadclaimed].Itattainsnoexplanatoryrolecertainlynotthatof determiningourconceptswithoutbeingbroughttogetherwiththefactsandtheir history.284Watsonsrichargument,whichitselfcombineshistoricalfactand systematicanalysisintracingMerleauPontyscriticalbreakfromelementsofboth Husserlsandhisownearlierphenomenology,neverthelessmakesacompelling indirect(and,forlackofabetterword,performative)casefortheinextricabilityofa comprehensionofMerleauPontystaskwithoutreferencetoHusserlasakindof permanenthorizonmuchinthesamewayperhapsthatMerleauPonty(citedby Watson)arguesforthedialecticalrelationalimportanceofscienceto phenomenology.285Itisthisthatcanbesaidtocomprisethestrongelementin WatsonsreadingoftheMerleauPonty/Husserlrelationship. D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo IntherestofthissectionIwilldealatgreaterlengthwiththeweakviewsof
284Ibid.,545
285Ibid.,540.TheoriginalcitationisfromPrimacy,29.WatsonalsocitesGurwitschswellknown
remarktotheeffectthatthelifeworldinHusserlcannotbeunderstoodapartfromitspolemical relationtothescientificattitude.
Severalthingscanbesaidtochallengethesesentiments,thoughnonedefinitive.For example,ononereading,MerleauPontydoesnotrenouncethetranscendental attitude,andattimesinfactembracesitexplicitly.287Onthisview,itisthe absolutenessorpriorityofitthathechallenges,notitsrightfulplacein phenomenologicalpraxis.Also,itisarguablethatMerleauPontysintensive engagementwiththesciencesatleastatthefirstorderlevel(meaning,the creativeinterpretationofitsresults)notonlymatchesbutsurpassesthatof Husserlhimself.288 Finally,toarguethatHusserlwasconcernedwithscienceas opposedtohumanexistencemightbeafalsedilemma,especiallyinMerleau
286Quotedin:Bernet,Rudolf;IsoKern;andEduardMarbach.AnIntroductiontoHusserlian
Phenomenology.Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1993(p.xi)
287Seeforexamplethefollowingpassageonp.63ofPP:Butnowthatthephenomenalfieldhasbeen
sufficientlycircumscribed,letusenterintothisambiguousdomainandletusmakesureofourfirst stepsasfarasthepsychologistisconcerned,untilthepsychologistsselfscrutinyleadsus,bywayof secondorderreflection,tothephenomenaofthephenomenon,anddecisivelytransformsthe phenomenalfieldintoatranscendentalone.(italicsadded)ReferenceprovidedbyHeinmaa(p.129) SeealsoTedToadvinesarticle,alsoinMR(pp.7194),entitledLeavingHusserlsCave?The PhilosophersShadowRevisited.ToadvinearguesthatthePSisanexampleofMerleauPontys reformulatingtherelationbetweenthetranscendentalandthemundane.(p.71) 288Andheisnostrangertothephilosophyofscienceassuch,either.SeeforexamplewhatMerleau PontysaysaboutscienceinhisEyeandMind(InThePrimacyofPerception,tr.CarletonDallery.Ed. JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964)pp.15961.
135 Pontyscase,butalso,arguably,inHusserls.Embree,oneofthemosteminent scholarsofphenomenologytoday,isobviouslyawareofallofthis,sothisismore thanamatterofliningupcitationstoproveonesideortheother.AsIwilltryto arguelater,howonereadstheMerleauPonty/Husserlrelationshipispartlya functionofonesreceptivitytothekindofambiguityagoodambiguity,mind you289thatMerleauPontywantstointroducetophilosophyandhermeneutics alike. BehnkebeginsarecentessaybyarguingthatMerleauPontysreadingof HusserlissimultaneouslyawritingofHusserlawritingthatappropriatesand develops,butalsodeformsandoccludes.290ItisinterestingtonotethatMerleau Pontyhimselfendorsesthenotionthatitisafalsedilemmatosaythat interpretationisrestrictedtoinevitabledistortionorliteralreproduction.(PS 159)Yetonewishestoaskhowitispossibletodevelopsomeonesideasby deformingthem?Doesnotthenotionofdevelopmentpresupposeacertainlackof completedform,andhenceamalleabilityorpotentialitythatmakesithardto defineinthefirstplace?Withthisominousphrasing,Behnkegoesontoexplainwhy shefaultsMerleauPontysapproachandmannerofappropriation,asinthistelling quote:
Onthewhole,then,MerleauPontysHusserlreadingischaracterizedbyaninterpretive engagementwiththecontentofHusserliantextsratherthanaconcernforadoptinga phenomenologicalattitude,consultingexperientialevidenceforourselves,andcarryingHusserls researchtraditionfurther.AndsinceMerleauPontysreadingofHusserlhashadaprofound influenceonthewayHusserlsworkhasbeenreceivedingeneral,theoveralleffecthasbeento
289Fortheexpressiongoodambiguity,seePrimacy,11. 290MerleauPontysOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhnomnologiedelaperception.InMR,
p.31
136
perpetuateaclimateofinterpretationinwhichHusserlianthemesandtermsaretypically approachedinlightofreceivedphilosophicalproblemsandreceivedwaysofposingthem,allatthe expenseofthepossibilityofappropriatingphenomenologyasalivingresearchhorizon.(Behnke, 4950)
Readclosely,thisemergesasaparticularlystingingcritiqueofMerleau Ponty,atleastquaphenomenologist.Bynotconsultingexperientialevidencefor ourselvesor,whatBehnkementionsjustbefore,cleavingtodescriptionrather thanexplanation(Behnke,49),MerleauPontyisperhapsnotsomucha phenomenologistatall,butclosertoasimpledogmatist,thatisametaphysician whoengagesinreceivedphilosophicalproblemsandreceivedwaysofposing them.BehnkesstickingpointisMerleauPontysabandonmentofHusserlsstrict methodologicaldirectives,somethingneitherhenorIwouldentirelydispute. Behnkeaddsyetanotherdarktwist,however,bysuggesting,likeEmbree,thatthe receptionofMerleauPontyasarepresentativephenomenologisthasdamaged Husserlslegacy.ObviouslyBehnkeisnottryingtocastaspersionsonMerleau Pontyhimself,butsimplytodescribewhatsheseesasacaseofalltoosuccessful appropriation(herword)ofHusserlsprogram.ButMerleauPontyhas,inBehnkes words,performedadisservicetoHusserlswork.291Thereisperhapsacertain assumptionherethatHusserlsownselfdefinedprojectwithoutinterventionby MerleauPontyisvitalonitsown,apowerfulphilosophicalsystemor methodologythathasbeenovershadowedbyaninferiorproduct.However,itisnot clearinthiscasethatMerleauPontywouldhavemarkedoutanysortof
291BehnkesinglesoutthatmajorelementofHusserlsworkasawholethatisconstitution.
137 developmentofHusserlsthought,somuchaswrongheadedlymisconstruedwhat Husserlwasfinallyupto. Thesesortsofsentimentsstandofcourseinsignificantcontrastwith MerleauPontysunderstandingofhisownrelationshiptoHusserlsthought,which, aswewillseeinthenextsectionofthischapter,isclosertothestrongviewsbriefly coveredabove.ItisinlightofthisselfinterpretationofMerleauPontysthat ThomasSeebohmdevelopsaninterestingpsychologicalhypothesis,suggestingthat MerleauPontyknewofthedistanceatsomelevelinhismind,buttriedinanycase tocoverupthisdistance.Whywouldhedothis?Again,alongbutrichquote:
AsinthecaseofFichteandKant,thetoposservesasacoverupofacritique,andthiscritiquehas thecharacterofdeconstruction.FichteshowedwithrespecttoKant,andMerleauPontywithrespect toHusserl,thatwhattheybelievedtobethelastwordinphilosophyisbuiltonunthought suppositions.TheselurkbehindthehiddencontradictionsofthecriticizedpositionThenewtaskis therecognitionandexplicationofthesepresuppositions,thusaskingforthepossibilityofthe criticizedpositions.Adeconstructivecritiquehas,takenforitself,thecharacterofamoreorless completeruptureandradicalrejectionofthepositionsinquestion.Butthegoalisalsotoclaimsome kindofcontinuity.292
Andheaddselsewhere,
MerleauPontyisineveryrespecthonestinhisattemptstosavethefaceofhishonoredmasterin thelightofthenewdevelopmentsintroducedbyhimandothers.293
292Seebohm,ThomasM.ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau
PontyandHusserl.InMR(p.59)
293Ibid.,p.55
138 facebygivinghimakindoffacelift!)Ifitisbeingimpliedthatthiskindofface saving,wellintentionedasitmaybe,isnonethelesscounterproductive,becausefor exampleittendstomisleadreadersastowhatHusserlreallymeant,thenwecome fullcirclebacktoBehnkescriticismaboutlegacyandocclusion.Thefacesaving hypothesisistempting,givenMerleauPontysgenerallynonconfrontationalstyleof engagingfriendsandenemiesalike,butitfacesarealdifficulty:whyshould MerleauPontyhavefeltobligedtodiscussHusserlinthefirstplace,andtothe extentthathedoes?OutofsomestrangeemotionalattachmenttoHusserl,amanhe hadnevermet,andwhoseworkhehadeveryreasontodownplaywithrespectto figureslikeHeidegger,Hegel,andothers?294Thisdoesnotseemwhollyconvincing. IfthereisanypersonalresponsibilityMerleauPontywouldfeeltowards Husserl,itwouldprobablybeasagratefulstudenttoa(virtual)teacher.Having benefittedfromreadingHusserlsprivatemeditationsintheHusserlarchives, concealedtomostofthepublic,andwhichoftenconflictedwiththetendenciesof thepublishedworks,MerleauPontyprobablyfeltincreasinglyresponsibleto revivifyHusserlintheeyesofapublicthatremembershiminaonesidedway.This isthedistinctimpressionthatIgetasIreadtheopeningofthePS.Hedidnothaveto citeHusserlasoftenashedoes,butnottohavedonesowouldhaveeventually appeared,tomany,asabitdishonest,giventheroleHusserlplaysinhisown thinking.AndifitistruethatMerleauPontysthoughtisakindofdeconstruction ofHusserl,MerleauPontyhimselfdoesnotreallygivethisindication.Evenwhenhe
294Thereferencetodeconstructionshouldnotbeignored,asitgoestotheissueofMerleauPontys
mannerofinterpretingphilosophers,butwewillcometothisinthenextsectionwhenweexamine PSindetail.
139 claimstoexposeacontradictioninHusserlhimself,295forexample,hequicklyadds thatHusserlwasatleastsemiawareofitandmovingtowardsasatisfactory resolutionofit,namelyinthelastphaseofhisphilosophy.MerleauPontyisnot deconstructingsomuchasreconstructingHusserlfromoutofHusserlsown writings,noless. BettinaBergosinterpretationoftheMerleauPonty/Husserlrelationbuilds onsomethingMerleauPontyhimselfcommentson,namelyacertaintensionin Husserlsthought,which,says,Bergo,liesbetweenthesearchforaground,a unifyingprinciple...and,ontheotherhand,theconvictionthatthegroundis ultimatelyneverwhollyreducibleandsocannotserveasanepistemicfoundation. (Bergo,159)OnBergosview,MerleauPontyeffectivelychosesides(mywords)by takingtheanarchicphenomenologicaloption.(Bergo,160)ThetensionBergo citesisreal,yesbutshe,unlikeMerleauPonty,expressesithereinsolelystatic orsynchronicterms.MerleauPonty,instead,providesamorediachronicaccount, accordingtowhichHusserlstextswereemergingintoacertainanarchismquite ontheirown.296Ifthisistrue,thenMerleauPontysautonomyasachooseris diminished;heisfollowingHusserlsleadeveninthinkingagainstHusserl.That, indeed,isafittingwaytocharacterizethedepthofHusserlsinfluenceover MerleauPonty,ifbyacircuitousroute.Bergointerestinglycallsthisinfluenceinto questionovertheissueofHusserlslatetextErfahrungundUrteil,atextthathas
295Seeforexample:MerleauPonty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollgedeFrance.
140 beenshowntohavemanyparallelswith(oranticipationsof)MerleauPontys writings.ButbecauseMerleauPontywasnotawareofthetextsexistence,Bergo concludesthatthecoincidencesaysmoreaboutMerleauPontysindependenttrain ofthoughtthanHusserlsinfluenceonMerleauPonty.However,athirdoption seemstobethatMerleauPontywasatsomepointkeyedintoacertainlogicof Husserlsthoughts,andsocouldanticipatemanyofthethingsHusserlmighthave said,withouthavingactuallyhadacquaintancewiththem.IamnotsureBergohas convincinglyforeclosedthispossibility. E.ConcludingThoughts Notwithstandingitsmanytwistsandfolds,theMerleauPonty/Husserl debatesdominantundercurrentissomethinglikewhetherMerleauPontyshould beunderstoodasathingapartfromHusserlorsomehowacontinuation,evena mereecho,ofthelatter.OneofBergosintriguingideas,drawnfromsomeaccounts ofLefort,isthatMerleauPontyisapeculiarsortofreaderofphilosophersgenerally, onewhoseappropriationofothersondistinctlyMerleauPontiantermsisso seamlessastomakeonebelievethatthesourceauthorreallymeant,allalong, whatMerleauPontysaystheymeant.(Bergo,1589)Ofcoursethismightbesaidof manyphilosophers;Iamsure,forexample,thatAristotlesstudentswereconvinced byhistendentioustreatmentofthepresocratics.ButIthinktheclaimisthat MerleauPontyisparticularlyeffectiveineffacinghimselffromtheequation,almost intermsofasortofappropriationbystealthasopposedtoanovertAristotelian Hegelianteleologism(allofthisleadstomytheory.)Animagethatisbroughtto
141 mindisoneofaplanet(MerleauPonty)whosepullbringsphilosophers(Hegel, Heidegger,Bergson,Schelling,Scheler,Marx,etc.)andnonphilosophers(Uexkll, Proust,Freud,Czanne,Valry,etc.)alikeintoitsorbit,revealingthemtobe(or bendingthemtobecome)justsomanycompliantmoons.Allofthismaybetruein thecaseofthefiguresjustlisted,butitisnottrue,Iwouldinsist,withrespectto Husserl.ItwouldgotoofartosayHusserlistoMerleauPontywhatastaristothis planet,soperhapsamorefittingimageisthatofthetwinstarsofthebinarySirius starsystem,workingintandemtoproduceapotentluminosityinthenightsky. III.MerleauPontysHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText A.Introduction Iwouldliketobeginthissectionwitha(second)epigraphofsorts,anearly
(1947)quotationfromMerleauPontywhichsetsthestagefortherestofhis (prematurelycurtailed)philosophicalcareer.
Whenphilosopherswishtoplacereasonabovethevicissitudesofhistorytheycannotpurelyand simplyforgetwhatpsychology,sociology,ethnography,history,andpsychiatryhavetaughtusabout theconditioningofhumanbehavior.Itwouldbeaveryromanticwayofshowingoneslovefor reasontobaseitsreignonthedisavowalofacquiredknowledge.Whatcanbevalidlydemandedis thatmanneverbesubmittedtothefateofanexternalnatureorhistoryandstrippedofhis consciousness.297
297See:ThePrimacyofPerceptionandItsPhilosophicalConsequences.(Tr.JamesEdie)In
Perception,p.24.Thiswasatalk(andensuingdiscussion)originallyrecordedin1947,shortlyafter thepublicationofPP.HereafterPrimacy.
142 Inacertainway,thispassageconveystheessenceofMerleauPontysphilosophyof man298:theenigmaticnexusoftheinnerlifeofconsciousnessandtheouterbeingof Nature,theambiguousmiddlespaceinwhichhumanexistenceunfoldsand (partially)findsitself.InMerleauPontysview,Husserlsawthesameenigma,and increasinglycametoseethatitcouldnotbesolvedthroughanappealtoabsolute consciousness,areflectiveconstitutivepossessionoftheworld,299anymorethan itcouldbesolvedbyscientificnaturalismanditsdeterministiclaws.Hencethe existentialthrustofMerleauPontianphenomenologyandthepersistentMerleau PontianclaimthatHusserlhimselfentersexistentialisminthethird,lifeworld themedphaseofhisphilosophy.ButhowdoesMerleauPontygetallofthisfrom Husserl,andhowdoesheparlayitintoanewvisionofhumanreality? ThecurrentsectionisoneoftwothatreconstructMerleauPontys philosophyasaHusserlianphenomenology.BecauseMerleauPontygenerally writespiecesandnotpiecemeal(areflectionofhislargelybecominganessayist betweenPPandVI),itisimportanttoexaminethismaterialtextbytext;butatthe sametime,thisapproachtendstooccludethegenuinelysystematicwayheengages withtheprincipalthemesofHusserlsphenomenology,suchasthetworeductions.I havethustriedtocombinebothapproachestextualhistoricalandthematic systematicbyorganizingthesecondsectionaroundthesamematerialdiscussed
298Hereaselsewhere,Iusemaninsteadofhumanityonlyinordertoreflectthestyleofthe
sourceauthor.IdoofcourseusethelattertermwhereverIamrepresentingmyownviewsalone.
299Originallyaprojecttogainintellectualpossessionoftheworld,constitutionbecomes
B.HusserlinPP PPisdominatedbythepreoccupationsandmethodologicalinnovationsof phenomenology.AndMerleauPontymakesitclearinhisfamousPrefacethatitis Husserlsversionofphenomenologythathehaschieflyinview.301Mostifnotallof themajorissuesintheHusserl/MerleauPontynexus,andMerleauPontysmanner ofinterpretingHusserl,arepresentinatleastgerminalformintheshortbut pregnantPreface.MerleauPontyenumeratesthethreemajorthemesof Husserlianphenomenologythephenomenologicalreduction,eideticreduction, intentionalityand,onebyone,endorsesandrepackagestheminexistential terms.Thuswelearnthatthephenomenologicalreductioninfactbelongsto existentialistphilosophy.302
300Intermsoftexts,IwilldrawprimarilyonthePrefacetoPP,theessaysPSandPhenomenology
andtheHumanSciences(InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:Northwestern UniversityPress,1964;hereafterPSM),andVI.(Note:Iwillbecitingfromthepaperbackeditionof theSmithtranslationofPP;amazingly,pagenumbersofthehardcoverandpaperbackeditionsfor themostpartdonotalign.) 301Afterall,heexplicitlyrelegatesBeingandTime(Heideggerbeingtheothermajor phenomenologicalalternativetoHusserl,exceptingSartre,whohimselfappropriatesHusserland Heidegger)tothestatusofadetaileddevelopmentofHusserlsownphilosophy.Thisstated preferenceforHusserloverHeidegger(andScheler)isrepeatedelsewhere,forexample,inPSM: Husserl,whodefinedphilosophyasthesuspensionofouraffirmationoftheworld,recognizedthe actualbeingofthephilosopherintheworldmuchmoreclearlythanHeidegger,whodevotedhimself tothestudyofbeingintheworld.(PSM,94)MerleauPontycallsHeideggerdogmaticinthesame passage.ThisattitudetowardsHeideggersuggeststhatMerleauPontyis,inaway,takingHeidegger backforHusserl.ThuswhenMerleauPontyusesatermlikebeingintheworldorfacticityin thePreface,itisalways,ironically,tothebenefitofHusserl.Againstthosewhowouldargueforan equalHusserlandHeidegger(atleasttheHeideggerofBeingandTime)influenceonthethinker,I thinktheseindicationshelpdispelthatimpression,thoughthereisadmittedlymuchroomfordebate onthematter. 302LestweimaginethistobeaveiledattackonHusserl,weneedonlyconsultalaterfootnotelaterin whichMerleauPontydefinesHusserlhimselfasexistentialistinhislastorthirdperiodof
ThisdeeperintentionalityisofcoursewhatMerleauPontyvariouslycallsmotor intentionalityoroperativeintentionality,thespontaneous,preconscious(or anonymousanotherHusserlianword)intentionalityofthebodyoriented towardsitsenvironment.Husserlhimselfhadagreatdealtosayaboutsuch operativeintentionalityitisinfacthisidea.ThusMerleauPontyisunderthis meaningofexistencemerelyemphasizingacertainlineofHusserlian investigation. OneoftheconsistentthemesofMerleauPontysthinkingitis,infact,one ofthefundamentalpremisesofhisgeneralphilosophicaloutlookishisopposition toidealism.Thereasonoroneofthemisthatoftheopacityoftheworldto consciousness.Idealisms(speakingnowespeciallyofthetranscendentalrather thanphenomenalistsort)managetorenderconsciousnesstransparenttothe
145 world.303MerleauPontysoppositiontoidealismisthereforeclear,butwhose idealismheisreferringtoKantsorHusserls,forexampleisnot.Thereare somewhotakeittobemotivatedagainstHusserl304,butA.D.Smith,totakean excellentrecentexample,showsconvincinglythatitisonlyaKantian(orNeo Kantian)kindofidealismwhichMerleauPontytargetsrepeatedlythroughoutPP asthequintessentialformofintellectualismthatthreatenstoimplythiskindof transparency,namelybybuildingitintoperceptionasaconditionofanysortof experienceatall.305HusserlsoppositiontoKantianhumanistconstructivismin factpavesthewayforMerleauPontysownappreciationofperceptionasan opennesstotheworld.(PPxix)Weareopentotheworld,butitisnotenclosed withinusorprefittedtoourcategorialthought.Thisisexactlywhythe determinationoftheworldthroughessencesisalwaysfraughtwithperilandshot throughwithcontingency.306 ButitisalsowhyHusserlsreturntothethings themselvesissoimportantandrevolutionary.
303alogicallyconsistenttranscendentalidealismridstheworldofitsopacityandits
transcendence.(PPxiii)
304See,forexample,Bergo,162:ItseemsfairtoconcludethatMerleauPontysetabouttoclearany
idealistresiduefromthepathofthelaterHusserl,and,insodoing,pushednumerousconceptsofhis own.Isthissortofcharacterizationright?I,atleast,certainlydontreadMerleauPontyashaving setabouttoreinterpretHusserl;onmyreading,hesimplysetabouttophilosophize,andHusserl gavethisphilosophizingitsshapeandtexture. 305Smith,A.D.TheFleshofPerception:MerleauPontyandHusserl.InReadingMerleauPonty:On PhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.1011) 306MerleauPontysstrongemphasisonopacityandcontingencydoes,ofcourse,exposehimto thedangersofskepticismandrelativism,bothofwhichheconfrontsasnecessarythreatstoface.He sideswiththeskepticslikeHumeandMontaigneuptoapointarguingthattheyarenevertheless tootimidinthereturntothepositiveaspectaftertheirskepticalcriticisms.(Primacy,29)He addressesthechallengeofrelativismandthethreatofscientismexhaustivelyinPSM,whichwewill cometobelow.(Wemightwishtokeepinmindthatthesamesoftrelativismthatemergesin MerleauPontymayhavebeguntocreepintoHusserlalreadyinthelattersinvestigationintothe multiplicityofhistoricalandculturallifeworldstheZulu,etc.)
146 Asageneralrule,mostofMerleauPontysdeclarationsinthePrefacecan beseentobeinconflictwithmanyfeaturesof,say,theHusserlofIdeasI,though muchlesssowiththegeneticphenomenologyofHusserlslaterperiod.Take,for example,MerleauPontysstatementthatphenomenologyisaphenomenologyof origins,orthatitcapturesmeaningasitcomesintobeing.(PPxxiv)Thisis nothingbutHusserlsSinngenesis,asMerleauPontyhimselfackowledges.(PPxxi) AndwhileitishardtoseeHusserlsayingtheworldisnotwhatIthink,itiswhatI livethrough(PPxix)usingjustthesewords,whatdoescometomindisHusserls intensivelaterinvestigationsintopassivesynthesisthepretheticconstitutionof theworld.Thatis,IlivethroughtheworldevenasIconstituteitbecauseI constituteitanonymously,muchinthewayIsoorientmyselftotheworld throughbodilyintentionality. C.HusserlinMerleauPontysLaterWork ItisonlyappropriatetobeginherewithPS,whichchroniclesthelasting philosophicalsignificanceofHusserl(andhisshadow).Byitselfitdemonstrates muchofwhatIamtryingtoshowinthischapter,namelytheinseparabilityof MerleauPontysphilosophicalcontributionandhisreading/appropriationof Husserl. ThepiecebeginswithsomecrucialremarksonMerleauPontysown hermeneuticalapproachtopastphilosopherslikeHusserl,someofwhichhavebeen citedalreadyabove.MerleauPontywarnsagainstourbeingseducedintoreducing aphilosopherstrictlytowhathesaidtowhatisobjectivelycertifiedofhim.
147 MerleauPontysmiddlewayinthisparticularcaseisbetweenobjectivism,on theonehand,andpurearbitrariness,ontheother.Thus:anobjectivehistoryof philosophywouldrobgreatphilosophersofwhattheyhavegivenotherstothink about.Yetneithershouldweengageinmeditationdisguisedasadialogue.He pointsout(asweindicatedabove)thatitisafalsedilemmatoclaimthat interpretationsofothersworkleadseithertoinevitabledistortionorliteral reproduction.307 MerleauPontythenquotesfavorablyfromHeideggerontheunthoughtof elementsinphilosophersworks;inHusserlthereisanunthoughtofelementinhis workswhichiswhollyhisandyetopensupontosomethingelse.(PS160,myitalics) Notetheparadoxicaliswhollyhisandontosomethingelse.MerleauPontyis tracingoutHusserlsownprocessofselftranscendenceandtherebymaking manifestwhatislatent,butofcoursethefullmanifestationturnsouttobe(more immanentin)thetextsofMerleauPonty.Theboundariesofselfandotherare porousindeed.TheunthoughtofinHusserlistherebygivenvoiceinMerleau Ponty,butitisimportanttorealizethatthereisnocleardividinglinebetween unthoughtofandthoughtofinthis,orperhapsinanyother,case.Thusin Husserl,existentialphenomenologyishalfthought,orsomewhatthought,whilein MerleauPontyitismorefullythoughtorrethought.308
307PS159161.Bothofthesepositionshavethecommonpremiseofpositivismhere,another
HeknowsthatHusserlwouldprotest.Hence,lateron,weencounterthisrevealing phraseology:Willynilly,againsthisplansandaccordingtohisessentialaudacity, Husserlawakensawildfloweringworldandmind.(PS1889,myitalics)Husserls laterthoughtverymuchbuildingontheearliersuggestsanewdirectionwithout necessarilyfullytakingit.MerleauPontyrevelsinshowingthroughliberal quotationsthatinIdeasII,Husserlfreelygrantsontologicalprioritytomaterial NatureoverSpiritinonebreath,evenasheprioritizestranscendental consciousnessinanother.(PS1645,171)Fromtheseandotherhintsheconcludes that:HusserlsthoughtisasmuchattractedbythehaecceityofNatureasbythe vortexofabsoluteconsciousness.(PS165)MerleauPontythenstressesthemutual encroachment(PS176)andreciprocalFundierung(PS173,1767)ofdifferent ordersofbeing,sensibleandideal,309citingHusserlsownwordsagaintosealthe case.(PS177)
149 PSM,anessayfrom1961,offersamoreprosaicbutalsothoroughly
revelatoryassessmentofHusserlianthoughtandhisownselfcircumscription withinitsberth.Itrepresentsthethinkersmatureconclusionsononeofthemajor themesofphenomenologysinceitsinception,namelyitspreciserelation(ornon relation,asthecasemaybe)tothesciencesbothnaturalandhuman.310Itis primarilypsychologythatMerleauPontyisconcernedwith,notsurprisingly(given hislongengagementwithGestaltpsychologyinparticular).Thecentralproblematic hereistheparadoxofessenceandfact.Theessayisparticularlyilluminating becauseofthewayitdemonstratesMerleauPontysstrategyofstrikingamiddle waythrough,andnotdespiteHusserlbetweenhistoricismandrelativism,on theonehand,andessentialism(and,implicitly,determinism),ontheother.What MerleauPontywantstomaintain,andclaimsthatHusserlhimselfachievesevenif belatedly,istruthinthemidstofindeterminacy,essencewithinexistence,and, strikingly,eternityalongwithcontingency.(PSM92)Inallofthis,heviewsthe humansciencessympathetically(andinfactallsciencesthereisnoclear separationmadeherebetweennaturalandhumansciencesontologicallyspeaking, eveniftheirmethodologiesdiffer).Thereasonforthissympatheticviewisthat
determinetheideaofnatureinIdeasII,HusserlencountersanapparentviciouscircleAre personscomponentsofnature,then,subordinatedtoit,ordoestheveryconstitutionofnature presupposethenonnaturalrealmofspirit?See:Crowell,StevenGalt.TheMythicalandthe Meaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.InIssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenon andLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996(p.81). 310BythesciencesofmanMerleauPontyhasprimarilypsychologyand,toalesserdegree, sociologyandethologyinmind.AnotherlecturecourseentitledPhenomenologyandSociology focusesonsomeotheraspectsofthesameproblem,thistimeemphasizingthenamesakescience, thoughitusesmuchofthesamelanguageasPSM,andismuchshorter.Ofcourse,whatisarguably mostimportantofallforMerleauPontyistherelationofphilosophytohistory.Butalthoughwecall historyoneofthehumanitiesasopposedtosocialsciences,itispreciselytheempirical, contingentfactorofhistoricalitythatmakesitakintothehumansciencesinMerleauPontyssense. Thisisalsowhyhetreatsthethreatofhistoricismalongwiththatofrelativismasheopensthe essay.
150 humansciences,intheirownway,aredoingpreciselythesamebalancingact,albeit withouttheselfreflectiveanxietythatphilosophybringswithit.Itisinthissense thatMerleauPontydeclaresthatthereisnocleardividinglinebetweenthetwo. (PSM72)OnceagainheseemstobeatoddswithHusserl,whoinsistsonthe separatenessoftranscendentalphenomenologyfromallsciences,butMerleau Pontytellsadifferentstorythatrelies,asusual,heavilyonevolutionary developmentswithinHusserlhimself.MerleauPontyseesaburgeoning recognitioninHusserlofthereciprocalenvelopmentofpsychologyand phenomenologybutalso,morebroadly,factandessence.Thushemakesseveral detourstochroniclethestoryofHusserlsprofounddevelopmentawayfrom absoluteessentialism,forexamplewiththecaseoflanguage311.(PSM80) InPSM,whatiskeytonoteinallofthisisnotjustwhatMerleauPontysays butwhyheissayingit:hedrawsHusserlintohisownfightagainstthenaturalismof psychologyandtheempiricalsciences,invokeshimtomakehisowncaseindeed, todefendhisownphenomenologicalapproachtothequestionsathand.Itisinthis lightthatwecanappreciateMerleauPontysdescriptionofphenomenologyitselfas anegotiatedmeanbetweenskepticismandabsolutism.MerleauPontydoesnotso muchwanttomodifythephenomenologicalmethodasbringitintolivingcontact withtherestoftheintellectualconversation:
Husserlisseekingtoreaffirmrationalityatthelevelofexperience,withoutsacrificingthevast varietythatitincludesandacceptingalltheprocessesofconditioningwhichpsychology,sociology, andhistoryreveal.Itisaquestionoffindingamethodthatwillenableustothinkatthesametimeof
311ThusforthelaterHusserl,arguesMerleauPonty,Thereisnoquestionanymoreofconstructinga
logicoflanguage,auniversalgrammar,butratheroffindingalogicalreadyincorporatedinthe world.(PSM82)
151
theexternalitywhichistheprincipleofthesciencesofmanandoftheinternalitywhichisthe conditionofphilosophy(PSM52)
Husserltherebyfindstherootsofreasoninourexperience(PSM52)justas MerleauPonty,wemightadd,findshisownrootsinHusserl. VIisthehardestofMerleauPontysworkstoassessintermsofits relationshiptoHusserl.Partlythisisbecausetheworkisunfinished,withexplicit referencestoHusserllyinginalargenumberofWorkingNoteswhoseproper interpretationisanythingbutclear312;butalsobecauseitsreferencesorallusionsto HusserlarebynowsointerwoveninMerleauPontysphilosophicalimagination thattheycomeandgoveiledorunannounced.Thisisnotthecaseentirely:thelast pageofthefinalfamouschapterTheIntertwiningtheChiasm,forexample,has fulsomepraisefortheGermanfounder.313 Nonetheless,atleasttwoofthechapters,thefirstandthirdReflectionand InterrogationandInterrogationandIntuitioncanbereadfruitfullyascritical meditationsonHusserl.JustasonecouldeasilysaythatPSdealsprimarilywiththe phenomenologicalreductionandPSMwiththeeidetic,thesame,Ithink,canbesaid forchapters1and3oftheVI,respectively.Onceagainitbecomesclear,whenone seesitthisway,justhowsystematicMerleauPontysreadingandrereadingsof Husserltrulyare.ThesubstanceoftheVIchapterswillbebroughtoutthroughout thefollowingsection.
312IhavetriedpresentlytoavoidtheuseofthefragmentaryWorkingNotesthataccompanythese
314Againforthischapter,asfortherestofthisdissertation,Iamnotmakingadistinction,as
MerleauPontydidnot,betweenthephenomenologicalandthetranscendentalreductions,but ratheramtreatingthemasone.
153 givesusovertoourexistentialselfhood.Andthisiswhythephenomenological reductionbelongstoexistentialistphilosophy. IdontthinkweshouldundervaluethefactthatMerleauPontyendorsesthe phenomenologicalreduction.Indeed,heregardsitascentraltohisphilosophy.Itis, afterall,thereductionthatbringsustothenaturalattitudebeforenaturalism anditsblosseSachen.(PS163)Itiswhatallowsustoslackentheintentional threadswhichattachustotheworldevertootightlytoseeourselves.(PPxv)He laterdescribesthereductioninsimilartermsasthelink,whichisindeeda schism[,]establishedbylifebetweenourthoughtandourphysicalandsocial situation,addingthatitneverthelessneverleadsusinanywaytonegatetimeor passbeyonditintoarealmofpurelogicorpurethought.(PSM49)Inotherwords, then,MerleauPontyacceptseventheschismaticaspectofthereduction315,so longasitisnottakentomarkatotaldeparturefromthefinitudeoflivedhorizons. MerleauPontysreductionconsistsintwomovements:themovementout ofnaturethatis,themomentinwhichonebreaksoutofonesnatural condition,thepassiveslumberofeverydaylife;andthemovementbackintoit,that is,toarecognitionofonesfinitude.316Initially,throughbracketingandtheshift fromthenaturalattitudetothetranscendentalattitude,Iseeorgainpossession ofmyself;reflectionsharpensmyconsciousnessandbringsitintoself
315Indeed,MerleauPontyinsistselsewherethatthesensibleorderisbeingatadistance(PS1678)
Closelytiedupwiththephenomenologicalreductionisthedialecticofthe naturalattitudeandthetranscendentalattitude.MerleauPontysunderstanding oftheseattitudespreserveselementsofbothcontinuityanddiscontinuitybetween them,inkeepingwiththeparadoxicalnatureofthereduction.317Ontheonehand, thereductiontakesusbeyondnaturalattitude,butthisisonlyhalfthetruth.(PS 162)MerleauPontysconsideredjudgmentisthatItisthenaturalattitudewhich, byreiteratingitsownprocedures,seesawsinphenomenology.Itisthenatural attitudeitselfwhichgoesbeyonditselfinphenomenologyandsoitdoesnotgo beyonditself.(PS164)Thetranscendentalattitudeisnotabandonedordeclared nonsense;butoneattitudedoesnotrelatetotheotherasfalsetotrue.318Inthe
317MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollgedeFrance19521960.Tr.John
155 end,wemustembracethecontradictorycharacteristicswhich,saysMerleau Ponty,Husserlhimselfpurposefullyassignsitofthereduction.(PS161) ItistruethatMerleauPontycannotacceptsomeofwhatHusserlregardsto betheconsequencesofthereduction,suchastheprivilegedperchofabsolute (reflective)consciousness.319Afterall,theincompletenessofthereductionalso meansthelimitedness,inthatsense,ofreflectivethought.Butinreadingthelater MerleauPontyinparticular,itbecomesincreasinglycleartoonethathehas essentiallyfoldedthetranscendentalattitude,thestandpointofphenomenological consciousness,ontothatofselfconsciousnessorreflectionassuch.Thisisneither meresemanticsloppinessnoranobvioustransgressionagainstHusserlhimself.Itis aconsequenceofhisrejectionofthestrongdivisionbetweenpsychologyand philosophy,manifestthroughoutPSM,forexample;reflectionisnotmerelya naturalisticpsychicact,tobesharplydelineatedfromtheheroicheightsofthe transcendentalreduction.Giventhisreorientation,MerleauPontysattacksinVIon thephilosophyofreflection,ashecallsit(VI43),appeartobedirectednotat HusserlassuchbutatakindofidealismthatHusserlsometimesaffirms,butwhich stemsmoreoriginallyfromKant. Atfirst,thisisadmittedlynotobvious.Takethefollowingpassages:
Aphilosophyofreflection,asmethodicdoubtandasreductionoftheopennessupontheworldto spiritualacts,tointrinsicrelationsbetweentheideaanditsideate,isthriceuntruetowhatitmeans toelucidate:untruetothevisibleworld,tohimwhoseesit,andtohisrelationswiththeother visionaries.(VI39)
andagain:
319MerleauPontycritiquestheannihilationoftheworldexperiment(see,forexample,PS1734)but
otherwisegiveseventhedescriptionofthereductioninIdeasIawarmreception.(SeePSM56)
156
letusrepeatthatwereproachthephilosophyofreflectionnotonlyfortransformingtheworld intoanoema,butalsofordistortingthebeingofthereflectingsubjectbyconceivingitasthought andfinallyforrenderingunthinkableitsrelationswithothersubjectsintheworldthatiscommon tothem.(VI43)
ItmayseemnowthatMerleauPonty,afteryearsoffacesavingacrobatics,isnow finallyjettisoningHusserlforgood.ButthefactisthatnoneofMerleauPontys criticismsherearenew.MerleauPontyhasalreadyrejectedtranscendental idealisminPP,withitsassumptionsofthetransparencyoftheworldtoreflective thought.320Indeed,theghostofthePrefacehauntsthischapteroftheVIinmore waysthanthis:Itisessentialtothereflectiveanalysisthatitstartfromadefacto situation(VI44)andThesearchfortheconditionsofpossibilityisinprinciple posteriortoactualexperience(VI45)arenothingmorethanrestatementsofthe existentialturntakeninPPandalreadydiscussedabove. ButacarefulreadingofthischapterrevealsthatMerleauPontysrealtarget isKantianconstructivism,whichhegivescredittoHusserlforpiercingthrough:
ThisiswhatHusserlbroughtfranklyintotheopenthatis:everyefforttocomprehendthe spectacleoftheworldfromwithinandfromthesourcesdemandsthatwedetachourselvesfromthe effectiveunfoldingofourperceptionsandfromourperceptionoftheworld,thatweceasebeingone withtheconcretefluxofourlifeinordertoretracethetotalbearingandprincipalarticulationsofthe worlduponwhichitopens.(VI45)
320Alogicallyconsistenttranscendentalidealismridstheworldofitsopacityandits
transcendence.(PPxiii)
This,ineffect,isMerleauPontysidentificationofthelimitsofphenomenology andafulfilmentofhispromisetomakeofphenomenologyaphenomenologyof phenomenology.322ButbecausethefoundationMerleauPontyreferstoisinfact lessdeterminatethanreflection,andmoreofanexplorationofitsneverfully recoverableunderside,itisnotareplacementofwhatisprovidedbythe existentialHusserlbutisinfactmerelyafurtherdevelopmentofit.Merleau Pontysdisagreementiswithpurecorrelationofsubjectandobject,atleastinan idealisticorquasiidealisticconstruction(VI47),andagainwiththenotionofa universalmind(VI49).ButheseesHusserlasonthepathofquestioningthese:In recognizingthateveryreflectioniseideticand,assuch,leavesuntouchedthe problemofourunreflectedbeingandthatoftheworld,Husserlagreestotakeup theproblemwhichthereflectiveattitude323ordinarilyavoidsthediscordance betweenitsinitialsituationanditsends.(VI46;compare:PS163and179)
321MerleauPontyannounceshispositionclearlyalreadyinthePrefaceofPP:Descartesand
158 MerleauPontyfinallycomestotheideabywayofSchelling,itwould seem324thatphilosophyasreflectionmustultimatelygivewaytoathinkingof therichmiddlebetweentheknowableandtheunknowable,theidealworldof thoughtandtherealworldofwildbeing.Forthisisthespringofhumanspirit,the soiloftheself.RemarksToadvine,Thisstateofcontinualbeginning,oftheneedfor continualreexaminationoftheparadoxicalfoundationsofareflectionthatattempts tograspitsownunreflectiveorigins,couldbeconsideredtheorientingthemeof MerleauPontysownphenomenologicalmethod.(Toadvine240)Itcanscarcelybe missedthatthissortofmethodconvergeswithMerleauPontysownre examinationofHusserl,theoriginofphenomenologyitself,andthe(atleast hitherto)unreflected. B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction CommentatorsaredividedoverwhetherMerleauPontyacceptstheeidetic
159 end,wasdoingexactlythesame.ThisiswhyhecitestheHusserliandistinction betweenexactandmorphologicalessences(PSM67),theunlikenessof mathematicstophenomenology(PSM67),Husserlsownstrictparallelismbetween therealmsoftheeideticandtheempiricalandarandompassagetothiseffectin DiePhilosophiealsstrengeWissenschaft,(PSM72)andsoon.Furthermore: [Husserls]notionofanexperiencedessence,oraneideticexperience,containsin germtheconsequencesIhavejustdrawnfromit.(PSM72) WhatMerleauPontyiscommunicatingisashiftheseesinHusserlfroma purephilosophyofreflectionanorientationtowardsthelogical,theoretical, transcendental,eidetictoaphilosophyofexistenceinwhich,wefindout, reflectionplaysacrucialbutnonfoundational325role.ItisinthislightthatMerleau Pontyunderstandsboththephenomenologicalandeideticreductions.Totakethe latterfirst,MerleauPontyexplainsthatphenomenologyisaboutnotonlyessences butalsofacticity.Thisfollowsfromphenomenologysbeingaboutachieving directandprimitivecontactwiththeworld.(PPvii)Idealityisnowcharacterizedin purelyinstrumentalterms:theeideticreductionprevail[s]overfacticitythrough ideality,thoughtheprevailingisforthesakenotofidealitybutratherfora graspingofthethingsthemselvesthefishthatarecaughtinthefishermans net.SurelyMerleauPontyisrightthatwedonotreachthethingsbydwellingonly inessences.Wemaynotreachthethingsascompletelyaswewish,butthereis somethingbetweenabsoluteknowledgeandtotalignorance.Inthisrespectitis
325Inastrictlyontologicalsense,thatisreflectionisstillforMerleauPontythefoundationofthe
activityofphilosophy,sinceunreflectiveexperienceisknowntousonlythroughreflection(PP 49)Itisthissortofinsightthatsetsthestageforthelaternotionofhyperreflection.
160 helpfultorememberthatHusserlhimselfembracedaversionoftheterm empiricist,whichmusthavemeantthatheprivilegesfactsoveressences,butwas vaguelyawareofthefactthatreflectioncanonlyknowessenceshence engenderingthemostenduringepistemologicalparadoxofMerleauPontys meditations.326 Justwhatareessences?Essencesarethemannerandstyleofbeingonly:the SoseinandnottheSein.Andjustasthereisanessentialincompletenesswith respecttothephenomenologicalreduction,sothereisalimitalsoonimaginative variationthusthereisnopureeidos,nototalvariation.Furthermore,eidetic variationisnotjustdoneinphenomenology,butinallsciences.Inoneplace MerleauPontyadmits:InpresentingthematterasIhave,IampushingHusserl furtherthanhewishedtogohimself.(PSM72)MerleauPontywantstoadmitofa fundamentalhomogeneityoftheinductiveandessentialmodesofknowledge, whichHusserlalwaysmaintainedwasimpossible.ButHusserlsownthinking, includinghisfocusontheconcreteandlivedstreamoflife,forcesonusan inevitabledialecticoftheconceptofessence. AllofthisallowsMerleauPontyfinallytosay:
wecansaythattheproblemwithwhichwewereconcernedatthebeginning[ofPSM]mustwe beforfactorforessence,fortimeoreternity,forthepositivescienceofmanorphilosophy?was bypassedinthelaterthoughtofHusserl.Herehenolongerconsidersessenceasseparatedfromfact, eternityfromtime,orphilosophicthoughtfromhistory.(PSM93)
326SeePP57fn44
161 V.ConcludingReflections IbeganthischapterbysuggestinganintegralrelationshipbetweenMerleau PontysphilosophyandhisreadingofHusserl.Ihopetohaveshownthisthrough thecourseofmyrecapitulationofandcommentaryonthisreading,butthesemay nowbesupplementedandreinforcedwithsomeanalogies.Thus,MerleauPonty standstoHusserl,Iwanttosay,muchashumanity,inMerleauPontysHusserlian philosophy,standstotheworld,thatisthepreexistentLogos(PPxxiii)orthat jointingandframingofBeingwhichisbeingrealizedthroughman(PS181).Or again,MerleauPontyistoHusserlaslanguage(orlogosthethemeof philosophy)istotheprelanguageofthemuteworld(VI126),orfinally,asSpirit istoNature,thefirstfindingavoiceinthesecond,thesecondfindingitsdepthinthe first.Theholisticvisionthatemergeshereofmanandworld,spiritandnatureis onlyprefiguredorsketchedinoutlineinMerleauPontyswritings,butitis determinateenoughtoshowhowMerleauPontycouldhaveascribedsomuchofhis philosophy327inmyviewvalidlytoanotherphilosopher,Husserl,whoforhis partneverthelesswentsomuchofthetimeinacontrarydirection.MerleauPontys viewsofreciprocityandreversibility,identityanddifference,paradoxandthe betweentheyareallrelevanttoandimplicitinhisdevelopmentaland organicappropriationofHusserlianthought.
327ObviouslyIdonotmakeasharpdistinctionbetweenthephilosophiesoftheearlierandlater
MerleauPonty.Thematerialpresentedinthepresentchapteraloneafford,Ithink,ample(though perhapsnotsufficient)evidencethatthisisso.
162 IsMerleauPontyfinally,intheend,justamerereaderorcommentatorof Husserl?Thisisthewrongquestiontoask.ShouldPlotinusberelegatedtobeinga commentatorofPlatoandAristotle?ShouldAverrosbedismissedasa commentatorofAristotle?Surelygreatphilosophycanbedonethrough commenting,bringingasitwerenewtruthsintobeing,asMerleauPontyhimself putsit.Thecommentatorisnotlikelytobecelebratedasatrailblazer,butwithout goodcommentators,itisunlikelythatanycoherenttrailscouldbediscernedfrom thedense,sometimescontradictoryoutpouringofathinkerlikeHusserl.Allthe same,MerleauPontydoesnotmerelycommenthehasthetalenttodevelop,to takefurtherandradicalizeandseethehiddenimplicationsof,thetextsheanalyzes. Thetextsspeaktohim,andhespeaksback. MerleauPontysversionofphenomenologyhasbeendisavowedbycertain
Husserlians,butitmustbesaidthattheirHusserl,whileconsistentforthemost partwithHusserlsownselfdeclarationsofthenatureandconsciouslystated intentionsofhisownphilosophizing,isnotalwayseasytodefendphilosophically.A narrowinterpretationofHusserl,MerleauPontywouldargue,wouldfatefullyturn itsbackonHusserlsownunderlyingsensitivitytotheinadequaciesofhisown earlierconceptions,ashehimselfsurgedforward.Inotherwords,thestrict HusserlianwouldfallwellshortofHusserlsownlevel,tosaynothingofexpanding onhim!SomeHusserlianshaveofcourseembracedMerleauPonty,butselectively, ifonlytodemonstratethatHusserleitheranticipatedorfullyexplicatedthesame thingsMerleauPontydiscusses,andperhapsinanevenbetterway.MerleauPonty wouldofcoursehavebeenhappytoacknowledgehisdebt(egotismisnotoneofhis
163 vices),buthewouldalsoinsistthatHusserlhimselfremainstooinconsistentforus totrytorelyonhimexclusivelyasthevoiceofphenomenology.Therearetoo manystrainsinhim,anditisnecessarytoeditorialize,toeditandtobringtolight whatistrueandfalse,necessaryanddispensableinhisthinking. Thereareobviousbutfatefulconsequencestothissortofreadingofthe MerleauPonty/Husserlrelationship.IfweacceptMerleauPontysreadingof Husserl,weimplicitlyrejectmuchofHusserlsselfinterpretationhisstated intentions,andhisframingofthetranscendentalphenomenologicalproject.Butis thisnotfamiliarhermeneuticalterritory?Itisindeedaninvokingofthe hermeneutictoposofknowingthephilosopherbetterthanhe/sheknew himself/herself.Buteventhisisnotsosimple,since,onMerleauPontysaccount, HusserlalreadyknewwhatMerleauPontyknowsaboutHusserl,justnotwiththe sameclarityorunivocity.ItistoMerleauPontyslastingcreditthat,decadesbefore DonnWeltonsTheOtherHusserl328 ,theFrenchthinkerhadalreadypaintedavivid portraitoftheinnerconflictednessofHusserlsthought.Hehadalreadyidentified andembracedtheotherHusserl,whoheknewalreadyastheprejection(my word,butMerleauPontianinspirit)ofhimself.ItistruethatMerleauPontydoes notfeelhimselfconstrainedbythehistoryoftraditionalinterpretationof Husserlsworks,orbywhatHusserlmayhavebelievedhehimselfwas accomplishingthroughhisownphilosophizing.ButinthiswayMerleauPontys attitudetowardsHusserlismuchlikethatofahealthychildtowardsitsparent:
328See:Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.
Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000.
Traditionally,theplausibilityofMerleauPontysreadingofHusserlhasbeen thoughttoturnonthis:whetheroneseesHusserlasaselfdivided,Janusfaced figure,workingprogressivelytoanadequatelytranscendentalexistential conceptionofphenomenology,orwhetheroneseeshimratherasamoreorless consistentOlympianthinkerofabsoluteconsciousness.ButwhatIhavetriedtodo, inmysmallway,istosayratherthatwhatmakesMerleauPontysreadingplausible isanacceptanceofMerleauPontysownstyleandsubstanceofthought.Butthis bringsoutakindofspecialparadox,wherebythelinebetweenthetwothinkers becomeswhollyblurred,exactlyasifwewereenteringtheintermondeMerleau Pontywritesaboutinthelaterworks.330ForifMerleauPontyisrightthatheis(in somanywords)aHusserlianthinkeratleast,athinkerofHusserlsinner thoughtsthenitturnsoutthattoacceptMerleauPontysHusserlunderthe bannerofacceptinghim(MerleauPonty)istohavealreadyacceptedHusserl.This
329Themes,p.83 330HeusestheterminVI(48,84)ThetermismentionedalreadyatthetimeofPP,butinaslightly
differentsense.SeealsothereferencetointercorporealityinPS(168)
166
ChapterFour:MerleauPontysMatureOntologyofNature
I.Introduction SomeofMerleauPontysmostimportantfinalwritings,Iwouldargue,are foundinTheVisibleandtheInvisible332,whichMerleauPontyhadbeenworkingon asamajorstatementofhisphilosophyatthetimeofhissuddendeath.Thegoalof thepresentchapteristoconveysomeoftheessentialfeaturesofMerleauPontys ontology,asdevelopedintheaforementionedwork,aswellashisincreasingly dialecticalunderstandingofnatureandspirit,allthewhileemphasizingthe (semi)naturalisticelementtherein.Accordinglyitwillundertakeadetailed examinationoftheNaturelecturesof19561960(astheycomedowntous,mostly intheformofmeticulousstudentnotes),inconjunctionwithVI,exploringtheways inwhichMerleauPontythinksthroughthequestionsofbeing,consciousness,and theirreciprocalrelationshipwiththehelpofanintensiveinvestigationofNature, particularlyinthebiologicalsciencesandthehistoryofphilosophy. MerleauPontystreatmentofnatureistothisdaylittleknown,despitethe factthattheNaturelecturescollectivelycompriseavolumeofroughlyequallength
331MerleauPonty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollgedeFrance.Compiledandwithnotes
167 toVI.Itistruethatthelectureswerenotintendedtobepublishedasabook preciselyintheformwehavethem,butitisalsotruethatMerleauPontyintended tousemuchofthematerialfromthemaspartsofhispublishedwritings,including sectionsofVIitself.333FromadetailedexaminationofbothtextsIconcludethat MerleauPontysoftencommenteduponrejectionofdualismwhichofcourse hardlydistinguisheshiminthehistoryofphilosophybothbeforeandafter Descartesisinfactmostproperlycharacterizedasaphilosophyof complementarity,onethatseekstounderstandtheprinciplesofidentityand difference,bothinthebroadestofontologicalcontextsaswellasnarrowerones (suchastheontologyofthebody),inawaythatdoesjusticetotherolethateachof themplaysinthestructurationofBeing,thatis,thestructureofthe visible/invisibleworld.Thisdiscussionwillalsotakeuswellintothefifthchapter anddissertationconclusion,whichascertaintheupshotofMerleauPontys dialecticforthephenomenologicalmethod. ItismyviewthatMerleauPontysphenomenologyisdialecticalbutina whollynewsense,onethatisdrivenbytheexigenciesofthinkingthenatural originsofsubjectivity(inthesenseofspirit,orhumanconsciousness)fromwithin, andoftherebyrecastingthephenomenologicalprojectasonethatinheresin ontologyinabroadersense.FromthecourseandprogressionoftheNature lectures,onecanseeMerleauPontysthoughtgrowmoreorganicistconcerned
333Seeforexample:N,xvi(fromtheTranslatorsIntroductionbyRobertVallier).Someofthe
168 withtheprincipleofwholenessanditsrealizationintheorganicformsoflife. OfcoursethenaturalismMerleauPontyespousesisnotthenaturalism embracedbyscientificallymindedmodernwriters,whoseformwealsofindin Husserlswritings,butanother,moreatoncephenomenologicallyrootedand romanticallyinspiredkind,whichdevelopsthroughouttheNaturelectures explicitlyandintherestofMerleauPontysotherworkimplicitly.Ontologywill,itis true,takeprecedence,inacertainway,butnotbecauseitisthefoundationof phenomenology,inthewayHusserlconceivedphenomenologytobethefoundation ofontology.MerleauPontysintentionisnottoinvertthisorderofdependence,but rathertomakephenomenologyanswertoitsexistentialsituation,whichnowcomes tomean,tobeartheshadowofitsnatural,wild,andprereflectiveorigins. II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLectures A.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andtheProjectof Ontology IntheNaturelectures,MerleauPontydeclares,Theontologicalproblemis thedominantproblem,towhichallotherproblemsaresubordinated.(N134)What exactlyistheontologicalproblem?MerleauPontydoesnotanswerthisquestion directly,butwehavesometellingclues.WhatMerleauPontywantstoavoid,he indicates,areatleastthreeisms:Naturalism,humanism,theismThesethree wordshavelostallclearmeaninginourculture,andtheyceaselesslypassintoone
ThereferencetoHusserlisclearlypositive.Whatisneededisanalternative ontologyclearlyinspiredbyHusserlianphenomenology,particularlythegenetic varietytothatofobjectivism.ThequestionofNatureissupposedtofitrightinto thisproject.Theproblem,inshort,ishowtoforgethisnewontology,howto overcomethestrabismofWesternontologysinceDescartes(N165),butalso,to someextent,ofphenomenologyitself(N72),whichinitsidealist(i.e.,Husserlian) formisstillsomewhathaunted,wemightsay,byDescartesghost. VIhasproventobeastumblingblockforsome,asitcancomeacrossasa curiousamalgamofphilosophyandpoetry.Attimeshighlyesoteric(especially whentheworkingnotesarefactoredin,someofwhicharebrilliantlyclear,others allbutinscrutable),itleavesreaderswithacertainsenseofpuzzlement,even bewitchment,throughitsextensiveuseofmetaphorandnewterminology.Agood waytoappreciateMerleauPontysincreasinglynuancedandtechnicalexplorations, hisnewphenomenologicalontology,isinfacttoconsulthisinvestigationsofnature. Ofcourse,thesearenotatallsufficientinthemselvestoexposeMerleauPontys ontologicalproject,sincetheyareintendedexplicitlytobepreparatory334to
334ExplainsMerleauPonty:theontologyofNatureasthewaytowardontologythewaywe
preferbecausetheevolutionoftheconceptofNatureisamoreconvincingpropaedeutic,[sinceit]
170 somethingelse,namelyafullerengagementwithsomeofthethemesMerleauPonty ismorewellknownfor,includingperceptionandembodiment.MerleauPontys treatmentofthesetopicsintheNaturelecturesisindirect,forexamplethroughthe studyofanimalUmweltenorthestudyoftheontologicalimplicationsoftheir physiology. Thereareotherinterestingdifferencesbetweenthetwotexts,when comparedsidebyside.ThuswhileVIemphasizesdiscontinuitybetweenpastand presentphilosophyandspeaksofradicalrenewal(VI83,165),etc.,thelectures reflecttheflipside,offeringacriticalcommentarythatestablisheslinkstothepast andseekstorectifyit.(N186)Throughacriticalengagementwiththe philosophicaltraditionandexaminationofthescienceofhisday,MerleauPontyin thelattertextstrivesforabalancingofoppositesand,ineffect,anewequilibrium, betweentheoreticalpoleslikefinalism(teleology)andmechanism. ThemultidisciplinaryNatureseminarscoveravastamountofterrain, exploringnolessthanthescientific,theological,andphilosophicalunderpinningsof Westernnotionsofnature,animality,God,andthehumanmind.Throughanearly rejectionoftheviewsofLaplaceakindofstandinformodernscientificviews analogoustoAugustinesroleatthestartofWittgensteinsPhilosophical InvestigationsMerleauPontyrevealshimselfintheNaturelecturestobea championoftemporality,becoming,andholicity,asagainstan(exclusiveorlop sided)emphasisonspatiality,being,andanalyticity.335 Inthiswayheisworkingin
171 obviousconcertwithlifephilosophyaswellasfiguressuchasBergsonand Whitehead,onlynowinamoredeeplyphenomenologicalregisterthat,onceagain, comesmoresignificantlytotheforeinVInotwithstandingthosereadingsofthe textthat,ratherunjustifiablyinmyopinion,downplayitsphenomenological character.ThecontentsofVIinfactbearcontinuityinsubstance,ifnotalwaysin style,toThePhenomenologyofPerception336anditsquestionsofmindandbody, perceptionandreflection,language,andthenatureofphenomenologyandHusserls thought.However,thelattertextismoreintentthanever,itseems,todescribethe ultimatenatureofrealityitselforatleast,todescribethetaskofinterrogation thatcirclesaroundthisontologicalultimacy.ThequestionsofBeingandNature cometotheforefrontinthelaterphilosophy;theissuesofperception,embodiment, intersubjectivity,etc.,aretreatedasillustrativeordisclosiveofthedepthsofBeing andhumaninvolvementinit.TheinfluenceofHeideggerisunmistakable,butfor themostpartunspoken;thisisprobablybecauseitismoresoHeideggerianthemes (manyofwhichareanchoredinHusserl)thatMerleauPontyappropriates,andless soHeideggerianconclusions.ItisalsoimportanttorealizethatMerleauPontyhas beeninterestedinontology,particularlythenaturespiritquestion,fromthefirst; TheStructureofBehaviorisakindof(evidentlyinadequate)phenomenological ontologyinitsownright.337
336MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:Routledge 337MerleauPonty,Maurice.TheStructureofBehavior.Tr.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963.For
andKeganPaul,1962(HereafterPP.)
agooddiscussionofthattextwithrespecttoMerleauPontysphilosophyofnature,see:Toadvine, Ted.MerleauPontysPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2009
172 Afterthatearlierwork,however,MerleauPontytookhispointofdeparture moreexplicitlyfromHusserlandthephenomenologicalreduction,aswehave alreadyseen.PPisessentiallymotivatedbytheparadoxofperceptionwherebythe worldthethingsbecomereally(andnotmerelysubjectively,asthrougha representation)availabletome,despitethefactthattheyaretranscendenttome. Thisspecificallyphenomenologicalparadoxmadeitnecessarytorethinkthereal natureoftheIthinkoregowhoperceivesfarfrombeingadisembodiedcogito, theImustbeabody,thebodysubject,whoseverybeingisworldlyinthesame sensethattheworldsis.Bodyandworldformacircuit,asystemofreciprocity, which,aswewillsee,MerleauPontycontinuesinthelaterwritingstomeditateon intensively,thoughwithreferencetowhathetermsanessentialfoldorhollow inBeing.338 However,onitsown,PPis,inacertainrespect,lockedinitsownformof Husserlinheritedsubjectivism,permittingtheworldtoariseinconsciousness, albeitpreintentionally(orthroughadeepermotororoperativeintentionality), butnotexplainingatallhowitisthatthisworld,ortranscendentBeing,couldand doesgiverisetoconsciousnessand,morebasically,toorganiclife.That phenomenologyinstructsitselfexplicitlytoavoidthiskindofquestiondoesnot preventMerleauPontyfrombroachingitfulsomelyanyway.Duponddescribes
338HerearetwoofthemanyinstancesinwhichMerleauPontymakesuseofthisidea,bothtaken
Ifitistruethatphenomenologyabstainsonprincipledgroundsfromquestions aboutlifeorbeingbeforeconsciousnessandgoingagainstthis,tosomeextent,is thesignificanceofaninquiryintoNaturefromMerleauPontysphenomenological vantagepointthisdoesnotmeanitcannotcontemplatetheparadoxicaldistance (unknowability,opacity,depth)ofNatureasthesourceoflifeandthoughtandyet alsothecontinuityofconsciousnesswithNatureitselfor,putdifferently,the prolongationofconsciousnessinthethingsthatMerleauPontyclaimsto characterizevision,forexample.(VI271)MerleauPontyspendsagooddealoftime thinkingaboutboththeactivityorautoproductionofsenseinandbyNatureitself, ontheonehand(thisismostevidentthroughtheactivitiesoforganiclife,whose seeminglymiraculousdevelopmentalprocessesdefycausalexplanation),andthe naturalityofhumanexistence,asrevealedthroughtheintertwiningofbodyand worldalreadylaidoutforus;hefurtherconsiderstheimplicationsofthisunityfor thereconceptualizationofthequestionsofsubject/objectandintersubjectivity(the latterofwhichwewillbeabletosaylittle,unfortunately,inthepresentchapter).
339Dupond,Pascal.DictionnaireMerleauPonty.Paris:Ellipses,2008.(p.153;mytranslation)
HereafterDupond.
174 B.DefiningNature Aswehavealreadyseen,MerleauPontyisthoroughlyopposedtoconceiving Natureasobject,includinglifelessmassofmatter,andsoon.Whatitis,initself, isnottheinitselfofthetradition,strictlyopposedtoaforitself,butratherwhat MerleauPontycalls(afterSchelling)wildBeing,orthebarbaricprinciple,which ismorebasicthanthesubjectobjectdistinction(similarlytotheflesh,arelated notion,aswewillseebelow).(VI200)Thewildnessofnatureisnotsuchthatitis somethingthatmustbemoldedorinformedinaKantianwayinordertobe madesenseoutof,butratherthatitcontainsallpotentialities,itisallthings,but withouthavingbecome,quaNatureitself,anyofthem.(N212)Attheoutsetofthe lectures,MerleauPontyoffersseveralimportantindicationspertainingtohis developingconceptofnature.HereIwillquotetheminfullandthencommenton subsequently:
Thereisnaturewhereverthereisalifethathasmeaning,butwhere,however,thereisnota thought;hencethekinshipwiththevegetative.(N3) Natureiswhathasameaning,withoutthismeaningbeingpositedbythought:itisthe autoproductionofmeaning.(N3) [Nature]hasaninterior,itisdeterminedfromwithin;hencetheoppositionofnaturalto accidental.Yetnatureisdifferentfromman:itisnotinstitutedbyhimandisopposedtocustom,to discourse.(N3) Natureistheprimordialthatis,thenonconstructed,thenoninstituted;hencetheideaofan eternityofnature(theeternalreturn),ofasolidity.Itisoursoil[sol]notwhatisinfrontofus, facingus,butrather,thatwhichcarriesus.(N3)
175 Thesentimentsexpressedinthesefourquotationsareclearlymeanttosetthe directionoftheinvestigationsthataretofollow.Torecapitulate,theydescribe Natureinthefollowingpositiveandnegativeterms:1)possessingorembodyinga meaning,2)producingameaninginoroutofitself,3)nothavingtodowithorbeing positedbythought,4)possessinganinteriority,5)beingdistinguishablefromthe artificial,conventional,ormanmade,6)beingeternalandprimordial,and7)lying notbeforeusbutratherbeneathusand,asMerleauPontywillalsosay,within us.(N2123)Theseareadmittedlyschematicproperties,anditisnotyetclearhow oriftheyinterlock,butalreadytheyrevealquiteabit.MerleauPontysconception ofNatureisthatofanontologicalground(ofsorts)thatisnonobjective(cf.its interiority)andradicallyprimordialandthusprereflective:atypeof englobingbeinginwhichwediscoverourselvesalreadyinvestedpriortoall reflection.(N84)Thatis,itisbothnoninstituted(areferencetoHusserlsnotion ofStiftung,institutionorestablishment)andessentiallyso(itisnoninstitutable). Butevenmoreimportant,itispresupposedineveryinstitution,ineveryhuman project,indeed,inembodimentandperceptionthemselves.Attimes,MerleauPonty singlesoutthispropertyofNaturemost,namelyitshauntingpresencebyabsence, or,temporallyspeaking,itsbeingapermanentpast,alwaysbehindus. WhatMerleauPontyistryingtogetathereisperhapsbestseenthroughhis critiqueofBergson,whoheclearlyadmiresbutalsofaultsforhavingmissedthisall importantfeatureofthenatural.MerleauPontyattributesthisblindnessof Bergsonstoacertainpositivism.MerleauPontybeginshiscritiqueby acknowledgingfavorablythatBergsonpositsconsciouslyaparadoxinherentto
176 perception:Beingisanteriortoperception,andthisprimordialBeingisconceivable onlyinrelationtoperception.(N55)ButhegoesontocriticizeBergsonfor makingofthisprehumanabeingwithwhichwecoexist.(N58)Therecanbeno simultaneityofreflection(orintuition)withNatureamajorpointthatMerleau Pontywillstressagainandagain,comingfromtheepistemologicalsideofthe questionofNature.MerleauPontysverdict:InBergson,theofficialpositionof positivismalsoruinstheideaofNature.(N70) Husserl,MerleauPontyclaims,improvesonBergsoninthisregard,ina passagethatcallstomindwhatwehavealreadysaidaboutthecontinuityofworld andconsciousness:
HusserlrehabilitatedtheideaofNaturebythisideaofjointuretoacommontruththatsubjects wouldcontinuebutofwhichtheywouldnotbetheinitiators.Allthathappensisnotexplainedby interiority,orbyexteriority,butbyachancethatistheconcordancebetweenthesetwogivensandis assuredbyNature.(N78)
177
TheconceptofNaturedoesnotevokeonlytheresidueofwhathadnotbeenconstructedbyme,but alsoaproductivitywhichisnotours,althoughwecanuseitthatis,anoriginaryproductivitythat continues[tooperate]beneaththeartificialcreationsofman.Itbothpartakesofthemostancient, andissomethingalwaysnew.Natureis,asLucienHerrsaidinhisarticlededicatedtoHegelinLa grandeencyclopdie,anuntamedthing:Natureistherefromthefirstday.Natureisnotexhaustedor usedupbytheveryfactthatendures.(N125)
Thus,partofwhatlendsopacitytonatureisitsneverceasingcapacityforinvention andselfrenewal.ThisissomethingBergsonofcoursewashighlyimpressedwithas well(nottomentionWhitehead,whoMerleauPontyfavorablycommentsonandfor whomtheprincipleofcreativityistheultimatecategory,highereventhan divinity).Asisclearfromthepassagecitedabove,therelationofnatural productivitytohumancreativityforMerleauPontyresemblesthatassignedby someoftheGermanRomanticstoart.340Likeartisticcreation,indeed,Natures autoproductionofmeaningisopen,fluid,andalwaysunfinishedapoint MerleauPontymakesthroughareferencetoHeraclitus:Heraclitussaysthat natureisachildatplay;itgivesmeaning,butinthemannerofachildwhois playing,andthismeaningisnevertotal.(N84) Finally,MerleauPontysnotionofNatureshouldbeunderstoodinrelationto thatofspiritmind,consciousness,language,thought.Towardtheendofthe Naturecoursesheoffersthefollowingtellingrecap:Oursubject:RegardingNature, theconcernwastostudyitasanontologicalleafandinparticular,regardinglife,
340ThoughIcannotexplorethisconnectionfullyhere,therearemanyotherindicationsthatMerleau
DupondfurtherexplainsthesenseinwhichMerleauPontysattitudetowards NaturevisvisSpiritshouldbeappreciatedhistorically:[MerleauPontyinverts] themovementofthehistoryofmodernthought,whichentersphilosophyviaspirit, [andstartsfrom]nature,inallowinghimselfthepossibilityofcomprehendingthe emergence,thesurgissementofspirit(Dupond70,mytranslation) MerleauPontysprincipalhistoricalinspirationconcerninghisconceptionof NatureappearstobeSchelling.Indeed,MerleauPontyseemstoidentifyatleast partiallywithromanticnaturalismasopposedtoscientificnaturalisma distinctionhehimselffitfullymakes.(N135)Thushearguesthatwemustpreserve theideaofsavagenaturefromtheRomantics,savingitforexamplefromKantian humanistdesignsofathinkerlikehisowncontemporaryNeoKantianLon Brunschwig.(N35)WhatMerleauPontyfindsmostimpressiveaboutSchellings notionofNaturearethesamethingshetendstoemphasizeinhisownexplorations ofit,forexampleitsdescriptionaswildBeingthathauntsconsciousnessasan irrecoverableground,aswellastheideaofthesubjectiveobjectivethatNature
Scientificnaturalism,asthistermiswidelytaken,ofcoursewoulddenybothof theseconclusions.ItdoesnotseethesenseinwhichwearetheparentsofNature becauseitdeniesanyontologicalorconstitutionalroletoperception(fearing idealism),anditdoesnotthinkofhumanbeingsastheseatofNaturesown reflexivitybecauseithastacitlyacceptedtheCartesianprincipleofthepure exteriority,andhencedeadness,ofnaturalbeing.Thereisnoautoproductionin Nature,thereareonlycausalmechanisticprocessesgovernedbythelawsof nature,setinmotionbythemysteriousburstofenergycalledtheBigBang. Ofcourse,thereisalwaysthedangerofanthropomorphizingnature, makingitintoakindofintelligenceofconsciousness,whichMerleauPontyiswell awareof:IfNatureisnotanobjectofthought,thatis,asimplecorrelativeofa thought,itisdecidedlynotasubjecteither,andforthesamereason:itsopacity,its enveloping.Itisanobscureprinciple.(N120)MerleauPontysNatureisnot, therefore,likeHegelsSpirit,thatis,aselfthatfindsitselfreflectedbacktoitself
341Compare:NotonlymustNaturebecomevision,buthumanbeingmustalsobecomeNature(N
47)Andnoticethephraseologyhere:Becomingnatureofmanwhichisthebecomingmanof nature.(N185)
Thethemeofnoncoincidenceofreflectionandobjectofreflectionisofcoursea majoroneinMerleauPontyslaterontology(andepistemology)generally,lyingat therootofhisconceptionofhyperreflectionandthemethodofinterrogation. WhatMerleauPontyfinds,inotherwords,isthatSchellingsisaphenomenologyof prereflexiveBeing(N41)thateffectsareflectiononwhatisnotreflection.(N 45)ThusMerleauPontysownparticularfascinationwithSchellingdoesnotlie simplywiththelattersantiCartesianismbutalso,onemightsay,withhisanti Kantianism(andantiidealismgenerally).343Schelling,likeMerleauPonty,denies thatconsciousnessiscoextensivewithmeaning.(Husserl,withgenetic phenomenologyandtheconceptofthelifeworldlyingbeneaththeconstructions
342TheseideasreappearinreferencetoWhiteheadsphilosophy.Itisthisstubbornnessthat
investigatefrontally,sotospeak,whichiswhatallowsMerleauPontytobeginto
344HegeldrewcopiouslyfromtheyoungerSchellingbutfamouslycriticizedthelatterinthepreface
WhatMerleauPontymeansbyscienceisbroadlyencompassesallcontrolled, observationbasedproceduraldisciplines,includingpsychology. MerleauPontysuseofscienceisextremelysubtleandsophisticated.It certainlydoesnotconsistofasimpleappropriationofthescientificmethod,butis insteadaninterrogationofexperiencethedomaincommontophilosophy(atleast asphenomenology),science,andevenreligion,art,andliterature(MerleauPonty famouslyturnstopaintersandwritersforinspiration,andtheNaturelecturesare noexceptioninthisregard,asdemonstratedbyanextendeddiscussionofProust therein).Thoughheundertakesanoverviewofthephysicalsciences,including relativitytheoryandquantummechanics,ofwhichwewillsayabitmorelateron, heprimarilyexaminestheresearchesofscientistswhofocusonanimalityand behavior,familiaroldthemesinMerleauPontyswork. MerleauPontysmethodisnotinductive.Philosophydoesnotsimply generalizefromresults,ifthisisindeedwhatscientistsdo;itinterpretsscience accordingtophilosophicalcategorieswhoselegitimacydependsnotmerelyon
Andagain:
Theconcernofthephilosopheristosee;thatofthescientististofindafoothold.Thephilosopher mustseebehindthebackofthephysicistwhatthephysicisthimselfdoesnotsee.(N867)
346Thereisalsohereadialecticofthenegativeandthepositivewithrespecttotheproperroleof
science.Forexample,onecanfindMerleauPontyonmorethanoneoccasionstressingthenegative roleofscienceinhelpingtoeliminatefalseoremptypossibilities.See:N,100,106.
184 Dichtung)mightbeasecretknowledgeof(oraccessto)Beingthateludesscientific andmetaphysicalunderstanding.347Thusitissimplyamatterofhavingareading ofscienceitselfasacertain(reduced)ontologyinthebroadercontextoftherelation withthemostprimordialbeing,thatis,withNatureitself.(N206) Oneofthemorechallengingsections(atleastforphilosophers!)ofthe Naturelecturesisitslongassessmentofthebiologyofhisday.Agreatdealof groundiscoveredinashortamountoftime,allthemoreimpressiveasMerleau Pontyishardlystingywithdetails.348 Whatisthepointofthisstudyofanimality, accordingtoMerleauPonty?Thekeylinesinthisrespectarethese:
Theorganismisnotdefinedbyitspunctualexistence;whatexistsbeyondisatheme,astyle,all theseexpressionsseekingtoexpressnotaparticipationinatranscendentalexistence,butina structureofthewhole.Thebodybelongstoadynamicofbehavior.Behaviorissunkintocorporeity. Theorganismdoesnotexistasathingendowedwithabsoluteproperties,asfragmentsofCartesian space.Anorganismisafluctuationaroundnorms,whichareeventsenframedbyastructurethat wouldnotberealizedinanotherorder,buthasrelationswiththeseevents.(N183)
347Comparewiththeseremarksfromaworkingnote:Thesearchforawildviewoftheworld
nowiselimitsitselftoareturntoprecomprehensionortoprescience.Areturntoprescienceisnot thegoal.theprescientificisonlyaninvitationtocomprehendthemetascientificandthislastisnot nonscience.(VI182)ItistruethatMerleauPontyhimself,atonepoint,identifieshisownBeing withHeideggers.Butthemethodologicaldifferencehasdeeperimplications:byinvolvingnatural science,nottomentionmetaphysicalthinkerslikeLeibniz,Schelling,Whitehead,andBergson, MerleauPontyisunderminingtheHeideggeriansuspicionofnaturalismthelatterinherited, arguably,fromcertainfeaturesofHusserls(andKants)transcendentalistframingof phenomenology. 348Thoughitwouldrequireacertainamountofbiologicalexpertisetodeterminethecontemporary validityofthescienceMerleauPontydealswith,muchofitconcernssimple(thoughsystematic) observationofanimalbehavior,inwhichinterpretationplaysasignificantrole.
MerleauPontyspendsagreatdealofattentionononeparticular1929study byCoghill,ontheaxolotllizard.349Theaxolotlisaverylonglizard,aboutseven inches,whichasatadpolelivesinthewater,then,onceithasfourlegs,developson land.(N140)Whatiscuriousabouttheanimal(whichisreallymoreofa paradigmaticcasethanananomaly)isthewaythatitsanatomicaldevelopments mysteriously(andnoncausally)parallelitsadaptedbehaviors;thereseemstobeno strictlycausalphysiologicalexplanationofthecoordination.Thelizards embryology,recountedbyMerleauPontyinpainstakingdetail,reallysuggests,for CoghillandMerleauPonty,that,Areferencetothefuturealreadyexistsinthe embryo.[Thus]Wecannotdefinetheanimalbyitsimmediatefunctioning:herethe apparatushasmeaningonlyforafuture.(N144)Forexample,theorderofthe nervouscephalocausaldevelopmentenvelops[i.e.,anticipates]swimming;thereis
349Thisbook[AnatomyandtheProblemofBehavior]hasstillnotbeenexceeded,butwehaventyet
measuredallitsweight.(N140)
186 thepossibleintheorganism.Thisnotionofthepossible,awhatitcandothatis realizedatthesametimeasthelizarddevelopsphysiologically,alreadyplacesus, MerleauPontypointsout,beyondthephysiologicaldefinitionoftheorganismby itsrealfunctioning.(N144)MerleauPontyseesheretheimportanceofasenseof thetotalityoftheorganism,onethatisimmanentalreadyintheorganisms behavioralaswellasanatomicaldevelopment,evenintheearliestphases.Buthe doesnotwanttosuggestasimpleteleology,forreasonsthatwillbecomecleareras weproceed. ItisusefulinallofthistohavebeforeonesmindoneofMerleauPontys
favoriteimagesormetaphorsforthekindofwholenessortotalitythathehasin mind,namelythatofthemelody.Themelodyisametaphorfortheorganism; indeed,MerleauPontyadaptsitfromfamousbiologistandethologistJakobvon Uexkll,whosaysoftheNaturfaktorhisownexplanatorynotionfororganic developmentthatitisnotanentelechybutamelodysingingitself.(N173)What iskeyaboutthemelodyisthis:Atthemomentwhenthemelodybegins,thelast noteisthere,initsownmanner.(N174)Thisisclearenough:afirstnoteofa melodyisnotthefirstnotewithoutthecompletemelodysbeingatleastimplied evenifnotyetfullythoughtout,sincethemelodymaybeinthemiddleofbeing created!350(ThisofcourseisoneofthereasonsthatMerleauPontyopposes teleologyorfinalism:thatitpresupposesacompletenessthatdoesnotmake intelligibletheimperfectionsoftheprocessesofeithernaturalproductivityor
350Thereisaconnectionherewiththeflesh.See:ThenpastandpresentareIneinander,each
envelopingenvelopedandthatitselfistheflesh.(VI268)
suggeststhatperceptionishelpful:Wefindmodelsofthisideaoftotalityinthe worldofperception.Forexample,
Psychologydoeseasilywhatsciencefindsdifficulttodo,namelytoallowforanorganizingprinciple withintotality.Ineffect,perceptiondoesnotgiveusthethings,butwhatwesee.Inthephenomenal milieu,nothingimpedesthewholefrombeingotherthanthesumofthepartswithoutbeingforall thatatranscendententity.(N153)
188 why,asitwere,thiswhyisanopen,groping,andincompleteone.MerleauPonty callsonHegelsimageofthecyclonetoillustratewhathehasinmind:Hegel alreadycomparedlifetoacyclone.Thecycloneisnothingotherthanwater,butits formisnotexplainedbywater.Wemustnotseekanorganictotalitybehindthe observablephenomena(N152),anymorethanwewouldseektoreducethewhole toitsindividualcomponents.ThusMerleauPontyconcludes,Theorganism wouldnotbeatranscendenttotality,anymorethanitwouldbeatotalityby summation.351 Thefactthatorganictotalityisnotanchoredinapositiveprinciple,suchas
life(vitalism)oranentelechy(Aristotelianism),resonatesthroughouttheNature lecturesinanumberofways.ThusMerleauPontysconceptoflifeisessentiallya reactionagainstvitalistpositivismagain,astypifiedbyBergsonaswellas,as always,scientificnaturalism.Thushepronouncesthatitisnotapositivebeing, butaninterrogativebeingwhichdefineslife.(N156)Indeed,MerleauPonty repeatedlystressesthisnegativeprinciplewithintheorganism.(N155)What doeshemeanbythis?Thenegativeprinciple,heexplainssomewhatobliquely,is lessidentitywithselfthannondifferencewithself.Thisabsencebecomesafactor onlybynegationofitsownnegation.ButunlikewhatisfoundinHegel,thedouble negationneverbecomesresolvedintoaconcretewhole,suchasLife,God,Spirit, orDerBegriff.InthecaseofaHegelianism,MerleauPontyobservescritically,
351ThereareseveralstunningholisticmetaphorsandimagesinVI,forexamplethatofmirrors
facingoneanother,inwhichwefindacouplemorerealthaneitherof[themirrorsindividually]. (VI139)
189
LifewouldbeSpiritinitself,andSpiritwouldbelifeforitself.ButlifeisnotyetSpiritinitself.We findinHegelthesameretrospectiveillusionasinAristotle.Tograsplifeinthethingsistograspa lackinthethingsassuch.(N157)
WhatMerleauPontyseemstomeanishere1)thattheorganismlacksaninitself, andhence(obviously)cannotbetheinitselfofSpirit,and2)thatthislack constitutes(orisaconditionof)whatitmeanstobealive.Thisnegativityis intertwinedwithacertaininteriority;forthereisanaturalnegativity,an interiorityofthelivingorganism(N210)Butthisisnottosaythatlifeisafor itself,aconsciousness.JustasNaturewassaidtobeneithersubjectnorobject,the sameholdsfortheorganismassuch.(WemightrecallthatHusserlstruggledwith thisveryissueinIdeasII,whendiscussinganimalityandthesoul.)Butthis interiorityhastodowiththesymbolicdepthoflivingbeings,ameaning generativitywhichisreflectedinthestructureofbehavior(andthequasiinteriority oftheUmwelt352),notinthepresenceofa(substantial)consciousness.Comparing machinesandanimals(exceptingthelimitcaseasitwereofthesimplestof organisms,whichMerleauPontycallsanimalmachines),thephilosopher
352Inadditiontoorganicholism,MerleauPontyassignsaparticularimportancetotheconceptofthe
Umwelt,asdevelopedbylegendaryethologistJakobvonUexkll.(N167)Theuntranslatableterm (whichwe,followingKersten,hadearliertranslatedasthesurroundingworldinreferenceto HusserlsnotioninIdeasII),isdefinedbestthroughMerleauPontysowndescriptionsofitandits significance.Hedescribesitas[marking]thedifferencebetweentheworldsuchasitexistsinitself, andtheworldastheworldofthelivingbeing.Thatis,itisbeyondthedistinctionoftheobjective andthesubjective.Essentially,itistheworldofananimalananimallifeworld,ineffect.The Umweltistheworldimpliedbythemovementoftheanimal,andthatregulatestheanimals movementsbyitsownstructure.352(N175)Andagain:[It]existsforthebehavioroftheanimal,but notnecessarilyinitsconsciousness;itistheenvironmentofbehaviorasopposedtothegeographical environment.(UexkllhimselflabelstheUmweltofhigheranimalstheGegenwelt.(N172))The Umweltiskeytotheexplanationofanimalbehaviorbecausebetweenthesituationandthe movementoftheanimal,thereisarelationofmeaningwhichiswhattheexpressionUmwelt conveys.(N175)Andfinally:ThenotionoftheUmweltnolongerallowsustoconsiderthe organisminitsrelationtotheexteriorworld,asaneffectoftheexteriorworld,orasacause.The Umweltisnotpresentedinfrontoftheanimallikeagoal;itisnotpresentlikeanidea,butasatheme thathauntsconsciousness.(N178)
thinking,andalmostallofthemcanbeconsideredaswaystounderstandthe identityanddifferenceofthetwoordersofbeingsensibleandsentient,objective andsubjectiveandofcoursethedimensionalityopenedupbytheirbeautifulbut oftenbafflingstyleofcommerce.Iwilltrytoshowinthefollowingseveralsections howMerleauPontyskeyconceptsarebasedonthisunderlyingidentityand differencethemeandacorrespondingtypeofdialecticthatemergestherefrom. Thiswillopenupadiscussionthatwilleventuallytakeusthroughtotheendofthis dissertation. B.Reversibility ThefoundationofMerleauPontysdialecticisthephenomenon,orconcept (itisinfactboth),ofreversibility.Inmyownreading,therearetwofundamental pointsofreferenceforMerleauPontyregardingthisconcept,theonehistoricaland theothersystematic.Theformeristhemindbodyproblemasinheritedby Descartes,whilethelatteristhephenomenonofselfsensing,theobservationof
192 whichMerleauPontyborrowsfromHusserl(butexpandsinwayswewillsee below).Wewilldealwiththelatterpointofreferencefirst. MerleauPontysclassicphenomenologicalexampleofreversibilityis Husserlsownobservationofthereversibilityoftouch,orthephenomenonofthe lefthandtouchingtherighthand353MerleauPontynotes,likeHusserl,thatto touchsomething,whenthatsomethinghappenstobeanotherpartofonesbody, isalsotobetouchedbythatsomething.Subjectherebecomesobject,andvice versa.Themostdramaticcaseisthatofhandstouchingoneanother;butMerleau Pontyextendsthisphenomenonofreversibilitybeyondthesenseoftouchto includevision,whichexplainsthetitleofhisprojectedworkandtherepeated referencesto,forexample,thestrangeadhesionoftheseerandthevisible.(VI 140)Husserlhadinitiallydistinguishedtouchingfromvisionbynoticingthatwhile touchisreversible,visionisnot.Thatis,wecannotseeourselvesseeingintheway wecantouchourselvestouching.ButMerleauPontyquestionsthevalidityofthis distinctionontwocounts.First,visioncouldnottrulyseetheworldiftheworld didnotadheretoitsglance;andsecond,eveninselftouching,thereisno completecoincidenceofsensingandsensednoncoincidenceisinfactoneof MerleauPontysfundamentalideas,anditappliesastrulytothiscaseastoany other.Asheexplainsinonecharacteristicpassage:
Tobeginwith,wespokesummarilyofthereversibilityoftheseeingandthevisible,ofthetouching andthetouched.Itistimetoemphasizethatitisareversibilityalwaysimminentandneverrealized infact.Mylefthandisalwaysonthevergeoftouchingmyrighthandtouchingthethings;butInever
353MereauPontysreferencestothistropeandtoreversibilityarefrequent.Someofthemost
interestinginthetextsweareexaminingincludethefollowing:N217;N224;VI272;VI1412;VI 147,148;VI4154,155;VI223.
193
reachcoincidence;thecoincidenceeclipsesatthemomentofrealization,andoneoftwothings alwaysoccurs:eithermyrighthandreallypassesoverintotheranksofthetouched,oritretainsits holdontheworld,butthenIdonotreallytouchitmyrighthandtouching,Ipalpatewithmyleft handonlyitsoutercovering.(VI148)
Thuswhileitistruethatwecannottrulyseeourselvesseeing,inthattheeye cannotbenditsvisionbackuponitself,neither,finallycantouch.354Andtothe extentthateithersenseisreversible,itisreversibleinthiscomplexmannerthat is,withacombinationofidentityanddifference.Asfortherelationoftouchand visiontooneanother,MerleauPontynotesthatwhiletheyareinsomesense incommensurable(wewillseebelowthathemakessimilarremarksconcerningall ofthesensestakentogether),theyarenonethelessunitedinoneaesthesiological nexus,renderingbacktousaunifiedworld:Sincethesamebodyseesandtouches, visibleandtangiblebelongtothesameworld.(VI134) Reversibilityis,ofcourse,aphenomenonwenoticefirstofallwithregardto thebody,whichforitspartisinterposed[notas]athing,aninterstitialmatter,a connectivetissue,butasensibleforitself(VI135)Thelivedbodyisthusalways alreadyawareofitselfandtheworld,which,throughitsUmwelt,ispresent beforeitimmanentlyandnotmerelyasanexternality.ButMerleauPontys discourseaboutthebodysubject,whilelegitimateinitsownright,hadtendedto obscuretheworldsideofthis(literal)equation.Theworld,nature,thesensible thesearethecomplementarypolestothebody,themind,andsentience.Therefore whatwefindaboveallinthelaterwritingsisMerleauPontysparlayingtheinsight
354Reversibilityisthus,inthewordsofDastur,neverfinishedandalwaysinthemaking.See:
Thismovetowardsgeneralizationisaccompaniedbyamoreontologicallygeneral (thoughsomehowstillthicklycarnal)languagethanwefindinhisprior phenomenologicalanalyses.Thislanguagewhichmayevencomeclosetosounding likeanewmetaphysics.Instead,itisintendedtobetakenasawaytoframethe resultsofphenomenologyinacoherentorsystematicway.AsIwillarguebelow(as IhavealreadybeguntodoinChapter3),MerleauPontysobjectiontohisownprior researchesisdirectedprincipallytotheirlackofbalance,nottotheirradical misguidedness.355 AsIreadit,therearebasicallythreefundamentallessonsorthemesMerleau Pontytakesfromreversibility.Thefirstisthatoftheunityorchiasmofsubject andobject,touchingandtouched,sentientandsensible,etc.;thesecondis,in apparentoppositiontothefirst,noncoincidence;andthethirdistheinterplayof identityanddifference,chiasmandnoncoincidence,thatproducestheparadoxical samenesswithoutidentity(VI261)thatweexperiencewithrespecttotheworld aswellasotherpeople(forexample,intheparadigmaticcaseofashakingofhands).
355ThecaseofHeideggerisagoodoneforthesakeofcomparison;hisownKehrefrom
195 Afterall,thephenomenonofreversibilitycouldnotbecomeknowntousifitwere merelyadifferenceormerelyanidentity.Clearlythesensibleandthesentientare notsimplytwobutratherinsomewayone(orelsehowcouldtheybereversibleand simplytradeplaces?),andyettheyaretwo,sinceiftheyweresimplyone,they couldnotproduceanexperienceorthedistanceofmindandthings.This intercrossingofidentityanddifferencealsohelpstoexplainwhyMerleauPonty speaksoftheindivision(VI208,255)ofBeinginthesamebreathasitsself splitting.Further,itisembodiedinMerleauPontysreciprocalexpressions differencewithoutcontradictionandidentitywithoutsuperposition.(VI135) AsImentionedabove,MerleauPontyalsodevelopshisbasicontological ideasinexplicitreferencetothehistoryofphilosophy,especiallymodern philosophyandthemindbodyproblemasitemergesinDescartes.Thisbecomes abundantlyclearintheNaturelectures,whereDescartesemergesashismain philosophicalrivalthoughhardlyintheManicheantermsthistermcouldbe takenin.356MerleauPontystatesDescartesdifficulty(whichisalsohisown)inthe followingterms:
Thereisanextraordinarydifficultyinthinkingaccordingtoboththefirstandthesecondorder [physicalandmental]atthesametime.Itisdifficulttoconceivethesoulandthebodyasoneandthe samething,whileatthesametimethinkingofthemasdistinct.Unionanddistinctionare,however, bothrequired,yettheyareunthinkablebothatthesametime.(N178,myemphasis)
ThisquotereferstoMerleauPontysideaofnoncoincidence,aswellasthatof intertwininghence,theCartesianproblematicteachesusthesamelessonstaught
356ItisinterestingtonoteinthisregardthatM.C.DillonpresentsMerleauPontysphilosophyasa
criticalassessmentofCartesianismthroughouthiswork,MerleauPontysOntology.(Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,1988)(Thequotedphraseisfromp.6ofthatwork).
196 bythephenomenonofselfsensing.Cartesiandualismhastobereplacedwith another,moreflexibleanddialecticalmodel.Accordingly,Dasturassertsthat MerleauPontysentirephilosophicalundertakingledhimtopromoteakindof thoughtwhichwouldnolongeropposeinteriorityandexteriority,thesubjectwith theworld,structureswithlivingexperience.357(Dastur25) C.Flesh Thenotionoftheflesh(chair)ismeanttoconveythecommonalityofboth ordersofbeing,subjectiveandobjective,whilerefusingtosynthesizethemintoa solidorsubstantialthis.ItisnotacausasuioraSpinozisticsubstance,muchless aneutralsubstrateofbeing.Ithasnonameintraditionalphilosophysinceitis neithersubjectnorobjectbutsomethingelseentirely,akindofelement(VI146) orthesiteofanontologicalexchangethatitselfcomesclosetodefiningwhat MerleauPontymeansbywildbeing.358ThisbecomesclearerwhenMerleauPonty alignsthefleshwiththeideaoflifeheisdevelopingintheNaturelectures:
357DasturalsousesoneofMerleauPontysmoreinterestingtropes,thatofnarcissism,through
whichtounderstandandsubvertourownpotentialmisunderstandingofMerleauPontysbasic insightintothewaytheseerandthevisiblerelate.Thuswhileatfirstitseemsasthoughthe narcissistisegocentricinthewayheseeshimselfintheobject(thinkofNarcissusstaringintothe pond),nonethelessthisisnotthesecond,moreprofoundmeaningofnarcissism,whichisthe feeling[thatoneis]lookedatbythings,byaninversionofthelookthattransformssubjective activityintoontologicalpassivity,sothatvisionnolongerhasanidentifiableauthor,sothatvision becomesgeneralvisibility.(Dastur30)Thisnotionthatitisnotonlywethatlookatthingsbut thingsthatlookatusisoneofthemostoriginalandchallengingofMerleauPontysthoughts,though itcanbeseentofollowlogicallyfromthenotionofreversibility. 358Thefleshcanbeimaginedasafieldofassemblageanddehiscenceofsentienceandsensibility, similarperhapstowaterorair(hencethenotionofelement),inthesenseofpermittingand facilitatingformsofcreationanddestruction,comingtogetherandcomingapart.
197
Itisnotthatlifeisapowerofbeingoraspirit,butrather,thatweinstallourselvesinperceived being/brutebeing,inthesensible,inthefleshwherethereisnolongerthealternativeoftheinitself andtheforitself,whereperceivedbeingiseminentlyinbeing.359(N210,myemphasis)
ThispassagerevealsthatforMerleauPontywearealwaysalready,inperception, separatedofffromourselvesorfromsomething,asitwere,withwhichwearestill connected,withwhichweshareatogetherness,andofcoursewhichisalsothevery siteofourconjunction,sinceitmakespossibletheexperienceofthingsor phenomenainconsciousness.Thusitseemswhatflesh,wildbeing,thecommon tissueorelement,etc.,aretryingtoname,ispreciselythephenomenonof identityanddifferenceofsensibleandsentientorders,aprimordialintertwining thatexpressesitself,paradoxically,inacertainseparation.Thefleshturnsoutto beaninevitablecorollarytoreversibilityitself;itisthefleshthatisreversible, movingbetweenthefleshofthebodyandthefleshoftheworld.360Thattheflesh
359InoneplaceheevenequatesthefleshwithNature.Hetellshimself:Doapsychoanalysisof
198 isattheheartofreversibilityalsoexplainswhyMerleauPontycallsthefleshthe miraclethatisthesenseorgan.(N209)Aswehaveseen,thesenseorgan,for exampletheskininitstactility,demonstratesthisreversibilityinaparadigmatic way. Theidentity,asitwere,ofintertwiningandseparation(sgrgation)is parallelwiththatofdistanceandproximity,whichdefinesourstrangeintimacy withthings,evenastheyremainoutsidewhatinHusserlianparlanceiscalledthe sphereofimmanence.Indeed,MerleauPontytakesthenotionofanimmanent transcendencyofthingsinconsciousnesstoitslogicalconclusion:
Bydefinitionperceptionputsusinthepresenceofadefinitivelyopaqueterm.Inotherwords,the Naturethatweperceiveisasdistantandascloseaspossible,andforthesamereasons.Thereis nothingbetweenmeandtheNaturethatIperceive.WhenIperceiveathing,Icannotconceiveofa perceptioninterposedbetweenmeandtheobject.(N118)
HereiteratesthesameideaintheVI:
thisdistanceisnotthecontraryofthisproximity,itisdeeplyconsonantwithit,itissynonymous withit.(VI135)
Andinasimilarvein:
Visiondoesnotcompletelyblendintovisible;nonethelessweareclosetoit,palpation,gazeenvelops things,clothesthemwithitsownflesh.(VI131)
In:MerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008 (p.191)HereafterEvans.
199 Itisimportanttorealizethatdistanceisinthissenseacrucialconcept361insofar asitispreciselysuchdistantiationthatisdenied,overlooked,suppressed,and forgottenbybothflatnaturalisticandidealisticontologies.ButMerleauPontys innovationistounderstand,inadeeplyHeracliteanway,thisdistanceas constitutiveofanddefiningofitsseemingopposite,proximity,inthematrixof perception.Wearewhatwesee,whichalsomeans,onceagain,thatwhatwesee seesusaswell,inawaythattranscendsmeremetaphor.Perceptionisofcourse equivalenttothebody,Leib,inthesensethattoperceiveistobecorporeal,and viceversa.ThusMerleauPontyobserves,Thethicknessofthebody,farfrom rivalingthatoftheworld,isonthecontrarythesolemeansIhavetogountothe heartofthings,bymakingmyselfaworldandbymakingthemflesh.(VI135)Inthis waythebodyisnotsimplythebodysubjectofthePhenomenologyofPerception, butthatpoleofthebodyworldcircuitnowhavingbeennamedtheflesh;indeed, itisthefleshofthebody.362 InstressingtheentwinementofsensibilityandsentienceoverCartesian styledualism,MerleauPontybecomesacutelyawareoftheneedtostresstheir differenceaswell,yetofcoursewithoutlapsingbackintodualism.Toexpressthe complexityofthisrelationship,whatMerleauPontysearchesforisakindof dialecticbutwhatkindofdialecticemerges?Tobeginwith,itcannotbeadialectic ofsynthesis,sinceitmustincludenoncoincidence,somehow,atitscore.Yetnon
361TheideaofdistancehasbeenemphasizedrecentlyinaworkbyRenaudBarbaras:Desireand
Thatsuchacoincidenceisincomplete,neverfinished,alwaysinthemaking,etc., helpstoexplainwhyfacticityalonecannotexplainexistence,thatis,why transcendenceorselfdistantiationwhicharethetwinbasesofthepossibilityof reflectionandthetranscendentalattitudeasareflectivestanceareequally necessarydeterminantsoftheexistentialsituation. D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleauPontys Dialectic Theunityorchiasmofmindandworld,spiritandnature,generatesasense ofakindofpreestablishedharmony(VI133)aswellasasenseofprimordial,but strictlyunthematizable,mutualbelonging,ofthetwononethelessdistinguishable orders.MerleauPontytreatsthisharmonyusuallyasabrutefactofsorts,thoughhe doesattimesunderstanditasexpressingadeeperlogicofreciprocity:since visionisapalpationwiththelook,itmustalsobeinscribedintheorderofbeing thatitdisclosestous;hewholooksmustnothimselfbeforeigntotheworldthathe looksat.(VI134)MerleauPontyexpressesthisideaofharmonyinmanywaysfor
363VI268.ElsewhereMerleauPontyreferstothisexplosionasthedehiscenceorcartthat
201 example,withregardtonaturewithinandwithout:Bythenatureinus,wecan knowNature,andreciprocallyitisfromourselvesthatlivingbeingsandevenspace speaktous364(N205)Centraltothisnotionistheultimatecontinuityofthe visibleandtheinvisible:Thesuperficialpellicleofthevisibleisonlyformyvision andformybody.Butthedepthbeneaththissurfacecontainsmybodyandhence containsmyvision.Mybodyasavisiblethingiscontainedwithinthefullspectacle. (VI138)Again,thisisacontinuityinterrupted,butnotbeforeitmakesitself knownasacontinuity.ThusIwouldwhollyagreewithFredEvansthatthe directionoftruthMerleauPontyspeaksof,evenifitcanneverbefulfilledin principle,doesseemtoputapremiumonperceptualandepistemological convergenceratherthandivergence(Evans,191) Ofcourse,thenotionofthefleshhasgeneratedmanycontroversiesand misunderstandings,oneofthembeingthatMerleauPontyisamonistandthatthe fleshis,asalreadyalludedtonegativelyabove,akindofontologicalsubstrate. MerleauPontycertainlyisanondualist;hedoesnotusetheword,nowassociated withstrainsofEastern(especiallyBuddhist)philosophy,butIthinkthismuchcan beadmitted.Forexample,hemakesclearinoneplace:Thereisnointelligible world,thereisthesensibleworld.365(VI214)Yetfromthisaloneitdoesnotfollow thatMerleauPontyisamonist.Hispointinthisquote,forexample,isthatthe invisibleisofthisworld,itisthatwhichinhabitsthisworld,sustainsit,and rendersitvisible,itsownandinteriorpossibility,theBeingofthis[visible,sensible]
364Compare:VI99thehomogeneityofthemeasuredandthemeasuringimpliesthatthesubject
makescommoncausewithspace.
365Insomeplaces,Natureisequated(oraligned)withthesensible.See,forexample:The
sensible,Nature,transcendthepastpresentdistinction(VI267)
202 being.(VI151)Orstatedinotherterms:Meaningisinvisible,buttheinvisibleis notthecontradictoryofthevisible:thevisibleitselfhasaninvisibleinner framework(membrure),andtheinvisibleisthesecretcounterpartofthevisible,it appearsonlywithinit(VI215)Whatweseehereisakindofreflexivitythatis totallyforeignto,say,Spinozasmonisticsystem,thoughtobefair,Spinozasdual attributetheoryisnotwhollyincompatiblewithMerleauPontysintentions.The matterishighlycomplex,chieflybecauseMerleauPontyistryingtoredrawthe termsofthisverydistinctionbetweenmonismanddualism. Itisimportant,however,todosomedisambiguationatthisstage.Thereare actuallytwodifferentkindsofquestionswithrespecttothequestionofmonism. Thereismonism(orpluralism)oftypesofbeingSpinozamaynotfitthiscategory, butBerkeley,James,orQuinedoandamonismofjusthowmanybeingsthereare, thatis,justone(acosmicwhole,substance,etc.)ormany(monads,Aristotelian substances,etc.).Regardingthislatterquestionofmonismorpluralism,whatis reallykeyforMerleauPontyistheprincipleofaunityinthemany.Evansputitthis way:
What[MerleauPonty]offersisclosertowhatwemightcallaunitycomposedofdifferencerather thanacollectionofseparate,merelyexternallyrelatedentitiesoraunityformedthroughdomination byoneoftheelementsofthatunityheeschews,inotherwords,bothpluralismandmonism. (Evans191)
withissuesofoppositionanddialectic.Foritinfactgoesspecificallytohis understandingofwhatconstitutesthecomplementarityofopposites.Thereare
366ThereissomethinganalogousinMerleauPontysdescriptionofwhatMatissesmethodof
204 twosidesofanexperience,conjugatedandincompossible,butcomplementary. Theirunityisirrecusable;itissimplyastheinvisiblehingeonwhichtwo experiencesarearticulatedaselftornapart.[myemphasis]contradiction, understoodasinteriortoNature,mustbeassumed.Wemustadmittheideaofan operatingnegationinNature...367(N6566)MerleauPontysuseoftheterm complementarity,isnot,Ibelieve,accidental.Ibelieveitisadeliberatereference toBohrstheoryofquantummechanicsbythesamename,asubjecttowhichhe devotesagoodamountofattentionintheNaturelecturesthemselves.(N89100)In asense,heapplieswhatistrueofsubatomicparticles,inparticularthesymmetrical applicabilityofmutuallyincompatiblewavetheoryandcorpusculartheorytothe descriptionofelementaryparticles,tobeingitself:thetwomapsarecomplete, andyettheydonotmergeintoone.Thetwopartsaretotalpartsandyetnot superposable.(VI134)(Noteagaintheideaofatotalpart.) Inaninterestingkindofconvergence,HusserlscholarSebastianLufthas
learntfromthereversibilityoftouchthatis,theimpossibilityofpurecoincidenceorasimple identityofopposites.(VI2501)
205
theycontradictorcanceleachotherout,butinthattheypursuetwodifferentagendas.Theyare locatedontwodifferentmaps.Onecanpursueonewhilecompletelyneglectingtheother.368
Inthisway,adistinctlyMerleauPontianconcept(presumablyindependently arrivedatbyLuft)ironicallycomesusefullytodefinethecareerarcofHusserl himself. IV.Conclusion MerleauPontybeginstheNaturecourses,aswehaveseen,withan investigationintothehistoryofphilosophy.Helatershiftshisinteresttoan examinationofcontemporaryscience.Buttheseprimafacieunconnecteddiscourses are,asiscustomaryinMerleauPontyssingularlysyncreticapproach,unitedina commonpurpose.Theconjunctionisrevealedintellingworkingnote,inwhichthe philosopherspeaksofwhatistobediscussedinVI:
Imustthereforeshowintheintroductionthatthebeingofscienceisitselfapartoraspectofthe objectifiedInfinity[ofDescartes]andthattheOffenheitoftheUmweltisopposedtobothofthese[i.e., Cartesianontologyandscience].WhencethechaptersonDescartes,Leibniz,Westernontology, whichindicatethehistoricointentionalandontologicalimplicationsofthebeingofscience.369(VI 176)
368Luft,Sebastian.HusserlsTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLifeWorldand
Cartesianism.InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.226)
369Relatedly:IclarifymyphilosophicalprojectbyrecoursetoDescartesandLeibniz.(VI177)
206 MerleauPontysnotionofNatureispolymorphous.Phenomenasuchaslifeand animality,wholenessandorganicform,growthandcreativity,naturaloriginsand processestheseareallphenomenathatrevealdifferentcluesaboutthenonfully constitutablecoreoftheworldandofourownhumanity.Naturalitydoesnot exhaustthemeaningofBeing,butitdoesencircleallbeingsinitsberth,and ultimately,nooneeverfullybreaksawayfromit,justasMerleauPontyalready observedaboutthenaturalattitudeofHusserl.Thusitisfittingtoendwiththe followingquotation,whichneatlysummarizesMerleauPontysattitudetowards natureanditsplaceinontology:
NatureByexaminingit,wehaveretrievedeverything,notthateverythingisinnature,butbecause everythingisorbecomesnaturalforus.TherearenosubstantialdifferencesbetweenphysicalNature, life,andmind.[myemphasis.]Wepassedbetweencausalrealistthinkingandphilosophicalidealism, becausewefoundinbrute,savage,vertical,presentBeingadimensionthatisnotofrepresentation andnotthatoftheInitself.(N212)
207
ChapterFive:MerleauPontyandHusserlontheQuestionofthe ParadoxofSubjectivityandNature
I.Introduction MerleauPontysembraceofparadoxisradical,bothinthesensethatit goestotheheartofhisphilosophicalprojectandinthesensethatitisverythorough indeed.ItcouldbearguedthatpostKantianContinentalphilosophy,especiallyin thetwentiethcentury,hascometotakeamorefavorableviewofparadoxthandid itspredecessors;onemaythinkhereofKierkegaardsfamousembraceofthe absoluteparadoxofChrist,MarcelsMysteryofBeing,Heideggershermeneutic circleandparadoxicalalwaysalready,evenaspectsofRicoeurshermeneuticsof identity(asevidencedinthetitleofoneofhismajorworks,OneselfasAnother).The differenceisthatMerleauPontymadeofparadoxacentralthematicinitsownright. Thatthehumanmindisledtoexpressorelucidateitssituationinparadoxical termssomethingMerleauPontysteadfastlymaintainsisamomentousfactfor someonewhoargues,asMerleauPontydoes,fortheintimacyofsubjectivityand Beingitself.ForitmeansthatBeing,andnotonlyconsciousness,iscontradictoryon theinside.DoesthismeanMerleauPontyrejectsthelawofnoncontradiction? MerleauPontysapplicationofthislaw(whichherarelydealswithinjustthose terms)goesasfarastheintelligibilityofBeingtorationalthoughtgoes;butheis
208 willingtoconcede(andinfactinsists)thatBeinginitsprimordialityisineffableand evennecessarilysoandthat,accordingly,rationalthinking(reflection,the transcendentalattitude)islessthanultimate. Iftruthisunavailabletousthroughconcepts,however,itisnevertheless availablyunavailable.Itdoesnotmerelyeludeus,iteludesusbecauseitsurrounds usandpenetratesustothecore.Moreover,thereisawayinwhichthoughtcan understanditselfandemployitsconceptsthroughdialecticalandhyper dialecticalthinkingthatservestobringthecontradictionsofunreflectedBeing intoafruitfulrelationshipwithreflectivity.Theresultofthisexchangearethe paradoxesofphilosophy,whoserigorousexpressionisnolesschallengingthanany mannerofproblemsolvingthatwecouldadopt. ByBeingMerleauPontydoesnotmeantosayanythingdifferentthan experienceasknowninperceptualfaith.Being,whichcanbeequatedtoalarge extentwithwhatwehavebeencallingNature(wildBeing),isexperiencedand livedthrough,indeeditmaybelifeitself(oragaintime,thesinequanonof livedexperienceassuch)whoseprimordialunityindifferenceconcealsatruth, evenalogosorlanguage,thatrevealsitself,intheparadoxesofthought,precisely asconcealed.Thesayabilityandintelligibilityofcoreexperientialityandwhatit disclosesispreserved,therefore,partiallyandasifintracelikeoutline,intheform oftheparadoxesofbeing,experience,time,mind,freedom,andsoonandthesein turngivelifetophilosophicalthought,whichariseandmustreturntothedepths theyopenup.Paradoxisthus,inMerleauPonty,bothproblemand,asitwere, solution.Itisthequestionandtheanswer,themysteryofbeingaswellasthe
209 explanationofthemystery.Inthisway,paradoxisnotintentionalitdoesnot pointbeyonditselftoatelos,apurpose,aform,oraplan.Itsfinalityisequallya functionofitsoriginalitythereisonlytheBeginning,asitwere,thebirththat eludestimebycreatingit. Philosophyisthereforemisunderstoodbythose,includingHusserl,whothink ofitasanessentiallyproblemsolvingenterprise.MerleauPontysconceptionis closerinthiscasetothatofthelater(circaPhilosophicalInvestigations) Wittgenstein,inthathewouldagreethatphilosophyisbetterusedforthepurpose ofdissolvingphilosophicalpuzzlesthansolvingthem.ButMerleauPontywould notthinkofparadoxesaslinguisticconfusions,ratherasmomentsofcontradiction orcrisissignifyingthebreakdownandlimitsofsignificationbeforethe unsignifiableverityattheheartofthebeingoftheworld.MerleauPontyand Wittgensteinareperhapsequallyinsistentonthecentralityoflanguagetothought andevenhumanexperience.Inthecaseoftheformer,ofcourse,onemustalways keepinmindhisfamousthesisoftheprimacyofperception,aprimacythat ultimatelyexpressesafaithinBeingthatisitsownmeaningormeaningfount, fromwhichlanguageanditsidealmeaningsariseand,overtime,alsodissolve. ThisisanotherwayofsayingthatforMerleauPonty,thereisstill,afterall,an absolute,arealthatcannotbedemarcatedsomuchaslived,anditispromisedin thesimplestactofperception,which,throughthephenomenon,promises disclosureoftheworldthefirstcontradiction(subjectivityandobjectivity)that theperceptualfaithharmonizesinitseffortlessway.MerleauPontyistothisextent
210 arealistthoughtherealcanneverbeknownpurelyasthereal,butonlythat whichescapeslanguagelinguistically,sotospeak. ThelaterWittgensteinisofcoursenotoriouslymuteaboutmetaphysical questions,butforMerleauPonty,theknowableunknowabilityofBeingisthe overridingthemeofallreflection,whilethestrugglesofphilosophyitselfaretaken assymptomaticnotofpathologicalhabitsoflinguisticbehaviorbut,attheirbestand mostauthenticallyapproached,oftherigorsofthinkingthroughthedialectical structureofphenomena. Inthisfinal,culminatingchapterofthepresentdissertation,myfocusis mostlyonMerleauPonty,butIalsobrieflyexamineandcompareHusserls approachtoparadoxtoMerleauPontysthroughtheformersfamousdiscussionin theCrisis370oftheparadoxofsubjectivity.Fundamentally,Iwillshowthatwhile forMerleauPontyparadoxitselfplaysafundamentalroleinexplicatingthe meaningofphenomenology,forHusserl,phenomenologyispreciselyameansto solveparadoxesamethodtoendallphilosophicaldisputes,infact.371Inthisway Husserlrepresentsthemainstream,onemightsay,ofphilosophyintheWestern philosophicaltraditionaswellas,importantlyforthethemesofthisdissertation, theimplicitparadigmofscientificthinking,whichseesitselfinsimilarlyproblem solvingterms.Thereis,ofcourse,aninterestingwayinwhichevenHusserl
370Husserl,Edmund.TheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:An
211 embracessomethinglikethecentralityofparadoxbutonlyinthesenseofits beingareversalofcommonsense;thisisacaseofsimplehomonymy. MerleauPontysincreasinglysophisticatedrelianceondialecticbecomes entirelyexplicitinTheVisibleandtheInvisible372,inwhichheendorsesit wholeheartedly,whiletryingtodistinguishitfromitsHegelian(andevenSartrean) versions.ThusIbrieflyexaminethisphilosophicalappropriationandthewaysin whichMerleauPontydoesanddoesnotconceiveofphilosophyasadialectic. Finally,andrelatedly,IlookatMerleauPontysuseandanalysisofthenotionof reflection,alongwithhyperreflection,hislabelforthephilosophicalattitude oncephilosophyhasbeentransformedfromaproblemsolvingtoaself problematizing(andtherebyselfrecovering)enterprise.373 II.MerleauPontysPhilosophyofParadox A.OverviewofMerleauPontysReferencestoParadox TheseedofMerleauPontysapproachtoparadox,andBeingasaparadoxical phenomenonthatis(quasi)intelligibleinthoughtthroughamovementof
372MerleauPonty,Maurice.TheVisibleandtheInvisible.Tr.AlphonsoLingis.Northwestern
UniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1969.HereafterVI.
373Note:MerleauPontyachievesgreatluciditywhenitcomestohismatureepistemologicalviews.In
Thatwecannotputupsuchasystemofeternaltruthsislessacriticismof Husserlianmethod,perhaps,whicharguablyalreadyproblematizesthequestionof eternitythroughitsembraceoforiginarytemporality,thanofclassical metaphysicalthought,particularlyitsantiparadoxicalandantidialectical character.Theabovequotedpassagestatesallofthefundamentalthemesof paradoxicalthinkingthatMerleauPontywouldcontinuetodeepenandthat,finally, cometoastartlinglyfreshnewexpressioninhislaterwritings.MerleauPonty makesitclearthatheisnotinterestedinthesterilecontradictionofAandnotA foritsownsake.Itisonlyundercertainconditions,forceduponusbytheexigencies oflivedexperience,thattherearisethejustifiedcontradictionsofphilosophy,
374MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePrimacyofPerceptionandItsPhilosophicalConsequences.Tr.
MerleauPontyiswidelyknownasaphilosopherofambiguity,asIhave mentioned,butlesssoasoneofparadox.Yetthecontradictionsofphilosophyare organized,dialectical,andfitapattern.Ambiguity,inMerleauPontysphilosophy, appearstomeasamoreinchoatesoundingversionofwhathemeansbyparadox; oralternately,ithasadifferentdiscursivefunction.Thatis,tosay(forexample)that thehumanbeingisanambiguousphenomenonistodeny,inessence,various strictlydelineatedandonesideddescriptionsofhim/herorhisorherexperience (intellectualism,empiricism,naturalism).Butitdoesnotclearlyposean alternativeview.SinceMerleauPontyhasnomonolithicalternative,thealternative issomethinglikeparadoxorjustifiedcontradictionthatis,alogosofambiguity. MerleauPontysrepeatedpositiveinvocationsofparadox,paradoxicalthinking, dilemmas,contradiction,anddialecticityareconstantthroughouthiswritingsbut initiallyonlyinthebackground,almostlikeanafterthought.Thischangesas MerleauPontyseekstoemphasizethathonestreflectioncannolongerpretendto dophilosophyinthemannerthattraditionhasimaginedituptothispointthatis,
214 withthetacitassumptionthatitcaninreflectionmaintainaholdontheparadoxical truth,soeffortlesslyinhabitedbyeverydayprereflectivelife. ItisimpossibletomentionallthewaysinwhichMerleauPontyembraces paradoxorallofthecountlessparadoxeshementions,butitisworthnotingthathis mainpreoccupationperceptionwasexplainedbyhimasfundamentally paradoxicalalreadyinthePhenomenologyofPerception,inthiscasewithrespectto immanenceandtranscendence,theparadoxmentionedascentralto phenomenology.376Herepeatsthesameideaoftheparadoxicalityofperceptionin PrimacyandreferstotheinternalparadoxofmyperceptioninVI377,wherehealso speaksoftheparadoxesofvisionandthefiguredenigmas,thethingandthe world.378TheessayThePhilosopherandHisShadow,devotedtoHusserl,also stressesenigmasofperceptionaswellasthehidden/revealeddualityofthings.379In anotherplacewecanfindareferencetothefertilecontradictionofhuman consciousness.380IntheMetaphysicalinMan,MerleauPontycharacterizesthe taskofmetaphysicsasoneofinquiringintoparadoxes,which,heexplainsina footnote,heevenoutrightcallscontradictions:
376MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:Routledge
andKeganPaul,1962.HereafterPP.(p.425)Notealsothewordingheusesinthesamepassage, furtherdown:Atthelevelofbeingitshouldneverbeintelligiblethatthesubjectshouldbeboth naturansandnaturatus,infiniteandfinite.Butwerediscovertimebeneaththesubject,andifwe relatetotheparadoxoftime,thoseofthebody,theworld,thething,andothers,weshallunderstand thatbeyondthesethereisnothingtounderstand.(myemphasis) 377VI,11 378Ibid.,4 379MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.Tr.RichardM.McCleary.InSigns. Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.1678) 380MerleauPonty,Maurice.SenseandNonSense.Tr.HubertL.DreyfusandPatriciaAllenDreyfus. NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.p.96HereafterSNS
215
Ihavetherighttoconsiderthecontradictionsofmylifeasathinkingandincarnatesubject,finite andcapableoftruth,asultimateandtrue[myemphasis]becauseIhaveexperiencedthemand becausetheyareinterconnectedintheunquestionableperceptionofathingorintheexperienceofa truth.IcannolongerintroduceatranscendenceinimmanencebehindmeasHusserldid(even transcendencequalifiedashypothetical),forIamnotGod,andIcannotverifythecoexistenceof thesetwoattributesinanyindubitableexperience.381
AndinoneofMerleauPontyslesserknownessaysonMontaigne382,inthe beginningoftheessay,hechidesDescartesfortryingtosolveparadoxinsteadof acceptingit,averytellingsentiment.(Montaigne,201) DuetothelimitedfocusofthisdissertationIhavehadmostlytobracketthe questionofintersubjectivity,buthere,too,MerleauPontythinksintermsof paradox.InSorbonnelectures,itseemsthatMerleauPontyacceptsthatthereisa contradictioninthefactthatIcannotexperienceotherpeople,yetnaturallydo experiencethem,inthecourseoflife.383Thereisalsoacontradictionofself/other attheheartofintersubjectivityaswell.(Toadvine,248).Interestinghereisthe methodologyofsimplyacceptingacontradictorysituationandproceedingfrom there.InthePrefaceofPPhediscussestheparadoxanddialecticoftheEgoand theAlter.(PPxiii)Amongotherthings,theotherisparadoxicalasanIthatis notI(notme),aswellasanotherthatisnotother(forIcannotbemyself withouttheother).Allhumansolidarity,andallhumanviolence,onemightsay, stemessentiallyfromthesamesource,theparadoxoftheother(or intersubjectivity).
NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.198210).HereafterMontaigne.
Overview.InMerleauPontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht: KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.227286).HereafterToadvine.
384MerleauPonty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollgedeFrance.Compiledandwithnotes
MerleauPontyinterestinglycallsournaturalcertitudeunjustifiable:an unjustifiablecertitudeofasensibleworldcommontousthatistheseatoftruth withinus.386Itisunjustifiableofcoursebecauseitisprimordialpresupposedin anyjustification(especiallythejustificationoftheskeptic,whichwewillsee pointedoutbelow). MerleauPontyalsocallsperceptualfaithopennessuponbeing.(VI88)But opennessentailsnotonlyaccessbutocclusion:accesstoworldexistssidebyside withoccultation(inaccess):thesetwopossibilities,whichtheperceptualfaith keepssidebysidewithinitself,donotnullifyoneanother.(VI28)Wehavealready ofcoursevisitedthisnotionofasidebysidecontradictioninwhichthesides neverthelessdonotnullifyeachotherMerleauPontyhascalledthis complementarity,afterthesamenotioninquantummechanics(withwhose lessonshecontinuestobepreoccupied).Thuscomplementarityandparadox
386Seealso:VI14insolubleantinomiesinperceptualfaith.
phenomenonofwholenessortotalityasacluetonotonlythestructureofbeingbut alsotheinabilityofthoughttothinkBeingotherwisethanparadoxically.Totalityis ofanotherorderhestatesinoneplace,inthiscaseintermsofbinocular perception.(VI7)Justasoneeyeseesandsodoestheother,evenasneitherbyitself seesthemiracleoftotalityanddepthpresentedinperception(VI8),so philosophersaretrappedinonesidedwaystograspBeing:objectiveand subjective[shouldbe]recognizedastwoordershastilyconstructedwithinatotal experience,whosecontextmustberestoredinallclarity.(VI20)Notethatitisthe contextwhoseclarityistoberestored,notthetotalexperienceitself.Theexperience isalreadyclarified,ironically,throughthecontradictionstowhichitgivesrisein philosophy,forthesearecomplementarydescriptionsofthewholeitselfwe havealreadyseenhowMerleauPontydisposesoftheproblemoftheoneandthe manyinthisway. Asatotality,theperceivedworldisbeneathorbeyondthisantinomy[of beingobjectandbeingsubject].(VI22)Itisthisfactwhichcallsforare examinationofthenotionsofsubjectandobject.SaysMerleauPonty,Every question,eventhatofsimplecognition,ispartofthecentralquestionthatis ourselves,ofthatappealfortotality[myemphasis]towhichnoobjectivebeing answers...(VI104)AgainstHusserlsframingofphenomenologyasarigorous science,MerleauPontyoffers,Philosophyisnotascience,becausescience
219 believesitcansoaroveritsobjectandholdsthecorrelationofknowledgewith beingasestablished,whereasphilosophyisthesetofquestionswhereinhewho questionsishimselfimplicatedinthequestion.(VI27)Butevenifphilosophyisnot abletograspitsobjectinselfcoincidentreflection(notleastbecausethe reflectionmusttakeaccountofitselfasafactor),itcanandmustaswewillsee,in regardstohyperreflectiontakestockofitssituationandfindexpressionforthe inexpressibletotalityinwhichitfindsitselfalwaysalready.Suchisthetotal situationthataphilosophymustaccountfor.Itwilldosoonlybyadmittingthe doublepolarityofreflection[reflectionandperception/reflectedandunreflected] andbyadmittingthat,asHegelsaid,toretireintooneselfisalsotoleaveoneself. (VI49) Thewindingmannerinwhichphilosophydoesanddoesnothaveawayto
220
definitionofBeingitself.Withthisdifference,weareindeedspeakingofthesamething(VI85,my emphasis;check)
C.ParadoxandPhilosophy MerleauPontysnotionofparadoxorcontradictioncaneasilybe misunderstoodandcaricatured.Onecouldalwaysarguewithaproparadox positionthatitpermitseverything387oristooschematicandabstract,allowingall binariestobeswallowedupwithinit,butthatispreciselywhyMerleauPontys phenomenologicalmethod,whichatleaststrivestobetruetoexperience,isso important.Dialecticallogicisalogicofthethingsthemselves.388 MerleauPontysprioritizationofparadoxshapesthewayheunderstandsthe natureofthephilosophicalenterprise.Heapprovinglystatesthatphilosophy[atits best]becomestheenterpriseofdescribinglivingparadoxes.389Philosophysimply interrogatestheperceptualfaith.Or,evenmoreprecisely,philosophyisthe perceptualfaithquestioningitselfaboutitself.(VI103)InanotherplaceMerleau Pontycomments:Philosophybelieveditcouldovercomethecontradictionsofthe perceptualfaithbysuspendingitinordertodisclosethemotivesthatsupportit. (VI50)MerleauPontythusalsospeaksofthereflectiveviceoftransformingthe
387Fordiscussionofsuchacritiquefromacontemporaryphilosopher,see:Sainsbury,R.M. 388Insupportofthisidea,seeforexampleonN945,whereMerleauPontyexpresslyrejectsthe
Paradoxes.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995(pp.1367)
221 opennessoftheworldintoanassentofselfwithself,theinstitutionoftheworld intoanidealityoftheworld,theperceptualfaithintoactsorattitudesofasubject thatdoesnotparticipateintheworld.(VI51)TheimplicitcritiqueofHusserlin thesewordsisevident;noticealsotheappealonceagaintotheopacityoftheself toselfwhichmustaccompanythereflectiveflightfromperceptualfaith. WewillrevisittheissueofMerleauPontysreconceptionofthetaskof philosophyinthefuturesectiononreflection. III.HusserlandParadox Husserlrecognizesplentyofparadoxicalenigmasinhisownpresentation ofphenomenology.390Hisapproachtothemistypicalofphilosophicaltradition, however,stemmingallthewaybacktoAristotlesMetaphysics(BookIII),inseeking toremovetheseenigmasinthenameoftruthandclarity.391Husserlneverquestions thenotionthattheparadoxes,whichappearonlyatfirst[as]insoluble(Crisis,175) needtoberesolvedonceandforall,lesthisownprojectoftranscendental phenomenologyfail.Husserlcouldnot,forexample,bemoreexplicitabouthowhe feelsaboutparadoxeswhenhecriticizesthesciencesintheEpiloguetoIdeasII (IdeasII,4278),whereheclaimsthattheirresultingparadoxesarepreciselythe
390Crisis174 391Aristotle,CompleteWorksofAristotle.Tr.JonathanBarnes.PrincetonUniversityPress,1971.(pp.
15721584)
222 deleteriousresultofbeingunphilosophicalintherequiredsense.Whenproper proceduresaretaken,Insuchacasetherecannotbeanyunclear,problematic conceptsoranyparadoxes.392(IdeasII,428,myemphasis) AllofthisbecomespertinentintheCrisiswhenHusserlconfrontshisown philosophyanditsapparentparadoxes,thosewhichcriticshadonseeminglygood groundspointedout.Inthistext,theparadoxHusserlpaysthegreatestattentionto istermedmemorablybyhimtheparadoxofsubjectivity.Howisit,theparadox goes,thattheentireworldisconstitutedbyonlyonepartoftheworld,namelythe partthatconsistsofhumansubjectsthatis,realhumanbeings,thecommunity ofmonadsastheyareelsewheredescribed?Ofcourse,verymuchthesameparadox wasonHusserlsmindeveninIdeasI:
Thus,ontheonehandconsciousnessissaidtobeabsoluteinwhicheverythingtranscendentand, therefore,ultimatelythewholepsychophysicalworld,becomesconstituted;and,ontheotherhand, consciousnessissaidtobeasubordinaterealeventwithinthatworld.Howcanthesestatementsbe reconciled?(IdeasI124)
II,429)
223
Concretely,eachIisnotmerelyanegopolebutanIwithallitsaccomplishmentsand accomplishedacquisitions,includingtheworldasexistingandbeingsuch.Butintheepochandin thepurefocusuponthefunctioningoftheegopole,andthenceupontheconcretewholeoflifeandof itsintentionalintermediaryandfinalstructures,itfollowseoipsothatnothinghumanistobefound, neithersoulnorpsychiclifenorrealpsychophysicalhumanbeings;allthisbelongstothe phenomenon,totheworldasconstitutedpole.(Crisis183)
Husserlssolution,inotherwords,comesdowntoadistinctionbetweenrealand phenomenalsensesinwhichwecanunderstandtheIofthehumansubject. Thereishereatrulyirresolvableparadoxofsubjectivityonlyifweareforcedto understandthetranscendentalIasidentical,withoutqualification,withthereal I.ThisissuetrulyiscentraltoHusserlsenterprise.Iftheparadoxwere insoluble,Husserlexplains,itwouldmeanthatanactuallyuniversalandradical epochcouldnotbecarriedoutatall,thatis,forthepurposesofasciencerigorously boundtoit.(Crisis180).Forphenomenologywouldreducetopsychology.Itis interestingtorememberthatMerleauPontydeniedpreciselythepossibilityofa radicaloruniversalepoch,whichshowsfromacertainanglewhyhedidnothave toworryaboutHusserlsversionoftheparadoxofsubjectivity. ThedistinctionasphilosophersbetweenHusserlandMerleauPontycanbe illustratedthroughcontrastingstatementstheymakeontheirultimatetask. Husserlsrelentlessgoalistounderstand,andtohimthismeans,toalargeextent, framingthingseideticallythatis,seeingthemintheirconceptualform:
Fromthebeginningthephenomenologistlivesintheparadoxofhavingtolookupontheobviousas questionable,asenigmatic,andofhenceforthbeingunabletohaveanyotherscientificthemethan thatoftransformingtheuniversalobviousnessofthebeingoftheworldforhimthegreatestof enigmasintosomethingintelligible.(Crisis180)
224 OfcourseMerleauPonty,inacceptingthereduction,parallelsHusserlwhenhesays thatphilosophydispossesseshumanitybyinvitingittothinkofitselfasan enigma.(VI3)ButhefollowsthisupwiththedistinctlyunHusserliansentiment: Thisisthewaythingsareandnobodycandoanythingaboutit.(VI4) IncontrasttoHusserl,thatis,forMerleauPontytheobviousnessofthe world,orrathertheperceptualfaithwithwhichwetaketheworldandour relationwithit,intheiressentialoneness,forgranted,is,strictlyspeaking,beyond intelligibility.ItisinterestinginthisregardthatHusserlcantacitlyconcedethis point,atleastinacertainlimitedrespect,yetwithoutacceptingitsconsequences. Thushewrites,
Noteventhesinglephilosopherbyhimself,withintheepoch,canholdfasttoanythinginthis elusivelyflowinglife,repeatitalwayswiththesamecontent,andbecomesocertainofitsthisness anditsbeingsuchthathecoulddescribeit,documentit,sotospeak(evenforhisownpersonalone), indefinitivestatements.(Crisis178)
ItismorethanapparentthatHusserlthrivesontheselfimageofbeinga
393MerleauPontymakessimilarlyderogatoryremarksonthesuperficialversionofparadoxical
thinkingintheNaturelectures.See:N108,114.Thereferencesherearetotheparadoxes generatedbyrelativitytheory.
226
Thoughtcannotignoreitsapparenthistory,ifitisnottoinstallitselfbeneaththewholeofour experience,inapreempiricalorderwhereitwouldnolongermerititsname;itmustputtoitselfthe problemofthegenesisofitsownmeaning.(VI12)
227 transcendentalattitude394,andclearly,itcannotforhimpulleffectively consciousnessoutofitsimmersionintheworld,itsprereflectivehome:AndifIdo notremainwith[perceptualfaith],whatelsecanIdoexceptreenterintomyself andseektheretheabodeoftruth?(VI31)Theproblemwithphilosophiesof reflectionisthattheytrytocomprehendtheselfworldbondbyundoingitfirst, thenfalselytryingtorefabricateit:thereflectionrecuperateseverythingexcept itselfasaneffortofrecuperation,itclarifieseverythingexceptitsownrole.The mindseyetoohasitsblindspot(VI33)Furthermore,reflective thoughtperformsallitsoperationsundertheguaranteeofthetotalitythatit claimstoengender(VI33),whereasclearlythetotalityexceedsit. ItisclearthatthereflectiveattitudeappliestoDescartes,Kant,Husserl,and evenHegelindifferentways.Themomentofrecoveryorrecuperationrepresented byreflection,andultimatelytheselfinterrogationofthoughtinthenaturalattitude thatHusserlidentifiesasthephenomenologicalreduction,isproblematic,indeed paradoxical395,insofarasitcontainsamomentofdisruptionornoncoincidence396 whichwehaveseenbefore:Whatisgivenisnotamassiveandopaqueworld,ora
394Iftherestillisanydoubtaboutthis,MerleauPontysownwordsshouldputittorest:Withone
strokethephilosophyofreflectionmetamorphosestheeffectiveworldintoatranscendentalfield;in doingso,itonlyputsmebackattheoriginofaspectaclethatIcouldneverhavehadunless, unbeknowntomyself,Iorganizedit.(VI44) 395MerleauPonty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollgedeFrance19521960.Tr.John ONeill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970(p.106):Reductioninvolvesa paradox. 396MerleauPontymakesthepointthatphilosophyismoreorlessatranslation.Onemightgosofar astosaythattheproblemsoftranslationarecoextensive,forMerleauPonty,withthoseofhisstyle ofphilosophy,whicheffectsatranslationofthemutesenseofnature/beingintothelanguageof concepts(i.e.,languageinitspropositionalcognitiverole).Forapowerfulandrelevantexamination oftheissueoftranslationfromwithinthephenomenologicalhermeneuticaltraditionsee: Vandevelde,Pol.TheTaskoftheInterpreter:Text,Meaning,andNegotiation.Pittsburgh:Universityof PittsburghPress,2005
MerleauPontydoesconsiderchallengestothispointofview.Forexample,
headdressesthekeychallengethatsaysthathowreflectiongetstoitsperchis irrelevant,astheprocessislikealadderthatcanbekickedaway;buthenoteson thecontrarythatinthatcase,there[wouldbe]nolongertheoriginatingandthe derivedandhencenophilosophyofreflection,strictlyspeaking,atall.(VI35)In otherwords,theladderisbuiltintothedefinitionofreflectivityinrelationto somethinglikefirstorder(unreflected)experience. Yethedoesnotendorsequietism,either.Itisaquestionnotofputtingthat perceptualfaithinplaceofreflection,butonthecontraryoftakingintoaccountthe totalsituation,whichinvolvesreferencefromtheonetotheother.(VI35,my emphasis)(Recallthatwehaveseenthisreferencetothetotalsituationabove.) Thisisofcourseexactlywhatsetsuptheproblematicofnaturenamely,the problemofatotalitythatcannot,intermsofspirit,fullyenvelopitself,butwhich knowsitselftobebonded,rooted,andevenensconcedtherein.Thatbondisof courseexactlywhatmakespossiblethetruthevenasthetruthinthisdeeper ontologicalsense(deeperthanlinguisticconceptualtruth)devolvesinto contradictoryconceptswhenweattempttoexpressitlinguisticallylogically.The
229 unityofthisbond,aprereflectiveunitythattranscends,finally,thedistinction betweenidentityandnonidentitythatpreoccupiestheGermanIdealists,is irrecoverable:therelationbetweenathoughtanditsobjectcontainsneitherthe wholenoreventheessentialofourcommercewiththeworldwhichweshallhere calltheopennessupontheworld(ouvertureaumonde)397(VI35) B.HyperReflection SowhatdoesMerleauPontyopposetoreflection,pureandsimple,without replacingreflection(thetranscendentalattitude)withperceptualfaith(the naturalattitude)?HisanswerisHyperreflection.Hyperreflectionisthus,Iwould propose,akindofthirdattitudetomatchthethirdwayMerleauPontymentions elsewhere:anaturaltranscendentalattitudeifyouwill,whichcomestobeingan awarenessofwhatHeideggercallsradicalfinitude.398InMerleauPontysparlance, whatneedstobegraspedis,asusual,theprimacyofperception.
Tofoundthelatter[perception]ontheformer[reflection],andthedefactoperceptiononthe essenceofperceptionsuchasitappearstoreflection,istoforgetthereflectionitselfasadistinctact ofrecovery.Inotherwords,wearecatchingsightofanotheroperationbesidestheconversionto reflection,morefundamentalthanit,ofasortofhyperreflection(surrflexion)thatwouldalsotake itselfandthechangesitintroducesintothespectacleintoaccount.Itaccordinglywouldnotlosesight ofthebrutethingandthebruteperceptionandwouldnotfinallyeffacethem,wouldnotcutthe
397ItseemsthatforMerleauPonty,quantummechanicsshowsthatthereisnorepresentationof
230
organicbondsbetweentheperceptionandthethingperceivedwithahypothesisofinexistence.399 (VI38)
Thetaskforphilosophy,byimplication,istothinktheworldoftranscendenceinits transcendence,difficultlyandevenimpossibly,usingthesignificationsofwordsto express,beyondthemselves,ourmutecontactwiththethings,whentheyarenotyet thingssaid.Wemightcallthistheparadoxofreflection:Thereflectionfinds itselfthereforeinthestrangesituationofsimultaneouslyrequiringandexcludingan inversemovementofconstitution.(VI45)400 MerleauPontyfindsinhisnotionofhyperreflectionawaytocritique Husserlsidealisticinterpretationofphenomenologicalmethod.401Whatthenotion thateverytranscendentalreductionisalsoaneideticreductionmeans(aHusserlian principlewehavequotedelsewhere),forhim,isthatwecannotcapturethe concretefluxofexistence.ToreflectinHusserlsstark,transcendentalsenseisto
disengagefromthethings,perceptions,world,andperceptionoftheworld,bysubmittingthemto asystematicvariation,theintelligiblenucleithatresistItthereforebyprincipleleavesuntouched thetwofoldproblemofthegenesisoftheexistentworldandofthegenesisoftheidealization performedbyreflectionandfinallyevokesandrequiresasitsfoundationahyperreflectionwherethe ultimateproblemswouldbetakenseriously.(VI456)
399Compare:45reflection:[as]reflection,return,reconquest,orrecovery,itcannotflatteritself
231 NotethatevenhereMerleauPontydoesnotstrictlyspeakingopposeeitherthe eideticorphenomenologicalreductions;hesimplywantstopushfurtherand deeper,inanefforttobetrulytruetothethingsthemselvesandtheirparadoxical (becauseaccomplishedthroughdifference)unitywithus.AsLangerpointsout helpfully,MerleauPontyslaterprocedureofthinkingtheorigin,usingreflectionto gobeyondit,isradicallyparadoxicalonlyinawaythatmatchesourown(i.e., humanitysown)paradoxicalbeingintheworldinthefirstplace.402(Langer1656) Indeed,onceagain,aswehavecometoexpect,MerleauPontyfindsthereversalof theHusserlianimpulseinHusserlsownphenomenologicalimperative:In recognizingthateveryreflectioniseideticand,assuch,leavesuntouchedthe problemofourunreflectedbeingandthatoftheworld,Husserlsimplyagreesto takeuptheproblemwhichthereflectiveattitudeordinarilyavoidsthe discordancebetweenitsinitialsituationanditsends.(VI46)Eveninanearlier essay,MerleauPontymakesasimilarpoint,saying,withwhatMerleauPonty interpretsasthematureHusserl:Wemust,rather,becomeawareofthisparadox thatweneverfreeourselvesfromtheparticularexceptbytakingoverasituation thatisallatonce,andinseparably,bothlimitationandaccesstotheuniversal.403 Hyperreflectionbecomesanothernameofphilosophyitself.Ittakes
Tallahassee:TheFloridaUniversityPress,1989.(1645)
403MerleauPonty.PhenomenologyandtheSciencesofMan.Tr.JohnWild.InThePrimacyof
Perception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.(p.82)
theworld?Thatis,hedeclaresinmanyplacesvariationsofthisthought:Thereisa Logosofthenaturalaestheticworld,onwhichtheLogosoflanguagerelies.(N 212)404WhatiskeytoseeisthatMerleauPontydoesnotwanttodenyintelligibility tothegroundormainspring,hesimplywantstodenythatitiscompletely isomorphic,asitwere,withhumanunderstanding.Inthiswayitisakintothe beinginitselfandforitselfMerleauPontyspokeofbefore.AlreadyinInPraiseof Philosophy,MerleauPontyobservesthatmancontainsinsilencealltheparadoxes ofphilosophy.405Thatis,humanitysownbeinghasadialecticallogicthatcanbe expressedinwords,butonlyobliquely.MerleauPontysunderstandingofthe tightlywoundunityofcontrariesinBeingactually,inhiseyes,servestopreserveas opposedtowoundtheintelligibilityofBeing.Thusheremarks(VI268)thatIdeasII trieswronglytodisentangleknots,sincedisentanglementdestroysintelligibility! Cartesiandualism,forinstance,hasincreasedintelligibilityofpartsattheexpense ofmakingentirelyunintelligiblethewholethatis,thewholebeingthatisalive, embodied,thinking,andsensing.Hyperreflectionrestoresthesenseofthiswhole,
404SeealsoVI,145:mindorthoughtissublimationoftheflesh. 405MerleauPonty,Maurice.InPraiseofPhilosophyandOtherEssays.Evanston:Northwestern
UniversityPress,1988(pp.634)
precedenttoithasmaturedsincePP,thoughsubtly.Noticewhathesaysinthe earliertextabouttheissue:
Itwillperhapsbemaintainedthataphilosophycannotbecenteredaroundacontradiction,andthat allourdescriptions,sincetheyultimatelydefythought,arequitemeaningless.Theobjectionwould bevalidifwewerecontenttolaybarealayerofprelogicalormagicalexperiences.Forinthatcase wewouldhavetochoosebetweenbelievingthedescriptionsandabandoningthought,orknowing whatwearetalkingaboutandabandoningourdescriptions.[Thus]wemustreturntothecogito, insearchofamorefundamentalLogosthanthatofobjectivethought(PP425)
Inaslightbutimportantcontrasttothesestatements,theMerleauPontyoftheVIis morecomfortablelivingintheabsenceofanother,deeper,nonobjectiveLogos. Thisisnottosaythereisnosuchlogos,orthatwildBeinglacksmeaninginits wildness(wehavealreadyseenthatNatureforMerleauPontyautoproducesits ownmeaning),onlythatthedistancebetweenitsmeaningandthemeaningsofthe ideal,reflectiveorderisinacertainsenseunbridgeable,andthathereinliesthe ultimateparadoxofreflection:thatwhilethereisameaningwithoutthought,justas thereistranscendencewithoutimmanencethesetruthscanonlybeappreciated throughthought,immanently.Consciousnessisbondedtoitsunconsciousorigin; weareprivilegedtoknowthedepthsofourignorance.
406Silverman,Hugh.IsMerleauPontyInsideorOutsidetheHistoryofPhilosophy?InChiasms:
MerleauPontysNotionofFlesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYork Press.Albany:2000(p.138)
235
[Thedialecticis]Selfmanifestation,disclosure,intheprocessofformingitself.Thedialecticis indeedallthis,anditis,inthissense,whatwearelookingfor.Ifnonethelesswehavenothitherto saidso,itisbecause,in[the]historyofphilosophy,ithasneverbeenallthatunadulteratedly;itis becausethedialecticisunstable(inthesensethatthechemistsgivetotheword),itiseven essentiallyandbydefinitionunstable,sothatithasneverbeenabletoformulateitselfintotheses withoutdenaturingitself,andbecauseifonewishestomaintainitsspirititisperhapsnecessaryto notevennameit.(VI92)
MerleauPontyformallyendorsesthemethodofdialecticinchapter2ofVI,entitled, ReflectionandInterrogation.(VI89)(Thechapteritselfisasustainedresponseto SartresBeingandNothingness.)MerleauPontygoesontogiveadetailedaccountof whathemeansbytheinstability(quotedabove)ofdialectic,itsnatureof subverting,mediating,andtransforming,notforthesakeofrestinginonefinalized thesis,butforthesakeofexpressingtheinnernatureofBeingitself.Heremorethan anywhereelse,MerleauPontysadoptionofacertainradicalHeracliteanism,one thatbreaksawayfrombothPlatonicandHusserliancontainers(whichopposean existentialHeracliteanfluxtoanidealParmenideanorder,sotospeak)becomes clear.Indeed,heallbutsayssohimselfbyapprovinglypointingoutthatHeraclitus alreadyshowedtheway,oppositedirectionscoincidinginthecircularmovement. (VI92) Asweexaminedbefore,MerleauPontysthoughtembracesaparadigmof
236
oftheindexofthethinkerandwhathethinks)coversaswarmofrelationswithdoublemeaning, incompatibleandyetnecessarytooneanother(complementarity,asthephysicistssaytoday),andthat thiscomplextotalityisthetruthoftheabstractdichotomyfromwhichwestarted?(VI92,my emphasis)
negation,theeither/orTranscendenceisidentitywithindifference.(VI225)
408Inotherrespects,ofcourse,manyofMerleauPontysdialecticalobservationsmirrorHegels
237
dialecticisthatwhichthinksitrecomposesbeingbyatheticthought,byanassemblageof statements,bythesis,antithesis,andsynthesis;thegooddialecticisthatwhichisconsciousofthe factthateverythesisisanidealization,thatBeingisnotmadeupofidealizationsorofthingssaid,as theoldlogicbelieved,butofboundwholeswheresignificationneverisexceptintendency(VI94)
238 nevercometofillinthephilosophicalquestion,sincethisobturationwouldtake fromitthedepthandthedistancethatareessentialtoit.(VI101)Butwecanand dospeakaboutthissituationperhapsaclueastothemysteryofthe intelligibilityofaNaturethatmakesitselfunknowntotheprogramsof intelligibilityimposeduponiteideticallybygraspingthought. Relatedtothequietismchargeisthatofskepticism.MerleauPonty himselfhastoworryaboutskepticism,ofcourse,becausehehasopenedhimselfto thecriticismofhispositionthatarguesthatit(MerleauPontysstanceon philosophy)effectivelyamountstoaversionofskepticism.Thekindofskepticism, namely,thatthrowsitshandsupanddeclaringthatphilosophyresolvesmerelyto unresolvableparadoxes.OnemightcallthisCarneadeanskepticism,afterthe famousAcademicwhowouldlectureonedayforaposition,thenextdayagainstit, demonstratingthefutilityofphilosophizing(underonestandardinterpretation)in thefirstplace.Thiskindofskepticismeventuallydevelopedintothecanonical Pyrrhonianviewoftheunresolvabilityofequipollentviewsinphilosophical disputes,aviewthatresemblesMerleauPontysupuntilonerealizesthatMerleau Pontygoesfurtherthantheskepticbyaffirmingacertainequipollenceinthetruth itself.Inotherwords,MerleauPontymakesametaphysicalclaimsupporting himselfonthewingsofaprereflectivefaithaboutNature,thoughadmittedly withoutthedogmaticsupportof,say,aninfalliblefirstpremise.MerleauPontys metaphysicsisstill,inthisregard,postmetaphysical. StrictPyrrhonismaside,thefactisthatwhileMerleauPontyisvigorously antidogmatical,eventothepointofembracinganinfinitedialectics,heiscertainly
239 notskepticalinsofarasskepticismisanegativisticapproachtophilosophical problemsthatdeniesonlywhatitcanfirstidentifyasmeaningfulinthefirstplace. Theskepticinthissenseis,inSartresterms,inbadfaith,playing(nowin Wittgensteinslanguage)thelanguagegameofphilosophyinordertoundermine philosophy.ThusMerleauPontyexplicitlyopposesskepticismfornegatingor callingintothequestiontheexistenceoftheworld(andoftruth)toperceptualfaith astheeffortlessprereflectiveconfidenceintheworldthateventheskeptic presupposes.(VI95)Indeed,MerleauPontyconcernshimselfwithrefuting(or defusing)skepticismfromthebeginningoftheVI.409Laterhequestionsatleast Cartesianskepticismfortacitlypresupposingthepositivityofthepsychic.(VI95) Onemightcallthisaclassicallyphenomenologicalcritiqueofthepsychologistic assumptionsoftheskeptic,whomustimplicitlyadvanceametaphysicsofsolipsistic idealismtogroundhis/herpoints. MerleauPontysattitudetowardsphilosophyisnotdismissivebutrather, onemightsay,bothcelebratoryandironic.Heunderstandsphilosophytobeatfirst akindofefforttoreplaceperceptualfaithwithawebofstatementsandconcepts, withanidealorder,whereasthereisneverreallyanyquestionofreplacingthe worldandphilosophyitselfcandeterminethis,too.Theworldissomething experienced,whilephilosophyistocapturemomentsofthisexperientiality,this primordialcontactwithtruth,inpartbutnotinwhole.Thatwhichunitesustothe worldintentionalityisonenameforitisthatwhichseparatesusfromitaswell.
409SeeVI4,6;95
Intheend,however,itcannotbedeniedthatthereisacertainkinship betweenradicalPyrrhonianskepticismandMerleauPontysprocedureespecially inthespiritofopennesspreachedfamouslybytheoriginalPyrrhonists,fromwhom thetermskepticism(literallysearching)derives.Thelink,asexplainedby MerleauPontyhimself,issummedupthusly:If[skepticism]multipliescontrasts andcontradictions,itisbecausetruthdemandsit.AndthusMontaigne,askeptic whoMerleauPontyadmires,aswehavealreadyseen,beginsbyteachingthatall truthcontradictsitself;perhapsheendsuprecognizingthatcontradictionistruth. (Montaigne198,myemphasis) C.MerleauPontyandMysticism IsMerleauPontyamystic?Isthereareligiousdimensiontothisthought?
241 oftheUpanishads,whilehisembraceofanidentityofoppositescrossesthefinal barrierofclassicallogic(inNeoplatonism,logismosasopposedtoNous)thatstands inthewayofaphilosophicalexpression(whichmustalsooccludeorobturate) whatonemightcalltheOne. MerleauPontyslackofspiritualisticreferences,howeveratleast comparedtohisinterestinart,literature,politics,psychology,andthesciences betrayadeeplysecularmind.Atthesametime,evenherethereliesaparadox.For MerleauPontystatesinoneplace:Forme,philosophyconsistsingivinganother nametowhathaslongbeencrystallizedunderthenameofGod.410 Theambiguity ofthestatementspeakseloquentlyforitself:MerleauPontysphilosophyispure religioninamannerreligionitselfdoesnotthink.Inthisspirit,Iamtemptedto callMerleauPontyamethodologicalmystic,orathinkerwithtendenciestowards, butnorealtiesto,aphilosophicalmysticism,perhapslikeHeideggerand Wittgensteininthelastcentury,butunlike,say,SimoneWeil,EmmanuelLevinas,or MuhummadIqbal. Ofcourse,thereisnoshortageofreligiousimagery,intendedassuchornot, inMerleauPontyswritings.Wehavealreadyseenhisreferencetomiracles,for examplethemiracleofthesenseorgan,themiracleoftotality,etc.Thereare othersuchreferencesaswell,almosttothepointofinvokingacelebratory attitudetowardsexistenceakintoChristianNeoplatonistPseudoDionysiusthe
410MerleauPonty,Maurice.TheMerleauPontyReader.Lawlor,LeonardandTedToadvine,eds.
NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007(p.240)
242 Areopagite.411Italsocannotbeignoredthathismetaphysicsoffleshhasaclear symbolicconnectiontothefleshofChrist,theman(visible)who,moreover, was/isGod(invisible).Oragain,therearetheinvocationofperceptualfaith,the ultimatemysteryoftheworldandbeing(PPxxiii),preestablishedharmony,grace andthegiftofvision,andfinally,tomoreindirectandesotericreferences,suchas therepeateduseofdepthtodescribetheabsoluteaclassicallygnostic (Valentinian)descriptionofthedivine,accordingtoElainePagels.412 ButIthinkthatGaryMadisongoestoofarwhenheclaimswecanonly appreciateMerleauPontyinaChristiancontext.413Itistruethathisattitudeseems ultimatelytobeoneofgratitude,humility,andwonderbeforeBeing.Butthisisalso trueofplentyofsecularphilosophers,nottomentionmysticsfromotherreligions. Also,thereisawayinwhichMadisonsclaimmightalsobetooweak,inadditionto beingtoostrong.ForvirtuallyanyphilosopherwritingintheChristianWesteven anatheistlikeSartrecanbesaidtobeindeliblymarkedbythedialecticsof Christianity.Byitselfthisilluminesverylittle. Therearecertainlythosebesidesthepresentauthorwhohaveidentifieda distinctaffinitybetweenMerleauPontianphenomenologyandcertainmystical schools;acaseinpointisNewYorkUniversityHebrewStudiesprofessorElliotR. Wolfson,whousesMerleauPontysthoughttoilluminetheKabbalah.Comments WolfsonintheProloguetohismonumentalworkLanguage,Eros,Being:
411Forexample,themiracleofthemanyandtheoneinreferencetopaintingandbiology.(N
243
IshalllabormoreonthepathwaysofMerleauPontysthinking,asinhisthoughtIfindanaffinity withtheunderstandingIhavederivedfromthestudyofkabbalisticliteratureandconsequentlyfeel itislegitimatetousehisjargontoformulatehermeneuticalandphenomenologicalsuppositionsin readingthesesources.414
414Wolfson,ElliottR.Language,Eros,Being:KabbalisticHermeneuticsandPoeticImagination.New
244 miracleofexperience,asifitwereawonderfully(thoughimperfectly)coordinated dance,involvinggreatsuccessandevenknowledgeofakindthatnevertheless cannotbeexplainedintermsofreflectionalone.MerleauPontyrecognizestheway inwhichhumanbeings(andsubjectivity)areessentiallyofthesamestuff(the flesh)astheworld,orNature,andthatthereinliesacluetothefundamental compatibilityandevenonenessofselfandworld.Butthereisalsoaradicalbreak,a dehiscence,orseparation,whichsomehow,inaparadoxicalmanner,makesthis relationshippossible.Thatis,thereisnotmerelyoneness,butamultiplicity constitutingonenessthusthereiswholeness,theultimatethemeofallphilosophy. VI.Conclusion Inhisarticle,PhenomenologyandHyperReflection,TedToadvinenicely
summarizeshisown(andtoalargeextentmineaswell)approachtoMerleau Pontyslaterwritings:
Despitehisongoingcriticalexaminations,MerleauPontypresentsphenomenologyinapositive lightthroughouthislaterwritingsThisisnottodenythatMerleauPontyrecognizes,and increasinglyaccentuates,certainparadoxicaltensionsofthephenomenologicalmethod.Butthese tensionsinevitablypointusbacktothecontradictoryintertwiningofimmanenceandtranscendence thatistheperceivedworld.416
416Toadvine,Ted.PhenomenologyandHyperReflection.InMerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Eds.
RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(pp.289)
245 ForMerleauPonty,philosophyisnotamatterofsolvingaproblem,butof understandingtheproblemasitsowntruth.(Thisisdifferent,ofcourse,than understandingtruthasaproblem,perhapsamorecharacteristicpostureforradical postmodernismthantheperceptuallypiousMerleauPonty.)WhenMerleau Pontystatesaproblem,itisstatedverymuchassomethingtobefurtherdeepened, tobeexplored(theabsoluteisdepth),etc.Towardsaddressinganissueinbiology, forexample,hesaysapprovingly,asifhungeringtolearnfromthelessonofanother discipline:Letssayfirstthattheexpressionsemployedbythenewschoolof biologyarenotsolutions:thenotionsoffieldandgradientaretheindexofaproblem, notresponses.(N151,myemphasis)ContrarytoBehnke,IdontbelieveMerleau Pontyabandoneddescriptionforexplanation417;onthecontrary,heshowswhy aproperdescription,attentivetotheparadoxicalnuancesofthetruthmade availabletous,makes(ultimate)explanationsmoot.Explanationisthegoal,one mightsay,ofreflection;hyperreflection,bycontrast,comesbacktodescriptionby wayofselfdescriptionoraradical,uncompromisingembraceofthefinitudeof reflectionitself. ItalsomayseemthatMerleauPontyismoreradicalandsubversivethan Husserl(forexample,bythrowingouttheuniversalisticortranshistorical pretensionsofphilosophyonceandforall),butthis,aswehaveseen,canbeturned around.Husserlsintentionsare,intheend,revolutionaryandsubversiveinaway thatMerleauPontysarenot.ForHusserlseeksaradicalreshapingofourwhole
417Behnke,Elizabeth.MerleauPontysOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhnomnologiedela
perception.InMerleauPontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht: KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.49)
418Moreprecisely:Truephilosophyconsistsinrelearningtolookattheworld.(PPxxiii)
247
Conclusion
Wehavenowreachedtheendofourinvestigations.Inthisconcluding sectionIwilloffersomewiderreflectionsonbothsomeofthesystematic philosophicallessonstobelearnedfromtheHusserlMerleauPontyencounter. I.MerleauPontyvisvisHusserl InthisdissertationwehaveseenhowHusserlandMerleauPonty understandandapplythephenomenologicalmethodandhowtheyinterpretits results.Inparticular,wehaveseenhowMerleauPontyreconsidersandmodifies thebasicHusserlianprogramwhilesomehow,Ihaveargued,remainingtrueto fundamentalaspectsofit.HeremainstruetoHusserlatleastinthesenseof embracingtheHusserliancentralizationoflivingconsciousnessandthe phenomenologicalreductionthatbringsthisconsciousnessanditsworldrelationto activeawareness(reflection). AlthoughwedidnotexamineHusserlssocalledlaterperiodinmuch detail,wedidreviewIdeasII,which,throughthenotionsofthepersonalistic attitudeandtheUmwelt,alreadycontainsmuchofthecoreofthelifeworld philosophythatwastolateremerge.ThroughouthiswritingsHusserldisplaysan ambivalence,asMerleauPontypointsout,regardingthenaturalattitudein particular:isitleftbehind,somehow,inthetranscendentalreduction,orisitmerely illuminedtherein?Dowecomethroughthereductiontoknowourselvesas naturalconsciousnessesmorefully,ordowerealizeourselvesasselfsplit
248 betweenhigherandlowerlevels,thelatterofwhichissubsumedinthemore comprehensive(becauseintersubjectiveandorientedtowardstheuniversal) former?IhavearguedthatwewouldberemisstounderstandHusserlasanentirely consistentthinkerwithapredeterminedagenda;ontheotherhand,onecannot ignorehispersistentlyrationalisticorientationandpreference,ifyouwill,forthe realmofideas. Itistooeasy,however,toassignMerleauPontythelabelsofanti essentialist,antirationalist,etc.Rather,MerleauPontyseesthesamething,asit were,thatHusserldoes;heknowstheworldtobeaphenomenalfieldormilieu,not animpermeableObjectseparablefromitsmannersofgivenness,andheknows consciousnesstobeintertwinedwiththeworldthroughitsbodyanditsintuitive graspoftheworlds(inexactly)eideticstructure.ButMerleauPontyalso,critically, seesthematrixofbeingandconsciousness(or,simply,Being,theontological totality)tobe,inacertainsense,ineffable.Asawhole,Beingcannotbeproperly thoughtaKantianpointfromthelattersTranscendentalDialecticbutneither doesreasonhaveautonomysuchthatitmaytametheformsofexperienceinto anidealistictemplateofdeterminacy.Andthewholeisnotaregulativeidea,such thatadivorcebetweentheoryandpracticebecomestheonlywaytoaccommodate it.Rather,thoughtispartofthewhole,itispartofnature,evenifitisthatpartthat hasthemeaningofwhatisapartandcontrarytonatureacontrarinessendemic tonatureitself. ThiskindofterritoryobviouslylendsitselftocomparisonswithHegelian dialectic,withwhichitisnotunrelatedevenforMerleauPonty.Hegel,famously,
249 understandsthespirittoknowitselfthroughitsidentificationwithahigherform ofnature,namelytheculturalworldandthedomainsofart,religion,and philosophy.AsIreadhim,MerleauPonty,bycontrast,understandswhatHegel meansbyselfknowingspirittobeitselfaformofalienationfromitsownnature, thoughatthesametimeanecessaryonethatholdsnatureandspiritalikeina tensionthatstemsfromanoriginaryunityofopposites,whichcannolongerbe thoughtexceptparadoxically,andwhichleavesitslegacyoflastingambiguityinthe humanexperience. ThusforMerleauPonty,Natureisneithertheobjectofthoughtnorasubject, noreventheircoincidenceinahighersynthesis,butrathertheparadoxicaldepth (theabsolute)andotherness(whichisnonethelessparadoxicallyinclusive)of thehumanspirit.ByitselfthisisnotaHusserlianview,butitistheculminationofa systematicmeditationMerleauPontyreferstofromveryearlyonasthe phenomenologyofphenomenologyareachingofthelimitsofwhatisthinkable insubjectiveorconstitutionalterms,limitswhichrevealthedependenceofspiriton aprereflectivenaturewhichisalso,atthesametime,preciselynotamenableto theoreticizationalongthelinesofascientificnaturalism.Inthisway,Merleau Pontysphilosophypreservesthesenseofconsciousnessrevealedinthe transcendentalattitudeandthroughthetranscendentalepochandreduction,but withoutgoingsofarastoallowingthoughttotakepossessionoftheworld.The transcendentalattitudebecomessubsumedintheparadoxofnatureina wholenessortotality,thatis,whichcanonlybethoughtasanunthinkable.
250 AllofthisexposesasignficantfaultlinebetweenHusserlandMerleauPonty. ForHusserlseemstobroadlyacceptthescientificphysicalisticdefinitionofnature, addingonlythatitssenseasphysicalnatureisderivedfromtranscendental subjectivity.ButthiswillnotdoforMerleauPonty.Naturecannotbelimitedtosuch asense,becauseitcannotbefullygraspedinthefirstplace.Astheconditionforthe possibilityofconsciousness,itisnecessarilybeyondit.Atthesametime,the transcendentalattitudetakentotheextremeofhyperreflection,whichthen problematizesthescopeofthetranscendentalattitudeitselfisabletounderstand thisbeyondasthehiddendepthsofitsownself,thesoilofsubjectivity.Dueto thisintertwiningbetweenthetwothisisMerleauPontysspeculativemove,if youwillsubjectandnature(note:notobject)arenotsimplymutuallyalienated substances,butrathermembersofanidentityrelationthatisnevertheless,atits core,selfsplitting(dehiscence,theparadoxoftheother,etc.).Comparisonsto whatHeideggercomestocallsamenesswithoutdifferenceorbelonging togetherareprobablyapthere. ItisclearthatMerleauPontyisinakindofstruggleonlyorprimarilywith thetranscendentalidealistHusserlofthemiddleperiod(andofthelaterperiod,to theextentthatthisHusserlremains).WecanonlyproperlyassessMerleau Pontysphilosophyonceweacceptthepremiseoftherebeingcertainself contradictionswithinHusserlsthoughtitself.Phenomenologybecomesin MerleauPontyshandsameditationontheparadoxesofhumanexistenceand incarnationleftbarebyHusserlsanalysis.Colloquiallyspeaking,onemightsayin thissensethatMerleauPontypitcheshistentinHusserlsbackyard.
251 Thusthisdissertationisaboutacritique,butitisastrangelyinternalone. MerleauPontyoperateswithinaframeworklargely(thoughnotwholly)definedby phenomenology.Heshouldbeseen,Ithink,assomeonewhoquietlybutdecisively reformsphenomenologyandbringsitintoasphereofinteractiverelevancewiththe sciencesandwithotherrealmsofculturehistory,politics,art,religionby softeningthedichotomiesthatHusserlrigidlyputsintoplace. II.MerleauPontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers ForMerleauPonty,philosophyasphenomenologyisanexercisein dialectics.Notpositiveornegativedialectics,sotospeak,butthedialecticsofself meditation.LikeMontaigne,MerleauPontyfindsaninfinityinhimself.Heis fascinatedbyexperienceanditsopenendedness.Hefindsthissame wondrousnessinHusserlswritings,buthealsoidentifiesrationalist,Cartesian presuppositionstherethatdictateacertainresult.Incontrast,MerleauPontys dialecticisnotamovementtowardsanything.Experienceneitherbeginsnorends inthought,butoutsideofit.Thusphilosophyisamattersimplyofovercomingits need,asitwere,toovercomeexperienceitisamatteroffindingitshomenotin itself(thisistheHegeliansolution,thesatisfactionofconsciousness)butinthe questforitself,whichnecessarilydoesnotendinitself(asaconsciousness). ThisisnotKant:forwhileKant,too,placesalimitonreason,helimits experienceitselftoanartificiallycontrolleddomain,adiscursivefiction.InMerleau Ponty,humanityisplungedintoaseaofunknowing,sotospeak,ontheraftof
252 perceptualfaith.Therearenoepistemicguarantees,notevenofatranscendental kind. MerleauPontysembraceoftheHeideggerianbeingintheworldinthe PrefaceofthePhenomenologyofPerceptioniswellknown,butMerleauPontys conceptionofnatureandspiritdepartsfromHeideggersinasignificantway.For whereasHeideggerprivilegesBeingoverbeings,suggestingaradicalbreak betweenthemthatisconstantlycoveredoverbymetaphysics,MerleauPonty doesnotunderstandBeingtobeanythingotherthantheinterplayofnatureand spirit,orexteriorityandinteriority,inacarnalfieldhefamouslytermstheflesh, andwhichhealsoidentifieswithnatureinanexpanded,holisticsense.Inthisway, MerleauPontyisclosertoHegel,butagainwithacriticaldifference.ForMerleau Pontyrejectstheideathatnature(andhencetheself,sinceweareofnature)can befullyknown,sinceitisnecessarilyunknowntoitself.InthisregardMerleau PontycallsonSchellingsnotionoftheAbgrundorabysswithinGodthatisthe savageprincipleofnature.MerleauPontyislessinterestedinthetheologicalor moralimplicationsofthisthantheepistemologicalandontologicalones:natureisa wildbeingthatcannotbeknownbyspiriteventhoughspiritisofit. Inthisway,MerleauPontybecomesinterestedintheFreudianconceptofan unconscious,inthathesawastructuralparallelbetweennature(orthebody)as theunconsciousofspiritandtheinternalstructureofthepsyche,aninterplayof consciousandunconsciousdimensions.
253 III.ThePersonalisticAttitudeandtheLimitsofReflection WehavespentagooddealoftimeexaminingMerleauPontysreformulation ofphenomenologyintermsoftheinterplayofperception,reflection,andwhatI havecalledathirdandnewtypeofattitude,hyperreflection.Hyperreflectionisa kindofmetaattitude,anattitudeinwhichthenaturalandreflectiveattitudestake theirrespectivepositions. Husserlsrecognitionoftheuntenabilityofthesharpnessofthenatural/ transcendentaldivideisreflectedinhisnotionofthepersonalisticattitude.Of course,here,thenaturalattitudecomesperilouslyclosetomergingwiththe transcendental;someofHusserlsdescriptionsofspiritsmackofasimilaror identicalabsolutismandontologicalprivilege.MerleauPontyisfundamentally righttoidentifyacentraltensioninHusserlsphilosophybetweenanunderstanding ofthenaturalattitudeasonethatisopposedandsupersededinthe phenomenologicalreduction,ontheonehand,andanaturalattitudethatissub divided,initself,betweenlowerandhigherpoles(asIhavementionedabove).But HusserlspolesthenaturalisticandthepersonalisticarenotwhatMerleau Pontywouldhaveinmind.Afterall,thenaturalisticattitudeisnottrulynaturalat all.Itispreciselyunnatural,thepurelytheoreticallensofthescientist.Unlikethe transcendentalorphenomenologicalorreflectivestandpoint,itdoesnotseekto understandtheworldasexistentiallyknown,muchlesstounderstandthenatural attitudeitself.Itdoesnotthematizenaturalexperienceorbeing,itsimplyrestricts thefieldofexperiencetoacertainsetofeidthatframetheresultsofexperiments performedintheworld.Anotherwaytoputitisthatthereisnotrue,separable
254 scientificattitude.ThisiswhatMerleauPontymeanswhenhesuggestsinthe Naturelecturesthatscience(bywhichhereferstoscientificpraxisandnottheory) iscontinuoussimplywithexperience.Clearly,itisthepersonalisticattitudethat isthetruer,deeperformoftheeverydaynaturallifeoflivingsubjectsofhuman subjects,thoughofcourseevenanimalspossessUmwelten. Butwesawthatwithhisdescriptionofit,Husserlmakesofthepersonalistic attitudeakindofbasisforasubjectiveidealism.HowcanMerleauPontyavoidthis result?Hecandosopreciselybylimitingthescopeofreflection,byassigning reflectivityorthethinkingattitudetoaneideticmatrix,itselfhistorically conditioned,anattitudewhichatitsouterlimitsofreflexivityopensupintoan interrogationintoitsorigins.Nature,astheultimatesourceofmeaningandbeing (asopposedtotranscendentalsubjectivity,eitherindividualorintersubjective),is notcoincidentwiththeegocogito.Itappearsinvariousguisesasthehiddenother thatisalsothehiddenself,theunknowabledepththatissimultaneously inescapablytranscendent,andothersuchparadoxesthatresultfromtheattemptof reflectiontothinktheunthinkable.Itisknownthroughactsofcreativity,through thepulseoflifeandwilledmotion,andthroughtheprincipleoftotalitywhich eludesratiocinativeanalysisandyetmustbeunderstoodasbeingatthebasisofthe significanceoflanguage,behavior,art,politics,andevensexuality. IV.PhenomenologyasParadox Withbodilysubjectivity,MerleauPontysupplementsthefirstparadoxof phenomenology,thatofimmanenttranscendency(or,theprincipleoftheworlds
255 havingtobewithinusjustinordertobewithoutus)withitsflipside,namelythe principlethatfortheretobeawithinatall,thiswithinmustfirstbewithout, spreadoutintheworld,sotospeak. Ofcoursebothformulationsareincompleteandeven,technically, misleadinglydualisticintheirownright.ButthisiswhyMerleauPontyslater reflectionsconcentratepreciselyonthemysteryoftheunsayabilityofthisunion which,asHeraclitushadmaintainedofallcontraries,isonebecauseofdifference ratherthaninspiteofitanditsrelationtothought,whichmustcontradictitself, finally,torecreateasenseoftheunity,sotospeak,afterthefact. V.Naturalism MerleauPonty,unlikeHusserlorKant,doesnotopposeatimelessrealm(or sphereofconsciousness)toatemporalone.Sothereisalsoamoveinhimtowards naturalizationandimmanentism,thoughnotinthenaturalisticsenseofthosewho wouldcircumscribeconsciousnesswithinanunconsciousreality.MerleauPontys naturalismdefiesbothrealistandidealistinterpretationsoftheterm.Merleau Pontysnaturalismisphenomenological;hecannotbesafelyappropriatedby moderncognitivescientistsandthelike.Thisisaquestionofstartingpoint; modernnaturalismstartslaterthanitthinksitdoes.Itobscurestheoriginby theorizingit,indeedbyprivilegingtheoryoverexperience.Forwhatdoes experiencetellusaboutanatureorworldthathasnoshareinthemindor soul,whichisafteralldoingtheexperiencing?
256 HusserlandMerleauPonty,whilehavingverydifferentapproaches,areboth respectfulofthecomplexityfacinganytheoryofnatureinwhichhumansubjectivity istakenseriouslyasnonreducibletoscientificnaturalisticcausality,whileatthe sametimeinvolvedinthethickofperceptualexperience(asopposedtobeing directedtoanetherealPlatonicrealmofIdeas).Husserl,however,believedthatthe waytoovercomescientificnaturalismwastoswallowitwhole,asitwere,inthe gulpoftranscendentalsubjectivity.MerleauPontysapproachisrathertoquestion bothnaturalismandtranscendentalphilosophyatonceasvictimsoffalse absolutizationandavoidanceofthefundamentalparadoxesofhumanexistence.
257
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