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Alberto J. L. Carrillo Canán (BUAP / Mex) firstname.lastname@example.org Marco Calderón Zacaula (UDLAP / Mex) email@example.com
Concerning photography both the film theoretician Bazin and the philosopher of photography Flusser follow a well-known tradition according to which aesthetic experience belongs in the realm of the extraordinary. In this way what makes of a photograph an aesthetic object is that a photograph is somehow linked to the extraordinary. Nevertheless, Flusser thinks of photography in the frame of a general theory concerning “technical images,” and such images have, according to him, a quantized structure or nature. Consequently, the extraordinary character of photography would vary in a quantized way. Furthermore, again according to Flusser, in the nature of “technical images” there would be a reversal of meaning: existentially meaningful is the technical image itself and not what it represents. So, in the case of photography its “meaning vector” points not to the world but to the photograph itself: the photograph is real, not its object. Of course, the last idea implies a break with Bazin’s “ontology of the photographic image,” an ontology according to which not only the photograph and its object do have a “common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint,” but it is the photograph that awakens admiration for the object, the photograph being thus a mere means for that. To briefly explore relationships between Bazin’s and Flusser’s concepts of photography at the aesthetic and ontological level is the goal of this text. 1. Art and the Extraordinary It is particularly the Russian formalist school of aesthetics which starting from the distinction between prosaic and poetic language postulates that art has to do with the extraordinary whereas non-art has to do with the ordinary. As a matter of fact poetry uses language in an unusual way as compared with prose.1 From this almost banal observation, the formalist school develops a far-reaching and sophisticated aesthetics. A true champion of this aesthetics is, of course, the famous linguist Roman Jakobson.2 But for the sake of
See the references to “(…) the contrast … between the laws of poetic language and the laws of practical language” (AT 276). For the abbreviations and the literature used see the list at the end of this text. 2 See above all Jakobson’s pathbreaking essay What is Poetry? (P), and also Das Kunstwerk, part IX of Ein Blick auf die Entwicklung der Semiotik (S).
” (AT 276) In this way “(…) all of our habits retreat into the area of the unconsciously automatic (…)” (AT 276). Flusser goes on to the opposition between art and habit: “‘Art’ is that which opposes habit (…)” (W 53). 4 Similar thoughts can be found. and it is the more artful (artistic) the less probable the situation is that it produces. it exists to make one feel things. we see that as perception becomes habitual.” (AT 277) .’ to make forms difficult. ordinary products are perceived “without any effort (…).” (AT 277) In fine. and as such. for instance. one’s wife (…)” (AT 277). within this realm of unawareness. “(…) the less habitual. related to “human 3 Whenever the stress into some quotation comes from the author of the corresponding text we indicate it using the abbreviation i. We can paraphrase this idea by saying that art takes things out from the realm of the ordinary by putting them in the realm of the extraordinary.” (W 52) From this. According to Shklovsky.4 2. “(…) the great mass of habitual ordinary products that surrounds us day and night and that we hardly perceive (…)” (W 53) are common objects. Of course. and. a (italics from author).” (W 53) Complementarily. what escapes from perception.5 Notice that it is not simply that for Flusser art is something extraordinary but the reversal is true: the extraordinary in and by itself is art – of course. thus.” (AT 277. but for the sake of brevity we cannot follow them here. impeded language. “(…) habitualization devours works. the more it may be experienced (perceived) (…)” (W 53). Flusser and Art as the Improbable On his part. a. clear: “The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar. to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. In fact. Almost following Shklovsky. Shklovsky calls this breaking down of perceptive automatisms concerning an object “defamiliarization” (AT 277). i. And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life. “(…) lives are as if they had never been. roughened. Those products plunge (…) into the ocean of habit (…)” (W 55). thus. In any other cases the stress is ours. Of course. “[a]rt removes objects from the automatism of perception (…)” (AT 277). namely. One finds in Flusser Shklovsky’s idea of art as making perception difficult in the complementary version. Flusser says: “‘Aesthetic’ means ‘capable of being experienced’ and ‘habit’ implies anaethetics: that which has becomes habitual is no longer experienced at all. furniture.clarity we do prefer to refer to Viktor Shklovsky who says that “[i]f we start to examine the general laws of perception. 5 See Shklovsky: “The language of poetry is (…) a difficult. Flusser says that “‘[a]rt’ is any human activity that aims at producing improbable situations. non-art. the habitual is the ordinary. it becomes automatic. to make the stone stony. clothes.)3 The conclusion is. in McLuhan and in Heidegger. Such products ‘anesthetize’ (…).
(…) vulgarity” (W 56). L. May 2007. since a photograph is not only like the photographed object but. it has from its very becoming “ontological identity” (WC2 98) with its object. the aesthetic dimension of photography is unavoidably entangled with realism.7 3. in Peircean indexical sense. 6 It is in the frame of such theory that “habit. improbable form” (PhF 21) to something – as the very mark of the human. In order to avoid misconceptions we must still mention here that Flusser’s referred ideas are part of his very particular theory of “information. realism has nothing more to do with the aesthetic dimension of painting. whereas art falls on the side of “improbability” (W 56). an index of the photographed object. The fact should be.” (WC1 12fn. on account of being physically connected with them. likeness – the obsession of plastic realism – seems to be compelled into photography – and cinema. “indications. material “kind of identity” (WC1 96) or. From the very invention of the “technical images” (Flusser) on. “(…) the theory of communication.” (EP1 5) For example the track of a quail or the lights on the control panel of a railroad are indices of the quail in the forest and of the trains in different parts of the railroad track. are signs “(…) which show something about things. “[t]he photographic image is the object itself (…)” (WC1 14).” a theory that cannot be presented here but which conceives “informing” – giving “a unnatural. On the other hand. 7 For a broaden account of Flusser’s “philosophy of photography” see Carrillo Canán.. A photograph is. In fact. may become one of the ‘sciences of the spirit’ (…)” (W 10). . again in Peircean sense. fall on the side of the “probability” (W 56). 8 According to the famous Peircean definition. (…) ordinariness. A Parte Rei 51. thus. noniconic. electronic magazine. it shares “a common being” (WC1 15) with such object. according to Bazin. it shows something of its object by being “physical connected” (Peirce) to it.) Insofar as a photograph is an “impression” of some object or reality. It can be said that photography freed painting to dwell in the realm of the symbolic.8 Whereas painting has been freed from representing objects. or indices” (EP1 5). photography has a real. the pictorial “(…) form ceases to have any imitative value (…)” (WC1 16). In fact. La crítica cultural de Flusser. a “physical connection” (EP1 6) with them. by the manipulation of light. that in view of photography. So. Bazin and the Aesthetic of Photography The thesis that “(…) photography had freed the plastic arts from their obsession with likeness (…)” (WC1 12) has become an impressive Bazin’s motto. with the methods of the theory of information.activity” (W 53). to their indexical duplication. Bazin says that “[o]ne might consider photography (…) as a molding. Alberto J. La fotografía y la libertad. to a plastic realism that does not have anything to do with plastic illusion. the aesthetic dimension of photography is of necessity tied to objects. the realm of the signs that are mere conventional. and so. the taking of an impression. 6 See furthermore What is Communication? and On the Theory of Communication. and. thus.
stripping its object of all those ways of seeing it. namely on the basis of “the essentially objective character of photography” (WC1 13). is able to present it in all its virginal purity to my attention and consequently to my love. the photographed object becomes something new. See below. those piled-up preconceptions. “[o]nly the impassive lens.” (WC1 15) Furthermore. In this newness the object becomes “improbable” (Flusser) and.9 The former sentences reminder us immediately of Shklovsky’s expressions such as “to create a special perception of the object” (AT 277) or “deautomatized perception” (AT 277). For this reason realist cinema has the same defamiliarizing (Shklovsky) potential related to events as photography in relation to objects. according to Flusser’s criterion. Flusser does not think of the photographed object but rather of its photograph. but it is well known that according to him “(…) the cinema is objectivity in time (…)” (WC1 14). In cutting off the photographed object of its actual context and presenting it on the well-known rectangular surface of a photograph. What counts for Flusser is not the improbability of the photographed object but the improbality of its photograph. yet there are at least two other passages conveying it. in which we could not have known nor have seen it without the help of the photograph.Insofar as photography implies a “kind of identity” with the photographed objects. it becomes something aesthetic. thus. 11 As we will see below. It becomes presented to our eyes in “its virginal purity. photography breaks down the perceptual automatisms of the habitual. 10 The strangeness of the object amounts to “its virginal purity” because the photograph de-alienates the photographed object. The first one implies that “the power of photography” (WC1 15) lies in giving us “(…) the natural image of a world that we neither know nor can see (…)” (WC1 15). . thus. We propose. of the everydayness. say. Bazin thesis is that.”10 a purity. In this sense. As a matter of fact. as “(…) the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it (…)” (WC1 14). unfamiliar. “[t]he aesthetic qualities of photography are to be sought in its power to lay bare the realities.” (WC1 15) Bazin does not further explain this idea. the object becomes strange. the world in what he just calls “its virginal purity” (WC1 15).11 The proposed interpretation permits us to understand Bazin’s thesis according to which “[o]riginality in photography as distinct from originality in painting lies in the 9 See also: “(…) a man is walking along the street and the onlooker is amazed at the beauty of the man walking.” (WC2 67) Bazin says this referring to a cinematographic shot. namely. never seen before. that is. to interpret the referred passages in the sense of the principle of Russian formalist aesthetic theory. In the same vein Bazin says that “(…) the photograph allows us (…) to admire in reproduction something that our eyes alone could not have taught us to love (…)” (WC 16). that spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes have covered it.
In seeing a photograph one is not dealing with some illusion but with a de-alienated reality. Admiration is. And it is in its objectivity – in its “originality” – that photography lays realities bare. thus. Just because of its objectivity. what amounts to de-alienate them from their insertion in the everydayness. On our part we could say that in indexically transferring the object to the photographed image. In principle a photograph de-alienates the photographed reality – making. de-alienated by means of its indexical duplication through the “physical connection” between the object and its photograph generated by light. In such a way the object is presented “to my love” (WC1 15). 4.1 The Artistic Value of Photography The first difference concerns Flusser’s idea that the aesthetic value of any artifact .” implies in this connection that the aesthetic character of photography lies in its objectivity as in its de-alienating power. there are many profound differences between Flusser’s and Bazin’s aesthetics of photography. Bazin’s thesis that “[t]he aesthetic qualities of photography are to be sought in its power to lay bare the realities (…)” (WC1 15). to ones admiration. For the sake of brevity we shall consider only four of such differences. Bazin and Flusser on Photography In spite of the already clear relationship between Flusser’s idea of the artistic as something extraordinary (“improbable”) and Bazin’s idea of photography as something aesthetic insofar as it is de-alienating. that photography defamiliarizes the photographed object. In other words. The photograph is by no means the artful image of some object but its veritable “impression by the manipulation of light” (WC1 12).essentially objective character of photography. for “its virginal purity. In seeing a photograph we are not transposed into the realm of illusion but we do see the object by means of its indexical reproduction. photography rescues the photographed object from its pragmatic insertion in the everydayness and transfers it into a realm of estrangement in which the object is able to arrest our attention and to become admired as something never seen before. the thesis that photography gives us the photographed object in “its virginal purity. therefore.” Shklovsky would have said in this connection. that is. the adequate aesthetic category linked with the realism proper to photography. photography enables us to admire things in their duplications as if we had never seen them before. with is objectivity. 4.” (WC1 13) As opposed to painting. photography does rely neither on pure imagination nor on the subjective interplay between the eye and the hand in order to generate a mere illusion. that is.
. that is. because the photograph has the sustained power of dealienating such content by always cutting it off of its pragmatic. we do never become used to the photographically duplicated object. existence is always out of time and space.” (W 53) Of course. Bazin’s idea seems to be rather that whenever we contemplate a photograph its content becomes like something never seen. improbably. it plunges into the habitual. In other words. remaining only the object by force of its technological duplication. as Flusser points out. each new photograph necessarily becomes an already realized photographic possibility and as such an already seen photograph. indexically transposing things from the everydayness or ordinariness into the extraordinariness. by the sole fact of its existence. “(…) the value of works of art is not ‘eternal. But as soon as we see the object on the photograph the pragmatic context is gone. images (…)” (PhF 34). but a purely aesthetic one. nor a political. the photographed reality remains in the realm of the ordinary. it is an “aesthetic ‘transformer’” (cfr. insofar as photography duplicates the object. As aesthetic transformer. ordinary context.” To the extent in which we are involved in a pragmatic context the object as such is imperceptible (Shklovsky). Certainly. photographers “(…) seek for (…) never before seen. That is: in seeing its photograph we do never see the object as we see it in its pragmatic context. It is 12 Obviously the photographed “object” may very well be a whole pragmatic context as such. Flusser is right only as to the fact that we do really become used to each photograph as plain thing not as photograph. also photography is affected by redundancy. or existential. We side here with Bazin against Flusser. For this reason. whereas the photographic duplication of that reality. it does not exist anymore. we never become used to the photograph of whatever object. WC1 26). which in its extraordinariness is not a sacred. That is unsurprising since “(…) even the most improbable situation created by art will in the long run become habitual. and that is true of any photograph of some object and true of each look at that photograph.” (W 52) On its part Bazin does not say anything about this. in its new. consequently.diminishes: with time “(…) it grows more habitual (‘redundant’) (…)” (W 53). in a purely extraordinary realm.’ but (…) all works tend to slide in the direction of habit. Nevertheless. photography is of necessity an “aesthetic transformer. for it remains always in the network of their relationships to the whole of such pragmatic context.12 In other words. photographic. we do behold photographs again and again but we do not do the same with their corresponding objects. photography indexically duplicates a reality de-alienating it.
which permits us again and again to admire it as something never seen. Photography is the permanent link between the object in its alienated ordinariness and the same objects in its extraordinariness.” (PhF . For Bazin. In fact such categories would be “the categories of the photographic space-time” (PhF 32).2 Photography. we can say. they necessarily present the photographed object “to my love. is “artistic” to the extent in which it is “improbable.” On the contrary. between its reality as pragmatic object and its reality as aesthetic object.” extraordinary. more precisely. since photographically “(…) the space-time is divided into quite clear separate zones. according to Flusser.3 Quantized Aesthetics A third important difference between Flusser and Bazin regarding photography is Flusser’s idea concerning what he calls the “quantized character of photographing” (PhF 35). but as soon as we are concerned with them as photographs. unknown. thus. as we saw above. i. namely the stress either on the photograph or on its content.” (AT 277. and the Improbable At this point a second. Furthermore. difference between Flusser and Bazin’s as to the aesthetics of photography appears.” As to human products. the object is not important.” On his part.” (AT 277. This idea refers to the “categories of the photo apparatus” (PhF 32). what matters is not if the photograph is new or redundant. for Bazin. an “aesthetic transformer. crucial.) What is important is its “artfulness” (AT 277). basically there is no difference between their being “improbable” and their being “artistic” or “art. Shklovsky says that “[a]rt is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object. i. For Flusser the photograph is aesthetic by the sole fact of being something “improbable. Photography is always an “esthetic transformer” insofar as by duplicating things they get situated in and extraordinary realm becoming admirable – presented “to my love” – again and again. namely. in contradiction to Flusser. the Extraordinary. 4. its capacity for de-alienating the photographed object. extraordinary. We become used to photographs only if we do not “use” them as photographs.the de-alienated duplication of some reality. a. the extraordinariness of photography stems from its being something aesthetic. a. 4. This crucial difference between Flusser and Bazin is associated to the fourth one we will discuss below. that the photograph as object “(…) is not important.” It is not a photograph what is extraordinary but it is content as content of the photograph.) Applying this to whichever photograph. a product whatever. every man made product.
the more extraordinary and. relating to cinema Bazin discards the “use of close-ups and unusual angles” (WC1 109). VS 421-3. according to Bazin.” that is. deforming lenses. one for pondering peering. Bazin clearly tends to reject “style. The only style Bazin approves is that which is “essentially a form of self-effacement before reality” (WC1 29).32) For instance. The extraordinariness and thus the artistic value of the photograph would vary in a quantized way according to the mentioned photographic “categories” (PhF 32). the various styles of cinematography in terms of the added measure of reality. Flusser refers to the different photographic lenses. photographic angles and distances. “Style” in cinema must be. one for archaic direct view with completely open eyes. one for a rapid glimpse. The idea behind this is clear: unusual perspectives. In fact. thus photographs have to be checked in the same way as cinematographic shots. In cinema as well as in photography such style means that the image of the object tends to disappear as image allowing the onlooker for attending to the object that is the content of the image. one for worm’s eye view. one for little boy’s eye view. any look at the photographic object that departs from presenting it in “its virginal purity. Obviously. thus. photographs departing from what vision theoreticians call the canonical perspective at the object – the point of view at the object giving the greatest information for recognizing it13 – seem to be for Bazin a kind of revival of “the conflict between style and likeness” (WC1 13) characteristic of painting. for they . one spatial zone for bird’s eye view. A clear example of such a case would be the frames in Julien Duvivier’s film Carnet de bal. cinema is made of photographic frames. The idea of this set of quantized photographic possibilities makes an important difference to Bazin. one for unhurried beholding. artificial lighting. there is “(…) one spatial zone for great proximity. the more improbable the choice of some of those photographic possibilities. apertures. following Flusser’s logic. make the onlooker aware of the photograph at the cost of its object or content as such. exposure times. if not classify in order of importance.14 13 14 See. for “[t]he result is a loss of realism.” So.” (WC2 28n. and the like. that is. one for long distance.” (PhF 32) In the same way there is “(…) a time zone (shutter speed) for a view as fast as a bolt.) What matters in cinema is the “raising of the reality coefficient” (WC2 28) and in fact “[o]ne might group. the more artistic the photograph would be. considered “[u]nder the heading ‘plastics’” (WC1 12).” (WC2 27) On the other hand. one for squinting from the side. under a specifically pictorial category. for instance.” (PhF 32) Clearly. one for middle proximity.
15 On the contrary.” 4. but it is the logical consequence of his stance about the relationship between probability and aesthetic and. in considering the spectrum of photographic possibilities. We would define as ‘realist. 16 Our interpretation. whereas what matters for Bazin is the photographed object: what we admire is not the photograph but the object. Flusser recounts discrete – quantized – ways of looking at the photographic object.4 The Photograph or the Photographed Object? The World or the Image? It is by mediation of the difference as to the aesthetic value of a photograph according to the perspective that it offers at its content.” 17 Up to this point it may be clear that for Flusser a photograph is nothing objective. the lesser the “measure of reality. and the more uncommon they are. So Bazin does really consider Flusser’s quantized “categories of photographing” but on the reverse scale: the more stylish – improbable -. One might group. say. but above all it is a “projection” of the “concepts” of the photographer (cfr. is directly supported by Bazin’s text. Thus. nothing that hampers recognizing objects on the cinematographic frames can be considered as raising the “measure of reality” (WC2 27). say of a house. the same object. The cinema theoretician Christian Metz says: “(…) precisely because it is uncommon. For him. The ordinary framings are finally felt to be nonframings (…). So. presenting it in “its virginal purity. UT 48. the house would not be the “cause” (UT 48) of the . IS 54). the better. the skill of a painter.’ then. that is. what matters for Flusser is the photograph. that we come to a fourth and fundamental difference in Flusser’s and Bazin’s aesthetics of photography. Each representation discards or retains various of the qualities that permit us to recognize the object on the screen. all narrative means tending to bring an added measure of reality to the screen. the various styles of cinematography in terms of added measure of reality [the analog to Flusser “categories of photographing”].Flusser does consider the different possibilities for photographing an object. is certainly a “reproduction” (UT 48) of the house. can be represented in various ways. habitual or ordinary. it is it in its photographic reproduction what arrests our attention. a photograph. the uncommon angle makes us more aware of what we had merely forgotten to some extent (…): an identification with the camera (…).” (WC2 27) Obviously. but by taking it off of time and space the completely ordinary object becomes something extraordinary – “never seen before. neither the are continuously tilted (cfr. if not classify in order of importance. that is the consequence of “the essentially objective character of photography. (…) The same event. 15 Certainly he does never say this explicitly. obviously. and the canonical perspective is. Clearly.”17 It is not. The uncommon angle reawakens me (…)” (IS 55). the more aesthetic – “improbable” – the result. 54) – realized as the choice of some set of photographic “categories. Bazin says that it is possible to “(…) magnify or neutralize the effectiveness of the elements of reality that the camera captures. the most probable. For this reason a photograph corresponding to the canonical perspective is for Flusser the least aesthetic one. the lest realist. further.” 16 Obviously the most effective way of de-alienating the object and presenting it to “my love” (WC1 15) is its photographic image from the canonical perspective: it presents the ordinary object as one really encounters it.” For this reason. from the fact that the more probable photographs are the more they tend to correspond to the canonical perspective. the canonical perspective is for Bazin the best possible indexical duplication of the object. according to which Bazin implicitly favors the canonical perspective insofar as it is the most adequate for recognizing the object shown on a photograph.
Alberto J. we recover the world by force of this technologically based “aesthetic transformer.) and the world wordly. See §3. Flusser is not interested in the world but in photography as “technical image. for Bazin the photography is there in behalf of the world. On the contrary. what matters is not the house.. what we admire. For this reason the “quantized (…) structure of the photographical as such” (PhF 36) is present in Bazin’s photographic aesthetics only negatively. For this reason. but simply because we usually do not see the world before our eyes – namely to the extent to which we are involved in pragmatic contexts. that is. Bazin is interested in the extraordinary character with which the photograph endows the photographed object. Flusser is interested in the extraordinary character of the photograph as such. May 2007. (…) the symbol” (PhF 35). La fotografía y el “programa.” Paraphrasing Shklovsky. La crítica cultural de Flusser. rather the photograph is an “image of concepts” (PhF 34) of the photographer. 18 Whereas realist cinema. photography gives us the world back by presenting it “to our love. not because we do not adopt unfamiliar perspectives to see it. photography gives us the possibility of “imagining” (UT 16) the world. electronic magazine. L.” in: Carrillo Canán. Concretion In fine. Resting on its objectivity.” whereas in Flusser’s photographic aesthetics occupies a central place. La fotografía y la libertad. based on photographs lacking “style” gives us life as such back.”18 5.” As “technical image. the photograph resulting from them. 34. but the signifier.photograph as such. . According to Flusser. what is “real” (PhF 35). but those concepts. Conclusion: Abstraction vs. A Parte Rei 51. perhaps the most important difference between Flusser and Bazin as to the aesthetics of photography is Flusser’s general theory according to which the improbable photograph. UT 14. 37). which allows to it to make the world unfamiliar. existentially and ontologically photography means a “reversal of the vector of meaning” (PhF 35): it is not the world.” namely. i. Bazin considers photography as an “aesthetic transformer” because through it we reach into the world with new eyes that permit us to admire it. under the negative rubric “style. but the photographed object itself since it has been indexically transferred to the photograph. that is. according to Flusser. “the signified. Whereas for Flusser the world is “only presupposition for the image” (PhF 34). What matters to Bazin is “(…) the natural image [canonical perspective] of a world that we neither know nor can see (…)”. that is. photography makes both the “stone stony” (AT 277. a. the possibility “to give sense” (UT 34) again to a world that has become senseless – deprived of whatever myths by the force of the scientific theories and simultaneously reduced to the abstract entities postulated by such theories (cfr.
Semiotik. Vilém. it is clear that in doing that. University of California Press. Frankfurt / M. Ausgewählte Aufsätze: 1921 – 1971. Ausgewählte Texte: 1919 – 1982. concrete. never seen. California. University of California Press. References WC1 WC2 PhF UT AT IS VS P S = Bazin. 1979. photography does really have an aesthetic character based on its concrete nature but not in the general determination consisting in being something “improbable. 1996. = Metz. as Flusser wants. Calififornia. 1995. Suhrkamp. Cambridge. Ch. = Jakobson. European Photography. Für eine Philosophie of Fotografie. is insufficient to determine photography as art. Bloomington. = Jakobson.” but being perceivable does not mean being art. aesthetic phenomenon. Oxford. An Antology of Changing Ideas. Roman. = Flusser. Photons to Phenomenology. = Harrison. Indiana University Press. Stephen. Frankfurt / M. it may very well be that Bazin’s thesis according to which photography presents the photographed object to my admiration. 1988. Suhrkamp. 2005. 1999.as such is aesthetic in the sense of being art. What is Cinema? Vol. Vision Science. The Imaginary Signifier. André. 2005. . 1999. Christian. Roman.” as something never seen. True: etymologically the term “aesthetic” originally means “perceivable. André. Blackwell Publishers. to “my love. 1. What is Cinema? Vol. whereas for Bazin the photography has an aesthetic character that makes of its content something new. Psychoanalysis and the Cinema. On the other hand. = Flusser. Göttingen. Nevertheless. = Bazin. European Photography. & Wood P. 1999. Poetik. Art in Theory: 1900 – 1990. Göttingen. Vilém. The MIT Press. Ins Universum der techinischen Bilder. 2. an abstract realm that does not correspond to photography as specific. as compared to the film theoretician Bazin. = Palmer. the philosopher of photography Flusser seems to dwell in a realm of abstraction.” Bazin’s aesthetics of photography seems to us nearer to the concrete artistic character of photography than Flusser’s abstract idea of art as something “improbable.” Concerning the aesthetics of photography.