Commentary

Research evidence and media bias: reflections on a 1980s dispute
Adrian Quinn
UNIVERSITY
OF

LIVERPOOL, UK

Some day these busy collectives for the censorious will themselves become the victims of attention by the media studies industry. There must, it will be supposed, be some deeply meaningful peculiarities about those who spend their working lives searching the television output, the most solemn of treasurehunters, with eyes only for the scattered trifles supporting their strict pattern of disapproval. (Sean Day-Lewis on the Glasgow University Media Group, 1985) This article will revisit a significant debate within British media studies and one in which Media, Culture & Society (MCS) figured strongly. In November 1985, Martin Harrison became the only scholar to produce an evidence-based challenge to the Glasgow University Media Group’s (GUMG) now famous claim that British TV news was not as balanced and impartial as it was meant to be. MCS played an important role in the subsequent debate involving Harrison and the GUMG, first by reviewing Harrison’s book, TV News: Whose Bias? (Corner, 1986) and then by publishing the GUMG’s official response to it (Philo, 1987). Twenty years on, this commentary piece offers some reflections and presents some new evidence on a 1980s dispute that saw played out the very real hostility that existed between journalists and media researchers, and sometimes between researchers themselves.1 In the 1970s, one of the principal debates that preoccupied media researchers in Britain concerned the ideological complexion of media output, specifically that of television news and whether broadcasters displayed an ideological bias. At the time, both the Left and the Right believed, not surprisingly, that the news was biased in the other’s favour. The GUMG decided that in order to get beyond that simplistic, almost binary suspicion, its members would have to take a close look at how news bulletins were organized over an extended period. In its first book, Bad News (1976) the group presented its analysis of how the news covered industrial and economic affairs during the first five months of 1975. It found that British TV news, across all channels, was remarkably similar, was heavily biased against the perspective of organized labour and that, overall, TV news offered viewers a highly selective picture of the world. Using a method called thematic analysis, the GUMG found that TV news tended to blame trade unions and a striking workforce for the Media, Culture & Society © 2006 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 28(3): 457–465 [ISSN: 0163-4437 DOI: 10.1177/0163443706062983]

2004). Culture & Society 28(3) under-performing economy. Independent Television News (ITN). the largest-scale. who reviewed TV News for the THES. If it were shown that the GUMG had acted in bad faith when analysing ITN’s coverage of industrial news. In a letter to The Guardian newspaper in the summer of 1982. provided by the BBC’s rival news provider. Harrison convincingly showed that the Glasgow Media Group’s conclusions ‘rest upon empirical foundations about as firm as a wet blancmange’ (1986). to show that the GUMG had not been mistaken in its analysis. Greg Philo. then the BBC could also claim to have been vindicated. unlike newspaper journalists. but could be shown to have ignored evidence and to have generally conducted its project in bad faith. Proving the GUMG wrong is precisely what Martin Harrison promised he had done. indeed. most recently in Bad News from Israel (Philo and Berry. still bear upon the Corporation. What the GUMG was positing amounted to a radical critique because. Harrison also came to assume the role of counsel for the defence of broadcasting. rather than managers or the culture of non-investment that was prevalent in British industry at the time. has observed that the group’s research techniques are now used all over the world (2002). The methods it developed for evaluating news coverage were said by some to be inventive and sometimes pioneering. Harrison’s intervention in the debate about bias in the news was significant since the evidence from Bad News had gone largely unchallenged for almost ten years. In defending the group’s current work on the Middle East and the Glasgow method more generally. naturally. Other objections had . 1980: 407). the GUMG concluded that ‘television is biased to the extent that it violates its formal obligations to give a balanced account’ (1982: xi). which I will visit briefly in my concluding remarks.J.458 Media. Published almost ten years after the appearance Bad News. Philo wrote that despite the numerous attacks of senior broadcasters on the GUMG ‘it is a tribute to the years of patient study by researchers here. Various commentators have credited the GUMG with producing the most ambitious. In Really Bad News (1982). The news items that were criticized most concerned strikes and wage inflation and who was being blamed for causing them. The GUMG’s international and. and also because the story that the GUMG was telling about the broadcasters bore no resemblance to the story that broadcasters were telling about themselves. British broadcasters were enjoined by law to be balanced and impartial. the best-funded and most controversial study of its kind to that point.A. ‘was less to replicate than to re-examine the group’s methods and their use of evidence’ (1986). its findings would. And while he may not have intended it. Background to the dispute For P. street credibility is rooted in its claim that the findings originally outlined in Bad News were based on detailed and verifiable evidence. its present director. gathered using empirical methods. that they have never been able to prove us wrong’ (1982b: 10). and they continue to be used today. Put more simply. Its author used written news transcripts. Waddington. TV News: Whose Bias? (1985) insisted that the group had got it very wrong. Though BBC bulletins did not figure in Harrison’s study. broadcasters were being accused of breaking the law. Towards the end of More Bad News (1980) the group provided a rationale for its particular take on content analysis: ‘It has been a basic contention of our approach that the detailed examination of the output of television journalism can be used to demonstrate its ideology and practices’ (GUMG. the GUMG’s most controversial book since the original Bad News (1976). ‘My prime purpose.’ wrote Harrison in a letter to the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES).

especially since. that they were Marxist left-wingers whose evidence could not. It wasn’t just something that was read by half a dozen academics. he did have serious misgivings about the validity of the Bad News findings and the secure place they had come to occupy on the social science syllabus. Thatcherism was having a strong impact on British broadcasting and some observers will have felt that scholarly resources should be focused on speaking to that. In a review of TV News for the NATFE Journal. Martin Harrison discussed his motivation for revisiting the Bad News project. 1999: 40). Though he did not necessarily adopt the view that the GUMG was staffed by ‘unscholarly Lefties’.Quinn. 1985: 106). for that reason if no other be trusted’ (McNair. not only in academic circles but also quite widely among media people and indeed in the national press. anybody who thought at all academically about the media was very familiar with the Glasgow work which received a lot of coverage. Revisiting and in a sense replicating a project rooted in 1970s industrial politics might have seemed an odd thing to do. by the early 1980s. It was a matter of considerably public debate. . giving prominence to those examples which serve to support their case while failing to mention (recorded) instances which would have undermined their whole argument’ (Alster. In an MCS editorial James Curran called Harrison study’s ‘a bitter attack on the conclusions and indeed the professionalism of the Glasgow Media Group’ (1987: 395). the GUMG was accused of being selective to the point of deceit. Harrison claimed that ‘in Bad News such “nonconformist” material is hastily skirted around or referred to in the briefest of snippets’ (Harrison. As in many other items of criticism. 1986) and served as a reminder that there is a ‘dark side to the politics of media research’ . Harrison believed he had shown that the Glasgow studies were ‘fatally flawed’ (1986). The opposition believed that ‘that it was the GUMG that was ideologically biased. Harrison added that by the 1980s: . rather than the broadcasters. . (1986: 382) In an interview with the author. The GUMG itself felt that the quarrel with Harrison represented ‘a very squalid episode’ in its relationship with the broadcasters (Philo and Eldridge. 1986: 34). on matters of methodology and address – and in some circles the group’s own impartiality had been questioned – but the evidential detail on which the GUMG based its conclusions had not yet formed a substantial part of any published critique of their work. That was my initial acquaintance with the GUMG. Laurence Alster says that Harrison had argued ‘powerfully that the Group has been deliberately selective in their analysis. That fatal flaw was the group’s tendency to consciously smother evidence that did not conform to its hypothesis that the news was biased against trade unions. Using dramatic language. Research evidence and media bias 459 been raised. John Corner seemed aware of this in his review of TV News for MCS in July 1986: To devote a whole book on ‘bias’ in TV news exclusively to the task of mounting a critique on a ten-year-old research report by undertaking a reassessment of roughly half its data (the BBC material is only mentioned in passing) might seem a little surprising given the thoroughness of academic discussion which it generated at the time and the range of studies which have appeared since. The work was very widely discussed. Brian McNair offers a summary and a flavour of what the opposition had been saying to that point. with the broadcasters furious at being traduced. when Harrison was writing. along with much of the rest of the nation at that particular time.

Obviously. That the GUMG should trigger such an attack says something about the profile of its work. He goes on to declare that the failures in the Glasgow critique exposed by Harrison constitute a ‘demolition of the Glasgow Media Group’. that of handwringing. A quieter sound. selective. . whereas some junior sociologists thought (probably quite wrongly) that it would be unwise to speak out against the orthodoxy. Waddington had previously expressed his enmity to the GUMG in a hostile review of More Bad News for the THES in 1980. 1997: 136).A. cavalier with statistics. (interview) Clearly. What is certain is that because the GUMG was taking about bias in the news.460 Media. he called TV News ‘a devastating critique. which continues to be a core complaint. and even if the GUMG was involved in ‘the most extreme example of this phenomenon’ (1997: 79). could be heard coming from the world of independent television.2 Accordingly. schools. but they go some way to explaining why a ten-year-old study should be dusted off and challenged in the way that Bad News was. I didn’t have to worry about anybody getting back at me. which has little impact on the way journalism is practised and is widely ignored by journalists. Direct and Biased (1997) agreed that ITN became ‘paranoid’ over the Bad News study – so much so that ‘everyone has a copy in their locker’ (MacGregor. speaking of a ‘demolition’. a number of people did come and say to me that they were glad I’d done it because they didn’t dare to do it. uses the language of the building site in his assessment of the GUMG. Harrison’s discourse suggests that he saw himself as something of a maverick. then Director of Television at the Independent Broadcasting Authority. In an interview with the author. . It is. The GUMG responds Waddington. adding that ‘it is clear from Harrison’s book that failures of this kind are not just some oversight. ‘The new orthodoxy’ was also how P. but are an integral part of the group’s polemic which masquerades as science’ (1986). in a word. Culture & Society 28(3) (Eldridge and Winston. Curran said that the GUMG was the ‘outstanding exception’ to the work of most media scholars. David Glencross. inaccurate. an academic. An unnamed. but senior journalist who spoke to Brent MacGregor for his book Live. both of these remarks are hyperbole. 1986). 1986). The group’s research is revealed as being imprecise. He says that after giving early seminar papers on his study: . voiced his concern that the Bad News studies had come to be seen as ‘tablets of Holy writ’ in universities. This would not have been the case unless the GUMG had had the effect of ‘crystallising views that were widely held inside parts of the profession’. its work attracted the attention of broadcasters in an unusual way – and incurred their wrath. unrepresentative and tendentious. Bad News did lead to some crucial dialogue between the rival camps.J. trade unions and parts of the Labour Party’ (1985/1986: 23). shoddy’ (Waddington. Waddington described the findings and conclusions of the GUMG in an aggressive and sometimes inaccurate review for the THES called ‘Even Worse News for the Media Watchdogs’ (1986). MacGregor also notes that it is not unusual for exchanges between scholars and journalists to be filled with confrontation and misunderstanding. Glencross called Harrison’s book ‘pretty devastating to the Glasgow case’ and he determined that the credibility of the group itself was ‘now . as MacGregor also explains (1997: 140). Harrison saw the GUMG as constituting the new orthodoxy and that he was one of the few academics with a senior enough position in the academy to withstand the counterattack that might follow on such an intervention.

. given the discrepancies which exist between his scripts and the actual broadcasts. the group identified over 250 material differences between the scripts and what was broadcast. (3) there are dozens of differences in transcription between the book and what was actually said in the news. the GUMG set about comparing Harrison’s data with recordings of ITN bulletins from 1975 that were still in their archives.Quinn. they had got it so comprehensively wrong. (2) many key sections of news are simply missing. It is clear from this that McKee at least possessed a clear motive for wanting to get back at the GUMG. in which the GUMG questioned the adequacy of ITN’s reporting from the Labour Party conference of October 1980 (Philo et al. The GUMG discovered that Harrison’s data differed significantly from what had appeared on TV screens ten years earlier. saying: ‘We can only repeat. yet again. an intrusion was altogether necessary for Harrison to obtain his core data of news scripts.3 Upon learning that. along with Peter Sissons (now a news presenter at the BBC) had engaged in a long and acrimonious exchange in the letters page of the New Statesman magazine over an article called ‘Goodies and Baddies. The substance of the news scripts would prove to be the weak point for his study. ..’ When questioned on whether he asked the GUMG for access to its tapes. as in its analysis of a 1975 speech on the motor industry by Prime Minister Harold Wilson.] gets the blue pencil’ (1981: 13). Notwithstanding this. . Where the Glasgow method of video recording was fairly unobtrusive. 1982a: 10). and ignores material that inconveniently undermines them [. Philo goes on to assert that in only three industrial stories. he said: ‘I would very much have liked to have had access to the videotapes. then Deputy Chief Executive at ITN. the group highlighted four principal ways in which material supplied by ITN was inadequate: (1) the transcripts mask clear interventions by the newscaster in the interpretation of news. ‘is the way in which it systemically selects evidence to back up its views. Harrison replied: . in Harrison’s estimation. (4) there are some pieces of text included in the transcripts which were not broadcast by ITN. as I shall note later. Cooperation from ITN was essential to the success of Harrison’s project. that our work stands or falls as detailed empirical evidence. he regretted the fact that he did not approach the GUMG and ask for access to its more complete and reliable data. as is claimed (Philo. 1987: 397–406). but he feels able to rationalize away their overall significance by citing the similarity of BBC and ITN coverage (itself a Glasgow finding) and by referring to moments when the Glasgow analysis was entirely linguistic. During the first half of 1981 the same Paul McKee.) placed ‘limitations’ on his study. Research evidence and media bias 461 so weakened’ by what Harrison had uncovered (1985/1986: 23). and given that he had no access to BBC material. Oxford sometime after the general election of June 1983.] any inconvenient observation which doesn’t quite fit the thesis [. The scripts were delivered by the late Paul McKee. 1981: 6–8). ITN but not BBC etc. 250 of TV News’s 400 pages contain an appendix that reprints all of the ITN transcripts used in Harrison’s study. . How Television Tells the Labour Story’. responded Sissons and McKee.5 In a formal rebuttal published by MCS. It was important that the GUMG did this since the group had previously issued a public challenge in response to Gus (now Lord) Macdonald’s disparaging review4 of Really Bad News. ‘The central weakness of this Glasgow Media Group study. who suggested to Harrison that he should challenge the GUMG when the pair met at a dinner at Nuffield College. as in its previous work’. Harrison concedes that all of these points (text but no visuals. Unusually. If we are shown to be wrong or to have counted or measured incorrectly then we will retract what we have said’ (Philo. I asked Harrison if.

noting the way in which the book documented: . Harrison says that he knew he would be critical of the GUMG before his project got under way. had debunked. on the whole. There is an all-roads-lead-toRome dimension to this debate wherein one constantly returns to the conclusion that it was wasteful. he makes it clear that there was no ‘mercenary’ intent to his study and he is insistent that he was not ‘put up to it’ by ITN. you can have access. a number of fundamental weaknesses in the figures and classifications employed by the Glasgow team.462 Media. 1991) which is still in print. Also. Maybe I should have been harder-headed. secondgeneration data when a full and genuine record of ITN’s output from 1975 lay not too far away in Scotland. it did nonetheless offer some useful. (Corner.’ Harrison told me. Despite this.’ wrote John Eldridge in Airwaves magazine ‘I did invite him but he failed to reply’ (1986: 21). In The Media Studies Book: A Guide for Teachers (Lusted. Concluding remarks Despite the ad hominem dimension to Harrison’s book. So there was no approach to them. Harrison should not have spent months analysing patchy. 1986: 382) There are other strengths in Harrison’s study. I didn’t give them the chance and I do regret that. . Blanchard plays a punctuation game in describing the Bad News books as ‘a(n) (in)famous series of research studies’ (1991: 202). . maybe I should have asked them. since it usefully ‘criticises Bad News by alleging a lack of academic rigour and honesty in research findings’ (1991: 202). general points of criticism. but I am not persuaded that I would have written very much differently and even. I got it wrong and that’s bad. to be fair to them. In . Culture & Society 28(3) I didn’t ask them. Tim Blanchard calls Harrison’s book an ‘antidote’ to the work of the GUMG (1991: 202). ‘On a number of more general questions about the problems of theory and approach which have regularly beset news analysis. John Corner credited Harrison for this in his review of TV News. more favourably. with the best will in the world.] which prove to be nowhere near as reliable or as consistently applied as might appear. I just didn’t feel comfortable about it. They may well have said ‘OK. ‘If I got it wrong. ‘there remains a fair degree of description and argument still standing after Harrison’s whirling blades have passed across’ (1986: 383). Harrison is often clear and relevant. Setting aside that an ‘antidote’ is taken to combat a poison. if mostly unoriginal’ (1986: 383). Corner still asserts that in Bad News. . he did not fight his corner as one would expect of a scholar who. Emphatic use is made by them of a quantitative methodology and contextualising statistics [. Given that when I embarked on the enterprise I knew it was going to be a critical one. even reckless of Harrison to proceed in this way. which Corner also acknowledges. He then recommends that teachers assign counter-readings from Harrison’s book. demolished and devastated ‘the best known media research team in Britain’ as James Curran once called the GUMG (1987: 395).’ So. It’s a point of personal taste and ethics I suppose. On balance. apart from one letter to the editor of the THES in March 1986. in his supporters’ words. ‘And yes. But if I got it wrong it was not from the sort of motivations that were ascribed to me. But. it appears that Martin Harrison did get it wrong and that an opportunity to add constructively to the Bad News debate was missed. I felt uncomfortable about the idea of approaching the group and asking to use its material. After seeing the visuals I might have had other bones to pick with them. .

Research evidence and media bias 463 effect. saying that the GUMG had made securing such cooperation ‘almost impossible’ (Robinson. who was thought to be one the GUMG’s more hostile critics (he judged Bad News to be ‘by any standards a poor book’) (Collins. Throughout the 1980s various commentators. Collins correctly sussed TV News as an attempt ‘to remove academic legitimacy from the Bad News studies and rehabilitate the reputation of British television news’ (1986: 135). 2004). This places serious limits on TV news. even bilious resentment. In ‘Bad News and Bad Faith: The Story of a Political Controversy’. in this study. its most recent study. which would remain in place for almost six years and further compromise editorial independence. Neither of these two things happened as a result of Harrison’s intervention. In terms of the ongoing debate about bias in the news. as is clear from senior broadcasters’ close involvement in Bad News from Israel (Philo and Berry. The GUMG also learned how the Israelis’ superior PR enables them to gain better access to news makers. they were given the chance to account for some of the pressures that shape their reporting. Notes 1. Blanchard has wrongly elevated Harrison’s intervention to the status of definitive rebuttal and he has also accused the GUMG of carelessness and duplicity. By inviting journalists to take part in focus group exercises. adding production and audience studies to its analyses of media content. The GUMG went on to further refine its methods. and an interview with Martin Harrison on 4 September 2000. The reputation of British TV news in the 1980s continued to suffer under politicians’ attacks. among them the veteran scholar Jeremy Tunstall. 1976/1977: 81). a review essay for the Journal of Communication. 1981: 457). A previous attempt to unpack the Harrison–GUMG dispute was made by Richard Collins. However. 1981: 13). Conditions placed on these interviews mean I cannot quote directly from some of them. From very early on in its first project. In this. a charge that is not supported by the evidence. Glasgow shows how very real was the hostility. the case of Harrison v. especially after the introduction of the broadcasting ban in 1988. None of this work would have been possible had some of the doomsayers been correct in their assessment of the long-term impact that the GUMG was having on relations between scholars and journalists. the group insisted that they were the inheritors and not the instigators of that ill feeling.Quinn. Fortunately. the GUMG recognized that broadcasting institutions’ hostility towards media research was a social fact. Another scholar went further. which already suffers from a limited capacity for offering a historical context for conflict. which broadcasters expressed towards those who would criticize them during the formative years of British media studies. the group was able to show more fully than before the reasons for this imbalanced coverage and the consequences of it. However. The potentially baleful impact of this on public knowledge and understanding was also shown when young people showed a shocking lack of understanding of the conflict. The new evidence presented here comes from interviews with all of the GUMG’s founder members and many of its peers. the GUMG looked at TV coverage of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and found that the Israeli perspective was treated more favourably. with some viewers not knowing who was occupying whom in the Occupied Territories. I am especially grateful to Martin . the Cassandras of the media studies community were mistaken. declared that the GUMG had alienated broadcasters so thoroughly as to make obtaining their cooperation ‘needlessly difficult for others’ (Tunstall.

then Assistant Editor at ITN was reported in The Times as saying that ‘Harrison was given scripts. Curran. 13 January 1986).’ that television news is systematically distorted to the disadvantage of the workers. Corner. is the poverty of much current sociology. displaying their ‘too strong a Marxoid tilt’ and whose ‘appeals for “popular” control of television are as vague and slightly sinister as one would expect of Dave Spart out of Che Guevara’ (Macdonald. NATFE Journal 11(1): 34. The dust jacket for Harrison’s book calls the source material ‘transcripts’. London: Routledge. . that the book was ‘categorically boring’ and ‘reveals most transparently the group’s methods and the lengths they will go to in order to bend the evidence to fit their pre-constructed opinions’ (Nicholas. This is a pity. 5. pp. Media. John (1986) ‘Review of TV News: Whose Bias?’. (Waddington. James (1987) ‘Editorial’. Day-Lewis. Thanks also to John Corner who commented on an earlier draft of this article and provided me with a title for it. 1987: 33). . Macdonald described Really Bad News as ‘a leftist critique’. 1980: 12) 3. wrote Waddington is his review of More Bad News: . but they are minor and Harrison’s conclusions are justified’ (Higham. Screen Education 21: 80–82. 1982). because it not only undermines that which is of value in this volume and its predecessor. . Sean (1985) ‘Censors Censured’. Such. He also accused the group of harbouring an ‘almost manic obsession with discrediting television journalists’ (1985: 29). 2. An unsigned and undated letter from the Head of Public Relations at ITN that was inserted into the 100 copies of TV News purchased and distributed by ITN calls the material ‘verbatim transcripts’. not transcripts. saying that he could see no point in this. Culture & Society 9(4): 395–6. 1985: 29). explaining that he had misread the text and suggesting that closer cooperation between the group and ITN might be fruitful. 191–226 in David Lusted (ed. Richard (1986) ‘Bad News and Bad Faith: The Story of a Political Controversy’. Nevertheless. ‘So flawed is this evidence’. illustrated . Glyn Matthias. Media. produced by the ‘bright red graduates of Glasgow’. There is other evidence that high-level personnel at ITN were angry with the group. Nicholas replied. . Tim (1991) ‘Listings’. 4. . ‘One book after another convinces me that you are not seekers after truth but presenters of opinion masquerading as science’ (official letter. Collins. Blanchard. Journal of Communication 36(4): 131–8. . References Alster.464 Media. I confidently anticipate that this research will be quoted ad nauseam in subsequent texts as having ‘shown . regrettably. . David Nicholas (now Sir).) The Media Studies Book: A Guide for Teachers. that one is obliged to entertain the severest reservations about the validity of the research as a whole. then editor at ITN. said in his review of War and Peace News (1985). . Collins. Culture & Society 28(3) Harrison for speaking to me. Laurence (1986) ‘Review of War and Peace News and TV News: Whose Bias?’. The group subsequently wrote to Nicholas. . Richard (1976/1977) ‘Review of Bad News’. so there are bound to be differences. Culture & Society 8(3): 382–3. demonstrated . Daily Telegraph 8 October. but also because it sours the important enterprise of researching the news.

Philo. Greg (1982b) ‘Letter to the Editor’. Direct and Biased. New Statesman 23 January: 6–8. Liverpool L69 7ZT. Times Higher Education Supplement 28 February. Brian (1999) News and Journalism in the UK: A Textbook. (1980) ‘Bias in Television News’. Philo. The Guardian 27 May. McGregor.A. Glencross. Sissons. 2002). Brent (1997) Live. Peter and Paul McKee (1981) ‘Legal. David (1985/86) ‘Bad News Revisited’. Greg. Glasgow University Media Group (1985) War and Peace News. John Hewitt and Peter Beharrell (1981) ‘The Bias in the Television Image: Goodies and Baddies. Martin (1985) TV News: Whose Bias? Hermitage: Policy Journals. (1986) ‘Even Worse News for the Media Watchdogs’. Glasgow University Media Group (1982) Really Bad News. David (1985) ‘How it Looked from the Newsdesk’. McNair. Roxby Building. Greg and John Eldridge (1986) ‘Glasgow Media: Letter to the Editor’. Philo. University of Glasgow. Address: University of Liverpool. [email: aquinn@livepool. Higham. Philo. Airwaves winter: 23. Greg (1982a) ‘Letter to the Editor’. Times Higher Education Supplement 14 February. The Media Reporter 5(1): 13. 3rd edn. Waddington.J. London: Writers and Readers.ac. Times Higher Education Supplement 1 August: 12. Harrison. British Journal of Sociology 32(3): 456–7. Greg and Mike Berry (2004) Bad News from Israel. Macdonald. Philo. The Times 14 October: 33. The Guardian 24 August: 10. David (ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.J. Adrian Quinn is a lecturer in the School of Politics and Communication Studies at the University of Liverpool and a researcher with the Media Unit. Waddington. Philo. England.) (1991) The Media Studies Book: A Guide for Teachers. London: Pluto. Decent and Honest’. Robinson. The Guardian 25 September: 21. Televisual October: 29. Research evidence and media bias 465 Eldridge. Philo. Times Higher Education Supplement 21 March. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. London: Arnold. Jeremy (1981) ‘Review of More Bad News’. Airwaves spring: 21. P. Times Higher Education Supplement 14 March. Eldridge. John and Brian Winston (1986) ‘Politics of Media Research: Letter to the Editor’. Glasgow University Media Group (1980) More Bad News. P. London: Routledge. He has previously written on the Front National in France for the International Journal of Cultural Studies (Sage. How Television Tells the Labour Story’. Lusted.Quinn. Glasgow University Media Group (1976) Bad News. Greg (1987) ‘Whose News?’. Nicholas. Nick (1987) ‘Script Development’. Tim (1981) ‘The Glasgow Gang Again’. New Statesman 20 March: 12–13. Harrison. Gus (1982) ‘Air Patrol’. London: Routledge. Tunstall.A. John (1986) ‘Reply to David Glencross’. Media. Martin (1986) ‘News Extra on TV Bias: Letter to the Editor’. Culture and Society 9(4): 397–406. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. The Guardian 1 June: 10. Greg (2002) ‘War of Words Continues over Middle East Coverage’.uk] .

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