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University of Notre Danze
Peirce conceived of methodology, or methodeutic, as he preferred to call it, as one of the three major parts of logic taken broadly-the other two being the theory of signs and formal logic. Unlike these two, however, his theory of methodology remained mostly programmatic, and there is little more than fragmentary suggestions about it scattered through his writings. But by gathering them together and pursuing their insights, it is possible to indicate how he might have divided and developed it: 1) The nature of scientific discourse and how it differs from non-scientific. 2) The logic of inquiry, both heuristic and systematic, according to the modes of argument as deductive, inductive, or abductive (i.e. hypothesis) or a combination or all three. 3) The assurance of science considered in the factors that thwart or promote inquiry.

Peirce was interested throughout his life in the methods of the sciences. During the few years he taught at Johns Hopkins he seems to have exerted every effort to make it into a "university of methods" (7.62).= In his tri-partite division of logic the study of methods occupies a prominent place and is sometimes described as the "highest and most living branch of logic" (2.333), destined with the development of modern logic to "grow into a colossal doctrine" (3.454). Yet among the many papers left from a life-time of devoted work there is, as his editors note, "no systematic treatment of this subject" (2.105, n.). Methodology, like esthetics and ethics, belongs to what Burks has called the "programmatic portion of Peirce's philo~ophy."~ What we have of it consists of little more than stray remarks and references scattered through his papers. But as with so much of Peirce's writing these remarks are highly suggestive and illuminating, not only of Peirce's thought, but of the whole field of logical studies. No attempt has been made, that I have been able to discover, to bring these remarks together and to pursue the suggestions so as to outline his theory of methodology as a whole and for itself. Weiss has recently followed up some of them in his paper on "The Logic of the Creative P r o ~ e s s . " ~ T h e book-length studies of Peirce have not done much more than to note and describe its place in his philosophy.

1. Its Place in Logic. First it will be well to place the study of methods within the field of logic, even though this entails going over welltrod ground.

* Received

January 1959.

Citations in bracketed numerals are, by volume and paragraph number, to the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vols. 1-6 edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss; Vols. 7-8 edited by A. W. Burks, Cambridge, Harvard 1931-35; 1958. ARTHUR BUKKS, W. The Logical Fo~mdationsof the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, doctoral dissertation, Ann Arbor, 1941. In Studies i n the Philosophy of Charles Smclers Peirce, edlt. P. P. Wiener and F. H. Young, Cambridge, Harvard, 1952, p. 166-182.



From the early papers of 1847 to the last letters to Lady Welby Peirce maintained that it is possible to distinguish a "trivium of formal sciences of symbols in general" (4.1 16). This trivium constitutes logic in the broad sense (1.444)) and consists of: (1) the "general theory of the nature and meaning of signs," (1.191), which is usually called "Speculative Grammar" and sometimes "stecheotic" or "stoicheology;" (2) the "theory of the general conditions of the reference of symbols and other signs to their professed objects, that is, it is the theory of the conditions of truth" (2.93) and is concerned with "classifying arguments and the validity and force of each" (1.191); this is called variously "logic in the strict sense," "Critic," "critical logic", or "obsistent logic;" (3) the last part is the object of our concern. Since it receives the greatest variety of names and descriptions it will prove helpful to look at the leading texts in the chronological order of their composition.
(a) "The third would treat of the formal conditions of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be called formal rhetoric." (1.559)-1867 (b) It treats of "the laws of the evolution of thought, which since it coincides with the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another ought, for the sake of taBing ad>~antage an old of association of terms, be called rhetorics speculativu, but which I content myself with inaccurately calling objecti,ue logic, because that conveys the correct idea that it is like Hegel's logic." (1.44.4)--1896 (c) "Thirdly, the general doctrine must embrace the study of those general conditions under which a problem presents itseif for solution and those under which one question leads on to another. As this completes a tries of studies, or trivium, we might, not inappropriately, term the last study Speculative Rhetoric." (3.430)-1896 (d) "The third, in imitation of Kant's fashion of preserving old associations of words in finding nomenclature for new conceptions. I call pure rhetoric. Its task is to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific illtelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another." (2.229)-1897 ( e ) "Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is substantially what goes by the name of methodology, orbetter,of methodezltic. ltis the doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine." (2.931-1902 (f) "Methodeutic, or Speculative Rhetoric. The practical want of a good treatment of this subject is acute. . . . a general doctrine . . . about methods of solving problems. . . . the logical study of the theory of inquiry. . . . the general theory of how research must be performed . . . a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must take place. . . T h e next step will surely be to find a method of discovering methods. This can only come from a t h e o ~ yof the method of discovery. In order to cover every possibility, this should be founded on a general doctrine of methods of attaining purposes, in general; and this, in turn, should spring from a still more general doctrine of the nature of teleological action, in general." (2.105-108)-1902

First, a word about the names, not all of which need be retained, Noting even in first using it (in b) that "objective logic" is inaccurate, Peirce came to separate the concern that it names from Methodology and from Logic as the general theory of signs. Objective logic S la Hegel considers "whether there be a life in signs, so that . . . they will go through a certain order of



development" and whether that order is repetitive in history (2.111). In distinguishing such a consideration from logic, even taken broadly, Peirce in effect is remarking that there are two ways of viewing how one idea follows from another. One, which is the way taken by the history of philosophy, considers the actual course of ideas in history as they are taken up from one thinker to another. Thus one might trace the development of philosophy from Descartes through Loclie, Berkeley, and Hume. T o analyse such a development and, if possible, to discern laws in it constitutes the work of Objective Loglc. T h e other way is "logical9' in the more usual sense in that it concerns the formal relations through which one idea follows another and the methods used to achieve it quite apart from their actual historical embodiment and development. I t seeks what is necessary logically, not historically, to get one idea from another so as to achieve a certain result. This fact is emphasized by the adjectives that Peirce uses to qualify the study when he calls it "formal," "pure", or "universal" rhetoric. From the chronoiogical order of the texts it is apparent that as Peirce thought about it he came to place greater weight on the study of methods as the proper object for this part of logic. T h e fullest description, excerptcd in (f), is all ir, terms of the method of solving problems, inquiry, discovery. In keeping with this he tends to use the name "Methodeutic" for this study, although he notes that it is more commonly called 'Wethodology." As still the most common, this would seem to be the most readily intelligible name for the general kind of study that he envisages. Yet throughout he is strongly attracted to the name "Rhetoric." At times fond of "preserving old associations of words," he may have wanted to link his triadic division of logic with the mediaeval Trivium, as is suggested in (c). Since he has correlated the first two parts with grammar and logic, "rhetoric" is left as the name for the third part. H e has a more substantial reason in the fact that some of the tasks he assigns to this part are commonly associated with rhetoric in ordinary usage. Thus he speaks of the "conditions of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind" (a), of the "conditions of the transmission of meaning" (b), and of "methods of attaining purposes" (f). Furthermore, in assigning to it particularly the study of the Interpretant, he finds the strongest reason for correlating it with rhetoric.

2. The Division of Methodology. A full discussion of the Interpretant and its many kinds would carry us into the whole theory of signs. Fortunately, however, the major distinctions are sufficient for suggesting and indicating how Peirce might have analysed and divided the field of M e t h ~ d o l o g y . ~ T h e Interpretant is one of the three essential ingredients that Peirce
For the whole question of Peirce's complex division of signs, cf. P. WEISS and A. BURKS, "Peirce's Sixty-Six Signs" in Journal of Philosophy, XLII (1945), p. 383-388, repeated with minor changes in Lieb, cited below in n. 5. I am much indebted to it. In the divisions I use I give usually only one of the many names that Peirce at various times assigned to them; all of them are included in this article by Weiss and Burks.



distinguishes in the sign, the others being the sign itself as a thing, and the object that it presents. T h e object is presented in "a certain respect or capacity" (2.228), as having its own "peculiar interpretability" (LW. 36)5 so as to produce a certain effect, i.e. a determinate interpretation, and this is the Interpretant. It is perhaps most briefly described as the aspect of use which belongs to a sign, i.e. its purpose. It accordingly belongs to the category of purpose, which Peirce calls "Thirdness." Thus besides being one of the terms of the triadic relation constituted by the sign, the Interpretant is itself a Third and hence divisible into three. This division, which is the fundamental one for the Interpretant, yields what Peirce calls the Immediate, the Dynamical, and the Final Interpretant. T o illustrate these three, Peirce cites as example his wife awaking and asking him, "What sort of a day is it ?" (8.314) Here the Immediate Interpretant is "what the question expresses, all that it immediately expresses." The Dynamical Interpretant is "my answering her question . . . the actual effect that it has upon me, its interpreter." T h e Final or Ultimate Interpretant is "the significance of it, . . . her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day." Peirce was never fully satisfied with these distinctions and as late as 1909 speaks of his "gropings after the three kinds of Interpretant" (LW. 35). Nor was he always consistent in what he has to say about them, and he proposes many different names for them.4 Yet from this one example it seems clear enough what he is after. Since the Interpretant is the use, purpose, or effect of a sign, we may consider it in any one of three ways: (1) As expressed in the sign (including its whole context) so as to give it a "peculiar interpretability before it gets any interpreter" (LW. 36), i.e. the Immediate Interpretant. (2) As the "direct effect actually produced by a sign upon an interpreter of it" (LW. 3 9 , which as such is a singular event different for each interpretation-the Dynamical Interpretant. (3) As the effect to be achieved-the Final Interpretant. Thus in the example we have a sign that is respectively (1) a question that (2) provokes the husband's answer (3) so as to settle the wife's plans for the day. Of these three, the Final Interpretant is the controlling one, and according to Peirce's categorical scheme it alone is a true Third and hence Interpretant in the full sense. He describes it more fully as "the effect the sign would produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect" (1,W. 35), or again as "the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered" (LW. 36). The difference in effects or results intended by the sign provides the ground for dividing the Final Interpretant into three: "Gra.tific; T o produce Action; T o produce self-control" (8.372). But self-control is for Peirce the mark of reasoned thought (1.606), and since it is here distinguished from action, I take it to be that, or generally as scientific thought. This is
Titations by bracketed "LU7" and numeral refer, by page number, to Charles S. Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby, edit. I . C. I i e b , New Haven, Whitlock's, 1953.

borne out by his elsewhere calling the three, Gratific, Practical, and Pragmatistic.* According to this division Peirce would then be saying that a sign may have as its ultimate purpose: to produce something to be enjoyed, to produce an action, or to produce scientific thinking. If so, we have in this division of the Final Interpretant the basis for distinguishing the major forms or kinds of discourse into Poetic, Practical, and Scientific. Peirce, so far as I have been able to discover, does not speak in these terms. Yet there are certain passages in which what he as to say seems to bear on this and to do so in ways that illuminate the division of the Final Interpretant:
(a) "The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. Its object is the thing or occasion, however, indefinite, to which it is to be applied. Its meaning is the idea which it attaches to that object, whether by way of mere SUPPOSITION, or as a COMMAND, or as an ASSERTION". (5.6)--1905 (b) "That which the sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a FEELING, to an EXERTION, or to a SIGN, which determination is the Interpretant". (4.536)-1906 (c) "What is man's proper function if it be not to embody general ideas in ART-CREATIONS, in UTILITIES, and above all in THEORETICAL COGNITION" (6.476)-1908

Peirce's thought abounds in triads, and the problem is always to know how to correlate them. But if these three sets, which I have emphasized by placing in capital letters, can be equated, they suggest the subdivision of the Final Interpretant. Suppose we are given a statement in symbols, e.g. a sentence in words. What is its intended or interpretable effect, i.e. what kind of response can it demand? There is good reason for thinking that there are but three possibilities: (1) It can demand that we see and enjoy the object that is presented, e.g. the wanderings and home-coming of an Odysseus; or (2) it can tell us to do something, as a question or a command, or as a recipe tells us what practical steps to take to get a pie; or (3) it can ask us to know theoretically, as Galileo's words, for example, enable us to know the law of falling bodies. In other words, we are presented with the possibibility of three different kinds of discourse. These are distinguished, I would suggest, by Peirce's division of the Final Interpretant. By it we are able to separate scientific discourse from other kinds, and this is to isolate the major object of Methodology. I n fact, on the basis of this division it might be claimed that the first task of Methodology, as concerned with the methods of the sciences, is to distinguish scientific discourse and argument from other kinds, particularly from poetic (or Gratific) and Practical. If either of the latter raises any peculiar kind of logical problem, it would receive consideration here. I do not know whether poetry would. Practical discourse can be divided, on Peirce's classifying imperatives and interrogatives together (LW. 32), into command and question, and here questions of particular interest to logic might arise, which would not properly fall into either Speculative Grammar or Critic, but would



suppose both of these. Recent work on the logic of questions and the logic of commands would appear to fit here in Peirce's classification of logic." However, the main task of Methodology is obviously the analysis of scientific discourse or argument. Within the classification of signs Peirce places argument as one of the three sub-divisions (along with term and proposition) coming from consideration of the relation between the sign and the Final Interpretant (8.344; 8.373).4 This is the place for what is the major relation among signs, namely the illative relation or inference. Thus Peirce writes:

. . the purpose of signs-which is the purpose of thought is to bring truth to expression. The law under which a sign must he true is the law of inference; and the signs of a scientific intelligence must, above all other conditions, be such as to lend themselves to inference. Hence the illative relation is the primary and paramount semiotic relation. It might be objected that to say that the purpose of thought is to bring truth to expression is to say that the production of propositions, rather than that of inferences, is the primary object. But the production of propositions is of the general nature of inference, so that inference is the function of the cognitive mind." (2.444. n. 1)
The study of arguments, which constitutes the second part of logic, or Critic, Peirce calls "the central part of logic, its heart" (LW. 39). We should expect it then to lead us to the heart of Methodology. It does so, as we shall see, with its division of argument into Deduction, Induction, and Abduction (or Hypothesis). The study of the discovery, establishment, and use of such arguments in science would naturally figure largely in any theory of Methodology. I n fact, such a consideration might well be identified with the logic of inquiry. However, before pursuing that in detail, it will be useful to consider one other division of the Interpretant: that which concerns the relation of the Final Interpretant to its Object (8.344).4 If we have a scientifk argument as a sign, the question may be asked how we know that its object is established. Peirce's division suggests that the answer may be the "assurance of Instinct, assurance of Experience; assurance of Form" (8.374). T h e first two of these obviously introduce psychological elements, qualities on the part of the scientists. Yet in Methodology Peirce was willing to relax his rule and allow psychological considerations to have a place (2.107). The assurance of formal validity of argument belongs to Critic, where the nature and force of arguments is analysed. Yet Peirce frequently considers the kind of attitude and experience that the scientist should have towards his work and the obstacles to be avoided. Formally, the obstacles consist of fallacies, and their study would seem to fall here rather than elsewhere in the division of logic. The remainder would be devoted to a consideration of the psychological conditions necessary for the assurance of science. Peirce makes still other divisions of the I n t e r ~ r e t a n t .But they do not ~
Cf. for example, M. L. PRICR and A. N. PRIOR, "Erotetic Logic" in Philcsophical Review, 1955, p. 43-59 and A. HOFSTADTER J. C. C. MCKINSEY, and "On the Logic of Imperatives" in Philosophy of Science, VI (1939), p. 446-457.




concern the Final Interpretant, and so far as I understand them, they throw no light upon the problems of Methodology. T h e results achieved so far, showing how the divisions relating to the Final Interpretant suggest a three-fold division o i Methodology, can be summarized in the following table :

Disision of the Interpretant

Division of Methodology

1. itccording to the nature of the Interpretant 1. Immediate 2. Dynamical 3. Final - 1) Gratific 2) Practical 3) Pragmatistic
2. According to relation of sign to the Final Interpretant I . Term (Rheme) 2. Proposition 3. Argument - I ) Deduction 2) Induction 3) Abduction

1 . Division of the Kinds of Discourse

I. Poetic 2. Practical 3. Scientific

2. The Logic of Inquiry according to the modes of argument 1. Deduction 2. Induction 3. Abduction
3. The Assurance of Science 1 . Instinct 2. Experience 3. Form

3. According to relation of Final Interpretant to the Object 1. Assurance of Instinct 2. Assurance of Experience 3. Assurance of Form

3. The Logic of Inquiry. Granted that the main concern of Methodology is with the methods of the sciences, we still need to distinguish its special interest. What we want to locate is the methodological interest in a scientific inquiry as distinct from both the scientific interest as such and the narrowly logical interest in its argument. Peirce does just this in anaiysing the various interests that a "broad mathematical hypothesis" may present (4.370). T h e scientific concern, in this case that of mathematics, lies in "the circumstance that that hypothesis necessarily involves certain relations among the things supposed, over and above those that were supposed in the definition of it," and the mathematician is interested in discovering and manifesting those relations. T h e methodological interest lies in "the devices which have to be employed to bring these new relations to light," i.e. in the metl~ods employed to discover and manifest the result. T h e logical concern lies in "the analytical interest in the essential elements of the hypothesis and of the deductive processes of the second study, in their intellectual pedigrees and in their conceptual affiliations with ideas met with elsewhere," i.e. with the nature and validity of the argument as hypothesis and deduction. Thus it might be said that whereas the science is concerned with getting a result, and logic with analysing the arguments that are finally used, methodology is concerned with discovering how to analyse the hypothesis so as to find arguments that lead to the desired result.



Peirce has left an analysis of a mathematical demonstration which indicates what these "devices" are which particularly interest methodology (4.612-616). He takes the proposition of Euclid, 1.20, that "in every triangle, any two sides taken together are always greater than the third." H e breaks down the argument into its parts and remarks on the names traditionally given to them. Those of main interest to us are the two that follow immediately upon the general statement of the proposition, just given. There is first "a translation of it into singular terms, each general subject being replaced by a Greek letter that serves as the p o p e - name for a single one of the objects denoted by that general subject" (4.616); in other words, a diagram of a particular triangle is drawn. This is immediately followed by direction for the so-called "construction," consisting of "precise directions for drawing certain lines . . . (which) are not only all that are referred to in the condition of the proposition, but also all the additional lines which he is about to consider in order to facilitate the demonstration" (4.616). T h e argument, called the "demonstration," then proceeds with respect to the diagram and construction and, using previously established propositions, deduces the desired conclusion. T h e narrowly logical interest in the argument is centered upon the last step, the deduction. Yet there is no argument until the diagram and construction are given. Peirce describes this as the "step of so introducing into a demonstration a new idea not explicitly or directly contained in the premises of the reasoning or in the condition of the proposition which gets proved by the aid of this introduction," and proposes calling it a "theoric step"the diagram being a minor and the construction the major theoric steps in the whole demonstration (4.613). T h e discovery and analysis of such theoric steps is, according to Peirce, one of the main objectives of methodology, since it is the foundation of a method.' When a theoric step has "once been invented, it may be imitated, and its analogues applied in proving other propositions. . . . If the theoric invention is susceptible of wide application, it will be the basis of a mathematical method" (4.613). By making a "historical study of all the remarkable theoric steps and noticeable classes of theoric steps . . . not a mere narrative, but a critical examination of just what and of what mode the logical efficacy of the different steps has been," we can obtain "a logical classification of theoric steps . . . crowned with a new methodeutic of necessary reasoning" (4.615). Such a methodology will not replace the need for genius, originality in invention, and creative imagination. Peirce clearly recognizes that at the beginning of scientific discovery comes that "penetrating glance at a problem that directs the mathematician to take his stand at the point from which it may be most advantageously viewed." But he claims that "that faculty may be taught to nourish and strengthen itself, and to acquire a skill in fulfilling its office with less of random casting about than it as yet can" (4.615;612).
An example of such an analysis as Peirce suggests may be found in G. POLYA, HOWt o Solve It, Princeton, 1948.

In effect, Peirce is here claiming the possibility of a genuinely logical interest in scientific discovery, against those who maintain that it is entirely a matter of genius, analysable at most by psychology. T h e discovery and analysis of theoric steps by no means exhausts the interest of methodology, even with regard only to deductive reasoning. Of equal if not even greater importance is the problem of organizing the results obtained into a system. "The Grzmdsatx of Formal Rhetoric," Peirce writes, "is that an idea should be presented in a unitary, comprehensive, systematic shape" (4.116). I n part his enthusiasm for the logic of relations stems from the hope that it will facilitate a better understanding of the nature of a system. Reviewing Schroder's Logik, he notes: "It must immensely widen our logical notions. For example a class consisting of a lot of things jumbled higgledypiggledy must now be seen to be but a degenerate form of the more general idea of a system. Generalisation, which has hitherto meant passing to a larger class, must mean taking in the conception of the whole system of which we see but a fragment, etc. etc." (3.454). What Peirce would seem to have in mind here, at least in part, is the elabor tion of what would now be called an Axiomatic System. In one text dealing with his logical graphs he describes in general terms what is involved in framing a system, and this, although too long to quote, is clearly an axiomatic system (4.481). Such a systematization would show how one question leads to another, which, as we have seen, belongs to methodology (3.430, p. 185 above). The methodology of necessary or deductive reasoning would thus appear to consist of two clearly distinct parts, corresponding in some ways to the traditional analytic and synthetic methods, or the via inventionis and the via resolutionis :the first dealing with the theoric steps of discovery and the second with the systematisation of the results. So far we have considered only the possibility of a "methodeutic of necessary reasoning," i.e. of deduction. For this mathematics, more than any other science, provides the material. But deduction does not constitute the whole of scientific inquiry, not even of mathematics. Equally important are induction and abduction (or hypothesis), which along with deduction constitute the three kinds of argument (2.266). We would expect to have then a methodology of induction and abduction corresponding to that of deduction. However, in his analysis of induction and abduction Peirce makes no such clear-cut distinction between the methodological and the critical interest in these arguments such as we found above for deduction. There is considerable more difficulty, consequently, in determining precisely how he would divide the consideration of induction and abduction between Critical Logic and Methodology. In the first chapter of his Minute Logic Peirce outlines a fairly detailed plan of the content of Critic. It deals with the nature and validity of the three fundamental modes of argument (2.100-104). Thus it would seem to belong to Critic to distinguish the three modes of argument from each other, and the various kinds of each and to analyse their rules and validity. What then remains for Methodology ?

Peirce comments most directly on the methodological character of induction and abduction whcn he analyses the method of science at work. Then, however, all three modes of argument are present. But before we turn to that we wanr. to know whether there is a separate methodology for both induction and induction such as we found for deduction. Some indication that therc is may be found in Peirce's contention that the sciences may be distinguished from one another by the predominance of one type of argument. Thus in an early paper he notes that one of the merits of the "distinction between induction and hypothesis is, that it leads to a very natural classification of the sciences and of the minds which prosecute them" (2.644). Some sciences are "purely inductive," such as the classificatory sciences of systematic botany and zoology. Others are primarily abductive or hypothetical. Here he distinguishes hypothesis from theory as an argument resting on slight evidence from one that is 11-ell established (2.638). This yields abductive "sciences of theory," such as astronomy and pure physics, and abductive "sciences of hypothesis," such as biology and geology. These sciences woilld thus appear to be best suited for providing material for a methodology of induction and abduction. If the methodology of deduction pro\~idesa pattern, we would have two distinct concerns, the first dealing with discovery and the second with the s <stematization of the results. I~~cluction being most prominent in the classificatory sciences, its methodology would be mainly concerned with discovering and systematizing the methods of classification Similarly, the methodology of abduction would look to the sciences of hypothesis and theory with a view to analysing the methods of discovering and formulating hypotheses and theories. As an example of the kind of results we would get we may look at the rules of abduction Peirce obtained (7.220-221; cf. 7.223). These are given as part of a larger enterprise to indicate the "proper scientific procedure" to follow in interpreting ancient historical documents (7.185), and Peirce would maintain that he had obtained them from the analysis of the sciences actually at work. In framing a hypothesis or theory (since the former distinction is not relevant here), Peirce claims that "three considerations should determined our choice. T h e hypothesis must be:
1. Capable of being subjected to experimental testing. 2. Explanatory of all the facts, either as natural chance results or as deductions from the

3. Economical, which is broken down into considerations of cost, value, and its effect upon
other hypotheses.

I n regard to cost, "if a hypothesis can be put to the test of experiment with very little expense of any kind, that should be regarded as a recommendation for giving it precedence in the inductive procedure." With regard to value, considered as tending towards "an expectation that a given hypothesis may be true," that hypothesis should be preferred which to the scientist "naturally

recommends" itself (the scientist having a "natural instinct for the truth) or which possesses the greater "likelihood as based on his past experience as a science. Finally, with regard to its relation to other hypotheses, there are three things to be observed in choosing a hypothesis: "Caution" in the sense of breaking it into its smallest logical components and risking only one of them at a time; "Breadth" in making the hypothesis as broad as possible so as to account for the same phenomena in other fields; and "Incomplexity" in that the sin~plesthypothesis should be tried f i r ~ t . ~ Even in so summary an account it has been found impossible to describe the method of abduction without bringing in the other kinds of argument, and even raising questions about the assurance of science. Consideration of methods in each of the fundamental modes of reasoning at most only provides the preparation for the main task of Methodology-the study of scientific inquiry as a "unique Indagation" (6.565) which unites all three arguments. A scientific theory is the greatest practical achievement of logic, and in the case of the physical sciences, "the rnost perfect example of the successful application of thought to the external world" (7.276). In it all three kinds of argument are constantly being employed. Peirce devoted a life-time of thought to the study of scientific theories with the purpose of discerning their logical structure, and this kind of study certainly fits most perfectly into the part assigned to Methodology in the large plan he drew up for logic. While at Johns Hopkins, he offered a course in the nature of scientific reasoning, which consisted in the study of Kepler's De nzotibus stellae Ik/Iarti~.~ Kepler, he declares, "comcs very close to realizing my ideal of the scientific method, and he is one of the few thinkers who have taken their readers fully into their confidence as to what their method really has been" (6.604). He devotes a chapter to iqepler in his Harvard lectures on the history of science.1 Elsewhere he calls him the "eternal exemplar of scientific reasoning" (2.96). In the theory of Mars' movements Peirce finds that Xepler utilizes all the fundament21 modes of reasoning: abduction for the idea cf the elliptical law (1.72; 2.196); deduction for the drawing of consequences and demonstration; and induction for testing by observation (2.97). Out of such study came Peirce's effort to chart the "stages of inquiry": how we move from the notice of a wonderful phenomenon to make a startling conjecture 2nd arrive at a plausible expianation by reasoning from consequent to antecedent by abduction; then set about collecting the consequences of the hypothesis, explicating it by deduction and drawing out its implications;
Since abduction is "nothing but guessing" (7.219), Peirce would certainly have welcomed as a contribution to the methodology of abduction, Mathematics and Plausible Reaso?zi:zg b y G. POLYA, Princeton, 1954, 2 vols. Cf. also A. W. BURKS, "Peirce's Theory of Abduction" in Philosophy of Science, XI11 (1946), p. 301-306. Cf. R?. Ei. Frsca & J. I. COPE, "Peirce at Johns Hopkins University," in the Wiencr-young Studies (above, n. 3), p. 288, p. 357, n. 39. In Values ill a Uniaerse of Chance :Selected Writings of Charles S. Peirce, edit. P. P . Wiener, Stanford, 1958, p. 250-257.



and finally, by induction, ascertaining how far these consequents accord with experience, classifying, proving, and judging to what extent the hypothesis is borne out (6.469-473, cf. 7.276). Peirce's own example provides an illustration of the sort of investigation that lies at the heart of Methodology. In broad terms it is the logical analysis of what happens in a scientific investigation; of how we begin and how we get from one question or problem to another; and how we finally elaborate our results into a scientific theory. Taken in a wide sense, it is the task of analysing the method of theory-construction, all of which results in a logical map of the stages of scientific inquiry. With this as a basis an attempt can then be made to describe, and ascertain the rules of, the scientific method, such as Peirce attempted in his article of that title in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (7.79-88).

4. The Assurance of Science. Since R/lethodology comes after Speculative Grammar and Critical Logic and depends upon them, Peirce claims that "there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like" (2.107). So far, however, in analysing the content of Methodology, we have found little occasion to introduce psychological considerations; in fact, the onlv place they have appeared has been in considering the rules of abduction. This is in accord with Peirce's contention that Methodology is not mainly a "matter of psychology" (4.116). Psychology becomes relevant only when we come to consider what it is on the part of the scientist that makes for the success of the scientific inquiry and the basis for his assurance that the inquiry is being conducted as it should be This consideration is suggested, as we have seen, by Peirce's division of the Final Interpretant according to the kind of assurance that is obtained. It would seem to belong to this part to take up not only the factors that positively promote inquiry, but also the negative ones that thwart it. Among the latter, two sorts can be distinguished: First, the kind of mistake that occurs when the scientist claims that one thing follows from another when in fact it does not, i.e. fallacies, to which Peirce devoted a chapter of his Grand Logic (6.278~1, but not included in the Collected Papers). Secondly, there are the factors that may be summed up in the rule which, Peirce urged, "deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy," namely, "Do not block the way of inquiry" (1.i35). Under this Peirce lists as to be avoided such convictions as that absolute certainty is capable of achievement (1.137), that something is inexplicable and unknowable (1.I%), that some one principle is the basic and ultimate which in itself is inexplicable (1.139), and that any law or truth has received its perfect and final formulation (1.140). I n general, we would want to discover and isolate the qualities of mind that prevent the scientist from getting on with his work. Peirce was well aware that successful inquiry also demands certain positive qualities of mind. He was fond of saying that they rest at bottom on no

more than "a hearty and active desire to learn what is true" (5.582). But he took this so broadly and deeply that this desire extends from the "instinct" of the scientist to choose the natural and simple explanation up to the vital power of inquiry for self-correction and growth in the unlimited community of inquirers. His discussion of the will to learn and the success of inquiry readily falls under the division of signs according to assurance by instinct, experience, and form or thought. Thus he comes to claim that Ockham's Razor as a rule of reason is not so much a matter of logical simplicity as of psychological appeal in that the scientist chooses the explanation that is the "more facile and natural, the one that instinct suggests" (6.477; cf. above p. 19;). Moreover, the analysis of the ingredients of a successful experiment contain much matter that is psychological, social, and even moral, rather than strictly logical, as in the rules for entertaining a hypothesis (6.524), the economy of research (1.122; 7.138- l6l), and the virtues necessary for successful research (1S76). But what is perhaps of most importance to Peirce in his analysis of the assurance of science is the conviction that "reasoning tends to correct itself" (5.575) and "controversies get settled" (5.578). This can occur only if inquiry is fully carried out. Since this in its full and Peircean sense is beyond the efforts of any one man, what is needed is the cooperation of inquirers in the "unlimited community" of science. Methodology, having considered the nature of scientific discourse and the ways of discovery and organization in inquiry, will thus at its close consider the place and function of the whole scientific community in the success of science, or, to put it in quite un-Peircean language, the role of tradition in science.

In resumC, the various tasks of Methodology, which constitute its division, can be collected into the following table:
Methodology as a logical science broadly taken 1. 1.1. 1.2. 1.21. 1.22. The The The The The nature of scientific discourse kinds of discourse: poetic, practical, theoretical methodology of non-scientific discourse logic of questions logic of commands

2. The logic of inquiry 2.1. In particular, according to the modes of argument: 2.11. The methodology of deduction 2.1 11. Heuristic: the discovery of theoric steps 2.112. Systematic: the organization of demonstration, esp. Axiomatic system. 2.12. The methodology of induction 2.121. Heuristic: discovery of the basis of classification 2.122. Systematic: organization of classification into a system

2.13. The methodology of abduction


2.131. Heuristic: the formulation of hypothesis

2.132. Systematic: the organization of hypotheses into a system 2.2 In general: the organization of the 3 modes of argument into a scientific inquiry: theoryconstruction The assurance of science N e g a t i z d y : the factors that thwart inquiry Fallacies Attitudes blocking the road to inquiry Positizdy: the factors promoting inquiry Instinct: qualities of mind promoting the will to learn Experience: the factors necessary for scientific experiment Form: how reasoning corrects itself in the long run: the unlimited scientific community