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Case: 12-2145

Document: 00116444718

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Date Filed: 10/16/2012

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No. 12-2145 __________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT __________________________________________________________________ MYRNA COLN MARRERO Plaintiff-Appellant v. HCTOR CONTY PREZ, President of the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission; EDWIN MUNDO ROS, as Electoral Commissioner of the New Progressive Party; EDER ORTIZ ORTIZ, as Electoral Commissioner of the Popular Democratic Party; ROBERTO I. APONTE BERRIOS, as Electoral Commissioner of the Puerto Rican Independence Party; JULIO FONTANET MALDONADO, as Electoral Commissioner of the Movimiento Unin Soberanista Party; ADRIAN DAZ DAZ, as Electoral Commissioner of the Puertorriqueos por Puerto Rico Party; and CARLOS QUIROS MENDEZ, as Electoral Commissioner of the Pueblo Trabajador Party Defendants-Appellees __________________________________________________________________ ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO __________________________________________________________________ EMERGENCY PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC BY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE EDWIN MUNDO ROS AS ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW PROGRESSIVE PARTY

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Counsel for Appellee Edwin Mundo Ros as Electoral Commissioner of the New Progressive Party David C. Indiano Seth A. Erbe INDIANO & WILLIAMS, P.S.C. 207 Del Parque St.; Third Floor San Juan, Puerto Rico 00912 Tel: (787) 641-4545 Fax: (787) 641-4544 david.indiano@indianowilliams.com seth.erbe@indianowilliams.com

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, Defendant-Appellee, Edwin Mundo-Ros, in his capacity as electoral Commissioner of the New Progressive Party (NPP), respectfully requests en banc review of the panels October 11, 2012 Order finding that Plaintiff-Appellant Myrna Coln-Marrero (Coln-Marrero, Plaintiff or Appellant) had established a likelihood of success in this case, and remanding to the district court to balance the hardships and make a determination regarding the public interest. STATEMENT AS TO WHY REHEARING EN BANC SHOULD BE GRANTED On September 12, 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant Myrna Coln-Marrero (ColnMarrero, Plaintiff or Appellant), a United States citizen residing in Puerto Rico, filed a Complaint alleging that Art. 6.012 of Law No. 78 of June 1, 2011, as amended, known as the Puerto Rico Electoral Code for the 21st Century (Law No. 78 or Puerto Ricos Electoral Code), implicates the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg, et seq.; the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 15301, et seq.; and her right to vote under various provisions of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also arguedin a footnote of her brief on appealthat not to impose the obligations of the NVRA on Puerto Rico implicates the Equal Protection Clause. The only challenge properly before the Court is Plaintiff claim under the NVRA. -1-

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The section of the Puerto Rico Electoral Code at issue governs the voterinactivation procedures of the Puerto Ricos State Elections Commission. It requires that each voter that fails to vote in a prior election must reactivate her status as an active voter. The panels determination involves an issue of exceptional importanceone that puts at risk the protection of the integrity and regularity of Puerto Ricos upcoming November 6 General Elections, and the procedures implemented by the Puerto Rico Electoral Commission to provide its citizens with fair and orderly election and post-election services. The panels determination also (1) contravenes the clear terms of the NVRA, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-1(4) (Imposing obligations regarding the right to vote on each State, and defining the term State to mean a State of the United States and the District of Columbia), (2) is in conflict with this Courts interpretation to a nearly identical provision in Herman v. Hector I. Nieves Transport, Inc., 244 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2001) (Torruella, J.) (Holding that the definition of State to the effect of the 50 states of the United States and the District of Columbia and United States as the States of the United States and the District of Columbia, explicitly excludes Puerto Rico because to hold otherwise would contravene the plain meaning of the statutory language), and (3) effectively overrules the this Courts long standing case law to the effect that the presumption [that federal laws apply to Puerto Rico] can be overcome[d] by specific evidence to -2-

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the contrary or by clear policy reasons embedded in a statute. Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuo, 670 F.3d 310, 322 (1st Cir. 2012) (Howard, J.) (quoting, Crdova & Simonpietri Insurance Agency v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1981)). Moreover, if in reaching its determination the panel diverted from the Courts longstanding practice of deeming waived undeveloped or perfunctorily raised arguments, and considered Plaintiff-Appellees undeveloped HAVA claim,1 that determination flatly contrary to the Supreme Courts decision in Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S. 5, 6 (2008) (summarily reversing the Court of Appeals because Section 303 of HAVAthe very section at issue heredoes not create private rights that may be vindicated throughout a private cause of action). The same goes as to Plaintiff-Appellants never-briefed right to vote claims. See, Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (states MAY impose mechanisms for the orderly execution of an election); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (same); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) (involving recount for senatorial

elections); see also, Igartua v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (Although [the NVRA] affects the right to vote, the Act does not infringe that right but rather limits a state's ability to restrict it.)

The panel did not state the basis for its determination on the likelihood of success of PlaintiffAppellants challengeeffectively impairing Appellees ability to challenge this holding.

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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS On November 2008, general elections were held in Puerto Rico for the election of state officers and the Resident Commissioner. Because Coln-Marrero did not vote in that election, see, App. Brief, at 2, she was deactivated as a qualified elector in accordance with Art. 6.012 of Law No. 78. Although Coln-Marrero had close to four years to reactivate her electoral status in accordance with the applicable legal statutes, she failed to do so.2 As evinced to the panel, for over a decade it has been the position of both the Attorney General of the United States and the Puerto Rico Electoral Commission that the NVRA and the provisions of HAVA at issue do not apply to Puerto Rico. In fact, the Attorney General filed an amicus brief with the Court reaffirming his position. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, filed on October 10, 2012. ARGUMENT 1. NVRA. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) (42 U.S.C. Sec.

1973gg, et seq.) imposes a series of obligations imposed upon each State designed to maximize voter participation in federal elections. 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-2. Relevant here, Section 6 provides that each State: shall not remove[] [ ] the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for
2

In fact, Coln-Marrero could have re-activated her right to vote on September 14, 2012 rather than file the instant lawsuit. -4-

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Federal office by reason of the persons failure to vote, [unless such person] has not voted or appeared to vote in 2 or more consecutive general elections for Federal office. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-6 (b) (2) (B). The term State is defined in Section 1 of the NVRA. See, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-1. Section 1 provides that the term State means a State of the United States and the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-1 (4). Although it is generally presumed that statutes of general application [ ] apply equally to Puerto Rico, Jusino Mercado v. Commonwealth of P.R., 214 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2000), that presumption can be overcome[d] by specific evidence to the contrary or by clear policy reasons embedded in a statute. Antilles Cement Corp., 670 F.3d at 322 (quoting, Crdova & Simonpietri Insurance Agency, 649 F.2d 42). The unambiguous text of the NVRA, the legislative record, Congresss failure to amend the statute despite the position of the Attorney General and U.S. Election Assistance Commission that it does not apply to Puerto Rico, and the statutes context and the policy behind it; all reflect Congresss clear and unequivocal intent to exclude Puerto Rico from the obligations imposed by the NVRA.3

This is clearly permissible under the applicable caselaw. See, Jusino-Mercado, 214 F.3d at p. 44 ((citing Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-51 (1980) (Congress may treat Puerto Rico differently from States as long as there is a rational basis for its actions)).

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The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning [and the Courts] inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (citing, U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)); see also, Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992) (in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there). Relevant here, [a] definition which declares what a term means, excludes any meaning that is not stated. Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 47:7 (7th ed.). See also, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning); Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130 (2008) (As a rule, [a] definition which declares what a term means' ... excludes any meaning that is not stated) (quoting, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 393, n. 10 (1979)); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 53 (1st Cir. 2006).

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As noted before, the word State is defined in Section 1 of the NVRA to mean (1) a State of the United States, and (2) the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-1. In Herman, 244 F.3d 32, this Honorable Court examined a similar definition of State provided in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 13102. In that statute a State is defined as the 50 states of the United States and the District of Columbia. Herman, 244 F.3d at 34; cf., Jusino-Mercado, 214 F.3d at 42 (Where Congress used the word state in an encompassing sense, agglomerating the states and the territories.) Thus, because of the plain meaning of the statute this Court unequivocally concluded that the definition explicitly excludes Puerto Rico. Id. at 35. As Judge Torruella explained; a contrary interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute. Id. There is no reasonable reason to reach a contrary conclusion in this case. Whether State is defined as the 50 states of the United States and the District of Columbia, as in the statute analyzed in Herman, see id., or means a State of the United States and the District of Columbia, as in the NVRA (see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-1(4), the issue is the same. The meaning is limited to a State of the United States, not a territory (except the District of Columbia). This is the only interpretation that preserves consistency with the very statements made by members of Congress leading up to the passage of the NVRA. On March 16 and May 11, 1993, in the final floor-debates in which the Senate was -7-

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considering the NVRAs Conference Report, three separate Senators belonging to different parties were clear in stating that the NVRA was limited to the 50 states of the Union. Senator Helms stated: Mr. President, this conference report will cost the States, all 50 of them, and their respective taxpayers, millions of dollars. 139 CONG. RECORD, S739-01, S 5737 (May 11, 1993) (emphasis added). Similarly, Congressman Akaka declared that [t]he Congressional Budget Office estimates that the total direct cost of this bill to all 50 States would be $20 million. Id., at S5744-01, S5746 (emphasis added). Senator Chafee from Rhode Island stated that H.R. 2 requires all 50 states to adopt uniform, federally mandated voter registration practices, Id., at S2913, S2914 (March 16, 1993). And, perhaps more importantly, Congressman Solomon from New York, in objecting the exclusion of the territories from the NVRA text, recognized that this piece of legislation mandates a cost on all 50 States, but not on the territories, because the territories are not included. 139 CONG. RECORD H495-04 (statement of Rep. Solomon). As if this were not enough, in Section 1 of the NVRA Congress defined various terms by incorporating the definitions given to those terms in the Federal Elections Campaigns Act (FECA), see, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-1 (incorporating definitions from 2 U.S.C.A. 431). Congress, however, explicitly refrained from incorporating the definition of the word State from the FECAwhere [t]he -8-

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term State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States (2 U.S.C.A. 431 (12)). See, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-1 (4). Indeed, and perhaps more importantly, when the NVRA was initially drafted by the 102nd Congress (filed as H.R. 2190 of 1990), that draft included in Section 114 a definition of the term State by referring to the definition of this term used in Section 431 (12) of the FECA (2 U.S.C. 431(12)). Before approving the statute, however, Congress eliminated this reference. Congress also explicitly included the District of Columbia when it defined State in the NVRA. Thus, not only did Congress explicitly excluded the

territories listed in the definition of the word State by incorporating the definition of the word provided by the FECA (or any other federal statute), it also effectively provided a definition in the NVRA that includes a territory (the District of Columbia)thereby reflecting that the only territory to which it intended to extend the NVRA was the District of Columbia.4

In its brief Appellantand Appellee PDPargues that the NVRA is applicable to Puerto Rico because it defines Federal office by incorporating the definition given to that term in the FECA. This theory is defeated by the very fact that the District of Columbia, which is also included in the definition of Federal office in the FECA, was also included in the definition of the word State in the NVRA. For, if Appellant was correct in her analysis, then Congress would not have included the District of Columbia within the definition of State as it was already covered under Federal office. At any rate, the NVRA imposes obligations on each State, not on each United States jurisdiction carrying an election for Federal office. The term Federal office was most likely

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Moreover, Congress knows very well the language necessary to include Puerto Rico as a state, Davila-Perez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 468 (1st Cir. 2000)), as is reflected in various statutes involving the same subject matter (voting), see, e.g.,2 U.S.C. 431 (12) (FECA); 42 U.S.C. 15541(HAVA); cf. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-1 (4) (NVRA), and in the numerous other statutes enacted by the 103rd Session of Congressthe Congress that finally approved the NVRA which included Puerto Rico in the definition of the term State in 23 of the 465 laws it enacted in the referenced Congressional Session.5 In the specific case of the NVRA, however, Congress consciously chose not to do so. [T]hat Congress knew
included to set forth that each State may not exclude a citizen that had voted for the Resident Commissioner in Puerto Rico during an election, and moved to a covered jurisdiction thereafter and singed up to vote in the covered jurisdictions subsequent election but failed to do so.
5

In 23 of 465 laws enacted in the 103rd Session of Congress, Congress explicitly included Puerto Rico in its definition of the term State (e.g.PL103-82, National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993; PL103-141, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993; PL 103-160, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994; PL 103-182, North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act; PL 103-190, Fresh Cut Flowers and Fresh Cut Greens Promotion and Information Act of 1993; PL 103-209, National Child Protection Act of 1993; PL 103-227, Educate America Act; PL 103-230, Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Amendments of 1994, PL 103-239, School to Work Opportunities Act of 1994; PL 103-272, To revise, codify, and enact without substantive change certain general and permanent laws, related to transportation, as subtitles II, III, and V-X of title 49, United States Code, "Transportation", and to make other technical improvements in the Code; PL 103-297, Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act; PL 103322, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994; PL 103-337, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995; PL 103-349, Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994; PL 103-353, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994; PL 103-358, Child Abuse Accountability Act; PL 103-359, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995; PL 103-375, North American Wetlands Conservation Act Amendments of 1994; PL 103-382, Improving America's Schools Act of 1994; PL 103383, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act; PL 103-414, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act; PL 103-430, Census Address List Improvement Act of 1994; PL 103-440,High-Speed Rail Development Act of 1994.

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the language necessary to include Puerto Rico as a state, Davila-Perez, supra, yet chose not to, reinforces the argument that Congress did not intend to impose the obligations of the NVRA on Puerto Rico. That this was Congresss intent has been the understanding of the United States Attorney Generalthe principal federal officer called to enforce the NVRA (see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-9(a))for decades and still is. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, filed on October 10, 2012; See also,

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/nvra/nvra_faq.php (Last visited on Oct 6, 2012.) (the territories are not covered by the NVRA (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands, American Samoa)). It is also the understanding of the U.S. Election Assistance Commissiona federal agency created by HAVA for the purpose of serving as a clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and review of procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections (42 U.S.C. Sec. 15322)which has assumed this position, before Congress itself. See, U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), THE IMPACT VOTER REGISTRATION ACT
OF OF THE OF

NATIONAL
FOR

1993

ON THE

ADMINISTRATION

ELECTIONS

FEDERAL OFFICE 2009-2010: A REPORT TO THE 112TH CONGRESS, June 30, 2011, p. 1;6 see also, id. at 10 (by the provisions of the NVRA, the term State means a

[Available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2010%20NVRA%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf (last

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State of the United States and the District of Columbia; territories are exempt.) That despite such interpretations Congress has remained silent and has never acted to amend the NVRA to include Puerto Rico within the term State is a clear indication of what its intent was, and that it desires this state of affairs. Puerto Ricos exclusion also has a logical explanationan explanation that this Court has used before to uphold other forms of differential treatment with regards to Puerto Rico, and its citizens, with regards to voting. The NVRA (and Appellants argument, at least in principle) is based on the notion that the right of the citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right. 42 U.S.C.A. 1973gg. This Court has repeatedly held, however, that such a right does not apply with equal force to the United States Citizens residing in Puerto Rico, see, Igarta de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (Igarta I) (no fundamental right to vote in presidential elections); Igarta de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (Igarta II) (same); Igarta de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Igarta III) (put[ing] fully at rest the issue that the United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico have no fundamental right to vote in presidential elections); Igarta v. United States, 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010) (Igarta IV) (No fundamental right to vote for members
visited October 6, 2012)] (Discussing the impact of the NVRA on the administration of elections for federal office and explicitly recognizing that all territories are exempt from the provisions of the NVRA.);

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of the House of Representatives). Therefore, because the right to vote of the United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico is severely limited by Puerto Ricos political status, there is no reason to presume that Congress intended to include Puerto Rico within its scope, even though the statute is silent as a matter of policy. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States, October 10, 2012, at 4 ([I]t is reasonable to read the NVRA, consistent with its plain language, as excluding Puerto Rico from its coverage. With respect to many NVRA provisions, Puerto Rico elections are not similarly situated to those of the States and the District of Columbia, and so the NVRA would not operate in the same manner.)7 2. HAVA. It is unclear what Appellants argument under the Help America

Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq. (HAVA) is. See, Appellants Brief, at 30-31. Although Appellant explains that in Section 303 (a)(2)(A)(i) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 15483 (a)(2)(A)(i)) of HAVA incorporates the NVRA provisions regarding voter registration, see, 42 U.S.C.A. 15483 (a)(2)(A)(i), and in another section defines the term State to include Puerto Rico; Appellant requests no relief under HAVA, and does not even argue that HAVA affords her a private right or a private remedy. Cf. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,

Indeed, Puerto Rico receives substantially less HAVA funding than the 50 States and the District of Columbia precisely because of the distinction with regards to the right to vote of its citizens. See, Puerto Ricos Plan for Implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, August 14, 2003 [Dkt. 1-7, p. 8].

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284 (2002) (a plaintiff suing under an implied right of action still must show that the statute manifests an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy) (quoting, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001)). Indeed, rather than arguing for the applicability of HAVA to her claims in the district court, Appellant expressly acknowledged that HAVA does not seem on its face to grant Plaintiff a private cause of action, and it is unclear whether there is an implied cause of action under Section 1983. Dkt. 7, at 20. At any rate, in Brunner, 555 U.S. 6 (summarily vacating a TRO, entered and upheld by the lower courts, directing the Ohio Secretary of State (Secretary), to update Ohio's Statewide Voter Registration Database to comply with 303 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002), the Supreme Court made abundantly clear that 303 of HAVAthe very same provision invoked by Appellant hereimposes a series of requirements and obligations on States or other state entities or officials, but does not confer individual rights or otherwise authorizes private causes of action. See, Id. (Respondents ... [were] not sufficiently likely to prevail on the question whether Congress ha[d]authorized the District Court to enforce 303 in an action brought by a private litigant (citing Gonzaga University, 536 U.S. at 283; Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286)).8

To be sure, Plaintiff cannot even invoke HAVA under Section 1983. See Gonzaga University, 536 U.S. at 286 ([W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress

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Furthermore, as the Attorney Generalthe principal federal officer tasked with enforcing HAVA (see 42 U.S.C. 15511)correctly observes in his amicus, while HAVA imposes obligations of its own on covered jurisdictionsincluding Puerto Rico it does not expand the coverage of the NVRA. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States, October 10, 2012, at 2-3 (emphasis added) (citing statute and Congressional record). 3. Right to Vote. Although she alleged a deprivation of the right to vote,

Plaintiff-Appellant has not pursued such argument. At any rate, the section of Puerto Ricos Electoral Code at issue does not deprive Appellant of her right to vote. She is free to exercise her right to vote if she so desires, provided that she follows Puerto Ricos registration requirementwhich she does not contest as being onerous, or otherwise imposing a burden on her right to vote that effectively deprives her of such a right. That states impose mechanisms for the orderly execution of an election does not implicate the right to vote. See, e.g., Munro, 479 U.S. 189; Storer, 415 U.S. 724; Roudebush, 405 U.S. 15 (recount for senatorial elections); see also, Igartua, 32 F.3d at 10 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (Although [the NVRA] affects the right to vote, the Act does not infringe that right but rather limits a state's ability to restrict it.)

intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under 1983 or under an implied right of action.)

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CONCLUSION Rehearing en banc should be granted, and the panels October 11, 2012 Order vacated. Respectfully submitted in San Juan, Puerto Rico this 16th of October 2012. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this same date I electronically filed the foregoing document with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the following parties or their counsel of record are registered as ECF Filers and that they will be served by the CM/ECF system: Carlos Antonio Del Valle Cruz, Rafael Enrique Garcia-Rodon, and Carlos Miguel Hernandez Lopez on behalf of Appellant Myrna Colon-Marrero; Jose Nieto Mingo on behalf of Appellee Hector Conty-Perez; Jorge Martinez Luciano, Emil J. Rodriguez Escudero on behalf of Eder Ortiz Ortiz; and Nelson Cordova on behalf of Adrian Diaz Diaz. INDIANO & WILLIAMS, P.S.C. 207 Del Parque; 3rd Floor San Juan, PR 00912 Tel: (787) 641-4545 Fax: (787) 641-4544

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By:

s/ David C. Indiano DAVID C. INDIANO U.S.C.A. BAR NO. 46075 david.indiano@indianowilliams.com

By:

s/ Seth A. Erbe SETH A. ERBE U.S.C.A. BAR NO. 94433 seth.erbe@indianowilliams.com

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